Scotus Academicus, Tomus decimus: De Baptismo, De Poenitentia, De Extrema Unctione

NOTE 1. The ancient theologians desired sixteen conditions for a perfect confession, expressed in the following verses:

Let it be simple, humble, pure, and faithful,

And frequent, unadorned, discreet, willing, and modest,

Complete, secret, tearful, and prompt,

Strong, self-accusing, and ready to make satisfaction.

The Seraphic Doctor explains all these conditions admirably in In IV Sent., d. 21, p. 2, dub. 3, in the explanation of the Master's text: “The sufficiency and number of these conditions,” he says, “may be understood in this way: some are conditions that are and ought to be in confession according to its proper measure; some according to proper order and association; and some according to proper quality and proper measure. The latter are threefold: either with respect to completeness, or frequency, or promptness; and thus there are three conditions, namely, that it be complete, frequent, and prompt. With respect to association, it ought to have the association of two parts, namely, contrition and satisfaction. With respect to contrition, it should be tearful; with respect to satisfaction, ready to make satisfaction; or with respect to both, and thus strong. As for quality, it concerns either the penitent himself or confession. If the penitent, there are five conditions: in respect of the rational power, it is simple; in respect of the concupiscible power, it ought to be willing; in respect of the irascible power, humble; in speech, faithful; and in sign, modest—thus there are five. If considered in itself, it ought to be pure, so that nothing extraneous is mixed in; it ought to be unadorned, so that nothing is kept hidden; with respect to circumstances, it ought to be discreet, adding nothing; it ought to be secret, so as not to harm others; and it ought to be self-accusing, so as to punish itself. Thus three are on the side of measure, three by reason of what is associated with it, five by reason of the subject, and five by reason of confession itself; and so in all there are sixteen.” Thus the Seraphic Doctor.

NOTE 2. The meaning of all these conditions is that confession should be first, simple: that is, made in plain words, not artfully composed, either to hide something or to make the penitent appear learned and eloquent—which would surely be vain and altogether perverse; second, humble: that is, with abasement of spirit and humility, apparent both in words and in bearing and bodily posture; third, pure: that is, without adding anything irrelevant to the accusation, which requires each person to confess his own sins, not those of others; fourth, faithful: that is, truthful and without lying, since in confession one must neither say what was not done nor deny what was committed; fifth, frequent: that is, performed often, rather than put off for a long time, lest many sins slip from memory; sixth, unadorned: that is, distinct and clear, so that neither the gravity nor the kind of sin is concealed, and each sin is stated by the penitent according to its gravity, as he reasonably judges it; seventh, discreet: that is, decent and expressed in fitting words; eighth, willing: that is, voluntary, so that it is done with deliberation of mind in order to appease God and obtain pardon for sin; ninth, modest: that is, showing confusion and shame of mind because of the shamefulness of sin, so that no one recites and announces his sins as if reading from a tablet; tenth, complete: that is, reporting absolutely all sins, both as to number and kind, and their aggravating circumstances; eleventh, secret: that is, performed in private and not publicly, and also auricularly, to one priest alone; twelfth, tearful: that is, accompanied by sorrow for the sins committed; thirteenth, prompt: that is, performed as soon as an opportunity to receive absolution presents itself after the sin has been committed; fourteenth, strong: so that nothing that must be said is omitted through fear or shame; fifteenth, self-accusing: that is, attributing the crime committed to oneself, not to the devil or temptation. Finally, it should be ready to make satisfaction: that is, the penitent should be disposed to fulfill what the confessor prescribes for satisfaction and expiation of his offenses. Many of these conditions overlap and pertain only to showing greater reverence for the Sacrament or receiving fuller fruit from confession. Accordingly, it is not our purpose to discuss each of them at length, but only the eleventh and twelfth: namely, that confession ought to be secret and complete.

NOTE 3. Two kinds of completeness in confession may be distinguished: one material, the other formal. Material completeness is when confession truly includes every mortal sin in its kind, number, and aggravating circumstances, so that no such sin at all remains unconfessed. Formal completeness, however, is considered complete and valid even though it does not disclose absolutely every mortal sin, because none is withheld without reasonable cause, or without excusable forgetfulness or ignorance; it is therefore truly informed and perfected by sacramental absolution. The question, then, is whether confession must be complete in either of these ways. Three matters therefore call for discussion here: first, whether confession must necessarily be made in secret; second, whether it must include absolutely all sins, both as to number and as to kind and circumstances; third, whether confession may sometimes be divided.

First conclusion. — AURICULAR CONFESSION WAS INDICATED BY CHRIST, NOT ENJOINED, ALTHOUGH IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN PRACTICED BY THE FAITHFUL AND RECEIVED IN THE CHURCH. The Council of Trent teaches this, sess. XIV, ch. 5, where it says: “As for the manner of confessing in secret to a priest alone, although Christ did not forbid anyone from publicly confessing his sins, in punishment for his crimes and humiliation of himself, both for the example of others and for the edification of the Church that had been offended, nevertheless this was not commanded by divine precept, nor would it have been prudent for any human law to prescribe that offenses—especially secret ones—be disclosed in public confession. Therefore, since secret sacramental confession, which the holy Church has used from the beginning and still uses, has always been commended by the most holy and ancient Fathers with great and unanimous consent, the empty slander of those who do not hesitate to teach that it is alien to divine command, a human invention, and originated with the Fathers assembled at the Council of Lateran is plainly refuted.” And in the same session, canon 6: “If anyone denies that sacramental confession was instituted by divine law or is necessary for salvation, or says that the manner of confessing in secret to a priest alone, which the Catholic Church has always observed and still observes from the beginning, is alien to Christ’s institution and command and is a human invention, let him be anathema.”

The same is proved by the authority of the Fathers, especially Origen, Homily 2 on Psalm 37: “Only,” he says, “consider carefully to whom you ought to confess your sin. First test the physician to whom you ought to disclose the cause of your illness, and so on, so that at last, if the one who has first shown himself to be a learned and merciful physician says anything, you may do and follow his advice. If he understands and foresees that your illness is such that it ought to be disclosed and treated in the assembly of the whole Church, from which perhaps others too may be edified and you yourself easily healed, this must be undertaken only after much deliberation and on the sufficiently expert advice of that physician.” From this it is clear how shamefully Rhenanus is mistaken in his argument on Tertullian’s book De Poenitentia, when he says that secret confession originated from public exomologesis, or confession. Rather, public penance proceeded conversely from secret confession: sins were not first declared publicly until after they had been privately and secretly disclosed to a priest, so that he might judge which called for public or private penance. Hence, since among some people the custom of confessing sins only in public had taken hold, St. Leo decreed that it be abolished as contrary to apostolic teaching, in ep. 80, addressed to the bishops of Campania. Among other things, he writes: “I have also recently learned of a presumption contrary to the apostolic rule, unlawfully practiced by some there. I decree that it be abolished in every way: namely, the practice whereby a written statement concerning the kind of each person’s sins is publicly read out, as penance is imposed on the faithful. The guilt of consciences is sufficiently disclosed to priests alone in secret confession. Although the fullness of faith that does not blush before men for fear of God seems praiseworthy, not everyone’s sins are such that they do not fear to make public what may call for penance. Let so unacceptable a custom therefore be removed, lest many be barred from the remedies of penance because they either blush or fear that their deeds will be revealed to their enemies, who could strike them under the law. For that confession is sufficient which is first offered to God and then also to the priest, who approaches as intercessor for the offenses of penitents. Only then can more people be stirred to penance, and the conscience of the one confessing will not be made public to the ears of the people.” St. Jerome teaches the same. Explaining the passage in Ecclesiasticus, ch. 10, “If a serpent bites in silence,” he says: “If the serpent, the devil, bites someone in secret and infects him with the poison of sin without anyone knowing, and the one bitten remains silent, does not do penance, and is unwilling to confess his wound to a brother or teacher, the teacher, though he has a tongue able to help heal, cannot help. If the sick man is ashamed to confess his wound to the physician, medicine does not cure what it does not know.”

That secret sacramental confession was indicated by Christ the Lord may be gathered from the Church’s perpetual and constant tradition and practice. For St. Augustine says, De Baptismo Contra Donatistas, bk. 7, ch. 23: “There are many things held by the universal Church, and therefore rightly believed to have been enjoined by the Apostles, although they are not found written down.” Since the whole Church has used secret confession from the beginning and still uses it, it follows that it was transmitted to us by Christ the Lord through the Apostles. The Council of Lateran therefore rightly prescribed the obligation to confess each year, saying: “One confesses one’s sins faithfully to one’s own priest alone, at least once a year.” There the word alone signifies that this obligation is not to declare one’s sins publicly and before many, but only before a priest alone. This reasoning will be confirmed in the response to the objections.

YOU WILL SAY: Nowhere in Scripture is Christ the Lord recorded as commanding penitents to disclose their sins to priests in private and secret confession; therefore he did not institute that secret manner of confessing. — I deny the inference. For the careful and never-interrupted custom of secret confession, from the earliest times of the Church down to our own, a custom that did not originate with councils or supreme pontiffs, is sufficient evidence that its author is none other than Christ. Add that, since the Sacrament of Penance was instituted in John 20, its institution also entails the institution of confession; from this its secret manner may likewise be inferred, as more fitting to the remarkable gentleness of the New Law and the gracious disposition of Christ the Lord, who willed his yoke to be easy and his burden light. Since disclosure of all sins, including hidden and interior ones, by its nature involves shame and therefore great difficulty, there is no doubt that Christ the Lord wished that declaration to be made in a less laborious and painful way, such as the secret way. It is plausible that he taught this manner when, after rising from the dead, he appeared to the disciples for forty days, speaking of the kingdom of God—that is, of matters concerning the governance of the Church and the salvation of human beings—among which the remission of sins through sacramental confession and the reception of absolution holds a foremost place.

YOU WILL SAY 2: Public confession of sins can be sacramental and valid, as is clear from the words of Trent quoted above; therefore Christ did not institute or ordain that confession of sins be made in secret. — I deny the inference. A superior may prescribe something to an inferior in either of two ways. First, by determining it, when he prescribes not only the action to be performed in particular but also the manner in which it is to be done. Thus Christ prescribed to the Church not merely that it baptize, but that it baptize in water with invocation of the most holy Trinity. Second, a superior may determine in particular the manner of carrying out a law he has made, while leaving the inferior free to use that manner or another which he prudently judges more expedient for the private or public good of the Church. Christ the Lord ordained confession to be made in secret in this latter way; nevertheless, he did not forbid anyone to confess publicly where he prudently judged it conducive to the greater edification of the Church or his own salvation.

YOU WILL ASK: Whether it is ever permitted to confess through an interpreter, when the penitent does not know the priest’s language, nor the priest the penitent’s, but a third person is present who knows both languages? — I affirm that it is. Lugo says, d. 15, n. 60, that all theologians, with a few exceptions, agree without controversy that this can be done; the practice of the faithful proves it, and reason supports it. For by this means sins are sufficiently made known to the priest for the purpose of absolution, and the priest can likewise sufficiently know the penitent’s disposition for receiving absolution. This is confirmed by the Sacrament of Matrimony, which everyone agrees may be celebrated through an interpreter in the presence of a parish priest and witnesses. Why, then, could confession not also be made through an interpreter? For, as Lugo says, greater knowledge seems to be required of a parish priest for him validly to assist at a marriage than of a confessor for him to absolve. The parish priest and witnesses are required at a marriage so that the Church may have legitimate proof that it was celebrated, should one spouse later deny it, or so that the spouses may prove it before the Church. For that purpose, consent given through an interpreter might seem insufficient, since the parish priest cannot testify to the consent when he does not understand the contracting parties’ language; he could only say that the interpreter said they consented. If the spouses later denied their consent and said the interpreter had lied, nothing could be clearly proved against them, since the whole matter would depend on the testimony of a single interpreter. If, then, the knowledge supplied through an interpreter is held sufficient for the parish priest validly to assist, much more readily should similar knowledge be held sufficient for sacramental confession. There, knowledge is not required so that the sin or its confession can later be proved before the Church, but so that the confessor in the internal forum may believe the penitent speaking against himself; for that, the manner of speaking through an interpreter suffices, just as it does in other human affairs and dealings. So far Lugo. From this, at the very least, and sufficiently for our purpose, it follows that the contracting party’s presence at marriage, to manifest consent to the priest, is required no less than the penitent’s presence in the Sacrament of Penance to manifest his sins. Therefore, just as the former sufficiently declares his consent through an interpreter¹ before the parish priest and witnesses, and is considered to contract validly, so the penitent will sufficiently disclose his sins to a priest who is present through an interpreter, and may legitimately be absolved by him. For the validity of the Sacrament requires nothing more than that sins be disclosed to a priest as judge, in order to obtain their remission.

YOU WILL SAY: The Subtle Doctor, in In IV Sent., d. 17, n. 31, responding to an argument he himself proposed at n. 2—namely, that not everyone is bound to confess his sins to a priest, because, he says, no one is obliged to do what is impossible, but a mute cannot speak, and every foreigner among those whose language is barbarous is mute, and therefore is not bound to confess—answers: “To the other point, one must say that such a person ought to confess through an interpreter, or through other signs besides words that can be understood by the priest. The second point should readily be granted, if there are such signs common to the mute or foreigner and to the priest. But the first does not seem necessary, because this forum is by its nature most secret; therefore no one is bound to this forum in such a way as to make it in some manner public. Although an interpreter may wish to keep the secret and is bound to do so, as is the priest, if he wishes to act maliciously, he and the priest can be witnesses against the accused; thus by the nature of this kind of accusation it can become public, and so it is not penitential. From this it is clear that one need not necessarily confess to several priests together so that they may judge better. If this is done, it is not sacramental confession. Above all, it seems that one should not confess through an interpreter when there is fear that he is not a suitable keeper of secrets; and even if in such a case this person is unable to confess to a suitable man, let him confess to God with the intention of confessing to a man when an opportunity arises.” Thus, according to the Doctor, confession through an interpreter is neither sacramental nor valid. — I deny the inference. The Doctor means nothing more by these words than that confession through an interpreter is not absolutely necessary for salvation, since it is neither commanded by Christ nor prescribed by the Church as something that must necessarily be done—especially when there is fear that the confession of the crime will be disclosed. For it is not plausible that Christ the Lord, who wills all people to be saved and gave himself as a redemption for all, instituted and commanded a manner of confession that would prejudice the penitent and make the Sacrament excessively difficult and burdensome—especially since, by commanding fraternal correction, he willed it to be done in secret. For he says in Matthew 18: “If your brother sins against you, go and correct him between yourself and him alone.” St. Augustine explains these words in Sermon 16, De Verbis Domini: “You know that he sinned against you, because he sinned against you. Since it was secret when he sinned against you, seek secrecy when you correct what he did against you. For if you alone know that he sinned against you, and you wish to accuse him before everyone, you are not a corrector but a betrayer.” If Christ the Lord therefore willed fraternal correction to be done secretly, who would think that he willed sacramental confession of hidden sins to be made publicly? The Doctor rightly holds, then, that one is not bound to confess through an interpreter, especially when there is fear that he will not keep the secret. Accordingly, such confession through an interpreter is not considered the sacramental confession to which all the faithful are ordinarily and in itself bound by Christ’s institution, although it can in fact be sacramental when the penitent freely resorts to it as he chooses. In the same way, public confession is not necessary, but is sufficient for salvation and sometimes useful both to the penitent and for the edification of the Church and the faithful.

Second conclusion. — ABSOLUTELY ALL MORTAL SINS THAT COME TO MEMORY AFTER A DILIGENT EXAMINATION OF CONSCIENCE MUST BE DISCLOSED IN CONFESSION, NOT ONLY GENERALLY BUT ALSO SPECIFICALLY AND ONE BY ONE; THEREFORE, FOR CONFESSION TO BE VALID, IT MUST BE FORMALLY COMPLETE. This is defined as a matter of faith by the Council of Trent, sess. XIV, ch. 5, where it says: “From the institution of the Sacrament of Penance already explained, the universal Church has always understood that integral confession of sins was also instituted by the Lord and is necessary by divine law for all who have fallen after Baptism. For our Lord Jesus Christ, ascending from earth to heaven, left priests as his own vicars, as prelates and judges, to whom all the mortal crimes into which Christ’s faithful have fallen must be brought, so that by the power of the keys they may pronounce sentence of remission or retention of sins. For it is clear that priests could not exercise this judgment without knowing the case, nor could they maintain equity in imposing penances if penitents declared their sins only in general and not rather specifically and one by one. From this it follows that penitents must enumerate in confession all mortal sins of which they are conscious after a diligent examination of themselves, even if these are most secret and committed only against the last two commandments of the Decalogue, which sometimes wound the soul more gravely and are more dangerous than those committed openly. Venial sins, by which we are not excluded from the grace of God and into which we fall more frequently, may indeed rightly and usefully be declared in confession, without any presumption, as the practice of devout people shows; yet they may be omitted without fault and expiated by many other remedies. But since all mortal sins, even those of thought, make people children of wrath and enemies of God, it is necessary to seek from God pardon for all of them through open and modest confession. Thus, while Christ’s faithful strive to confess all the sins that come to mind, they undoubtedly lay them all open to divine mercy. Those who do otherwise and knowingly retain some propose nothing for the priest to remit by divine goodness; for if the sick person is ashamed to reveal his wound to the physician, medicine does not cure what it does not know.” Thus the Council. These words plainly declare that absolutely all mortal sins that occur to one after a diligent examination of conscience must be disclosed in confession. It proves this by two arguments. First, in the Sacrament of Penance God remits sins by way of judgment, through the penitent’s accusation and the priest’s sentence of absolution. But the priest cannot legitimately pass sentence without knowing the case, nor could priests maintain equity in imposing penances if penitents declared their sins only generally rather than specifically and one by one. Therefore, sins must be declared in this way. Second, in this Sacrament the priest is not only a judge but also a physician. A physician cannot prudently and wisely prescribe a remedy suited to illnesses without knowing all such illnesses and understanding the patient’s whole condition. Therefore, a priest cannot prescribe salutary penance for a penitent unless he distinctly knows all his sins; and he cannot know them unless the penitent discloses them. It follows, then, that absolutely all sins must be disclosed in confession. Accordingly, the Council admirably defines in canon 7: “If anyone says that, in the Sacrament of Penance, it is not necessary by divine law to confess all and each mortal sin of which one is mindful after due and diligent reflection, and the circumstances that change the kind of sin . . . let him be anathema.” Nor should one think that the Council introduced this doctrine into the Church as some new dogma. For what has been said sufficiently establishes that it is the common teaching of the holy Fathers that absolutely all mortal sins must be disclosed in confession. Thus St. Cyprian teaches in his sermon De Lapsis, speaking of those who were not guilty of apostasy or idolatry but had nevertheless fallen into other sins: “How much greater in faith and better in fear are those who, although bound by no crime of sacrifice or certificate, because they have nevertheless thought of this, confess it sorrowfully and simply to the priests of the Lord, make an exomologesis of their conscience, lay bare the burden of their soul, and seek salutary medicine even for small and slight wounds, knowing that it is written: God is not mocked.” The author of De Vera et Falsa Poenitentia, ch. 15, teaches the same: “Let him be careful not to divide confession privately within himself, led by shame, and wish to disclose different sins to different priests.” For some conceal from one what they preserve to be disclosed to another; this is to praise oneself, tend toward hypocrisy, and remain forever without the pardon they foolishly think they can reach in fragments. St. Ambrose likewise teaches this in bk. De Paradiso, ch. 14; St. Gregory, Homily 10 on Ezekiel; and St. Jerome, on Ecclesiasticus, ch. 10. Their testimonies are cited in part II of the Roman Catechism, title On the Sacrament of Penance, n. 61.

Theological reasoning also supports this. For the precept of confession, instituted by Christ the Lord, was substituted for the precept of contrition. But contrition must necessarily be made for all sins: by the ordinary means one sin cannot be blotted out without all being blotted out together. Thus contrition does not blot out sins unless it detests them all. Therefore confession and absolution likewise cannot blot them out unless all sins are submitted to the keys of the Church.

YOU WILL ASK 1: What should be thought about the circumstances of sins? — I ANSWER: Circumstances are of three kinds. Some change the kind of sin. For if someone has relations with an unmarried woman who consents, it is simple fornication; with a married woman, adultery; with a close relative, incest; with one consecrated to God by a vow, or in a sacred place, sacrilege. All these circumstances make a different sin. Other circumstances only aggravate the sin notably within the same kind. For someone who steals one hundred or two hundred gold coins sins more gravely than one who steals only a single gold coin. Still other circumstances neither change the kind nor aggravate it notably, such as whether someone kills a person by striking him with iron, wood, or stone. As for circumstances that change the kind, all theologians agree that they must necessarily be explained in confession, as the Council of Trent also teaches in the aforementioned ch. 5, where it says: “It further follows that those circumstances that change the kind of sin must also be explained in confession. Without them, the sins themselves would not be fully disclosed by penitents, nor become known to judges, and they would be unable to judge the gravity of the crimes correctly and impose on the penitents the penance that is fitting for them. It is therefore unreasonable to teach that these circumstances were invented by idle people, or that only one circumstance must be confessed, namely, that one sinned against a brother.” As for circumstances that neither aggravate the sin nor change its kind, all agree with the Subtle Doctor, d. 17, n. 20, that they need not necessarily be disclosed in confession. “As for other circumstances,” the Doctor says, “which have no bearing on the matter and without which the gravity would be the same as with those irrelevant circumstances, it is foolish to confess them—for example, that someone sinned with a woman named Iberta or Lucia, or the like.” As for circumstances that aggravate notably, authors disagree. Some contend that they must necessarily be disclosed in confession: thus Alexander of Hales, 4th part, q. 18, memb. 4; Cajetan, I–II, q. 4; Maior, In IV Sent., d. 4, q. 1, and others. Others deny it with St. Bonaventure, d. 17, p. 3, art. 2, q. 3. The Subtle Doctor, in the place just cited, says: “There are many circumstances by which a sin is in some way more grave, either on the side of the object or on the side of the person sinning. It is not so certain that these must be confessed; nevertheless, it is safe and useful to do so.” This is especially so because St. Augustine, or whoever the author of De visitatione infirmorum may be, seems to indicate it in ch. 5: “The deeds that more gravely disturb the mind,” he says, “must be made plain to God’s manifest messenger, concealing nothing and enveloping guilt in no evasions, and so on. The places where you sinned should also be identified, if you remember them, as well as the times; the persons with whom you sinned, but not their names; and the relationship, which should be corrected privately so that they may desist from sin; whether you were of a susceptible age, what rank you served in the Church, whether you sinned in old age or from habit, from necessity or by choice. For judgments are relevant to all these matters. In secular courts, places distinguish one case from another: murder in the king’s court is punished by a different censure from murder on a public road or in a country village. Sometimes the age of childhood is forgiven on account of the time of life; sometimes allowance is made for old age, while the middle years are held to a stricter rein. Crimes committed especially on the solemn feast days of the Nativity are punished with fierce severity. Likewise, other deeds must be removed by stricter penalties in places sacred to God, at times dedicated to God’s feasts, at a more discerning age, among persons specially dedicated to God, and in higher ranks. Is not more required of one to whom more has been entrusted? Is it not less to have killed one man than many? Is it not lighter to have sinned as an old man than a hundred times? Does not one who fell through necessity obtain pardon sooner than one who did so by choice? And so on.”

I admit, however, that many circumstances are listed in those accounts which everyone agrees need not be disclosed in confession as a requirement of the Sacrament—namely, the age of reason, the time of fasting, and age. The strongest argument, then, is drawn from the authority of the Council of Trent. Although it did not expressly define this question, which is disputed among Doctors, it nevertheless plainly supports our affirmative position in the places cited above. For the Council teaches that sins must be confessed specifically and one by one because, it says, priests plainly cannot maintain equity in imposing penances if they know sins only generally rather than specifically and one by one. In explaining why circumstances that change the kind must be confessed, it gives this reason: “without them, the sins themselves would not be fully disclosed by penitents, nor become known to judges, and they would be unable to judge the gravity of the crimes correctly and impose on the penitents the penance that is fitting for them.” These arguments equally prove the necessity of confessing circumstances that notably aggravate: for it is self-evident that a greater penance must be imposed on someone who in a single act took many thousands of gold coins—for example, from a prince, by unjustly dispossessing many subjects in one edict—than on someone who took only three gold coins in three separate thefts. Add that if an aggravating circumstance within the same kind did not bring new malice, it would follow that someone who committed incest in the first degree did not sin more gravely than someone who committed it in the third or fourth degree. It would likewise follow that someone who cut off another’s ears, nose, and arms and legs, and gouged out his eyes, provided he did not kill him, would satisfy the precept of confession by saying that he had gravely wounded someone. Likewise, someone who voluntarily killed several people by firing a cannon in war would explain his offense sufficiently by saying he was guilty of homicide. These conclusions are absurd. We must therefore conclude with the Roman Catechism, title On Penance, ch. 62: “One must explain not only grave sins by recounting them, but also the circumstances surrounding each sin that greatly increase or lessen its gravity.” Nor is it an objection that circumstances that notably aggravate within the same kind do not formally constitute distinct sins; it suffices that they constitute them virtually or equivalently. For a single sin that is notably grave because of some circumstance is morally equivalent to many sins distinct in number, as the examples already given show. It therefore seems that mortal sins are not sufficiently explained as to number unless circumstances that notably aggravate within the same kind are explained.

YOU WILL OBJECT 1: No one is bound to do what there is no precept to do. But there is no divine or ecclesiastical precept to confess circumstances that notably aggravate within the same kind; therefore no one is bound to do so. — I DENY THE MINOR: for we are bound by divine precept to express in confession everything necessary for the perfect administration and reception of the Sacrament of Penance. The declaration of such circumstances is necessary for this. Since this Sacrament was instituted by Christ the Lord as a judgment, whatever is required for a priest to judge correctly the gravity of crimes and prescribe the due penance falls under divine precept. Since explaining circumstances that notably aggravate within the same kind is necessary for the confessor to form a correct judgment about the gravity of sins, we must admit that confession of those circumstances falls under divine precept.

YOU WILL OBJECT 2: If circumstances that notably aggravate within the same kind had to be confessed, then, by the same reasoning, circumstances that notably lessen the gravity of a sin would have to be disclosed in confession. But that seems contrary to the nature of confession, which ought to be an accusation, not an excuse; therefore, and so on. — I DENY THE MINOR: just as a small number of sins must be explained so that a correct judgment may be made about the penitent, so a circumstance that notably lessens guilt must also be disclosed—for example, if someone sinned through ignorance, under a strong temptation, or from fear of imminent danger of death. These matters especially help the priest to judge the crime correctly. As for the proof, I say that although confession is an accusation rather than an excuse, that accusation must nevertheless be such that the priest can recognize the gravity of the offense from it and prescribe the due satisfaction, without exceeding it. Explaining a circumstance that lessens the gravity of the sin contributes to this; therefore it must be disclosed in confession.

YOU WILL OBJECT 3: It does not seem necessary or safe to assert and practice something that inflicts excessive anxiety of mind on the penitent and leaves him always uncertain about the validity of his confession. But that is what would happen if grave circumstances had to be disclosed: who could determine how intense or how long an act must be in order for a sin to be considered notably aggravated within the same kind? Therefore, and so on. — I DENY THE MINOR: first, an aggravating circumstance is readily apparent with respect to magnitude or multitude. The same is true of the intensity and duration of a sinful act. Through an exact examination of his conscience, any penitent can learn how long he persisted in an act of hatred toward his neighbor, and how fiercely that hatred burned in him, so that he may disclose it in confession. The same must be said of other cases. Accordingly, it is not so difficult to recall such aggravating circumstances and express them in confession.

YOU WILL ASK 2: How thorough and extensive should the examination of conscience be before a salutary and complete confession? — The Doctor, d. 17, n. 19, answers that the examination should be as thorough as someone would undertake for a very difficult matter that he cared deeply about. He should undertake the same care regarding all mortal sins, bringing them back to memory, and, once recalled, confessing them together rather than dividing confession. For, as Augustine says in De vera et falsa Poenitentia, cited in De Poenitentia, distinction 5, ch. Consideret: “Some conceal from one priest what they keep to disclose to another; this is to praise oneself, tend toward hypocrisy, and remain forever without the pardon they think they can reach in fragments.” The Roman Catechism teaches the same, title On Penance, n. 62, saying: “In confession, however, we must apply that supreme care and diligence that we usually devote to very serious matters, directing all our effort toward discerning the wounds of the soul and tearing out the roots of sin.”

These statements must nevertheless be understood so that the examination is made with as much diligence as human frailty permits, lest perhaps, as the same Catechism says in n. 66, “we examine our conscience too carelessly and laxly, and so negligently strive to recall our committed sins that we may rightly seem not even to have wished to remember them. If that has happened, confession must certainly be repeated.” Prudence is therefore needed, so that the penitent neither examines himself too lightly nor torments himself excessively in this inquiry, to the detriment of bodily health and peace of mind.

Third conclusion. — MATERIAL COMPLETENESS IS NOT ABSOLUTELY REQUIRED FOR A PERFECT CONFESSION, FOR PHYSICAL AND MORAL IMPOTENCE EXCUSES FROM IT. This is the common opinion, and the Council of Trent teaches it in express words, sess. XIV, ch. 5, where it says: “It is clear that the Church requires penitents to do nothing more than, after each person has examined himself carefully and searched all the recesses of his conscience, confess those sins by which he remembers having mortally offended the Lord his God. The other sins, which do not come to mind after careful reflection, are understood to be included in that confession as a whole.”

The reason for this conclusion is that God does not command the impossible, and Christ the Lord did not institute as a necessary means of salvation something that is sometimes impossible. But sometimes a materially complete confession of all sins is physically and morally impossible; therefore, and so on. The major premise is clear. The minor premise is proved, as to the first part, namely, that such completeness is sometimes physically impossible, either on the penitent’s part—if he suddenly becomes speechless while confessing, or is so overtaken by death that he cannot declare any sin specifically and one by one, but can only show signs of contrition and a desire to receive absolution. In these cases, everyone agrees that he must necessarily be absolved. Or it may be impossible on the confessor’s part: if he is deaf or speaks a different language and no one else is available to hear the sins one by one; or if many people need absolution and, because of the shortage of time, he cannot hear them individually—for example, when a shipwreck, fire, or some other disaster is imminent. In these cases, as is clear, material completeness of confession is physically impossible. Yet it is not plausible that God willed such people to be excluded in these cases from receiving the Sacrament of Penance, which was instituted for all who have fallen after Baptism as a necessary means of salvation. Therefore, and so on. The same minor premise is proved as to moral inability. For many cases occur in which confession seems to be divisible and the precept of confessing absolutely every sin that comes to mind is not considered to apply. You may consult the authors of cases of conscience for these. The chief cases are as follows:

First, when confessing such a sin would bring grave inconvenience and harm to the penitent—for example, if there were a probable imminent danger of bodily death or of an equivalent evil, such as mutilation, perpetual imprisonment, exile, and so forth; or if, during a plague, the confessor reasonably feared infection from remaining long with a penitent infected by the plague. In these cases, the penitent may confess the more serious sins and receive absolution.

The second case is when there is a danger of spiritual death to either the penitent or the confessor. For example, a woman prone to sexual sin may prudently judge that the confessor will solicit her to such a sin if she discloses that sin and her propensity to sin. Lugo, however, d. 16, n. 734, thinks a distinction must be made. If, he says, the woman fears that the solicitation will put her in danger of consenting, or that the confessor will make importunate requests or press her—something that causes her no slight hardship—she may remain silent about it. If she fears none of these things, there is no reason for her to concern herself with the confessor’s wickedness. The common rule usually given in matters of scandal must nevertheless be observed: if harm to one’s neighbor can conveniently be avoided without harm to ourselves, charity obliges us to avoid it. Thus, just as one who seeks the Sacrament from a person in mortal sin needs some special benefit to himself, so in the present case there must be a special cause excusing him from confessing to this priest rather than another.

Third, when the penitent prudently fears that the confessor will reveal a sin to another without his consent, because he knows him to be less discreet and unable to keep a secret. The penitent must nevertheless beware, says Coninck, d. 7, dub. 2, n. 57, of suspecting such things of his confessor without very serious grounds. Such grounds would include knowing that he had at some time revealed a confession, mistreated people because of sins heard in confession, solicited someone to vice, or was inclined to vices and used any pretext to solicit people close to him to shameful acts. Otherwise, by suspecting these things, he would sin most gravely. For the penitent legitimately to be excused from completeness of confession in these cases, three conditions must concur. First, there must be a necessity of making confession, either from divine precept—for example, if danger of death is imminent—or from the ecclesiastical precept of annual confession. For if someone confesses only out of devotion, there seems to be no reason why he could legitimately divide his confession for such motives. Second, it must not be easy to have recourse to another confessor to whom a complete confession could be made without fear of these harms and dangers. Third, these inconveniences must be grave and extraordinary to confession. For, as Coninck rightly observes at n. 58, it is not enough to omit a sin in confession that a confessor, who thought me healthy, devout, and chaste, will consider me a very grave sinner after hearing my sins, or that he will rebuke me severely and make me feel ashamed. Such things are not extraordinary to confession but almost incidental to it.

Fourth, the Doctor gives the following case in d. 20, q. 2, n. 21, where he says:

“A confessor who has administered the Sacrament of Penance indiscreetly is not bound to confess his indiscreet act immediately when his own confessor could at once learn the identity of the person concerning whom he exercised the power of the keys indiscreetly. This is for the greater good: he need not specify the particular sin or the manner in which he exercised the power of the keys indiscreetly, but may say only in general, ‘You committed a sin and administered the Sacrament of Penance.’ Or, if his conscience presses him to confess this specifically, as the argument states, because it is a distinct mortal sin with specially aggravating circumstances, he is bound to wait for an opportunity to confess to someone who could not learn from the confession of the sin and its circumstances the identity of the person who confessed it to him. If no such confessor can ever be found, without learning from the explanation of the sin and its circumstances the guilt and identity of the person who confessed it to him, this man is in a case of impossibility of confessing to another person. For he is more bound by precept not to disclose guilt confessed to him than to confess and explain his own guilt: he is bound to the former in many ways by natural law, as the arguments for the first conclusion prove, and in many ways by positive divine law, as the arguments for the second conclusion prove. But to the latter he is bound, at most, by positive divine law, as stated in d. 17. Therefore, he confesses to God.”

Fourth, some authors give the following case, and say confession may not even then be divided: when a sin cannot be revealed to another without also revealing the sin of the accomplice, or the person with whom the penitent sinned. Thus teach Navarrus, ch. 7, n. 3, and many other casuists. But the opposite opinion is more common and safer, and the Subtle Doctor indicates it, d. 21, q. 2, n. 16, where he says: “What do I say?² That not only must the penitent’s principal sin and its circumstances be confessed—for circumstances cannot properly be disclosed without revealing the deed—but also the other person with whom the sin was committed. For the penitent ought to wish to preserve the person with whom he sinned just as he preserves himself; indeed, all the more because that person was joined to him in the crime. For he is all the more bound to restore to that person the good he lost through it, and to protect the good he can protect, notwithstanding any crime committed.” Thus the Doctor. Although he expressly teaches only that the confessor must conceal the accomplice’s identity under the seal of confession, he nevertheless sufficiently indicates that the accomplice’s identity may be disclosed in confession, since the priest must conceal the person once disclosed in confession.

The Angelic Doctor plainly teaches this in In I Sent., d. 16, q. 3, a. 2, q. un., fifth point, where he says: “To the fifth point, one must say that in confession a person ought to preserve another’s reputation as much as he can, but he ought more to cleanse his own conscience. Therefore, if a circumstance that leads to the identification of a person is necessary for confession, according to the rule given, then he ought to confess while concealing that person as much as he can. But if it is not necessary for confession, he ought to omit it, lest he betray another’s sin.” St. Bonaventure, the Seraphic Doctor, holds the same opinion, In IV Sent., d. 21, p. 2, art. 1, q. 3, n. 51, where he writes: “One’s neighbor’s sins are either irrelevant to the accusation of our own sin, though the one confessing mentions them by association and as a kind of excuse—for it is a comfort to the wretched to have companions in their punishments—and he acts badly in confessing this way, as do many simple people who accuse others by naming all their neighbors so that they may feel less ashamed, saying, ‘We are thieves, usurers, perjurers,’ and the like. Confessors must correct such people, because they do not keep to the strict form of confession. Or another’s sins are joined and mixed with our own, so that our own guilt cannot be properly explained without them; in that case, it is permissible to confess them insofar as our own guilt cannot be explained without another’s sin. Thus, sometimes in general terms: for example, if a woman was known by a bishop (God forbid), it suffices to say that some great prelate knew her. If it was a religious person, it suffices to remain general, since the kind of guilt is sufficiently evident. If one goes on to identify the individual, the person confessing must be rebuked. But if the sin cannot be explained without identifying the particular person—as when a woman was improperly known by a man—then, if she names her husband, she does not sin, because she cannot otherwise confess her own guilt. In this case, one must attend not to the accusation of another but to one’s own accusation. Thus it is generally true that another’s sins must not be mentioned in confession except insofar as they are our own, and confessors must not inquire into them. Therefore, confessors who probe into the details of confessions, hear evil of others, and tolerate it can scarcely ever be excused from the sin of detraction; they do not know how to heal souls, since they allow those who come for medicine to inflict a serious wound on themselves by accusing others.” So far St. Bonaventure. St. Bernard also supports this in his Formula of an Upright Life, near the end: “Speak ill of no one at all, however true or evident it may be, except in confession, and then only when you cannot otherwise disclose your own sin.”

That a penitent may lawfully reveal the identity of an accomplice in confession is proved first as follows. It is lawful to exercise one’s right and seek one’s own bodily or spiritual benefit, even if inconvenience to one’s neighbor follows. For it is lawful to do something in defense of one’s own life from which another’s death follows indirectly. But the penitent has the right to make a complete confession to provide for his own salvation and spiritual care. Therefore, he may lawfully disclose a sin whose disclosure entails identifying the accomplice, even if that disclosure brings some loss of reputation to the accomplice before the confessor—especially since that loss is slight, because the accomplice’s crime is disclosed to only one person, who acts in God’s place and is strictly bound to conceal the sin. Furthermore, by voluntarily making himself an accomplice and participant in a crime, a person also subjects himself to the penalties due and all the consequences of that crime. Therefore, since this committed sin must be submitted to the keys of the Church and explained to the confessor in the manner in which it was committed, whenever that manner changes the kind of sin or notably aggravates it, it follows that if the sin cannot otherwise be disclosed, the accomplice’s sin must also necessarily be explained. This is confirmed: Christ the Lord willed the faithful to disclose all their sins, even secret ones, to a priest despite the loss of reputation that follows from such confession, because the penitent derives the greatest benefit from a complete confession. “For,” says the Council of Trent, sess. XIV, ch. 5, “the difficulty of this kind of confession and the shame of disclosing sins might indeed seem grave, were it not relieved by so many and such great benefits and consolations, which are most certainly conferred through absolution on all who worthily approach this Sacrament.” Therefore, if I may disclose all my hidden sins to a confessor despite the loss of my own reputation, for the great benefit that follows, why may I not likewise disclose the accomplice’s identity to obtain the fruit and benefit of a complete confession? Finally, I may lawfully disclose another’s crime to someone, says Lessius, De Iustitia, ch. 11, dub. 12, when this is necessary for that person to help me in an important matter, since I am not bound to keep another’s reputation wholly unharmed at notable cost to myself. Therefore, much more may I disclose it in confession when this is necessary to avoid having to confess my sins again and to receive salutary counsel from the confessor for ordering my spiritual life, so that I may especially avoid the danger of falling into the same sin again.

That the penitent is bound to disclose the accomplice’s identity for completeness of his confession is clear from what has just been said. For the penitent is bound to confess all mortal sins completely whenever this is lawful and he is not prevented from doing so by some greater precept. Therefore, if he may lawfully reveal the accomplice’s identity when completeness of confession requires it, and cannot otherwise disclose his own sin, he is bound to do so by divine precept. Furthermore, by virtue of the precept to make a complete confession, a person is bound to confess his own sins, even the most shameful, despite the greatest shame and loss of his own reputation before the confessor, who may previously have considered him a devout and religious man. Therefore, he is much more bound to declare those sins at the risk and prejudice of another’s reputation when he cannot otherwise explain his own sin completely. The inference is clear: by charity, a person is more bound to avoid his own disgrace than another’s; thus he would be less bound to confess his own sins than another’s. Therefore, since he is bound to disclose his own sins, however monstrous, even at the risk of harming his reputation, he is much more bound to do so even if some loss of his neighbor’s reputation follows. Finally, if a penitent were not bound to disclose the accomplice’s identity in confession when he cannot otherwise declare his own sin, it would follow that married people would not be bound to confess sins sometimes committed in the marital act, especially when both are known to the confessor, and consequently that the confessor could not judge and retain those sins. But this seems absurd, since it would prejudice the salvation of married people and lead to an excessively lax administration of this Sacrament.

YOU WILL OBJECT 1: A penitent cannot disclose his accomplice’s sin in confession without damaging the accomplice’s reputation before the confessor. But for the completeness of his confession he cannot damage his neighbor’s reputation before the confessor; therefore he cannot reveal the other’s sin. The major premise is clear. The minor is proved: when two precepts must be observed together, one of natural law and the other of positive divine law, and they cannot both be observed at once, the precept of natural law must be observed rather than that of positive law. For if there were a positive precept to make confession, while a natural precept to protect one’s neighbor’s life arose at the same time, I would be more bound to protect my neighbor’s life than to make confession. But completeness of confession belongs only to positive law, while the prohibition against damaging a neighbor’s reputation belongs to natural law. Therefore, the penitent is more bound not to damage his neighbor’s reputation than to make a complete confession. — I deny the minor, and in response to its proof I say that in this case the natural-law precept against damaging one’s neighbor’s reputation is not in force, because of the precept and benefit of a complete confession—not because this positive precept by itself derogates from that natural precept, but because it changes the circumstances included in that natural precept and under which it alone binds. For the natural precept to preserve one’s neighbor’s reputation is not absolute and general for every time and place and every possible circumstance; it applies only when no reasonable cause to the contrary arises, as is clear of other precepts of natural law. For, as our Bosco rightly observes, d. 7, sect. 9, n. 28, the natural precept “You shall not kill” does not bind simply and absolutely—for it is lawful to kill evildoers by public authority, and lawful to kill an unjust aggressor who privately attacks one’s life, and so on—but with this limitation: “You shall not kill the innocent and the just,” Exodus 23:7. Likewise, avoiding scandal is a precept of natural law, but not at grave harm to oneself. Hence the positive precept to hear Mass on Sunday can allow a woman, who would otherwise have to remain at home to avoid giving scandal to a young man who loves her inordinately, to go to church to fulfill this precept; she is not bound to deprive herself of Mass and fulfillment of the precept in order to help someone who will sin out of malice, at such a cost to herself. The same applies to the natural precept to defend the commonwealth. If, however, I cannot do so without revealing the sacramental seal, whose observance belongs in some way to positive law, I am under no obligation, because I am bound to defend the commonwealth only when I can do so without greater harm than the benefit the commonwealth will receive from my defense. The harm that would follow from revealing the seal is much greater than any benefit to the commonwealth. Accordingly, in our case, the natural right that forbids revealing an accomplice’s identity and damaging his reputation is understood to apply unless there is a reasonable cause, such as the completeness of confession, whose good far outweighs the damage to the accomplice’s reputation before the confessor alone. This damage therefore does not excuse the penitent from material completeness of confession. Add to this that greater consideration must be given to the reverence due to the Sacrament of Penance and the penitent’s spiritual good, which require him to confess completely, than to the accomplice’s very small loss of reputation. The accomplice himself voluntarily exposed his reputation to this risk when he committed such a sin with the penitent. Therefore, the precept of completeness of confession does not here require anything contrary to natural law, but something fully in accord with it—just as an external-court judge does not act contrary to natural law when he compels an accused person to disclose his accomplices and orders a witness to state the accused person’s crime.

YOU WILL SAY 2: One should not recommend for practice what makes confession especially hateful. But revealing an accomplice makes confession most hateful to the penitent and so risks turning him away from it; therefore it should not be recommended or asserted.

I deny the major premise. For the penitent’s own loss of reputation makes confession hateful to him and, by itself, turns him away from confession more than an accomplice could. Nevertheless, confession would not legitimately be divided because of the penitent’s shame and loss of reputation. Therefore it must not be divided because of the accomplice’s loss of reputation either.

YOU WILL OBJECT 3: Confession of sins is necessary for salvation only because Christ the Lord instituted and ordained it in this way. But it is not plausible that Christ the Lord wished to institute this Sacrament at the cost and harm of a neighbor’s reputation, and to bind the penitent to disclose the accomplice’s crime when he cannot confess completely without such disclosure. Therefore the penitent is neither bound nor permitted to reveal the accomplice’s identity to preserve the completeness of confession. — I deny the minor. Since Christ the Lord instituted the Sacrament of Penance as a true judgment, it follows that, just as in an ordinary court an accused person has the right to disclose his accomplice’s crime when the judge requires and commands it, and a prosecutor or witness has the right to disclose the crime of the accused and his accomplices when this is necessary for the completeness of the trial, even if the accomplice suffers harm to his reputation, property, or life as a result, so in the tribunal of Penance the penitent, accusing himself, has the right to disclose the partner in his crime in confession if this disclosure is necessary for its completeness, even if the accomplice thereby suffers some harm to his reputation before the confessor.

YOU WILL OBJECT FINALLY: If a penitent is bound to reveal the accomplice’s identity in order to confess completely, he will also be bound to disclose another person’s sin, even if that person is not an accomplice, when he cannot explain his own sin to the confessor without such disclosure—for example, if he gave a potion to an unmarried woman to destroy a child conceived through fornication or adultery. But this is false, since a penitent has no right to reveal a sin in which he did not share or participate, and which was not committed in partnership with him. Therefore, by the same reasoning, he is not bound to disclose the accomplice’s identity to preserve the completeness of confession. — I deny the inference of the major, and the reason for the difference is that a neighbor who did not commit a sin together with the penitent did not subject himself to the completeness of the judgment exercised in the tribunal of Penance concerning that penitent. Nor does the confessor, from his right to know the penitent’s offense, also have a right to know the neighbor’s offense, which is not a circumstance of the sin the penitent himself accuses. For whether the child was conceived through adultery or fornication is irrelevant to the potion given to suffocate the fetus and procure an abortion. The accomplice’s case is different, since his offense is a circumstance that changes the kind or notably aggravates the sin the penitent confesses.

NOTE, HOWEVER, that the penitent may not disclose the accomplice’s identity except when it is necessary for the completeness of confession. Thus, if a sister had sinned only venially by not resisting promptly enough the violence of her brother, who was trying to rape her, she would not be permitted to disclose her brother’s identity and crime in confession. In that case she would have no right, for the sake of the completeness of her own confession, to reveal her brother’s sin, since venial sins and their circumstances do not necessarily have to be disclosed in confession. It would suffice for her to say that she had not resisted with the promptness and strength of mind she ought to have shown toward the man who was urging her to carnal sin. The same must be said of sins already committed: when they are disclosed again in confession, the accomplice’s identity should not be stated if it could be known to the confessor, since accusing oneself of such sins is not necessary for the completeness of confession. In that case, it is better not to confess such sins again, or at least not with the circumstance that would identify the accomplice.

NOTE SECONDLY that someone who reveals an accomplice’s sin without any necessity or benefit sins against justice, and is therefore bound to restore the reputation that such an indiscreet confession took away before the confessor. For the reason why a person’s reputation is damaged in confession is the same as outside confession when confession itself does not require it. But damaging someone’s reputation outside confession without necessity or benefit is unjust and in itself obliges one to restore it in whatever suitable way is possible. Therefore the same must be said of damage to reputation caused through confession.

YOU WILL ASK 1: Whether someone who has reserved cases may, when necessity arises, confess sins that are not reserved to a priest who lacks the faculty to absolve from reserved cases, without disclosing the reserved sins to him? — Alexander of Hales teaches the affirmative, 4th part, q. 18, memb. 5, art. 2, reply to the last point. In response to this argument—“For certain sins one must have recourse to the supreme pontiff, who has the fullness of power to absolve; but one need not have recourse to him for lesser sins, from which an ordinary priest can absolve; therefore sometimes it is necessary to divide confession”—he says: “One must say that it is one thing to confess some sins to one priest and some to another, so that one’s wickedness may appear less; and another thing, when one cannot be absolved by the person who immediately has care of one’s soul, to go with his consent and will to a superior who can absolve, because one cannot be absolved by the first. In the first way, the person dividing confession is moved by a disordered and perverse will, by which he wishes to justify himself in part, when he ought to humble himself. In the second way, he is moved by good will toward himself and another, because he intends in this way to provide for his own salvation. Such a person is not said to divide confession, since with one priest’s consent and counsel he confesses to another.” Yet it is clear that Alexander does not deny that the penitent must disclose the reserved sins to the priest who absolves him from the nonreserved sins, since he plainly says that, on that priest’s counsel, the penitent must have recourse to a superior so that he may be absolved from the reserved sins. But how could the priest give this counsel if the penitent did not disclose those sins?

The negative opinion is therefore more probable: someone confessing to a priest who cannot absolve from reserved sins is also bound to confess the reserved sins. First, since the priest will at least indirectly absolve the penitent from the reserved sins, he must also know and judge them. Second, disclosure of these sins greatly helps determine whether the penitent is worthy of absolution, since because of them he may not be absolved at all—for example, if he has a concubine he is unwilling to abandon, or refuses to restore another’s property, and so on.

YOU WILL OBJECT 1: No one is bound to confess the same sins twice, otherwise the burden of confession would be too heavy. But the penitent is bound to confess reserved sins to the person who has the power to absolve directly from them; therefore he should not confess them to a priest who lacks that power. — I deny the major premise for this case. The burden of repeating confession is not so significant that the completeness of confession should therefore be violated, especially since the penitent must blame himself for this burden, because he freely incurred this obligation.

YOU WILL OBJECT 2: A penitent is bound to confession only when it is sacramental and made before a legitimate judge who can loose or bind. But an ordinary priest is not a legitimate judge with respect to reserved sins, and consequently a confession made to him cannot be sacramental; therefore the penitent is not bound to confess those sins to him. — I deny the minor premise. Although that priest is not the legitimate judge of such sins in themselves and directly, so that if the penitent confessed only reserved sins he could not judge them sacramentally, nevertheless he is at least their indirect judge, insofar as they are joined to other sins about which he can judge, as well as to the penitent’s condition. For that reason the accusation of those reserved sins can be called sacramental confession: they are, as it were, circumstances of the sins from which the penitent must be absolved directly, and concern the present condition of the sinner that must be disclosed in confession, so that it may be judged whether he should be absolved.

YOU WILL ASK 2: Whether a dying person may legitimately be absolved if he could not confess any particular sin but could only show general signs of sorrow? — I answer that such a dying person may be considered in two ways: either while a priest is present, he gives certain signs of sorrow by which he shows that he has sinned and grieves over it, but because he is suddenly deprived of the power of speech he cannot confess any particular sin; or he may be considered as having shown certain signs of penance and asked for a confessor before the priest arrived, but in the meantime lost the use of reason entirely, so that the priest, on arriving, cannot obtain any sign of penance from him and can learn only from those present that he gave signs of penance and asked for a confessor. I say, then, that a dying person considered in either way may legitimately be absolved, as is gathered from the Council of Orange, ch. 11, where it says: “A person who suddenly becomes speechless, as provided, can be baptized or receive Penance if he has the testimony of others concerning his previous will, or shows it presently by a nod, by which he signifies sorrow for his sins.” The Council of Carthage III, ch. 34, likewise says: “If the sick cannot answer for themselves, let them be baptized when their will has been attested; the same must be done for penitents.” Carthage IV, ch. 67, likewise says: “If someone asks for Penance while ill, and by chance, while the invited priest is coming to him, is struck speechless by illness or becomes delirious, let those who heard him testify, and let him receive Penance. If he is believed to be about to die at once, let him be reconciled by the laying on of hands, and let the Eucharist be poured into his mouth.” It is no answer to say that these councils speak only of absolution from censures; that is asserted entirely without grounds. First, the councils compare this reconciliation with Baptism, indicating that they speak of reconciliation through the Sacraments. Second, they speak of reconciliation that must take place before receiving the Eucharist. For those infected with mortal sin, this must be sacramental, as the Council of Trent teaches, sess. XIV, canon 7.

St. Leo also clearly teaches this truth, ep. 91, addressed to Theodore, bishop of Forum Iulii, where he writes about those to be reconciled through the Sacrament of Penance: “If they have been so weighed down by some illness that they cannot indicate, in the priest’s presence, what they had sought shortly before, the testimony of the faithful standing around them ought to help, so that they may receive together the benefit of Penance and reconciliation.” He is not speaking there of absolution from censures, since he had previously said: “The mediator between God and human beings, the man Jesus Christ, gave this power to the leaders of the Church, so that they might impose the satisfaction of Penance on those who confess and admit to sacramental communion, through the door of reconciliation, those cleansed by that same salutary satisfaction.” Here he clearly teaches that he is speaking of sacramental absolution. Next, after explaining with what charity and diligence priests ought to devote themselves to this work, he adds: “But if one of those for whom we beseech the Lord, hindered by any obstacle, fails to receive the present gift of pardon and, before reaching the prescribed remedy, ends his temporal life according to the human condition, what he did not receive while remaining in the body he will be unable to obtain once stripped of the flesh.” From this it is plainly clear that St. Leo is not speaking of absolution from censures, which can also be granted to the dead, as is evident from ch. A nobis 28, and so on.

Reason also supports this. If such absolution were invalid, it would be above all because it did not presuppose true matter or a genuine accusation of oneself accompanied by signs of sorrow, from which the priest could know that the penitent was worthy of absolution. But that is not so: by asking for Penance, the penitent sufficiently shows that he is sorry for his sins and has already begun to confess them in general by asking for a priest to be summoned. This is almost like someone confessing through an interpreter, when he writes down his sins for the interpreter to explain to the priest. For when those present explain to a priest who is there the dying person’s request for Penance and desire for it, they explain his confession to the priest as interpreters do; thus, with the priest already present, he makes his sins known to him, as it were, through interpreters and presents signs of penance.

YOU WILL OBJECT 1: Confession is required before sacramental absolution so that the penitent’s condition may be known. But his condition cannot be known from signs of this kind; therefore, and so on. Furthermore, through those signs the confessor learns nothing he did not already know, since he learns only generally that the person has sinned. But he cannot exercise judgment without distinct knowledge of the case; therefore the priest cannot pronounce judicial and sacramental absolution over this dying person. — I answer the first point by denying the minor: through signs of this kind the priest sufficiently knows that this person needs the Sacrament of Penance and is therefore guilty of sin. For to be absolved directly, one need not confess any particular sin. If someone who had lived for many years in the gravest sins confessed only one venial sin—for example, that he had once been voluntarily distracted while praying—and then suddenly lost his senses, everyone agrees that he ought to be absolved. Yet, speaking morally, the priest could judge his condition no better from that confession than if he had said only in general that he had sinned. Therefore, in this case too he ought to be absolved. To the second point, I deny the major premise: by the signs shown by the penitent, the priest knows, as a judge in the tribunal of Penance, that this man has offended God and is sorry for it. The priest did not previously know either of these things, at least the latter, under his judicial aspect.

YOU WILL OBJECT 2: If a penitent who showed a sign of penance while the priest was absent could validly and lawfully be absolved, it would follow that one could sacramentally confess sins to an absent confessor by letter or messenger. But Clement VIII and Paul V condemned this as an erroneous doctrine, as we already said when discussing the form of this Sacrament; therefore, and so on. — I deny the inference of the major premise. The case of a dying person is entirely different from that of someone who declares his sins by letter to a priest who is absent. For the dying person confesses, as it were, through an interpreter: through the testimony of those who heard him ask for a confessor and saw the signs of contrition he made. Moreover, in this case the priest is not considered absent, since he has the person to be absolved present, as well as witnesses present who declare that the dying person has an effective will to receive the Sacrament of Penance. The case is different for someone who is entirely absent, because the confessor has no moral certainty and cannot have it that the penitent who confessed by letter is in the proper condition to be absolved. In response to the minor premise, then, I say that this assertion does not conflict with the definition of Clement VIII, who condemned the proposition: “It is permissible to confess sacramentally through a letter or messenger to an absent confessor and to obtain absolution from that absent person.” First, as we have said, this case is entirely different from ours. Second, when the pontiff himself was asked whether a dying person in this situation should be absolved sacramentally, he replied that he ought to be absolved and that he himself would absolve him if such an occasion arose, and that he did not intend his decree to include this case in any way. For, as Coninck reports, disp. 7, n. 105, on April 16, 1608, the most illustrious Cardinal Bellarmine and the most illustrious Archbishop of Armagh testified that they had heard this from him. This is confirmed by the Roman Ritual, published by authority of Paul V, in which the supreme pontiff not only permits but also commands all parish priests to confer sacramental absolution on a dying person in such a case. For it says: “If, while confessing or even before beginning to confess, the sick person loses his voice and power of speech, the priest should try, insofar as possible, to learn the penitent’s sins by nods and signs. Once they are known in some way, either generally or specifically, or even if the desire to confess has been shown either by the person himself or through others, he must be absolved.”