Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

Note 1. From Aristotle, 6. Ethic. cap. 4., five intellectual virtues are commonly distinguished. The first is Intelligence, by which it perceives the first principles of things immediately and per se, and known not through another. The second, Wisdom, which is the knowledge of divine things through their highest causes. The third, Prudence, which is occupied with those goods to be pursued and evils to be avoided by man. The fourth, Science, which is certain and evident cognition generated through demonstration. The fifth, finally, is Art, which is a habit directing an external faculty to skilfully produce some sensible work. It is certain, however, that theology is not art; for it regards no external work to be fabricated directly or indirectly. It is equally certain that it is not perfect science, since, as was proved above, it lacks evidence. It is likewise established that it is not adorned with the name of intelligence, since that power of perceiving the first principles of cognition is not innate to individual men; rather it contemplates divine things revealed and disclosed by the benefit of faith. It could indeed partly glory in the name of prudence, for no small part of it is held and occupied in pointing out vices to be fled, virtues to be pursued, and the means leading to the ultimate end: nevertheless, since its dignity and nature are discerned from its object, namely God to be known, hence it comes about that it is not judged to be called by the proper name of prudence. It remains, therefore, to be shown whether it can be called true and perfect Wisdom,

Note 2. Wisdom can be distinguished as threefold: one indeed profane, and vicious; another indifferent, and neutral; another truly sacred, and praiseworthy. The first is the astuteness and cunning of worldly men in establishing their own affairs and fortunes. Thus to the Romans 8.: The prudence of the flesh is death; but the prudence of the spirit is life and peace: since the wisdom of the flesh is an enemy to God, for it is not subject to the law of God; whence James 3.: This wisdom is not descending from above; but is earthly, animal, devilish. The second is that philosophical knowledge which is concerned with being as such; and it contemplates its nobler species; which St. Paul calls human, 1. Corinth. 2. My speech, he says, and my preaching was not in the persuasive words of human wisdom, but in the showing of the spirit and power. The third is either acquired or infused; the former is called Theological, which elicits conclusions from revealed principles; the latter, truly, is the Gift of the Holy Spirit, which is a light descending from the Father of lights, says St. Bonaventure, book On the seven Gifts of the Holy Spirit, and which, irradiating the soul, makes it Godlike: for it illuminates the intellective power, inflames the affective, strengthens the operative. It makes the intellective comely, the affective pleasant, the operative robust: for it is at once splendor and savor; splendor directing the intellect to the cognition of truth, savor raising the affection to the savory love of the good. Whence in the same place it is defined as a supernatural habit of the soul infused by the Holy Spirit for knowing God and loving him savorously, about which Wisdom there is no discourse here, just as neither about profane and natural wisdom, but only about theological.

Note 3. Acquired wisdom, from Aristotle, lib. 1. Metaph. cap. 1., and from the Doctor in the same place, is rightly defined thus. Wisdom is the highest habit of the mind, occupied with the most universal, most difficult, most certain causes of all things, and evidently setting forth principles, to be sought especially for its own sake, and commanding the other scientific habits as servants. From this definition it is gathered that six conditions are required for perfect wisdom. First indeed, that it be concerned with all knowable things, at least in kind; for it is the prince and moderatrix of all the sciences, and therefore it ought to open and prescribe their principles and greatest truths, at least in common. Second, with the most difficult things, and remote from the senses; for to know things open to the senses is common to all, says Aristotle; but it belongs to the wise man alone to search out things hidden and abstruse. Third, with the most certain things, either in themselves, as all necessary beings are, or in another, as contingent things are, which are certain in the divine essence and science. Fourth, evidently setting forth the general causes of all things which are known; for from it the other sciences receive the confirmation and evidence of their principles. Fifth, it ought to be sought for its own sake; for those things which are among the most knowable, such as the sciences which are concerned with first principles, are sought for their own sake. Sixth, finally, the other Sciences ought to be subjected to it as servants, and to serve it. Whether, however, the theology of God, of the Blessed, and of the wayfarers has all these or at least the principal characters, so that it may be resolved, let it be

Single conclusion. — The theology of God and of the Blessed has the principal characters of perfect Wisdom; but the theology of the wayfarers fails in evidence.

This Conclusion embraces two parts, of which the Doctor proves the first in quaest. 3. of the Prologue, n. 28., where, when he had said that theology cannot be called a perfect science, insofar as it is concerned with contingent things, he adds:

Yet it can more properly be said that theology in itself is wisdom, because of the necessary things contained in it it has evidence, and necessity, and certainty, and the highest and most perfect object. As to contingent things, however, it has manifest evidence about the contingents in the theological object, as seen in themselves; and it does not have evidence begged from other prior sciences: whence the knowledge of contingents, as it is had in it, is more assimilated to the understanding of principles than to the science of conclusions.

By these words the Doctor proves two things: First indeed, that theology in itself, and insofar as it is in the divine and beatific intellect, has all the principal characters of perfect Wisdom, inasmuch as it is concerned with necessary objects. Second, moreover, that it can also be called intelligence, insofar as it is concerned with contingent things. It is clear, therefore, that theology thus considered can be called wisdom; namely inasmuch as wisdom is that cognition by which it is evidently occupied with the most certain, highest, and most excellent object.

That moreover the theology of the wayfarers (if you set aside evidence) can also be called wisdom is proved; first indeed by the authority of Sacred Scripture; for St. Paul, speaking of theology in 1. to the Corinth. 2., says: We speak wisdom among the perfect: yet not the wisdom of this world, nor of the princes of this world, that come to nought: but we speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, which is hidden, etc. This same thing Christ the Lord had promised to the Apostles, Luc. 21.: I will give you a mouth and wisdom, which all your adversaries shall not be able to resist and gainsay. All the holy Fathers likewise go in this opinion, who call theology by the illustrious name of Wisdom.

The same thing is clear by reason. For our theology has all the conditions to be desired for perfect Wisdom, if you exclude only evidence. First, indeed, it is the highest habit and occupied with the most universal and most excellent things; for it contemplates God, the most excellent of all beings and the artificer and creator of the rest; thence it opens and explains the principles of things, their origin, state, and their direction to their ends through suitable means. 2. It is concerned with the most certain and most invariable things, at least by reason of the means through which they become known; for it searches out and investigates divine things by the medium of the light of faith, than which nothing can be more excellent. 3. It scrutinizes the most difficult things; what is more difficult to understand and to know than the mysteries of faith from which our theology deduces its conclusions? For natural reason, however perspicacious it may have been, could not so much as remotely suspect and detect these mysteries. 4. It sets forth the causes and principles of all things; since it itself discourses about God as the supreme efficient cause, and end of all things; and so about the emanation, conservation, government, and direction of all things from him to their fitting ends: and so it is the science of all things; not indeed in the universal, according to predication and cognition, as if it handed down the principles by which individual things would be known: but because it opens the font and principle of all things, and that relying on the divine and supernatural light of faith; which is certainly much nobler and more excellent than if it handed down general and common concepts of all things, and their complex principles, through natural light, as Metaphysics does. Although, however, it is ordered to practice, nevertheless it is especially sought for its own sake, if it is considered comparatively to the other sciences; since it is not ordered to them, so as to serve them: indeed the others are referred to it, as handmaids, so as to be subject to it and serve it. For this is that divine Wisdom which sent her handmaids, namely all the natural sciences, to call to the citadel of divine cognition and the defense of faith; as St. Bonaventure most eloquently indicates in the little work on the reduction of the arts and sciences to Theology: therefore, since all the conditions to be desired for wisdom, with evidence removed, belong to it, it not undeservedly rejoices in the title of wisdom.

You will say 1. Wisdom ought to hand down, prove, and make known the common principles of things and of the sciences: but our theology does not do this: therefore it is not wisdom. — I distinguish the major. Philosophical and common wisdom, which rests on the light of reason and is concerned with first principles evidently and naturally known, I concede; supernatural wisdom, or that which proceeds by a supernatural light, such as theology is, I deny. For Metaphysics, v. g., hands down and proves the principles of the other sciences for this reason, because it is of the same natural order with them, and is concerned with being in common, and with the general principles of things, insofar as they are naturally known: but theology, since it rests on the light of a higher order, reaches even higher, nor does it lower itself to the natural sciences, except to judge of their doctrine, and to disapprove whatever it finds alien to truth in them, and to eliminate it from the Academies of Christians as a perverse dogma. — Add. But if theology does not hand down the principles of cognition, it at least hands down the principles of the entity of things; since it treats of God, the first cause of all things, the supreme moderator, and the ultimate end: and this as much in the natural order as in the supernatural. It is also, in some measure and on occasion, the science of all things in particular, and more penetrating than any natural science; since, on the occasion of the Mystery of the Incarnation, it treats of essence, subsistence, and personality; and teaches that subsistence and personality are really distinct from the entity of the individual; and also that two natures can subsist in the same subsistence, which indeed was previously unknown to the Metaphysician. Similarly, in treating of the works of the six days, it opens the origin, place, state, and direction of beings: moreover, it indicates the nature, endowments, and properties of the most excellent species of being, namely of Angels and of men. It likewise treats of corporeal accidents subsisting without a subject in the Sacrament of the Eucharist, of the habits of virtue and grace, etc., and therefore it can in some measure be called a universal science.

You will say 2. Wisdom ought to be concerned with difficult things and remote from the senses: but theology treats of those things which can easily be known and are exposed to the senses, for example the humanity of Christ, man, the Sacraments, etc.: therefore it should not be called wisdom. — I distinguish the minor. That those things can easily be known and be perceived by the senses, as they are considered by the Philosopher externally and according to their natural constitution, let it pass: that they are considered by the theologian, and insofar as the humanity of Christ is personally united to the divine Word: likewise inasmuch as men are destined to a supernatural end through supernatural means; similarly inasmuch as the Sacraments are taken up by God as certain and efficacious signs for producing grace, etc., these things, I say, are easy to know, I deny. For these and whatever other things are handed down in theology become known and are opened only through the light of faith and a discourse resting on the supernatural light, to which man can in no way rise by the forces of nature; for as saint Paul says, 1. to the Corinth. 2., But the sensual man perceiveth not these things that are of the Spirit of God; for it is foolishness to him, and he cannot understand, because it is spiritually examined; but the spiritual man judgeth all things, and he himself is judged of no man.