Scotus Academicus, Tomus decimus: De Baptismo, De Poenitentia, De Extrema Unctione

NOTE 1. The Church has the power to command, or at least to determine, the use of the sacraments, as well as matters pertaining to their administration and reception, as the Council of Trent teaches, sess. XXI, ch. 2, where it writes: “The holy Synod declares that this power has always been in the Church, so that in the dispensation of the sacraments, their substance being preserved, it might establish or alter those things which, according to the variety of circumstances, times, and places, it judged more expedient for the benefit of those receiving them or for the reverence due to the sacraments themselves.... Therefore, recognizing this authority of hers in the administration of the sacraments, although from the beginning of the Christian religion the use of both kinds had not been uncommon, nevertheless, as that custom had by the passage of time been very widely changed, holy Mother Church, moved by grave and just reasons, approved this custom of communicating under one kind and decreed that it be held as law, which it is not lawful to reject or alter at will without the authority of the Church herself.” The question, then, is whether, on the hypothesis that confession was not commanded by divine law, the Church could legitimately have commanded it—and did in fact command it—and have determined the time at which it was to be made. Theologians do not agree on the answer. Their principal opinions are three. The first is Durand’s, In IV Sent., d. 17, q. 8, n. 7, who teaches that sacramental confession, insofar as it is an accusation of all sins, including interior ones, cannot be commanded by the Church; consequently, either the precept of annual confession is not purely ecclesiastical, or there is no precept but only a counsel. Their second opinion is that of those who teach that the Church could not have commanded confession and determined its time unless confession were already required by divine law; hence the ecclesiastical precept of annual confession is only a determination, modification, or application of the divine precept to observe it at this or that specified time. So teach Soto, In IV Sent., d. 18, q. 1, a. 1, conclusion 1, and Canus in his Relection on Penance, part 5. Their third opinion is that of those who teach that the precept of annual confession is not merely a declaration or determination of divine law, but wholly an ecclesiastical precept, whose observance binds all the faithful.

NOTE 2. All theologians (with few exceptions, at least) agree that the Church has no direct authority or power over purely interior acts, consummated within, such as acts of the intellect’s assent or dissent, or the will’s hatred, love, or delight in a forbidden or illicit thing. For the Church has no direct power over what it cannot prohibit, nor can it punish its transgression; but it cannot punish a transgression of a precept concerning interior acts, because such acts cannot be brought before its judgment. Therefore it cannot command those acts either. Whether, however, it can command such purely interior acts at least indirectly, by reason of another precept to be observed, the Doctor affirms in In III Sent., d. 27, where, treating of the obligation of charity, he says that an act of charity can be commanded by the Church insofar as it must be elicited in order that the commanded holy days be observed religiously and due worship be offered to God at that time with fitting reverence. The question, then, is whether the Church can directly or indirectly command confession of all sins, including interior ones.

NOTE 3. One can distinguish two kinds of obligation to observe a precept. The first is essential and immediate, arising from the force of that precept itself, that is, with every other precept, divine or human, set aside. Thus penance is essentially commanded for a sinner when the danger of death is especially present and imminent. The second is mediated and accidental: it does not arise from a precept concerning the very thing that must be done and fulfilled, but only from a precept concerning another thing to be done or received, which would not be done properly unless something else were first performed as a prior disposition. Thus penance is said to be commanded whenever a person stained by mortal sin must receive the Eucharist, lest, by receiving Christ’s Body unworthily, he eat judgment upon himself. The difficulty, then, is whether confession must be made essentially by an ecclesiastical precept, or only accidentally, once a year, namely on the occasion of fulfilling the precept to receive the Eucharist at Easter.

Three things, then, are to be determined here: first, whether the Church could command confession directly and of itself, and actually did so; second, which sins must be confessed in order to satisfy that ecclesiastical precept; third, who is bound to observe this precept.

First conclusion. — THE CHURCH COULD IN FACT COMMAND, AND DID ACTUALLY COMMAND, CONFESSION TO BE MADE ESSENTIALLY EVERY YEAR.

Both parts are proved from the general Council of Lateran under Innocent III, where it was decreed: “Let every faithful person of either sex, after reaching the age of discretion, alone faithfully confess all his or her sins to his or her own priest at least once a year, and strive with his or her own strength to fulfil the penance imposed; reverently receiving the sacrament of the Eucharist at least at Easter, unless perhaps, on the advice of his or her own priest, he or she judges it right to abstain for a time from receiving it for some reasonable cause. Otherwise, let such a person be barred from entering the Church while alive and deprived of Christian burial when dead. Therefore let this salutary statute be frequently proclaimed in churches, lest anyone take the veil of ignorance as an excuse.” Two things are determined by these words: first, that confession must be made; second, that it must be made at least once a year. Both are commanded by the Church, as is clear not only from the words of this decree but also from the severe penalty imposed there on transgressors. For the Church is not accustomed to act so severely against her children except for the transgression of a precept properly so called, whose observance is necessary for salvation. Nor is it valid to reply with Durand that this severe action of the Church concerns those who have omitted to make confession only insofar as they have neglected to receive the Eucharist at Easter. This answer, I say, is worthless: first, because the word “otherwise,” which threatens the penalty, applies equally to confession and Communion, and specifies the one no more than the other; second, because the intention of the Lateran Council can be known no better than from the Council of Trent. From the latter it is clear that the Lateran Council commanded confession once a year: for Trent says, sess. XIV, can. 8: “If anyone says that confession of all sins, as the Church observes it, is impossible and a human tradition to be abolished by the devout; or that all and each of Christ’s faithful of either sex are not bound to it according to the constitution of the great Lateran Council, and that the faithful should therefore be advised not to confess during Lent, let him be anathema.” In this canon, as is evident, there is no mention of Easter Communion. We may therefore conclude that the Council means that the Lateran Council commanded confession not only accidentally and mediately, insofar as it is a necessary means for communicating worthily, but also immediately and essentially, so that those who would otherwise be excused from the precept of Communion are also bound to this annual confession; and consequently, whoever omits annual confession and Communion at Easter would sin twice. Add that, if the precept of making confession were not distinct from the precept of receiving the Eucharist, it would follow that the Church has not five distinct precepts, which is certainly contrary to the common opinion of the faithful.

You will say: No law can command an act if it cannot justly punish the transgressor; but no human law can justly punish someone who does not confess a sin known only to himself. This is proved because he cannot be punished for a transgression whose occurrence cannot be known; but the Church cannot know with certainty whether a sinner confesses all his hidden sins, interior or exterior. Therefore, and so on. — I deny the minor premise. For the Church legitimately commands Communion, as Durand also admits, although at times it cannot punish a violator of that precept—for example, if someone were to receive the Eucharist only in his mouth but not swallow it. That the Church often commands things over which it cannot readily judge or obtain knowledge in the external forum, and therefore cannot punish transgressors, is evident from the precept that clerics recite the Canonical Hours every day, and that the faithful hear Mass on Sundays and feast days, as well as from similar acts which require a definite interior intention that is not clearly manifested by the external act. The same applies when acts are commanded that need not be performed publicly, since someone could say that he fulfilled the law in secret, though in fact he did not. I answer secondly that the minor premise can be denied: someone who committed public crimes might fail to approach his own priest and then die in the meantime; the Church can take action against him as one who has not confessed and punish him with the penalty prescribed by the Lateran Council. This shows how slight was the ground on which Durand doubted whether the Lateran Council’s determination was a precept rather than a counsel. Add that Durand himself seems to argue against himself: for about halfway through the question he adds that the Church can command confession by Christ’s authority. To say this is nothing other than to admit in fact that the Church can directly command confession by the authority it possesses; for the Church derives all its authority from Christ, and consequently everything it commands concerning the reception or administration of the sacraments, it commands by Christ’s authority. From these points, then, it is clear that even if confession were not required by divine law and precept, the Church could command it. But since it is required by divine law, to be made at least once in life—namely, when a sinner is bound to seek remission of sins through sacramental absolution—the Church has rightly determined a set time at which that divine precept must be fulfilled, as Trent teaches, sess. XIV, ch. 5, near the end: “For the Church did not establish through the Lateran Council that Christ’s faithful should confess what she understood to be necessary and instituted by divine law, but that the precept of confession” (the divine precept) “be fulfilled by all and each once a year, when they had reached the age of discretion.” The Subtle Doctor agrees, In I Sent., d. 17, n. 14: “Concerning the third article, I say that the Church did not specify that precept” (the divine precept of confession) “with respect to some of the matters mentioned above, and specified it with respect to others. The principal specification of this precept is found in that chapter, Omnis utriusque sexus, in the Decretals, On Penance and Remission.” And below, n. 28: “As to when, the Church determined the precept” (the divine precept of confession), “namely, once a year.” The Doctor does not say, “The Church commanded confession,” but “determined the precept,” namely the divine one.

YOU WILL ASK 1. Whether, if confession were not to be made by divine law and had not been commanded by Christ, the Church could have commanded it? — I answer that, if sacramental confession had been instituted by Christ alone as something to be done or omitted at one’s discretion, the Church could not have commanded it in the form in which it is in fact commanded, namely, that confession be made of all mortal sins, even hidden ones. This is so not only because, as some maintain, the Church lacks power, at least direct power, over purely interior acts—for this, as we have just said, is not so certain—but because the Church cannot command something so difficult as confession of all mortal sins unless it had some other means of alleviating that difficulty. In fact, it is alleviated and lessened by the effect of remission, sanctification, and the interior renewal of a person, which takes place through sanctifying grace conferred in priestly absolution. But the Church does not have it within herself to confer such sanctifying grace by her own power, and consequently has nothing by which she can relieve that difficulty; otherwise, she would have in herself the power to institute a sacrament, the contrary of which we established in the preliminary disputation. Therefore, if, despite the power and efficacy of this sacrament—which reconciles us to God and is often followed, in devout men who receive it with devotion, by peace and serenity of conscience together with a strong consolation of the Spirit, as Trent says, sess. XI, ch. 3—if, I say, despite these things, many Catholics, out of excessive shame, do not fulfil the divine precept of confession, which the Church has declared must be fulfilled at least once a year, how much more would they be deterred from fulfilling such a precept if remission of sins could not certainly be hoped for as a result?

The Doctor approves this reasoning. For, In IV Sent., d. 17, n. 9, while attacking the opinion of those who say that confession is binding only by an ecclesiastical precept, he says: “That cannot easily be disproved, except on the ground that the Church would not have ventured to impose so arduous a precept on all Christians unless it were a divine precept, etc.” By this he indicates that fulfilling the precept itself is exceedingly difficult, such that the Church alone would not prescribe it unless it had already been established elsewhere by Christ the Lord. We must therefore admit that, just as the Church cannot command someone to profess the religious state, which Christ the Lord willed to be free because of the difficulty attached to that state, although it has various other advantages, so too, on account of this difficulty, it could not have prescribed for people the obligation to confess their sins if Christ the Lord, in instituting the sacrament of penance and at least implicitly designating confession, had left its use to the freedom and choice of penitents.

You will say: The authority that can prescribe the time for doing something by ordinary power can, by that same power, command the substance of the act, since the time is commanded as an accessory to the act, as one of its circumstances. But the Church, as just stated, can prescribe and in fact has prescribed the time for making confession. Therefore it can also prescribe its use. — I distinguish the major premise: when the substance and exercise of this act do not ordinarily exceed human capacity, I grant it; when they do, I deny it. And, with the minor premise distinguished in the same way, I deny the inference. For the circumstance of the time for making confession does not ordinarily exceed human frailty, whereas the substance of the act does. For, as Coninch very aptly says, Disputation 5, On Penance, doubt 4, n. 42: confession of all mortal sins is very difficult for many in many cases, so that very many dread it as death and would almost rather die than confess certain sins; scarcely any artifice or threat of hell can induce them to confession, and while confessing they feel such anguish as those condemned to execution experience. Yet unless there is some very great, indeed almost extreme, necessity, human authority cannot command something so difficult. Therefore, in the case at hand—if, that is, the sacrament of confession were free of a divine precept—there would be no such necessity, and the Church could not command that confession.

YOU WILL ASK 2. From what point does the year begin within which the Church’s precept of annual confession is in force? — I answer that the year can be reckoned from one Easter to the next, or from one Lent to the next, or from the day on which the last confession was made to the same day in the following year. The more common and truer opinion, however, is that the year is reckoned by the ordinary calendar, from the first day of January to the last day of December. The first part is clear: whichever of these three ways one assigns the beginning of the year, if someone confesses his sins within that interval, he is rightly said to have satisfied the precept of annual confession prescribed by the Lateran Council. Understand this, however, of the precept and obligation essentially arising from the force and efficacy of the precept to make confession itself. For it can happen accidentally—that is, by reason of the precept to receive the Eucharist—that someone is bound to confess again during the Easter fortnight, when the precept of receiving Communion is in force: namely, if he is burdened by some mortal sin and cannot approach the sacred Eucharist without first making confession and receiving sacramental absolution.

The latter part, however, is more common and safer: the words of a law are to be taken as they sound, unless something else stands in the way. Hence, when the Church commands annual confession, the year must be taken according to the ordinary calendar, from the first day of January to the last day of December.

YOU WILL ASK 3. If someone has not confessed during the year, is he bound to confess immediately at the beginning of the following year? — I answer that this seems more probable. For when a time is prescribed not as a deadline at which a precept expires, but only as the limit beyond which its execution must not be extended or deferred, the precept remains binding even after that time has elapsed. Thus, when a fixed time is set for a debtor to pay a debt, once that time has passed the debtor remains bound to pay it always, since the time was not fixed so that the debt would expire then, but so that payment would not be deferred beyond it. But in the aforesaid constitution of the Lateran Council, the year is not set as a deadline at which the precept expires, but as the limit beyond which fulfilment of the precept of confession must not be deferred. For the words “so that he confess at least once a year” are equivalent to “so that he not defer confession beyond a year.” Hence there is not only an affirmative precept to confess once each year, but also a negative one, namely, not to defer it further. Whoever does not confess immediately after the year has elapsed transgresses this precept, since he is delaying beyond what is fitting so salutary a remedy and medicine. From this it is clear that there is a difference between the precept to make confession every year and the precept to recite the Canonical Hours, to hear Mass on feast days and Sundays, and to receive the Eucharist at Easter. In these precepts, the time is prescribed as the deadline for their execution, with the obligation to perform the act attached to that day and time as its due. Thus the precept of Easter Communion, being specially laid down out of reverence for and in celebration of that season, expires with the season itself, just as the precept to hear Mass expires with Sunday or the feast day.

YOU WILL ASK FINALLY: Whether someone who foresees that he will be unable to confess during the rest of the year—because, for example, he is going to sail or travel to a remote region where confession will not be available—is bound to confess immediately, before beginning that voyage or journey? I affirm. The reason is straightforward: since the precept to make confession is prescribed for the whole year and for every part of the year, it follows that it can be fulfilled in any part of the year. Therefore, one who cannot fulfil it during the other parts of the year is bound to satisfy it here and now. Thus one who cannot hear Mass on a feast day at eleven-thirty must anticipate that time, since the entire morning has been prescribed for fulfilling that precept.

You will say: Someone who foresees that he will be prevented from hearing Mass on a feast day is not bound to attend on Saturday; likewise, someone who foresees that he will be prevented from fasting on Saturday is not bound to anticipate that time by fasting on Friday. Therefore, by the same reasoning, someone who foresees that he will be prevented from fulfilling the precept of confession during the rest of the year is not bound to anticipate that time. — I deny the parity. The reason for the difference is that the obligation to hear Mass or to fast does not begin before the appointed day on which that precept is to be fulfilled; hence, however much one might anticipate that time, one would not at all satisfy that obligation. The obligation to confess is different: since it is annual, it begins on the first day of the year and continues until the last—not because the obligation must actually be fulfilled on the first day, but because it is free for me to fulfil it on that day if I wish. Consequently, when I foresee that I cannot discharge that debt on other days, I am bound to fulfil it on the first day on which I may and ought to do so.

Second conclusion. — ONLY AND ALL THE BAPTIZED, AFTER REACHING THE AGE OF DISCRETION, ARE BOUND BY THE PRECEPT OF ANNUAL CONFESSION IF THEY ARE STAINED BY SOME MORTAL SIN. So teaches the Lateran Council (as is clear from its words cited in the preceding conclusion), which Trent interprets, sess. XIV, ch. 5, as follows: “For the Church did not establish through the Lateran Council that Christ’s faithful should confess what she understood to be necessary and instituted by divine law, but that the precept of confession be fulfilled by all and each at least once a year, when they had reached the age of discretion.” Therefore, all and only those who have sinned mortally after baptism are bound by both the divine and ecclesiastical precepts to make confession. Whether unbelievers are bound by divine law to make confession at least once in their lives, and consequently sin mortally not only by neglecting baptism but also by not receiving the sacrament of penance, the Doctor seems to affirm, In IV Sent., d. 17, n. 29, where he says: “If confession were only a precept of ecclesiastical law, it would not seem that unbelievers were bound by the precept of confession, since, according to the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 5, ‘What have I to do with judging those outside?’”

Richard teaches this explicitly, In IV Sent., d. 17, a. 2; so does Sylvester, under the entry “Confession,” and Hiquaeus in his commentary on the Doctor’s d. 17, where he proves his assertion as follows: The Gospel Law, he says, was promulgated for the faithful as well as unbelievers, as were the remedies of that law, such as the sacraments and their precepts. Therefore it includes both faithful and unbelievers. The antecedent is established. The consequence is proved: for an obligation under a law or precept in general, which pertains to the substance of the law, it is not required that an affirmative precept be fulfilled in every state, subject matter, and circumstance; it is sufficient that it be fulfilled in a specified state, matter, time, and circumstances. But this does not prevent someone from being bound by the law, even if he never encounters a time when he must fulfil the affirmative precept of the law or the subject matter it specifies. Therefore the obligation of a law and precept can stand even though it does not bind one to the performance of the act except upon a prior condition determined by the law itself. The major premise is evident: the law itself implies that specified condition, which may not arise or be present. The minor is proved from natural law: everyone is bound to help a neighbor in extreme need when able; yet even if no occasion to fulfil this precept arises, it does not follow that no one is bound by the law. Similarly, everyone is bound to expose life and possessions for the commonwealth, even if the particular necessity in which one must do so never actually arises. So the faithful person is bound to confess the faith and exchange his life for its defense before a tyrant, if the occasion arises, and so on. Therefore the obligation of a law is neither removed nor confused with the performance of the prescribed act, even if the particular circumstance for performing it does not arise. In the same way, an unbeliever is bound by the Gospel Law and its precepts, although not while remaining in the state of unbelief, since in that state he cannot fulfil any positive precept proper to this law—not the precept of faith, which is the foundation of the others, nor of baptism, which is the sacrament of faith—at least not fruitfully for salvation. Thus far Hiquaeus. He immediately adds: whatever one may say about these matters, the precept of the Eucharist includes unbelievers, although that precept cannot be fulfilled while they remain in unbelief.

If you reply that an unbeliever, once he has received faith and baptism, can receive the Eucharist, but not the sacrament of penance unless he has sinned after baptism—and that he is not bound to sin, as he is bound to receive faith and baptism—this is countered by the fact that on this account not all the faithful would be bound by the precept of confession, but only those baptized persons who have sinned mortally. Indeed, Hiquaeus says, even in that state there was never an obligation to penance except on account of personal mortal sin, as Trent presupposes, sess. XIV, ch. 1. Yet the precept of penance bound everyone, not in its performance unless sin were assumed to have been committed. Just as, then, the precept of the Eucharist binds unbelievers, so to speak, in the signified act though not in its exercise, unless the prior condition is fulfilled—namely, by receiving faith and baptism and reaching adulthood—so too the precept of penance binds unbelievers, on the supposition of baptism and the matter of penance itself, namely, an actual mortal sin committed after baptism. But this is also sufficient, since it binds the faithful in no other way: according to everyone, it binds them in its exercise only if such a sin is assumed. Hence, if this argument exempts unbelievers from the obligation of the precept because in that state they cannot perform the act by which it is fulfilled, the faithful who are just must likewise be exempted from the obligation while in the state of justice. I answer: The faithful who are just are indeed to be exempted while in the state of justice, and they are exempted by all who say that the divine precept of confession binds only those baptized persons who have sinned mortally. Nor does Trent anywhere imply that penance is necessary for all the faithful, but, as it says, sess. XIV, ch. 1, “for all people who have stained themselves with some mortal sin.” Nor does Scotus bind all the faithful to confess. For he says, In I Sent., d. 17, n. 18: “Concerning the second article, I say that this precept includes who must confess, because he is an adult.” Does he mean everyone? He continues: “that is, one who has the use of reason and knows the sin he has committed, whether at baptism or after baptism, for that alone is the matter of confession.” Therefore Hiquaeus does not seem to reason in conformity with the Doctor’s own principles, and his argument is not very forceful; for many deny that unbelievers are bound by divine precept to receive the Eucharist.

Moreover, there is a difference between the obligation to the sacrament of the Eucharist and to that of penance. A person is bound to confession by reason of the precept to receive the Eucharist only because confession is a means to such reception for someone guilty of mortal sin; for the Eucharist cannot be received by him worthily and properly unless he has first obtained remission of mortal sin, which he cannot have without confession and absolution, actually or by desire. We must therefore conclude that the divine precept of confession is directed essentially only to baptized persons who have sinned mortally at baptism or after baptism. Consequently it does not include unbelievers, nor are they therefore to be judged guilty of a new mortal sin on account of omitting sacramental accusation of sins.

Indeed, whatever may be the case concerning the divine precept with respect to unbelievers, it is at least certain that they are not bound to annual confession, since this obligation arises only from the Church’s authority and precept. But the Church has no authority over unbelievers who have not yet been baptized, as the Apostle teaches, 1 Corinthians 5: “What have I to do with judging those outside?”

That all adults, even children, as soon as they reach the age of discretion, are bound by ecclesiastical precept to annual confession is clearly gathered from the Councils of Lateran and Trent, where it is decreed that every faithful person of either sex, after reaching the age of discretion, confess all his or her sins at least once a year. These words also include all baptized children who are faithful, have the use of reason, are guilty of mortal sin, and are conscious of it. For they have reached the age of discretion because they can distinguish good from evil, feel shame over a lie or some similar sin, and praise piety and other virtues known to them. Hence the Doctor, In IV Sent., d. 17, n. 21, asking who is bound by the precept of annual confession, says: “As to who, the Church specified a sinful adult, that is, after he has reached the age of discretion, etc.” This means nothing other than an adult according to the interpretation given earlier, namely in n. 18, where he says: “By an adult I do not mean someone of such-and-such an age, but one who has reached the age of knowing what is just or unjust against God’s law.” By these words the Doctor excepts no adult from the ecclesiastical law requiring annual confession, and consequently infers that all children too who have the use of reason are bound by it. And rightly so, because we must not make distinctions where the law itself does not distinguish; for it is odious to distinguish where the laws do not. But the law of the Lateran Council, by a universal statute binding all the faithful, does not except children or distinguish them from other faithful. Therefore, in keeping with the common opinion, we must say that children who have the use of reason and are guilty of mortal sin are bound to annual confession as soon as they reach the age of discretion.

YOU WILL SAY: The Lateran statute commands confession and Communion equally; yet Communion does not bind children as soon as they reach the age of discretion. Therefore neither does confession. — Lugo replies, Disputation 15, n. 151, that the difference can be gathered from the very words, since Communion is commanded with this limitation: “Unless perhaps, on the advice of their own priest, they judge it right to abstain for a time from receiving it for some reasonable cause.” This reasonable cause is prudently judged to apply so long as the child does not yet fully recognize the dignity of this sacrament, so as to approach it with due reverence. Although there are authors who affirm that the age of discretion is the same for confession and Communion, so that every child, upon reaching the age of discretion and being bound by the law of confession, is also bound to receive the Eucharist unless the confessor expressly extends the time. Their chief reason is that the precept of annual confession and of Easter Communion is imposed equally on all the faithful. The limitation “Unless perhaps,” etc., is added because there may be more reasons for extending the time for Communion than for confession.

In what precise year this obligation begins, and whether children have sufficient use of reason, cannot be determined with certainty by us. For, the Doctor says in n. 18, in many cases malice supplies for age before the customary age (that is, before the seventh year), and not only in evil matters, as the common saying has it, because someone may have an earlier prudence for evil and thus be called capable of deceit, but also in good matters, according to the saying in the life of St. Agnes: “Faith is not measured by years.” Hence the Lateran Council also determined no definite age, but said simply, “after they have reached the age of discretion,” leaving it to the discretion and judgment of pastors and confessors to decide and determine this. For it often happens that some in the seventh year of their age are more mature in intellect and better and more fully instructed in matters of faith than others in their twelfth year. Accordingly, the Roman Catechism, II, ch. 17, n. 33, aptly says: “First, from the canon of the Lateran Council, which begins ‘Every faithful person of either sex,’ it is clear that no one is bound by the law of confession before the age at which he can have the use of reason. Yet that age has not been defined by any number of years; rather, it seems generally to be determined that confession is enjoined on a child from the time when he has the power to distinguish between good and evil and deceit can enter his mind. For when each person reaches that period of life in which he must deliberate about eternal salvation, then he must first confess his sins to a priest, since no one burdened by consciousness of crimes may otherwise hope for salvation.”

Third conclusion. — IT IS PROBABLE THAT SOMEONE GUILTY ONLY OF VENIAL SINS IS NOT BOUND BY ECCLESIASTICAL PRECEPT TO ANNUAL CONFESSION. This is the Doctor’s opinion, In IV Sent., d. 17, n. 25, where he says: “Therefore, as far as I understand from the general statutes of the Church, no one is bound to confess venial sins in any case; nor has the Church specified a precept of confession in this matter. And reasonably so, because she uses the sacrament of penance as a second plank after shipwreck, which is not the case with venial sins. Nor is anyone bound to any contrition for venial sins; indeed, someone dying with an actual will or act of venial¹ sin will be saved, though he will suffer punishment. Yet it does not seem that anyone is bound to the second part of penance, which is confession, concerning something for which he is not bound to have contrition or attrition. This is also clear for another reason: as was said above, venial sins are sometimes wholly wiped away with respect to guilt and punishment without any special act, as by a fervent act of contemplation of God, just as a drop is consumed by a powerful flame.”

If you ask, then, how the priest is to know the face of his flock if someone who says he has lived innocently is not bound to confess his venial sins: I answer, if someone confessed to him only venial sins, how would he know that the person had committed nothing but venial sins? From nothing but the person’s own confession. Hence the Extravagants, On the Office of the Ordinary, chapter Significavit, says: “One making a penitential confession is to be believed in all things, since it is not likely that anyone would be forgetful of his own salvation.” Therefore let the priest believe in the same way someone who comes and says: “Lord, I give thanks to God that, since my last confession, I have no consciousness of mortal sin. Give me the Eucharist.” In this penance the priest knows the face of his flock just as much as if the person had recounted his venial sins for two days; if he confessed them, he could have no more certainty about those venial sins than he now has of the person’s innocence, namely, from the person’s own testimony. The Doctor’s words. By these words he teaches clearly that someone who has only venial sins is not bound by ecclesiastical precept to annual confession. St. Thomas teaches the same in this distinction, q. 3, a. 1, question 3, reply to objection 3.

This is further proved, first, because by force of the Lateran Council’s statute all the faithful are bound to confess all their sins; but no one can confess all venial sins or recall them all to mind because of their number. Consequently, the Council did not intend to include venial sins under the word “sins.” Next, the gravest penalty is prescribed, as we said above, for those who do not fulfil this precept, namely, expulsion from the Church and deprivation of ecclesiastical burial. But it does not seem just or reasonable to inflict so severe a penalty on someone who refuses to confess venial sins. Therefore the same conclusion follows. Third, as we showed above, the ecclesiastical precept of annual confession is a determination of the divine precept; but the divine precept binds one to confess only mortal sins. Therefore neither does the ecclesiastical precept. The minor premise is established from the Council of Trent, sess. XIV, ch. 5, where it says: “Venial sins, by which we are not excluded from the grace of God and into which we fall more frequently, may indeed rightly and usefully be mentioned in confession, without any presumption, as the practice of devout people shows; yet they may be omitted without guilt and expiated by many other remedies.”

YOU WILL SAY: The purpose of annual sacramental confession is to enable one to approach the Eucharist with greater reverence and for the pastor himself to know his sheep. But confession of venial sins contributes to both: from knowledge of venial sins, the pastor can understand his subject’s soul and state of conscience quite clearly, so as to give salutary advice and fortify him against future sins, even mortal ones; likewise, freedom from venial sins greatly contributes to receiving the Eucharist worthily. Therefore these sins, even if they are the only ones, must still be confessed. — I answer that the major premise is true as a matter of appropriateness, but not of necessity. For the pastor to recognize the face of his flock and learn the state and conscience of the sheep entrusted to him, it is enough in such a case for the penitent to present himself to the priest and say that his conscience is not burdened with any mortal sin. Likewise, in order for someone to approach the Eucharist worthily and without any defect, even venial, it is not necessary that he confess such venial sins, since they can be expiated by other remedies, as we have just said on the authority of the Council of Trent.

YOU WILL ASK: Whether the Church can command confession of venial sins? Theologians commonly affirm that it can, and prove it as follows. First, this seems in fact to have been commanded of the religious of St. Benedict in the Clementine, Ne in agro Dominico, where it is decreed: “Lest anything unbecoming or vicious creep into the sacred field of the black monks (that is, the Benedictine religious) and perniciously grow among its crops, but rather that flowers of honor and fruits of honesty grow abundantly in it, etc. Here is the reason for the constitution.” The constitution follows: “Indeed, every month, both in monasteries and outside them, with every occasion removed, all and² each of the monks shall come to confession once. And on the first Sunday of each month they shall always receive Communion in monasteries, unless for some cause—which they must not delay in making known to the abbot, prior, or penitentiary of the monastery—they abstain or withdraw on their judgment.” Although that constitution does not mention venial sins, nevertheless, says Canus, Relection, On Penance, ch. 5, and Navarrus, On Penance, d. 6, since those religious are commanded to confess every month, it follows that they are bound to confess venial sins if no others are present. This argument seems weak to me. For that constitution does not absolutely bind them to make confession every month, but only on the supposition that the religious need confession. For if they fell into no sin at all, there is no doubt that they would not be bound to confession by virtue of that constitution. The Supreme Pontiff therefore presupposes that those religious need confession in order to obtain remission of sins. But since venial sins can be remitted without confession, it follows that the Supreme Pontiff did not intend the Benedictines to be bound by virtue of this constitution to confess venial sins, such that they would incur the sin of disobedience if they did not confess them.

But whatever may be the case concerning this constitution, it seems more probable that the Church can command confession of venial sins. First, sometimes the Church imposes a censure for a venial sin, namely, minor excommunication, and disclosure of that sin is necessary for absolution from the censure. Second, confessing venial sins is an act of the virtue of penance; therefore it can fall under a precept, since the Church can command every act of virtue. Finally, confession of venial sins greatly contributes to spiritual progress, since it involves an effective purpose to root out the venial sin into which a person is accustomed to fall, as experience shows in those who confess venial sins. For although they do not confess all of them, but only those they choose, this is nevertheless a great restraint and remedy for correcting ordinary faults and light sins.

YOU WILL SAY: The Church cannot change the matter of a sacrament and therefore cannot make necessary matter which, by Christ’s institution, is not necessary. But if it commanded confession of venial sins, it would change the matter of the sacrament of penance, because it would in fact make necessary matter that is not necessary and is free; for by its precept it would require that venial sins, which need not be confessed, in fact must be confessed. Therefore the Church cannot command confession of venial sins. — I answer, denying the minor premise. For even if the Church commanded confession of venial sins, it would not thereby change the matter of the sacrament of penance instituted by Christ, since its matter is sin, not only mortal but also venial. It would truly change that matter if it declared that something which is sin is not matter for confession, or that something which is not sin is matter for that confession. But the present case is different: by its precept the Church would make necessary matter which was otherwise sufficient, though free.

YOU WILL PRESS: The sacrament of penance is primarily ordered of itself to the remission of guilt. Therefore that guilt whose remission does not require this sacrament, such as venial sins, cannot become necessary matter for this sacrament. — I distinguish the consequent: it cannot become necessary matter such that this sacrament can never be administered without it, I grant; that it cannot become necessary matter which here and now must be remitted by virtue of this sacrament, I deny.