Scotus Academicus, Tomus decimus: De Baptismo, De Poenitentia, De Extrema Unctione

NOTE 1. By the term Attrition theologians commonly mean that detestation and sorrow for sin which is made and conceived from some motive other than God himself, insofar as he is to be loved for his own sake and as supremely good in himself, from whom mortal sin turns us away. Moreover, the Council of Trent assigns a twofold motive for this sorrow, in sess. XIV, ch. 4, where, having distinguished Contrition in general as perfect and imperfect—the former it simply calls Contrition, while the latter it calls Attrition—it immediately adds: Attrition is so called because it is commonly conceived either from consideration of the shamefulness of sin or from fear of hell and punishments, etc. Here the two general motives of this Attrition are assigned, namely, the shamefulness of sin and fear of hell and punishments, to which all other motives can readily be reduced. For the desire for blessedness and fear of losing it are included under fear of hell and punishments; since by the term hell the Council understands not only the punishment of sense, but also the punishment of loss, or the absence of the enjoyment and possession of God, which the sinner would incur eternally if he did not repent and obtain admission to the remission of sin. For to fear the lack of some good is the same as to desire it, and conversely, to wish for the possession of some good is the same as to fear its loss and forfeiture. Hence fear of losing an object entails love of that object, and conversely, love entails fear. Thus the common saying: As great as the love in possessing was, so great is the sorrow in losing. Likewise, every other evil for which we detest sin is included under the shamefulness of sin, such as the mark of disgrace one would incur, not only before mortal men but also before God and the most blessed spirits, as well as the dreadfully disfigured, foul, and horrifying state of a soul corrupted by sin, etc.

NOTE 2. Attrition and Contrition agree in this, that each is sorrow of the mind and detestation for a sin committed, together with a purpose not to sin again. For that is how the Council of Trent defines Contrition in general, sess. XIV, ch. 1, when it says: Contrition, which holds the first place among the penitent’s acts—for it is sorrow and detestation for a sin committed, together with a purpose not to sin again. They also agree in this, that each is sorrow for sin on account of God offended. For Attrition, insofar as it is a means of obtaining remission in the sacrament of penance, must be sorrow for sin with some reference to God. Hence purely human disgrace that one would incur through sin, as well as any punishment insofar as it is inflicted only by a human being, could not be the motive of true and properly so-called Attrition, as Lugo observes, disp. 5, n. 11. For through Attrition a person must turn to God in order to obtain from him remission of sin by virtue of the sacrament of penance. But if one has sorrow for sin only on account of purely human disgrace, or on account of punishment to be inflicted by a human judge, that act is in no way a conversion to God, since it would in no way proceed from love or fear of God, but from fear of a human judge. A person who is moved not by fear or love of God but by fear of a human being in no way gives satisfaction to God, honors God, or prefers God to a creature; for he does not leave sin on account of some perfection he recognizes in God, but on account of the power of a created judge or something similar. Yet every true conversion requires turning away from sin and turning to God, just as sin involved turning away from God and turning to a creature. Therefore, just as turning to a creature was on account of some perfection perceived in that creature, so turning to God must be on account of some perfection of God himself: for example, his power to punish, which we fear; his goodness, which we love; or his superiority, which we obey, etc. Where, then, no perfection of God moves a person, there is no repentance of the kind God requires: namely, that by which a person recognizes something in God on account of which God must not be put second, but rather preferred to a creature. Hence not every shamefulness of sin and fear of punishment is a sufficient motive for Attrition, but only insofar as each has some reference to God—that is, insofar as sin is disobedience, irreverence, ingratitude toward God, or something similar. For all these ground sin’s shamefulness precisely as sin, insofar as it expresses opposition to God. Therefore one who detests sin under this aspect is moved by some excellence of God, in view of which he turns to God and prefers him to the creature whom he previously loved more than God. Third, they agree in this, that each has love of God, as the highest good, annexed to it, at least virtually. For one who truly grieves over having sinned on account of God offended must have love of God, at least virtual love: he grieves over having offended God in precisely the measure that he loves him. Finally, they agree in this, that both sorrow—of Attrition as well as of Contrition—is ordered to obtaining remission of sin through the sacrament of penance, received in fact or by desire.

NOTE 3. Attrition and Contrition differ from one another: first, as to their power and effect. For, the Council of Trent cited above says, Contrition sometimes reconciles a person to God by perfect charity before the sacrament of penance is actually received, provided there is a desire to receive it. Attrition, however, even with a desire to receive the sacrament of penance, does not suffice to obtain remission of sin outside the sacrament of penance, as the Council teaches in the same place, saying that although on its own it cannot lead a sinner to justification without the sacrament of penance, nevertheless it disposes him to obtain the grace of God in the sacrament of penance. Second, they differ in their principle, because Contrition is elicited by the virtue of penance insofar as it has charity annexed to it or is commanded by charity; Attrition, however, proceeds from the virtue of penance insofar as it has the virtue of hope annexed to it. For it sorrows over sin from fear of incurring hell and from fear of losing blessedness. This belongs to the virtue of hope, which, since it has God as its object insofar as he is a good for us and to be possessed by us, also tends toward what opposes and removes that possession, such as the shamefulness of sin and the danger of incurring hell. Third, they differ in their motive: perfect Contrition must be elicited from love of God as the highest good, loved above all things, and from the affection of charity; imperfect Contrition, however, must indeed be elicited from love of God as the highest good, to be loved above all things—not for his own sake, but for ours, or not insofar as he is good for himself, but insofar as he is our good, in whose possession our eternal happiness consists and in whose loss our supreme misery and unhappiness consist. Hence Contrition proceeds from the love of friendship, by which God is loved for his own sake. Attrition, however, proceeds from the love of desire, by which God is loved for our sake and as our good. Hence the love of hope, when compared with the love of charity, can be called imperfect and initial: imperfect, not absolutely, but relatively and comparatively, because its motive is less perfect than charity, which loves God only for his own sake and has no regard to the good of the one who loves; initial, because, as will appear below from St. Augustine, we are advanced and prompted by the love of hope itself and by fear of hell toward the love of charity. Thus this fear and love arising from the affection of hope is, as it were, the seed, first beginning, and initial stage of salvation, when it is conceived under the impulse of the Holy Spirit. For, the Council of Trent cited above says, that fear and love is a gift of God and an impulse of the Holy Spirit, not yet indeed indwelling, but only moving, by which the penitent, helped by it, prepares the way to righteousness.

From these points it is clear that perfect Contrition is not distinguished from imperfect by duration, since prolonged sorrow is not required for perfect Contrition, as we have already said. Moreover, the sorrow of Attrition can last much longer than that of Contrition, since its object is, as it were, perceptible to the senses and affects the mind more powerfully than the object of Contrition. For people are moved more powerfully to flee something by fear of punishment than by love of righteousness. — Nor are Contrition and Attrition distinguished by intensity, since intense sorrow is not required for perfect Contrition: any sorrow, even one elicited at a low degree, is truly an act of Contrition if elicited from the supernatural motive of charity; but greater and lesser degrees do not change the species of a thing. — Finally, Contrition is not distinguished from Attrition on the ground that perfect Contrition is informed by habitual grace and charity, whereas Attrition is not, because it sometimes happens that Attrition is elicited by a person who is just and in a state of grace, while Contrition is produced by a person in a state of sin. Nor is this contradicted by the Council of Trent when it says, sess. XIV, ch. 1: And if it sometimes happens that this Contrition is perfect charity and reconciles a person to God before this sacrament of penance is actually received, etc. For by these words the Council does not mean that Contrition must always be elicited by a person who possesses the habit of charity. Otherwise, it would have said in vain at the beginning of the same chapter that an act of Contrition was necessary at every time for obtaining remission of sins, and that in one who had fallen after baptism it was at last a preparation for remission of sins. For one who possesses habitual charity has already obtained remission of sins, and therefore would be prepared in vain to obtain it. The Council therefore means only that Contrition is deemed perfect when elicited from the motive of charity, in which it differs from imperfect Contrition, which is not elicited from such a motive but only from the motive of hope.

With these points established, two matters remain to be determined in particular in this Question: first, whether sorrow for sins conceived from fear of hell is good and useful for salvation; second, whether Attrition—that is, sorrow elicited from fear of hell and from the affection of hope—suffices for remission of sins when joined to the sacrament of penance.

First conclusion. — ATTRITION, OR SORROW FOR SINS ELICITED FROM FEAR OF HELL OR FROM THE SHAMEFULNESS OF SIN, IS GOOD AND USEFUL FOR SALVATION.

This Conclusion is of faith, determined by the Council of Trent, sess. VI, can. 8, in these words: If anyone says that fear of hell, by which we flee to the mercy of God, grieving over our sins, or abstain from sin, is a sin or makes sinners worse, let him be anathema. And in sess. XIV, ch. 1, it defines that sorrow conceived from fear of hell and punishments, if it excludes the will to sin and is accompanied by hope of pardon, not only does not make a person a hypocrite and a greater sinner, but is also a gift of God and an impulse of the Holy Spirit, not yet indeed indwelling, but only moving, by which the penitent, helped by it, prepares the way to righteousness.

This truth is proved first from Sacred Scripture, which commends servile fear in many places. Thus Proverbs 1: The fear of the Lord is the beginning of Wisdom—an oracle which the Holy Fathers explain as referring to servile fear, for that is what begins wisdom, while filial fear brings it to perfection and completion. Likewise, Ecclesiasticus 2: The fear of the Lord drives out sin, because it disposes one to justification and the expulsion of sin, as St. Augustine, cited below, explains. Similarly, Isaiah 26: We have conceived and have been, as it were, in labor, and have brought forth the spirit; we have not wrought deliverance on earth. There the interpreters of the Septuagint read: From fear of you, O Lord, we conceived and brought forth the spirit of salvation and salutary penance.

The Holy Fathers unanimously teach this very thing, commending and extolling that fear. Thus St. Clement of Alexandria calls it an assistant of faith; St. Ambrose, the rudder of a wavering soul. Tertullian, On the Apparel of Women, ch. 2, says: Fear is the foundation of salvation; presumption is an obstacle to fear. St. Augustine teaches the same in many places, especially in his exposition of Psalm 127, where he distinguishes three kinds of fear: the first is fear of temporal evils, the second fear of hell or eternal punishments, and the third, finally, chaste fear. Concerning the first kind of fear he says: Some fear only for this reason: lest they suffer some evil on earth, lest sickness kill them, lest loss leave them bereft, lest they lose someone dear, lest they lack help, lest they be condemned, imprisoned, or undergo some tribulation. For this reason they fear and tremble. This fear is not yet chaste. Of the second kind he continues: Another person fears not suffering on this earth, but fears hell. The Lord too struck fear in people by this, as you heard when the Gospel was read: “Their worm will not die, and the fire will not be quenched.” People hear these things, and because they will truly befall the wicked, they fear and restrain themselves from sin; they have fear, and through fear they restrain themselves from sin. They fear, indeed, but do not love righteousness. Of the third kind of fear he adds: When through fear they restrain themselves from sin, a habit of righteousness is formed, and what was hard to love begins to grow sweet, and God grows sweet, and a person already begins to live righteously—not because he fears punishments, but because he loves eternity. Fear, then, is driven out by charity, but chaste fear succeeds it. What is this chaste fear? According to it, my brothers, we should understand what was said in Psalm 18: “Blessed are all who fear the Lord, who walk in his ways.” He explains this chaste fear there by comparing a chaste woman with an adulteress: “The chaste woman,” he says, “fears lest her husband depart; the adulteress, lest he come. What if both husbands are away? The adulteress fears he will come; the chaste woman, that he will delay.” Hence he later concludes: “Therefore, my brothers, chaste fear has this character: it comes from love. But that fear which is not yet chaste fears the Lord’s presence and punishments. It does whatever good it does out of fear—not from fear of losing that good, but from fear of suffering that evil. It does not fear losing the embraces of the most beautiful bridegroom, but fears being cast into hell. This fear too is good and useful; it will not last forever and ever, but it is not yet that chaste fear which lasts forever and ever. In what does chaste fear consist? I ask you again something by which you may question yourselves. If God were to come and speak to us in his own voice—although he does not cease speaking through his writings—and say to a person: ‘Do you want to sin? Sin. Do whatever pleases you. Whatever you have loved on earth shall be yours. Whoever has angered you, let him perish; whoever you wish to seize, let him be seized; whoever you wish to beat, let him be beaten; whoever you wish to condemn, let him be condemned; whoever you wish to possess, possess him. Let no one resist you, let no one say to you, “What are you doing?” Let no one say, “Do not do what you wish”; let no one say, “Why did you do it?” Let all those earthly things you coveted abound for you, and live in them not for a time but forever; only you will never see my face.’ My brothers, why do you groan, unless because chaste fear, which lasts forever and ever, has already been born? Why was your heart struck if God were to say, ‘You will never see my face’? Look: you will abound in all this earthly happiness and in every good; temporal goods will overflow in you, you will neither lose nor leave them. What more do you want? Chaste fear would indeed weep, groan, and say: ‘Rather, let all be taken away, so that I may see your face.’ Chaste fear would cry out from the Psalm and say: ‘God of hosts, turn us back, and show us your face, and we shall be saved.’ Chaste fear would cry out from the Psalm and say: ‘One thing I asked of the Lord.’ See how boldly this chaste fear, this true and sincere fear, dares to say: ‘One thing I asked of the Lord; this I shall seek: what? That I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life.’” He says similar things in Sermon 18, On the Words of the Apostle. There, having distinguished this threefold fear in chapters 1 and 5, he finally rejects worldly fear in chapter 7; then, speaking of fear of hell in chapter 8, he writes: What great thing is it to fear punishment? It is a great thing, but to love righteousness is greater. I question you and discover what you are. Look at my spoken question and question yourself in silence. I say to you: overcome by lust, you have a willing partner; why do you not commit adultery? You will answer: “Because I fear hell, I fear the punishment of eternal fire, I fear Christ’s judgment, I fear the company of the devil, lest I be punished by him and burn with him.” What shall I say, that you fear wrongly, as I was saying about the adversary who sought to kill your body? There I rightly said, “You fear wrongly,” because your Lord makes you secure, saying: “Do not fear those who kill the body.” But now, when you say to me, “I fear hell, I fear burning, I fear eternal punishment,” what shall I say? “You fear wrongly”? “You fear in vain”? I do not dare to say so, since the Lord himself, having removed one fear, went on to impose another. He said, after saying, “Do not fear those who kill the body and afterward can do nothing more,” “But fear him who has power to cast both body and soul into the fire of hell. Yes, I tell you, fear him.” Since, then, the Lord has inspired fear, inspired it intensely, and doubled the threat by repeating the word, shall I say, “You fear wrongly”? I will certainly not say that. Fear, then; you fear nothing better, nothing that you ought to fear more. But I ask you: if God did not see you when you act, and no one were to convict you at his judgment, would you do it? Look at yourself. You cannot answer all my questions with words; examine yourself. Would you do it? If you would, then you fear punishment, but do not yet love chastity; you do not yet have charity; you fear in a servile way. It is dread of evil, not yet love of the good. Still, fear, so that this dread may guard you and lead you to love. For this fear by which you fear hell and therefore do not do evil restrains you; it does not let a soul that wants to sin do so. It is a kind of chaste fear, like a tutor. The letter threatens, but grace does not yet help. Still, let this fear guard you while you refrain from doing something out of fear, and let charity come. Let it enter your heart, and as far as charity enters, fear departs. Fear’s task was to prevent you from doing it; charity’s task is to prevent you even from wanting to do it, even if you could do it with impunity. I have told you what you should fear; I have told you what you should desire. — From these passages one may argue as follows: that fear is good which is distinguished from mercenary fear directed toward temporal evils; that fear is good which St. Augustine does not dare call evil, by which a person does not fear in vain, by which one does not sin, which is useful and good, which restrains a person externally from sin—even though it does not let the inner soul that wishes to sin do so—which checks the habit of sinning, which is the beginning of wisdom, and which prepares a place for charity; from it a habit of righteousness is formed, what was hard to love begins to grow sweet, and God grows sweet. Yet Augustine attributes all these things to servile fear. Therefore servile fear is good.

This is confirmed by what he says in Sermon 24, On Time, where he says: When the threatened punishment is feared, one learns to love the promised reward; and so a good life is maintained through fear of punishment. Through a good life a good conscience is acquired, so that through a good conscience no punishment is feared. Therefore, let him who does not wish to fear learn to fear; let him who always wishes to be secure learn to be anxious for a time. For, as John says, “There is no fear in charity, but perfect charity drives out fear.” He spoke truly and rightly. If, then, you do not wish to have fear, first see whether you already have perfect charity, which drives fear out. But if fear is driven out before this perfection, pride puffs up; charity does not build up. For just as hunger in a healthy body is dispelled not by disgust but by food, so in a sound mind fear must be driven out not by vanity but by charity. By these words St. Augustine plainly indicates that fear of failing to attain blessedness, or of incurring hell, can sometimes suffice to exclude every inclination to sin. In this way that fear can be deemed chaste, at least in its initial stage, since by it a person not only avoids sin but filial fear also arises—the fear that proceeds not from hope of reward but from the affection of a person’s goodwill toward God. For this reason that affection is called filial fear: a son obeys his father not because he hopes for some reward from him or fears a punishment to be inflicted, but precisely because he knows that disobedience displeases the father whom he loves; thus, from love of his father, he shuns disobedience, with absolutely no regard for his own advantage.

YOU WILL SAY 1: That fear should not be called good which does not exclude the will to sin; but fear, or sorrow conceived from fear of hell, does not exclude the will to sin. Proof: That sorrow and fear do not exclude the will to sin which virtually and implicitly retain it. But sorrow for sins from fear of hell virtually retains the inclination and will to sin, as St. Augustine teaches very well in Sermon 15 on Psalm 118, where he says: Fear by which one does not love righteousness but fears punishment is servile, because it is carnal. For the will to sin lives on; it appears in action when impunity is available. But when a person believes punishment will follow, it lives in secret; it lives nonetheless. For he would prefer sin to be permitted, and he grieves that the law forbids what he is not permitted to do, because he takes no spiritual delight in its goodness but carnally fears the evil it threatens. But under chaste fear, charity itself—which drives out this fear—fears to sin even if impunity should follow, because charity does not expect impunity to follow when, from love of righteousness, it counts sin itself a punishment. — I DENY the minor premise: although sorrow does not itself include some other motive for hating sins, nevertheless it does not positively exclude every other motive for detesting them. For although the will of one who has Attrition is immediately stirred to avoid sin on account of fear of hell¹, nevertheless it does not rest there, but virtually and mediately tends toward God as its ultimate end. In this way the act of hope immediately and directly tends toward eternal blessedness, or toward God insofar as he is good for the one hoping, but by its power and implicitly is directed toward God in himself as its ultimate end.

YOU WILL PRESS: That is evil in itself which cannot subsist with charity and sanctifying grace. But servile fear, or fear of hell, does not subsist with charity. For St. John says in his First Epistle, ch. 4: There is no fear in charity, but perfect charity drives out fear. Therefore, etc. — I distinguish the major premise: that which cannot subsist with charity on account of its own evil and deformity, which is opposed to charity, I deny; on account of its imperfection, I grant. For, as St. Augustine, cited above, observes very well in his exposition of Psalm 127, there are two kinds of fear which charity drives out. One is fear of temporal things, since some fear only lest they suffer any evil on earth, lest some sickness befall them, or loss or the loss of someone dear, or some tribulation come upon them. The other is fear of hell, by which the Lord frightens people in the Gospel, and on account of which earthly people restrain themselves from sin and thus begin to live righteously and love God. The first fear is always driven out by charity; the latter remains for a time together with charity, especially when charity is not yet perfect. Augustine also teaches this very well in his Tractate 9 on the First Epistle of John: There is no fear in charity—that is, perfect charity—but fear is in charity in its beginning, because the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom. Fear prepares a place for charity, as it were. When charity begins to dwell there, fear is driven out because it prepared a place for charity. The more charity grows, the more fear diminishes; the more charity becomes interior, the more fear is driven out. Greater charity, less fear; less charity, greater fear. If there is no fear, there is no way for charity to enter. A little further down in the same place: There is a fear which charity drives out, and there is a chaste fear which lasts forever and ever. There are people who fear God lest they be sent into hell; this fear introduces charity, but it comes in order to depart. For if you fear God on account of punishments, you do not love him and do not desire good things, but avoid evil things. You correct yourself, you begin to desire good things; when you desire good things, there is in you chaste fear of losing those very good things. Imagine two married women: one wishes to commit adultery but fears her husband may come. She loves wickedness, and her husband’s presence is burdensome to her. The other loves her husband and wishes to defile herself with no impurity of adultery; she longs for her husband’s presence. Each fears, but one fears that her husband may come, the other that he may leave. The one says, “I fear he may condemn me”; the other says, “I fear he may abandon me.” Apply this to the hearts of Christians and see the fear which charity entirely drives out, and the other chaste fear which lasts forever and ever.

YOU WILL OBJECT 2. It is a sin to order a greater good to a lesser; but one who sorrows over sins from fear of damnation alone orders a greater good to a lesser, the corruption of guilt to avoidance of punishment. Therefore he sins. — I distinguish the major premise: to order the greater to the lesser as to the ultimate end, I grant; as to a proximate end, I deny. For God himself orders a greater good to an inferior one, as the Incarnation of Christ to the salvation and glory of human beings. One who sorrows over sins from fear of hell alone orders the greater good to the lesser as to a proximate end, not as to the ultimate end. In this way holy men order sacrifices and prayers to obtain health or some other temporal good from God. Hence, if anyone were so disposed virtually or actually that, if there were no punishment, he would in no way grieve over guilt, this Attrition would not be good, because it would not tend in any way toward God as its ultimate end.

YOU WILL OBJECT 3. What tends toward a creature does not tend toward God as the ultimate end, because no one can have two ultimate ends. But Attrition tends toward a creature as its ultimate end, for everyone who has Attrition but not Contrition remains in sin; Attrition by itself does not justify at all. — I distinguish the major premise: it does not tend toward God effectively, I grant, for no one can effectively desire several ultimate ends; ineffectively, I deny. For otherwise morally good works performed in mortal sin, such as fasting, prayers, and almsgiving, would be mortal sins, because they do not tend effectively toward God as their ultimate end. We have taught the contrary in the treatise On Grace.

YOU WILL OBJECT 1. If servile fear is good, worldly fear will also be good; but the latter is not good, because it makes people evil. Therefore, etc. — I deny the major premise, because worldly fear is fear of a creature, from attachment to which a person does not hesitate to offend God; servile fear is truly fear of God, drawing a person away from sin and guarding him against it. For by it a person fears offending God on account of fear of the punishment that God himself inflicts for sins.

YOU WILL OBJECT 5. An act by which a person sorrows more over punishment than over guilt is evil, because one ought to grieve more over the greater evil than the lesser; guilt is a greater evil than punishment. But Attrition for sins from fear of damnation alone is an act by which a person sorrows more over punishment than guilt, for he sorrows over guilt because of punishment. Yet that on account of which each thing is such is itself more such. Therefore, etc. — I deny the minor premise. For although a servant loves his master for the sake of a wage, and a believer loves God through hope for the sake of receiving glory, it does not follow that the servant loves the wage more than his master, or the believer the reward of glory more than God, whom he always recognizes as the ultimate end. Therefore, although one who has Attrition hates guilt on account of punishment, it does not follow that he hates punishment more than guilt. For the Aristotelian axiom must be understood of that on account of which something else is such as its principal cause, not as its less principal cause. For although a servant loves his master on account of the sustenance he expects from him as a less principal cause, and a believer loves God on account of glory, it does not follow that the servant loves his sustenance more than his master, or the believer glory more than God.

Third conclusion. — ATTRITION CONCEIVED FROM FEAR OF HELL AND FROM THE LOVE OF DESIRE, THAT IS, FROM THE AFFECTION OF HOPE, IS A SUFFICIENT DISPOSITION FOR OBTAINING GRACE IN THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE.

First, this is proved from the Council of Trent, sess. XIV, ch. 1², where, after distinguishing contrition into perfect contrition, which proceeds from charity, and imperfect contrition, which is called attrition, it says: “Since it is commonly conceived either from consideration of the ugliness of sin or from fear of hell and punishments, if it excludes the will to sin, together with hope for forgiveness,” it immediately adds: “That attrition does not make a person a hypocrite or a greater sinner; rather, it is also a gift of God and an impulse of the Holy Spirit, not yet indeed indwelling, but only moving, by which the penitent, aided, prepares the way for himself to righteousness; and although by itself, without the sacrament of penance, it cannot lead to justification, nevertheless it disposes him to obtain the grace of God in the sacrament of penance.” The Council says the same in can. 5. In these words the Council assigns two distinctions between contrition and attrition: one, that attrition tends toward sin from a less noble motive than contrition, namely, from consideration of sin's ugliness or from fear of hell, but not from consideration of God as supremely beloved; the other, that perfect contrition by itself suffices outside the sacrament to obtain remission of sin, provided that the vow to receive it is joined to it, whereas attrition indeed disposes one to obtain that remission through the sacrament, but without actually receiving the sacrament it does not suffice for remission of sin.

YOU WILL REPLY 1: The Council there speaks only of a remote and wholly insufficient disposition, not of a proximate one that prepares a person immediately to obtain justifying grace. — On the contrary, the Council there plainly teaches that attrition conceived from fear of hell, if it excludes the will to sin, truly disposes one to the grace of justification obtained in the sacrament of penance, in the same way as contrition disposes one to it before receiving the sacrament. But contrition disposes proximately and sufficiently to sanctifying grace, and reconciles one to God before priestly absolution is received. Therefore the Council's intention too is that attrition joined to the sacrament should dispose the penitent proximately and sufficiently, and reconcile him to God in the sacrament of penance. Moreover, attrition disposes a person to grace with the sacrament in a different way than it does outside the sacrament, as the Council of Trent teaches; but outside the sacrament it disposes remotely and insufficiently to justification, because, as St. Augustine taught above, fear prepares the way for charity. Therefore, in the Council's understanding, attrition joined to the sacrament disposes proximately to justification. Finally, the Council there especially condemns Luther's error, as it does in sess. VI, can. 8, where it says: “If anyone shall say that fear of hell, by which we flee to God's mercy while grieving over our sins, or abstain from sin, is a sin, or makes sinners worse, let him be anathema.” But Luther taught not only that sorrow arising from fear of hell is evil and makes a person worse and a hypocrite, but also that it is altogether an insufficient preparation for receiving absolution and making communion. For he writes in serm. 2, On Penance: “Contrition (for so he begins) called true inward penance is prepared in two ways: first, by displeasure, recollection, and detestation of sins, by which one, as they say, recalls one's years in the bitterness of one's soul, weighing the gravity, harm, ugliness, and multitude of one's sins; then, by admitting eternal blessedness and the attainment of eternal damnation, and other things that can excite sorrow and grief, in the hope of making satisfaction by good works. But this grief makes a hypocrite, indeed a greater sinner, because one does it only from fear of the precept and grief at loss; and all such people are absolved and admitted to communion unworthily. And if they had to confess freely, with the precept and threats of punishments set aside, they would certainly say that their past life did not displease them, though they are thus compelled to confess that it displeases them. Indeed, the more they are thus contrite from fear of punishment and grief at loss, the more they sin and are attached to their sins, which they are compelled, but do not wish, to hate. This is that contrition which they call non-meritorious outside charity; others call it attrition, disposing proximately to contrition: for so they themselves think, and I call that opinion an error.” These are Luther's words about the first mode of contrition. He describes the other mode of contrition as follows: “Second, (contrition) is prepared by the sight and contemplation of most beautiful righteousness, by which one, meditating on the beauty and form of righteousness, burns with desire for it and is carried away, and begins, with Solomon, to become a lover of wisdom, whose beauty he had seen. This makes one truly penitent, because one acts from love of righteousness, and such people are worthy of absolution.”

YOU WILL REPLY 2: When the Council writes that attrition disposes one to obtain God's grace in the sacrament, it intends only to condemn heretics who, denying the usefulness of attrition's sorrow, said that it makes a person a hypocrite and a greater sinner; it does not intend to settle the controversy among Scholastic theologians about attrition's sufficiency with the sacrament of penance. — Against this, the Council not only shows that attrition's sorrow is good and useful and does not make a person a greater sinner, but also distinctly and expressly signifies that although attrition cannot by itself lead a sinner to justification without the sacrament, nevertheless in the sacrament it disposes him to obtain God's grace; and consequently it declares that attrition in the sacrament has a power it would not have without the sacrament. Here it sufficiently clearly upholds our position and vindicates it from the heretics' calumnies. For after saying that attrition is a good act, conceived under the impulse of the Holy Spirit, and disposes one to obtain God's grace in the sacrament of penance, at the end of the same chapter it concludes: “Wherefore some falsely calumniate Catholic writers, as though they had taught that the sacrament of penance confers grace without any movement on the part of those receiving it; this the Church of God has never taught or held.” But the heretics seized the opportunity to calumniate Catholic writers solely because they thought that attrition arising from fear of punishments was not a good act but an evil one, and made a person a hypocrite. Therefore the Council teaches that attrition conceived from fear of hell and punishments disposes one to obtain God's grace in the sacrament of penance.

YOU WILL PRESS: If the Council had thought that attrition disposes sufficiently to God's grace when joined to the sacrament, it would have said distinctly that attrition disposes “with the sacrament.” But it did not say so; it said only that attrition disposes “in the sacrament,” in order to signify that it disposes remotely and mediately to grace, namely, insofar as it disposes the penitent to receive sacramental absolution and to elicit contrition from God's grace, from which justification then follows immediately. Therefore the Council lends no support at all to our position. — I deny the consequence. In answer to the antecedent, I say that when the Council says attrition disposes one to God's grace “in the sacrament,” it means the same as if it said “with the sacrament.” For when it sets the phrase in the sacrament against without the sacrament, which means the same as separately and apart from the sacrament, when it says that attrition does not lead to justification without the sacrament, it follows that when it also says attrition disposes one to God's grace in the sacrament, it means the same as if it said with the sacrament.

YOU WILL REPLY 3: When the Council says that attrition disposes one to justification in the sacrament, it is not speaking of attrition conceived from fear of punishments, but only of attrition arising from love of God above all things, though imperfect, which is indeed essentially contrition, but imperfect contrition—as the Council itself calls it there, since it divides contrition into perfect and imperfect. — But the person who dreams this is indeed looking for knots in a bulrush and shadows in the sun. First, because the Council asserts that the attrition sufficient to obtain God's grace in the sacrament is the attrition it says is conceived from consideration of hell and fear of punishments. Therefore it is not speaking of attrition that is initial and imperfect love of God. Second, because the Council speaks of the attrition that Luther had taught makes a person a hypocrite and worse. But the attrition Luther speaks of does not proceed from imperfect and incipient charity, but from fear of punishments alone, as is clear from what was said above. Therefore, etc. Third and finally, because the Council says that the attrition which disposes one to grace in the sacrament of penance “is a gift of God and an impulse of the Holy Spirit, not yet indeed indwelling, but moving the soul.” But attrition from love of God above all things, however imperfect, is a movement of the Holy Spirit indwelling the soul. For “he who remains in charity remains in God, and God in him.” Therefore, etc.

Moreover, the Council calls attrition imperfect contrition not merely because of a deficiency in degree, as a boy is called an imperfect man because he has not yet attained the perfection of a man at all; rather, it calls it imperfect because it lacks the essence of contrition, since it is not sorrow for sins arising from the love of friendship with God. So an embryo is an imperfect man because it does not yet have human nature, but is disposed toward it, as we said in the Third Note. This is confirmed: no greater disposition is required to receive grace through the sacrament of penance than to receive it through baptism. But attrition is a sufficient disposition in an adult being baptized to receive justifying grace. Therefore it will also be sufficient in a penitent. The major premise is established, since the reason is the same for the sacrament of penance as for baptism, inasmuch as both are sacraments of the dead. The minor premise is proved by the authority of St. Augustine, who in On Catechizing the Uninstructed, ch. 17 recounts three kinds of people who wish to be Christians and come to baptism. The third kind consists of those who wish to become Christians for the sake of everlasting blessedness and perpetual rest, which is promised to the saints after this life, so that they may not go into eternal fire with the devil, but enter the eternal kingdom with Christ. “He who is such a person,” he says, “is truly a Christian: cautious in every temptation, lest he be corrupted by prosperous circumstances or broken by adversity; moderate and temperate amid an abundance of earthly goods, and strong and patient in tribulations. By making progress he also reaches such a disposition of mind that he loves God more than he fears hell, so that even if God were to say to him, ‘Enjoy carnal delights forever, and sin as much as you wish; you will neither die nor be sent to hell, but only you will not be with me,’ he would shudder and not sin at all—not now to avoid falling into what he feared, but lest he offend the one he loves so much, in whom alone is rest.” In these people there is only attrition concerning the sins of their former life. For if their only motive for attrition is fear of hell, their fear of God is merely servile; they do not yet have filial fear or contrition made perfect by charity, since St. Augustine lists them among those coming to faith and says that they will later reach the point of loving God more than they fear hell. If they were aflame with perfect charity, they would not be on their way to such a state or advancing toward it by making progress; they would already have attained it. But whatever degree of disposition is given suffices for the fruitful reception of baptism, for a person so disposed is called truly Christian, that is, fit to receive the sacrament of baptism, in which the profession of Christian faith is made. Thus in the preceding ch. 16, where the form of a certain prayer or address is given, the catechist congratulates the person who comes to baptism for the rest hoped for after this life, saying: “Thanks be to God, brother; I congratulate you greatly and rejoice on your account, because amid the world's many and very dangerous storms you have thought of true and certain security.” But unless the aforementioned disposition—which is a disposition of attrition—were sufficient for baptism, the person who came to baptism with it would not have thought of certain security. Therefore, since the reason is the same for the sacrament of penance as for baptism, because both are sacraments of the dead—baptism being a sacrament of regeneration, and penance a sacrament of resurrection and restoration—attrition, which is a sufficient disposition for receiving baptism properly, will likewise be sufficient for receiving the sacrament of penance truly and fruitfully.

Finally, this is proved by reason. First, every sacrament of the New Law can immediately effect by itself that for which it was instituted first and in itself, for it acts by the work performed. But the sacrament of penance was instituted in itself to cause first sanctifying grace in a person fallen through sin. Therefore it can produce first sanctifying grace in him. But if attrition did not suffice for that, the sacrament would never produce first grace. For since contrition by itself suffices to produce first grace outside the sacrament, if it were a necessary disposition for the sacrament of penance, grace would in reality have to be produced before that sacrament was received. Therefore, etc. Moreover, a sacrament of the dead, such as penance, does not presuppose in its recipient a formal principle of spiritual life, for it immediately effects that principle. But contrition made perfect by charity is the principle of spiritual life in a person. Therefore the sacrament of penance does not presuppose it as a necessary disposition. Moreover, the sacraments of the New Law are more efficacious than those of the Old Law and consequently require a lesser disposition in the recipient. But the sacraments of the Old Law necessarily required contrition in order to confer first grace on a person who had fallen after circumcision. Therefore penance, which is a sacrament of the New Law, does not presuppose it. It should be added that if perfect contrition were equally necessary in the New Law and the Old, it would follow that remission of sin is far more difficult in the New Law than in the Old. For in the Mosaic Law the act of contrition alone sufficed to obtain it; but in the Gospel Law, in addition to it, confession of all mortal sins according to number and kind would further be required, which certainly seems a very heavy burden. Therefore, so that pardon may appear easier to obtain through the sacraments of the New Law, contrition need not be presupposed for the sacraments of the dead.

All these arguments are confirmed by the censure of the Sacred Faculty of Paris, which it issued on the first of June and the first of July 1638 against certain propositions of Claude Séguenot, a priest of the Oratory, which he had written in his notes on St. Augustine's book On Holy Virginity. Most especially, he had asserted that attrition was not sufficient to obtain remission of sins in the sacrament of penance, but that contrition made perfect by charity was required; and consequently he had added that sacramental absolution was nothing other than a juridical declaration of sin already remitted. The Sacred Faculty noted these propositions in its censure: “The Faculty condemned what he taught concerning the insufficiency of attrition and the absolute necessity of contrition arising from perfect charity for receiving the sacrament of penance, and what he further added and approved concerning absolution, namely, that it is nothing other than a juridical declaration of sin already remitted; and it judged these propositions to be disturbers of the peace of souls, contrary to the common and entirely safe practice of the Church, subversive of the efficacy of the sacrament, and, in addition, rash and erroneous.”

YOU WILL OBJECT 1. True penance requires that the penitent turn to God with his whole heart in order to obtain pardon, and have a new heart. But attrition alone does not accomplish this. Therefore, etc. The major premise is established both from Deuteronomy 4: “When you seek the Lord, you will find him, if indeed you seek him with your whole heart and with all the anguish of your soul”; and from Ezekiel 18: “Make for yourselves a new heart and a new spirit.” The minor premise is also clear: for one who is merely attrite does not seek God with his whole heart and with all the anguish of his soul; nor does attrition make a new heart and a new spirit, because it does not remove the spirit of the old Adam, namely, the inclination to sin, nor introduce the spirit of the new Adam, namely, charity. Therefore, etc. — I distinguish the minor premise: if attrition is without the sacrament, I grant it; if it is joined to the sacrament, I deny it. For the heart will be made new, and God will be sought profitably and sufficiently, when sanctifying grace is conferred on the person, through which he is renewed and recalled to fellowship, union, and friendship with God. As for the authorities from Scripture, I answer that they are to be understood of the penance of the Old Law, and also of the penance of the New Law that is sufficient to obtain remission of sin outside the sacrament. For in the New Law a person is sufficiently reconciled to God by the power of the sacrament of penance when he grieves for his sins and lays aside his will to sin; this indeed is accomplished through attrition, as was said above.

YOU WILL PRESS: The Council of Trent, sess. XIV, ch. 3, teaches that contrition is the matter of the sacrament of penance and that, by God's institution, it is required for remission of sins. In ch. 4 it says: “At every time this movement of contrition was necessary for obtaining pardon of sins.” And in ch. 6 it says that “one who has no contrition is not truly absolved by the sacrament of penance.” Therefore, in the Council's view, attrition does not suffice to obtain pardon of sins even with the sacrament. — I distinguish the antecedent: contrition is required in the general sense, insofar as it is abstracted from perfect and imperfect contrition, I grant it; perfect contrition is required, I deny it. For there the Council teaches that perfect contrition reconciles a person to God through charity before this sacrament is actually received; imperfect contrition, by itself, does not bring the sinner to justification, but only disposes him to obtain God's grace in the sacrament of penance. For the Council says that the contrition required is the kind it defines at the beginning of ch. 4, when it says that it is “sorrow of the mind and detestation of sin, with the purpose of not sinning thereafter.” There, however, contrition is defined in the generic sense, as abstracting from perfect and imperfect contrition, since that definition also applies to attrition, inasmuch as it is sorrow of the mind and detestation of sin, with the purpose of not sinning thereafter.

YOU WILL PRESS: The same Council, sess. VI, ch. 6, when listing the various dispositions presupposed for justification, asserts that a person is disposed toward righteousness not only through acts of faith, fear, and hope, but also through love, from which hatred of sin arises, through the purpose of a new life, and finally through observing the divine commandments. “They are raised to hope,” the Council says, “trusting that God will be propitious to them for Christ's sake; they begin to love him as the source of all righteousness, and are therefore moved against sins by some hatred and detestation—that is, by the penance which must be practiced before baptism; finally, while they purpose to receive baptism, to begin a new life, and to keep the divine commandments.” Here the Council requires incipient love for justification effected through baptism, as is clear from the words, “they begin to love him as the source of righteousness.” Hence, since no lesser disposition is required for justification through penance than for justification through baptism, the adversaries think it plainly follows from this testimony of Trent that incipient and imperfect charity is necessarily required for justification through penance. — I answer that in this passage the Council is speaking of justification effected outside the sacrament and through the mere vow and desire for baptism; hence it says expressly, “while they purpose to receive baptism,” etc. Certainly in that case we do not deny that love of God is necessary, as is also contrition formed by charity. But it is different with justification effected in the sacrament. For the same Council, sess. VI, ch. 6, speaking of penance in adult sinners as preceding baptism, says: “People are moved against sins by some hatred and detestation—that is, by the penance which must be practiced before baptism.” Yet contrition is not absolutely necessary for practicing this penance before baptism, as we said above from St. Augustine. Or I say that the Council is to be understood as speaking of that initial love which we said above belongs to the virtue of hope. This love is called initial because, for the most part, our justification begins from this love; and, as I said above, we are often led from this love to that perfect love which belongs to the virtue of charity.

YOU WILL PRESS: The initial love which the Council of Trent there requires as a disposition for justification is the love by which a sinner begins to love God “as the source of all righteousness.” But this love belongs to the virtue of charity, not to the virtue of hope. Therefore, etc. — I deny the minor premise: for the love of which the Council speaks there is love of God as the source of our righteousness, or justification, which we expect from him as promised through Christ. For that reason it says that God is to be loved not as righteousness in himself, but “as the source of righteousness,” namely, the righteousness he conveys to us. Thus it signifies that he is to be loved as one who is good to us and bestows good things on us. Nor should the word all trouble us. For by that word the Council of Trent means only that sinners begin to love God as the source of any justification whatsoever and of all supernatural dispositions toward justification, since no one can be justified except through God's grace, as is plainly clear from the preceding ch. of the Council of Trent and from our treatise On Grace.

YOU WILL INSIST: The love required by the Council in the passage just cited is a love that, joined to the sacrament of penance, can effect the sinner's conversion. But no love of God can effect this conversion unless it belongs to the virtue of charity. Therefore the love of which the Council speaks there belongs to the virtue of charity. — I answer by denying the minor premise; for love belonging to the virtue of hope suffices for this, and I assume it is joined to the aforementioned attrition, which we hold can effect this conversion, not by itself alone, but when it is joined to the sacrament of baptism or the sacrament of penance, as the cited Council of Trent teaches quite clearly, sess. XIV, ch. 4, where it expressly teaches: “Imperfect contrition, which is called attrition, and which is commonly conceived either from consideration of the ugliness of sin or from fear of hell and punishments, if it excludes the will to sin, together with hope of pardon, not only does not make a person a hypocrite or a greater sinner, but is also a gift of God and an impulse of the Holy Spirit; and although by itself, without the sacrament of penance, it cannot lead a sinner to justification, it nevertheless disposes him to obtain God's grace in the sacrament.” Note the expression that it “disposes him in the sacrament itself,” and indeed “to obtain grace”; for these words make it readily clear that through this attrition, as distinguished from contrition made perfect by charity, grace can be conferred if attrition is joined to the sacrament of penance.

YOU WILL INSIST AGAIN: The same Council, sess. XIV, ch. 6, speaking of the penitent, says: “He ought not to flatter himself so much on account of his faith that, even if he has no contrition, or the priest lacks the intention to act seriously and truly absolve, he should nevertheless think that on account of his faith alone he has truly been absolved before God.” Therefore perfect contrition is absolutely required for remission of sin, and attrition does not suffice even in the sacrament. — I deny the consequence. For there the Council intends only to refute the innovators of the last century, who taught that a person need not be prepared to obtain remission of sins by any movement of the will or by any sorrow or feeling of penance, but that faith alone—or rather, a sure trust and confidence that remission of sins had been obtained—suffices. Hence, after the words cited, the Council adds: “For faith without penance would not bring about any remission of sins.” But attrition is a kind of penance. Therefore the Council understands contrition there in the generic sense to be entirely necessary: one or the other of its two kinds must absolutely be present, either imperfect contrition, called attrition, or perfect contrition, simply and strictly so called. For outside the sacrament perfect contrition is required; in the sacrament imperfect contrition, called attrition, suffices.

YOU WILL OBJECT 2. St. Augustine, who teaches in many places that the person who merely abstains from sins out of fear of punishment and penalty repents in vain, says, for example, in ep. 144, addressed to Anastasius: “He thinks in vain that he has conquered sin, who does not sin from fear of punishment. For even if the business of evil desire is not carried out outwardly, the evil desire itself is still within; and who is found innocent before God who wishes to do what is forbidden if what he fears were removed? Thus the one who wishes to do what is not permitted, but does not do it only because it cannot be done with impunity, is guilty in his very will. For, as far as he himself is concerned, he would rather there were no righteousness forbidding and punishing sins. And surely, if he would rather there were no righteousness, who would doubt that he would take it away if he could? But how is someone just if he is such an enemy of righteousness that, were he given the power, he would abolish it when it commands, so as not to endure it when it threatens or judges? Therefore he who does not sin from fear of punishment is an enemy of righteousness.” Similarly, in bk. On Nature and Grace, ch. 57, he says: “He is under the law who feels that he abstains from the act of sin out of fear of the punishment threatened by the law, not from love of righteousness; for he is not yet free, nor is he free from the will to sin: for in that very will he is guilty.” Further, in bk. I of Against Two Letters of the Pelagians, ch. 9, he says: “He sins inwardly in his very will who does not sin willingly, but out of fear.” And in bk. I, ch. 4: “He who does the commandments from fear of punishment undoubtedly does them unwillingly, and thus does not do them in his mind; and thus in his very will he is inwardly guilty, where he himself, who receives him, looks.” Finally, St. Augustine, in tract. 9 on the Letter of John, as we mentioned above, and also in Psalm 127, says that those who cease from sins out of fear of punishment or hell are like the adulterous woman who refrains from adultery only out of fear of her husband, lest she be discovered by him and severely punished, while always retaining the intention to commit adultery. Therefore, in St. Augustine's view, attrition insofar as it is fear arising from fear of hell does not remove the will to sin, and consequently is not sufficient with the sacrament to obtain remission of sins. — I distinguish the consequence: attrition arising from fear of hell, which moves someone merely to avoid sins because of fear of temporal evils alone and love of earthly goods, does not remove the will to sin, I grant; attrition conceived from fear of hell, by which a person fears being deprived of God and on account of this fear abstains from sin, I deny. For this fear of hell is ordered to God as the ultimate end, and as such it removes the will to sin, because it is ordered to an end contrary to the end of sin. For the one who fears in this way does not place his ultimate end in avoiding punishment itself, but in the deprivation and loss of God. Since God cannot be possessed by a sinner, one who abstains from sin out of this fear proposes to himself an ultimate end contrary to that of sin. But when the sinner regards avoidance of punishment in this way, he does not retain the will to sin. — Hence servile fear in one who ceases from sin through fear of punishment can be of two kinds. One is when the entire reason, both final and moving or motivating, for restraining oneself from sins is flight from punishment: that is, when a person is so disposed that he avoids evil solely because of the punishment intended for that evil of sin, and places his ultimate end in avoiding punishment or in the good contrary to that punishment. Many call this fear servilely serving, because it is characteristic of servants and slaves who abstain from what is forbidden out of no love for their master, but only from fear of punishment, so that they always have an inclination to do what is forbidden unless they would have to undergo punishment. Such fear always leaves in the will some formal or virtual effect of sinning. The other kind of servile fear is when the one who fears does not establish his ultimate end in avoiding such punishment, but freely tends toward an honorable good. Such is the fear of attrition: although it is directed immediately toward avoiding the punishment one fears, nevertheless mediately it tends toward a further end, namely, eternal beatitude and God as the supreme good. One who fears in this way does not wish to be deprived of God, but to enjoy him; consequently, one moved by this fear does not retain the will to sin. From these points one may infer that whenever St. Augustine says that those who cease from sin through fear remain guilty in their inclination and will, he is speaking of the fear that terrifies those who rest content in avoiding punishment and serve servilely and obey the divine commandments; this fear is indeed evil, because through it people rest in love of self as their ultimate end. He is not speaking of the fear that goes beyond avoidance of punishment and tends toward possession of God as the supreme good, whose loss one fears; such is the fear of attrition.

YOU WILL PRESS: St. Augustine also teaches in many places that no one can be justified without love of God. Thus in serm. 7, On Time: “No one does true penance unless there is hatred of sin and love of God”; and in bk. XXI of The City of God, ch. 27: “If they do not cease from sin by having charity, which does not act perversely, it profits them nothing.” Hence the author of On True and False Penance says: without love, no one ever found grace or obtained pardon. This is also confirmed by Scripture. For St. Paul expressly says in 1 Corinthians 13: “Without charity I am nothing; if I have not charity, it profits me nothing.” And in 1 John 3: “He who does not love remains in death.” Therefore, even with the sacrament, attrition conceived from fear of hell does not suffice for justification; rather, an affection and movement of charity are required. — I distinguish the antecedent: love of God, whether actual or habitual, accompanying or subsequent, is required, I grant; actual love alone, preceding justification, I deny. It is indeed true that a sinner cannot be justified without love of God and habitual charity, which is not distinct from sanctifying grace. But it is not absolutely required that actual and formal love of God precede justification itself when the sinner obtains it through the sacrament. Rather, habitual love of God, or charity, suffices; it is the form of this justification, through which the sinner becomes God's friend and acceptable to him. Thus the Doctor resolves these authorities in d. 14, q. 2, n. 20, where he says: “The statement that no one obtains pardon without the love of God may be understood there of pardon not merely as penance, but as the end of penance. And so we understand it when we say that pardon is acquired through penance: that pardon is when someone is accepted into divine friendship through grace.” Or I say that St. Augustine is speaking of love of God arising not from the affection of charity, but from the affection of hope. The fear of hell leads to this love of God. For no one truly attrite fears hell except insofar as it deprives one of the eternal possession of God; consequently, when a person grieves for sins because of fear of hell, that grief tends toward love of God. For he would not fear hell unless it deprived him of possession of God, nor would he grieve over such deprivation unless he loved God; for the grief of losing is as great as the love of possessing. Therefore true attrition always has joined to it love of God arising from the affection of hope, if not explicitly and formally, at least virtually and implicitly.

YOU WILL SAY 3: Since the Gospel Law is far superior to the Old Law, it also requires a more excellent remedy for obtaining remission of sin; for where the law is more perfect, the means for obtaining grace ought to be more excellent. But contrition strictly so called, which was the necessary means for obtaining grace in the Old Law, is a more excellent means than attrition, or imperfect contrition. Therefore this too is necessary in the New Law. — I distinguish the minor premise: perfect contrition is more excellent than attrition if considered according to its entity, I grant; if considered in its order and relation to the end and effect, and in the way it procures the end and effect in the sacrament of penance, I deny. For although the nature and power of contrition are more excellent and perfect than attrition when considered in itself—hence outside the sacrament contrition can lead to justification, which attrition cannot—nevertheless attrition joined to the sacrament can dispose or lead a person to righteousness and grace ultimately just as much as contrition itself can; that is, it can lead to the very grace which the sacrament of penance produces in penitents by the work performed. For this grace requires only that the obstacle of an evil will turned toward a creature be removed; attrition joined to the sacrament can accomplish this. Hence it is said to be equivalent to the ultimate disposition, although contrition strictly so called disposes more perfectly to the grace produced in the sacrament by the work of the one acting, because a person's merit is greater than attrition.

YOU WILL SAY 4: Most of the more eminent theologians, and especially the Seraphic Doctor and the Subtle Doctor, openly teach that attrition does not suffice, together with the sacrament, for the remission of sin, because it does not exclude the will to sin. For first, the Seraphic Doctor, in In III Sent., d. 34, p. 2, a. 1, says: It must be said that, without doubt, servile fear is a gift of the Holy Spirit. The reason is that, just as it is a gift of God to know, or to believe, future punishments, because there is in this a certain illumination and direction of the heart, so it is a gift of God to flee and fear those eternal punishments, because from such a gift come a certain softening of the heart, a restraint of the flow of concupiscence, and in this a certain rectification. And because of that fear a person ceases from committing sins, although he does not cease altogether from the will to sin. For he adds: The will to sin remains in habit and root, because the deformity is present in the one who fears. Likewise, the Subtle Doctor, in In IV Sent., d. 20, q. un., where he treats of penance that takes place only at life’s end and shows it to be doubtful, proves this by various arguments, but especially by the authority of St. Augustine, who says: One must not only fear the judge, but love him; for he seeks freedom of choice, so that one may grieve over the sins committed, not act under compulsion: charity, not fear. Therefore, according to their opinion, sorrow conceived from fear of hell does not suffice for the remission of sin. — I deny the antecedent, and concerning the Seraphic Doctor I say that by “the will to sin,” which he says remains in habit and root, he understands nothing other than habitual sin, that is, the stain that remains after a past actual sin and is not expelled by servile fear unless the sacrament is added; consequently, he says that it is removed by the sacrament rather than by that fear. For in q. 2 he says: “When I say ‘servile fear,’ I mean two things: namely, the very habit by which the soul is disposed to fear God as one who punishes those who transgress; and, further, the name ‘servitude’ conveys the deformity of sin. This deformity is joined to that habit in the same person, on account of which that person is called a slave of sin and the fear existing in him is called servile fear. In the same way, when I say that someone fears servilely, I mean two things: namely, both the act proceeding from that habit and the servitude or deformity of the will that accompanies it.

But it must be observed that this can be the case in two ways: either that deformity of the will accompanies the fear with respect to the habit; in this way someone may fear servilely and yet not sin by that movement. For if, from thinking of punishments, someone abhors offending God, this can occur without actual sin. But if the deformity accompanies the fear in the act, then, although fearing is not evil in itself, it is corrupted by reason of the deformity actually attached to it: as when someone fears punishments and, in fearing, grieves that such punishments are inflicted for guilt, yet in act also desires to sin if that punishment were absent. In this way, servile fear is sin and evil. But this is not always the case when someone is moved by servile fear; otherwise, by using that gift a person would distance himself from grace rather than be prepared for it, which is plainly false. So says the Seraphic Doctor, who therefore concludes: “And so it must be granted that the use of servile fear can be good, although it is not good with the goodness of merit, but rather with the goodness of preparing or directing one toward merit, which coexists with sin. Hence the arguments that show this must also be granted.” Accordingly, in answer to the first objection, he says that what is first objected on the other side—that in servile fear the will to sin lives, and that one grieves over what the law forbids—is to be understood as follows: Augustine’s statement does not mean that whenever someone fears, he always grieves in act, or likewise that the will to sin is always in act; rather, he says this because it remains in habit and root. Although the will has been deformed by sin and evil love reigns in it, it can nevertheless sometimes be moved to some good works in their general character, or by reason of a circumstance, through some freely given grace, without committing guilt, etc. Therefore, the Seraphic Doctor holds that sorrow for sin on account of fear of hell, or attrition, can exclude every actual affection and will to sin, although in itself it does not suffice to remove habitual sin—that is, the deformity and stain that remain in the sinner after the sinful act has passed—unless that attrition is joined to the sacrament of penance. — I answer the Subtle Doctor that first it can be said that he is treating chiefly of penance that suffices for salvation outside the sacrament, for which, without doubt, the love of God, or perfect contrition of charity, is required. Second, it can be said that, if the subject is penance, that is, sorrow of penance joined to the sacrament of penance, the words one must not only fear the judge, but love him signify not so much an affection of charity as one of hope, as can be gathered from what follows: Let the penitent, then, not fear punishment, but be anxious for glory. To be anxious for glory is nothing other than to fear the loss of the blessedness of the eternal inheritance, which is lost through sin and restored through penance. Moreover, this anxiety of the soul cannot arise from any other virtue than the virtue of hope; consequently, neither St. Augustine nor the Subtle Doctor understands by love anything other than an affection of hope. Attrition has this affection, since no one can fear hell through attrition without also having a voluntary displeasure at having sinned, because by sinning he lost his right to the inheritance promised to him. Such displeasure is directed toward God, at least mediately, since God is the objective beatitude that the penitent hopes to recover. That the Doctor is speaking of no other sorrow than attrition, when a penitent receives the sacrament of penance at life’s end, is clear from what he adds at n. 7, where from the foregoing he concludes: A sick person already brought to this point should be urged to labor, according to his ability, toward ordered penance: that is, notwithstanding his sorrow or fear, to use reason as far as he can, to strive to have voluntary displeasure for the proper end, namely, on account of God, and to resist the evil inclination of habit and present pleasures; and to labor to feel as much displeasure as he can, even if it is brief. And, lest he be cast into despair, God’s mercy must be raised up before him by proposing the example of that thief whose penance was late, but whose pardon was not late. By these words the Doctor would undoubtedly be setting out a true, though diminished and imperfect, account and teaching, unless he is to be understood as wishing that love of friendship, or perfect charity, is required for justification outside the sacrament, whereas with the sacrament love of desire, or a less perfect love, suffices. He proves that it is difficult for a sinner at life’s end to have such charity, or rather hope, because, as he said just before, He who until then was unrepentant does not seem then to draw a new displeasure from himself except through fear of the punishment at hand; for it is presumed, etc. And he rightly said “it is presumed,” because the contrary can occur. Nevertheless, it is greatly to be feared that such a sinner still retains an inward satisfaction in his past sins, as well as a conditional affection for sinning if the danger of death were not imminent, etc.

YOU WILL PRESS: For penance to be salutary, it must be voluntary without qualification. But, according to the Doctor in the same place, penance performed at life’s end from fear of hell alone is not voluntary without qualification. Therefore, etc. The major premise is established. The Doctor explains the minor premise as follows at n. 5: For displeasure to be effective and ordered, it must be duly qualified by its circumstances, and especially by the circumstance of its end and of its principal active source, so that it is voluntary on account of God. But it is difficult then to have an act qualified by these circumstances, because he who until then was unrepentant does not seem then to draw a new displeasure from himself except through fear of the punishment at hand. For it is presumed that if he were removed from the punishment, as before, he would not draw that displeasure from himself, just as he did not before. Moreover, something simply involuntary seems to be the cause of this displeasure, for the expectation of death seems to cause this displeasure, while that expectation is involuntary. And what is done only on the supposition of something involuntary is not voluntary without qualification, just as someone does not cast his goods into the sea entirely voluntarily if he does so only on the supposition of some danger that he does not wish to face. At least, what is done only in this way through something involuntary is not very pleasing to another, nor does it seem to have been done very much out of love for him. So says the Doctor. By this he signifies that penance conceived from fear of death is not voluntary or pleasing to God. Therefore penance conceived on account of fear of hell will be voluntary to a much lesser degree, because fear of hell is far greater than fear of death: hell brings a greater harm than natural death, and consequently inspires greater fear, further diminishing the element of voluntariness in someone who regrets having sinned for such a reason. — I answer that “involuntary” is said in three ways: first, of that which has nothing at all of the voluntary; second, of that which has more of the voluntary than of the involuntary; third, of that which is done independently of every circumstance that would impede the act. What is done from fear, even if it is not voluntary without qualification in the first sense, is nevertheless voluntary without qualification in the second sense. The Doctor, moreover, must be understood as speaking of the voluntary in the first sense, as can be gathered from the example he gives and repeats of the person who throws goods into the sea. For that throwing is voluntary without qualification, since it proceeds from an effective will to throw such goods, with sufficient knowledge of the circumstances, although a certain element of the involuntary is mixed into it, and it occurs against the ineffective inclination of that will, which would not want such danger to exist, so that the goods might remain safe and intact. Hence the throwing is voluntary without qualification on the part of the agent, although it is not voluntary without qualification on the part of the object, but is done only because of the circumstance of imminent danger. Therefore displeasure at sin out of fear of hell must also be called voluntary without qualification in this second sense; nevertheless, it is involuntary in a qualified sense, not because of a simple satisfaction in sins or an affection for sinning if the danger of hell were absent—for this conditional will would be sinful, because its object is evil. Rather, it is called involuntary in a qualified sense because of the rejection of that danger, which the penitent certainly would not want to be present. But simply and absolutely he is displeased by his sins, not only external but also internal; otherwise the sinner could not escape the imminent danger of hell. Hence there is a great difference between throwing goods into the sea and attrition. For someone to escape the imminent danger of shipwreck, it suffices to throw the goods overboard; but to escape hell, it is absolutely necessary to detest all sins, not only external ones but also internal ones. Hence someone can escape the danger of shipwreck even while having this conditional will not to throw the goods overboard unless danger presses. But a person with attrition cannot have this conditional affection of not detesting sins unless hell were imminent, because he cannot escape the danger of hell unless he excludes every affection for sin altogether. Nor is it an objection that in the same place the Doctor adds that such detestation, which has something involuntary mixed into it, is not very pleasing and acceptable to God. For I grant that attrition in itself, and apart from the sacrament, is not very acceptable to God and cannot restore the sinner to God’s grace. That this is the Doctor’s opinion is clear from what he teaches in d. 14, q. 4, n. 7, where, speaking of the remission of a sin committed after baptism through the sacrament and without the sacrament, he says that when someone is justified through the sacrament, he receives its effect, namely penitential grace: Not indeed by merit, he says, because the interior disposition was not sufficient by way of merit, but by virtue of God’s agreement to assist his sacrament toward the effect for which he instituted the sacrament. Otherwise it would not be clear how the sacrament of penance could be a second plank, if one could never recover through it, precisely as a sacrament, the second grace that had been lost, but only through attrition as a prior disposition and through contrition as a completing disposition. Therefore, in the Doctor’s view, attrition can suffice together with the sacrament for justification, even if in itself it is little acceptable and pleasing to God.

Corollaries. — From these points it follows first that, for attrition to suffice together with the sacrament for justification, it must be supernatural. For the Council of Trent defines it in this way, sess. XIV, ch. 4, where it says: Attrition not only does not make a person a hypocrite or a greater sinner, but is also a gift of God and an impulse of the Holy Spirit. Hence, in sess. VI, can. 3, it defines: If anyone says that a person can believe, hope, or repent, as is required in order that the grace of justification be conferred on him, without the prevenient inspiration of the Holy Spirit and his help, let him be anathema. The sacred oracles of Scripture also bear witness to this, since God attributes man’s penance to himself. Thus, in Ezekiel 36: I will take from you your heart of stone and give you a heart of flesh. And in Lamentations 5: Turn us, O Lord, to yourself, and we shall be turned. Hence in Luke 22: The Lord turned and looked upon Peter.... and Peter went out and wept bitterly. St. Ambrose interprets these words as follows: “Those upon whom Jesus looks weep for their offense. Peter denied Christ and did not weep, because the Lord had not looked upon him; he denied him a second time and did not weep, because the Lord had not yet looked upon him; he denied him a third time, Jesus looked upon him, and he wept most bitterly.” Accordingly, the Second Council of Orange, can. 4, decrees that through the infusion and operation of the Holy Spirit it comes about in us not only that we are cleansed from sin, but also that we will to be cleansed. But the will to be cleansed from sin is attrition or contrition. Therefore it holds that attrition cannot be salutary unless it is conceived with God’s supernatural help.

YOU WILL SAY 1: Attrition conceived by the powers of nature, such as fear of the punishments of hell that we believe on divine faith, is supernatural, since it is conceived from a supernatural motive. But supernatural attrition suffices for the remission of sin. Therefore, etc. — I distinguish the major premise: supernatural objectively only, and materially, as is the faith by which heretics believe the divine Trinity and the Incarnation of the Word, I grant; formally, by reason of its formal object, and efficiently, through the influx of the cause producing attrition, of the kind required for the grace that remits sin, I deny.

YOU WILL SAY 2: Absolute detestation of sins, not merely hypothetical and ineffective detestation, suffices for the remission of sin. But attrition conceived by the powers of nature can be an effective and absolute detestation of sins. Therefore, etc. — I distinguish the major premise: if it comes from God’s grace, I grant; from nature, I deny. For according to the Second Council of Orange, can. 7: Whoever affirms that by the rigor of nature a person can choose anything pertaining to salvation without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit is deceived by a heretical spirit, not understanding the voice of God in the Gospel, who says: “Without me you can do nothing.”

YOU WILL SAY 3: The Subtle Doctor, in In IV Sent., d. 14, q. 2, n. 14, expressly teaches that sorrow for sins conceived by the powers of nature suffices to obtain remission of sin. Therefore, he does not hold that attrition must necessarily be supernatural. The antecedent is evident: for, treating of sorrow that precedes the remission of sin as a necessary disposition, he says: “For understanding this, it must be known that a sinner living in sins can, in the way stated in the preceding question, a. 1, concerning sin’s remaining after the act, by natural powers with the common influx consider the sin committed as an offense against God, as against the divine law, as turning one away from God, as preventing one from obtaining reward, and as bringing punishment upon one, and under many such aspects. The will can detest that sin, thus considered, under one or several of those aspects, and that movement can continue and intensify before the infusion of grace. This detestation can also be fully qualified by the morally required circumstances. For it is not plausible that, because of this sin that remains, every act concerning the sin committed must be deficient in some moral circumstance. This movement is called attrition, and it is a disposition, or a merit of congruity, toward the deletion of mortal sin, which follows at the last instant of some period during which this attrition has lasted.” So says the Doctor. From this it is clear that he wishes the will, by its own powers and without any special help of God, to be able to elicit an act of penance that is ultimately dispositive for grace. — I deny the antecedent, as well as the two consequences. Concerning the Doctor’s authority, I say that by “by natural powers with the common influx” he does not mean an act elicited by the powers of nature themselves and without any supernatural help, but an unformed act—that is, one not informed by charity and habitual grace. For there the Doctor is asking whether a prior unformed disposition suffices for the remission of sins. He says at n. 13: “Concerning the second main point, namely, whether repentance as an act of virtue is required for the deletion of sin, I say: first, not as the act of one determinate virtue; second, not as the act of just any generated virtue, whichever one; and third, if it is required as an act simply and perfectly qualified by its circumstances, is it required as formed, or does an unformed act suffice?” To this last question he answers: “Concerning the third point, I say that the requirement of some human act for the deletion of sin can be understood in two ways: either as a prior disposition or as a concomitant one. In the first way, an unformed act suffices; indeed it is always unformed, because a disposition prior to the deletion of sin is always without grace and charity, and only through the inherence and inclination of charity toward the act is the act called formed. In the second way, I say that a formed act is required, for at the instant in which sin is deleted, charity is present; and consequently, if an act is required as concomitant, it is required as formed.” This is the Doctor’s statement. From this it is clear that when he says at the following n. 14 that the intellect can consider sin as an offense against God by natural powers with the common influx, and that the will can detest sin considered in this way, by “by natural powers” he excludes only habitual grace, not prevenient and concomitant actual grace, which elsewhere he asserts to be necessary for true penance and justification—especially in In I Sent., d. 44, n. 1, where he says that every sinner can be saved: Because, he says, God can anticipate him with his grace, etc. And in d. 20, q. un., he says that it is the work of God to inspire a person with fruitful penance. And in d. 22, a. 2, he says that God gives grace sooner for rising again on account of extinguished merits, etc. Indeed, in this very d. 14, q. 2, n. 20, the Doctor makes this same point quite plainly. For, answering the authorities he had himself raised—that charity is necessary for the remission of sin—he says: All these authorities have one answer, because penance, whether an act or a virtue (that is, a habit), is not true with respect to attaining the end (extrinsic) of penance without charity; and this is what the second authority says concerning fruitful penance. For penance, taken absolutely, can indeed arise from the natural powers of a person, but it is not fruitful—that is, it does not bear fruit—until it is fruitful at the last instant. The Doctor would contradict himself if at n. 14 he asserted that fruitful penance can arise from natural powers. Therefore it is not plausible that by “by natural powers” he excludes the help of actual or concomitant grace; he means only that, for true attrition, insofar as it is the necessary disposition together with the sacrament of penance for receiving justification, it is not required that the act proceed from habitual sanctifying grace.

COLLECT SECOND: Attrition, when the power of the sacrament is added, can become contrition equivalently, since it obtains the same effect that contrition would have outside the sacrament. In this sense the Doctor, d. 4³, q. 2, n. 15, teaches that attrition can become contrition without a change, when grace comes, for he says: “Although the same movement against sin remains in its natural and moral being, which was previously attrition, at that instant it becomes contrition, because at that instant it is concomitant with grace, and thus is a formed act, since it has charity with it, which is the form of the act, as we are speaking here. Nevertheless, one must distinguish the aspects of nature between the act as such in its natural and moral being, charity, and the act as formed. For in the first aspect of nature there is an act of this kind; in the second, charity; and in the third, an act formed by charity, which now inclines and inheres. Thus attrition becomes contrition without any real change in the act itself.” That is, an unformed act becomes a formed act. For the Doctor does not mean that attrition, which is detestation of sin from the motive of hope, can become contrition, or detestation of sin from the motive of charity. Hence it is easy to understand what the same Doctor intends in In IV Sent., d. 14, q. 4, n. 9, when he says: “I grant that before a worthy reception of penance, one must be raised up either simply, in which case sin is not deleted through the sacrament of penance, but the grace that was present is increased; or raised up in a qualified way, namely, so as to have some displeasure for sins and a purpose of avoiding them thereafter, and to be willing to receive the sacrament of penance, in which attrition becomes contrition. That is, in which, or through which, that imperfect or partial displeasure confers sanctifying grace, which perfect contrition of charity would have conferred without the sacrament. Attrition, then, becomes contrition in the sacrament equivalently, or with respect to its effect, not with respect to its entity.”

COLLECT THIRD: Attrition must extend to absolutely all mortal sins, because one mortal sin cannot be remitted without another. Consequently, since attrition is necessary for the remission of mortal sin, it is also necessary that the attrition required for this sacrament be directed toward all mortal sins, without exception; and that the penitent, who is disposing himself in this sacrament so as to obtain pardon, detest all mortal sins at least in a general and virtual way, and reject every affection for them.

Whether attrition must also be directed toward all venial sins is not agreed among theologians: many affirm this, while the others deny it. The negative opinion nevertheless seems more probable to me, both because a penitent need not be sorry for those sins that he is not required to confess; but to obtain pardon in the sacrament of penance it is not necessary to confess venial sins, as the Council of Trent teaches, sess. XIV, ch. 5. After saying that all mortal sins that come to mind must necessarily be confessed, it adds: Not venial sins, by which we are not excluded from the grace of God and into which we fall more frequently, although it is right and useful to mention them in confession, without any presumption, as the practice of devout people shows. Yet they can be omitted without guilt and expiated by many other remedies. And secondly, because one venial sin can be remitted without another, and consequently it is not necessary for someone to form attrition for each one; rather, it suffices to grieve over some of them, so that this sorrow is the necessary matter for the celebration of this sacrament.

YOU WILL SAY 1: Someone who is not sorry for all the venial sins he has confessed is proposing as matter for the sacrament of penance something that truly cannot be its matter. Therefore, far from being able to obtain pardon, he instead commits a new sin. The antecedent is evident: for that is the matter of the sacrament of penance which must be loosed by priestly absolution, just as that is the matter of the sacrament of the Eucharist which must be consecrated by the words of consecration. Therefore, just as someone would sin gravely by presenting a paper host together with wheat hosts to be consecrated, so too someone would sin gravely by mentioning in confession some venial sins for which he is not sorry, because for want of sorrow he would present as matter something that truly cannot be its matter. — I deny the antecedent: for someone who discloses in confession some venial sins for which he is not sorry does not propose them as matter for the sacrament of penance. He merely sets out such venial sins along with those for which he is sorry, either to have greater humility and shame as a result, or to give his confessor a clearer knowledge of his conscience, just as he is accustomed to disclose vicious habits, occasions of sinning, and temptations that arise. Hence, in proving the antecedent I deny the parity. The reason for the difference is that a paper host cannot be presented at Mass together with wheat hosts except to be consecrated and as matter capable of transubstantiation, which it is not. But it is not necessary to propose as matter for the sacrament all the venial sins that we disclose in confession. We are not required to confess them; rather, we mention them for our own humility and shame and to disclose more fully to the priest knowledge of our condition, in order to receive counsel. In the same way, we praiseworthily disclose in confession to the priest our natural inclinations, occasions, temptations, and the like, which are not sins.

YOU WILL SAY 2: Someone who is not contrite for all the venial sins he discloses in confession makes the form of absolution false and the sacrament partly null and false, insofar as he deprives it of suitable matter for absolution and its proper effect. Therefore, he sins most gravely. — I deny the antecedent: for the meaning of this form, I absolve you from your sins, is “from those that you confessed with sorrow and a due purpose.” Therefore the sacrament is not partly null, because nothing necessary for its validity and fruit is lacking if the penitent has confessed one venial sin, even though it does not have as great an effect as it could have if he were sorry for each one. Hence the penitent should be advised, when he makes an examination of conscience in preparation for confession and recalls each sin he has committed, to elicit sorrow and detestation upon recalling each one as well, so that he may be disposed more effectively and better to receive the effect of the sacrament.

COLLECT FOURTH: It is most salutary for the sorrow that ordinarily comes through attrition to precede confession. For someone who is contrite for his sins declares them far more clearly and carefully, and also with greater devotion of soul and preparation for grace and sacramental absolution. Nevertheless, it is not absolutely necessary for that movement and affection of sorrow to precede confession, as is clear from the common practice of the faithful, who consider that they have duly received sacramental absolution, provided that they have attrition before receiving it. Hence, after hearing the penitents’ sins, confessors exhort them to be sorry for them, with a purpose not to sin again in the future. But this would be useless, and this practice would tend to the penitent’s own harm and to irreverence toward the sacrament, if this sorrow had necessarily to precede the confession being made. Therefore, etc.

Nevertheless, it is necessary that the sorrow of attrition itself come before sacramental absolution. For sacramental absolution is given in the form of a judicial sentence, and such a sentence necessarily presupposes the accused person’s accusation. But because that accusation is voluntary, it must be accompanied—or at least followed—by sorrow on the penitent’s part, as a prior disposition. Therefore the priest cannot absolve the penitent unless the penitent has first declared his sins by confession and has grieved over those sins. This is especially so because the sentence reconciles the sinner with God; consequently, the penitent must be ready and disposed to return to God’s grace. But that return cannot take place unless the sinner is engaged with, and detests, those very things that had been the cause of his turning away from God. This detestation occurs by way of contrition or attrition. Therefore that movement and affection of sorrow must necessarily come before sacramental absolution. From this it follows that whenever anyone confesses sins without such sorrow, absolution is given invalidly, and that person must confess those sins again.

COLLECT FINALLY: Attrition can be defined as follows: Attrition is sorrow and detestation of the soul for sins committed, with a purpose not to sin thereafter, and with hope for and a petition for pardon, conceived from a supernatural motive, either from fear of hell or from the ugliness of sin, together with some love of God belonging to the virtue of hope. All the parts of this definition, or description, are established by what has been said. First, it says sorrow and detestation of the soul for sins committed, with a purpose not to sin thereafter. In these features attrition agrees with perfect contrition, which likewise has the same characteristics. It adds with hope for and a petition for pardon: for someone who is duly contrite hopes to obtain pardon from God and entreats him for it. It then says conceived from a supernatural motive: for someone who grieved over sins for a purely natural motive would not have a sufficient disposition to obtain pardon and sanctifying grace. The remaining words are added to distinguish attrition itself from perfect contrition, which likewise has hope of obtaining pardon and is conceived from a supernatural motive, but solely from the affection of charity and the love of God for his own sake.