Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

Note 1. A twofold necessity is wont to be distinguished, namely absolute and hypothetical; for in the first place that is said to be absolutely necessary which is such that the highest necessity of existing belongs to it per se and by the force of its own nature and essence; so that, prescinding from the supposition of anything else whatsoever, it cannot at all not be, in which manner God alone is called a Being absolutely necessary. Secondly, a thing is necessary from hypothesis, namely because, some other thing being supposed, it cannot not be, because it is included in it, or infallibly follows from it, or has a necessary connection with it; in which manner, if a man exists, it is necessary that he be an animal; if there is a cause under the notion of cause, it is necessary that there also be an effect; if a man wishes to preserve his natural life for a long time, food is necessary for him; if he desires to attain eternal life, he must depart from this mortal life in grace.

Note 2. What is necessary from hypothesis, in order to attain some end, can be said to be so in three ways: First indeed by the necessity of precept only: Second, only by the necessity of means: Third, by both necessities at once, namely of means and of precept. Thus hearing Mass on feast days is necessary by the necessity of precept in order to salvation: but Baptism for the same end is necessary for little children only by the necessity of means, not however of precept, of which infants, as lacking reason, are incapable. But for adults Baptism is necessary by both necessities; by that of means indeed, because without it, received in reality or in desire, they cannot be justified; by that of precept truly, because by divine command they are bound to procure their salvation through the means necessary and ordained by God, such as Baptism is. But whether any Theological Doctrine is necessary for us by some one of these necessities, will have to be resolved in the present Question; but first:

Note 3. Theology properly taken, according to its various division and acceptation, also obtains various appellations: First, by reason of the Means, or of the light, by which it is illumined, it can be distinguished and named threefold, namely Theology of Vision, of Revelation, and of Reasoning. For there is a threefold light by which God becomes known to men, namely the light of glory, by whose aid blessed minds contemplate God face to face, the Royal Prophet saying, Psal. 35.: In thy light we shall see light; another is the light of faith, by which, says St. Peter 2. 1., is a lamp shining in a dark place until the day dawns, by which light we, still mortal, see divine things through a mirror and in an enigma; for faith, says St. Paul, is the substance of things hoped for, the argument of things not appearing, Hebr. 11. Third finally is the light of natural reason; For God hath signed upon us the light of his countenance, that we might perceive and discern his invisible things, understood through the things which are made. — By reason of the Subject, it is also threefold: namely the Theology of God, of the Blessed, and of the Wayfarers. The first is called Comprehensive, by which God most perfectly comprehends himself and in himself all things by his infinite knowledge: For all things are naked and open to his eyes, Hebr. 4. The second is Intuitive, by which the blessed see God as he is, so that there is nothing in him which lies hidden from the one seeing. The third is Discursive, by which wayfarers either detect the Creator from the magnitude of the species and of the creature, or from the sacred storehouse of the divine Scriptures draw out and demonstrate catholic dogmas. The first is in an adequate subject, the second in a clear subject, the third in an obscure subject: for we know in part and we prophesy in part, 1. Cor. 13. — By reason of the Object about which it is occupied, one is called the Theology of Necessary Things, by which it regards God ad intra and according to himself, and inasmuch as he is one in essence, three in persons, and infinite in his excellences. Another, of Contingent Things, which regards God as operating ad extra and in respect to creatures, which he either creates, conserves, and moderates in the order of nature; or calls and justifies in the order of grace; or beatifies and crowns in the order of glory. — By reason of the Method, one is called Positive, another Scholastic: the former expounds the sacred letters and the articles of faith in a fuller style and in an oratorical manner; and therefore it is called positive, because it as it were posits and proposes the truths of faith, from which, as from principles and premises, the Scholastic in a philosophical manner and by syllogistic art deduces its conclusions, so that it makes catholic dogmas manifest, and separates and defends them from the wicked assertions of Heretics or of those philosophizing badly.

Only conclusion. — Theological doctrine is necessary for men, by which, from principles known by divine faith, it may disclose certain truths which mortal men could not procure for themselves with the aid of philosophy. This is the position of all Theologians against the Philosophers, and the Subtle Doctor proves it in q. 1. of the Prologue, n. 6., thus:

First, it is necessary that man determinately know his ultimate end, toward which he ought to direct all his operations: but he cannot attain this knowledge without some doctrine grounded on revelation, which is called Theology: therefore this is necessary for him. The major is clear from the fullest agreement of the Philosophers, who freely confess that every agent endowed with reason intends in its operations some determinate end, and directs toward it all its motions and acts, so that in it as in a beatifying object it may rest: but it would aim uncertainly at the mark, unless it determinately knew this end: therefore it ought to know it distinctly.

Proof of the minor. If the ultimate end of man could be detected by any of the philosophers with the light of reason alone, undoubtedly Aristotle, the Eagle of the Philosophers and the Genius of Nature, would have discovered it: but he did not discover it: which I indeed show by a twofold reason: first, because nowhere did he teach that God, clearly and intuitively to be seen, is our ultimate end; indeed in 10. Ethic. lib. 7. he placed the ultimate end of man in the knowledge of separated substances; for when in cap. 5. and 6. he had reported and impugned the various opinions of the ancient Philosophers concerning the ultimate end and beatitude of man, he himself established a twofold happiness of man; the one moral and civil; the other speculative and contemplative. The moral he said, 1. Ethic. cap. 7., to be an operation according to the best virtue, which is prudence; so that he judged man to be happy then, when he composed all his actions wisely and in an orderly manner: the speculative, however, he explains in 10. Ethic. cap. 6. 7. and 8., and he teaches that it consists in the most perfect operation of all, which he judged to be the knowledge of God and of immaterial substances; not indeed intuitive, which he himself did not know; but abstractive, such as human discourse can attain, e.g., etc. — It is proved secondly: by the force of no natural principle can it be proved that eternal beatitude and the ultimate end consist objectively in God, and formally in the clear vision of God, or in the love following upon the vision, or in both at once: therefore man's happiness and ultimate end cannot be detected by natural light.

Proof of the antecedent. If there were any such principles from which it were lawful to infer that we are naturally ordered to see God clearly, they would especially be certain acts and effects arising in us, by which as by stimuli we would naturally be incited to that vision: but it is evident that we do not experience such acts or effects; and therefore they are none: therefore neither are there any principles by which we could naturally know our ultimate end determinately; and therefore some doctrine is necessary which infers this from revealed principles; this, however, is Theology, and therefore it is necessary.

Proof of the 2. Conclusion. and the preceding argument is confirmed by the same Doctor, ibid., n. 8.: Every agent acting for an end must necessarily know three things; First, how it is to be acquired; Second, what means conduce to its attainment; Third, whether those means suffice for this attainment; for if anyone does not know how the end is to be acquired, in what manner will he be able to gird himself for its attainment? Likewise, if he is ignorant of what means are necessary, perhaps he will not make use of something necessary, whereby it will come about that he is frustrated in his labor. If finally he is not certain that the means which he uses suffice for attaining the end, without doubt he will either wholly withdraw from the work, or will advance only waveringly; but man the wayfarer cannot know these three things by natural light. Not indeed the mode of acquisition; for that beatitude is to be acquired either as the inheritance of sons, or as the reward of those who labor, or as the crown of those who conquer, is wholly contingent, since God could have ordained that it be conferred otherwise. Not even the means; for that these or other sacraments are destined as necessary means to its attainment depends wholly on the free ordination of God, which has no necessary connection with natural things; and therefore it cannot be detected by natural discourse. Therefore some doctrine is necessary which from revealed principles discloses our ultimate end, and the mode, and the means by which it can be obtained, determinately and distinctly: this, however, Theology provides. Therefore it is necessary for us.

I prove finally, 3. Natural reason is wholly insufficient for detecting and manifesting the principal and higher truths, namely the nature of God, the immortality of the soul, the beatitude of man, etc., since it labors under one of these four defects, and for the most part under all four at once: for that natural reason is either weaker for inquiring into those truths: or obscurer for finding them when sought: or more uncertain for embracing them when found; or more timid and feeble for affirming and publishing them when believed: therefore a supernatural doctrine is necessarily needed, which, being free of these defects, may certainly inquire into, detect, affirm, and manifest the truth. The antecedent is proved as to each of its parts; and this by authority and reason at once, that I may satisfy Preachers and students of Theology.

First, therefore, natural reason is weaker for inquiring into those principal truths, since indeed it begs all its knowledge from the senses, according to that saying of Aristotle, 3. De Anima, cap. 9.: he who perceives nothing can learn and understand nothing; whence that common saying of Averroes, nothing is in the intellect which was not first in the sense; and since the senses have no proportion to divine things and higher truths; from this it comes about that the human mind wholly fails in inquiring into those truths; For the corruptible body, says the Sage, 3., weighs down the soul, and the earthly habitation depresses the sense thinking many things: and we hardly estimate the things which are on earth, and we find with labor the things which are in view, but the things which are in heaven, who shall investigate? whence St. Paul, first to the Corinthians 2.: The animal man does not perceive the things which are of God. — St. Augustine weighs this in a marvelous manner, lib. 8. De Trinit., cap. 2.:

Behold, see if you can, O soul weighed down by the body which is corrupted and laden with many and various earthly thoughts: Behold, see if you can, God is truth... do not seek what Truth is; for immediately the darknesses of bodily images and the clouds of phantasms will oppose themselves, and will disturb the serenity which at the first stroke shone upon you, when I said Truth; Behold, in that very first stroke by which you are struck as by a flash, when Truth is said; remain if you can, but you cannot. You will slip back into those usual and earthly things. By what weight at last, I ask, will you slip back, if not by the birdlime of the contracted filth of desire and the errors of the pilgrimage?

Whence rightly, Isai., 14.: My eyes are weakened looking up on high.

Second. Reason is obscurer for finding the truth; for the human mind, bound to and accustomed to corporeal things, can scarcely shake off its phantasms, so that it may be able to perceive and detect things cleansed of all body and free of matter. From this it came about that the Philosophers judged God to be nothing other than something corporeal; since indeed Justin the martyr says, in the first exhortation to the Greeks:

Thales of Miletus, the first author of natural Philosophy, judged the principle of all things to be water: Anaximander, infinity; Anaximenes, air; Heraclitus and Hippasus, fire: Anaxagoras, particles similar to one another, or similarities: Archelaus, infinite air; and the density and rarity of the things which surround it; Pythagoras, numbers: Epicurus, corpuscles, which can neither be corrupted, nor crushed, nor broken: Empedocles, the four elements, and two primary virtues, friendship and strife; of which the one serves union, the other dissension.

Whence St. Justin concludes that the doctrine of the Philosophers about the gods is much more ridiculous than the Theology of the Poets.

Nor was this gross and doubtful opinion of the ancient Philosophers only about God: but their ignorance and quarrel concerning the rational soul was also the greatest. Which the praised St. Justin excellently explains; for when he had said that Plato admitted three parts in it, namely reason, irascibility, and concupiscence, yet that it is immortal; that Aristotle on the contrary said that several little parts are detected in it, and that these are subject to corruption, and therefore that it is mortal, he adds that the other Philosophers, divided as it were in many ways by ignorance, thought that one must also contend about the soul, and be torn asunder by dissensions among themselves. For some of them assert that the soul is fire; some others, air; others, mind; others, motion: others, exhalation; some indeed, that it flows down from the stars; some, that it is a number holding the power of moving; others, genital water.

The same ignorance and disputation of the Philosophers labored in assigning man's beatitude: since indeed Marcus Varro numbered two hundred and eighty-eight opinions about man's happiness. St. Justin assigns the cause of this ignorance and dissension, namely that they did not want to learn from the experts, but trusted that they themselves could perceive heavenly things by the skill of the science of the human mind, when they could not even see through earthly ones. One must infer, therefore, with Tertullian, lib. De Praescript., cap. 7., that it belongs to secular Wisdom to be the reckless interpreter of the divine nature and disposition. Whence rightly St. Hilary, lib. 5.: Of God one must learn what is to be understood about God; because he is known with no one but himself as Author. The same, lib. 1.: Our talents do not ascend into heavenly science; nor will our infirmity conceive the incomprehensible power by any sense. God himself must be believed concerning himself, and the things which he has granted to our knowledge must be obeyed. For, as St. Cyril says, lib. 1. contra Iulianum, the things which exceed the grasp of the human mind must be honored by faith. Hence that celebrated saying of Plato in the Timaeo, that all truth can be learned in one way only, if we are taught it either by God himself, or by those who are born of God. From which Clemens Alexand. lib. 6. Strom.: rightly we, Christians, who gather testimonies from the divine oracles, glory that we have learned the truth through the Son of God.

Thirdly. Reason is more uncertain for embracing the truth once found, which is abundantly evident from the divided opinion of the Philosophers; for not only, as Justin says in the same passage, is there a confused and discordant opinion among them, which seems condemnable at least on one count by those approved by sound judgment, because their study is set upon this, that they argue and convince one another of being deluded and of putting forward nothing true; but (as he had warned above) if anyone wishes to inspect their writings more diligently, they do not sufficiently agree even with themselves in their opinions. Plato himself at one time established three principles of all things, God, matter, and the idea; at another time four: for he adds the universal soul. The same man, where he had professed matter to be unbegotten, later says that the same is begotten. Hence Caecilius, in Minutius Felix's Octavius, not incongruously said, all should be indignant and grieve, that some dare to decree something certain about the highest of things and about majesty, concerning which, through all ages, philosophy itself, with its very many sects, still deliberates. Nor without reason, since human mediocrity is so far removed from the exploration of divine things, that neither the things which are raised up and suspended in the heaven above us, nor the things which are sunk deep beneath the earth, is it given to know, or permitted to scrutinize, or religious to profane.

Fourthly and finally, natural human reason is weaker and more timid in publishing and preaching the divine truths known and believed; this St. Augustine demonstrates concerning Seneca, lib. 6. De Civ., cap. 10. That man (he says), whom the Philosophers made, as it were, free; yet because he was a Senator of the illustrious Roman people, he worshipped what he reproved, he did what he argued against, he adored what he blamed. St. Paul clearly expresses all these things in 1. cap. ad Romanos, affirming that the ancient Philosophers and Wise men had fallen into four horrible vices. The first indeed, of ingratitude, because when they had known God, they did not glorify Him as God, or give thanks: The second, of ignorance, their foolish heart was darkened; for saying themselves to be wise, they became fools: The third, of idolatry, for they changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of a corruptible man, and of birds, and of four-footed beasts, and of creeping things: The fourth, of abominable shamefulness, therefore He delivered them up to passions of ignominy, etc.

It must therefore be concluded with St. Thomas, secunda secundae q. 2. art. 2., that it was necessary for man to receive by way of faith not only the things which are above reason, but also those which can be known by reason, and this for three reasons: First, that man may arrive more quickly at the knowledge of divine truth: Second, that the knowledge of God may be more common: Third, for the sake of certainty; for human reason is greatly deficient in divine matters. Or, as he speaks in 1. p. q. 1. art. 1., the truth about God investigated by reason would come to men only to few, and after a long time, and with the admixture of many errors.

You will object 1. The Doctor argues for the Philosophers. Every potency which is concerned with some common object can also be concerned with any special object contained under that common and general object; for the eye, e.g., because it is concerned with the colored object as such, can also be concerned with the white and the other particular colored things: but our intellect by natural power is concerned with being, as being, as with its first and adequate object: therefore it can also be concerned naturally with any special being; and so it does not need any revelation in order to know certain beings.

The Doctor distinguishes the major, num. 32. A potency which is concerned with some common object can also be concerned with any particular object contained under it — that is, it can have a natural inclination to know that special object: he concedes; that is, it has in itself a natural power by which it knows any special object just as it knows the common object: he denies. For although the intellect, in knowing being as being, also has an inclination implanted by nature to know any special being; it does not, however, follow from this that it can uncover any being by the powers of nature; for there are many knowable things which in this mortal state cannot be known without divine revelation; either because they have no commerce with our senses, such as spiritual substances; or because there is no natural effect leading into their knowledge, such as the Trinity of persons in the unity of essence: or finally because they entirely exceed the grasp of nature, both in being made and in being known, of which sort are grace, faith, and hope, which are therefore said to be of the supernatural order.

You will object 2. Sense is a cognitive potency far inferior to the intellect, which yet needs no supernatural help in order to be borne toward whatever of its objects; for the eye, e.g., can by its native activity see whatever is visible: therefore the intellect ought to need such help much less, in order to be borne toward anything intelligible. The consequence is proved: sense does not need supernatural help for this reason, that according to Arist. 3. De Anima, t. 45., nature does not fail in necessary things, and supplies to potencies all the aids by which they can exercise their operations; therefore it ought to fail much less toward the intellective potency, which, since it is far more excellent than the senses, ought to depend less on what is extrinsic in order to operate; but it would fail it if, besides its native power of understanding, it still needed another help in order to perceive some object: therefore it does not need such help.

The Doctor denies the consequence. and to its proof he responds, that nature does not therefore fail in necessary things because it itself supplies all the means necessary for acting; but because it bestows potencies and faculties ready for the operation befitting each thing: and this it confers on the intellect no less than on the senses; for each faculty, both the sensitive and the intellective, has a power of operating most suited to itself implanted by nature. But if the intellect cannot exercise this its natural power with respect to some object; that does not come from a defect of nature not supplying what is necessary; but from the supreme dignity both of the object, which, since it is of a higher order, exceeds the natural power of the intellect, nor can it be attained by it unless it be raised and strengthened by some help of a higher order; and of the intellect, which is therefore deemed nobler and more illustrious, because it requires not only a natural, but even a supernatural order of perfection for its ornament and completion. Whence the Doctor rightly infers, num. 33., that nature does not fail it; since it confers on it all the things which are desired in it for natural operation; although it does not confer on it what is required for the supernatural knowledge of a supernatural object; for nature ought to accomplish only those things which are natural. But since every perfection of the senses is purely natural, nature would surely fail them if it did not supply them with all things for perceiving their object.

You will insist. Nature supplies the senses not only with power, but also with the means necessary for operating: therefore it ought also to confer on the intellect all the means necessary for understanding anything; otherwise the intellect will be of a worse condition and lot than the senses.

I deny the consequence. for the comparison of the intellect with the senses is not equal; since the senses, on account of their less perfect power of acting, are limited to certain objects and a certain natural mode of operating, beyond which order they can in no way break out; for they are concerned only with sensible being, which, since it is only of the natural order, it is no wonder if the senses desire nothing at all beyond the order of nature for reaching all their objects. But it is otherwise with the intellect, which, since it has as its adequate object any intelligible being, and there are some intelligibles exceeding the grasp and order of nature; hence it happens that although it has a natural inclination to know them, it cannot, however, reach them by the powers of nature; whence it is necessary that, in order to know them, it be enlightened and strengthened by some supernatural means. Nor does it follow from this that the intellect is of a worse lot than the senses, for, as the Doctor speaks, n. 33., it is the greatest perfection for the intellect, that it can be divinely elevated to receive a greater perfection than it can itself actively produce. For it is a sign that it is perfected not only by those things which are confined within the limits and barriers of nature; but that it also requires some preternatural excellence for the completion of its perfection. But it is otherwise with the senses, whose highest and ultimate perfection, since it can be conferred by natural agents, it follows that they are capable of less perfection than the intellect.

You will object 3. Doctor: For this reason some supernatural doctrine would be required, chiefly because the intellect is not proportioned to knowing every object, and consequently it would have to be conformed and proportioned to it by something else: but this reason is of no force: therefore neither is that conclusion for the proving of which it is assumed.

Proof of the minor. That by which the intellect would have to be equated and conformed to the object would either be natural or supernatural. Not the first, because it could not raise the intellect beyond its natural state, and make it proportioned to a supernatural object. Not the second either, because since the intellect is not of itself proportioned to another supernatural thing, it could not receive that supernatural thing, unless it were again made capable of this reception through another; about which, since the same difficulty would recur, there would be a process to infinity: therefore no supernatural doctrine is required in the intellect.

He answers, n. 31. having conceded the major by denying the minor. For it is true that the intellect is conformed to a supernatural object both formally, through the supernatural knowledge which it has of that very object, and efficiently, through God revealing and concurring effectively to produce that knowledge, which otherwise the intellect could not attain by itself and through phantasms (without which it naturally perceives nothing in this state). Whence that by which it is proportioned to the object, both efficiently and formally, is supernatural; not, however, must it be conformed and proportioned to it through something else; since, as the intellect is in obediential potency both with respect to receiving supernatural knowledge and with respect to the effective supernatural concurrence of God, it can receive both immediately, nor does it need anything else in order to be disposed and proportioned to this.

You will press. To every natural potency there ought to correspond a natural active principle which reduces it to act; otherwise the potency would be in vain, since it would not be reducible to act: but in our soul there is a passible, or passive, intellect, which is a potency receptive of any knowledge, even supernatural: therefore the agent intellect, which is in it, ought to be productive of supernatural knowledge as well.

The Doctor answers 1., n. 25. denying the major; for it is false that a natural active principle corresponds to every natural passive potency; because, he says, many things are naturally receptive of a perfection of which they do not have an intrinsic active principle; but most of all when a potency, on account of its excellence, is naturally ordered to receive a perfection so eminent that it cannot be produced by any natural agent; thus, as a matter of fact, our passible intellect is ordered to the knowledge of a supernatural object, which can be conferred by God alone revealing. Nor does it follow from this that that potency, insofar as it is natural, is in vain; for although it cannot be reduced to act principally through a natural agent; it suffices that it be completed and reduced to act by a supernatural agent.

He answers 2. distinguishing the major, n. 26.: To every natural passive potency there corresponds a natural active principle, insofar as that potency is called natural from the fact that it is ordered to an act or form that is natural and to be received naturally, he denies: but a potency which is called natural insofar as it regards a natural agent, so as to concur with it in producing some effect, e.g., the matter of wood, which regards fire, so as to concur with it in producing another fire, he concedes: but the passible intellect, or the potency receptive of knowledge, insofar as it extends itself to the knowledge of a supernatural object, is not called natural; since indeed it regards a supernatural form to be produced by a supernatural agent: but according to this consideration it can be called supernatural; and therefore, considered in this way, it ought not to be a wonder if it does not have a natural active principle corresponding to itself.

You will insist. The agent intellect cannot immediately produce supernatural knowledge, and knowledge concerning a supernatural object: therefore neither will the passive intellect be able to receive it, when produced by God revealing and acting supernaturally. The consequence is clear, because the activity of the agent intellect for producing ought not to be less than the capacity of the passive intellect for receiving that which is produced.

I deny the consequence. For more things are required to produce even natural knowledge than to receive it once produced; since, in order to elicit knowledge, not only is the activity of the agent intellect required, but also the object moving through phantasms, which must, as it were, be wiped clean of their earthly contagions, so that they can concur with the intellect in eliciting knowledge; but all these things are not required in receiving knowledge, but only the capacity of the passive intellect is required for receiving what is proposed to it. But this capacity, since it extends to receiving every knowledge, in whatever way that knowledge is produced, is of itself, as it were, indifferent to knowledge produced naturally or supernaturally; for it can receive either, whether from the intellect acting naturally or supernaturally. With this difference, however, that for the reception of natural knowledge it needs only the ordinary concurrence; but for the reception of supernatural knowledge it requires a more abundant concurrence of God. It remains, therefore, that theological doctrine, which discloses the more sublime truths, is supremely necessary.