Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

Although our theology, on account of its lack of evidence, is not distinguished with the titles of a perfect science, and hence the present Question may seem to be raised superfluously and in vain; for if it is not a science, it follows that neither is it a subalternated science; nevertheless, because from its discussion and resolution the preceding conclusion is more firmly established, and the opinion of the Thomists, who contend that our theology is a science precisely for this reason, because its principles are evident in the theology of God and of the Blessed, to which it is subalternated, is more strongly weakened; in order that we may close off this last refuge, it is worthwhile to demonstrate that our theology is in no way subalternated to the science of God and of the Blessed, which, in order that it may be done more evidently

Note 1. Among the sciences, some are called subalternated and others subalternating. The former are those which are placed under another science, on which they depend in the certainty and evidence of their object and of their principles; the latter, however, are those which evidently demonstrate such objects and prove the principles of the inferior sciences. Thus Medicine is said to be subalternated to Physics, because in Physics the principles of Medicine are proved, and the nature and properties of the human body, which is its object, are demonstrated and made known.

Note 2. For the subalternation of the sciences three principal conditions are required. The first is that the material subject of the subalternated science be contained under the general object of the subalternating science, just as the human body, which is the object of Medicine, is contained under the natural body, which is the general object of Physics, to which Medicine is subalternated. The second is that the subalternated science consider that object under some accidental difference, under which it is not considered by the subalternating science, by reason of which difference the object has a new knowability, and is as it were the root of new properties, which are demonstrated in the subalternated science. Thus Medicine considers the natural body as curable, which curability is not considered by Physics, and is the reason and root of all the properties which Medicine detects and investigates in the human body. The third is that the subalternated science depend in the certainty and evidence of its principles on the subalternating science; so that the conclusions of the latter are the principles of the former; for where the subalternating science ends, there the subalternated begins, as the Doctor observes in Q. 3 of the Prologue, no. 30; whence the common saying: There the physician begins, where the physicist ends.

Note 3. A subalternated science has some properties different from the properties of the subalternating science. The first is that the subalternating science proceeds from principles known per se in itself: the subalternated, however, from principles known in the subalternating science. The second is that the subalternating science is superior and independent, both as regards its object and as regards its principles to be made known: the subalternated, however, is inferior and dependent on the subalternating science in both respects. The third is that both ought to be and can be in the same subject and intellect, because one must illustrate the other by proving and making known its principles, which could not be done if the subalternating and the subalternated sciences were in different subjects; for just as the subalternated would not be a science if its conclusions were not resolvable into evidently known principles, so it would not be a science in this intellect, unless this intellect could resolve the conclusions of that subalternated science into evidently known principles; but it could not form this resolution if it did not have the subalternating science, by which it contains and demonstrates the subalternated principles, and therefore both must be in the same intellect.

First conclusion. — The theology of the wayfarers is in no way subalternated to the discursive and theological science of the Blessed.

This is the teaching of the Subtle Doctor, q. 3 of the Prologue, n. 30, and in book 3, the single question, dist. 24, against St. Thomas and his followers.

The Doctor proves it. First: a subalternated science is compatible with the subalternating science in the same subject: but our theology cannot subsist with the theology of the Blessed; therefore it is not subalternated to it. The major is clear from note 3. The minor is proved: our theology rests on faith, for its principles are the articles of faith, from which it elicits its conclusions: but faith cannot subsist with the science of the Blessed: therefore neither can our theology; which we will prove more fully in the following conclusion.

Second: a subalternated science depends on the subalternating science as on a cause; for the conclusions of the subalternating science are the principles of the conclusions of the subalternated science; for the latter are proved through the former, and consequently they are also the principles and causes of the subalternated science; because what is the cause of a cause is also the cause of the thing caused: but our theology does not depend on the science of the Blessed as on a cause. Proof. If the theology of the Blessed were the cause of our theology, this would be most of all either by reason of the object, or by reason of the power and subject, or by reason of the light: but none of these can be affirmed; for our theology does not depend on the science of the Blessed as on an object, or on a power, because God is the object, and our intellect is the subject of our theology independently of the theology of the Blessed. Nor does it depend on it as on a light, because our theology depends on the light of faith. Moreover, the conclusions of our theology are formed and known independently of the light of the beatific vision; and consequently they do not depend on it as on a cause. Therefore our theology is not subalternated to the theology of the Blessed.

Third: a subalternated science does not primarily and of itself concern the same truths which the subalternating science considers; because where the latter ends, there the former begins, in that the conclusions of the subalternated science must be proved through the conclusions of the subalternating science as through principles: but our theology concerns the same truths with which the theology of the Blessed is occupied: for the believed mysteries, from which we deduce our conclusions, are the same from which the Blessed elicit their conclusions; with this sole difference, that the same mysteries which are made known to us obscurely through faith are made known to them clearly and intuitively through the light of glory. Hence they can say: As we have heard (through faith, which is from hearing), so we see in the city of the Lord etc. Psal. 47.

Fourth: he who has a subalternated science can, indeed ought to, have also the subalternating science; otherwise he is not perfectly knowing, since he cannot resolve the conclusions of the subalternated science into evidently known principles, which are made known through the subalternating science; for the subalternating science is the habit by which the principles of the subalternated science are known: but it is impossible to acquire the habit of the conclusions unless the habit of the principles is first had; whence the physician ought to be skilled in Physics, at least as regards those things which have the character of a principle with respect to Medicine. But neither can we have the theology of the Blessed, nor can they have ours: therefore our theology is not subalternated to their science.

Fifth: a subalternated science considers its object under some real accidental notion, under which it is not considered by the subalternating science; for Medicine considers the natural body as curable, in a way in which it is not regarded by Physics, and by this difference Medicine is specifically distinguished from Physics: but our theology has altogether the same object as the theology of the Blessed, namely God under the notion of Deity: therefore it is not subalternated to it. — Nor does it matter that God is clearly seen by the Blessed, but is known obscurely and through revelation by us. For these do not effect a real diversity in the object: both because this diversity is to be traced back not to the object, but to the diversity of light, namely of glory and of faith: and because being clearly seen is only an extrinsic denomination, which therefore does not introduce any real diversity in the object, under which it could be considered by one science and not by another: and because the object under the formal notion of object precedes the science, as the cause precedes the effect; for every knowledge is born from the object and the power: but God as clearly seen does not precede the beatific science, which is vision; rather he follows it, because he is said to be seen from the vision. Therefore this notion of being clearly seen is not an objective notion specifying and essentially distinguishing the science of the Blessed from ours.

Gonet replies that although in the natural sciences the subalternated science must consider the object under some accidental notion, which is the notion of a new knowability and the root of the properties which the subalternating science does not consider; nevertheless this condition is not required in theology. For since the object of theology is infinite and unlimited, of itself, and without the addition of any accidental difference, it has several modes of knowability, by reason of which it can terminate different sciences, and be known through one wholly supernatural science, such as is the science of the Blessed; and through another natural one, which through natural light and discourse deduces its conclusions from the principles of that science of the Blessed, such as is our theology. — Against this: 1. He speaks contradictorily, saying that our theology demands lack of evidence from its own nature, yet has it only as joined per accidens and by reason of state; for what is demanded from the nature of the thing belongs to it, not per accidens and by reason of something extrinsic, but by reason of its intrinsic principles. For although, e.g., heat in fire is an accident; yet because fire demands heat from its own nature, no one would say that it belongs to it only by reason of state and from what is extrinsic; and therefore either our theology does not demand lack of evidence from its own nature, or it does not have it only from what is extrinsic and by reason of the faith on which it leans, and of the state of a wayfarer in which it is; but it has it from its intrinsic notion and from the principles from which it deduces its conclusions. Whence just as evidence is intrinsic to the science of the Blessed, because they elicit their conclusions from principles evidently known through the light of glory; so lack of evidence is intrinsic to our theology, because it deduces its conclusions from principles known without evidence through faith. — Secondly, that obscure revealability does not hold on the part of the knowable object, which of itself has nothing obscure, nothing that is not evident and evidently knowable: but it is traced back only to the part of the light and medium, by which the same object is apprehended clearly by the Blessed through the light of glory and obscurely by the wayfarers through faith: but the diversity of light does not suffice for the notion of subalternation, as we have shown in the second proof. — Thirdly, this response rests on a false foundation, namely that our theology and that of the Blessed differ only with respect to state, so that the theology of the wayfarers remains the same in the state of beatitude, which, in order that it may be resolved, is

Second conclusion. — The theology which we acquire here through discourse will not remain in the state of beatitude.

Proof first. From the Apostle, the first Epistle to the Corinthians, chap. 13, where when he had said: Charity never falls away, he adds: Whether prophecies shall be made void, or tongues shall cease, or knowledge shall be destroyed. From these words I argue thus: the knowledge which the Apostle indicates is to be destroyed in the homeland is the theology acquired here: therefore this will not remain in the homeland. The antecedent is proved: he says that that knowledge is to be destroyed about which, speaking earlier, he had said: If I should have prophecy and know all mysteries and all knowledge: but this is theological knowledge, by which namely one knows the mysteries through conclusions deduced from the articles of faith, as is evident. Therefore he judges that theological knowledge does not remain in the homeland.

You will answer. Perhaps, with certain Thomists, you will say that knowledge is said by the Apostle to be destroyed in the same way in which the elements are said by Christ to be dissolved after the day of judgment: so that, just as the elements will not be dissolved as regards their substance, but only as regards their mode and state, because namely they will pass from a more imperfect state to a more perfect state; so likewise our knowledge is not destroyed as regards the substance of the habit, but only as regards the mode of obscurity or lack of evidence which it has here. — On the contrary: this explanation is altogether contrary to the words of the Apostle, and far removed from his mind; both because the Apostle says simply and absolutely that knowledge is to be destroyed: but destruction is not merely a purification of the thing or a passage from a less perfect state to a more perfect state, as Christ speaks of the elements saying: Heaven and earth will pass away: but the verb "to destroy" signifies the cessation and ending of a thing, or the passage from non-being to being. And because he says that knowledge is to be destroyed in the same way in which prophecy is to be made void: but it is certain that prophecy does not in any way remain in the homeland, but fails entirely: therefore the same judgment is to be rendered concerning theological knowledge. And finally, because the Apostle gives the reason for this cessation and destruction: For we know in part, he says, and we prophesy in part: but when that which is perfect has come, that which is in part shall be made void. That is, whatever we now know, we know only partly through prophecy and partly through theological knowledge; and since both kinds of knowledge, being imperfect, as being obscure and lacking evidence, will be made void when the perfect and evident beatific knowledge has come: therefore the Apostle openly judges that all the knowledge which we have here of God through theological discourse does not subsist in the homeland, but ceases.

Proof second. Faith will not remain in the state of beatitude: therefore neither will our theology. The antecedent is admitted by all theologians, and is gathered from these words of the Apostle: We see now through a mirror, and in an enigma; but then face to face. The consequence is proved: our theology rests on faith; for from its articles it deduces all its conclusions: therefore, faith perishing, it is necessary that our theology also perish; for the loss of the foundation brings the ruin of the building.

It is confirmed. Faith does not remain in the homeland for this reason, because since it is obscure and lacking evidence, it is incompatible with the beatific science and clear vision of God: but our theology is likewise obscure and lacking evidence, not only by reason of state and per accidens (as the Thomists will have it), but from its intrinsic principles and from its formal notion, which I thus establish: such is the conclusion essentially and intrinsically as are the principles from which it is deduced: but the principles of our theology are intrinsically lacking in evidence: for they are the articles of faith, which, as they are articles of faith, have annexed to them lack of evidence and obscurity, since they are made known through faith and revelation alone: therefore the theological conclusion is intrinsically lacking in evidence; and consequently it cannot subsist with the beatific vision.

You will say 1. No habit is destroyed, except either per se, and for the introduction of a contrary, as the habit of temperance is dissolved by the vice of intemperance; or per accidens, and upon the cessation of the subject in which it is, or of the object about which it is, or of the act by which it is formed and nourished: but our theology can perish in the homeland in neither of these ways: therefore it does not cease, but perseveres. The major is known to the Philosophers: the minor is evident as regards both parts: for first, the beatific vision is not opposed per se to our theology, but only per accidens and by reason of the different light, of faith and of glory: second, the object is the same, and the same intellective and discursive faculty, both in the way and in the homeland: therefore, etc. — I deny the minor. As regards the first part, since the beatific vision is opposed per se to theology, as the clear is opposed to the obscure and the evident to what lacks evidence, as has often already been said, and therefore it is necessary that upon the coming of the beatific vision all our theology perish, just as at the rising of the sun the darkness is dissolved and vanishes.

You will say 2. St. Jerome judges that theological knowledge perseveres in heaven, since in the Epistola ad Paulinum, when exhorting him to the study of Sacred Scripture, he says: Let us learn on earth those things the knowledge of which will persevere with us in the heavens. And St. Chrysostom, in c. 13 of the first Epistle to the Corinthians, weighing the aforesaid words of St. Paul, says: Knowledge will not be abolished, but will cease to be imperfect: therefore they judge that theology does not fail, but perseveres in heaven. — I deny the consequence. And to St. Jerome I say that he speaks of the things known, not of knowledge itself, so that he wishes Paulinus to apply himself to the study of the mysteries, the evident and clear knowledge of which he ought to have in the heavens. To St. Chrysostom I say that he wishes our knowledge indeed not to be abolished, not because the preceding one remains, but because upon the cessation of the imperfect and obscure knowledge, a clear and evident one succeeds.