Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

From philosophy it is established that the object of a science is said to be everything that is set before or proposed to the intellect to be known through that science: it is also called the subject, not indeed of inherence, that is, that to which some accident inheres, but of attribution, because all things with which a science deals are attributed to it, and are referred to it either as parts, or as properties, or as species, if it has any.

Note 1. First, a twofold object is commonly distinguished, namely material and formal. The former is so called not because it is corporeal and composed of physical matter, but by a certain analogy which it has with matter; for just as matter is indifferent to the various forms by which it is informed, so this is indifferent to the various sciences by which it is attained and perceived; for the same human body, v. g., can be called the object of medicine as healable, of physics as natural, and of geometry as extended. The latter, however, is that formality to be found in the material object by which the object is determined to a certain science; thus naturalness determines the human body to physics, healability to medicine, quantity to geometry, etc. Each of these is again twofold, namely adequate, or total, to which all things treated in a science are referred either as parts, or as properties, or as causes, or as effects, etc.; and inadequate or partial, which is considered from only one part of that science.

Note 2. The formal object — to pass over all its other acceptations and usages — can be distinguished as threefold, namely specificative, motive, and terminative. The specificative, or that by which, is that formality to be found in the material object, v. g., healability in the human body, which determines the object to medicine, and specifies and distinguishes that science from any other. The motive, or that because of which, is the reason by which the intellect is moved to know the object, and without which it would not apply itself to the knowledge of it; thus light can be called the object moving sight to perceive color, and premises can be said objectively to move the intellect to give assent to the conclusion: and because divine revelation, objectively proposed to the intellect, moves it to the assent of faith, it can be called the formal motive object of that assent. The terminative, however, or that which, is the whole compounded of the material and formal object, which terminates all the cognitions which are had in a science about such an object: thus the healable can be called the terminative object of medicine, because it is the reason terminating all the cognitions and conclusions of medicine. — To these add the formal notion under which, which, although the intellect does not attend to it in the object while through science it is engaged about that object, nevertheless if it were absent, it would not tend to the object through that science. Thus visibility is the reason under which the eye perceives color; for although one seeing color does not see visibility, nevertheless if color were not visible, it would not be seen by the eye. So likewise abstraction from matter is the reason under which metaphysics considers being and its properties; because although while the metaphysician considers being, and in it unity, goodness, etc., he does not attend to whether they prescind from matter; nevertheless unless they so prescinded, them

the metaphysician would not consider, for the reason that the object of metaphysics must prescind from all matter.

Note 3. Something can be said to be revealed in a twofold manner. First, formally, immediately, and explicitly; thus it is revealed that God is one in essence, and three in persons, that the divine Word is incarnate, etc. Second, virtually, mediately, and implicitly, when namely in the thing immediately revealed, another is virtually, intrinsically, and necessarily contained, or follows upon it, either as a principle, or as a property, or as an effect, which is deduced from it by reasoning; in which manner in this immediately revealed proposition: Christ is a man, these are virtually and mediately revealed: Christ is capable of laughter, of discourse, etc., because the power of laughing and of discoursing are properties inseparable from man.

These things having been premised, it must be resolved what is the object of theology, both material and formal: in the discussion of which question the foremost theologians so disagree that among them all they scarcely consent with one another. But, that what has seemed truer to the Subtle Doctor may become apparent, let there be

First conclusion. — God is the adequate object of our theology.

So the Doctor, q. 3. Prologi. n. 7.; for although there he speaks only of the object of theology in itself and insofar as it is in the divine intellect, nevertheless that he thinks the same about the theology which is in us, I shall establish below.

Therefore the conclusion is proved. That is the adequate object of a science which contains all the truths, and to which are referred all things which are treated in it: but God virtually contains all truths, and to Him are referred all things which are treated in theology: therefore He is its adequate object.

The minor is proved. Whatever is handed down in theology regards God subsisting, operating, and producing, either in the order of the Divinity — and this is the First book of the Sentences; or in the order of nature, by creating, moderating, and destining things to their ends through means suited to each — and this the Second book contains; or in the order of grace, by supplying supernatural means to men for attaining the supernatural end — and about these the Third book disputes. Finally, in the order of glory, by decreeing to each one a reward or punishments according to merits and demerits. — Or, as our Aureolus says, q. 1. Prologi art. 4., since theology, he says, is about God and about divine things, some things can be called divine by essence, some by participation; some are called divine by assumption, as Christ and His humanity: some indeed by creation and governance, as the whole world comprising every creature: some indeed by precept and prohibition, as virtues and vices: some indeed by institution, as the Sacraments: some indeed by final direction, as the beatific vision and love; by which it openly stands that all things which are treated in theology are referred to God as to the adequate object.

It is confirmed. By the refutation of the other principal opinions: First indeed, the object of theology is not things and signs, as the Master of the Sentences asserts, book one, dist. 1., understanding by the name of signs the things which are symbols of others; whether meanwhile they effect what they signify, as the Sacraments; or only signify and prefigure, as the figures of the Old Testament which signified the mysteries of the new law. This opinion, I say, is deservedly rejected by all. Then because things in themselves are considered by physics or metaphysics, whose office it is to investigate the nature and properties of things; insofar, however, as they have the notion of a sign, they are considered either by grammar or by logic, whose office it is to unfold the signification of names and things: therefore things and signs are not the proper object of theology. Then because theology, according to the etymology of the name, is speech or knowledge about God; and therefore things and signs cannot be its object, except insofar as they are appropriated to God, and employed to signify divine things: and so God is more fittingly established as the object than things and signs. — Secondly, neither can meritorious work nor the salvation of man fittingly be assigned as the object of theology, as Durandus wished, q. 1. et 5. Prologi. Then because the things which are treated in theology are not referred to meritorious work, e.g., the unity of essence, the trinity of persons, etc.: indeed meritorious works are ordered to something else; for they are considered as they are from God and tend into God: Then because even if there were no meritorious work, and no salvation to be hoped for, theology could nonetheless remain safe; for an Angel or a wayfaring man, not illumined, could deduce theological conclusions from the objects revealed to him: therefore, etc. — Thirdly, finally, neither is Christ, insofar as He is God-man, legitimately established as the object of theology, as St. Bonaventure wished, q. 1. Prologi, and many others with him: Then because, as the Doctor says, if Christ were the adequate object of theology, it would follow that four propositions would not be theological; namely, the necessary propositions about the Person of the Father and of the Holy Spirit; such as: The Father generates, The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son; nor even the contingent truths which are formed about them, for example: The Father creates with the Son: The Holy Spirit was temporally sent to the Apostles, and is infused by grace into justified men. — Likewise neither would the necessary propositions about the triune and one God be true; for example, God omnipotent, and immense, etc.; nor the contingent ones, for example, God creates, orders, and rules the world, etc.; but this is absurd: therefore also that from which it follows. The consequence is clear; for no truth belongs to any science, except because it looks to its object, either as its subjective part, or as an integral or essential part, or finally as its property. But neither the Father, nor the Holy Spirit, nor the Trinity of persons is Christ, nor a subjective or essential or integral part of Christ, nor are they His properties: therefore the truths about them would not be properly theological if Christ were the adequate object of theology. The minor is clear, because Christ as God-man is not deemed to comprehend the Father and the Holy Spirit, for He is a person distinct from them. — Moreover, since Christ involves and expresses at once the divine and human nature, if He were the adequate object of theology, since this must be prior at least in nature and concept to all the particular objects which it comprehends, and which are referred to it, it would follow that according to the human nature He would be prior to the Father and the Holy Spirit: but no Catholic ought to or can assert this. — Finally, Christ as man is considered by the natural sciences; by metaphysics indeed, insofar as He is a being; by physics insofar as He is corporeal, etc.; and therefore He could not be established as the object of theology, except precisely insofar as He is man-God, and so the Deity would be the principal reason why He is established as the object of theology. Therefore not Christ, but God Himself is legitimately assigned as the adequate object of theology.

The Bishop of Lincoln replies, that Christ, to be sure, precisely considered and according to the divine and human nature alone, is not rightly assigned as the adequate object of theology: but well if He is considered according to a threefold unity: either of essence, which He has with the Father and the Holy Spirit; or of person, which He has with the divine and human nature; or of head, which He has with the members of the Church: for nothing, he says, is treated in theology which is not referred back to one or other of those unities. — But truly neither by this reason can Christ be assigned as the adequate object of theology; since, as has been said, all the propositions, both necessary and contingent, which are made about the Father and the Holy Spirit, would not by this reason be theological; since they cannot be referred back to Christ according to one or other of those unities. Then from this it would follow that Christ could be said to be prior to the Father; since the adequate object is prior with the priority of concept to the particular objects contained under it. And so it follows that God Himself is assigned as the adequate object of theology.

You will say 1. Many things are handed down in theology which ought not and cannot be reduced to God, e.g., vices and sins: therefore God is not the adequate object of theology. — I distinguish the antecedent. That they ought not to be reduced directly, I concede; for they are not means ordered to attaining God, indeed they remove from His possession; that they ought not to be reduced at least indirectly, I deny; for vices, although they do not have God as author, because they do not have an efficient cause, but a deficient one, in that they are not effects, but rather defects of human liberty deviating from the right path; nevertheless they regard God as the permitting, ordering, and punishing cause. For God, on account of His infinite liberty, and lest He coerce our will, permits sins to be committed out of wisdom, orders them to some good out of providence, and punishes them out of justice; for as St. Augustine says, tractate 112. on Ioannem, The good God uses evils well, and makes good things from evils, and makes the good to be made from the evil, and the good to be discerned from the evil.

You will say 2. Any science supposes, but does not prove, the existence of its object: but theology proves the existence of God, as will be clear below: therefore God is not its object. — I distinguish the major. That a science does not prove the existence of its object a priori and through a proper and intrinsic means, I concede: that it does not prove it a posteriori through an extrinsic means, or through its effects, I deny the major. — Similarly I distinguish the minor. That it proves the existence of God a priori and from its own principles, namely the articles of faith, I deny: that it proves it a posteriori through effects, and from the principles of the other natural sciences, in order to beat back the madness of the Atheists, I concede: for the existence of God, as it is a supernatural being, in the manner in which it is considered by theology, is not proved by any reasoning, but is believed by faith.

Second conclusion. — The formal object by which, that is, the specificative and terminative object of theology, is God, under the notion of the Deity.

The Doctor proves it. Quaest. 3. Prologi num. 7.: God is the specificative object of theology under that notion under which He virtually contains all the truths which are treated in it: but He contains them under the notion of the Deity: for all the truths which are handed down and considered in theology are either of necessary or of contingent things; and all these God virtually contains through the formal notion of the Deity.

— The necessary ones indeed; for the reason why God is one, triune, infinite, eternal, etc., is the Deity itself; and through the Deity itself, evidently known, any of the blessed can demonstrate all things which belong to God; for the Deity itself is the fount and root of all things which are in God; and therefore it is likewise the reason by which it can be proved that they belong to God. — The contingent ones also; for that God is creator, sanctifier, glorifier, or something of those things which are contingently attributed either to the Father, or to the Son, or to the Holy Spirit, singly, or to the whole Trinity together, these belong to Him by no other reason than the Deity itself, which, since it is the first and fundamental reason of all things which are in God, also virtually contains the truth and knowability of all those things which are affirmed of God.

Second. The noblest habit ought to have the noblest object, and under the noblest notion: but among the habits of the intellect, theology is the noblest; among knowable objects God is the noblest; and the Deity itself is the most excellent among all the divine notions, since it is the root and foundation of the others: therefore God under the notion of the Deity is the formal object of theology.

Third. That is the specificative formal object by which theology is distinguished from the other sciences regarding God: but by the sole notion of the Deity theology is distinguished from metaphysics, which likewise considers God, not under the notion of the Deity, but under the notion of first cause, of infinite being, of ultimate end, etc., as is clear from 1. et 12. Metaphysicorum: therefore it is necessary that theology contemplate God under the notion of the Deity.

Fourth. God is the object of theology under that notion under which He is set before faith and the beatific vision; for theology depends on faith and is ordered to the beatific vision, and those cognitions succeed one another: but all confess that God is the object of the beatific vision under the notion of the Deity; since the blessed see God as He is; He is likewise the object of faith under the same notion; and that either immediately, e.g., in those articles of faith which are immediately about the one or triune God; or mediately, namely in those articles which concern the incarnation, nativity, passion, etc., of the Word; for those articles are not about a pure man but about the man-God. Therefore God under the notion of the Deity is the object of theology.

Fifth. Finally, that is the specificative formal object of theology which, being posited, theology is posited, and which, being removed, it perishes, even with all the others remaining: but even if God had not been either Redeemer, or Creator, or Glorifier, nor had any of those appellations which He obtains in the order of nature, or of grace, or of glory, theology would nonetheless have remained safe: since, these being set aside, the theologian could have elicited various conclusions about God, and proved that God is eternal, because He is immutable; infinite, because He is being by essence; intelligent, because He is a spiritual substance: therefore, etc.

You will say 1. God cannot be known by us wayfarers under the notion of the Deity: therefore neither can He be the specificative object of our theology under the same. The antecedent is proved: God cannot be known under the notion of the Deity, unless His essential predicates are known: but these cannot be known by us, as is certain: therefore, etc. — I distinguish the antecedent. That God cannot be known by us under the notion of the Deity distinctly, intuitively, and in itself, I concede: that He cannot be known confusedly, abstractively, and through alien species, which lead us into the cognition of that divinity, I deny; for, as St. Paul says ad Rom. 1., His invisible things, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made; his eternal power also, and divinity. Therefore His Deity and attributes can be known through the species of creatures, at least abstractively, by us wayfarers. But this abstractive cognition suffices for the notion of a scientific object; otherwise we could have no scientific cognition of substance, not only spiritual, but even corporeal; since (as the Doctor says, q. 1. Prologi n. 11.) we know no substance in this state distinctly and through its own species, but only confusedly and through the habitude and order to some effect proper to it.

You will say 2. A science ought to equal and comprehend its object, and to know it only as much as it is knowable: but our theology, since it is finite, cannot equal God, infinite under the notion of the Deity: therefore under this notion He is not its object.

I distinguish the major. That science must equal its object with an arithmetical equality, by which a two-foot line, for example, is equal to another two-foot line, I deny: with an equality of proportion, that is, that it knows the object just insofar as it is knowable in this way and by this science, I concede; and in this way our theology equals God under the notion of Deity: because it attains and knows him insofar as he is knowable from revealed principles. But that this equality of proportion suffices for science, and that arithmetical equality is not required, is evident; otherwise metaphysics would scientifically know nothing about God as the supreme being and first cause; indeed, neither would the science of the Blessed be perfect: for neither of them can equal God arithmetically, since each science is created and finite, whereas God is infinite and uncreated.

You will say 3. The adequately specifying object of some science must be predicated of all the special objects which are considered by that science: but Deity is not predicated of the Angels, of Man, of the Laws, of the Sacraments, of the Vices, of the Virtues, which are considered in theology: therefore this is not the specifying object of theology.

I distinguish the major. That it must be predicated either in the direct or in the oblique case, I concede: always in the direct case, I deny. To the minor, I say that Deity is indeed not predicated of all the aforementioned in the direct case; for it is true that those things are not God; but it is predicated in the oblique case; for they are either effects of God, or means conducing to God as to a supernatural end.

You will say 4. The specifying and formal object must be the cause and formal notion of all the properties which are demonstrated of the object: but Deity is not the cause nor the formal notion of innascibility, which, for example, is in the Father; otherwise the Son and the Holy Spirit, since they have the Deity, would be formally innascible; which is false. Therefore, etc.

I distinguish the major. Either per se and immediately, or through another in which it is found and by which it is determined, I concede: always per se, I deny. For naturalness, for example, which is the specifying formal object of Physics, is the notion and formal cause of all the properties which are demonstrated of the human body; not indeed per se, but insofar as it is determined to such a body through humanity.

Similarly I distinguish the minor. That Deity is not the notion why innascibility belongs to the Father per se and precisely insofar as it is divinity, I concede; mediately and by reason of another, that is, insofar as it is determined through the relation of paternity to the first divine supposit, I deny.

You will say 5. That is not the formal object of theology to which alone the formal notion does not belong, under which theology considers its object. But this notion does not belong to the Deity alone. Proof: The notion under which theology considers its object is the truthfulness of God in revealing, as will be proved in the following conclusion: but this belongs not to the Deity alone, but also to anything supernatural; for every supernatural being is revealable just as much as the Deity itself: therefore Deity is not the formal object.

I distinguish the major. That the notion under which does not belong to it alone proximately, let it pass; ultimately and remotely, I deny. And with the minor likewise distinguished, I deny the consequence. For although this notion can proximately belong to every supernatural being immediately and proximately; nevertheless it is certain that it must principally and ultimately be traced back to the Deity itself: whence the Deity is not only a revealable object, but is also the source of all revealable things; and it is revealable per se, whereas the rest are revealable through it, and by reason of it.

You will say 6. This conclusion openly contradicts the Subtle Doctor: for he teaches in q. 3. of the Prologue n. 7. that God under the notion of Deity is indeed the object of theology in itself, or insofar as he is in the divine intellect: but in n. 12. he affirms that the object of our theology is infinite being, for he says:

For our theology, insofar as it is ours, there need not be given a first object, except the first known; from which, once known, the first truths are immediately known. But that first known is infinite being, because this is the most perfect concept which we can have of him, etc. therefore he judges that infinite being is the specifying formal object of our theology: not indeed the Deity itself.

I distinguish the consequence. That he judges infinite being to be the object first specifying and as regards the mode of knowledge, so that God is known by us earlier and more easily under the notion of infinite being than under the notion of the Deity itself, I concede: as regards the truth of the matter and the substantial notion of the specifying object, which from itself must virtually contain all the truths which are treated in the science, and to which all things which are in it must be reduced, I deny.

The Doctor therefore does not will that the notion of infinite being be absolutely the formal object of theology, whether considered according to itself and in the divine intellect, or in our intellect; for he had previously disapproved and attacked this in n. 9., saying:

That God under the notion of infinite or necessary being is not legitimately established as the object of theology, because as such he cannot cause all theological truths, and be the means for demonstrating that they belong to God; for infinity and necessity of being is not the notion why God is One and Triune, why the Son is generated, why the Holy Spirit is breathed forth; otherwise, since we naturally know God to be infinite and necessary being, we would also naturally know God to be Triune, the Son to be generated, and the Holy Spirit to proceed by spiration; for once the cause is known, that can be known to which it leads in knowledge. But it is false that we can naturally know the mystery of the Trinity, as all admit.

But the Doctor through the aforementioned words in the objection intends only this, either that the notion of infinite being is the principal and better-known concept which we can have of God in this state; for since God is variously conceived by us, now under the notion of first cause, now under the notion of necessary being, now under the notion of the omnipotent, now under the notion of infinite being, the Doctor judges that the notion of infinite being is the principal and nobler among all these notions under which God can be conceived by us wayfarers.

Or in a word, the Doctor judges that God under the notion of infinite being is the object of our theology comparatively with respect to the mode of our knowledge; because he is known by us more easily and more evidently under this notion than under the notion of Deity; not however absolutely and according to the essential notion of the adequate formal object, namely insofar as it is the first notion and as it were the root of all the truths which are treated in theology: for these belong to the Deity alone, as has been proved.

But that this is the mind of the Doctor openly appears, for he adds:

Nevertheless, because our theology is about necessary things, it is about the same things about which theology in itself is, therefore a first subject is assigned to it as regards this, that it contains truths in itself: and this same is the subject of our theology which is the first subject of theology in itself: but because that is not evident to us, therefore it does not contain these truths as known to us. And proposing to himself this objection: Therefore God under the notion of Deity is not the first object of our theology, he says: I answer, it is true, it is not the first subject giving evidence, but the first subject containing all the truths, and born to give evidence, if it itself were known. Therefore he speaks comparatively and with regard to our mode of conceiving; not however absolutely and with regard to the substantial and fundamental notion of the adequate formal object; and consequently neither does he contradict us, nor we him; for we speak of the adequate formal object considered according to itself; he indeed of the object as it is more evidently attained by us. As also Smising consents, q. 2. n. 58.

Third conclusion. — The formal object by which, or the motive of our theology, is the truth, or the truthfulness of God in revealing, insofar as it is applied and becomes known through theological discourse.

Proof. Our theology does not rest on the evidence of its object, but on the testimony and revelation of God; for it deduces its conclusions from the principles and articles of faith: but the authority and certainty of testimony is resolved into the truthfulness of the witness, as into the motive of the assent which one gives to testimony: therefore the truthfulness of God is the motive of the assent which we give to a theological conclusion; not indeed truthfulness alone, otherwise theological assent would not differ from the assent of faith, which is given only on account of the truthfulness of God revealing: but truthfulness applied through theological discourse.

Secondly. Our theology must be borne toward God by some special motive and singular notion which does not belong to others: therefore, since the theology of the Blessed is borne toward God clearly and evidently, and deduces its conclusions from evident principles; while faith is borne toward God to be known obscurely and on account of the sole authority of the one revealing: it is necessary that our theology, as it were middle between the two, be borne toward God on account of his truthfulness in revealing applied through discourse, so that through the obscurity of revelation it may differ from the theology of the Blessed; and through discourse be distinguished from the knowledge of faith.

Thirdly. Through our theology we know God more certainly and more truly than through any natural science, for instance Physics and Metaphysics: but this greater certainty and firmer truth does not come from elsewhere than this, that the natural sciences rest on the light of reason alone, while theology rests on the testimony of God, which is far firmer and truer than any natural light of reason: therefore the testimony of God revealing is the motive object of our theology.

You will say 1. The formal motive notion of the object must be intrinsic to it: but the truthfulness of God revealing is extrinsic to the object of theology: therefore it is not its motive notion.

I distinguish the major. In the natural sciences, which deduce their conclusions from evident principles and are borne toward the object on account of its evidence, I concede: in theology, which deduces its conclusions from the articles of faith, whose truth and certainty depends on the truthfulness of God testifying and revealing, I deny.

You will say 2. That truthfulness is resolved into the Deity, for that testimony is true and infallible for this reason, because it is divine: therefore the Deity itself is also the formal motive notion of theology.

I distinguish the antecedent. That it is resolved into the Deity as into the ultimate and remote motive, I concede: as into the immediate and proximate, I deny: for the first motive why I assent to some revealed proposition is the truth of God in revealing; the mediate one, however, is his infinite goodness and wisdom, by which it comes about that he can neither be deceived nor deceive: the ultimate one, however, is the Deity itself. For a theological conclusion is on that account judged true, because it is deduced from principles revealed by God: on that account these revealed principles are certain, because God is truthful and cannot lie: on that account he cannot lie, because since he is infinitely wise he cannot be deceived, and since he is infinitely good he cannot deceive: on that account, however, he is infinitely good and wise, because he is God: and so the truth and certainty of a theological conclusion is ultimately resolved into the notion of Deity.