Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

Nor indeed should it seem a marvel, nor an unusual thing, that the chief doctors and standard-bearers of heretical impiety strive to disparage its authority in the eyes of all, and to remove and pluck it out of the midst with every curse and reproach; for they know that it is the key and the sword of their errors and of heresy, struck by which it fell prostrate. And I cannot sufficiently wonder at men who are not only Catholic, but some even of their upright ones, and the fiercest enemies of heretical depravity, yet not only speak and think with the heretics, but even assault Scholastic Theology with their own weapons. But I fear that they are counted among those of whom St. Jude the Apostle wrote: What things indeed they know not, they blaspheme; but what things they know naturally, like dumb animals, in these they are corrupted; I fear, I say, lest men of this sort, relying on the felicity of memory rather than on the firmness of judgment and the keenness of wit, speak against the sacred doctrine, which they cannot attain from elsewhere, and despise in appearance those things of which they are deprived against their will. But in order that it may appear how far they wander from the truth and are deluded, the necessity and existence of both theologies, which they call Positive and Scholastic, must be demonstrated in the following Questions: but first must be premised:

Note 1. A twofold necessity is wont to be distinguished, namely absolute and hypothetical; for in the first place that is said to be absolutely necessary which is such that the highest necessity of existing belongs to it per se and by the force of its own nature and essence; so that, prescinding from the supposition of anything else whatsoever, it cannot at all not be, in which manner God alone is called a Being absolutely necessary. Secondly, a thing is necessary from hypothesis, namely because, some other thing being supposed, it cannot not be, because it is included in it, or infallibly follows from it, or has a necessary connection with it; in which manner, if a man exists, it is necessary that he be an animal; if there is a cause under the notion of cause, it is necessary that there also be an effect; if a man wishes to preserve his natural life for a long time, food is necessary for him; if he desires to attain eternal life, he must depart from this mortal life in grace.

Note 2. What is necessary from hypothesis, in order to attain some end, can be said to be so in three ways: First indeed by the necessity of precept only: Second, only by the necessity of means: Third, by both necessities at once, namely of means and of precept. Thus hearing Mass on feast days is necessary by the necessity of precept in order to salvation: but Baptism for the same end is necessary for little children only by the necessity of means, not however of precept, of which infants, as lacking reason, are incapable. But for adults Baptism is necessary by both necessities; by that of means indeed, because without it, received in reality or in desire, they cannot be justified; by that of precept truly, because by divine command they are bound to procure their salvation through the means necessary and ordained by God, such as Baptism is. But whether any Theological Doctrine is necessary for us by some one of these necessities, will have to be resolved in the present Question; but first:

Note 3. Theology properly taken, according to its various division and acceptation, also obtains various appellations: First, by reason of the Means, or of the light, by which it is illumined, it can be distinguished and named threefold, namely Theology of Vision, of Revelation, and of Reasoning. For there is a threefold light by which God becomes known to men, namely the light of glory, by whose aid blessed minds contemplate God face to face, the Royal Prophet saying, Psal. 35.: In thy light we shall see light; another is the light of faith, by which, says St. Peter 2. 1., is a lamp shining in a dark place until the day dawns, by which light we, still mortal, see divine things through a mirror and in an enigma; for faith, says St. Paul, is the substance of things hoped for, the argument of things not appearing, Hebr. 11. Third finally is the light of natural reason; For God hath signed upon us the light of his countenance, that we might perceive and discern his invisible things, understood through the things which are made. — By reason of the Subject, it is also threefold: namely the Theology of God, of the Blessed, and of the Wayfarers. The first is called Comprehensive, by which God most perfectly comprehends himself and in himself all things by his infinite knowledge: For all things are naked and open to his eyes, Hebr. 4. The second is Intuitive, by which the blessed see God as he is, so that there is nothing in him which lies hidden from the one seeing. The third is Discursive, by which wayfarers either detect the Creator from the magnitude of the species and of the creature, or from the sacred storehouse of the divine Scriptures draw out and demonstrate catholic dogmas. The first is in an adequate subject, the second in a clear subject, the third in an obscure subject: for we know in part and we prophesy in part, 1. Cor. 13. — By reason of the Object about which it is occupied, one is called the Theology of Necessary Things, by which it regards God ad intra and according to himself, and inasmuch as he is one in essence, three in persons, and infinite in his excellences. Another, of Contingent Things, which regards God as operating ad extra and in respect to creatures, which he either creates, conserves, and moderates in the order of nature; or calls and justifies in the order of grace; or beatifies and crowns in the order of glory. — By reason of the Method, one is called Positive, another Scholastic: the former expounds the sacred letters and the articles of faith in a fuller style and in an oratorical manner; and therefore it is called positive, because it as it were posits and proposes the truths of faith, from which, as from principles and premises, the Scholastic in a philosophical manner and by syllogistic art deduces its conclusions, so that it makes catholic dogmas manifest, and separates and defends them from the wicked assertions of Heretics or of those philosophizing badly.

Only conclusion. — Theological doctrine is necessary for men, by which, from principles known by divine faith, it may disclose certain truths which mortal men could not procure for themselves with the aid of philosophy. This is the position of all Theologians against the Philosophers, and the Subtle Doctor proves it in q. 1. of the Prologue, n. 6., thus:

First, it is necessary that man determinately know his ultimate end, toward which he ought to direct all his operations: but he cannot attain this knowledge without some doctrine grounded on revelation, which is called Theology: therefore this is necessary for him. The major is clear from the fullest agreement of the Philosophers, who freely confess that every agent endowed with reason intends in its operations some determinate end, and directs toward it all its motions and acts, so that in it as in a beatifying object it may rest: but it would aim uncertainly at the mark, unless it determinately knew this end: therefore it ought to know it distinctly.

Proof of the minor. If the ultimate end of man could be detected by any of the philosophers with the light of reason alone, undoubtedly Aristotle, the Eagle of the Philosophers and the Genius of Nature, would have discovered it: but he did not discover it: which I indeed show by a twofold reason: first, because nowhere did he teach that God, clearly and intuitively to be seen, is our ultimate end; indeed in 10. Ethic. lib. 7. he placed the ultimate end of man in the knowledge of separated substances; for when in cap. 5. and 6. he had reported and impugned the various opinions of the ancient Philosophers concerning the ultimate end and beatitude of man, he himself established a twofold happiness of man; the one moral and civil; the other speculative and contemplative. The moral he said, 1. Ethic. cap. 7., to be an operation according to the best virtue, which is prudence; so that he judged man to be happy then, when he composed all his actions wisely and in an orderly manner: the speculative, however, he explains in 10. Ethic. cap. 6. 7. and 8., and he teaches that it consists in the most perfect operation of all, which he judged to be the knowledge of God and of immaterial substances; not indeed intuitive, which he himself did not know; but abstractive, such as human discourse can attain, e.g., etc. — It is proved secondly: by the force of no natural principle can it be proved that eternal beatitude and the ultimate end consist objectively in God, and formally in the clear vision of God, or in the love following upon the vision, or in both at once: therefore man's happiness and ultimate end cannot be detected by natural light.

Proof of the antecedent. If there were any such principles from which it were lawful to infer that we are naturally ordered to see God clearly, they would especially be certain acts and effects arising in us, by which as by stimuli we would naturally be incited to that vision: but it is evident that we do not experience such acts or effects; and therefore they are none: therefore neither are there any principles by which we could naturally know our ultimate end determinately; and therefore some doctrine is necessary which infers this from revealed principles; this, however, is Theology, and therefore it is necessary.

Proof of the 2. Conclusion. and the preceding argument is confirmed by the same Doctor, ibid., n. 8.: Every agent acting for an end must necessarily know three things; First, how it is to be acquired; Second, what means conduce to its attainment; Third, whether those means suffice for this attainment; for if anyone does not know how the end is to be acquired, in what manner will he be able to gird himself for its attainment? Likewise, if he is ignorant of what means are necessary, perhaps he will not make use of something necessary, whereby it will come about that he is frustrated in his labor. If finally he is not certain that the means which he uses suffice for attaining the end, without doubt he will either wholly withdraw from the work, or will advance only waveringly; but man the wayfarer cannot know these three things by natural light. Not indeed the mode of acquisition; for that beatitude is to be acquired either as the inheritance of sons, or as the reward of those who labor, or as the crown of those who conquer, is wholly contingent, since God could have ordained that it be conferred otherwise. Not even the means; for that these or other sacraments are destined as necessary means to its attainment depends wholly on the free ordination of God, which has no necessary connection with natural things; and therefore it cannot be detected by natural discourse. Therefore some doctrine is necessary which from revealed principles discloses our ultimate end, and the mode, and the means by which it can be obtained, determinately and distinctly: this, however, Theology provides. Therefore it is necessary for us.

I prove finally, 3. Natural reason is wholly insufficient for detecting and manifesting the principal and higher truths, namely the nature of God, the immortality of the soul, the beatitude of man, etc., since it labors under one of these four defects, and for the most part under all four at once: for that natural reason is either weaker for inquiring into those truths: or obscurer for finding them when sought: or more uncertain for embracing them when found; or more timid and feeble for affirming and publishing them when believed: therefore a supernatural doctrine is necessarily needed, which, being free of these defects, may certainly inquire into, detect, affirm, and manifest the truth. The antecedent is proved as to each of its parts; and this by authority and reason at once, that I may satisfy Preachers and students of Theology.

First, therefore, natural reason is weaker for inquiring into those principal truths, since indeed it begs all its knowledge from the senses, according to that saying of Aristotle, 3. De Anima, cap. 9.: he who perceives nothing can learn and understand nothing; whence that common saying of Averroes, nothing is in the intellect which was not first in the sense; and since the senses have no proportion to divine things and higher truths; from this it comes about that the human mind wholly fails in inquiring into those truths; For the corruptible body, says the Sage, 3., weighs down the soul, and the earthly habitation depresses the sense thinking many things: and we hardly estimate the things which are on earth, and we find with labor the things which are in view, but the things which are in heaven, who shall investigate? whence St. Paul, first to the Corinthians 2.: The animal man does not perceive the things which are of God. — St. Augustine weighs this in a marvelous manner, lib. 8. De Trinit., cap. 2.:

Behold, see if you can, O soul weighed down by the body which is corrupted and laden with many and various earthly thoughts: Behold, see if you can, God is truth... do not seek what Truth is; for immediately the darknesses of bodily images and the clouds of phantasms will oppose themselves, and will disturb the serenity which at the first stroke shone upon you, when I said Truth; Behold, in that very first stroke by which you are struck as by a flash, when Truth is said; remain if you can, but you cannot. You will slip back into those usual and earthly things. By what weight at last, I ask, will you slip back, if not by the birdlime of the contracted filth of desire and the errors of the pilgrimage?

Whence rightly, Isai., 14.: My eyes are weakened looking up on high.

Second. Reason is obscurer for finding the truth; for the human mind, bound to and accustomed to corporeal things, can scarcely shake off its phantasms, so that it may be able to perceive and detect things cleansed of all body and free of matter. From this it came about that the Philosophers judged God to be nothing other than something corporeal; since indeed Justin the martyr says, in the first exhortation to the Greeks:

Thales of Miletus, the first author of natural Philosophy, judged the principle of all things to be water: Anaximander, infinity; Anaximenes, air; Heraclitus and Hippasus, fire: Anaxagoras, particles similar to one another, or similarities: Archelaus, infinite air; and the density and rarity of the things which surround it; Pythagoras, numbers: Epicurus, corpuscles, which can neither be corrupted, nor crushed, nor broken: Empedocles, the four elements, and two primary virtues, friendship and strife; of which the one serves union, the other dissension.

Whence St. Justin concludes that the doctrine of the Philosophers about the gods is much more ridiculous than the Theology of the Poets.

Nor was this gross and doubtful opinion of the ancient Philosophers only about God: but their ignorance and quarrel concerning the rational soul was also the greatest. Which the praised St. Justin excellently explains; for when he had said that Plato admitted three parts in it, namely reason, irascibility, and concupiscence, yet that it is immortal; that Aristotle on the contrary said that several little parts are detected in it, and that these are subject to corruption, and therefore that it is mortal, he adds that the other Philosophers, divided as it were in many ways by ignorance, thought that one must also contend about the soul, and be torn asunder by dissensions among themselves. For some of them assert that the soul is fire; some others, air; others, mind; others, motion: others, exhalation; some indeed, that it flows down from the stars; some, that it is a number holding the power of moving; others, genital water.

The same ignorance and disputation of the Philosophers labored in assigning man's beatitude: since indeed Marcus Varro numbered two hundred and eighty-eight opinions about man's happiness. St. Justin assigns the cause of this ignorance and dissension, namely that they did not want to learn from the experts, but trusted that they themselves could perceive heavenly things by the skill of the science of the human mind, when they could not even see through earthly ones. One must infer, therefore, with Tertullian, lib. De Praescript., cap. 7., that it belongs to secular Wisdom to be the reckless interpreter of the divine nature and disposition. Whence rightly St. Hilary, lib. 5.: Of God one must learn what is to be understood about God; because he is known with no one but himself as Author. The same, lib. 1.: Our talents do not ascend into heavenly science; nor will our infirmity conceive the incomprehensible power by any sense. God himself must be believed concerning himself, and the things which he has granted to our knowledge must be obeyed. For, as St. Cyril says, lib. 1. contra Iulianum, the things which exceed the grasp of the human mind must be honored by faith. Hence that celebrated saying of Plato in the Timaeo, that all truth can be learned in one way only, if we are taught it either by God himself, or by those who are born of God. From which Clemens Alexand. lib. 6. Strom.: rightly we, Christians, who gather testimonies from the divine oracles, glory that we have learned the truth through the Son of God.

Thirdly. Reason is more uncertain for embracing the truth once found, which is abundantly evident from the divided opinion of the Philosophers; for not only, as Justin says in the same passage, is there a confused and discordant opinion among them, which seems condemnable at least on one count by those approved by sound judgment, because their study is set upon this, that they argue and convince one another of being deluded and of putting forward nothing true; but (as he had warned above) if anyone wishes to inspect their writings more diligently, they do not sufficiently agree even with themselves in their opinions. Plato himself at one time established three principles of all things, God, matter, and the idea; at another time four: for he adds the universal soul. The same man, where he had professed matter to be unbegotten, later says that the same is begotten. Hence Caecilius, in Minutius Felix's Octavius, not incongruously said, all should be indignant and grieve, that some dare to decree something certain about the highest of things and about majesty, concerning which, through all ages, philosophy itself, with its very many sects, still deliberates. Nor without reason, since human mediocrity is so far removed from the exploration of divine things, that neither the things which are raised up and suspended in the heaven above us, nor the things which are sunk deep beneath the earth, is it given to know, or permitted to scrutinize, or religious to profane.

Fourthly and finally, natural human reason is weaker and more timid in publishing and preaching the divine truths known and believed; this St. Augustine demonstrates concerning Seneca, lib. 6. De Civ., cap. 10. That man (he says), whom the Philosophers made, as it were, free; yet because he was a Senator of the illustrious Roman people, he worshipped what he reproved, he did what he argued against, he adored what he blamed. St. Paul clearly expresses all these things in 1. cap. ad Romanos, affirming that the ancient Philosophers and Wise men had fallen into four horrible vices. The first indeed, of ingratitude, because when they had known God, they did not glorify Him as God, or give thanks: The second, of ignorance, their foolish heart was darkened; for saying themselves to be wise, they became fools: The third, of idolatry, for they changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of a corruptible man, and of birds, and of four-footed beasts, and of creeping things: The fourth, of abominable shamefulness, therefore He delivered them up to passions of ignominy, etc.

It must therefore be concluded with St. Thomas, secunda secundae q. 2. art. 2., that it was necessary for man to receive by way of faith not only the things which are above reason, but also those which can be known by reason, and this for three reasons: First, that man may arrive more quickly at the knowledge of divine truth: Second, that the knowledge of God may be more common: Third, for the sake of certainty; for human reason is greatly deficient in divine matters. Or, as he speaks in 1. p. q. 1. art. 1., the truth about God investigated by reason would come to men only to few, and after a long time, and with the admixture of many errors.

You will object 1. The Doctor argues for the Philosophers. Every potency which is concerned with some common object can also be concerned with any special object contained under that common and general object; for the eye, e.g., because it is concerned with the colored object as such, can also be concerned with the white and the other particular colored things: but our intellect by natural power is concerned with being, as being, as with its first and adequate object: therefore it can also be concerned naturally with any special being; and so it does not need any revelation in order to know certain beings.

The Doctor distinguishes the major, num. 32. A potency which is concerned with some common object can also be concerned with any particular object contained under it — that is, it can have a natural inclination to know that special object: he concedes; that is, it has in itself a natural power by which it knows any special object just as it knows the common object: he denies. For although the intellect, in knowing being as being, also has an inclination implanted by nature to know any special being; it does not, however, follow from this that it can uncover any being by the powers of nature; for there are many knowable things which in this mortal state cannot be known without divine revelation; either because they have no commerce with our senses, such as spiritual substances; or because there is no natural effect leading into their knowledge, such as the Trinity of persons in the unity of essence: or finally because they entirely exceed the grasp of nature, both in being made and in being known, of which sort are grace, faith, and hope, which are therefore said to be of the supernatural order.

You will object 2. Sense is a cognitive potency far inferior to the intellect, which yet needs no supernatural help in order to be borne toward whatever of its objects; for the eye, e.g., can by its native activity see whatever is visible: therefore the intellect ought to need such help much less, in order to be borne toward anything intelligible. The consequence is proved: sense does not need supernatural help for this reason, that according to Arist. 3. De Anima, t. 45., nature does not fail in necessary things, and supplies to potencies all the aids by which they can exercise their operations; therefore it ought to fail much less toward the intellective potency, which, since it is far more excellent than the senses, ought to depend less on what is extrinsic in order to operate; but it would fail it if, besides its native power of understanding, it still needed another help in order to perceive some object: therefore it does not need such help.

The Doctor denies the consequence. and to its proof he responds, that nature does not therefore fail in necessary things because it itself supplies all the means necessary for acting; but because it bestows potencies and faculties ready for the operation befitting each thing: and this it confers on the intellect no less than on the senses; for each faculty, both the sensitive and the intellective, has a power of operating most suited to itself implanted by nature. But if the intellect cannot exercise this its natural power with respect to some object; that does not come from a defect of nature not supplying what is necessary; but from the supreme dignity both of the object, which, since it is of a higher order, exceeds the natural power of the intellect, nor can it be attained by it unless it be raised and strengthened by some help of a higher order; and of the intellect, which is therefore deemed nobler and more illustrious, because it requires not only a natural, but even a supernatural order of perfection for its ornament and completion. Whence the Doctor rightly infers, num. 33., that nature does not fail it; since it confers on it all the things which are desired in it for natural operation; although it does not confer on it what is required for the supernatural knowledge of a supernatural object; for nature ought to accomplish only those things which are natural. But since every perfection of the senses is purely natural, nature would surely fail them if it did not supply them with all things for perceiving their object.

You will insist. Nature supplies the senses not only with power, but also with the means necessary for operating: therefore it ought also to confer on the intellect all the means necessary for understanding anything; otherwise the intellect will be of a worse condition and lot than the senses.

I deny the consequence. for the comparison of the intellect with the senses is not equal; since the senses, on account of their less perfect power of acting, are limited to certain objects and a certain natural mode of operating, beyond which order they can in no way break out; for they are concerned only with sensible being, which, since it is only of the natural order, it is no wonder if the senses desire nothing at all beyond the order of nature for reaching all their objects. But it is otherwise with the intellect, which, since it has as its adequate object any intelligible being, and there are some intelligibles exceeding the grasp and order of nature; hence it happens that although it has a natural inclination to know them, it cannot, however, reach them by the powers of nature; whence it is necessary that, in order to know them, it be enlightened and strengthened by some supernatural means. Nor does it follow from this that the intellect is of a worse lot than the senses, for, as the Doctor speaks, n. 33., it is the greatest perfection for the intellect, that it can be divinely elevated to receive a greater perfection than it can itself actively produce. For it is a sign that it is perfected not only by those things which are confined within the limits and barriers of nature; but that it also requires some preternatural excellence for the completion of its perfection. But it is otherwise with the senses, whose highest and ultimate perfection, since it can be conferred by natural agents, it follows that they are capable of less perfection than the intellect.

You will object 3. Doctor: For this reason some supernatural doctrine would be required, chiefly because the intellect is not proportioned to knowing every object, and consequently it would have to be conformed and proportioned to it by something else: but this reason is of no force: therefore neither is that conclusion for the proving of which it is assumed.

Proof of the minor. That by which the intellect would have to be equated and conformed to the object would either be natural or supernatural. Not the first, because it could not raise the intellect beyond its natural state, and make it proportioned to a supernatural object. Not the second either, because since the intellect is not of itself proportioned to another supernatural thing, it could not receive that supernatural thing, unless it were again made capable of this reception through another; about which, since the same difficulty would recur, there would be a process to infinity: therefore no supernatural doctrine is required in the intellect.

He answers, n. 31. having conceded the major by denying the minor. For it is true that the intellect is conformed to a supernatural object both formally, through the supernatural knowledge which it has of that very object, and efficiently, through God revealing and concurring effectively to produce that knowledge, which otherwise the intellect could not attain by itself and through phantasms (without which it naturally perceives nothing in this state). Whence that by which it is proportioned to the object, both efficiently and formally, is supernatural; not, however, must it be conformed and proportioned to it through something else; since, as the intellect is in obediential potency both with respect to receiving supernatural knowledge and with respect to the effective supernatural concurrence of God, it can receive both immediately, nor does it need anything else in order to be disposed and proportioned to this.

You will press. To every natural potency there ought to correspond a natural active principle which reduces it to act; otherwise the potency would be in vain, since it would not be reducible to act: but in our soul there is a passible, or passive, intellect, which is a potency receptive of any knowledge, even supernatural: therefore the agent intellect, which is in it, ought to be productive of supernatural knowledge as well.

The Doctor answers 1., n. 25. denying the major; for it is false that a natural active principle corresponds to every natural passive potency; because, he says, many things are naturally receptive of a perfection of which they do not have an intrinsic active principle; but most of all when a potency, on account of its excellence, is naturally ordered to receive a perfection so eminent that it cannot be produced by any natural agent; thus, as a matter of fact, our passible intellect is ordered to the knowledge of a supernatural object, which can be conferred by God alone revealing. Nor does it follow from this that that potency, insofar as it is natural, is in vain; for although it cannot be reduced to act principally through a natural agent; it suffices that it be completed and reduced to act by a supernatural agent.

He answers 2. distinguishing the major, n. 26.: To every natural passive potency there corresponds a natural active principle, insofar as that potency is called natural from the fact that it is ordered to an act or form that is natural and to be received naturally, he denies: but a potency which is called natural insofar as it regards a natural agent, so as to concur with it in producing some effect, e.g., the matter of wood, which regards fire, so as to concur with it in producing another fire, he concedes: but the passible intellect, or the potency receptive of knowledge, insofar as it extends itself to the knowledge of a supernatural object, is not called natural; since indeed it regards a supernatural form to be produced by a supernatural agent: but according to this consideration it can be called supernatural; and therefore, considered in this way, it ought not to be a wonder if it does not have a natural active principle corresponding to itself.

You will insist. The agent intellect cannot immediately produce supernatural knowledge, and knowledge concerning a supernatural object: therefore neither will the passive intellect be able to receive it, when produced by God revealing and acting supernaturally. The consequence is clear, because the activity of the agent intellect for producing ought not to be less than the capacity of the passive intellect for receiving that which is produced.

I deny the consequence. For more things are required to produce even natural knowledge than to receive it once produced; since, in order to elicit knowledge, not only is the activity of the agent intellect required, but also the object moving through phantasms, which must, as it were, be wiped clean of their earthly contagions, so that they can concur with the intellect in eliciting knowledge; but all these things are not required in receiving knowledge, but only the capacity of the passive intellect is required for receiving what is proposed to it. But this capacity, since it extends to receiving every knowledge, in whatever way that knowledge is produced, is of itself, as it were, indifferent to knowledge produced naturally or supernaturally; for it can receive either, whether from the intellect acting naturally or supernaturally. With this difference, however, that for the reception of natural knowledge it needs only the ordinary concurrence; but for the reception of supernatural knowledge it requires a more abundant concurrence of God. It remains, therefore, that theological doctrine, which discloses the more sublime truths, is supremely necessary.

From the preceding Question it is abundantly clear that some theological doctrine must necessarily be admitted, which lays open the principal and most necessary truths, which could in no way be detected with the help of philosophy and the aid of natural reason. Since, however, as we have already warned, theology is divided by reason of method into positive and scholastic; and since the heretics of this age most bitterly attack both; it is worth the effort to resolve whether both are necessary for the faithful and the Church, or whether one or the other is to be banished and rejected; that this may become the more evident

Note 1. Positive theology is so called for one or other of these three reasons. First, because it proposes and expounds the truths and articles of faith as certain and indubitable foundations, from which scholastic theology elicits its conclusions and forms the arguments by which it may illustrate the mysteries of faith and defend the Catholic dogmas against heretics and unbelievers. Second, because it is chiefly occupied with explaining and laying open the divine law and institution, which is called positive divine law. For just as human positive law is so called because it has been freely laid down by a Superior, and could simply not have been prescribed by him had he wished, and could still be freely revoked by him from authority, if it should so seem; in which positive law differs from natural law, because the latter is not such by some arbitrary institution and free precept of the Superior, but is such of itself and from its own nature, nor is it capable of any change: so positive theology is so called, which is wholly occupied with explaining positive divine law, namely the divine law, laying open the sacred Scriptures, as well as investigating the divine traditions and the decrees of the Church, which are called positive, divine, or ecclesiastical law; because it has been freely laid down and determined as much by God as by the Church. Third and finally, it is called positive from the positions and theses, because it treats the weightier controversies of faith and the positions, that is, the principal truths, so that from their declaration faith may be illustrated and persevere unshaken.

Note 2. Positive and scholastic theology do not differ from one another essentially, but only accidentally and according to a different manner of proceeding: since both have the same object, namely God, to be known under the notion of divinity through discourse, whether oratorical by positive, or philosophical by scholastic theology. Both acknowledge the same principles, the same assertions of faith, whether written or handed down. Both do not cling to setting forth the sacred Scriptures alone, but also gather and add the indubitable traditions of the Church; they unfold the ecclesiastical history; they scrutinize the decrees of the Councils; they search out the books and commentaries of the holy Fathers, in order to detect and lay open the Catholic truth hidden in them. Nevertheless they seem to differ from one another in this, that scholastic theology is more exact and accurate, and in treating and applying all these things preserves the philosophical method and the syllogistic order the more, so that it may detect the truths more evidently and persuade more efficaciously: for order is the midwife, just as, diametrically, confusion is the stepmother of all disciplines. Add that scholastic theology for the most part summons the help and light of natural philosophy, not only to dissolve with natural and philosophical reasoning the arguments hurled by heretics and unbelievers at the articles of faith, but also to persuade by natural reasons and philosophical considerations that the dogmas of faith are to be believed.

Note 3. This is the concord of the Church triumphant with the militant, that just as in the heavenly Church God willed the lower Angels to be taught and enlightened by the higher ones, so likewise in the earthly Church

Some indeed, says the Apostle ad Ephesios 4., he gave as Apostles, some as Prophets, others as Evangelists, others as Pastors and Doctors; and that for a twofold end: first indeed, he says, for the perfecting of the saints, in the work of the ministry, in the building up of the Body of Christ, until we all meet into the unity of faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, etc. Secondly, that, he says, we may no longer be little children, tossed to and fro and carried about by every wind of doctrine, in the wickedness of men, in craftiness for the circumvention of error.

As if he would say that God therefore established Doctors in the Church, both that they might manifest the divine truths, which they themselves behold more deeply, to the more unlearned company of the faithful; and that, with the torch and club of their doctrine, they might extinguish the heresies springing up and eliminate them from the Church. From which it is clear how much the faithful need Doctors: which indeed will be proved more evidently

Only conclusion. — Positive theology has always been useful to the Church of God and most necessary.

This is the assertion of all Catholics against the heretics, especially the Calvinists, who with their heresiarch contend that the sacred Scriptures lie open so evidently and manifestly, that no Doctor at all is needed to grasp and explain them.

Proof of the conclusion. For first, some doctrine must be admitted which lays open the genuine sense of the sacred Scripture, resolves its ambiguities, and detects the mysteries hidden under the simple coverings of words; by which it may build up faith, destroy heresy, and turn back and blunt against the heretics themselves the darts which they are wont to draw from the divine Scriptures and hurl at Catholics; but positive theology accomplishes all these things: therefore it must necessarily be admitted. The minor is plainly evident from the very definition and office of positive theology; for it is wholly occupied with the explanation of the Scriptures, that it may instruct the faithful, unlock the mysteries, and attack and overcome the false dogmas of the heretics with the same oracles of the Scriptures on which they wickedly relied; therefore Tertullianus, in the book De praescriptionibus, cap. 15, calls it the exercise of the Scriptures, inasmuch as it is wholly devoted to expounding and unlocking the divine Scriptures. — The major is therefore proved from sacred Scripture itself, for St. Paul says, 2. ad Timotheum 2: All scripture divinely inspired is useful for teaching, for reproving, for correcting, for instructing in justice; that the man of God may be perfect, furnished to every good work. By these four he detects and points out the principal offices of positive theology, which it draws from Scripture: First, it teaches the faithful the Catholic truth: Secondly, it reproves the heretics: Thirdly, it corrects the wicked: Fourthly, it teaches and instructs the unbelievers. Moreover he himself affirms, ad Ephesios 4., that God by his ineffable providence toward the Church gave her various ministers, but especially some Pastors and Doctors, for the perfecting of the Saints, in the work of the ministry, in the building up of the body of Christ, until we all meet into the unity of faith. He subjoins the reason: That we may no longer be little children, tossed to and fro, and carried about by every wind of doctrine, in the wickedness of men, for the circumvention of error. Whence he says, ad Titum 1.: The Bishop ought to hold fast the faithful word which is according to doctrine, that he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine, and to reprove those who contradict. Therefore he judges that there is some sacred doctrine, which the Pastors and Doctors of the Church ought to master, that they may teach the faithful, lest they be circumvented by the false dogmas of the heretics: for the heretics, says Tertullianus, in the book De praescriptione, cap. 14., parade the Scriptures, and by this their cunning immediately move some; in the very encounter, indeed, they weary the firm, capture the weak, and send away the intermediate with scruple. It is necessary, therefore, that there be some most expert men, who lay open the genuine sense of the Scripture, and unravel the snares which the heretics set for the faithful from the depraved sense of the Scripture.

Second proof. The sacred Scriptures have so profound and hidden a sense, and involve so many and such great difficulties, that the greatest erudition and the greatest study are needed to explain and interpret them, and accordingly it is necessary that some give all their effort to this explanation and interpretation; but this is done through positive theology: therefore it is to be admitted. The minor is evident: the major is proved: for first, nearly the same judgment seems to be passed on all the Scriptures, which St. Peter himself passed on the Epistles of St. Paul, in which, he says, Epist. 2. c. 3., there are some things hard to be understood, which the unlearned and unstable wrest, as also the other Scriptures, to their own destruction.

Almost all the holy Fathers confess the same thing: for Origenes, lib. 7. Contra Celsum, says: Other prudent men too, by searching the Scripture, have been able to find its understanding; although in truth it is obscure in many places. Ambrose, Epist. 14.: The divine Scripture is a sea, having in itself profound senses, the depth of the prophetic enigmas. Augustine, 12. Confess. c. 14.: Wondrous is the depth of your utterances, O Lord! whose surface, behold, lies before us, soothing the little ones! but wondrous is the depth. It is a horror to gaze into it: a horror of honor, and a trembling of love. The same, lib. 2. De doctrina Christiana, cap. 4., speaking of the reading of the Scriptures, says: But by many and manifold obscurities and ambiguities are deceived those who read rashly, understanding one thing for another: in certain places, however, they do not find what they might even falsely suspect; so obscurely are some things said, that they draw over them a very dense darkness. — He subjoins, however, the reason for this obscurity: That all of it (he says) I do not doubt was divinely provided, to tame pride by labor, and to recall the understanding from fastidiousness, to which things easily investigated generally become cheap.

St. Gregory agrees with him, Hom. 6. in Ezech.

Of great utility, he says, is the very obscurity of the utterances of God, because it exercises the mind, that it may be expanded by effort, and being exercised may grasp what the idle cannot grasp. It has also another greater good, because if the understanding of the sacred Scripture were open to all, it would become cheap, which in certain more obscure places refreshes what is found with so much the greater sweetness, by how much the more manifestly it is found.

And let Calvinus be gone, who, though contrary to himself, says in lib. 1. Institutionum, c. 7.: Scripture of its own accord presents no obscurer sense of its truth, than white and black things present of their color, and sweet and bitter things of their taste.

Third proof. Heretics twist the sacred Scriptures into a perverse sense in order to patronize their erroneous dogmas: therefore it is necessary that there be some Catholic Doctors who lay open the genuine sense of the same Scripture, by which the truth of faith may be the more easily defended. The consequence is evident. The holy Fathers prove the antecedent, in the first place Tertullianus, in the book De praescriptione haereticorum, cap. 39.: Nor am I in peril saying that the Scriptures themselves were so disposed by the will of God as to furnish material to the heretics; since I read that there must be heresies, which cannot exist without the Scriptures. Origenes, in lib. 3. De principiis, c. 21.: Of all these, he says, the cause of the false understanding, for those of whom we spoke above, was none other than that the holy Scripture is understood by them not according to the spiritual sense, but according to the sound of the letter. Hilarius, in libro 2. De Trinitate: heresy arises from the understanding, not from the scripture; and the sense, not the speech, becomes the crime. St. Augustine agrees, in tractatu 18. super Evangelium Ioannis: For neither, he says, were heresies and certain dogmas of perversity born, ensnaring souls and casting them headlong into the deep, except while the good Scriptures are not well understood; and what in them is not well understood is also rashly and boldly asserted. Vigilius Afer, in lib. 2. Contra Eutychem: This is the origin of all impieties, when the force of the heavenly sayings, violated by the vice of evil understanding, is not weighed according to the quality of its sense, but is diverted to other things at the whim of the reader, otherwise than the reason of the matter demands. Isidore Hispalensis, in lib. 8. Originum, c. 5.: Whoever understands the sacred Scripture otherwise than the sense of the Holy Spirit demands, by whom it was written, although he has not departed from the Church, can nevertheless be called a Heretic. Epiphanius Diaconus, in the 6th action of the 1st Synod: When some attempt to pervert right dogmas according to what seems to themselves, let no one wonder if they use the words of the Scripture. For all Heresiarchs too gather from the divinely inspired Scripture the occasions of their error, adulterating with malicious senses the things that were rightly said through the Holy Spirit.

Thirdly and finally, the truth of our Conclusion is strengthened from the universal practice of the Church; since we read that from its very beginning schools were instituted in which positive theology was publicly taught. Eusebius makes mention of such a school, lib. 5. Historiae Ecclesiasticae, cap. 10., where, speaking of the Alexandrian School, he says:

At the same time there presided over the School of the faithful a man most celebrated for the sake of doctrine, by name Pantaenus, since already from ancient times a School of sacred letters had been instituted in that city, which indeed continues even to our age and is said to be held by men most thoroughly equipped both in eloquence and in the study of divine letters: therefore the heretics wrongly attack and assail the Christian Academies, as a new invention begged from heathenism and pernicious to the faith.

The heretics object: If any reason and utility should persuade that positive theology is to be admitted, it is chiefly that it may interpret the sacred Scripture and resolve its various obscurities and ambiguities: but for this it is altogether useless: therefore it is to be rejected. The major is evident from what has been said. The minor they prove by various texts of the sacred Scripture itself, from which they strive to infer that it is so open, that to perceive its genuine sense no interpreter and no Doctor is needed. Thus Psalmo 18.: The precept of the Lord is clear, enlightening the eyes. Prov. 6.: The commandment is a lamp, and the law a light. 2. Petri 1.: We have the more firm prophetical word, to which you do well to attend, as to a lamp shining in a dark place: therefore so far is it from the case that the sacred Scripture is overspread with any obscurity; rather it is itself the light, which exhibits all the truths that it embraces in its bosom as irradiated with a certain divine splendor.

I deny the minor. And I distinguish its proof: that the sacred Scripture shines in the manner of a light in all its books and contexts, I deny; in some, namely the historical ones, I concede; for I confess that the sacred Scripture sometimes bears so open a sense, that it becomes manifest to any reader at first glance. But the Heretics must also confess that for the most part it is suffused with so great a darkness, that its genuine sense can be detected only either with God revealing, or with most learned men interpreting: as is evident both from the above-mentioned opinion of the holy Fathers, and from David himself, who although he knew to the highest degree the meaning and force of the words of the Hebrew language, in which the sacred Scripture was then written, nevertheless prayed suppliantly to God: Give me understanding, and I will search your law; Open my eyes, and I will consider the wonderful things of your law... Enlighten your servant, and teach me your justifications, Psal. 118. Whence St. Jerome rightly infers, Epist. ad Paulinum: If so great a Prophet confesses the darkness of ignorance, with what night of ignorance do you think us little ones, and almost sucklings, to be surrounded? This veil, however, is placed not only on the face of Moyses, but also in the Gospels, and the Apostles... Unless all things that are written are opened by him who has the key. David, who opens and no one closes, closes and no one opens, will be unfolded by no other opener.

The heretics insist: The sacred Scriptures are not difficult to understand except to proud men, and men blinded by malice, according to that saying of Paulus, 2. Corinth. 4.: If our Gospel is hidden, in those who perish it is hidden; in whom the god of this world has blinded the minds of the unbelievers, that the illumination of the Gospel of the glory of God should not shine unto them. Therefore for the faithful of Christ the sacred Scripture is not hidden, but open. — They confirm it from St. John Chrysostom, Homilia 3. de Lazaro, where, after he had shown that the Philosophers spoke obscurely, and did not uncover the truth, but covered it with many wrappings of words, he adds: But the Apostles and Prophets on the contrary made all things manifest, and brought them forth clear, as the common Doctors of the world; that each one by himself might be able to learn the things that are learned from reading alone: therefore to perceive them the faithful does not need an interpreter and a Doctor.

I answer the first. The Apostle in those words is not dealing with the easy or difficult understanding of the Scripture, but with the Evangelical faith, which many, when the Apostles preached, rejected out of malice and blindness of mind, because they judged the Evangelical truths to be repugnant to the pleasure of the senses and to natural reason. St. John Chrysostom, however, does not speak of the whole Scripture, but only of the historical books, which he declares easy to understand from the mere reading itself. For he adds: Take the book in your hands, read the whole history, and keep in memory the things that are known; and the things that are obscure and little manifest, run through frequently: but if by the assiduity of reading you cannot find what is said, go to the wiser man, go to the Doctor: therefore he judges that there are some obscure contexts, about which Doctors are to be heard and consulted.

The heretics object secondly, that although the sacred Scripture may be overspread with some darknesses, these are nevertheless to be resolved not by man teaching from without, but by God teaching from within; for the faithful ought to have God alone as Doctor, according to that prophecy of Isaias 51.: I will make all your sons taught of the Lord. And of Ieremias 31.: I will give my law in their hearts, and in their heart I will write it: a man shall no longer teach his neighbor, saying: Know the Lord; for all shall know me, from the least of them even to the greatest. Therefore we need no doctor, nor accordingly is positive theology needed.

I deny the consequence. For neither is that the sense of the aforesaid contexts; for Isaias and Ieremias are to be understood of the Evangelical Doctrine, which excelled over the Mosaic law in this above all, that it was handed down and expressed not through Prophets, but through the very Son of God himself, according to that saying of St. Paul, Hebr. 1.: God, speaking of old to the Fathers in the Prophets, in many ways and in many manners; in these last days has spoken to us in the Son: whence it comes about that all Christians are called Theodidacti, that is, taught of God, either immediately, like the Apostles and Disciples; or at least mediately, like the rest of the faithful.

— Or I say that the aforesaid Prophets compare the state of the new law with the old, so that the sense is that all the mysteries and secrets of faith will be much clearer in the Evangelical law than in the Mosaic, which was full of shadows and figures.

— Or finally I say that the aforesaid texts were predictive of that wonderful descent of the Holy Spirit upon the Apostles on the day of Pentecost, and upon all the other faithful sons of the nascent Church, to whom with baptism the Holy Spirit was conferred, and the gift of knowledge, of prophecy, and kinds of tongues were divinely infused, so that any unlearned and rude persons became in a moment most wise.

The heretics press: From the first of Ioannes, 2. cap., You have no need, says Ioannes writing to the faithful, that anyone teach you: but the unction teaches you of all things: therefore the faithful need no Doctor either, nor consequently any theology.

I deny the consequence. For St. John does not intend that the faithful have no need of a man as Doctor; for to what end would he himself have written the Epistles for the instruction of the faithful? To what end would God have ordained in his Church pastors and Doctors for the perfecting of the Saints, as we said above? He wishes, therefore, only to curb the vain curiosity of certain faithful, who, taught by the Apostles, also listened to the Pseudo-Apostles, who, sowing tares, darkened the Catholic truths with their perverse dogmas. — Or I say that he is to be understood of Affective and Mystical theology, which not reading teaches, but unction; not the letter, but the spirit: not mortal man, but immortal God, who for the most part chooses the weak things of the world, that he may confound the strong. For it happens not rarely that any rude and unlearned persons, who scarcely know their letters, with God teaching within and divinely enlightening, perceive the most hidden mysteries of faith, and open and explain the recondite senses of the Scriptures more plainly than any most learned man could do. Concerning whom St. Augustine seems to speak, lib. 83. Quaestionum, q. 48., saying:

There are three kinds of things to be believed: some are those which are always believed and never understood, as is all history, running through temporal and human deeds: others which, as soon as they are believed, are understood, as are all human reasonings, whether about numbers, or about any disciplines whatsoever. The third, which are first believed and afterwards understood, such as are those things about divine matters which cannot be understood except by those who are clean of heart, which comes about by keeping the precepts, which are received by living well.

Note 1. Scholastic Theology is so called for a threefold reason. First, because this theology is chiefly taught and learned in the Schools; whereas Positive theology is acquired by one's own study and by the private and assiduous reading of the sacred Scriptures and by the exercise of the holy Fathers. Second, because in the Academic and philosophical manner, from the principles of the divine faith known immediately or mediately, it elicits its conclusions through legitimate discourse, so that it may explain the mysteries of the faith more clearly, defend them courageously against those who attack them, and, by resolving all the contradictions and entanglements which could be raised against them, persuade that they are the more easily to be believed. Third and finally, it is so called by a certain analogy with Philosophy; for just as Philosophy is engaged in investigating natural things, so Scholastic Theology is chiefly detained and occupied with the divine natural law, that is, with truths altogether immutable; of which sort are not only the essence of God, His perfections, the Trinity of persons; but also the worship due to Him according to Himself: nay, and His divine precepts, and all the means which conduce to the attainment of God; not indeed as they are actually existing; for in that way these are altogether free, and are considered rather by Positive than by Scholastic Theology: but as they are possible, and inasmuch as they involve no contradiction, namely that the Theologian may show that there is no repugnance in the works of God; and that grace does not obstruct nature, nay rather perfects it; and that all the mysteries of the faith are not contrary, although they are not according to natural reason.

Note 2. It is most certain that Positive or Scholastic Theology, individual faithful being considered singly, is not absolutely necessary for the attainment of salvation. The reason is clear; for many rustics, wholly rude and ignorant of theological matters, as dwelling in the fields almost always and among cattle, nevertheless believe the Articles of the faith most firmly, and, fortified with the holy sacraments of the Church, depart happily from this life and attain eternal salvation. Nay, Scholastic Theology does not even seem absolutely necessary to the whole assembly of the faithful, or to the entire Church; since before the times of the Master of the Sentences, who around the year 1140 reduced Theology to academic form and method, the Church long flourished in piety and doctrine, and was furnished with sufficient means both for instructing its own people in matters of faith, and for repelling the force of heretics and eliminating error.

Note 3. Scholastic Theology is necessary for individual faithful, at least mediately, but for the whole Church immediately, by a moral necessity, or one of the greatest advantage and of the highest utility; for individual faithful have need of Doctors, who may render the Articles of the faith, obscure and difficult in themselves, credible by various reasons proposed; and may dilute and dissolve all the doubts which can arise either from each one's own talent, or be suggested by the art of the devil, or finally be proposed from the perversity of heretics: for rude faithful, exposed to so many perils, if they are deprived of the protection of Theologians of this kind, will with difficulty stand firm in the faith. The Church likewise, assailed by the darts of so many heretics, would be weakened, if those subtle princes of Theology were not present, who could unravel the tricks and fallacies of heretics, and dissipate the darkness of error cast over men's minds. Which indeed will be demonstrated more fully and more effectively

Only conclusion. — Scholastic Theology is supremely useful to the Church of God, and necessary. This is the judgment of all the wise against the heretics, and certain pseudo-Catholics.

It is proved first indeed from the universal consent of the whole Christian commonwealth, which venerated and embraced this methodical Theology as soon as it came forth into the world, and raised up most ample schools for teaching and learning it; enriched it with ample stipends for the Professors, and adorned it with honorable privileges.

Second. From the oracles of the Councils; for the Council of Constance approved Scholastic Theology more than enough, when in Session 8 it disapproved and condemned all the errors of Wicleff; especially that one by which he proclaimed that universities, studies, colleges, and masterships had been introduced by vain vanity. Likewise Clemens V, in the Council of Vienne, where he had established that baptism is necessary for salvation both for adults and for little children, adds: But, because as regards the effect of baptism certain theological Doctors are found to have held contrary opinions; some of them saying that by the power of baptism guilt is indeed remitted to little children, but grace is not conferred: others on the contrary asserting that both guilt is remitted to them in baptism, and the virtues and informing grace are infused as to habit, although not for that time as to use; We, however, attending to the general efficacy of the death of Christ, because through baptism it is applied equally to all the baptized, have judged that the second opinion, which says that informing grace and the virtues are conferred in baptism on little children as well as on adults, is to be chosen as the more probable, and the more consonant and agreeable to the sayings of the Saints and of the modern Doctors of Theology, the sacred Council approving.

— From which it is plainly clear how much authority not only so great a Pontiff, but also the universal Church, attributes to the Scholastic Theologians; since in a matter of such moment he wills and decrees that one must adhere to the opinion approved by several of them; what if all had conspired among themselves with one constant accord? It is of no avail to relate how much aid and dignity the Scholastic Doctors have contributed in the other subsequent Ecumenical Councils, by sifting each most difficult question and weighing them on both sides, so that the truth might appear the more easily, and the false dogmas of the heretics might utterly fall and vanish; for this only he can be ignorant of who has not read the acts of those Councils. Hence the Council of Trent sanctioned by several decrees that colleges should be instituted in all places, and that Academies should be endowed with all graces and privileges.

Third. The same thing is evident from the decrees and judgment of the Supreme Pontiffs: since Innocentius IV commanded our Alexander Alensis (who, on account of his supreme learning, was called while he lived the Fountain of life) and by Apostolic authority enjoined that he should write a Summa of Theology; which finally Alexander IV also approved by an Apostolic Diploma. And that I may pass over the other decrees of the Pontiffs, I relate one or another: First indeed that of Honorius III: for he, in the chapter Super specula, concerning masters, decreed:

Some are destined to the study of the profession of Theology, who, when they have been brought into the Church of God, may shine like the splendor of the firmament: and from whom afterwards a supply of Doctors may be had, who, as stars about to remain unto perpetual eternities, may be zealous to teach many unto justice.

Gregory IX commends this very thing excellently in an Epistle directed to the Masters and Students of the Parisian Academy for the restoration of studies, and dated at the Lateran in the 5th year of his Pontificate, in the month of April, where among the other praises of this Academy he has these words:

Paris, the parent of the sciences, like another Cariath-Sepher, a city of letters, shines clear: great indeed, but of itself it makes greater things to be desired, gracious to those who teach and to those who learn. In the cross indeed, as in a special workshop of wisdom, it has the beginnings of its veins of silver, and for gold there is a place in which it is duly smelted: from which the prudent, forging golden chains of mystic eloquence fretted with silver, and fashioning necklaces adorned with precious stones, nay, to be compared with no price, adorn the Spouse of Christ.

Fourth. The utility and necessity of Scholastic Theology appears from its offices and duties; for its principal offices are four; namely, the declarative, the probative, the defensive, and the discursive; which it is allowed to gather from St. Augustine, lib. 11. De Trinitate, cap. 1., where, speaking of Theology, which he calls science and wisdom, he says: To this science is attributed that by which the most saving faith, which leads to true beatitude, is begotten, nourished, defended, strengthened. From which the generation and nourishment of faith conduce to the utility of the faithful; but its defense and strength conduce to the conquest of the unbelievers. For St. Augustine adds:

With this science very many of the faithful do not abound, although they abound very much in the faith itself; for it is one thing to know only what a man ought to believe for the sake of obtaining the blessed life, which is none other than eternal, but another to know in what manner this very thing both helps the pious and is defended against the impious.

But that Scholastic Theology contributes most to the generation, nourishment, defense, and strength of faith through its four offices is easily shown. For by declaration faith is begotten; for by the explanation of Sacred Scripture and the proposal of the revealed object, faith is begotten dispositively; since faith is from hearing, and hearing through the word of God. Rom. 10. By proof faith is strengthened; for the reasons, similitudes, motives and examples by which the Scholastic Theologians elucidate the articles of the faith and show them credible, strengthen and cherish the weak and wavering faith of the feeble. By defense faith is fortified as with a firm shield, in which, as St. Paul speaks, Ephes. 6., it can extinguish all the fiery darts of the most wicked one; for while the Scholastic Theologians detect the fallacious reasonings of the heretics and the tricks and sophisms of those who philosophize badly with the torch of reasoning, and dissolve them into smoke, faith triumphs safe and victorious. By discourse faith is nourished; for when through theological discourse it appears that the articles of the faith are not contrary, although they are beyond and above natural reason; nay, for the most part they are shown conformable to the principles of nature, it is certain that the intellect is inclined more and more to give them a firmer and more tenacious assent, whence it happens that faith is, as it were, nourished and grows.

Fifth and finally, just as there is no one who does not receive the Theology of the holy Fathers with the highest praises, and does not judge it most useful and most necessary to the Church of God; so there is no one who ought to judge Scholastic Theology useless and to be rejected: for it has the same object as the Theology of the holy Fathers, rests on the same principle, and aims at the same end, namely the explanation of the faith and of the mysteries, the extirpation of heresies, the instruction of the faithful, etc. Nor does this differ from that in anything, except that with a better method and order it reduces into one body those things which the holy Fathers treated in various places, as the occasion offered, and aptly disposes each thing in its own place. Whence, just as no one in his right mind would judge Aristotle worthy of blame, because he ordered Philosophy, previously disturbed, undigested, and dissipated, delivered it with supreme art, distributed it into parts, to which he recalled all things in order, and enlarged it in many places; so far is it from being the case that the Scholastic Theologians are worthy of reproaches, that rather they merit the highest praise among all, because they have performed the same service for Theology, and have ordered it in the place and by the method in which it now is, and have enlarged it with many questions explanatory of the divine mysteries. For Scholastic Theology so investigates, weighs, and sifts all the dogmas of the faith, that it leaves almost nothing untouched and undiscussed: for the various difficulties and questions omitted by the ancient Fathers, or at least briefly touched upon, it has excogitated more subtly, proposed more clearly, explained more abundantly, and has weighed them, tested by the norm of faith or by the exact rule of reason. Whence not undeservedly the Scholastic Theologians can be called the Doctors and Fathers of the Church of their time; for they surely play the part of those ancient Doctors of the nascent Church, who illustrated the dogmas of God by their doctrine, and defended them most fiercely from the attacks of the heretics. — Add. That against Theology of this kind, which is most pleasing to all the pious and learned, only grammatical idiots, and heretics and men of heretical parties, speak ill; of whom the first are no more to be heard than the blind judging of colors; the latter, indeed, are to be made as much of as the frenzied who struggle against the physician and medicine, to whom these words of Augustine fitly apply, lib. 3. De peccatorum meritis et remissione, cap. 6: Because they were not such men as that I should be solicitous about their authority, I easily held this among things past and abolished. — Our Sixtus V confirms all these things no less luculently than wisely. For he, the supreme Pontiff of the Church of God, in the decretal letters by which he numbers the holy Bonaventure among the distinguished Doctors and Fathers of the Church, where he had said that Scholastic Theology was invented by the divine gift through most wise men, adds:

The knowledge, indeed, of this so salutary science, which flows from the most abundant fountains of the divine letters, of the Supreme Pontiffs, and of the Councils, could certainly always bring the greatest aid to the Church, whether for reading the Fathers more safely and more usefully, or for detecting and refuting the various errors and heresies, etc.

The heretics object: Scholastic Theology is far from the gravity and skill of speaking of the ancient Theologians: for the Doctors and the first Fathers of the Church treated the divine mysteries more weightily; for they judged nothing without the authority of Scripture, or the opinion of the prior Fathers and the definition of Councils; but those syllogistic formulas, the mousetraps of the weak, they either did not know, or as useless they shunned and rejected: but the Theologians of this time, having omitted all things which most become the faithful, examine all things on the balance and scale of reason: therefore this theology is to be cast away as useless. — I deny the antecedent. For as was said above, Scholastic Theology differs from the doctrine of the holy Fathers in this alone, that those things which they disputed more diffusely, and in an oratorical style more accommodated to the understanding of the common people, in whole books and volumes, this concludes in a brief and dialectical manner of speaking, sometimes by one or another reasoning. Wherefore if there is anything in which the more recent Theology disagrees with the old, for that very reason it ought to seem worthy of more utility and advantage to its students, and therefore of greater commendation and celebrity.

The heretics press: All novelty is to be avoided, and to be cast far away from the Church: therefore this scholastic doctrine, as being a new invention of later centuries, is to be banished far away. — I distinguish the antecedent. The novelty of dogmas is to be feared and is not to be heard, until it has been examined and reprobated by the Church, I concede: the novelty of the method of handing on doctrine, especially if it be clearer and easier, is to be rejected, I deny: nay, Christ himself, praising the Theologian, Matth. 13., makes him like a man who is the father of a family, who brings forth from his treasury new and old things. Not that he ought to teach new dogmas opposed to the old: but that he should teach and explain the old by a new method, as Vincentius Lirinensis warns, cap. 27.

Let it be understood, he says, more clearly through you who explain it than it was formerly believed more obscurely: through you may posterity congratulate itself for understanding what antiquity venerated without understanding: teach the same things which you have learned in such a way that, when you say them in a new way, you do not say new things.

Scholastic theology carries this out above all to the letter, for it does not hand down new dogmas, but the things which were said by the ancients, whether more diffusely and copiously or more lightly, it touches upon more acutely, and searches out and explains more profoundly.

They object 2. Scholastic theology is wholly occupied in discussing certain vain philosophical questions, which contribute absolutely nothing to salvation and to the illustration of the dogmas of faith: therefore it is to be dismissed as useless. — I answer 1. The antecedent is altogether false, for experience itself shows that Scholastic Theologians treat the things of faith accurately and exactly from the very principles of faith, namely Sacred Scripture, the doctrine of the holy Fathers, the sanctions of the Councils, and the other sanctuaries of Catholic truth, from which they elicit conclusions through legitimate discourse; which greatly contributes to the elucidation of the mysteries, the confutation of heresies, and the instruction of the faithful; for as Melchior Cano aptly says, loc. 8. cap. 1.: If you remove reason from Theology, you will lose both the thing and the name; because science is sought only through the syllogism... for what difference is there, when reason is removed, not only between a rustic and a Theologian, but between a Theologian and a beast, or a stone, or a block? — Secondly, if Scholastic Theology were to be rejected for this reason, that on the occasion and for the sake of treating divine things it discusses some philosophical questions which do not per se contribute to salvation, by a similar argument sacred Scripture would have to be cast aside, as reporting many things that do not lead to salvation: for instance when it deals with the histories of the Patriarchs, the Judges, the Kings, with the animals brought into Noah's ark and led out of it, with the dog of Tobias wagging its tail, and countless other things, the knowledge of which per se contributes nothing to salvation. — I say therefore that all useless contentions and quarrels among Theologians are to be ascribed not to Theology, but to the Theologian who wills to know more than he ought. What then? Are not heretics daily abusing sacred Scripture to the ruin of faith; should it therefore be dismissed? Or is the crop to be burned and rooted out because sometimes among the ears of wheat oats and tares grow up? By no means, but the useless weeds are to be plucked out, the crop is to be left untouched. All those vain questions, I admit, are to be cut off: but those which serve to explain and illustrate theological matters are to be kept and discussed.

They object 3. That perpetual dissensions blaze among Theologians, and that their writings are wholly filled with quarrels and contentions; nor is there any limit to their wrangling among themselves: nothing therefore certain, nothing stable can be found among them. — I answer. Theologians do not disagree among themselves in those things which pertain to faith, but are supremely in concord among themselves; that they differ in other matters is no inconvenience: nay, various matters are greatly illustrated thereby, and truth shines forth more and more each day: for while each one defends his own part, and strives to confirm his own opinion with reasons gathered from every side and to cultivate it with every kind of learning, infinite treasures of the sciences are little by little heaped up for the honor and ornament of the Church, and all disciplines are rendered complete in all their parts. — I answer 2. Heretics unjustly blame the dissension of Theologians: for he who casts a crime upon another must needs be innocent, lest he constitute himself guilty of the fault which he reproves in another. Who, however, does not know with how many quarrels and how hostile contentions heretics fight among themselves? For scarcely was the Lutheran sect born, than it was immediately cut into three other classes, and divided into Anabaptists, Confessionists, and Sacramentarians, as into three heads, and in its very infancy made three-headed: but soon, when it had grown up (for heresy is a fruitful parent of monsters), it thrust out now one and now another head from itself, and in a brief space of time grew into thirty-four sects: now indeed almost a hundred most diverse Religions are numbered as sprung from one Luther. Nor do they disagree among themselves only in lighter matters, but also in the principal Articles of faith, and brand upon one another the name and mark of heretic. Thus Luther, in his book Against the Sacramentarians, calls them and the Zwinglians heretics: and elsewhere says: Blessed is the man who has not walked in the counsel of the Sacramentarians, nor stood in the way of the Zwinglians, nor sat in the chair of the Zurichites: and not content with these, he even calls them devil-ridden, super-devil-ridden, and trans-devil-ridden. But they, to repay him in kind, say that Luther's mouth is full of devils, etc. — And what is the crown of inconstancy, one and the same sect so disagrees in the articles of faith that, leaving the earlier ones behind, it forges new and different dogmas day by day and proposes them to all to be believed. Hence George, the Saxon Duke, asked by the Catholics what the Lutherans there believed, said: I know what they now believe; what they will believe next year I am wholly ignorant: thus indeed are they carried from faith to faith, from religion to religion. Wherefore, most aptly to the present matter, St. Hilary, in the book to Constantius and Constans the Emperors:

It is dangerous, he was saying, and even astonishing to us, that there now exist as many faiths as wills: as many doctrines for us as there are customs, while faith is either written as we wish, or understood as we practice it, so that very many faiths burst forth in such a way that none may exist; nay, even yearly and monthly faiths about God are decreed, etc.

They object 4. Scholastic theology empties and extinguishes the merit of faith; therefore so far is it from benefiting faith in any way, that it greatly harms it. They prove the antecedent from St. Gregory, hom. 26. in Evang.: Faith has no merit where human reason supplies the proof: but through theological discourse natural reason supplies the proof to faith; for through it the intellect is moved to give its assent to the proposed object: therefore this empties the merit of faith. — I distinguish the antecedent. If the revealed proposition is believed only on account of the evidence of reason, it empties the merit of faith, I concede. If it is believed chiefly on account of the authority of God revealing, I deny. But theological discourse does not evidently demonstrate the revealed proposition; for it implies a contradiction that something should be revealed and be per se evident insofar as it is revealed; but it only demonstrates that that proposition is contained either in Scripture, or in the Councils, or in the universal tradition and practice of the Church. Hence it does not induce the intellect to assent to it on account of the evidence of reason: but only on account of the certain and infallible authority of the Revealer.

They insist. Scholastic theology relies most of all on philosophical and dialectical subtleties: but these greatly harm Faith and Christian truth: therefore, etc. They prove the Minor from the Apostles and the holy Fathers, who confess that Philosophy is the enemy and adversary of faith; for saint Paul admonished the Colossians, 2. cap.: See that no one deceive you through Philosophy and empty deceit: and Tertullian, lib. De Anima, cap. 3., calls Philosophers animals of glory and Patriarchs of Heretics, and in cap. 18 says that philosophical argumentations are torments for torturing simplicity and hanging truth, and in the same place calls Plato the condiment-maker of Heretics. Hence, in the book De praescriptionibus he says: God chose the foolish things of the world for the confusion of Philosophy itself; for it is the material of secular wisdom and the rash interpreter of the divine nature and disposition: in fine, heresies are furnished by Philosophy. What then has Athens to do with Jerusalem? What the Academy with the Church? What heretics with Christians? We have no need of curiosity after Christ, nor of inquiry after the Gospel; when we believe, we desire to believe nothing beyond.

Hence St. Gregory Nazianzen, in oration 26., grieves that Sophistic cavils and the depraved artifice of the Aristotelian art have crept into the Church, and other things of this kind, like certain Egyptian plagues. Likewise Gregory of Nyssa, lib. 2. against Eunomius, reproaches that sophistic cunning: We frankly and without shame confess, he says, that we have prepared neither any speech elaborated by rhetorical artifice nor a contest; nor do we put forward the subtlety of Dialectical acuteness as an aid against adversaries, which also brings truth into suspicion of falsehood among the unskilled. Ambrose also, lib. 1. De Fide, cap. 3., speaking of the Arians says:

They place all the force of their poisons in dialectical disputation, which by the opinion of the Philosophers is defined as having the power not of building up, but of the zeal of destroying: but it has not pleased God to save his people through Dialectic; for the kingdom of God is in the simplicity of faith, not in the contention of speech.

And in Psal. 118.: We have nothing to do with Philosophy, lest it draw our faith from the truth through the elements of this world: lest anyone plunder our assertion through Philosophy. For thus we have learned that the Arians fell into perfidy, while they think that the generation of Christ is to be gathered from the usage of this age. They abandoned the Apostle, they follow Aristotle; they abandoned the wisdom which is with God; they chose the little snares of disputation and the bird-catching of words according to the discipline of Dialectic: therefore Scholastic theology is proscribed by the holy Fathers, and so is to be exploded by us. — I distinguish the major. That it relies on philosophical subtleties to detect the sophisms of heretics and to eliminate their tricks, I concede: that it relies on them to circumvent the simplicity of faith and to obscure the Catholic truths, I deny. To the minor I say that Philosophy is adverse to faith not per se, but through the perverse malice of those who philosophize, who, as saint Jude speaks, vers. 1: For the things which they know not, they blaspheme; but the things which they know naturally, as dumb animals, in these they are corrupted. — And that this and no other is the opinion of the holy Fathers is clear from this, that they themselves adorn Dialectic with many praises, and confess that it is necessary for the defense of Faith: for St. Clement of Alexandria, lib. 2. Stromata says: Dialectic leads by the hand to the true and eternal wisdom, and to the knowledge of the supreme truth. St. Jerome, on cap. 25. of Ezekiel: Truly, he says, whatever of perverse dogmas is shown to be strong in earthly wisdom is overthrown by this Dialectical art, and, like a fire, is dissolved into ashes and cinders. St. Augustine inculcates the same in many places, but especially in the books against Cresconius, who mockingly called Augustine a Dialectician: But even the Apostle, namely Paul, was a dialectician, Augustine answered in lib. 2., and freely did not fear to dispute with the Stoics, because not only acutely, like them, but also truthfully, which they were not. He subjoins: Beware lest you cast Dialectic as a crime against anyone, Dialectic which you confess the Apostles used. Nay, he even shows that Christ the Lord used Dialectic: But if you call Christ a Dialectician, you will praise the Dialectic which you cast at me as a crime: therefore the treatment and method of those philosophical matters, which can be of use for better explaining or more accurately defending the things of faith, ought not to be judged useless or importunate. — Add. That heretics themselves are the cause why Scholastic Theologians discuss certain philosophical questions; for they are wont to argue from Philosophy against Catholics, v. g. that the same body cannot be at the same time in different places, so that they attack the real presence of the Body of Christ in the Eucharist. So of old the Arians used philosophical arguments, or rather sophisms, against the mystery of the Trinity, in order to deceive Catholics; and they had (says St. Epiphanius) three hundred arguments from natural reason, with which they attacked the divinity of the Son. Hence it was necessary for Catholics to fight back with the same weapons of Dialectic with which they were assailed, and, the heretics compelling, to take up Philosophy in defense of faith, that with its help they might investigate the Evangelical truths more diligently and explain them more evidently. For as St. Augustine says, lib. 16. De Civit. Dei, cap. 2.: Many things pertaining to the Catholic faith, while they are pondered amid the cunning attack of heretics so that they can be defended against them, are both considered more diligently, and understood more clearly, and preached more insistently: and a question moved by the adversary becomes an occasion for learning. And as Gregory the Great says, lib. 14. Moral., cap. 12., When the heavier contests of enemies have come forth, then indeed are more sublime darts of the senses required; then the razor of arguments, then a more perplexed search of words. Justly therefore have Theologians taken up Dialectic to refute the fallacious subtleties of heretics and of Gentile Philosophers, which St. Basil, on the second Chapter of Isaiah, did not hesitate to call a wall to the sacred dogmas, because it does not allow them to be easily plundered and to lie open to the incursion of anyone. And Clement of Alexandria, lib. 6. Stromat., says that the same is the hedge of Christ's vineyard, lest the Catholic truth be trampled by Sophists.

They object 5. The accusers of Scholastic theology charge it with its uncultivated style, and with the harsher and barbarous words with which it expresses its meanings, which certainly disgrace wise men and depress and obscure the august mysteries of faith. — But if for this reason Scholastic theology does not please them, then the simplicity of the sacred Letters and the uncultivated manner of speaking ought also to displease them. Do they perchance not know that under a rough cloak a learned Philosopher often lies hidden, and that the roughest and most uncultivated mountains sometimes conceal the richest veins of gold? Truth has no need of verbal allurements to shine: it is better to express it in easy and common speech than to obscure it with affected elegance; that succinct brevity which Theologians use cannot bear a wider compass and ornament of speech, lest, already burdened by the abundance and multitude of things, they be crushed also by the useless burden of words. But that it employs certain words proper to itself and otherwise unheard of and unusual ought not to seem wonderful; since every discipline has its own terms unknown to others, and devised at the pleasure of those who teach. What will not be allowed to Theology, the queen of the sciences, which its handmaids freely usurp?

You will ask. Why in these later centuries alone have the sacred Doctors of Theology used the Scholastic method, when from the very beginnings of the Church itself the Positive theology was chiefly frequented?

I answer 1. This was done for very many and most weighty reasons. First indeed, because positive Theology savors more of the Platonic manner of teaching, inasmuch as, after the fashion of Plato, it makes great use of allegories and oratorical and rhetorical syllogisms; Scholastic theology, however, imitates the Aristotelian method of teaching through analysis and tighter syllogisms: God, however, willed

that the Platonic Philosophy should serve the children of the nascent Church for just reasons. Then because this manner of philosophizing and reasoning was more frequent among the Jews and the Gentiles, whose errors were to be attacked and conquered with the same weapons with which they were defended. Then because the Platonic Philosophy was less stubborn and more docile than the dogmatic; and the same was more apt for insinuating the truths of faith and persuading the divine mysteries. Then, finally, because, since it flourished and was illustrated very much with parables and allegories, it tempered the rays of divine truth with these coverings, and proposed them, as it were milk, to the still weaker capacity of the faithful. For the children of the Eastern Church were still like weak little ones, of whom St. Paul speaks to the Hebrews 5.: You have become such as have need of milk, not of solid food; for every one that partakes of milk is without experience of the word of justice, for he is a little one: but solid food is for the perfect, for those who by habit have their senses exercised to the discerning of good and evil. — It was fitting, therefore, that the children of the Church, still little ones, should first receive the Evangelical truths tempered by allegories and parables and be nourished, as it were, with milk, before, having grown greater and been exercised for many centuries in this heavenly doctrine, they would have the discerning of good and evil, and would separate the depraved dogmas of heretics from Catholic truths through analysis.

Secondly: It was unbecoming that, once the Gospel was published, the Christian truths should be reduced into theological summaries and various questions formed about them, which would both have disturbed the wavering faith of the faithful, and revealed the hidden mysteries to the infidels. It was necessary, therefore, that Allegory should precede Analysis, and that, with a new revelation of truths always coming to hand, the body of Catholic doctrine should, in the course of time, be, as it were, joined together, before it should be cut apart and distributed, as it were anatomically, through the resolutions and disputations of Scholastic Theology and through the dissections of Analysis.

But when the body of Evangelical doctrine stood solidly constituted in all its parts; then, for the easier understanding of the truths, it was fitting to reduce them into a certain and methodical order, and to take up the more contracted and briefer, but more urgent, Aristotelian manner of philosophizing; then so that the Evangelical truths should shine forth more brightly; then so that the tricks and sophisms of heretics should be more easily solved and cut asunder. — Add. That since Plato is wholly occupied in contemplating divine things, and learned very many truths of faith and not a few mysteries from the Hebrews in Egypt, and set them down in his writings; his Philosophy seemed by far more apt for persuading those truths to the Philosophers and Pagan Doctors than the Aristotelian, which is wholly detained about natural things, and scarcely searches out and investigates divine things. But when these divine truths were sufficiently and more than sufficiently published, and disseminated in the writings of the holy Fathers and set forth and approved in oratorical speech and rhetorical syllogisms; then it was necessary that Theologians should take up the Aristotelian analysis, and gather them into one body, and, after the manner of Anatomists, cut them apart with various questions and resolutions, as with so many dissections, so that each one might be more aptly ordered and appear more evidently.

There is no reason, therefore, why heretics should so much inveigh against this change of Theological Method, and long for the Positive and Oratorical Theology used by the holy Fathers to be frequented again, which, they say, they would not criticize, nay, would receive with the highest praises. But to them I can justly return what the adorable Savior returned to the Scribes and Pharisees, Matth. 23.:

Woe to you, Scribes and Pharisees, who build the sepulchres of the Prophets, and adorn the monuments of the just, and say: if we had been in the days of our Fathers, we would not have been their companions in the blood of the Prophets; so you are witnesses to yourselves, that you are the children of those who killed the Prophets. For what else are the heretics of this time than the children of those heretics who persecuted the holy Fathers and criticized their doctrine? Nor do they accomplish anything else while they assail the more modern Theologians with words and writings, than what the ancient heretics plotted against the sacred Doctors in the Church. These, indeed, the heirs of Arius, Nestorius, and Manichaeus, while they attack the Theologians, fill up the measure of their Fathers, and do the same things which they blame in others.