Scotus Academicus, Tomus decimus: De Baptismo, De Poenitentia, De Extrema Unctione

Three chief matters must be determined in this Question: first, whether the priest alone is minister of the sacrament of penance; second, whether this belongs to every priest by virtue of his character and Order; third, whether the confessor must be so strict a keeper of secrecy that he may under no circumstances ever disclose to anyone other than the penitent the sin confessed to him. In order that these matters may be resolved more distinctly and made clear,

NOTE 1. Among the other errors of Wycliffe was the claim that a priest was not a necessary minister of the sacrament of penance, as Waldensis testifies, vol. 2, ch. 135; some of the more recent heretics followed him in this error, as is gathered from the Council of Trent, sess. XIV, ch. 6, where it declares: Concerning the minister of this sacrament, the holy Synod declares that all doctrines are false and wholly alien to the truth of the Gospel which perniciously extend the ministry of the keys to any other persons whatever besides bishops and priests, supposing that those words of the Lord, “Whatever you bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatever you loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven,” and “Whose sins you forgive, they are forgiven them, and whose you retain, they are retained,” were spoken indiscriminately and promiscuously to all Christians, contrary to the institution of this sacrament, as though anyone had power to remit sins: public sins, indeed, through correction, if the corrected person has accepted it, but secret sins through spontaneous confession made to anyone whatever. Nor were there lacking certain Catholics who, following the Master of the Sentences in bk. I, d. 17, although they granted that the priest alone is minister of this sacrament, nevertheless thought that in necessity, when no priest is present, the sinner is bound to confess to a layman. For they said, as St. Bonaventure reports in the same distinction, part 3, doubt 1, that the power of absolving is possessed in five ways: by authority, and thus it belongs to God; by excellence, and thus it belongs to Christ as man; by power, or authority committed, and thus it belongs to the priest; by merit of life, and thus it belongs to the just and holy man; and by virtue of the unity of the Church, and thus it belongs to any faithful man. Therefore they say that such confession is in a certain way a sacrament of the Church. It is more probable, however, to say that it is not a sacrament of the Church, since its formal element is lacking, namely, the power of the key; rather, it is something in place of it.

NOTE 2. The power to absolve from sins, granted by Christ the Lord to the priests of the New Law, is declared metaphorically under the name keys in Matthew 16, where the Lord, promising this power to Peter, says: I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and whatever you bind on earth, etc. “Moreover,” says the Seraphic Doctor, d. 18, a. 1, “the name key is transferred to spiritual things from bodily things themselves; among bodily things a key is an instrument for removing some obstacle. Since, then, in spiritual things we find an obstacle to entering the heavenly kingdom, it must be removed. Hence we transfer the name key to spiritual things, calling that power a key by which the obstacle is removed, or by which one is excluded or admitted. Accordingly, it must be observed that, since there are three obstacles to entering the kingdom and three powers that remove them, there is a threefold spiritual key, differing according to degree and dignity. The obstacle to entering heaven is a debt arising from some sin, and this is threefold. First, the debt of a sin committed, namely, mortal sin, which is a debt of eternal punishment. God alone removes this obstacle, because it is removed by the deletion of guilt; therefore the power removing it is divine power, which some call the key of authority. The second obstacle is the debt of contracted sin, namely, the debt of paying a price; it could be paid by him who could make satisfaction, and such was Christ alone. Therefore this power, which removes that obstacle, belongs to Christ alone, and some call it the key of excellence. The third obstacle is the debt of a remitted sin, because after guilt has been remitted, a person is still bound to temporal punishment. This can be removed by one who can determine the penalty for sin, and such is Christ’s minister, not Christ alone. This power has been communicated to men and is called the key of ministry. Since, then, the obstacle is threefold, the key is threefold: the first, namely, that of authority, from which comes the second, that of excellence, which belongs to Christ alone; and the third is the key of ministry, which descends from the key of authority through the key of excellence. Of this it was said to Peter: I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven.” The Doctor explains this truth somewhat differently in d. 19, n. 1, where he says: “Judicial authority to pronounce sentence that heaven is to be opened to someone, or is open, can be understood in three ways: first, as authority that is simply principal; second, as not principal but pre-eminent; third, as neither principal nor pre-eminent, but particular. The first belongs to God alone for two reasons. First, because he alone is just of himself—indeed, justice itself. The first judgment can belong only to the first just one, since judgment is not perfect unless it is just, as in the Psalm: I have done judgment and justice; for to judge is to declare what is right or just. The first just one must be most perfect, and hence most just: therefore, the first just one. Second, because to judge belongs to the presiding authority, according to the Apostle’s words in Romans 14: Who are you to judge another’s servant? The first presiding authority can be God alone. Thus, just as he cannot communicate divinity to another, neither can he communicate the first power of judging, and consequently neither the simply principal key for opening heaven. The second key, which is not principal yet is pre-eminent, can be understood in relation to two kinds of pre-eminence: one in the universality of the causes to be judged, the other in the firmness of the definitive sentence. Both can belong to one who knows all the merits and demerits that are the causes for which heaven is to be opened or closed, and whose will is also inseparably conformed to divine justice. On the first account he can pronounce sentence in every case, because he knows them all… On the second, his sentence can be absolutely firm and irrevocable, because it is always just. This key, with both kinds of pre-eminence, belongs properly to Christ, who knows all the merits and demerits of those to be judged and always judges in conformity with divine justice. Nor can it belong to the Church militant, at least not suitably, because no one in the Church knows all judicial causes or has a will immutably just. The third key, particular with respect to the causes known and weak with respect to the sentence pronounced, in that it can sometimes be revoked, may be conferred on someone in the Church militant who can know the case in question and judge rightly in it according to divine law; if he judges beyond that case, his sentence will not be firm, but within that case it will be firm. Thus there can be in the Church one key for opening heaven: the authority to pronounce a particular sentence, not irrevocably, that heaven is open to someone. It is also fitting that this key be in the Church, and in a priest, so that the ecclesiastical hierarchy may be ordered and the last things brought back to the first through an intermediary.”

NOTE 3. The seal of confession is nothing other than the obligation by which a confessor is bound to keep secret all that he has heard in confession. This obligation is called metaphorically a seal because, just as secrets are customarily sealed so that they do not become known to others, so sins made known to a confessor must be sealed in perpetual silence, as though by a sacred and inviolable seal, lest they become known to others. Since there are three kinds of right by which someone may be bound to keep a secret entrusted to him—natural, divine positive, and ecclesiastical—the question is whether the confessor is bound by each of these three kinds of right to conceal the sin disclosed to him in confession.

First conclusion. — THE PRIEST ALONE OF THE EVANGELICAL LAW IS THE LAWFUL MINISTER OF THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE, TO WHOM SACRAMENTAL CONFESSION MUST BE MADE. This is a matter of faith, defined by the Council of Trent, sess. XIV, ch. 10: If anyone says that priests who are in mortal sin do not have the power to bind and loose, or that not priests alone are ministers of absolution, but that these words were spoken to all the faithful, “Whatever you bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatever you loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven,” and “Whose sins you forgive, they are forgiven them, and whose you retain, they are retained,” by the power of which words anyone may absolve sins—public sins through correction only, if the corrected person has accepted it, but secret sins through spontaneous confession—let him be anathema. This truth is evident from the action of Christ the Lord, who, when he conferred the power to absolve from sins in John 20¹, gave it to the Apostles alone. For after he had breathed on them and said, Receive the Holy Spirit, he immediately added, Whose sins you forgive, etc., clearly indicating that only those who by a special ordination would receive the grace of the Holy Spirit for this purpose were to speak these words; such are priests alone. Therefore, etc.

This same truth is further proved by the authority of the holy Fathers, who unanimously teach that this power of absolving was granted to the priests of the New Law alone. Thus St. Ambrose, in On Paradise and On Penance, speaking of the power to bind and absolve, says: This right has been permitted to priests alone. Explaining the words of Matthew 16, I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven, St. Jerome says: The other Apostles have judicial power, and so does the whole Church in its bishops and priests; but Peter received it especially so that all might understand that whoever is separated from the truth of the faith and the fellowship of the Church can neither be loosed from sins nor enter heaven. The other Fathers attest the same, especially St. Leo, ep. 91, and before them St. Pacian, in Against the Novatians. Moreover, the Subtle Doctor praised above proves this truth, n. 6, from the fact that a priest is a mediator between God and the sinner: “It is fitting,” he says, “that this authority be in the Church, and in a priest, so that the ecclesiastical hierarchy may be ordered and the last things brought back to the first through an intermediary. The hierarchy is the intermediary between God and the sinner who is to be brought back. This also accords with the perfection of secondary causes in moral being: God does not universally deny creatures the causality that can belong to them; indeed, he communicates it and assists secondary causes in their action. Since, then, in the order of grace it is possible for a human being to have this reductive causality, called the key, it is fitting that it be given to the highest authority in the Church, namely, the priest.”

The Seraphic Doctor declares the same truth plainly and clearly in d. 19, a. 2, q. 1, where he says: “It must be said, as the Saints say, and as the very manner of conferring Orders also indicates, that the power of the keys is conferred in the priestly Order. The reason is divine institution. We can see the fittingness of the institution: the keeper of these keys has the efficacy of a mediator and the office of a reconciler. A mediator stands between God and man; a reconciler restores someone to the Church and reconciles him to the Church. To be a perfect and competent mediator between God and man, one must be able to offer gifts and sacrifices for sins, by which God is appeased. To be a reconciler, one must be able to restore someone to the mystical body of Christ, whose head is Christ himself; and for this power to be rightly ordered, one must be able to consecrate the most holy body of Christ. This belongs to priests alone. Therefore God’s wondrous wisdom, ordering ecclesiastical powers in the most orderly way, entrusted this power of binding and loosing to priests alone; thus the keys are given in the priestly Order.”

OBJECTIONS 1. St. James, ch. 5, admonishes them to confess their sins to one another, for he says: Therefore confess your sins to one another and pray for one another, that you may be saved; the constant prayer of a just man is very powerful. Therefore he does not think confession must be made to a priest alone. — I answer: Scripture distinguishes three kinds of confession of sins made to one’s neighbor: one is satisfactory, made to an offended brother to obtain his pardon and peace; another is consultative, made to obtain advice necessary for salvation; the third is sacramental, made to obtain pardon through absolution. The first may be made to any neighbor who has been offended. The second may be made to a just and learned man, especially to pastors and religious men, whose office is to enlighten the faithful publicly and privately with evangelical teaching and console them with salutary exhortation. The third, however, may be made only to the Church’s priests, to whom alone the power of absolving from sins has been granted. St. James seems to speak only of this last kind when he urges that sins be confessed to another; for he had first spoken of priests, admonishing the faithful that if anyone among them is sick, he should summon the presbyters of the Church to pray over him and anoint him with oil. Hence he immediately concludes: Therefore confess your sins to one another, thereby indicating plainly enough that sins are to be laid before those whom he had already said should be summoned to pray over the sick man and anoint him. Lest anyone think that the mortal sins burdening the sick person’s conscience could be wiped away through the priests’ prayer and the holy unction they administered, he adds: Confess your sins to one another—as Hugh of St. Victor explains in On the Sacraments: that is, among you, human beings to human beings, sheep to pastors, subjects to prelates, laymen to priests, those who have sins to those who have the power to remit sins.

OBJECTIONS 2. St. Cyprian, bk. 3 of the Letters, according to Pamelius’s edition, ep. 13, teaches: If someone, overcome by illness, cannot wait for the priest’s arrival, let him be reconciled through a deacon, after first making an exomologesis, that is, a confession. Similarly, in On Thefts, ch. “Thieves,” we read: We have decided that prayers should not be said for thieves and robbers if they are killed while stealing and plundering; but if, when captured or wounded, they have confessed to a presbyter or deacon, we do not deny them communion. — I answer: Cyprian is speaking not of sacramental absolution but of that by which public penitents were received into the communion of the Church, so that they could share communion with others and take part in divine worship. As to the second passage, I say that it does not say there that a deacon can sacramentally absolve a thief, but that he can hear his confession and judge whether he is truly contrite and worthy to receive the sacrament of the Eucharist, which at that time deacons customarily administered to the faithful when no priest was present.

OBJECTIONS 3. Various authorities of the holy Fathers seem to indicate that the power of the keys belongs to all the faithful, especially the good and devout, and is exercised by them whenever they forgive penitents for offenses committed against them, or leave the obstinate and impenitent to be punished by divine judgment. Among these, St. Augustine says most notably in bk. 3 of Against the Donatists, ch. 18, speaking of the Apostles to whom it had been said, Whose sins you forgive: “Therefore, if they represented the Church and this was said to them as though it were said to the Church itself, the Church’s peace forgives sins, and alienation from the Church’s peace retains sins—not according to the judgment of men, but according to God’s judgment, and the prayers of the spiritual saints, who judge all things but are themselves judged by no one. For the rock retains, the rock forgives; the dove forgives; unity retains, unity forgives. The peace of this unity is found only among the good, whether they are already spiritual or are advancing toward spiritual things through harmonious obedience; it is not found among the wicked, etc.” Further on, concerning the wicked, he says: “They did not grant the remission² of sins that is given through the prayers of the saints, that is, through the dove’s sighs. For the Lord would not say to robbers and fornicators, If you forgive anyone’s sins, etc.” And in bk. 5, ch. 21: “Therefore,” he says, “God gives the sacrament of grace even through the wicked, but grace itself only through himself or his saints; thus he effects the remission of sins either through himself or through the members of that dove to whom he said, If you forgive anyone’s sins, etc.” In bk. 6, ch. 4 of the same work he says: “When sins are remitted to an evil man truly converted to God, they are remitted by those to whom he is joined through true conversion. For the same Holy Spirit remits them, the Spirit who has been given to all the saints bound to one another by charity, whether or not they know one another. Likewise, when someone’s sins are retained, they are retained by those from whom he is separated by a difference of life and the estrangement of a perverse heart.” Moreover, in Tractate 58 on John he says that when we forgive one another’s sins, we loose them on earth so that they may also be loosed in heaven. And in Tractate 121, on the words Whose sins you forgive, etc., he says: “The charity of the Church forgives the sins of those who share in it and retains the sins of those who do not.” A similar passage occurs in St. Ambrose, bk. 9 on Luke, on the words Loose him and let him go, where he says: The apostolic hand looses; such be your action, such your life, such your grace; be such yourself, that you may loose those who are bound. Origen also writes in Homily 1 on Matthew 16: All who follow in Peter’s footsteps have the power of loosing and binding. Theophylact likewise states plainly in Matthew 18: Not only what priests loose is loosed, but whatever we, when injured, bind or loose is also bound or loosed. — I answer that we have already partly answered all these authorities in the Provincial Disputation, where we showed that sacraments are validly administered even by wicked ministers. I add that in the passages just cited St. Augustine and St. Ambrose are not speaking of ministers of the sacrament or of the sacramental manner of remitting sins, which occurs through ministerial authority, but of the intercessory manner proper to holy and devout men. For outside the sacrament God remits sins to no one in answer to the prayers of the wicked, but in answer to those of the just. St. Augustine distinguishes these two matters most clearly in bk. 4 of Against the Donatists, ch. 4, where, discussing whether a heretic and a robber remit sins, he says: If it is through the power of God’s sacrament, then each does so just as the other; if through his own merit, neither does so. By this he means that sins are sometimes remitted either through the ministry of the one absolving or through the merit of the one interceding. The Church also recognizes this latter manner of remitting sins in the saints reigning with God. Estius says that in d. 20, § 2, the Church says in a hymn to the Blessed Virgin: Loose the bonds of the guilty, and again, Make us, freed from sins, gentle and chaste; to the Apostles: We beg you, loose us from all sins by command; and to a martyr: The bonds of your sacred body are now loosed; loose us from the bonds of the world, etc. By command is said because of the certainty of the effect that follows from their intercessions. Likewise, to the Forerunner: Holy John, loose the guilt of a polluted lip. Conversely, the saints are said to bind the impenitent and retain their sins when they approve divine justice toward the impenitent, especially the condemned. Hence their voice is heard in the Psalm: Have no mercy on all who work iniquity. For just as the saints will be judges on the day of the Last Judgment, so now, in a certain way, they judge the wicked and impious by approving the sentence that divine justice passes on them even in this life. As for the objection from Origen and Theophylact, it has already been answered above in reply to the first objection, where we said that confession is threefold: one kind is satisfactory, and these two authors are to be understood as speaking of it.

YOU WILL ASK: When no priest is present and the danger of death is imminent, is someone conscious of mortal sin bound to confess to a layman or a deacon? — I answer: various authors advise such confession. First, the author of the book On True and False Penance, ch. 10, and Gratian after him, in the chapter “Whoever repents,” d. 1, On Penance, says: Such is the power of confession that, if there is no priest, one should confess to a neighbor. It often happens that a penitent cannot feel shame before a priest; and even if the one to whom he confesses has no power to absolve, the penitent nevertheless becomes worthy of the priest’s pardon through his desire, when he confesses to a companion. For lepers were cleansed while they went to pray or show themselves to the priests, before they reached them. Hence it is clear that God looks into the heart when necessity prevents people from reaching priests. Often they seek them while healthy and joyful, but as they seek them they die before arriving. Yet God’s mercy is everywhere: he knows how to spare the just, even if not as quickly as if they were absolved by a priest. Peter the Chanter of Paris teaches the same in his Summa on the Sacraments, fol. 203, defending the same opinion as common and relying on the same authority from On True and False Penance: Behold, from this authority we learn that in necessity one must confess to a layman if no priest is available, and not only venial sins but mortal ones as well. He then raises against himself the authority of Bede, who seems to understand this only of venial sins, and answers: Perhaps this was said of a case in which a priest can be found, as appears from what follows, namely, that sins cannot be remitted without the correction of confession. For if confession is so necessary that, when no priest is available, one must confess to anyone at all in danger of death, must one confess to a Jew, a Gentile, or an avowed heretic? It does not seem so, since they are despisers and mockers of the Christian religion, etc. He then proves that one should not confess to a dead person or a child, but to a discreet layman who will not be scandalized by such a confession. Peter further asks and answers matters that seem worth inserting here, to show more clearly what the widespread practice of many was at the time: And likewise, may one confess to a woman who will not be scandalized by such a confession? Again, if a faithful servant of a Jew is dying on the road, with only his master present, and has no sins that the Jew could or would use to detain the penitent or the Church; and before dying he confesses to that Jew and adjures him by God and the faith he owes him to attest his penance and confession to the Church, will he be believed later when he attests this? Will the Church not commend such a confession, since no danger follows from it? I answer: I believe that the Lord, who in such a case gives the penitent contrition, will teach him through inward inspiration what he should do. Because of such great necessity, I believe he may confess even to this Jew or heretic; yet he may commendably abstain from confessing to them if his conscience so directs. Praepositivus likewise taught this as a widely accepted doctrine, as is gathered from his manuscript Summa, bk. 2, ch. “On Confession,” where he writes: It is asked whether one may confess to a companion. It seems so, and this is proved. On the passage “Confess your sins to one another,” Bede says that sins committed deliberately should be confessed to a priest, but those committed through weakness or ignorance may be confessed to a companion. Objection: Some sin committed through weakness is graver than every sin committed deliberately. For the sin of fornication committed through weakness is graver than an idle word spoken deliberately. Therefore someone must confess a mortal sin to a companion and a venial sin to a priest. Solution: By sins of weakness Bede understood daily sins, without which life can scarcely be lived, since these often proceed from weakness or ignorance. But what does confessing to a companion achieve? It seems to achieve nothing, since a companion has no power to bind and loose; moreover, one can find a priest. Solution: Whatever Bede may say, we say that it is always better to confess to a priest than to a companion, and one should confess to a companion only in necessity. Necessity, however, arises even in the case of the smallest sins: it would be almost impossible to find a priest every time we sin, whereas it is easy to find a companion; and when someone confesses to a companion, he is loosed through his desire for a priest, as Augustine says. That is what he says. Albert the Great, in In IV Sent., d. 17, a. 58, poses the question: Can someone confess to a companion, and what is such confession worth? He answers: Confession made to a layman is of value when necessity, and not contempt for religion, rules out one’s own or another priest. He then teaches that the Fathers asserted various powers of absolving: “There is,” he says, “the power to absolve by authority, which belongs to God; the power of supreme excellence, which belongs to Christ as man, etc. A third power comes from the merit of life and the suffrages of prayers; this belongs to the saints in the Church, whereby one person merits for another the first grace that absolves from sins. Another power, conferred on priests by the office of ministers, is the last; by virtue of the unity of faith and charity, in a case of necessity it descends to every person to help his neighbor. A layman has this power in a case of necessity, and so does a woman.” In the following article he teaches that such absolution is sacramental, like baptism administered by a layman, and that in this case the layman is a true minister, that is, the priest’s substitute. St. Raymond likewise says in bk. 3 of On Penance and Remission, § 20: Graver sins too should be disclosed to one’s equals when no priest is available and danger is pressing; when no priest is available, it is permissible to confess venial sins to one’s equals, and this suffices, as most Doctors say, provided the priest is not omitted out of contempt. Others say—and I believe this the safer view—that sins of both kinds should be disclosed to priests, to whom the power of binding and absolving has been granted, if one can be found. Earlier, in session 15, relying on St. Augustine, the Decree On Penance, d. 1, “Whoever repents,” and On Consecration, d. 4, ch. “The Holy,” he had said: Such is the power of confession that if a case of necessity arises—because someone who wishes to confess is sick unto death or must enter a just war, and no priest is available—he may confess to a neighbor; thus he may confess not only to a cleric but also to a layman or companion. Alexander of Hales, Summa, part 4, q. 19, memb. 1, a. 1, says confession made to a layman is useful for many reasons and that absolution given by a layman is a petition for absolution from God; in proof he cites the saying of St. Augustine already quoted, but attributes it to St. Gregory. St. Bonaventure, in d. 17, part 3, doubt 3, and a. 2, q. 1, attests that some Doctors consider this confession sacramental, though he judges the contrary more probable. It matters little, however, whether it is sacramental or not, provided it produces in the penitent in some way the primary effect of sacramental absolution, namely, salvation. Cardinal Hostiensis, in bk. 5 of the Summa, title On Penance and Remission, ch. 14, explains cases in which it is permissible not to confess to one’s own parish priest: “Seventh, in a time of necessity, 26, q. 6, ‘If a priest,’ On Penance, d. 3, ‘Any priest’; for, as Augustine says, confession has such power that, if a case of necessity is imminent—for example, one who wishes to confess is sick unto death, or must enter a war, and no priest is available, neither his own nor any other—in such a case he may confess even to a layman or, if no one else is present, to a woman, On Penance, d. 1, ‘Whoever repents,’ and d. 3, ‘Whoever wishes,’ and On Consecration, d. 4, ‘It is holy,’ etc. One must not, however, confess to a heretic or an excommunicate.” Shortly afterward he explains the power of such confession: “What was said about a layman or woman should be understood as concerning the manifestation of sacramental faith; hence, if someone dies in this way, he is saved. Yet the proper sacrament is lacking, because no one can truly absolve so as to make it the true sacrament of penance unless he is a priest. Therefore, if such a person survives, he must confess again to his own priest.” Likewise, St. Thomas says in d. 17, q. 3, a. 3, question 2: “It must be said that, just as baptism is a sacrament of necessity, so too is penance. Baptism, as a sacrament of necessity, has two ministers: one whose office it is to baptize, namely, a priest; the other to whom the administration of baptism is entrusted by reason of necessity. So too the minister of penance, to whom confession must be made by office, is a priest; but in necessity a layman also takes the priest’s place, so that confession may be made to him.” In his reply to the first objection he later teaches that such confession contains the character of a sacrament, and those things that pertain to its essence, though not all of them; what is lacking, namely, a priest, is supplied by the High Priest. When necessity is imminent, the penitent must do what lies on his part: be contrite and confess to whomever he can. A little later he says: “Nevertheless, confession made to a layman out of desire for a priest is sacramental in a certain way, though it is not a perfect sacrament.” In reply to the second objection he says that the layman is the confessor’s judge, because the penitent has submitted to him by reason of necessity and to obtain the sacrament.

In truth, I say that these and similar authorities and opinions do not mean that the confession made by a penitent, and absolution given by deacons or laymen, are sacramental. For absolutely all the Doctors of the Church consistently teach that the power of the keys belongs to bishops and presbyters alone, as the Council of Trent plainly defines, sess. XIV, ch. 6. Hence such confession can indeed be salutary on account of the contrition, shame, and humility attached to it. For, as the Doctor says in d. 17, q. 27: “Such confession can be an occasion of shame, which is one penalty due for sin; by confessing, a person pays some penalty that he would pay if he confessed to a priest. But since the precept requires accusation for this purpose, and no other, namely, that a sentence follow, and since a layman has no authority to pronounce sentence in this forum, it follows that there is no precept to accuse oneself to a layman. Perhaps it would be more useful not to accuse oneself to him, if one could feel the same shame by recalling the same sins privately and thus be punished equally. Someone might say that it is necessary not to confess to a layman because one may not defame oneself or disclose one’s hidden sin, especially when the person to whom it is disclosed is not presumed to keep the secret and does not know better than the sinner himself how to advise him. Perhaps it is permissible to disclose one’s sin to some more discreet layman in order to seek counsel. But even this is not clear, since one could seek counsel by presenting the case in general terms, without disclosing one’s own sin. What, then, of condemned criminals confessing to laymen? I answer that their simplicity excuses them from sinning in this, and their humility is meritorious for them, insofar as they wish to supply as best they can what pertains to the sacrament of penance. But for a discreet man who knows well the purpose for which confession was instituted, it would perhaps not be useful and would certainly not be necessary to make such a confession.” That is what the Doctor says.

Second conclusion. — NOT EVERY PRIEST, OUTSIDE IMMINENT DANGER OF DEATH, IS A MINISTER OF THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE TO WHOM CONFESSION MUST BE MADE; ONLY ONE WHO HAS BEEN GRANTED JURISDICTION FOR THIS PURPOSE IS. This is the common view among theologians and is expressly

Deduced from the Council of Florence, in the Decree of Eugenius, where it teaches that the minister of this sacrament is a priest having ordinary or delegated authority to absolve. By these words, since it explains what is required by divine law for the essence of the sacraments, it indicates that this authority, or power of jurisdiction, is required by divine law. The Council of Trent teaches the same quite plainly, sess. XIV, ch. 5³, where it says that absolution from sins is a judicial act instituted by Christ; jurisdiction is required for this act. Hence in ch. 7 it says: Since, therefore, the nature and character of judgment require that a sentence be passed only upon subjects, it has always been held in the Church of God, and this Synod confirms as most true, that an absolution is to be considered null when a priest pronounces it upon someone over whom he has neither ordinary nor delegated jurisdiction. Hence the chapter “If a Bishop,” On Penance and Remission, in the sixth book, also establishes that no custom can be introduced or prescription acquired by which anyone may choose a confessor for himself without his superior’s permission; for no custom or prescription can prevail against divine law. From this it is clear that the requirement of jurisdiction follows from the very nature and institution of the sacrament. For if the fact that any priest cannot absolve anyone whatever arose only from human law, a contrary prescription could be acquired, since, according to the more probable opinion, prescription can prevail against every human law.

The difficulty, however, is where this jurisdiction comes from. Some theologians, with Armachanus, bk. 11 of Armenian Questions, ch. 4, teach that in this sacrament the power of jurisdiction is not distinct from the power of Order; thus a priest receives both together, fully, at ordination, and any priest can validly absolve anyone properly disposed, though illicitly, because of the Church’s prohibition. But this opinion plainly conflicts with the Council of Trent, ch. 7, which decrees: The reservation of sins is consonant with divine authority and has force not only in external government but also before God. Nevertheless, with great piety, lest anyone perish on this very account, it has always been observed in the same Church of God that there is no reservation at the point of death; therefore all priests can absolve any penitents whatsoever from any sins and censures. Outside that point, since priests can do nothing in reserved cases, they should strive only to persuade penitents to approach their superiors and lawful judges for the benefit of absolution. These words plainly teach that certain priests absolve from reserved sins not merely illicitly but also invalidly; consequently, it is false that they all possess complete jurisdiction by virtue of their ordination.

Some, with Navarro in the Summa, ch. 4, n. 3, and ch. 27, n. 54, think that priests do indeed receive habitual jurisdiction at their ordination, but not jurisdiction so full and extensive that they can validly absolve when the Church’s prohibition prevents it. But this opinion nearly coincides with the preceding one. For if every priest by divine law and virtue of his ordination had sufficient power actually to absolve from all sins, the Church could in no way make it the case that he validly absolves a penitent properly disposed; just as none of its prohibitions can make a bishop ordain or confirm someone invalidly.

Third, some teach, with St. Antoninus, part 3, title 17, ch. 4, that priests do receive the power of jurisdiction at ordination, but that even without any prohibition by the Church it cannot be reduced to act, owing to a lack of material: for a judge to exercise an act of jurisdiction, it is not enough that a prince appoint him judge; he must also have subjects and a definite place in which to exercise that jurisdiction. Hence, for priests to be able validly to absolve a penitent, the Church must assign them some subjects, because Christ the Lord instituted this sacrament so that no one can pronounce sentence upon another without the Church’s authority and designation. I consider this opinion the more correct.

A fourth and final opinion teaches that the power of Order, which alone a priest receives at ordination, is distinct from the power of jurisdiction, which he later receives from the prelates of the Church. Consequently, he cannot absolve anyone until he has first received this authority, which can be freely granted and likewise freely suspended and revoked. So teach Medina, On Penance, tract 2, q. 39, conclusion 3; Soto, In IV Sent., d. 18, q. 4, a. 2; and Suarez, disp. 16, sect. 3, n. 7. They support this opinion especially with the following arguments, which we shall examine elsewhere when treating Order. The Councils of Trent and Florence distinguish this jurisdiction as ordinary and delegated; consequently, they consider this power delegable. But that would be false if the power of jurisdiction were the same as the power of Order, since no one would say that the power of Order can be delegated; therefore the Councils consider the power of jurisdiction distinct from the power of Order. Further, every jurisdiction is essentially a superiority, which intrinsically implies a relation to subjects: just as no one can truly be a master without having a servant, neither can anyone be a superior or have jurisdiction without having subjects. But a priest acquires no subjects by virtue of his ordination; therefore he does not obtain jurisdiction by virtue of it. Finally, it belongs to the same authority to confer jurisdiction as to assign the subjects over whom that jurisdiction is exercised. But the Church assigns ordained priests subjects over whom they exercise jurisdiction and sacramental judicial authority; therefore it also grants them this jurisdiction.

YOU WILL SAY 1: Urban II, as cited in the chapter “It has been decided,” On Penance, established that henceforth no priest may receive for penance anyone committed to another priest without the consent of the priest to whom he had first committed himself. Therefore, previously anyone could receive whomever he wished for penance and absolution. — I DENY THE CONSEQUENCE: the passage concerns not sacramental penance but public penance alone. It decrees that someone performing solemn penance may not, after committing himself to one priest to perform it according to that priest’s judgment and prescription, commit himself to another in the same matter without the first priest’s permission—unless perhaps that priest had imposed something indecent on him through ignorance, in which case he could consult another.

YOU WILL SAY 2: The power of jurisdiction, or of remitting sins, is granted to every priest at his ordination, as the Council of Trent decrees, sess. XIV, ch. 6, in these words: The holy Synod also teaches that priests held in mortal sin exercise the function of remitting sins as ministers of Christ through the power of the Holy Spirit conferred at ordination, and that those who contend that this power is absent in wicked priests judge wrongly. Here the Council teaches that priests possess the power of jurisdiction by virtue of their ordination; therefore that power is not distinct from the power of Order. Consequently, just as any priest can exercise the power of Order independently of any prohibition by the Church, so he can exercise jurisdiction and the authority to absolve. Add that the Council says priests have the same authority that was granted to the Apostles by the words of John 20, Whose sins you forgive; but by virtue of these words the Apostles could absolve anyone whatever; therefore priests can do the same. — I DENY THE CONSEQUENCE, in accordance with the third opinion. For although the power of remitting sins is conferred on every priest in its substance and efficacy at ordination, it is not conferred for exercise until subjects are assigned over whom it may be exercised. Consequently, it is conferred as intrinsically complete in respect of its efficacy, but as externally incomplete in respect of its exercise and the application of a subject upon whom that power is exercised. It is like a king granting certain men the power of judging and appointing them judges, but not assigning them subjects, instead allowing the provincial governors to designate the people over whom they judge as they consider expedient for the good of the kingdom. As for the further claim that every priest receives at ordination no other power than the one granted to the Apostles when it was said to them, Whose sins you forgive, etc., I answer that I grant they receive precisely no other power by virtue of those words; but just as, in addition to this power, they were sent by Christ’s will into the whole world, and by that mission received the complement of the power of jurisdiction, so every priest, in addition to the power received at ordination, must receive its complement from the Church, which assigns him subjects.

YOU WILL OBJECT 2. If our opinion were true, it would follow that priests receive from the Church the power to absolve, which is absurd; otherwise one would have to say, “I absolve you by the authority of the Church.” — I answer by denying the consequence: priests receive from Christ at their ordination the power of jurisdiction, from which the remission of sins efficiently proceeds, provided subjects are assigned. Thus they have from Christ the power to absolve, while from the Church they receive only the designation of subjects. This is not receiving the power itself, but only its complement; hence one cannot say that a priest in this way receives the power to absolve. It is like fire not receiving the power to burn from the person who brings combustible matter near it. A judge appointed by a prince receives judicial power from the prince; he has subjects designated for judgment by the provincial governor.

Third conclusion. — A CONFESSOR IS STRICTLY BOUND BY NATURAL, DIVINE POSITIVE, AND ECCLESIASTICAL LAW TO KEEP THE SEAL OF CONFESSION, SO THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES MAY HE REVEAL TO ANOTHER WHAT HAS BEEN DISCLOSED TO HIM IN CONFESSION. This is the common view among Catholics and, as regards the obligation under ecclesiastical law, was defined by the Fourth Lateran Council under Innocent III, ch. “Everyone of either sex,” which decrees: Let the priest take the utmost care not to betray the sinner in any way, by word, sign, or any other means. If he needs wiser counsel, let him seek it cautiously without any expression of the person’s identity. For we decree that one who presumes to reveal a sin disclosed to him in the tribunal of penance is not only to be deposed from the priestly office but also confined in a strict monastery to perform perpetual penance. The Council of Trent, sess. XIV, ch. 5, approves this decree. As for the obligation under natural law, theologians labor to assign the true reason for it. Some derive it from lying, saying that one may never lie: if a priest revealed a confession, he would lie, since he would say that, as a man, he knows something that he does not know as a man but only as God’s vicar. But the Doctor refutes this reason in d. 21, n. 4. First, the priest, by the power of the keys entrusted to him, knows and judges in his own person in the sinner’s case; for the one who knows in a case is the same as the one who pronounces sentence in it. But when absolving a penitent, the priest does not pronounce sentence in God’s person; therefore he also hears and knows in his own person. The minor premise is clear: he does not absolve principally but only ministerially. To absolve ministerially belongs to him only in his own person. For if he spoke in God’s person when absolving a penitent, he could truly say without first saying, “May the Lord absolve you”: “I absolve you principally and infuse grace”—just as the Angel truly said in God’s person, “I brought you out of Egypt.” Moreover, the priest does not hear or absolve in the forum of confession in God’s person any more than he consecrates the Eucharist in God’s person. The former act is no more excellent than the latter, and in both a sacramental act is performed in which divine power works; indeed, the priest seems to act more in God’s or Christ’s person there than here. For there he speaks Christ’s words, “This is my body,” in Christ’s person, having first said of him, “Who, on the day before he suffered,” etc. Thus he says the whole passage, “Take… this is my body,” by reciting Christ’s words; that is not so in the present case. Here he does not first say, “Christ, wishing to absolve the sinner, said, ‘I absolve you’”; rather, I stands here for the person of the minister. It is therefore clear that he consecrates in Christ’s person as much as, or no less than, he absolves or hears confessions in Christ’s person. But he consecrates in his own person; hence after Mass he does not lie by saying, “I know that today I consecrated.” Therefore neither would he lie by saying, “Today I heard this person confess this sin.” Third, if this reason were sound, it would follow that a priest could not disclose to another a sin heard in confession, without revealing the penitent’s identity, unless he lied. But this appears false from the chapter Officii, Extra, On Penance and Remission, where Innocent III replies to a cardinal legate who had written about a case he had heard in confession and sought the pope’s advice on it. The pope did not rebuke him for revealing such a sin in general terms in writing, but replied with advice on how the person who had confessed should be counseled. Fourth, the common practice of confessors shows that outside confession a confessor may say that this or that was confessed to him, when there is no danger of disclosing the penitent’s identity. But on the proposed reasoning this would not be allowed, since lying is never permitted. Therefore, etc. Hence the Doctor concludes that since a priest hears confessions and absolves not as God’s person but only as his minister and representative, he would not lie if he disclosed to another a sin confessed to him.

The Doctor therefore offers four other arguments, n. 8, to show that the seal of confession is a matter of natural law. Since they are clear and evident in themselves, I have chosen to transcribe them here. The first is based on charity, the second on fidelity, the third on truth or truthfulness, and the fourth on unity or mutual benefit. The first is this: “The natural law of brotherly charity is expressed in Matthew 7: Whatever you wish that men would do to you, do so to them; for this is the Law and the Prophets. And in Luke 6: As you wish that men would do to you, do so to them. But this principle of the natural law of brotherly charity must be understood as ‘what you wish for yourselves’, that is, what you ought to wish for yourselves according to right reason; this is understood in Matthew 22: You shall love your neighbor as yourself. Everyone ought according to right reason to wish for his own good reputation; therefore he ought also to wish that his confessed sin be concealed. Consequently the confessor ought to love and wish the same for the penitent; but disclosure would take away the penitent’s good reputation. Therefore, etc. The minor premise is proved from Scripture. Ecclesiasticus 11 says: Take care of a good name, and gives its reason: for it will remain with you more than a thousand great and precious treasures. It proves this also by adding: The number of the days of a good life; but a good name will remain forever. Proverbs 22 says: A good name is better than great riches. It is also proved by reason: everyone ought according to right reason to wish for a civic life; this is taken away by the loss of reputation, because someone lives a civic life insofar as he is fit for certain acts appropriate to him in that city. Once his reputation is lost, he is deprived of fitness for such acts, because he has lost the standing of unimpaired dignity, namely, fitness for acts for which he would otherwise be worthy. The second part of the minor premise, that disclosure of a confessed sin takes away the penitent’s good reputation, is proved as follows: what may be disclosed to one person may be disclosed to another and thus to everyone; but such disclosure plainly takes away from him the standing of unimpaired dignity that consists in his reputation among his fellow citizens.”

The second argument is this: “Everyone is bound by natural law to preserve for his neighbor the fidelity that he would and ought to wish to be preserved for himself. But when someone entrusts another with a very great secret, he would and ought to wish it to be kept for him as a secret. Therefore the other, to whom he entrusts it, is bound to keep it for him. This argument is touched on in Proverbs 11: He who goes about deceitfully reveals secrets, but he who is faithful conceals what his friend has entrusted to him.”

The third argument: “Everyone is bound by natural law to keep a lawful promise. But one who receives a secret, especially this one disclosed in confession, implicitly promises to keep it even if he does not promise explicitly, since without such a promise, at least understood, this secret would not be entrusted to him. Therefore, etc. This argument is proved, or can be drawn, from the words: Speak truth, each one with his neighbor.”

The fourth argument: “In this matter the community has a unity proportioned to the unity of a body, for there is an order of superior and inferior, and the superior is bound to influence the inferior while the inferior serves the superior, according to Paul’s parable of the mystical and natural body in various places. In a city the inferior is less capable and less knowledgeable; in the Church the sinner is inferior. The superior, however, is the hierarch, who can counsel and reconcile him. Therefore natural law requires that no one exclude an inferior from access to a superior, since this is the members’ common benefit to one another. But disclosure of the secret excludes the inferior from such access to a superior for counsel about his soul, and consequently prevents the superior from helping the inferior; for no one would seek advice if, as a general rule, the matter for which he asks counsel or a remedy were not to remain secret. Therefore by the same natural law by which everyone is bound to preserve the unity of the mystical body of Christ and to promote the common good of others as of members of a body, he is bound to conceal this secret.”

The Doctor likewise proves that the obligation is imposed by divine positive law: “Every Christian,” he says, n. 11, “is bound not to give another an occasion to be drawn away from the law of Christ. But the law of Christ requires confession to be made, as was shown in d. 17. Therefore everyone under the law of Christ is bound not to deter anyone from making confession. But one who reveals a confession gives an occasion for deterring some people from confession. Therefore, etc. If you say that, even if that priest reveals it, another person will keep the secret, that is no answer, because by the very kind of act he performs, this priest gives the other person an occasion to take the same precaution with respect to each confessor. Second, Christ established the tribunal of penance as final on earth with regard to the confessed crime, as is clear from his words in Matthew 16: Whatever you loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven, that is, finally and ultimately approved; and John 20: Whose sins you forgive, etc., that is, those remitted here are finally approved as remitted in the divine judgment. Therefore anyone who brings before another public forum something examined and finally settled in this forum sins against the law of Christ. But one who reveals a confession, insofar as it lies with him, makes it possible for the matter to be brought before another forum. Therefore, etc. Third, one who gives occasion for mortal sin by carrying out a precept of Christ sins mortally, because he makes a precept that ought to be properly carried out be carried out improperly, as far as he can. But one who reveals a confession gives an occasion for Christ’s precept of confession to be carried out improperly and deceitfully: he gives occasion for someone in confession to praise himself and disparage another whom he hates, so that he himself may be unjustly advanced by the confessor and the other punished. Therefore, etc.”

YOU WILL OBJECT 1. St. Bernard says in bk. 4 of On Precept and Dispensation: What is instituted for charity ought not to work against charity. But in some cases the seal of confession would work against charity: for example, if someone learned in confession that a pastor and ruler of souls was a heretic and could not persuade him to stop spreading errors and infecting the flock entrusted to him. In this case, not reporting him would be against charity, just as it would be against charity for someone who knew that a person infected with plague was mixing with others not to warn them to flee his company. Therefore such a seal should not be upheld. — The Doctor denies the minor premise. It is not against the order of charity that some evil sometimes go unchecked in order to preserve the reverence due to the sacrament, which is a far greater good than any harm that could result from revealing a confession. For the order of charity and justice requires that the greater good be preferred to the lesser: Deuteronomy 16 says, You shall carry out what is just and right; therefore, the Doctor says, you shall carry out charitably what belongs to charity. Hence he concludes that the lawyers’ verse, Heresy is a crime that not even confession conceals, must be rejected, since it is false. Add that the confessor can provide for this in another way and prevent the evil from spreading further: for example, by advising the bishop to inquire diligently into the conduct and faith of the pastors subject to him and to learn from their congregations whether they teach Catholic doctrines, but in such a way that he does not, by any sign, directly or indirectly reveal the person who confessed to him.

YOU WILL SAY 2: No one can be bound to do something that damages his own conscience. But concealing a confessed sin would sometimes damage the confessor’s conscience: for example, if he were summoned to court and sworn to tell the truth that he knew from confession. If he did not tell the truth, he would incur the crime of perjury and thus commit a mortal sin. — I deny the minor premise. Concealing this secret would not prejudice the confessor’s conscience, nor would he incur the crime of perjury, since he is not bound by his oath to reveal this truth. As we have said, when various precepts arise that cannot all be observed together, one must observe most carefully the one of greater weight and importance. Here, however, the seal of confession is plainly weightier than the precept of an oath, because the obligation to keep the seal is grounded in natural law, divine positive law, and ecclesiastical law.

YOU WILL SAY 3: A priest who learns in confession that an ambush has been set for him in a wood he is about to enter, by one of the conspirators who has become penitent and sacramentally confessed this to him before he enters, may use this knowledge to take another route. But by doing so he would reveal the confession. Therefore it is sometimes lawful not to keep the seal. — The Doctor denies the minor premise, n. 20: “It can be said that this priest may have many reasons other than the malice of the robbers disclosed to him for not entering the wood. He can think of various other reasons and state them before the others, such as: ‘I want to do this and that, and turn aside to this or that place before going farther.’ If he seems to turn aside for some such reason, he reveals the confession neither by word nor by deed. But if he cannot turn aside for some reason without the others realizing he is turning aside because of the confession, and by this action he would reveal it, someone says that he is bound to enter; even if he exposes himself to death, he does so for a just cause, namely, to keep God’s law concerning the seal of confession, and consequently, if he dies, he is a martyr. But it can be said otherwise: actions can be equivocal signs, since different people may understand them in different ways, as pointing to this or that action. Therefore an action should not be considered revealing of a confession unless by its nature it discloses the confessed sin. But turning aside from the wood does not do so; for if those men had not previously discussed the planned murder, they would never learn from his turning aside that he had confessed his intention to kill this man. Yet if turning aside by its nature led people to know that such a sin had been confessed, it would lead everyone to that knowledge, these men as much as anyone, whether or not they had spoken beforehand. In general, therefore, a sign that is in itself indifferent as to whether a certain sin has been confessed, even if some particular circumstance makes it a more definite sign to certain people, is not a sign revealing confession and consequently is not simply unlawful for a confessor.”

YOU WILL SAY 4: Suppose a priest absolved a simoniac bishop, although he had no power to absolve him, and the priest is bound to confess immediately in order to celebrate Mass. He will also be bound to reveal the confession made to him by declaring that he wrongly absolved this bishop from the sin of simony, because that is a mortal sin and these circumstances aggravate it: simony committed by a bishop is graver than that committed by any other cleric because of the bishop’s greater knowledge and dignity. But by confessing in this way he reveals the sin of the simoniac bishop. Therefore it is sometimes lawful to reveal a confessed sin. — The Doctor replies, n. 21: “First, one who administered the sacrament of penance so indiscreetly is not bound to confess this indiscreet act immediately when the confessor could come to know the identity of the person on whom he indiscreetly exercised the power of the keys. Or, if he is bound to confess, he should at least not specify the particular fault or the manner in which he acted indiscreetly, but should say generally, ‘I am guilty of having administered the sacrament of penance indiscreetly and wrongly.’ If, however, his conscience urges him to think that he must disclose the aggravating circumstances, he should wait for an opportunity to confess to someone who could not learn from the confession of the sin and its circumstances the identity of the person who had confessed to him. If no such confessor can be found without the person who confessed becoming identifiable from the explanation of the sin and circumstances, then in that case this confessor must not confess the sin to a man, but it suffices for him to confess it to God. For,” says the Doctor, “he is more bound not to disclose the fault confessed to him than to confess his own fault explicitly: he is bound to the former by natural law and divine positive law, but to the latter only by divine positive law.” So says the Doctor.

FROM THIS IT FOLLOWS FIRST that violation of the seal is a sin against religion insofar as it opposes the reverence and good of the sacrament; and that it also has grave malice against justice insofar as it violates the natural right to secrecy, which would bind the confessor to keep the secret even if the sacrament were set aside, even if what was revealed were only a venial sin.

IT FOLLOWS SECOND that no one may use knowledge acquired through confession to do or avoid anything unless he has that knowledge from another source outside confession. This was expressly defined by Clement VIII in his motu proprio, issued on 26 May 1594, concerning regulars and reserved cases, where he commands both superiors currently in office and confessors who are later promoted to a position of superiority to take the greatest care not to use for external governance the knowledge they have gained in confession of other people’s sins. The Doctor had taught this earlier, n. 33. In reply to the sixth argument—namely, that an abbot who learns in confession that one of the monks living outside the monastery has a suspicious association there that continually tempts him to sin may recall him to the monastery to provide for his salvation—the Doctor says: “If it is the common custom in a college that anyone living outside the monastery with a charge, or staying there without a charge, may be recalled at the president’s discretion without reproach, or even not indiscriminately at his discretion but sometimes for another reasonable cause, so that one monk now rests in the cloister, another works with Martha in an external ministry, and another is assigned wherever the president considers useful, then I say that the abbot may recall to the monastery a monk who has confessed to a crime committed in some place outside the monastery where he is staying. For in this he in no way betrays the confessed sin, even though someone may say that a confessor can never treat someone who has confessed differently, because of the confession, in any act outside that forum than if he had heard nothing at all. But if the custom in the college is that a monk is not transferred from an outside place to the cloister except because of a crime or inadequacy in the work he does there, then it does not seem lawful for the abbot to recall the person who confessed to the monastery. If you say that he is not providing a remedy for the salvation of his sheep, I answer that he should counsel him in the forum of penance, as best he can, to leave that dangerous place. If he refuses, let him not presume to act as God, but leave hidden faults that cannot be corrected under justice to God’s correction.” He says the same about avoiding an excommunicate known only through confession: “For if a confessor can learn by another means that someone is excommunicated, he may avoid his company; otherwise, he not only ought not but is not permitted to avoid him, because such avoidance would violate ecclesiastical positive law alone, whereas the confessor is bound not to disclose him by natural law and divine and ecclesiastical positive law. When precepts seem to conflict, the higher precept is more binding and must be kept more firmly; one who keeps it and omits the other does not sin.” So says the Doctor.

MAY YOU ASK 1. May a confessor, at a penitent’s request, sometimes reveal confessed sins that he knows in no other way than through confession? St. Thomas affirms this in d. 21, q. 3, a. 3; the Doctor of Hales denies it in part 4, q. 19, memb. 2, a. 2, as does the Subtle Doctor in d. 21, q. 2, n. 18: “The obligation to conceal a confessed sin belongs not only to the penitent but also to the rights of the whole community of the faithful and the entire Church, as well as to the reverence due to the sacrament. For if a confessed sin were disclosed, constant disturbance would follow in the community, since everyone would readily regard another as abominable. The penitent is not entitled to renounce the rights of the community or the reverence due to the sacrament; therefore, even at his request, the confessor cannot reveal this sin.” Next, if a confessor could reveal a confession with the penitent’s permission, an immediate opportunity would be given to lie in confession, deceive the confessor, and fail to confess one’s sins fully. For people defamed for a crime they committed, though not convicted of it, could refrain from confessing that crime and thus give the confessor permission to reveal sins, thereby making it known that the penitent was not guilty of the sin of which he was defamed. But this would make a mockery of the sacrament and would plainly be sacrilege. Therefore, etc. Finally, if this were lawful, the confessor could be bound by the penitent’s permission to reveal sins whenever there was sufficient motive; the penitent could also be obliged, or induced by force or promises, to give such permission. But this would undermine the freedom so necessary for the frequent reception of this sacrament. Therefore, though a secret can be revealed with the consent of the person who entrusted it, the secret of confession cannot be revealed, because insofar as it is a sacramental obligation of secrecy it is not within the penitent’s power. What, then, should a confessor do when the penitent wants to disclose his sin? “I say,” the Doctor replies, “that the penitent may afterward speak of his sin outside confession. If he speaks of it as a secret, however, the subsequent permission does not release the confessor from natural law, under which he remains bound to conceal it. But if he says it is not to be kept secret, especially from some other person or particular persons to whom it may be disclosed for some good that could follow from their learning it, then the confessor may speak of it as something told to him publicly, outside all secrecy. But may he then say, ‘I heard this in confession’? I answer: it is said that the words ‘I heard this person’s sin in confession’ in themselves include mortal sin, because they disclose it as having been known in a way in which it may not be revealed. Therefore, if someone reveals it to him after confession outside all secrecy, he must take care how he relates it, lest he report it as something told to him in a way in which it may not be revealed.”

MAY YOU ASK 2. Is the priest alone bound by the seal of confession? The Doctor replies, n. 18, that not only the confessor, but also those who receive the penitent’s confessed sin from him directly or indirectly, or to whom the sin is in any way made known in connection with confession, are bound to keep the seal. “I say,” the Doctor says, “that not only the confessor but also the person to whom the confessor reveals it, though illicitly, is bound to conceal it. This is proved because one who in fact transfers something to another that cannot lawfully be transferred does not give the other person the right to use or transfer it to someone else: since he had no right, he could not transfer a right to another, for no one gives what he does not have. But a confessor who reveals it had no right to transfer it. I say the same of someone who hears a penitent’s confession besides the confessor. If he hears it by chance, he does not sin, but he is bound to keep silent; if he listens deceitfully, he sins mortally and is still bound to keep silent.” So says the Doctor. Hence the seal binds: first, one who hears the penitent’s sins maliciously or by chance and without fault, for the matter passes with the penitent’s own words; otherwise confession would be burdensome and odious. Second, interpreters when a penitent uses one in making confession, because the interpreter ministers not only to the penitent but also to the priest, who thereby learns the penitent’s sins through the interpreter just as the penitent speaks through him. Third, one who is not a priest but acts as a priest by hearing confessions. Fourth, a doctor and anyone consulted in connection with sacramental confession, to whom, with the penitent’s permission, both his person and his sin are disclosed. Fifth, a superior from whom the power to absolve the penitent from a reserved case is requested, with an equal or similar disclosure. Sixth, someone to whom a confessor unjustly reveals the penitent’s confession. Seventh, someone who finds a written list prepared for confession; he is bound to return or burn it.

MAY YOU ASK 3. May a judge or prelate use knowledge gained from a discovered list to punish the person who wrote down the sins that were erased from it? — I answer that he may not. Henriquez teaches this especially in his book On Sacramental Penance, where he says: “One who finds, by chance or deliberately searching, a paper on which a defendant had written sins as an aid to memory in preparation for confession is not bound by the seal, but is bound to great secrecy, since that paper was a means to confession. But if a judge or prelate has learned of the sins because of such writings, or from one sacrilegious confessor or several, or even, while investigating in good faith and proceeding with a case, realizes that the knowledge originated from the disclosure of a confession, he must immediately cease the investigation and judicial proceedings and treat what was done as undone. Nor may he question the defendant about the matter, since he did not come to know it by human means.” Antonius Diana teaches the same: “Is one who finds a paper on which someone’s sins were written bound to hide it under the seal of confession?” He answers: “One who finds sins written down, perhaps by someone who put them in writing to help his memory and confess them more exactly, is bound by the seal, whether confession has already been made or is yet to be made. The common reasoning of the Doctors is that the contents of the paper are something belonging to confession, and almost a written confession. The paper should be treated as equivalent to the case in which someone accidentally hears a confession, for the paper is like a messenger aiding the penitent’s memory; thus it is considered sealed with the sacred seal—and rightly so, for the paper can be called a confession begun.” Likewise, Navarrus, ch. 18, n. 31, says: “He sins who finds a writing in which someone has written his sins as a reminder for confession and publishes them; the same applies to one who reads it even if he does not publish it, if at the beginning of the sheet it was written, ‘A reminder of my sins,’ or something similar, by which he should know that its author does not want another to read them.” Dominic Soto agrees, In IV Sent., d. 18, a. 50: “But what if someone learns the matter not through confession but by way of confession, as when someone writes down his sins, loses the paper, and a prelate finds it? I know this has happened in practice, when a prelate proceeded to investigate in this way; but he was rightly punished for it by his superior. For confession is so sacred that even what is directed toward it must be buried in perpetual silence. What was said of ecclesiastical prelates is to be understood also of secular magistrates and judges.” Rodericus Acugna, Archbishop of Braga, confirms the same in his treatise On Confessors Who Solicit, q. 13, n. 38, with an example taken from St. Thomas of Villanova, which he relates as follows: “A certain Catalan,” he says, “killed an adversary and secretly gave his corpse burial. Later, to expiate the sin of homicide, he sought an unknown cleric, to whom he plainly confessed all the circumstances of the killing, the time and place, the dispute and the reasons for the killing, and the burial; he was condemned to the ultimate punishment. When, according to custom, a confessor approached to hear the condemned man’s confession, the wretched man refused to be brought to it, repeatedly saying that the sacrament of confession had been instituted by the Lord and Savior and was a source of the greatest danger and harm. The priest insisted and his friends urged him not to take upon himself so great a crime that he would lose his soul along with his body; but the stubborn man refused to change his mind. Those present thought he had lost his senses out of fear of death. “N. 39. When this matter was reported to the Archbishop of Valencia, St. Thomas the Almoner, the good shepherd asked the magistrate to delay the execution and allow the man to be brought to him, lest that sheep perish. Moved by respect for so great a man and the urgency of such a just request, the magistrate agreed and ordered that the condemned man be brought under guard before the prelate. The latter tried to soften the man with admonitions and earnestly urged him to disclose the cause of his great stubbornness. The man destined for death, breaking into tears, explained that the sacramental confession of his crime was the cause of his final punishment: the confessor was the brother of the man he had killed, though he had not known this at the time, and no one else could have revealed it. The pious prelate told him to be of good courage and, with the magistrate’s consent, kept him with himself after promising that he would return him once he had first conducted a proper inquiry. He summoned the confessor, who was unaware of the matter, and, removing witnesses, so earnestly adjured him before a devout crucifix that, with signs of penance, he fell at the prelate’s feet and confessed his error and breach of the seal, pleading the grief of his murdered brother and his love for him. The archbishop ordered the priest to be kept in a chamber in his own palace, explained to the magistrate what had happened and that the accusation had originated in the sacrament of confession, and easily persuaded the prudent magistrate, a religious man devoted to sacred things, that under divine law the proceedings and execution must cease, using the opinions of learned men. The murderer was released amid the people’s astonishment and reverence for the sacraments, while the confessor was punished with a penalty milder than his crime deserved.”

From all this it is clear that no one may use knowledge obtained from lists of confession in order to punish sins that someone was preparing to accuse himself of. I do not deny, however, that when such lists come to the attention of a prelate or judge, they may serve as some aids to a more diligent investigation of a crime about which the person who wrote the list was already infamous or had already been accused before a judge or prelate.

MAY YOU ASK AT LAST: From what kind of confession does this seal arise? — I answer that it arises from every sacramental confession, whether valid or invalid: that is, whether it truly has attached to it the remission of sin through sacramental absolution because of the penitent’s proper disposition, or not, because that disposition is lacking. For even if an invalid confession is not a complete sacramental confession, since it does not attain the effect of the sacrament or have priestly absolution attached to it because the penitent is manifestly indisposed, it is at least an incomplete beginning of a sacramental confession. Add that if only a valid confession bound one to the seal, penitents would take this as an occasion not to frequent confession. Since they would be uncertain whether, because of a lack of contrition or some other disposition, they were worthy to receive absolution, they could scarcely be moved or persuaded to confess their sins if a sin not followed by absolution could be revealed to someone. Therefore a priest is bound to keep the seal with respect to all those whom he knows to have approached confession with the genuine intention of receiving sacramental absolution; but not if he discovers that the penitent came only in pretense, intending by making an accusation in confession to entice and lead the priest into some evil.

FROM THIS GATHER that confession can be defined as follows: Sacramental confession is an accusation to a priest of one’s own sins committed after baptism, made in order to obtain their remission by virtue of the keys of the Church. It is called, first, an accusation, both because it must be an external acknowledgment of one’s own fault, made in the manner of an accusation by the penitent, who is to be regarded as a defendant seeking pardon, and so that it may be understood that confession must not take the form of an excuse, a mere narrative, or a commendation of one’s own virtues, as some sometimes do—not, I think, from a spirit of boasting, but from some ignorance and inexperience or from a habit of excessive talkativeness. It is called, second, of sins committed after baptism, because these are the remote matter of the sacrament of penance, and confession of them is its partial proximate matter. Third, it is called one’s own, to indicate that the sins of others should not be disclosed together with one’s own, unless perhaps they become one’s own or are so closely shared through some participation or in some other way that they cannot be disclosed otherwise. In this case the penitent should try not to disclose the accomplice’s identity unless the sin cannot otherwise be made known. Fourth, it is called made to a priest, because no one inferior to a priest can administer this sacrament to penitents, as will become clear from what is said below when we treat the minister of the sacrament of penance. Fifth, it is made to obtain remission of sins committed after baptism, to mark the special effect of this sacrament. Sixth, it is made by virtue of the keys of the Church, because in this sacrament sins are remitted only through the power that the Church received from Christ.