Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

Threefold, and indeed accommodated to natural reason itself and to the order of things, is the method of teaching, so that, once the existence of something has been intimated and proved, its essence and nature — the source and spring of all its properties and excellences — may immediately be inquired into and set forth.

Therefore, since the necessity of admitting theological doctrine is now more than sufficiently evident, it must now be resolved whether that eminent and sublime habit of mind rejoices in and glories in the title of science and wisdom, which indeed we accomplish in the present article, inquiring: 1. Whether the theology of God and of the Blessed is a true and perfect science. 2. Whether our theology, that of the wayfarers, possesses all the characters of a perfect science. 3. Whether it is worthy of the appellation of wisdom. 4. Finally, whether it is subalternated to divine and beatific science.

From the first Question of Tom. 3. it is evident that theology taken generally is divided by reason of its subject into the theology of God, of the Blessed, and of wayfarers; in the present Question it must be resolved whether the theology of God and of the Blessed can truly and properly be called science: the following Question, however, will disclose whether our theology possesses the characteristics of perfect science.

Note 1. According to the Subtle Doctor, in 3. dist. 4. quaest. unica, the name of science is used in two ways. First, indeed, for true knowledge, in whatever manner its truth becomes known; thus Aristotle defined science in 6. Ethic. c. 1.: The habit by which the soul speaks truth in affirming or denying: whence St. Augustine, lib. 15. De Trin. cap. 12., calls science the knowledge which we receive either through the senses or through the report of others: Far be it, he says, that we should deny that we know what we have learned on the testimony of others; otherwise we do not know that the Ocean exists; we do not know that there are lands and cities which the most celebrated fame commends. 2. Strictly, as Aristotle used and defined it, 1. Post. cap. 2., saying: But we think that we know each thing (namely, not as the Sophists do, per accidens) when we think that we know the cause on account of which the thing is, and that it is its cause, and that it cannot be that the thing be otherwise. From these things the Doctor infers, in question 3. of the Prologue n. 36., that four conditions are required for science properly so called. First, that it be true and certain knowledge, by which it is distinguished from error and opinion. Second, that it be of a necessary thing, that is, about a necessarily true proposition, so that it may be separated from art and prudence, which are concerned with particular and changeable things. Third, that it be through causes evident to that intellect which reasons scientifically; so that science may be distinguished from divine faith, which indeed is true, certain knowledge, and of a necessary thing, at least consequently, namely from the certainty and infallibility of the revealer; but it is obscure and enigmatic. Fourth, finally, that from evidently known causes the conclusion be drawn out through a true and legitimate syllogistic discourse, so that scientific knowledge may differ from understanding, by which we perceive the first principles of things not through discourse, but by the bare apprehension of men.

Note 2. That although the Royal Prophet marvels, How does God know, and is there knowledge in the Most High?, because sinners themselves had obtained riches, nevertheless it is established by faith that there is in God a true knowledge, not one which is an accident, as in us and in the Angels, but one which is really the very essence of God itself, and without any defect containing entirely every perfection of knowledge. This, although it is altogether indivisible, can nevertheless be distinguished as twofold by reason of object and term, namely, essential and altogether intrinsic, by which God knows himself; and extrinsic, by which he knows the other things from himself, through himself, and in himself. Which again is distinguished as threefold in the usual way; namely, the knowledge of simple Intelligence, by which he knows purely possible things, according to that text in Romans 4.¹: He calls the things that are not as the things that are. Second, the knowledge of Vision, by which he knows things determinately future, present and past, according to that text of Psalm 138.: You understood my thoughts from afar; you have searched out my path and my line, and you have foreseen all my ways. You have known all things, the newest and the ancient. Third is called the Middle knowledge, by which he is said to know future things under a condition, so that if the condition is posited, the thing will come about; but if it is not present, the thing will not exist.

Note 3. A twofold knowledge is distinguished in the Blessed: the first is called beatific, and it is the beatific Vision, by which they see clearly and intuitively in the divine Word all the mysteries which, obscurely only and through revelation and faith, are made known to us who are still wayfarers. The second is Discursive, which the Blessed themselves form from principles known through the light of glory, inferring conclusions about God through discourse and the natural light of the intellect; for glory and beatitude do not destroy nature, but perfect it; and therefore the discursive power remains whole and unimpeded in the Blessed, and consequently they can use it by discoursing and inferring theological conclusions. The former knowledge is called by St. Augustine the morning knowledge, because it is clear, and the first which the Blessed have of the beatific object: the latter is named the evening knowledge, because it is last and follows the former, nor does it have as much light and clarity as the former; because the natural light of discourse, on which it rests, does not shine as much as the light of glory by which the former is irradiated.

Note 4. The special object of theology is in part necessary from itself, and in part contingent from itself. The first is said to be that which from its own nature cannot be other or otherwise, e.g. God one in essence, three in persons, eternal, infinite, etc. The second, that which can be otherwise, namely incarnation, vocation, sanctification, etc., which absolutely could have not been, if God had indeed decreed and ordained otherwise. Although these contingent things, inasmuch as they are decreed by God and as they fall under that divine knowledge, cannot fail to come about, they are nevertheless not necessary ex natura rei and from themselves; but only from an extrinsic source, and through divine determination and knowledge. Whence the knowledge which is formed about these objects themselves is not intrinsically, and by reason of the object, simply necessary, but only secundum quid, and by reason of an external condition. These things having been premised, let it be

First conclusion. — The theology of God can truly and properly be called science as regards the three former conditions required for perfect science, but not as regards the fourth.

This involves two parts, which the Doctor approves together in q. 3. of the Prologue, n. 26., for he says: Theology in itself is not science as regards the last condition of science: but as regards the other three conditions it is science in itself and in the divine intellect.

The first part is easily established; for that knowledge is scientific which is evident and of a necessary thing. But such is the knowledge which God has, both of himself and of the things which he embraces and beholds in his infinite entity: For all things are naked and open before his eyes, which are brighter than the sun, as the sacred text declares. It is likewise about an object supremely necessary: for God is a being simply necessary, instilling evident and certain knowledge of himself into an intellect apprehending him distinctly and perfectly, and therefore the knowledge which he has of some theological object (e.g. of this proposition, the Father produces the Word by uttering it) is certain knowledge of a necessary object, and on account of an evident cause, namely on account of the divine nature, which is evident to God, and therefore from this part it is scientific.

The second part is also evident. For God cannot discourse: therefore he does not have the fourth condition required for science. The antecedent is proved: Perfect discourse requires three things: first, that one thing be known through another; second, that one thing be known from another; third, that one thing be known after another, at least in an instant of nature: but these things are supremely unbecoming to God, who knows all things by one most simple act; whence Augustine, lib. 15. De Trinit. cap. 12., after having said that God the Father and the Son know all things in themselves, concludes:

They know each other, therefore, the Father and the Son, but the former by begetting, the latter by being born, and all things which are in their knowledge, in their wisdom, in their essence, each one of them sees at once. Not partially or singly, as with an alternating concept, from here to there, and from there to here, and again from there, or from there to here, and one thing and another, so that one cannot see some things unless not seeing others: but as I have said, he sees at once all things, of which there is none which he does not always see: therefore since God does not have alternating concepts, but comprehends all things by one most simple act, he cannot discourse at all, nor consequently have the fourth condition required for perfect science.

It is confirmed. From the Doctor cited. The causation of science through discourse from cause to the thing known includes an imperfection on the part of the science, namely, that it is an equivocal effect, and also a potentiality on the part of the receiving intellect. That is, science generated through discourse imports and connotes a twofold imperfection, one indeed on its own part, the other on the part of the intellect. — The former imperfection arises from the fact that discursive science is an equivocal effect, because it is produced by a more perfect cause, and of a different species, namely, by understanding, or the knowledge of the principles from which science is drawn out. But understanding is more perfect and more evident than science, because that on account of which each thing is such is itself more so; it is certain, however, that a scientific conclusion is evident only on account of the evidence of the premises, and therefore the premises which are known through understanding are more evident than the conclusion. — The latter imperfection arises on the part of the intellect, which through theological discourse acquires scientific knowledge, and consequently was earlier stripped of such knowledge, and was in potency to its reception; but this lack of knowledge and potentiality is an imperfection, and therefore to be kept far from God: therefore God cannot discourse.

You will say. To discourse scientifically is to know a thing certainly and evidently through another: but God thus knows some things through others, namely effects through causes, and properties through the essence. Proof: God knows things as they are: but effects are through causes, and properties through essences: for the former are produced through causes, the latter emanate through essences: therefore God truly discourses.

I distinguish the major. To discourse is to know a thing through another or dependently on another, so that one is the principle and means of the knowledge of the other, I concede; it is only to know a thing proceeding from another and dependent on another, I deny. I likewise distinguish the minor: God knows effects dependent on causes, I concede: he knows them dependently on the knowledge of the causes, I deny. For, as St. Dionysius speaks, lib. De divinis nominibus, cap. 7., God does not have a peculiar knowledge of himself, and another, common knowledge embracing all things, for the cause of all things itself, knowing itself, will in no way be ignorant of the things which are from it and of which it is the cause. Therefore God, knowing these things, knows them not by a knowledge of the things, but by the knowledge of himself. And as he had said a little above: He knows all material things without matter, and divisible things indivisibly, and many things singly: therefore his knowledge is intuitive, not discursive. For discourse requires that the principle of discourse be naturally known first, and that it be causative of the knowledge of another (as the Doctor speaks in question 3. of the Prologue n. 27.); for discourse is the inference of a less known thing from a more known one; which certainly cannot befit divine knowledge.

You will ask. Whether on account of the defect of this condition, the knowledge of God cannot be called science simply?

I answer. that it can rightly be so named. For the inference of one thing from another through legitimate discourse is not of the intrinsic notion of science, but is required for it only on account of the weakness of the created intellect, which, since it is not the same as its act, and cannot through one single simple act detect the cause and the effect at once and know all things at the same time, hence it happens that in order to attain scientific knowledge it is compelled to discourse from one proposition to another, inferring the less known from the more known, on account of the necessary connection which it perceives between the two. But since the divine intellect has no need of these things, its knowledge likewise does not need discourse in order to be reckoned scientific.

But concerning divine knowledge we will institute a fuller and more explicit discourse in the course of the Work, wherefore let it be

Second conclusion. — The theology of the Blessed can truly and properly be called science as regards the four aforementioned conditions. This is the express opinion of the Doctor in the cited place n. 27. This can be conceded, he says, that the Blessed one can truly have theological science as regards all the conditions of science, because all the conditions of science truly concur in the knowledge of the Blessed.

Proof. First, for it is certain knowledge, without error, since they themselves see God face to face, and behold the divine essence evidently and intuitively. 2. It is about a necessary object, without change; for with God there is no transmutation of accidents or of existence, nor any overshadowing of contingency and vicissitude. 3. Through causes, for they can gather that God is immense, e.g. on account of his infinite essence, which is the cause and source of all divine perfections and attributes. 4. Through legitimate discourse; for since they see in the divine essence the causes and natures first, with at least a priority of nature, before they see the properties and effects, it is certain that they can infer one from the other.

Which the Doctor proves thus: The essence of the subject contains virtually its properties, and the cause its effects, and can instill knowledge of them into every intellect capable of knowing them: therefore whether that essence and cause is seen by wayfarers by natural light, or by the Blessed by supernatural light, it will always be able to produce the knowledge of its property and effect. The Doctor subsumes: But every truth and knowledge caused in the intellect through something naturally known first, is made through discourse, because it is made through the inference of the less known from the more known: For discourse, he says, does not require a succession of time nor its order, but an order of nature: namely, that the principle of discourse be naturally known first, and as such, be causative of the other extreme of the discourse.

That is, for legitimate discourse it is not required that some space of time flow between the knowledge of the premises and the inference and the knowledge of the conclusion deduced from them, but it suffices that the premises be known first by nature, and as containing in themselves virtually the knowledge of the conclusion deduced from them.

Whence although the Blessed see at once in one single moment of time the essences and properties, the causes and effects, the premises and the conclusion, they can no less be said to discourse, because they know by nature first the essence before the properties, the causes before the effects, and the premises before the conclusion; but this priority of nature suffices for the less known to be said to be inferred from the more known: therefore it likewise seems to suffice for forming a perfect discourse, although in reality it can hardly be understood how discourse could take place in an instant, since it requires a judgment about the legitimate inference of the consequent from the antecedent. That these things may appear more evident

You will say 1. Discourse involves several acts by which the principles are known, and the conclusion is inferred from them: but the Blessed do not have a multiple act about the object of beatitude, rather they perceive it and all things represented in it by one single and simple act, as St. Augustine affirms in lib. 15. De Trinit. cap. 16. where, after he had said: In beatitude our word will not be false, because we will neither lie nor be deceived; he adds: Perhaps even our cognitions will not be fluid, going and returning from some things to others, but we will see all our knowledge in one simultaneous view.

The Doctor answers in the cited place. denying the minor, nor does Aug. affirm this, but only proposes it doubtfully, for he said perhaps, which is the word of one doubting, not of one affirming. Or Augustine is to be understood of the beatific vision, inasmuch as it extends itself to essential things alone; for this he beholds by one single and simple act: but the attributes and other things which arise from the essence they can gather through legitimate discourse: for the Blessed one, seeing the divine essence unlimited and infinite, can gather evidently that it is likewise immense, by reasoning thus. Every infinite entity is immense: but the divine essence is an infinite entity: therefore it is immense. Which conclusion is truly scientific and inferred through legitimate discourse.

Or finally I say that St. Augustine is to be understood of the beatific and morning knowledge, which is invariable and always the same, as we will prove in section 4. On the invisibility of God, third conclusion; but not of the discursive and evening knowledge, as was observed in the third Note. And so a twofold theology can be distinguished in the Blessed: one formally incomplex and intuitive, which is the beatific vision itself: the other complex and quasi-abstractive, which is made through discourse from principles clearly and evidently known. The former is similar to the theology of God on account of its simplicity and vision; the latter is assimilated in some measure to our theology on account of the discourse by which it is strengthened.

You will say 2. Science ought to be concerned with a necessary object: but theology, whether of God or of the Blessed, and ours, is concerned with a contingent object, namely, about the creation of things, the existence of the Angels, their order, operation, speech, motion, the incarnation, grace, the sacraments, the laws, the virtues and the rest, which are all contingent: therefore on account of the contingency of its object neither can be called science.

The Doctor answers in question 3. of the Prologue, n. 28. that indeed by the defect of this condition neither theology can properly be called science, inasmuch as it is defined by Aristotle in the first book of the Posterior Analytics:

nevertheless, he says, it can be said that for the intrinsic perfection of science it suffices that it be evident and certain; but that it be about a necessary object, this is altogether extrinsic to it and holds itself more on the part of the object than on the part of the science; which is evident from this, because science can be contingent, even if it be about a necessary object; since it can be destroyed through forgetfulness. Whence if some knowledge were given which from itself were certain and evident, and as far as in it lies were perpetual, although its object were contingent, it would seem to be more perfect than science, which although it is about a necessary object is nevertheless from itself defective and variable. For this reason, says the Doctor, both theologies can be called certain, and therefore perfect science, because in God and in the Blessed it has perpetual certainty and evidence; in us it has also an invariable certainty by reason of faith, by which it discloses the truths certainly and constantly.

Or I say again with the same Doctor in the same place.

that contingent things, as they pertain to theology, are born to have certain and evident knowledge, and, as far as concerns themselves, perpetual evidence: because all theological contingent things are born to be seen in the first theological object, and in it the conjunction of those contingent truths is born to be seen. But the vision of the extremes of a contingent truth and of their union necessarily causes evident certainty about such evident truth; as far as it is also on the part of the theological object showing such true things, they are born to be seen in such a perpetual object as far as concerns itself: Therefore contingent things, as they pertain to theology, are born to have a more perfect knowledge than science acquired about necessary things.

Nevertheless, inquiring there whether on this account the theology of contingent things is truly science, the Doctor answers:

I say that according to that notion of science posited in the first book of the Posterior Analytics, which requires the necessity of the object, there cannot be science about them, because to know the contingent as necessary is not to know the contingent; nevertheless, according as the Philosopher takes science in the 6. book of the Ethics, as it is said against opinion and suspicion, it can well be science, because it is a habit by which we speak the truth determinately. And so the theology of contingent things does not have the notion of proper and perfect science; therefore it is established that only the theology which is about a necessary object can truly be called science.

From the preceding Question it is established that knowledge is twofold, namely perfect and imperfect; it is likewise established that four characteristics and conditions are required for perfect knowledge, namely that it be certain without fear and any doubt, evident without obscurity, about a necessary object without any change, and through reasoning with a true and legitimate inference of one thing from another. Whether, however, Theology, insofar as it is in us wayfarers, possesses the four aforesaid characteristics, is to be resolved in this Question. But first

Note 1. A threefold light can be assigned by which divine and supernatural things can become known to men who are still mortal. The first is the light of infused faith, by which they are perceived through a mirror and in an enigma. The second is the light of knowledge, either divinely implanted or acquired with the aid of revealed principles and of the natural sciences, by which the learned and the Doctors perceive the mysteries of faith more deeply and more openly than the unlearned and the simple do. The third, finally, is the light of divine contemplation, by which minds cleansed of various and earthly contagions are for the most part caught up into ecstasy and see secret words which it is not lawful for a man to speak. The first is likened to nocturnal light, for faith is a lamp shining in a dark place until the day of eternity dawns; the second is compared to the dawn, which partly dispels the darkness and is partly overspread by it; the third is like the light of day, by which all things are disclosed and made manifest. Whether, moreover, besides this threefold light another light is also divinely infused into Doctors and students, by which the mysteries of faith become evident and manifest to them, as Henry of Ghent contends, will appear below.

Note 2. Evidence (about which the controversy chiefly turns in the present question) is the clear and perspicuous truth of an object, which becomes known from the perceived necessary connection of the predicate with the subject. This, however, is twofold: for some proposition is evident from its terms, such as are all immediate propositions and those necessary of themselves; another is evident from principles, such as is the evidence of a conclusion, which is drawn from evidently known principles through a true demonstration. This evidence from principles, moreover, comes about in two ways: first, when we proceed from principles and causes known to us to demonstrating their effects, as is done through a demonstration a posteriori; second, by proceeding from effects known to us to the knowledge of the principles and causes. — Each of these processes, however, is made from things which are known to us: the first indeed from what is better known by nature; for since causes are universal and more remote from the senses, they are indeed better known by nature and in themselves, because they virtually contain the truth and entity of the effects, whose truth emanates from the principles and is resolved back into the principles; whereas the effects, since they are nearer to our senses, are also said to be better known to us than their principles are; and every science must proceed from one or the other evidence. Evidence, therefore, is distinguished from certainty in this: first, that certainty is sought on the part of the faculty, whereas evidence is on the part of the object; second, everything evident is certain, but not everything certain is evident, for the things that are believed with divine faith are indeed certain, yet obscure.

Note 3. Concerning the resolution of the present question, different men think different things. For some contend that our Theology is truly and properly a science; and to establish this, some have devised various ways of speaking by which they might prove its evidence; others, however, seeing that it is entirely lacking in evidence, have judged that it is nonetheless on that account a perfect science, because (they say) evidence is only an extrinsic condition to be desired for science, namely for establishing its certainty, which, if it is firm from elsewhere, has no need of evidence. But so that it may become known what is to be judged more truly with the Subtle Doctor, let it be:

First conclusion. — Theology in us wayfarers is not properly to be called a science. This is the teaching of the Subtle Doctor, Quaest. 3. Prologi n. 30. and in 3. dist. 24. n. 7.

Proof 1. Perfect science is the effect of a legitimate demonstration; but theological knowledge is not produced by a legitimate demonstration; therefore it is not perfect science. The major is evident. The minor is proved from these words of Aristotle, 2. De Demonstratione, cap. ultimo: That, therefore, he says, it is not possible to know through demonstration without knowing the immediate principles has been said before. From which I argue thus: a perfect demonstration must be made from the evident and certain knowledge of the principles from which the conclusion is inferred; but the Theologian cannot have evident knowledge of the principles from which he deduces his theological conclusions, for those principles are revealed and believed by faith, and accordingly obscure and lacking in evidence, as St. Paul indicates, 1. Corinth. cap. 13.: We see now through a mirror and in an enigma.

It is confirmed. No one, unless foolish or obstinate, can dissent from a perfectly demonstrated proposition; but many dissent from and oppose theological conclusions, as is clear concerning heretics and unbelievers, who laugh at and reject all the theological arguments by which we strive to commend the mysteries of faith; therefore it is a sign that those arguments are not perfectly demonstrative.

Proof 2. Perfect science makes a perfect knower; but theological knowledge does not render the Theologian perfectly knowing. I prove it: he is not to be called perfectly knowing who assents to a proposition more on account of the authority and truthfulness of the one revealing than on account of the legitimate inference of the conclusion from the premises; but the perfect Theologian experiences his intellect inclining more toward assent to a conclusion drawn from the principles of faith, on account of the infallible authority of God revealing, than on account of the legitimate inference from the premises; for he adheres more firmly and tenaciously to a theological conclusion than to any philosophical conclusion, not on account of the perfection of the syllogistic inference, in which he is equal in both; but because he leans more firmly on the authority of God revealing the premises of the theological conclusion than on the natural light manifesting the principles of the philosophical conclusion; therefore it is a sign that the Theologian assents more on account of authority than on account of inference. But to assent to some proposition on account of authority is not to know it perfectly, but to believe it; therefore Theology is not perfect science, since it makes one more a believer than a knower.

It is confirmed. From the Doctor in 3. dist. 24. n. 9.: no voluntary adherence is scientific; for knowledge compels and necessitates the intellect to assent; for given the assent to evident premises, the intellect is so necessitated to assent to the conclusion that it cannot in any way dissent, as we proved in Logic; but the Theologian can voluntarily suspend his assent, both with regard to the believed principles, that is, the articles of faith, from which he deduces the theological conclusion, and with regard to the conclusion itself; For nothing is more in our power than to believe, says Augustine, lib. De spiritu, et littera, c. 21. Therefore such assent is not scientific.

Proof 3. Knowledge which lacks the perfect and principal characteristic of science is not perfect science; but theological knowledge lacks the principal characteristic of science. I prove it: evidence is the principal characteristic of science, for it is defined thus: certain and evident knowledge; so that just as by certainty it essentially differs from error and opinion, so by evidence it essentially differs from faith, both divine and human; indeed certainty belongs to it only by reason of evidence, since the intellect for that reason gives firm assent to a scientific proposition, because it sees it evidently deduced from evident principles, and accordingly it is established that evidence is the principal and essential characteristic of science. But theological knowledge has no evidence. I prove it: the evidence of a conclusion arises from the principles from which it is deduced; therefore where the principles lack evidence, it is likewise necessary that the conclusion equally lack evidence, because the perfection which is not in the cause cannot be in the effect; for since the effect receives all its entity from the cause, it also receives its perfection from it; and accordingly, since no one gives what he does not have, it is impossible that principles lacking evidence can confer evidence on the conclusion. But the principles of the conclusions of our Theology are not evident, but revealed and believed; for, says St. Paul, Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the argument of things not appearing; therefore they can confer no evidence on a theological conclusion; and hence, since Theology lacks the principal characteristic of perfect science, it cannot be called perfect science.

In order that the adversaries may solve this most powerful argument, different men set down different replies; and I have therefore judged that they should be refuted one by one, so that the truth of our conclusion may shine forth more brightly and be strengthened.

First, therefore, some reply with Henry of Ghent, quodlib. 12. q. 2., that the principles of theological conclusions are indeed of themselves lacking in evidence, but are made manifest through a certain light, as it were a mean between the light of faith and the light of the beatific vision; for Henry distinguishes a threefold light: the obscure light of faith, the clear light of the homeland, and the evident light of vision. The first he compares to night, the second to midday, the third to the dawn, because it has something of light and of darkness; and he says that this light presupposes, but does not precede, faith; so that the student of Theology must first believe, according to that saying of Isaiae 7. according to the version of the Seventy Interpreters: If you do not believe, you will not understand; secondly, he must strive for a more perfect penetration of the terms of which the articles of faith consist; and this with the aid and study of the natural sciences; which being posited, as a prior disposition he judges that that intermediate light is divinely infused, by which it comes about that the Theologian perceives the articles of faith more clearly than the faithful rustic and ignorant man; because through that light the Theologian perceives the terms of the things to be believed more evidently and better than they are understood by the common run of the faithful.

But the Doctor attacks this reply in 3. dist. 24. quaest. 1. n. 7. First indeed, because science and faith cannot exist at the same time about the same object, which he proves thus: science and opinion cannot exist at the same time about the same thing, therefore neither can faith and science. The antecedent is clear: for since they fight each other contradictorily, they cannot stand together; but opinion and science have contradictory predicates, namely certainty and non-certainty; for science is certain knowledge, whereas opinion is uncertain, and consequently opinion, which has non-certainty, and science, which has certainty, are incompossible. The consequence is likewise clear by the same reason; for science has evidence on the part of the object, whereas faith has non-evidence: therefore, since evidence and non-evidence fight each other contradictorily, it is established that evident science cannot stand with non-evident faith, nor accordingly can the evident light which Henry imagines subsist with the obscure light of faith about one and the same object.

It is confirmed. From Henry's opinion, that scientific light which he imagines cannot precede faith, but only follows it; from which the Doctor argues thus: that scientific light cannot precede faith, either because the habits of science and faith are incompossible, and so the point is established; or because of the formal repugnance of the objects, and so likewise it is proved that faith and science cannot be had at the same time about the same thing, because, says the Doctor n. 9., objects are distinguished equally according to formal notions after faith is posited just as before. Nor does it avail to say that they are together as contraries in a mean, like the extreme colors in redness, because so there would be one cognition mixed and intermediate from science and faith, for then that cognition would be neither of faith nor of science, just as redness is neither whiteness nor blackness. But it seems absurd that between obscure and evident cognition there should be given some cognition which would be neither evident nor non-evident.

Secondly: since this light presupposes faith and leans upon it, it follows that at the loss of faith this light also perishes, and so there would not remain in the Doctors the same greater and clearer cognition of the articles of faith than in the rustics, which had existed before; but that this is false, experience itself bears witness, for when a Theologian falls into heresy, he loses the faith, yet he does not lose any of the cognition of theological matters which he previously had; therefore his theological cognition did not lean upon any light divinely infused, which could be lost at the loss of faith.

Thirdly: this divinely infused light would be desired either that the intellect of Theologians might be more firmly strengthened in assenting to the articles of faith; but for that it would be useless, since for this firm assent infused faith suffices; or that the Theologian might adhere so firmly and tenaciously to the articles themselves that he could in no way dissent; but this too is false, otherwise men could not fall away from the faith once they were Theologians, the contrary of which daily experience persuades, for many Theologians, even the most skilled, miserably fall into heresy; or finally that Theologians might have a more evident knowledge of the mysteries and of the articles of faith, both for teaching the rest of the faithful and for defending faith itself against heretics and unbelievers, which Henry seems chiefly to intend; but for this too this light is entirely useless, since for it the light of faith by which we perceive the mysteries suffices, and the light of natural reason of the philosophical sciences, by which we are able to explain the truths believed by us and to draw conclusions from the articles of faith with the benefit of philosophy, with which we both conquer heretics and defend the faith. — Fourthly: even if this light were admitted, it would not suffice to cause perfect science and evident cognition through a true and legitimate demonstration, as the Doctor most subtly proves in 3. dist. 24. n. 11. et 12.; both because, in order that through this light science might be caused concerning this proposition, e.g., God is three and one, it would be necessary that first, at least by priority of nature, some immediate principles be evidently perceived from which this proposition could be inferred; but this light does not provide this, for no evidently known principles appear to us from which it would be permissible evidently to infer the aforesaid proposition. And because, if through some light the articles of faith, which are the principles of theological conclusions, were evident and were made manifest under their own proper notion, they would be most certain, not only on account of the assent of faith, but also on account of their own evidence; and so Theology would be more certain than all other sciences, not only on account of faith, but also on account of the evidence of the object, which no Theologian admits. And finally, because either God grants this light to all who strive for the understanding of the Scriptures and of the mysteries, or only to those whom he wills, by his good pleasure. If the first, that light, says the Doctor n. 12., will not be miraculous and supernatural, for when God confers something as a general cause and according to the disposition of nature, it cannot be called miraculous, nor divinely but naturally infused; thus, e.g., the infusion of the rational soul into an organized body is not called miraculous, although it is done by God alone, because it is done according to the disposition and exigency of nature. If the second, therefore, says the Doctor in the same place, we labor in vain in studying and in seeking by our own power, and it would be much better, for acquiring Theology, that one earnestly beseech God in the temples that he deign to infuse this light into him, than to sit among books, so that from their laborious reading he might dispose himself for the uncertain infusion of this light. It is clear, therefore, that this light is wholly fictitious and empty. — It is confirmed. That light seems to have been granted to no one thus far: therefore it is asserted without foundation. I prove the antecedent: if that light had been granted to anyone, by which the terms of the articles of faith and the principles of theological conclusions would become evidently known, it would have been granted most of all to St. Paul and St. Augustine, who more than the rest seem to have penetrated divine things and unlocked the mysteries more intimately and clearly; but they themselves testify that no evidence of the mysteries is granted to us in this mortal life. For, says St. Paul, 1. Corint. 13.: We see now through a mirror and in an enigma, but then face to face. And St. Augustine, Epistola 3. which is to Volusianus, says:

So great is the depth of the Christian Scriptures that I should make daily progress in them, if I alone, from earliest boyhood even to decrepit old age, with the greatest leisure, the utmost study, and a better mind, should strive to learn them.

Not that in regard to the things necessary for salvation so great a difficulty is met with in them, but when anyone there has held the faith, without which one does not live piously and rightly, so many things remain to be understood by the faithful, darkened by so many and so manifold coverings of mysteries, and so great a depth of wisdom lies hidden not only in the words in which these things are said, but also in the realities which are to be understood, that it befalls the most aged, the most acute, and those most fervent in the desire of learning, what Scripture, Eccles. 18., has: When a man has finished, then he begins.

Therefore by these words he openly confesses that he does not evidently perceive the terms of the articles of faith, and that consequently that light devised by Henry was not granted to him. Hence, in tractate 68. on John, weighing those words: I go to prepare a place for you, he says:

Faith is that by which the hearts of those who are to see God are cleansed while they journey; it believes what it does not see, for if you see, it is not faith; for the believer merit is gathered, for the one who sees the reward is rendered. Let the Lord go, then, to prepare a place; let Him go lest He be seen, let Him hide that He may be believed; for a place is then prepared if one lives by faith, if the believed One is desired, so that, being desired, He may be possessed; the desire of vision is the preparation of the dwelling.

He has the same in lib. 3. De vera innocentia and in the Epistle to Consentius: Faith, he says, has its own eyes, by which it in a certain manner sees that to be true which it does not yet see, and by which it most certainly sees that it does not yet see what it believes; by which words he openly confesses that no evidence of the same object subsists along with faith, and that consequently that scientific light devised by Henry is fictitious.

You will say. St. Augustine himself seems to admit and approve this light, since on these words of John, cap. I., He was the true light, he says: It is one thing to be a light for believing: another for understanding. And in the same place: The uncreated light illumines man with a twofold light of wisdom, by which they are fed as with solid food, which the Apostle had who said: We speak wisdom among the perfect, 1. ad Corint. 2. The same, tractate 39. on John: With faith going before, which heals the eye of our heart, so that what we understand we may grasp without obscurity, what we do not understand we may believe without doubt. Finally, against the Epist. Fundamenti cap. 24.: I profess the Catholic faith, and through it I presume that I shall arrive at certain science, with God, no longer men, illuminating our mind inwardly. Therefore, besides faith another light divinely infused is given, by which theological science is generated and formed in us. — I answer. Denying the consequence, and to the first authority of St. Augustine I say that it must be understood either of the light of contemplation and understanding, which we said in Note 3. is sometimes infused by God into the purest minds, or into the Pastors and Doctors of the Church, that with greater ease they may perceive the divine mysteries, and explain and commend them to others through certain fitting reasons and likenesses: or of our theology, which can be called a light of wisdom, not indeed by reason of the evidence of its object, but by reason of the discourse and of the greater knowledge of the terms by which the articles of faith are expressed; whence it comes about that the reasons and arguments which could be urged to the contrary are easily resolved. — To the second authority I say that a twofold obscurity can be distinguished: one which is opposed to evidence, another which is opposed to distinct and explicit knowledge, and which is the same as indistinct and confused cognition, for what we understand only confusedly we are said to know obscurely. St. Augustine speaks of the latter obscurity, not of the former, so that he wishes theologians to know the things of faith more explicitly and distinctly than the unlettered and ignorant, not that they perceive them more evidently. For while the unlettered man hears that God is one in essence and three in persons, he indeed perceives that there are three divine persons and one God, yet he does not know what the word essence signifies, or what precisely the name of person indicates, which are nevertheless known to the theologian from Metaphysics. — To the third authority I say that St. Augustine speaks of the gift of understanding and science, which God at His pleasure infuses into the Pastors and Doctors of the Church, that they may instruct the other faithful.

Some reply, with our Aureolus, Q. 1. Prologi, article 1, that theology is indeed not evident with the evidence of the object, of the principles and of the consequent, but with the evidence of the consequence, so that for the evidence of science it is not required that it be evidently known that the consequent is rightly deduced from the antecedent, but it suffices that it be known that the consequence is correctly inferred from the premises according to syllogistic form; but this evidence of the consequence is found in theology, since the theologian can easily judge that his conclusions are legitimately inferred, and according to the rules of syllogistic form. — On the contrary. First, it is false that the evidence which is desired in science consists in the consequence, not in the inference of the consequent: for scientific discourse does not consist in a judgment of the consequence, but of the consequent, as we have demonstrated in Logic. Second, it is not for the theologian to judge of the goodness of the consequence, for this wholly pertains to the logician, but whether the consequent is rightly inferred from the Articles and Principles of faith. Third, the evidence of the consequence does not prevent the consequent from being evident: therefore neither will it bring it about that the theological assent is not obscure; and consequently, notwithstanding the evidence of the consequence, theology will always be obscure.

Some reply, with Francis de Marchia as reported by Gregory, Question 1. Prologi, that the principles of theology are indeed not evident per se, since they are articles of faith known only through revelation; yet they are made evident from without, and through their resolution into certain evidently known principles. But he says these principles are two: the first indeed is this: whatever God has revealed is true, which is indeed known by the light of nature, because natural reason dictates that the first truth can neither be deceived nor deceive. The latter, however, is this: God has revealed all the articles which are proposed to us for belief, which likewise becomes evident through the miracles wrought in their confirmation. — On the contrary. Miracles are only motives of credibility, not of the assent of faith; and they evidently demonstrate that a thing is credible, not that it is evidently true, because the evidence of credibility arises from the truthfulness of the one revealing; but the evidence of truth proceeds from the principles of the thing itself, which appears evidently true either per se or through its effects. Hence, with the evidence of credibility there can stand the inevidence of the thing according to its entity: for if God immediately and clearly revealed to me that the mystery of the Trinity exists, v. g., that mystery would indeed appear to me evidently credible; yet not on that account would that mystery be evidently known to me. — Then: although from an evident revelation there might inhere in the articles of faith some evidence, this would be wholly extrinsic, and consequently insufficient to cause scientific evidence in the theological conclusions to be elicited from the articles of faith themselves; for the evidence of science is not to be sought from without and on the part of the one testifying and revealing, otherwise the scientific assent would not differ from the assent of faith, which rests on the evident testimony of the one speaking: but it must be taken from the intrinsic and entitative evidence of the principles from which the scientific conclusion is deduced: therefore, although through an evident revelation the articles of faith would be evident, their evidence would nevertheless not suffice to cause scientific evidence in theology, and consequently for this reason theology cannot be called a perfect science.

You will say. No one is bound to believe anything except what is evidently true: but we are bound to believe the articles of faith: therefore they must be evidently true. Proof of the major: we are not bound to esteem a thing as true, as long as its truth does not sufficiently appear to us: therefore we are not bound to believe it as true. — I deny the major. For we are bound to believe not only what is evidently known, but also what is evidently credible, namely by reason of the infallible authority of the one revealing; indeed, if it were evidently known, it would no longer be credible, but knowable: and we would assent to it not by faith, but by science. To the proof I say that it suffices that the truth of the credible thing be made known through the infallible testimony of the one revealing; but it is not necessary that it appear evidently from the terms.

The Thomists reply, that our theology is made evident through the resolution of its principles into the science of God and of the Blessed, to which it is subalternated; for it must be known, says Saint Thomas, 1. parte, q. 1. art. 2.:

That there is a twofold genus of sciences; for some are those which proceed from principles known by the natural light of the intellect, such as Arithmetic, Geometry and the like: but some are those which proceed from principles known by the light of a higher science, just as Perspective proceeds from principles made known through Geometry, and music from principles known through arithmetic: and in this way sacred Doctrine is a science, because it proceeds from principles known by the light of a higher science, which namely is the science of God and of the Blessed.

By which words he plainly teaches (say the Thomists) that although in the subalternating sciences the formal and actual evidence of the principles is required, in the subalternated ones, however, there suffices the radical evidence which arises through resolution into the subalternating science. Hence, since our theology is subalternated to the science of God and of the Blessed, to whom the articles of faith are evidently known, it suffices for its evidence that its principles become evident through resolution. — On the contrary. First, it is false that our theology is subalternated to the theology of God and of the Blessed, as we will prove in the following Question: therefore the Thomists' reply falls entirely. Second, in order that the principles of a subalternated science become evident through their resolution into the subalternating science, it is necessary that both sciences, both the subalternating and the subalternated, be in the same intellect; so that the same intellect can resolve the principles of the subalternated science into the subalternating one; for if this resolution were made by Peter, v. g., how could Paul know that it is evidently made, especially if he does not master the subalternating science? Does a blind man evidently perceive color, because I myself attest to him that I see color evidently and intuitively? Who would assert that a physician evidently knows this principle of Medicine, contraries are cured by contraries, through its resolution into this physical principle, contraries mutually expel each other from the same subject, if he himself does not hold Physics? But the theology of the Blessed is not in us, nor do we have it as known. Therefore we cannot evidently resolve the principles of our theology into it. Third, experience shows that the theologian does not assent to a theological conclusion drawn from the articles of faith because those articles are evidently known by God and the Blessed; but because they are believed by faith by the theologian himself: therefore his assent is inevident, since it rests only on motives and principles known without evidence; and consequently theological knowledge for this reason cannot be called evident and scientific.

Some modern Thomists reply, that our theology does not indeed have the mode and state of perfect science, namely evidence; yet it has its essence, namely certainty and necessity, and therefore can indeed be called an imperfect science as to mode and state, in comparison with the perfection which it can have within its own species, namely in the state of beatitude, when that which is perfect shall come, and that which is in part shall be done away. Just as, they say, a boy, although he is substantially a man, yet because he lacks the use of reason and freedom, is not called a perfect man according to state. — On the contrary. 1. Evidence is an essential character of science, as has been proved: therefore a knowledge which does not have evidence cannot be scientific. Second, it is false that our theology differs from the theology of the Blessed only in state, and that it can at some time attain that evidence, just as a boy can attain the use of reason and freedom; since our theology differs in species from the theology of the Blessed, nor does the same theology remain in the Blessed which had been in the wayfarers, as we will prove below: therefore if it is imperfect, it must be called imperfect not only comparatively, but simply, because it lacks the essential perfection desired for science, which it will never obtain.

Finally, others reply, that our theology is indeed not evident, but that evidence is not required for the notion of perfect science, except on the hypothesis that the intellect has no other more excellent motive by which it may adhere more firmly and tenaciously to a proposition: but it has a more excellent motive by which it adheres more firmly to theological principles, and is convinced of their truth, than is the evidence of the propositions and of the natural sciences; for faith brings it about that it adheres to them on account of the first truth revealing, which is by far a firmer motive, and one more convincing to the intellect, than the evidence of the knowledge of the principles of the other sciences: therefore evidence is not needed for the perfect notion of the science of theology. — They confirm it. From Aristotle, who, speaking of science, 1. Poster. says: That unless one has the science of the premises, or something greater than science, he cannot be truly knowing. Therefore when he has something greater than science, he will be able to be truly knowing: but divine faith is a motive greater and more perfect than science: therefore the theologian will be able to elicit scientific conclusions from principles known by divine faith. — On the contrary. Perfect science differs essentially from faith; but it differs from it by nothing other than evidence: therefore either it is not perfect science, or it must have evidence. The major is evident; for faith and science are essentially diverse habits, since the former rests on the authority of the one revealing, the latter on evident knowledge of the premises; the former inclines to an obscure assent without discourse; the latter to a clear assent with philosophical discourse, etc. The minor is also clear; since it does not differ from it by certainty and necessity, because each is a certain knowledge and about a necessary object, especially while they are concerned with God subsisting in Himself: therefore it remains that science is distinguished from faith by evidence; and consequently evidence belongs to science not hypothetically and per accidens, but essentially. 2. That firmness of assent, which is made greater by faith than by evidence, does not render the intellect readier and more expeditious for producing the reasons of its knowledge, and for demonstrating it from principles known to all, which anyone perfectly knowing ought to accomplish, but only makes it adhere more tenaciously to the revealed proposition than it adheres to an evident one: therefore it does not make him perfectly knowing, but only certain and believing; and consequently certainty does not suffice for perfect science. — To the confirmation I say that Aristotle, by something greater than science, does not understand some supernatural light, such as is the light of faith; for that genius of nature recognized no supernatural things, as one illumined only by the natural light; but by that greater thing he wished to signify and indicate the habit of first principles, or understanding, by which the premises are sometimes known, and that more certainly than through science.

You will say. The Subtle Doctor, in 3. dist. 24. q. 1., speaking of the Prophets and Apostles and the other sacred Doctors illumined by God, said that they had a habit which, although it was inevident, yet on account of its firmness and certainty could be called science: for he says n. 17.:

I say that every effect which God can produce through a second efficient cause, He can produce immediately; now if the things themselves of which Sacred Scripture treats were clearly and intuitively apprehended, they would generate certain knowledge without doubt; and this knowledge, because it is evident, would be called science. But God, without the motion of the object, can so cause certain knowledge without any doubt: so that one having such knowledge revealed by God could not doubt its truth; of which kind of knowledge the Prophets are believed to have had, and many other saints in Scripture. And such men had a habit affording a great assent, so that, while it stood, they could not but assent to the truth: that certainty, however, was not evident from the evidence of the thing; because then it would be a contradiction that knowledge of this kind and faith should stand together: yet that certainty was firm, just as is scientific certainty, which is caused from principles known from the evidence of the terms.

Therefore, according to his mind, a habit having certainty can be scientific, even if it is inevident: but theology has greater certainty than all the natural sciences; therefore with all the more right it claims for itself the dignity and appellation of science. — I deny the consequence. For neither is that the mind and opinion of the Doctor; he indeed wills that the canonical writers received from God a certain habit, by which they adhered to the truths revealed to them, and that more firmly and tenaciously than if those truths had been elicited and demonstrated from evident principles through discourse; yet he does not will that this habit was scientific, for he adds: Therefore it could not be called science from the evidence of the thing; there was, however, greater certainty than the certainty of faith, because faith does not exclude all doubt, but some doubt can stand with faith. From which it is clear that he speaks, not of a habit which is science — for no science has greater certainty than faith — but of the most perfect habit of faith, which wholly excluded all doubt in those holy men, such as the habit of faith which is infused in other men does not exclude. Hence after he added that faith cannot stand with science, he says: there is nevertheless had along with faith by many another habit, that is, a new firmness and perfection, or mode, superadded to the prior habit of faith; by which one assents firmly to the truth of Scripture, and not to one truth on account of another, but to any- one immediately: but it is evident that no one assents to Scripture immediately except through faith; and consequently the Doctor speaks there of the perfect habit of faith, not indeed of some other habit which is truly and properly science.

Second conclusion. — Our theology can be called a science, in the manner in which Aristotle defined science, 6. Ethicor. The truth of this conclusion is clear from the preceding one; since theological knowledge is certain; indeed it is far more certain than all the natural sciences, as we will prove below. For this reason the holy Fathers call theology Science, and the Prince and Queen of the Sciences: indeed Saint Augustine affirms at length that it is at once science and wisdom, especially lib. 14. De Trinitate, cap. 1., where, making a discourse about theology, he says:

With which science very many of the faithful do not abound, although they abound very much in faith itself. For it is one thing to know only what a man ought to believe for the sake of attaining the blessed life, which is only eternal: but another thing to know how this very thing both helps the pious and is defended against the impious, which the Apostle seems, by its proper word, to call science, primae Corinth. 12., saying: To another is given the word of science.

By which it is established that our theology can be called a science, insofar as science is said to be certain knowledge, about a necessary and infallible object, and generated through legitimate discourse; not, however, as scientific knowledge also requires the evidence of the object. But whether it claims for itself the august name of Wisdom, will reveal

Note 1. From Aristotle, 6. Ethic. cap. 4., five intellectual virtues are commonly distinguished. The first is Intelligence, by which it perceives the first principles of things immediately and per se, and known not through another. The second, Wisdom, which is the knowledge of divine things through their highest causes. The third, Prudence, which is occupied with those goods to be pursued and evils to be avoided by man. The fourth, Science, which is certain and evident cognition generated through demonstration. The fifth, finally, is Art, which is a habit directing an external faculty to skilfully produce some sensible work. It is certain, however, that theology is not art; for it regards no external work to be fabricated directly or indirectly. It is equally certain that it is not perfect science, since, as was proved above, it lacks evidence. It is likewise established that it is not adorned with the name of intelligence, since that power of perceiving the first principles of cognition is not innate to individual men; rather it contemplates divine things revealed and disclosed by the benefit of faith. It could indeed partly glory in the name of prudence, for no small part of it is held and occupied in pointing out vices to be fled, virtues to be pursued, and the means leading to the ultimate end: nevertheless, since its dignity and nature are discerned from its object, namely God to be known, hence it comes about that it is not judged to be called by the proper name of prudence. It remains, therefore, to be shown whether it can be called true and perfect Wisdom,

Note 2. Wisdom can be distinguished as threefold: one indeed profane, and vicious; another indifferent, and neutral; another truly sacred, and praiseworthy. The first is the astuteness and cunning of worldly men in establishing their own affairs and fortunes. Thus to the Romans 8.: The prudence of the flesh is death; but the prudence of the spirit is life and peace: since the wisdom of the flesh is an enemy to God, for it is not subject to the law of God; whence James 3.: This wisdom is not descending from above; but is earthly, animal, devilish. The second is that philosophical knowledge which is concerned with being as such; and it contemplates its nobler species; which St. Paul calls human, 1. Corinth. 2. My speech, he says, and my preaching was not in the persuasive words of human wisdom, but in the showing of the spirit and power. The third is either acquired or infused; the former is called Theological, which elicits conclusions from revealed principles; the latter, truly, is the Gift of the Holy Spirit, which is a light descending from the Father of lights, says St. Bonaventure, book On the seven Gifts of the Holy Spirit, and which, irradiating the soul, makes it Godlike: for it illuminates the intellective power, inflames the affective, strengthens the operative. It makes the intellective comely, the affective pleasant, the operative robust: for it is at once splendor and savor; splendor directing the intellect to the cognition of truth, savor raising the affection to the savory love of the good. Whence in the same place it is defined as a supernatural habit of the soul infused by the Holy Spirit for knowing God and loving him savorously, about which Wisdom there is no discourse here, just as neither about profane and natural wisdom, but only about theological.

Note 3. Acquired wisdom, from Aristotle, lib. 1. Metaph. cap. 1., and from the Doctor in the same place, is rightly defined thus. Wisdom is the highest habit of the mind, occupied with the most universal, most difficult, most certain causes of all things, and evidently setting forth principles, to be sought especially for its own sake, and commanding the other scientific habits as servants. From this definition it is gathered that six conditions are required for perfect wisdom. First indeed, that it be concerned with all knowable things, at least in kind; for it is the prince and moderatrix of all the sciences, and therefore it ought to open and prescribe their principles and greatest truths, at least in common. Second, with the most difficult things, and remote from the senses; for to know things open to the senses is common to all, says Aristotle; but it belongs to the wise man alone to search out things hidden and abstruse. Third, with the most certain things, either in themselves, as all necessary beings are, or in another, as contingent things are, which are certain in the divine essence and science. Fourth, evidently setting forth the general causes of all things which are known; for from it the other sciences receive the confirmation and evidence of their principles. Fifth, it ought to be sought for its own sake; for those things which are among the most knowable, such as the sciences which are concerned with first principles, are sought for their own sake. Sixth, finally, the other Sciences ought to be subjected to it as servants, and to serve it. Whether, however, the theology of God, of the Blessed, and of the wayfarers has all these or at least the principal characters, so that it may be resolved, let it be

Single conclusion. — The theology of God and of the Blessed has the principal characters of perfect Wisdom; but the theology of the wayfarers fails in evidence.

This Conclusion embraces two parts, of which the Doctor proves the first in quaest. 3. of the Prologue, n. 28., where, when he had said that theology cannot be called a perfect science, insofar as it is concerned with contingent things, he adds:

Yet it can more properly be said that theology in itself is wisdom, because of the necessary things contained in it it has evidence, and necessity, and certainty, and the highest and most perfect object. As to contingent things, however, it has manifest evidence about the contingents in the theological object, as seen in themselves; and it does not have evidence begged from other prior sciences: whence the knowledge of contingents, as it is had in it, is more assimilated to the understanding of principles than to the science of conclusions.

By these words the Doctor proves two things: First indeed, that theology in itself, and insofar as it is in the divine and beatific intellect, has all the principal characters of perfect Wisdom, inasmuch as it is concerned with necessary objects. Second, moreover, that it can also be called intelligence, insofar as it is concerned with contingent things. It is clear, therefore, that theology thus considered can be called wisdom; namely inasmuch as wisdom is that cognition by which it is evidently occupied with the most certain, highest, and most excellent object.

That moreover the theology of the wayfarers (if you set aside evidence) can also be called wisdom is proved; first indeed by the authority of Sacred Scripture; for St. Paul, speaking of theology in 1. to the Corinth. 2., says: We speak wisdom among the perfect: yet not the wisdom of this world, nor of the princes of this world, that come to nought: but we speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, which is hidden, etc. This same thing Christ the Lord had promised to the Apostles, Luc. 21.: I will give you a mouth and wisdom, which all your adversaries shall not be able to resist and gainsay. All the holy Fathers likewise go in this opinion, who call theology by the illustrious name of Wisdom.

The same thing is clear by reason. For our theology has all the conditions to be desired for perfect Wisdom, if you exclude only evidence. First, indeed, it is the highest habit and occupied with the most universal and most excellent things; for it contemplates God, the most excellent of all beings and the artificer and creator of the rest; thence it opens and explains the principles of things, their origin, state, and their direction to their ends through suitable means. 2. It is concerned with the most certain and most invariable things, at least by reason of the means through which they become known; for it searches out and investigates divine things by the medium of the light of faith, than which nothing can be more excellent. 3. It scrutinizes the most difficult things; what is more difficult to understand and to know than the mysteries of faith from which our theology deduces its conclusions? For natural reason, however perspicacious it may have been, could not so much as remotely suspect and detect these mysteries. 4. It sets forth the causes and principles of all things; since it itself discourses about God as the supreme efficient cause, and end of all things; and so about the emanation, conservation, government, and direction of all things from him to their fitting ends: and so it is the science of all things; not indeed in the universal, according to predication and cognition, as if it handed down the principles by which individual things would be known: but because it opens the font and principle of all things, and that relying on the divine and supernatural light of faith; which is certainly much nobler and more excellent than if it handed down general and common concepts of all things, and their complex principles, through natural light, as Metaphysics does. Although, however, it is ordered to practice, nevertheless it is especially sought for its own sake, if it is considered comparatively to the other sciences; since it is not ordered to them, so as to serve them: indeed the others are referred to it, as handmaids, so as to be subject to it and serve it. For this is that divine Wisdom which sent her handmaids, namely all the natural sciences, to call to the citadel of divine cognition and the defense of faith; as St. Bonaventure most eloquently indicates in the little work on the reduction of the arts and sciences to Theology: therefore, since all the conditions to be desired for wisdom, with evidence removed, belong to it, it not undeservedly rejoices in the title of wisdom.

You will say 1. Wisdom ought to hand down, prove, and make known the common principles of things and of the sciences: but our theology does not do this: therefore it is not wisdom. — I distinguish the major. Philosophical and common wisdom, which rests on the light of reason and is concerned with first principles evidently and naturally known, I concede; supernatural wisdom, or that which proceeds by a supernatural light, such as theology is, I deny. For Metaphysics, v. g., hands down and proves the principles of the other sciences for this reason, because it is of the same natural order with them, and is concerned with being in common, and with the general principles of things, insofar as they are naturally known: but theology, since it rests on the light of a higher order, reaches even higher, nor does it lower itself to the natural sciences, except to judge of their doctrine, and to disapprove whatever it finds alien to truth in them, and to eliminate it from the Academies of Christians as a perverse dogma. — Add. But if theology does not hand down the principles of cognition, it at least hands down the principles of the entity of things; since it treats of God, the first cause of all things, the supreme moderator, and the ultimate end: and this as much in the natural order as in the supernatural. It is also, in some measure and on occasion, the science of all things in particular, and more penetrating than any natural science; since, on the occasion of the Mystery of the Incarnation, it treats of essence, subsistence, and personality; and teaches that subsistence and personality are really distinct from the entity of the individual; and also that two natures can subsist in the same subsistence, which indeed was previously unknown to the Metaphysician. Similarly, in treating of the works of the six days, it opens the origin, place, state, and direction of beings: moreover, it indicates the nature, endowments, and properties of the most excellent species of being, namely of Angels and of men. It likewise treats of corporeal accidents subsisting without a subject in the Sacrament of the Eucharist, of the habits of virtue and grace, etc., and therefore it can in some measure be called a universal science.

You will say 2. Wisdom ought to be concerned with difficult things and remote from the senses: but theology treats of those things which can easily be known and are exposed to the senses, for example the humanity of Christ, man, the Sacraments, etc.: therefore it should not be called wisdom. — I distinguish the minor. That those things can easily be known and be perceived by the senses, as they are considered by the Philosopher externally and according to their natural constitution, let it pass: that they are considered by the theologian, and insofar as the humanity of Christ is personally united to the divine Word: likewise inasmuch as men are destined to a supernatural end through supernatural means; similarly inasmuch as the Sacraments are taken up by God as certain and efficacious signs for producing grace, etc., these things, I say, are easy to know, I deny. For these and whatever other things are handed down in theology become known and are opened only through the light of faith and a discourse resting on the supernatural light, to which man can in no way rise by the forces of nature; for as saint Paul says, 1. to the Corinth. 2., But the sensual man perceiveth not these things that are of the Spirit of God; for it is foolishness to him, and he cannot understand, because it is spiritually examined; but the spiritual man judgeth all things, and he himself is judged of no man.

Although our theology, on account of its lack of evidence, is not distinguished with the titles of a perfect science, and hence the present Question may seem to be raised superfluously and in vain; for if it is not a science, it follows that neither is it a subalternated science; nevertheless, because from its discussion and resolution the preceding conclusion is more firmly established, and the opinion of the Thomists, who contend that our theology is a science precisely for this reason, because its principles are evident in the theology of God and of the Blessed, to which it is subalternated, is more strongly weakened; in order that we may close off this last refuge, it is worthwhile to demonstrate that our theology is in no way subalternated to the science of God and of the Blessed, which, in order that it may be done more evidently

Note 1. Among the sciences, some are called subalternated and others subalternating. The former are those which are placed under another science, on which they depend in the certainty and evidence of their object and of their principles; the latter, however, are those which evidently demonstrate such objects and prove the principles of the inferior sciences. Thus Medicine is said to be subalternated to Physics, because in Physics the principles of Medicine are proved, and the nature and properties of the human body, which is its object, are demonstrated and made known.

Note 2. For the subalternation of the sciences three principal conditions are required. The first is that the material subject of the subalternated science be contained under the general object of the subalternating science, just as the human body, which is the object of Medicine, is contained under the natural body, which is the general object of Physics, to which Medicine is subalternated. The second is that the subalternated science consider that object under some accidental difference, under which it is not considered by the subalternating science, by reason of which difference the object has a new knowability, and is as it were the root of new properties, which are demonstrated in the subalternated science. Thus Medicine considers the natural body as curable, which curability is not considered by Physics, and is the reason and root of all the properties which Medicine detects and investigates in the human body. The third is that the subalternated science depend in the certainty and evidence of its principles on the subalternating science; so that the conclusions of the latter are the principles of the former; for where the subalternating science ends, there the subalternated begins, as the Doctor observes in Q. 3 of the Prologue, no. 30; whence the common saying: There the physician begins, where the physicist ends.

Note 3. A subalternated science has some properties different from the properties of the subalternating science. The first is that the subalternating science proceeds from principles known per se in itself: the subalternated, however, from principles known in the subalternating science. The second is that the subalternating science is superior and independent, both as regards its object and as regards its principles to be made known: the subalternated, however, is inferior and dependent on the subalternating science in both respects. The third is that both ought to be and can be in the same subject and intellect, because one must illustrate the other by proving and making known its principles, which could not be done if the subalternating and the subalternated sciences were in different subjects; for just as the subalternated would not be a science if its conclusions were not resolvable into evidently known principles, so it would not be a science in this intellect, unless this intellect could resolve the conclusions of that subalternated science into evidently known principles; but it could not form this resolution if it did not have the subalternating science, by which it contains and demonstrates the subalternated principles, and therefore both must be in the same intellect.

First conclusion. — The theology of the wayfarers is in no way subalternated to the discursive and theological science of the Blessed.

This is the teaching of the Subtle Doctor, q. 3 of the Prologue, n. 30, and in book 3, the single question, dist. 24, against St. Thomas and his followers.

The Doctor proves it. First: a subalternated science is compatible with the subalternating science in the same subject: but our theology cannot subsist with the theology of the Blessed; therefore it is not subalternated to it. The major is clear from note 3. The minor is proved: our theology rests on faith, for its principles are the articles of faith, from which it elicits its conclusions: but faith cannot subsist with the science of the Blessed: therefore neither can our theology; which we will prove more fully in the following conclusion.

Second: a subalternated science depends on the subalternating science as on a cause; for the conclusions of the subalternating science are the principles of the conclusions of the subalternated science; for the latter are proved through the former, and consequently they are also the principles and causes of the subalternated science; because what is the cause of a cause is also the cause of the thing caused: but our theology does not depend on the science of the Blessed as on a cause. Proof. If the theology of the Blessed were the cause of our theology, this would be most of all either by reason of the object, or by reason of the power and subject, or by reason of the light: but none of these can be affirmed; for our theology does not depend on the science of the Blessed as on an object, or on a power, because God is the object, and our intellect is the subject of our theology independently of the theology of the Blessed. Nor does it depend on it as on a light, because our theology depends on the light of faith. Moreover, the conclusions of our theology are formed and known independently of the light of the beatific vision; and consequently they do not depend on it as on a cause. Therefore our theology is not subalternated to the theology of the Blessed.

Third: a subalternated science does not primarily and of itself concern the same truths which the subalternating science considers; because where the latter ends, there the former begins, in that the conclusions of the subalternated science must be proved through the conclusions of the subalternating science as through principles: but our theology concerns the same truths with which the theology of the Blessed is occupied: for the believed mysteries, from which we deduce our conclusions, are the same from which the Blessed elicit their conclusions; with this sole difference, that the same mysteries which are made known to us obscurely through faith are made known to them clearly and intuitively through the light of glory. Hence they can say: As we have heard (through faith, which is from hearing), so we see in the city of the Lord etc. Psal. 47.

Fourth: he who has a subalternated science can, indeed ought to, have also the subalternating science; otherwise he is not perfectly knowing, since he cannot resolve the conclusions of the subalternated science into evidently known principles, which are made known through the subalternating science; for the subalternating science is the habit by which the principles of the subalternated science are known: but it is impossible to acquire the habit of the conclusions unless the habit of the principles is first had; whence the physician ought to be skilled in Physics, at least as regards those things which have the character of a principle with respect to Medicine. But neither can we have the theology of the Blessed, nor can they have ours: therefore our theology is not subalternated to their science.

Fifth: a subalternated science considers its object under some real accidental notion, under which it is not considered by the subalternating science; for Medicine considers the natural body as curable, in a way in which it is not regarded by Physics, and by this difference Medicine is specifically distinguished from Physics: but our theology has altogether the same object as the theology of the Blessed, namely God under the notion of Deity: therefore it is not subalternated to it. — Nor does it matter that God is clearly seen by the Blessed, but is known obscurely and through revelation by us. For these do not effect a real diversity in the object: both because this diversity is to be traced back not to the object, but to the diversity of light, namely of glory and of faith: and because being clearly seen is only an extrinsic denomination, which therefore does not introduce any real diversity in the object, under which it could be considered by one science and not by another: and because the object under the formal notion of object precedes the science, as the cause precedes the effect; for every knowledge is born from the object and the power: but God as clearly seen does not precede the beatific science, which is vision; rather he follows it, because he is said to be seen from the vision. Therefore this notion of being clearly seen is not an objective notion specifying and essentially distinguishing the science of the Blessed from ours.

Gonet replies that although in the natural sciences the subalternated science must consider the object under some accidental notion, which is the notion of a new knowability and the root of the properties which the subalternating science does not consider; nevertheless this condition is not required in theology. For since the object of theology is infinite and unlimited, of itself, and without the addition of any accidental difference, it has several modes of knowability, by reason of which it can terminate different sciences, and be known through one wholly supernatural science, such as is the science of the Blessed; and through another natural one, which through natural light and discourse deduces its conclusions from the principles of that science of the Blessed, such as is our theology. — Against this: 1. He speaks contradictorily, saying that our theology demands lack of evidence from its own nature, yet has it only as joined per accidens and by reason of state; for what is demanded from the nature of the thing belongs to it, not per accidens and by reason of something extrinsic, but by reason of its intrinsic principles. For although, e.g., heat in fire is an accident; yet because fire demands heat from its own nature, no one would say that it belongs to it only by reason of state and from what is extrinsic; and therefore either our theology does not demand lack of evidence from its own nature, or it does not have it only from what is extrinsic and by reason of the faith on which it leans, and of the state of a wayfarer in which it is; but it has it from its intrinsic notion and from the principles from which it deduces its conclusions. Whence just as evidence is intrinsic to the science of the Blessed, because they elicit their conclusions from principles evidently known through the light of glory; so lack of evidence is intrinsic to our theology, because it deduces its conclusions from principles known without evidence through faith. — Secondly, that obscure revealability does not hold on the part of the knowable object, which of itself has nothing obscure, nothing that is not evident and evidently knowable: but it is traced back only to the part of the light and medium, by which the same object is apprehended clearly by the Blessed through the light of glory and obscurely by the wayfarers through faith: but the diversity of light does not suffice for the notion of subalternation, as we have shown in the second proof. — Thirdly, this response rests on a false foundation, namely that our theology and that of the Blessed differ only with respect to state, so that the theology of the wayfarers remains the same in the state of beatitude, which, in order that it may be resolved, is

Second conclusion. — The theology which we acquire here through discourse will not remain in the state of beatitude.

Proof first. From the Apostle, the first Epistle to the Corinthians, chap. 13, where when he had said: Charity never falls away, he adds: Whether prophecies shall be made void, or tongues shall cease, or knowledge shall be destroyed. From these words I argue thus: the knowledge which the Apostle indicates is to be destroyed in the homeland is the theology acquired here: therefore this will not remain in the homeland. The antecedent is proved: he says that that knowledge is to be destroyed about which, speaking earlier, he had said: If I should have prophecy and know all mysteries and all knowledge: but this is theological knowledge, by which namely one knows the mysteries through conclusions deduced from the articles of faith, as is evident. Therefore he judges that theological knowledge does not remain in the homeland.

You will answer. Perhaps, with certain Thomists, you will say that knowledge is said by the Apostle to be destroyed in the same way in which the elements are said by Christ to be dissolved after the day of judgment: so that, just as the elements will not be dissolved as regards their substance, but only as regards their mode and state, because namely they will pass from a more imperfect state to a more perfect state; so likewise our knowledge is not destroyed as regards the substance of the habit, but only as regards the mode of obscurity or lack of evidence which it has here. — On the contrary: this explanation is altogether contrary to the words of the Apostle, and far removed from his mind; both because the Apostle says simply and absolutely that knowledge is to be destroyed: but destruction is not merely a purification of the thing or a passage from a less perfect state to a more perfect state, as Christ speaks of the elements saying: Heaven and earth will pass away: but the verb "to destroy" signifies the cessation and ending of a thing, or the passage from non-being to being. And because he says that knowledge is to be destroyed in the same way in which prophecy is to be made void: but it is certain that prophecy does not in any way remain in the homeland, but fails entirely: therefore the same judgment is to be rendered concerning theological knowledge. And finally, because the Apostle gives the reason for this cessation and destruction: For we know in part, he says, and we prophesy in part: but when that which is perfect has come, that which is in part shall be made void. That is, whatever we now know, we know only partly through prophecy and partly through theological knowledge; and since both kinds of knowledge, being imperfect, as being obscure and lacking evidence, will be made void when the perfect and evident beatific knowledge has come: therefore the Apostle openly judges that all the knowledge which we have here of God through theological discourse does not subsist in the homeland, but ceases.

Proof second. Faith will not remain in the state of beatitude: therefore neither will our theology. The antecedent is admitted by all theologians, and is gathered from these words of the Apostle: We see now through a mirror, and in an enigma; but then face to face. The consequence is proved: our theology rests on faith; for from its articles it deduces all its conclusions: therefore, faith perishing, it is necessary that our theology also perish; for the loss of the foundation brings the ruin of the building.

It is confirmed. Faith does not remain in the homeland for this reason, because since it is obscure and lacking evidence, it is incompatible with the beatific science and clear vision of God: but our theology is likewise obscure and lacking evidence, not only by reason of state and per accidens (as the Thomists will have it), but from its intrinsic principles and from its formal notion, which I thus establish: such is the conclusion essentially and intrinsically as are the principles from which it is deduced: but the principles of our theology are intrinsically lacking in evidence: for they are the articles of faith, which, as they are articles of faith, have annexed to them lack of evidence and obscurity, since they are made known through faith and revelation alone: therefore the theological conclusion is intrinsically lacking in evidence; and consequently it cannot subsist with the beatific vision.

You will say 1. No habit is destroyed, except either per se, and for the introduction of a contrary, as the habit of temperance is dissolved by the vice of intemperance; or per accidens, and upon the cessation of the subject in which it is, or of the object about which it is, or of the act by which it is formed and nourished: but our theology can perish in the homeland in neither of these ways: therefore it does not cease, but perseveres. The major is known to the Philosophers: the minor is evident as regards both parts: for first, the beatific vision is not opposed per se to our theology, but only per accidens and by reason of the different light, of faith and of glory: second, the object is the same, and the same intellective and discursive faculty, both in the way and in the homeland: therefore, etc. — I deny the minor. As regards the first part, since the beatific vision is opposed per se to theology, as the clear is opposed to the obscure and the evident to what lacks evidence, as has often already been said, and therefore it is necessary that upon the coming of the beatific vision all our theology perish, just as at the rising of the sun the darkness is dissolved and vanishes.

You will say 2. St. Jerome judges that theological knowledge perseveres in heaven, since in the Epistola ad Paulinum, when exhorting him to the study of Sacred Scripture, he says: Let us learn on earth those things the knowledge of which will persevere with us in the heavens. And St. Chrysostom, in c. 13 of the first Epistle to the Corinthians, weighing the aforesaid words of St. Paul, says: Knowledge will not be abolished, but will cease to be imperfect: therefore they judge that theology does not fail, but perseveres in heaven. — I deny the consequence. And to St. Jerome I say that he speaks of the things known, not of knowledge itself, so that he wishes Paulinus to apply himself to the study of the mysteries, the evident and clear knowledge of which he ought to have in the heavens. To St. Chrysostom I say that he wishes our knowledge indeed not to be abolished, not because the preceding one remains, but because upon the cessation of the imperfect and obscure knowledge, a clear and evident one succeeds.

From philosophy it is established that the object of a science is said to be everything that is set before or proposed to the intellect to be known through that science: it is also called the subject, not indeed of inherence, that is, that to which some accident inheres, but of attribution, because all things with which a science deals are attributed to it, and are referred to it either as parts, or as properties, or as species, if it has any.

Note 1. First, a twofold object is commonly distinguished, namely material and formal. The former is so called not because it is corporeal and composed of physical matter, but by a certain analogy which it has with matter; for just as matter is indifferent to the various forms by which it is informed, so this is indifferent to the various sciences by which it is attained and perceived; for the same human body, v. g., can be called the object of medicine as healable, of physics as natural, and of geometry as extended. The latter, however, is that formality to be found in the material object by which the object is determined to a certain science; thus naturalness determines the human body to physics, healability to medicine, quantity to geometry, etc. Each of these is again twofold, namely adequate, or total, to which all things treated in a science are referred either as parts, or as properties, or as causes, or as effects, etc.; and inadequate or partial, which is considered from only one part of that science.

Note 2. The formal object — to pass over all its other acceptations and usages — can be distinguished as threefold, namely specificative, motive, and terminative. The specificative, or that by which, is that formality to be found in the material object, v. g., healability in the human body, which determines the object to medicine, and specifies and distinguishes that science from any other. The motive, or that because of which, is the reason by which the intellect is moved to know the object, and without which it would not apply itself to the knowledge of it; thus light can be called the object moving sight to perceive color, and premises can be said objectively to move the intellect to give assent to the conclusion: and because divine revelation, objectively proposed to the intellect, moves it to the assent of faith, it can be called the formal motive object of that assent. The terminative, however, or that which, is the whole compounded of the material and formal object, which terminates all the cognitions which are had in a science about such an object: thus the healable can be called the terminative object of medicine, because it is the reason terminating all the cognitions and conclusions of medicine. — To these add the formal notion under which, which, although the intellect does not attend to it in the object while through science it is engaged about that object, nevertheless if it were absent, it would not tend to the object through that science. Thus visibility is the reason under which the eye perceives color; for although one seeing color does not see visibility, nevertheless if color were not visible, it would not be seen by the eye. So likewise abstraction from matter is the reason under which metaphysics considers being and its properties; because although while the metaphysician considers being, and in it unity, goodness, etc., he does not attend to whether they prescind from matter; nevertheless unless they so prescinded, them

the metaphysician would not consider, for the reason that the object of metaphysics must prescind from all matter.

Note 3. Something can be said to be revealed in a twofold manner. First, formally, immediately, and explicitly; thus it is revealed that God is one in essence, and three in persons, that the divine Word is incarnate, etc. Second, virtually, mediately, and implicitly, when namely in the thing immediately revealed, another is virtually, intrinsically, and necessarily contained, or follows upon it, either as a principle, or as a property, or as an effect, which is deduced from it by reasoning; in which manner in this immediately revealed proposition: Christ is a man, these are virtually and mediately revealed: Christ is capable of laughter, of discourse, etc., because the power of laughing and of discoursing are properties inseparable from man.

These things having been premised, it must be resolved what is the object of theology, both material and formal: in the discussion of which question the foremost theologians so disagree that among them all they scarcely consent with one another. But, that what has seemed truer to the Subtle Doctor may become apparent, let there be

First conclusion. — God is the adequate object of our theology.

So the Doctor, q. 3. Prologi. n. 7.; for although there he speaks only of the object of theology in itself and insofar as it is in the divine intellect, nevertheless that he thinks the same about the theology which is in us, I shall establish below.

Therefore the conclusion is proved. That is the adequate object of a science which contains all the truths, and to which are referred all things which are treated in it: but God virtually contains all truths, and to Him are referred all things which are treated in theology: therefore He is its adequate object.

The minor is proved. Whatever is handed down in theology regards God subsisting, operating, and producing, either in the order of the Divinity — and this is the First book of the Sentences; or in the order of nature, by creating, moderating, and destining things to their ends through means suited to each — and this the Second book contains; or in the order of grace, by supplying supernatural means to men for attaining the supernatural end — and about these the Third book disputes. Finally, in the order of glory, by decreeing to each one a reward or punishments according to merits and demerits. — Or, as our Aureolus says, q. 1. Prologi art. 4., since theology, he says, is about God and about divine things, some things can be called divine by essence, some by participation; some are called divine by assumption, as Christ and His humanity: some indeed by creation and governance, as the whole world comprising every creature: some indeed by precept and prohibition, as virtues and vices: some indeed by institution, as the Sacraments: some indeed by final direction, as the beatific vision and love; by which it openly stands that all things which are treated in theology are referred to God as to the adequate object.

It is confirmed. By the refutation of the other principal opinions: First indeed, the object of theology is not things and signs, as the Master of the Sentences asserts, book one, dist. 1., understanding by the name of signs the things which are symbols of others; whether meanwhile they effect what they signify, as the Sacraments; or only signify and prefigure, as the figures of the Old Testament which signified the mysteries of the new law. This opinion, I say, is deservedly rejected by all. Then because things in themselves are considered by physics or metaphysics, whose office it is to investigate the nature and properties of things; insofar, however, as they have the notion of a sign, they are considered either by grammar or by logic, whose office it is to unfold the signification of names and things: therefore things and signs are not the proper object of theology. Then because theology, according to the etymology of the name, is speech or knowledge about God; and therefore things and signs cannot be its object, except insofar as they are appropriated to God, and employed to signify divine things: and so God is more fittingly established as the object than things and signs. — Secondly, neither can meritorious work nor the salvation of man fittingly be assigned as the object of theology, as Durandus wished, q. 1. et 5. Prologi. Then because the things which are treated in theology are not referred to meritorious work, e.g., the unity of essence, the trinity of persons, etc.: indeed meritorious works are ordered to something else; for they are considered as they are from God and tend into God: Then because even if there were no meritorious work, and no salvation to be hoped for, theology could nonetheless remain safe; for an Angel or a wayfaring man, not illumined, could deduce theological conclusions from the objects revealed to him: therefore, etc. — Thirdly, finally, neither is Christ, insofar as He is God-man, legitimately established as the object of theology, as St. Bonaventure wished, q. 1. Prologi, and many others with him: Then because, as the Doctor says, if Christ were the adequate object of theology, it would follow that four propositions would not be theological; namely, the necessary propositions about the Person of the Father and of the Holy Spirit; such as: The Father generates, The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son; nor even the contingent truths which are formed about them, for example: The Father creates with the Son: The Holy Spirit was temporally sent to the Apostles, and is infused by grace into justified men. — Likewise neither would the necessary propositions about the triune and one God be true; for example, God omnipotent, and immense, etc.; nor the contingent ones, for example, God creates, orders, and rules the world, etc.; but this is absurd: therefore also that from which it follows. The consequence is clear; for no truth belongs to any science, except because it looks to its object, either as its subjective part, or as an integral or essential part, or finally as its property. But neither the Father, nor the Holy Spirit, nor the Trinity of persons is Christ, nor a subjective or essential or integral part of Christ, nor are they His properties: therefore the truths about them would not be properly theological if Christ were the adequate object of theology. The minor is clear, because Christ as God-man is not deemed to comprehend the Father and the Holy Spirit, for He is a person distinct from them. — Moreover, since Christ involves and expresses at once the divine and human nature, if He were the adequate object of theology, since this must be prior at least in nature and concept to all the particular objects which it comprehends, and which are referred to it, it would follow that according to the human nature He would be prior to the Father and the Holy Spirit: but no Catholic ought to or can assert this. — Finally, Christ as man is considered by the natural sciences; by metaphysics indeed, insofar as He is a being; by physics insofar as He is corporeal, etc.; and therefore He could not be established as the object of theology, except precisely insofar as He is man-God, and so the Deity would be the principal reason why He is established as the object of theology. Therefore not Christ, but God Himself is legitimately assigned as the adequate object of theology.

The Bishop of Lincoln replies, that Christ, to be sure, precisely considered and according to the divine and human nature alone, is not rightly assigned as the adequate object of theology: but well if He is considered according to a threefold unity: either of essence, which He has with the Father and the Holy Spirit; or of person, which He has with the divine and human nature; or of head, which He has with the members of the Church: for nothing, he says, is treated in theology which is not referred back to one or other of those unities. — But truly neither by this reason can Christ be assigned as the adequate object of theology; since, as has been said, all the propositions, both necessary and contingent, which are made about the Father and the Holy Spirit, would not by this reason be theological; since they cannot be referred back to Christ according to one or other of those unities. Then from this it would follow that Christ could be said to be prior to the Father; since the adequate object is prior with the priority of concept to the particular objects contained under it. And so it follows that God Himself is assigned as the adequate object of theology.

You will say 1. Many things are handed down in theology which ought not and cannot be reduced to God, e.g., vices and sins: therefore God is not the adequate object of theology. — I distinguish the antecedent. That they ought not to be reduced directly, I concede; for they are not means ordered to attaining God, indeed they remove from His possession; that they ought not to be reduced at least indirectly, I deny; for vices, although they do not have God as author, because they do not have an efficient cause, but a deficient one, in that they are not effects, but rather defects of human liberty deviating from the right path; nevertheless they regard God as the permitting, ordering, and punishing cause. For God, on account of His infinite liberty, and lest He coerce our will, permits sins to be committed out of wisdom, orders them to some good out of providence, and punishes them out of justice; for as St. Augustine says, tractate 112. on Ioannem, The good God uses evils well, and makes good things from evils, and makes the good to be made from the evil, and the good to be discerned from the evil.

You will say 2. Any science supposes, but does not prove, the existence of its object: but theology proves the existence of God, as will be clear below: therefore God is not its object. — I distinguish the major. That a science does not prove the existence of its object a priori and through a proper and intrinsic means, I concede: that it does not prove it a posteriori through an extrinsic means, or through its effects, I deny the major. — Similarly I distinguish the minor. That it proves the existence of God a priori and from its own principles, namely the articles of faith, I deny: that it proves it a posteriori through effects, and from the principles of the other natural sciences, in order to beat back the madness of the Atheists, I concede: for the existence of God, as it is a supernatural being, in the manner in which it is considered by theology, is not proved by any reasoning, but is believed by faith.

Second conclusion. — The formal object by which, that is, the specificative and terminative object of theology, is God, under the notion of the Deity.

The Doctor proves it. Quaest. 3. Prologi num. 7.: God is the specificative object of theology under that notion under which He virtually contains all the truths which are treated in it: but He contains them under the notion of the Deity: for all the truths which are handed down and considered in theology are either of necessary or of contingent things; and all these God virtually contains through the formal notion of the Deity.

— The necessary ones indeed; for the reason why God is one, triune, infinite, eternal, etc., is the Deity itself; and through the Deity itself, evidently known, any of the blessed can demonstrate all things which belong to God; for the Deity itself is the fount and root of all things which are in God; and therefore it is likewise the reason by which it can be proved that they belong to God. — The contingent ones also; for that God is creator, sanctifier, glorifier, or something of those things which are contingently attributed either to the Father, or to the Son, or to the Holy Spirit, singly, or to the whole Trinity together, these belong to Him by no other reason than the Deity itself, which, since it is the first and fundamental reason of all things which are in God, also virtually contains the truth and knowability of all those things which are affirmed of God.

Second. The noblest habit ought to have the noblest object, and under the noblest notion: but among the habits of the intellect, theology is the noblest; among knowable objects God is the noblest; and the Deity itself is the most excellent among all the divine notions, since it is the root and foundation of the others: therefore God under the notion of the Deity is the formal object of theology.

Third. That is the specificative formal object by which theology is distinguished from the other sciences regarding God: but by the sole notion of the Deity theology is distinguished from metaphysics, which likewise considers God, not under the notion of the Deity, but under the notion of first cause, of infinite being, of ultimate end, etc., as is clear from 1. et 12. Metaphysicorum: therefore it is necessary that theology contemplate God under the notion of the Deity.

Fourth. God is the object of theology under that notion under which He is set before faith and the beatific vision; for theology depends on faith and is ordered to the beatific vision, and those cognitions succeed one another: but all confess that God is the object of the beatific vision under the notion of the Deity; since the blessed see God as He is; He is likewise the object of faith under the same notion; and that either immediately, e.g., in those articles of faith which are immediately about the one or triune God; or mediately, namely in those articles which concern the incarnation, nativity, passion, etc., of the Word; for those articles are not about a pure man but about the man-God. Therefore God under the notion of the Deity is the object of theology.

Fifth. Finally, that is the specificative formal object of theology which, being posited, theology is posited, and which, being removed, it perishes, even with all the others remaining: but even if God had not been either Redeemer, or Creator, or Glorifier, nor had any of those appellations which He obtains in the order of nature, or of grace, or of glory, theology would nonetheless have remained safe: since, these being set aside, the theologian could have elicited various conclusions about God, and proved that God is eternal, because He is immutable; infinite, because He is being by essence; intelligent, because He is a spiritual substance: therefore, etc.

You will say 1. God cannot be known by us wayfarers under the notion of the Deity: therefore neither can He be the specificative object of our theology under the same. The antecedent is proved: God cannot be known under the notion of the Deity, unless His essential predicates are known: but these cannot be known by us, as is certain: therefore, etc. — I distinguish the antecedent. That God cannot be known by us under the notion of the Deity distinctly, intuitively, and in itself, I concede: that He cannot be known confusedly, abstractively, and through alien species, which lead us into the cognition of that divinity, I deny; for, as St. Paul says ad Rom. 1., His invisible things, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made; his eternal power also, and divinity. Therefore His Deity and attributes can be known through the species of creatures, at least abstractively, by us wayfarers. But this abstractive cognition suffices for the notion of a scientific object; otherwise we could have no scientific cognition of substance, not only spiritual, but even corporeal; since (as the Doctor says, q. 1. Prologi n. 11.) we know no substance in this state distinctly and through its own species, but only confusedly and through the habitude and order to some effect proper to it.

You will say 2. A science ought to equal and comprehend its object, and to know it only as much as it is knowable: but our theology, since it is finite, cannot equal God, infinite under the notion of the Deity: therefore under this notion He is not its object.

I distinguish the major. That science must equal its object with an arithmetical equality, by which a two-foot line, for example, is equal to another two-foot line, I deny: with an equality of proportion, that is, that it knows the object just insofar as it is knowable in this way and by this science, I concede; and in this way our theology equals God under the notion of Deity: because it attains and knows him insofar as he is knowable from revealed principles. But that this equality of proportion suffices for science, and that arithmetical equality is not required, is evident; otherwise metaphysics would scientifically know nothing about God as the supreme being and first cause; indeed, neither would the science of the Blessed be perfect: for neither of them can equal God arithmetically, since each science is created and finite, whereas God is infinite and uncreated.

You will say 3. The adequately specifying object of some science must be predicated of all the special objects which are considered by that science: but Deity is not predicated of the Angels, of Man, of the Laws, of the Sacraments, of the Vices, of the Virtues, which are considered in theology: therefore this is not the specifying object of theology.

I distinguish the major. That it must be predicated either in the direct or in the oblique case, I concede: always in the direct case, I deny. To the minor, I say that Deity is indeed not predicated of all the aforementioned in the direct case; for it is true that those things are not God; but it is predicated in the oblique case; for they are either effects of God, or means conducing to God as to a supernatural end.

You will say 4. The specifying and formal object must be the cause and formal notion of all the properties which are demonstrated of the object: but Deity is not the cause nor the formal notion of innascibility, which, for example, is in the Father; otherwise the Son and the Holy Spirit, since they have the Deity, would be formally innascible; which is false. Therefore, etc.

I distinguish the major. Either per se and immediately, or through another in which it is found and by which it is determined, I concede: always per se, I deny. For naturalness, for example, which is the specifying formal object of Physics, is the notion and formal cause of all the properties which are demonstrated of the human body; not indeed per se, but insofar as it is determined to such a body through humanity.

Similarly I distinguish the minor. That Deity is not the notion why innascibility belongs to the Father per se and precisely insofar as it is divinity, I concede; mediately and by reason of another, that is, insofar as it is determined through the relation of paternity to the first divine supposit, I deny.

You will say 5. That is not the formal object of theology to which alone the formal notion does not belong, under which theology considers its object. But this notion does not belong to the Deity alone. Proof: The notion under which theology considers its object is the truthfulness of God in revealing, as will be proved in the following conclusion: but this belongs not to the Deity alone, but also to anything supernatural; for every supernatural being is revealable just as much as the Deity itself: therefore Deity is not the formal object.

I distinguish the major. That the notion under which does not belong to it alone proximately, let it pass; ultimately and remotely, I deny. And with the minor likewise distinguished, I deny the consequence. For although this notion can proximately belong to every supernatural being immediately and proximately; nevertheless it is certain that it must principally and ultimately be traced back to the Deity itself: whence the Deity is not only a revealable object, but is also the source of all revealable things; and it is revealable per se, whereas the rest are revealable through it, and by reason of it.

You will say 6. This conclusion openly contradicts the Subtle Doctor: for he teaches in q. 3. of the Prologue n. 7. that God under the notion of Deity is indeed the object of theology in itself, or insofar as he is in the divine intellect: but in n. 12. he affirms that the object of our theology is infinite being, for he says:

For our theology, insofar as it is ours, there need not be given a first object, except the first known; from which, once known, the first truths are immediately known. But that first known is infinite being, because this is the most perfect concept which we can have of him, etc. therefore he judges that infinite being is the specifying formal object of our theology: not indeed the Deity itself.

I distinguish the consequence. That he judges infinite being to be the object first specifying and as regards the mode of knowledge, so that God is known by us earlier and more easily under the notion of infinite being than under the notion of the Deity itself, I concede: as regards the truth of the matter and the substantial notion of the specifying object, which from itself must virtually contain all the truths which are treated in the science, and to which all things which are in it must be reduced, I deny.

The Doctor therefore does not will that the notion of infinite being be absolutely the formal object of theology, whether considered according to itself and in the divine intellect, or in our intellect; for he had previously disapproved and attacked this in n. 9., saying:

That God under the notion of infinite or necessary being is not legitimately established as the object of theology, because as such he cannot cause all theological truths, and be the means for demonstrating that they belong to God; for infinity and necessity of being is not the notion why God is One and Triune, why the Son is generated, why the Holy Spirit is breathed forth; otherwise, since we naturally know God to be infinite and necessary being, we would also naturally know God to be Triune, the Son to be generated, and the Holy Spirit to proceed by spiration; for once the cause is known, that can be known to which it leads in knowledge. But it is false that we can naturally know the mystery of the Trinity, as all admit.

But the Doctor through the aforementioned words in the objection intends only this, either that the notion of infinite being is the principal and better-known concept which we can have of God in this state; for since God is variously conceived by us, now under the notion of first cause, now under the notion of necessary being, now under the notion of the omnipotent, now under the notion of infinite being, the Doctor judges that the notion of infinite being is the principal and nobler among all these notions under which God can be conceived by us wayfarers.

Or in a word, the Doctor judges that God under the notion of infinite being is the object of our theology comparatively with respect to the mode of our knowledge; because he is known by us more easily and more evidently under this notion than under the notion of Deity; not however absolutely and according to the essential notion of the adequate formal object, namely insofar as it is the first notion and as it were the root of all the truths which are treated in theology: for these belong to the Deity alone, as has been proved.

But that this is the mind of the Doctor openly appears, for he adds:

Nevertheless, because our theology is about necessary things, it is about the same things about which theology in itself is, therefore a first subject is assigned to it as regards this, that it contains truths in itself: and this same is the subject of our theology which is the first subject of theology in itself: but because that is not evident to us, therefore it does not contain these truths as known to us. And proposing to himself this objection: Therefore God under the notion of Deity is not the first object of our theology, he says: I answer, it is true, it is not the first subject giving evidence, but the first subject containing all the truths, and born to give evidence, if it itself were known. Therefore he speaks comparatively and with regard to our mode of conceiving; not however absolutely and with regard to the substantial and fundamental notion of the adequate formal object; and consequently neither does he contradict us, nor we him; for we speak of the adequate formal object considered according to itself; he indeed of the object as it is more evidently attained by us. As also Smising consents, q. 2. n. 58.

Third conclusion. — The formal object by which, or the motive of our theology, is the truth, or the truthfulness of God in revealing, insofar as it is applied and becomes known through theological discourse.

Proof. Our theology does not rest on the evidence of its object, but on the testimony and revelation of God; for it deduces its conclusions from the principles and articles of faith: but the authority and certainty of testimony is resolved into the truthfulness of the witness, as into the motive of the assent which one gives to testimony: therefore the truthfulness of God is the motive of the assent which we give to a theological conclusion; not indeed truthfulness alone, otherwise theological assent would not differ from the assent of faith, which is given only on account of the truthfulness of God revealing: but truthfulness applied through theological discourse.

Secondly. Our theology must be borne toward God by some special motive and singular notion which does not belong to others: therefore, since the theology of the Blessed is borne toward God clearly and evidently, and deduces its conclusions from evident principles; while faith is borne toward God to be known obscurely and on account of the sole authority of the one revealing: it is necessary that our theology, as it were middle between the two, be borne toward God on account of his truthfulness in revealing applied through discourse, so that through the obscurity of revelation it may differ from the theology of the Blessed; and through discourse be distinguished from the knowledge of faith.

Thirdly. Through our theology we know God more certainly and more truly than through any natural science, for instance Physics and Metaphysics: but this greater certainty and firmer truth does not come from elsewhere than this, that the natural sciences rest on the light of reason alone, while theology rests on the testimony of God, which is far firmer and truer than any natural light of reason: therefore the testimony of God revealing is the motive object of our theology.

You will say 1. The formal motive notion of the object must be intrinsic to it: but the truthfulness of God revealing is extrinsic to the object of theology: therefore it is not its motive notion.

I distinguish the major. In the natural sciences, which deduce their conclusions from evident principles and are borne toward the object on account of its evidence, I concede: in theology, which deduces its conclusions from the articles of faith, whose truth and certainty depends on the truthfulness of God testifying and revealing, I deny.

You will say 2. That truthfulness is resolved into the Deity, for that testimony is true and infallible for this reason, because it is divine: therefore the Deity itself is also the formal motive notion of theology.

I distinguish the antecedent. That it is resolved into the Deity as into the ultimate and remote motive, I concede: as into the immediate and proximate, I deny: for the first motive why I assent to some revealed proposition is the truth of God in revealing; the mediate one, however, is his infinite goodness and wisdom, by which it comes about that he can neither be deceived nor deceive: the ultimate one, however, is the Deity itself. For a theological conclusion is on that account judged true, because it is deduced from principles revealed by God: on that account these revealed principles are certain, because God is truthful and cannot lie: on that account he cannot lie, because since he is infinitely wise he cannot be deceived, and since he is infinitely good he cannot deceive: on that account, however, he is infinitely good and wise, because he is God: and so the truth and certainty of a theological conclusion is ultimately resolved into the notion of Deity.