Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

From the first Question of Tom. 3. it is evident that theology taken generally is divided by reason of its subject into the theology of God, of the Blessed, and of wayfarers; in the present Question it must be resolved whether the theology of God and of the Blessed can truly and properly be called science: the following Question, however, will disclose whether our theology possesses the characteristics of perfect science.

Note 1. According to the Subtle Doctor, in 3. dist. 4. quaest. unica, the name of science is used in two ways. First, indeed, for true knowledge, in whatever manner its truth becomes known; thus Aristotle defined science in 6. Ethic. c. 1.: The habit by which the soul speaks truth in affirming or denying: whence St. Augustine, lib. 15. De Trin. cap. 12., calls science the knowledge which we receive either through the senses or through the report of others: Far be it, he says, that we should deny that we know what we have learned on the testimony of others; otherwise we do not know that the Ocean exists; we do not know that there are lands and cities which the most celebrated fame commends. 2. Strictly, as Aristotle used and defined it, 1. Post. cap. 2., saying: But we think that we know each thing (namely, not as the Sophists do, per accidens) when we think that we know the cause on account of which the thing is, and that it is its cause, and that it cannot be that the thing be otherwise. From these things the Doctor infers, in question 3. of the Prologue n. 36., that four conditions are required for science properly so called. First, that it be true and certain knowledge, by which it is distinguished from error and opinion. Second, that it be of a necessary thing, that is, about a necessarily true proposition, so that it may be separated from art and prudence, which are concerned with particular and changeable things. Third, that it be through causes evident to that intellect which reasons scientifically; so that science may be distinguished from divine faith, which indeed is true, certain knowledge, and of a necessary thing, at least consequently, namely from the certainty and infallibility of the revealer; but it is obscure and enigmatic. Fourth, finally, that from evidently known causes the conclusion be drawn out through a true and legitimate syllogistic discourse, so that scientific knowledge may differ from understanding, by which we perceive the first principles of things not through discourse, but by the bare apprehension of men.

Note 2. That although the Royal Prophet marvels, How does God know, and is there knowledge in the Most High?, because sinners themselves had obtained riches, nevertheless it is established by faith that there is in God a true knowledge, not one which is an accident, as in us and in the Angels, but one which is really the very essence of God itself, and without any defect containing entirely every perfection of knowledge. This, although it is altogether indivisible, can nevertheless be distinguished as twofold by reason of object and term, namely, essential and altogether intrinsic, by which God knows himself; and extrinsic, by which he knows the other things from himself, through himself, and in himself. Which again is distinguished as threefold in the usual way; namely, the knowledge of simple Intelligence, by which he knows purely possible things, according to that text in Romans 4.¹: He calls the things that are not as the things that are. Second, the knowledge of Vision, by which he knows things determinately future, present and past, according to that text of Psalm 138.: You understood my thoughts from afar; you have searched out my path and my line, and you have foreseen all my ways. You have known all things, the newest and the ancient. Third is called the Middle knowledge, by which he is said to know future things under a condition, so that if the condition is posited, the thing will come about; but if it is not present, the thing will not exist.

Note 3. A twofold knowledge is distinguished in the Blessed: the first is called beatific, and it is the beatific Vision, by which they see clearly and intuitively in the divine Word all the mysteries which, obscurely only and through revelation and faith, are made known to us who are still wayfarers. The second is Discursive, which the Blessed themselves form from principles known through the light of glory, inferring conclusions about God through discourse and the natural light of the intellect; for glory and beatitude do not destroy nature, but perfect it; and therefore the discursive power remains whole and unimpeded in the Blessed, and consequently they can use it by discoursing and inferring theological conclusions. The former knowledge is called by St. Augustine the morning knowledge, because it is clear, and the first which the Blessed have of the beatific object: the latter is named the evening knowledge, because it is last and follows the former, nor does it have as much light and clarity as the former; because the natural light of discourse, on which it rests, does not shine as much as the light of glory by which the former is irradiated.

Note 4. The special object of theology is in part necessary from itself, and in part contingent from itself. The first is said to be that which from its own nature cannot be other or otherwise, e.g. God one in essence, three in persons, eternal, infinite, etc. The second, that which can be otherwise, namely incarnation, vocation, sanctification, etc., which absolutely could have not been, if God had indeed decreed and ordained otherwise. Although these contingent things, inasmuch as they are decreed by God and as they fall under that divine knowledge, cannot fail to come about, they are nevertheless not necessary ex natura rei and from themselves; but only from an extrinsic source, and through divine determination and knowledge. Whence the knowledge which is formed about these objects themselves is not intrinsically, and by reason of the object, simply necessary, but only secundum quid, and by reason of an external condition. These things having been premised, let it be

First conclusion. — The theology of God can truly and properly be called science as regards the three former conditions required for perfect science, but not as regards the fourth.

This involves two parts, which the Doctor approves together in q. 3. of the Prologue, n. 26., for he says: Theology in itself is not science as regards the last condition of science: but as regards the other three conditions it is science in itself and in the divine intellect.

The first part is easily established; for that knowledge is scientific which is evident and of a necessary thing. But such is the knowledge which God has, both of himself and of the things which he embraces and beholds in his infinite entity: For all things are naked and open before his eyes, which are brighter than the sun, as the sacred text declares. It is likewise about an object supremely necessary: for God is a being simply necessary, instilling evident and certain knowledge of himself into an intellect apprehending him distinctly and perfectly, and therefore the knowledge which he has of some theological object (e.g. of this proposition, the Father produces the Word by uttering it) is certain knowledge of a necessary object, and on account of an evident cause, namely on account of the divine nature, which is evident to God, and therefore from this part it is scientific.

The second part is also evident. For God cannot discourse: therefore he does not have the fourth condition required for science. The antecedent is proved: Perfect discourse requires three things: first, that one thing be known through another; second, that one thing be known from another; third, that one thing be known after another, at least in an instant of nature: but these things are supremely unbecoming to God, who knows all things by one most simple act; whence Augustine, lib. 15. De Trinit. cap. 12., after having said that God the Father and the Son know all things in themselves, concludes:

They know each other, therefore, the Father and the Son, but the former by begetting, the latter by being born, and all things which are in their knowledge, in their wisdom, in their essence, each one of them sees at once. Not partially or singly, as with an alternating concept, from here to there, and from there to here, and again from there, or from there to here, and one thing and another, so that one cannot see some things unless not seeing others: but as I have said, he sees at once all things, of which there is none which he does not always see: therefore since God does not have alternating concepts, but comprehends all things by one most simple act, he cannot discourse at all, nor consequently have the fourth condition required for perfect science.

It is confirmed. From the Doctor cited. The causation of science through discourse from cause to the thing known includes an imperfection on the part of the science, namely, that it is an equivocal effect, and also a potentiality on the part of the receiving intellect. That is, science generated through discourse imports and connotes a twofold imperfection, one indeed on its own part, the other on the part of the intellect. — The former imperfection arises from the fact that discursive science is an equivocal effect, because it is produced by a more perfect cause, and of a different species, namely, by understanding, or the knowledge of the principles from which science is drawn out. But understanding is more perfect and more evident than science, because that on account of which each thing is such is itself more so; it is certain, however, that a scientific conclusion is evident only on account of the evidence of the premises, and therefore the premises which are known through understanding are more evident than the conclusion. — The latter imperfection arises on the part of the intellect, which through theological discourse acquires scientific knowledge, and consequently was earlier stripped of such knowledge, and was in potency to its reception; but this lack of knowledge and potentiality is an imperfection, and therefore to be kept far from God: therefore God cannot discourse.

You will say. To discourse scientifically is to know a thing certainly and evidently through another: but God thus knows some things through others, namely effects through causes, and properties through the essence. Proof: God knows things as they are: but effects are through causes, and properties through essences: for the former are produced through causes, the latter emanate through essences: therefore God truly discourses.

I distinguish the major. To discourse is to know a thing through another or dependently on another, so that one is the principle and means of the knowledge of the other, I concede; it is only to know a thing proceeding from another and dependent on another, I deny. I likewise distinguish the minor: God knows effects dependent on causes, I concede: he knows them dependently on the knowledge of the causes, I deny. For, as St. Dionysius speaks, lib. De divinis nominibus, cap. 7., God does not have a peculiar knowledge of himself, and another, common knowledge embracing all things, for the cause of all things itself, knowing itself, will in no way be ignorant of the things which are from it and of which it is the cause. Therefore God, knowing these things, knows them not by a knowledge of the things, but by the knowledge of himself. And as he had said a little above: He knows all material things without matter, and divisible things indivisibly, and many things singly: therefore his knowledge is intuitive, not discursive. For discourse requires that the principle of discourse be naturally known first, and that it be causative of the knowledge of another (as the Doctor speaks in question 3. of the Prologue n. 27.); for discourse is the inference of a less known thing from a more known one; which certainly cannot befit divine knowledge.

You will ask. Whether on account of the defect of this condition, the knowledge of God cannot be called science simply?

I answer. that it can rightly be so named. For the inference of one thing from another through legitimate discourse is not of the intrinsic notion of science, but is required for it only on account of the weakness of the created intellect, which, since it is not the same as its act, and cannot through one single simple act detect the cause and the effect at once and know all things at the same time, hence it happens that in order to attain scientific knowledge it is compelled to discourse from one proposition to another, inferring the less known from the more known, on account of the necessary connection which it perceives between the two. But since the divine intellect has no need of these things, its knowledge likewise does not need discourse in order to be reckoned scientific.

But concerning divine knowledge we will institute a fuller and more explicit discourse in the course of the Work, wherefore let it be

Second conclusion. — The theology of the Blessed can truly and properly be called science as regards the four aforementioned conditions. This is the express opinion of the Doctor in the cited place n. 27. This can be conceded, he says, that the Blessed one can truly have theological science as regards all the conditions of science, because all the conditions of science truly concur in the knowledge of the Blessed.

Proof. First, for it is certain knowledge, without error, since they themselves see God face to face, and behold the divine essence evidently and intuitively. 2. It is about a necessary object, without change; for with God there is no transmutation of accidents or of existence, nor any overshadowing of contingency and vicissitude. 3. Through causes, for they can gather that God is immense, e.g. on account of his infinite essence, which is the cause and source of all divine perfections and attributes. 4. Through legitimate discourse; for since they see in the divine essence the causes and natures first, with at least a priority of nature, before they see the properties and effects, it is certain that they can infer one from the other.

Which the Doctor proves thus: The essence of the subject contains virtually its properties, and the cause its effects, and can instill knowledge of them into every intellect capable of knowing them: therefore whether that essence and cause is seen by wayfarers by natural light, or by the Blessed by supernatural light, it will always be able to produce the knowledge of its property and effect. The Doctor subsumes: But every truth and knowledge caused in the intellect through something naturally known first, is made through discourse, because it is made through the inference of the less known from the more known: For discourse, he says, does not require a succession of time nor its order, but an order of nature: namely, that the principle of discourse be naturally known first, and as such, be causative of the other extreme of the discourse.

That is, for legitimate discourse it is not required that some space of time flow between the knowledge of the premises and the inference and the knowledge of the conclusion deduced from them, but it suffices that the premises be known first by nature, and as containing in themselves virtually the knowledge of the conclusion deduced from them.

Whence although the Blessed see at once in one single moment of time the essences and properties, the causes and effects, the premises and the conclusion, they can no less be said to discourse, because they know by nature first the essence before the properties, the causes before the effects, and the premises before the conclusion; but this priority of nature suffices for the less known to be said to be inferred from the more known: therefore it likewise seems to suffice for forming a perfect discourse, although in reality it can hardly be understood how discourse could take place in an instant, since it requires a judgment about the legitimate inference of the consequent from the antecedent. That these things may appear more evident

You will say 1. Discourse involves several acts by which the principles are known, and the conclusion is inferred from them: but the Blessed do not have a multiple act about the object of beatitude, rather they perceive it and all things represented in it by one single and simple act, as St. Augustine affirms in lib. 15. De Trinit. cap. 16. where, after he had said: In beatitude our word will not be false, because we will neither lie nor be deceived; he adds: Perhaps even our cognitions will not be fluid, going and returning from some things to others, but we will see all our knowledge in one simultaneous view.

The Doctor answers in the cited place. denying the minor, nor does Aug. affirm this, but only proposes it doubtfully, for he said perhaps, which is the word of one doubting, not of one affirming. Or Augustine is to be understood of the beatific vision, inasmuch as it extends itself to essential things alone; for this he beholds by one single and simple act: but the attributes and other things which arise from the essence they can gather through legitimate discourse: for the Blessed one, seeing the divine essence unlimited and infinite, can gather evidently that it is likewise immense, by reasoning thus. Every infinite entity is immense: but the divine essence is an infinite entity: therefore it is immense. Which conclusion is truly scientific and inferred through legitimate discourse.

Or finally I say that St. Augustine is to be understood of the beatific and morning knowledge, which is invariable and always the same, as we will prove in section 4. On the invisibility of God, third conclusion; but not of the discursive and evening knowledge, as was observed in the third Note. And so a twofold theology can be distinguished in the Blessed: one formally incomplex and intuitive, which is the beatific vision itself: the other complex and quasi-abstractive, which is made through discourse from principles clearly and evidently known. The former is similar to the theology of God on account of its simplicity and vision; the latter is assimilated in some measure to our theology on account of the discourse by which it is strengthened.

You will say 2. Science ought to be concerned with a necessary object: but theology, whether of God or of the Blessed, and ours, is concerned with a contingent object, namely, about the creation of things, the existence of the Angels, their order, operation, speech, motion, the incarnation, grace, the sacraments, the laws, the virtues and the rest, which are all contingent: therefore on account of the contingency of its object neither can be called science.

The Doctor answers in question 3. of the Prologue, n. 28. that indeed by the defect of this condition neither theology can properly be called science, inasmuch as it is defined by Aristotle in the first book of the Posterior Analytics:

nevertheless, he says, it can be said that for the intrinsic perfection of science it suffices that it be evident and certain; but that it be about a necessary object, this is altogether extrinsic to it and holds itself more on the part of the object than on the part of the science; which is evident from this, because science can be contingent, even if it be about a necessary object; since it can be destroyed through forgetfulness. Whence if some knowledge were given which from itself were certain and evident, and as far as in it lies were perpetual, although its object were contingent, it would seem to be more perfect than science, which although it is about a necessary object is nevertheless from itself defective and variable. For this reason, says the Doctor, both theologies can be called certain, and therefore perfect science, because in God and in the Blessed it has perpetual certainty and evidence; in us it has also an invariable certainty by reason of faith, by which it discloses the truths certainly and constantly.

Or I say again with the same Doctor in the same place.

that contingent things, as they pertain to theology, are born to have certain and evident knowledge, and, as far as concerns themselves, perpetual evidence: because all theological contingent things are born to be seen in the first theological object, and in it the conjunction of those contingent truths is born to be seen. But the vision of the extremes of a contingent truth and of their union necessarily causes evident certainty about such evident truth; as far as it is also on the part of the theological object showing such true things, they are born to be seen in such a perpetual object as far as concerns itself: Therefore contingent things, as they pertain to theology, are born to have a more perfect knowledge than science acquired about necessary things.

Nevertheless, inquiring there whether on this account the theology of contingent things is truly science, the Doctor answers:

I say that according to that notion of science posited in the first book of the Posterior Analytics, which requires the necessity of the object, there cannot be science about them, because to know the contingent as necessary is not to know the contingent; nevertheless, according as the Philosopher takes science in the 6. book of the Ethics, as it is said against opinion and suspicion, it can well be science, because it is a habit by which we speak the truth determinately. And so the theology of contingent things does not have the notion of proper and perfect science; therefore it is established that only the theology which is about a necessary object can truly be called science.