Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

From the preceding Question it is established that knowledge is twofold, namely perfect and imperfect; it is likewise established that four characteristics and conditions are required for perfect knowledge, namely that it be certain without fear and any doubt, evident without obscurity, about a necessary object without any change, and through reasoning with a true and legitimate inference of one thing from another. Whether, however, Theology, insofar as it is in us wayfarers, possesses the four aforesaid characteristics, is to be resolved in this Question. But first

Note 1. A threefold light can be assigned by which divine and supernatural things can become known to men who are still mortal. The first is the light of infused faith, by which they are perceived through a mirror and in an enigma. The second is the light of knowledge, either divinely implanted or acquired with the aid of revealed principles and of the natural sciences, by which the learned and the Doctors perceive the mysteries of faith more deeply and more openly than the unlearned and the simple do. The third, finally, is the light of divine contemplation, by which minds cleansed of various and earthly contagions are for the most part caught up into ecstasy and see secret words which it is not lawful for a man to speak. The first is likened to nocturnal light, for faith is a lamp shining in a dark place until the day of eternity dawns; the second is compared to the dawn, which partly dispels the darkness and is partly overspread by it; the third is like the light of day, by which all things are disclosed and made manifest. Whether, moreover, besides this threefold light another light is also divinely infused into Doctors and students, by which the mysteries of faith become evident and manifest to them, as Henry of Ghent contends, will appear below.

Note 2. Evidence (about which the controversy chiefly turns in the present question) is the clear and perspicuous truth of an object, which becomes known from the perceived necessary connection of the predicate with the subject. This, however, is twofold: for some proposition is evident from its terms, such as are all immediate propositions and those necessary of themselves; another is evident from principles, such as is the evidence of a conclusion, which is drawn from evidently known principles through a true demonstration. This evidence from principles, moreover, comes about in two ways: first, when we proceed from principles and causes known to us to demonstrating their effects, as is done through a demonstration a posteriori; second, by proceeding from effects known to us to the knowledge of the principles and causes. — Each of these processes, however, is made from things which are known to us: the first indeed from what is better known by nature; for since causes are universal and more remote from the senses, they are indeed better known by nature and in themselves, because they virtually contain the truth and entity of the effects, whose truth emanates from the principles and is resolved back into the principles; whereas the effects, since they are nearer to our senses, are also said to be better known to us than their principles are; and every science must proceed from one or the other evidence. Evidence, therefore, is distinguished from certainty in this: first, that certainty is sought on the part of the faculty, whereas evidence is on the part of the object; second, everything evident is certain, but not everything certain is evident, for the things that are believed with divine faith are indeed certain, yet obscure.

Note 3. Concerning the resolution of the present question, different men think different things. For some contend that our Theology is truly and properly a science; and to establish this, some have devised various ways of speaking by which they might prove its evidence; others, however, seeing that it is entirely lacking in evidence, have judged that it is nonetheless on that account a perfect science, because (they say) evidence is only an extrinsic condition to be desired for science, namely for establishing its certainty, which, if it is firm from elsewhere, has no need of evidence. But so that it may become known what is to be judged more truly with the Subtle Doctor, let it be:

First conclusion. — Theology in us wayfarers is not properly to be called a science. This is the teaching of the Subtle Doctor, Quaest. 3. Prologi n. 30. and in 3. dist. 24. n. 7.

Proof 1. Perfect science is the effect of a legitimate demonstration; but theological knowledge is not produced by a legitimate demonstration; therefore it is not perfect science. The major is evident. The minor is proved from these words of Aristotle, 2. De Demonstratione, cap. ultimo: That, therefore, he says, it is not possible to know through demonstration without knowing the immediate principles has been said before. From which I argue thus: a perfect demonstration must be made from the evident and certain knowledge of the principles from which the conclusion is inferred; but the Theologian cannot have evident knowledge of the principles from which he deduces his theological conclusions, for those principles are revealed and believed by faith, and accordingly obscure and lacking in evidence, as St. Paul indicates, 1. Corinth. cap. 13.: We see now through a mirror and in an enigma.

It is confirmed. No one, unless foolish or obstinate, can dissent from a perfectly demonstrated proposition; but many dissent from and oppose theological conclusions, as is clear concerning heretics and unbelievers, who laugh at and reject all the theological arguments by which we strive to commend the mysteries of faith; therefore it is a sign that those arguments are not perfectly demonstrative.

Proof 2. Perfect science makes a perfect knower; but theological knowledge does not render the Theologian perfectly knowing. I prove it: he is not to be called perfectly knowing who assents to a proposition more on account of the authority and truthfulness of the one revealing than on account of the legitimate inference of the conclusion from the premises; but the perfect Theologian experiences his intellect inclining more toward assent to a conclusion drawn from the principles of faith, on account of the infallible authority of God revealing, than on account of the legitimate inference from the premises; for he adheres more firmly and tenaciously to a theological conclusion than to any philosophical conclusion, not on account of the perfection of the syllogistic inference, in which he is equal in both; but because he leans more firmly on the authority of God revealing the premises of the theological conclusion than on the natural light manifesting the principles of the philosophical conclusion; therefore it is a sign that the Theologian assents more on account of authority than on account of inference. But to assent to some proposition on account of authority is not to know it perfectly, but to believe it; therefore Theology is not perfect science, since it makes one more a believer than a knower.

It is confirmed. From the Doctor in 3. dist. 24. n. 9.: no voluntary adherence is scientific; for knowledge compels and necessitates the intellect to assent; for given the assent to evident premises, the intellect is so necessitated to assent to the conclusion that it cannot in any way dissent, as we proved in Logic; but the Theologian can voluntarily suspend his assent, both with regard to the believed principles, that is, the articles of faith, from which he deduces the theological conclusion, and with regard to the conclusion itself; For nothing is more in our power than to believe, says Augustine, lib. De spiritu, et littera, c. 21. Therefore such assent is not scientific.

Proof 3. Knowledge which lacks the perfect and principal characteristic of science is not perfect science; but theological knowledge lacks the principal characteristic of science. I prove it: evidence is the principal characteristic of science, for it is defined thus: certain and evident knowledge; so that just as by certainty it essentially differs from error and opinion, so by evidence it essentially differs from faith, both divine and human; indeed certainty belongs to it only by reason of evidence, since the intellect for that reason gives firm assent to a scientific proposition, because it sees it evidently deduced from evident principles, and accordingly it is established that evidence is the principal and essential characteristic of science. But theological knowledge has no evidence. I prove it: the evidence of a conclusion arises from the principles from which it is deduced; therefore where the principles lack evidence, it is likewise necessary that the conclusion equally lack evidence, because the perfection which is not in the cause cannot be in the effect; for since the effect receives all its entity from the cause, it also receives its perfection from it; and accordingly, since no one gives what he does not have, it is impossible that principles lacking evidence can confer evidence on the conclusion. But the principles of the conclusions of our Theology are not evident, but revealed and believed; for, says St. Paul, Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the argument of things not appearing; therefore they can confer no evidence on a theological conclusion; and hence, since Theology lacks the principal characteristic of perfect science, it cannot be called perfect science.

In order that the adversaries may solve this most powerful argument, different men set down different replies; and I have therefore judged that they should be refuted one by one, so that the truth of our conclusion may shine forth more brightly and be strengthened.

First, therefore, some reply with Henry of Ghent, quodlib. 12. q. 2., that the principles of theological conclusions are indeed of themselves lacking in evidence, but are made manifest through a certain light, as it were a mean between the light of faith and the light of the beatific vision; for Henry distinguishes a threefold light: the obscure light of faith, the clear light of the homeland, and the evident light of vision. The first he compares to night, the second to midday, the third to the dawn, because it has something of light and of darkness; and he says that this light presupposes, but does not precede, faith; so that the student of Theology must first believe, according to that saying of Isaiae 7. according to the version of the Seventy Interpreters: If you do not believe, you will not understand; secondly, he must strive for a more perfect penetration of the terms of which the articles of faith consist; and this with the aid and study of the natural sciences; which being posited, as a prior disposition he judges that that intermediate light is divinely infused, by which it comes about that the Theologian perceives the articles of faith more clearly than the faithful rustic and ignorant man; because through that light the Theologian perceives the terms of the things to be believed more evidently and better than they are understood by the common run of the faithful.

But the Doctor attacks this reply in 3. dist. 24. quaest. 1. n. 7. First indeed, because science and faith cannot exist at the same time about the same object, which he proves thus: science and opinion cannot exist at the same time about the same thing, therefore neither can faith and science. The antecedent is clear: for since they fight each other contradictorily, they cannot stand together; but opinion and science have contradictory predicates, namely certainty and non-certainty; for science is certain knowledge, whereas opinion is uncertain, and consequently opinion, which has non-certainty, and science, which has certainty, are incompossible. The consequence is likewise clear by the same reason; for science has evidence on the part of the object, whereas faith has non-evidence: therefore, since evidence and non-evidence fight each other contradictorily, it is established that evident science cannot stand with non-evident faith, nor accordingly can the evident light which Henry imagines subsist with the obscure light of faith about one and the same object.

It is confirmed. From Henry's opinion, that scientific light which he imagines cannot precede faith, but only follows it; from which the Doctor argues thus: that scientific light cannot precede faith, either because the habits of science and faith are incompossible, and so the point is established; or because of the formal repugnance of the objects, and so likewise it is proved that faith and science cannot be had at the same time about the same thing, because, says the Doctor n. 9., objects are distinguished equally according to formal notions after faith is posited just as before. Nor does it avail to say that they are together as contraries in a mean, like the extreme colors in redness, because so there would be one cognition mixed and intermediate from science and faith, for then that cognition would be neither of faith nor of science, just as redness is neither whiteness nor blackness. But it seems absurd that between obscure and evident cognition there should be given some cognition which would be neither evident nor non-evident.

Secondly: since this light presupposes faith and leans upon it, it follows that at the loss of faith this light also perishes, and so there would not remain in the Doctors the same greater and clearer cognition of the articles of faith than in the rustics, which had existed before; but that this is false, experience itself bears witness, for when a Theologian falls into heresy, he loses the faith, yet he does not lose any of the cognition of theological matters which he previously had; therefore his theological cognition did not lean upon any light divinely infused, which could be lost at the loss of faith.

Thirdly: this divinely infused light would be desired either that the intellect of Theologians might be more firmly strengthened in assenting to the articles of faith; but for that it would be useless, since for this firm assent infused faith suffices; or that the Theologian might adhere so firmly and tenaciously to the articles themselves that he could in no way dissent; but this too is false, otherwise men could not fall away from the faith once they were Theologians, the contrary of which daily experience persuades, for many Theologians, even the most skilled, miserably fall into heresy; or finally that Theologians might have a more evident knowledge of the mysteries and of the articles of faith, both for teaching the rest of the faithful and for defending faith itself against heretics and unbelievers, which Henry seems chiefly to intend; but for this too this light is entirely useless, since for it the light of faith by which we perceive the mysteries suffices, and the light of natural reason of the philosophical sciences, by which we are able to explain the truths believed by us and to draw conclusions from the articles of faith with the benefit of philosophy, with which we both conquer heretics and defend the faith. — Fourthly: even if this light were admitted, it would not suffice to cause perfect science and evident cognition through a true and legitimate demonstration, as the Doctor most subtly proves in 3. dist. 24. n. 11. et 12.; both because, in order that through this light science might be caused concerning this proposition, e.g., God is three and one, it would be necessary that first, at least by priority of nature, some immediate principles be evidently perceived from which this proposition could be inferred; but this light does not provide this, for no evidently known principles appear to us from which it would be permissible evidently to infer the aforesaid proposition. And because, if through some light the articles of faith, which are the principles of theological conclusions, were evident and were made manifest under their own proper notion, they would be most certain, not only on account of the assent of faith, but also on account of their own evidence; and so Theology would be more certain than all other sciences, not only on account of faith, but also on account of the evidence of the object, which no Theologian admits. And finally, because either God grants this light to all who strive for the understanding of the Scriptures and of the mysteries, or only to those whom he wills, by his good pleasure. If the first, that light, says the Doctor n. 12., will not be miraculous and supernatural, for when God confers something as a general cause and according to the disposition of nature, it cannot be called miraculous, nor divinely but naturally infused; thus, e.g., the infusion of the rational soul into an organized body is not called miraculous, although it is done by God alone, because it is done according to the disposition and exigency of nature. If the second, therefore, says the Doctor in the same place, we labor in vain in studying and in seeking by our own power, and it would be much better, for acquiring Theology, that one earnestly beseech God in the temples that he deign to infuse this light into him, than to sit among books, so that from their laborious reading he might dispose himself for the uncertain infusion of this light. It is clear, therefore, that this light is wholly fictitious and empty. — It is confirmed. That light seems to have been granted to no one thus far: therefore it is asserted without foundation. I prove the antecedent: if that light had been granted to anyone, by which the terms of the articles of faith and the principles of theological conclusions would become evidently known, it would have been granted most of all to St. Paul and St. Augustine, who more than the rest seem to have penetrated divine things and unlocked the mysteries more intimately and clearly; but they themselves testify that no evidence of the mysteries is granted to us in this mortal life. For, says St. Paul, 1. Corint. 13.: We see now through a mirror and in an enigma, but then face to face. And St. Augustine, Epistola 3. which is to Volusianus, says:

So great is the depth of the Christian Scriptures that I should make daily progress in them, if I alone, from earliest boyhood even to decrepit old age, with the greatest leisure, the utmost study, and a better mind, should strive to learn them.

Not that in regard to the things necessary for salvation so great a difficulty is met with in them, but when anyone there has held the faith, without which one does not live piously and rightly, so many things remain to be understood by the faithful, darkened by so many and so manifold coverings of mysteries, and so great a depth of wisdom lies hidden not only in the words in which these things are said, but also in the realities which are to be understood, that it befalls the most aged, the most acute, and those most fervent in the desire of learning, what Scripture, Eccles. 18., has: When a man has finished, then he begins.

Therefore by these words he openly confesses that he does not evidently perceive the terms of the articles of faith, and that consequently that light devised by Henry was not granted to him. Hence, in tractate 68. on John, weighing those words: I go to prepare a place for you, he says:

Faith is that by which the hearts of those who are to see God are cleansed while they journey; it believes what it does not see, for if you see, it is not faith; for the believer merit is gathered, for the one who sees the reward is rendered. Let the Lord go, then, to prepare a place; let Him go lest He be seen, let Him hide that He may be believed; for a place is then prepared if one lives by faith, if the believed One is desired, so that, being desired, He may be possessed; the desire of vision is the preparation of the dwelling.

He has the same in lib. 3. De vera innocentia and in the Epistle to Consentius: Faith, he says, has its own eyes, by which it in a certain manner sees that to be true which it does not yet see, and by which it most certainly sees that it does not yet see what it believes; by which words he openly confesses that no evidence of the same object subsists along with faith, and that consequently that scientific light devised by Henry is fictitious.

You will say. St. Augustine himself seems to admit and approve this light, since on these words of John, cap. I., He was the true light, he says: It is one thing to be a light for believing: another for understanding. And in the same place: The uncreated light illumines man with a twofold light of wisdom, by which they are fed as with solid food, which the Apostle had who said: We speak wisdom among the perfect, 1. ad Corint. 2. The same, tractate 39. on John: With faith going before, which heals the eye of our heart, so that what we understand we may grasp without obscurity, what we do not understand we may believe without doubt. Finally, against the Epist. Fundamenti cap. 24.: I profess the Catholic faith, and through it I presume that I shall arrive at certain science, with God, no longer men, illuminating our mind inwardly. Therefore, besides faith another light divinely infused is given, by which theological science is generated and formed in us. — I answer. Denying the consequence, and to the first authority of St. Augustine I say that it must be understood either of the light of contemplation and understanding, which we said in Note 3. is sometimes infused by God into the purest minds, or into the Pastors and Doctors of the Church, that with greater ease they may perceive the divine mysteries, and explain and commend them to others through certain fitting reasons and likenesses: or of our theology, which can be called a light of wisdom, not indeed by reason of the evidence of its object, but by reason of the discourse and of the greater knowledge of the terms by which the articles of faith are expressed; whence it comes about that the reasons and arguments which could be urged to the contrary are easily resolved. — To the second authority I say that a twofold obscurity can be distinguished: one which is opposed to evidence, another which is opposed to distinct and explicit knowledge, and which is the same as indistinct and confused cognition, for what we understand only confusedly we are said to know obscurely. St. Augustine speaks of the latter obscurity, not of the former, so that he wishes theologians to know the things of faith more explicitly and distinctly than the unlettered and ignorant, not that they perceive them more evidently. For while the unlettered man hears that God is one in essence and three in persons, he indeed perceives that there are three divine persons and one God, yet he does not know what the word essence signifies, or what precisely the name of person indicates, which are nevertheless known to the theologian from Metaphysics. — To the third authority I say that St. Augustine speaks of the gift of understanding and science, which God at His pleasure infuses into the Pastors and Doctors of the Church, that they may instruct the other faithful.

Some reply, with our Aureolus, Q. 1. Prologi, article 1, that theology is indeed not evident with the evidence of the object, of the principles and of the consequent, but with the evidence of the consequence, so that for the evidence of science it is not required that it be evidently known that the consequent is rightly deduced from the antecedent, but it suffices that it be known that the consequence is correctly inferred from the premises according to syllogistic form; but this evidence of the consequence is found in theology, since the theologian can easily judge that his conclusions are legitimately inferred, and according to the rules of syllogistic form. — On the contrary. First, it is false that the evidence which is desired in science consists in the consequence, not in the inference of the consequent: for scientific discourse does not consist in a judgment of the consequence, but of the consequent, as we have demonstrated in Logic. Second, it is not for the theologian to judge of the goodness of the consequence, for this wholly pertains to the logician, but whether the consequent is rightly inferred from the Articles and Principles of faith. Third, the evidence of the consequence does not prevent the consequent from being evident: therefore neither will it bring it about that the theological assent is not obscure; and consequently, notwithstanding the evidence of the consequence, theology will always be obscure.

Some reply, with Francis de Marchia as reported by Gregory, Question 1. Prologi, that the principles of theology are indeed not evident per se, since they are articles of faith known only through revelation; yet they are made evident from without, and through their resolution into certain evidently known principles. But he says these principles are two: the first indeed is this: whatever God has revealed is true, which is indeed known by the light of nature, because natural reason dictates that the first truth can neither be deceived nor deceive. The latter, however, is this: God has revealed all the articles which are proposed to us for belief, which likewise becomes evident through the miracles wrought in their confirmation. — On the contrary. Miracles are only motives of credibility, not of the assent of faith; and they evidently demonstrate that a thing is credible, not that it is evidently true, because the evidence of credibility arises from the truthfulness of the one revealing; but the evidence of truth proceeds from the principles of the thing itself, which appears evidently true either per se or through its effects. Hence, with the evidence of credibility there can stand the inevidence of the thing according to its entity: for if God immediately and clearly revealed to me that the mystery of the Trinity exists, v. g., that mystery would indeed appear to me evidently credible; yet not on that account would that mystery be evidently known to me. — Then: although from an evident revelation there might inhere in the articles of faith some evidence, this would be wholly extrinsic, and consequently insufficient to cause scientific evidence in the theological conclusions to be elicited from the articles of faith themselves; for the evidence of science is not to be sought from without and on the part of the one testifying and revealing, otherwise the scientific assent would not differ from the assent of faith, which rests on the evident testimony of the one speaking: but it must be taken from the intrinsic and entitative evidence of the principles from which the scientific conclusion is deduced: therefore, although through an evident revelation the articles of faith would be evident, their evidence would nevertheless not suffice to cause scientific evidence in theology, and consequently for this reason theology cannot be called a perfect science.

You will say. No one is bound to believe anything except what is evidently true: but we are bound to believe the articles of faith: therefore they must be evidently true. Proof of the major: we are not bound to esteem a thing as true, as long as its truth does not sufficiently appear to us: therefore we are not bound to believe it as true. — I deny the major. For we are bound to believe not only what is evidently known, but also what is evidently credible, namely by reason of the infallible authority of the one revealing; indeed, if it were evidently known, it would no longer be credible, but knowable: and we would assent to it not by faith, but by science. To the proof I say that it suffices that the truth of the credible thing be made known through the infallible testimony of the one revealing; but it is not necessary that it appear evidently from the terms.

The Thomists reply, that our theology is made evident through the resolution of its principles into the science of God and of the Blessed, to which it is subalternated; for it must be known, says Saint Thomas, 1. parte, q. 1. art. 2.:

That there is a twofold genus of sciences; for some are those which proceed from principles known by the natural light of the intellect, such as Arithmetic, Geometry and the like: but some are those which proceed from principles known by the light of a higher science, just as Perspective proceeds from principles made known through Geometry, and music from principles known through arithmetic: and in this way sacred Doctrine is a science, because it proceeds from principles known by the light of a higher science, which namely is the science of God and of the Blessed.

By which words he plainly teaches (say the Thomists) that although in the subalternating sciences the formal and actual evidence of the principles is required, in the subalternated ones, however, there suffices the radical evidence which arises through resolution into the subalternating science. Hence, since our theology is subalternated to the science of God and of the Blessed, to whom the articles of faith are evidently known, it suffices for its evidence that its principles become evident through resolution. — On the contrary. First, it is false that our theology is subalternated to the theology of God and of the Blessed, as we will prove in the following Question: therefore the Thomists' reply falls entirely. Second, in order that the principles of a subalternated science become evident through their resolution into the subalternating science, it is necessary that both sciences, both the subalternating and the subalternated, be in the same intellect; so that the same intellect can resolve the principles of the subalternated science into the subalternating one; for if this resolution were made by Peter, v. g., how could Paul know that it is evidently made, especially if he does not master the subalternating science? Does a blind man evidently perceive color, because I myself attest to him that I see color evidently and intuitively? Who would assert that a physician evidently knows this principle of Medicine, contraries are cured by contraries, through its resolution into this physical principle, contraries mutually expel each other from the same subject, if he himself does not hold Physics? But the theology of the Blessed is not in us, nor do we have it as known. Therefore we cannot evidently resolve the principles of our theology into it. Third, experience shows that the theologian does not assent to a theological conclusion drawn from the articles of faith because those articles are evidently known by God and the Blessed; but because they are believed by faith by the theologian himself: therefore his assent is inevident, since it rests only on motives and principles known without evidence; and consequently theological knowledge for this reason cannot be called evident and scientific.

Some modern Thomists reply, that our theology does not indeed have the mode and state of perfect science, namely evidence; yet it has its essence, namely certainty and necessity, and therefore can indeed be called an imperfect science as to mode and state, in comparison with the perfection which it can have within its own species, namely in the state of beatitude, when that which is perfect shall come, and that which is in part shall be done away. Just as, they say, a boy, although he is substantially a man, yet because he lacks the use of reason and freedom, is not called a perfect man according to state. — On the contrary. 1. Evidence is an essential character of science, as has been proved: therefore a knowledge which does not have evidence cannot be scientific. Second, it is false that our theology differs from the theology of the Blessed only in state, and that it can at some time attain that evidence, just as a boy can attain the use of reason and freedom; since our theology differs in species from the theology of the Blessed, nor does the same theology remain in the Blessed which had been in the wayfarers, as we will prove below: therefore if it is imperfect, it must be called imperfect not only comparatively, but simply, because it lacks the essential perfection desired for science, which it will never obtain.

Finally, others reply, that our theology is indeed not evident, but that evidence is not required for the notion of perfect science, except on the hypothesis that the intellect has no other more excellent motive by which it may adhere more firmly and tenaciously to a proposition: but it has a more excellent motive by which it adheres more firmly to theological principles, and is convinced of their truth, than is the evidence of the propositions and of the natural sciences; for faith brings it about that it adheres to them on account of the first truth revealing, which is by far a firmer motive, and one more convincing to the intellect, than the evidence of the knowledge of the principles of the other sciences: therefore evidence is not needed for the perfect notion of the science of theology. — They confirm it. From Aristotle, who, speaking of science, 1. Poster. says: That unless one has the science of the premises, or something greater than science, he cannot be truly knowing. Therefore when he has something greater than science, he will be able to be truly knowing: but divine faith is a motive greater and more perfect than science: therefore the theologian will be able to elicit scientific conclusions from principles known by divine faith. — On the contrary. Perfect science differs essentially from faith; but it differs from it by nothing other than evidence: therefore either it is not perfect science, or it must have evidence. The major is evident; for faith and science are essentially diverse habits, since the former rests on the authority of the one revealing, the latter on evident knowledge of the premises; the former inclines to an obscure assent without discourse; the latter to a clear assent with philosophical discourse, etc. The minor is also clear; since it does not differ from it by certainty and necessity, because each is a certain knowledge and about a necessary object, especially while they are concerned with God subsisting in Himself: therefore it remains that science is distinguished from faith by evidence; and consequently evidence belongs to science not hypothetically and per accidens, but essentially. 2. That firmness of assent, which is made greater by faith than by evidence, does not render the intellect readier and more expeditious for producing the reasons of its knowledge, and for demonstrating it from principles known to all, which anyone perfectly knowing ought to accomplish, but only makes it adhere more tenaciously to the revealed proposition than it adheres to an evident one: therefore it does not make him perfectly knowing, but only certain and believing; and consequently certainty does not suffice for perfect science. — To the confirmation I say that Aristotle, by something greater than science, does not understand some supernatural light, such as is the light of faith; for that genius of nature recognized no supernatural things, as one illumined only by the natural light; but by that greater thing he wished to signify and indicate the habit of first principles, or understanding, by which the premises are sometimes known, and that more certainly than through science.

You will say. The Subtle Doctor, in 3. dist. 24. q. 1., speaking of the Prophets and Apostles and the other sacred Doctors illumined by God, said that they had a habit which, although it was inevident, yet on account of its firmness and certainty could be called science: for he says n. 17.:

I say that every effect which God can produce through a second efficient cause, He can produce immediately; now if the things themselves of which Sacred Scripture treats were clearly and intuitively apprehended, they would generate certain knowledge without doubt; and this knowledge, because it is evident, would be called science. But God, without the motion of the object, can so cause certain knowledge without any doubt: so that one having such knowledge revealed by God could not doubt its truth; of which kind of knowledge the Prophets are believed to have had, and many other saints in Scripture. And such men had a habit affording a great assent, so that, while it stood, they could not but assent to the truth: that certainty, however, was not evident from the evidence of the thing; because then it would be a contradiction that knowledge of this kind and faith should stand together: yet that certainty was firm, just as is scientific certainty, which is caused from principles known from the evidence of the terms.

Therefore, according to his mind, a habit having certainty can be scientific, even if it is inevident: but theology has greater certainty than all the natural sciences; therefore with all the more right it claims for itself the dignity and appellation of science. — I deny the consequence. For neither is that the mind and opinion of the Doctor; he indeed wills that the canonical writers received from God a certain habit, by which they adhered to the truths revealed to them, and that more firmly and tenaciously than if those truths had been elicited and demonstrated from evident principles through discourse; yet he does not will that this habit was scientific, for he adds: Therefore it could not be called science from the evidence of the thing; there was, however, greater certainty than the certainty of faith, because faith does not exclude all doubt, but some doubt can stand with faith. From which it is clear that he speaks, not of a habit which is science — for no science has greater certainty than faith — but of the most perfect habit of faith, which wholly excluded all doubt in those holy men, such as the habit of faith which is infused in other men does not exclude. Hence after he added that faith cannot stand with science, he says: there is nevertheless had along with faith by many another habit, that is, a new firmness and perfection, or mode, superadded to the prior habit of faith; by which one assents firmly to the truth of Scripture, and not to one truth on account of another, but to any- one immediately: but it is evident that no one assents to Scripture immediately except through faith; and consequently the Doctor speaks there of the perfect habit of faith, not indeed of some other habit which is truly and properly science.

Second conclusion. — Our theology can be called a science, in the manner in which Aristotle defined science, 6. Ethicor. The truth of this conclusion is clear from the preceding one; since theological knowledge is certain; indeed it is far more certain than all the natural sciences, as we will prove below. For this reason the holy Fathers call theology Science, and the Prince and Queen of the Sciences: indeed Saint Augustine affirms at length that it is at once science and wisdom, especially lib. 14. De Trinitate, cap. 1., where, making a discourse about theology, he says:

With which science very many of the faithful do not abound, although they abound very much in faith itself. For it is one thing to know only what a man ought to believe for the sake of attaining the blessed life, which is only eternal: but another thing to know how this very thing both helps the pious and is defended against the impious, which the Apostle seems, by its proper word, to call science, primae Corinth. 12., saying: To another is given the word of science.

By which it is established that our theology can be called a science, insofar as science is said to be certain knowledge, about a necessary and infallible object, and generated through legitimate discourse; not, however, as scientific knowledge also requires the evidence of the object. But whether it claims for itself the august name of Wisdom, will reveal