Scotus Academicus, Tomus decimus: De Baptismo, De Poenitentia, De Extrema Unctione

NOTE 1. Theologians agree that contrition must detest absolutely all sins, so that if a penitent took pleasure in any sin, his sorrow and contrition would be wholly useless; for, as St. James says, “Whoever sins in one thing has become guilty of all.” Since contrition is the final disposition for sanctifying grace, which cannot be obtained without man’s perfect conversion to God and turning away from everything that removes him from God, it is therefore necessary that, just as by every mortal sin a man turns away from God, so by contrition he turn his mind away from all sins and consequently detest them. Sacred Scripture teaches the same plainly in various places, especially in Ezekiel, ch. 18, v. 21: “If the wicked,” he says, “do penance for all his sins that he has committed, and keep all my precepts … he shall live, and shall not die.” And v. 28: “For considering and turning himself away from all his iniquities which he has committed, he shall live, and shall not die.” Likewise, v. 30: “Be converted, and do penance for all your iniquities, and iniquity shall not be your ruin.” Hence Pope Innocent II, in the Roman Council, ch. 22, cited in On Penance, dist. 5, ch. 8, says: “We admonish our brother bishops and priests not to allow the souls of the laity to be deceived by false penances and dragged to hell.” It is clear that penance is false when, though many sins are set aside, penance is done for only one, or when it is done for one in such a way that the sinner does not depart from another. Likewise St. Augustine, or whoever is the author of On True and False Penance, ch. 9, found in On Penance, dist. 3, ch. 42: “There are many who regret having sinned, but not wholly, reserving for themselves certain things in which they take pleasure; they do not perceive that the Lord delivered the deaf and mute man from the demon at the same time, thereby teaching us that we are never healed except of all our sins. If he had wished sins to be reserved in part, the man with seven demons could have progressed with one remaining after six were expelled. But he expelled all seven, to teach that all crimes must be cast out together. When he drove out the legion from another man, he left none of them to possess the man who had been freed, showing that even if there are a thousand sins, one must repent of them all.” Reason also supports this: first, when someone detests a sin out of love for God above all—that is, insofar as it is an offense against divine goodness, which he loves above all—it is impossible that an offense of the same kind should not displease him for the same reason wherever it is found, whether formally and explicitly, if the offense is expressly presented, or implicitly and virtually, if it does not specifically come to mind; second, contrition turns toward sins to be detested in the same way as faith toward objects to be believed. But faith cannot turn toward one object while denying another; therefore neither can contrition detest one sin if the penitent takes pleasure in others, since the motive is altogether the same in all. Just as you cannot keep the faith if you deny one article, neither can you have perfect contrition if you take pleasure in any sin. The difficulty, however, is how this detestation must be made: whether perfect contrition requires a person to grieve specifically for each sin one by one, or whether it suffices to detest them all generally.

NOTE 2. The Doctors also agree that if the occasion is pressing, there is no time or opportunity to recall each mortal sin, and clear danger of death is imminent, it suffices for perfect contrition to detest all sins together, conceived confusedly. Sorrow for sins in a confused manner is nothing other than the sorrow a sinner feels because he knows that he has offended God, without any prior examination of conscience; he forms this or a similar act: “I regret having offended God, on account of his supreme goodness and glory, however I may have done so, and I firmly purpose not to sin again and to confess these sins if the opportunity arises.” That this sorrow suffices in such distress is evident; otherwise that man would have no sufficient means of salvation, and it would be false that God so often insists in the divine Scriptures that whenever the sinner groans, he shall live. The difficulty is whether, when time and opportunity are available and a priest is present to whom he can confess, a man is bound to recall each sin distinctly to mind, both as to kind and number, and so grieve for them. On this there are two principal opinions among authors. The first is that of the Halensis, pt. 4, q. 17, memb. 3, a. 2, followed by many recent authors, who affirm that perfect contrition requires the penitent to grieve for each sin individually. The second is the opinion of the Subtle Doctor, d. 15, q. 1, n. 9, who maintains that true penance does not require contrition and satisfaction for each sin one by one, but that it suffices to do so generally and confusedly for absolutely all sins.

NOTE 3. Sorrow or detestation for each sin can occur and be done in two ways. First, a distinct sorrow and detestation may correspond to each sin according to its number or kind, so that there are as many acts of detestation as there are committed sins that come to mind. Second, it may mean that, after examination of conscience and recalling all the sins the penitent wishes to recall, he grieves for them and detests them generally in a single act. The question is whether a penitent, either outside the sacrament of penance or in receiving it, must recall each sin individually and detest each by a distinct act, and whether he ought to grieve more for graver sins and less for lighter sins.

First conclusion. — FOR PERFECT CONTRITION IT IS NOT NECESSARY THAT THE SINNER GRIEVE FOR AND DETEST EACH SIN INDIVIDUALLY. This is the Doctor’s view in the place cited above. Having said that it is not necessarily required for perfect satisfaction that it be individual either in kind or number, he adds: “That it need not be distinct by kind is evident, because contrition can correspond to this sin and to that, and it is the same in kind, especially if the objects are the same in kind. That it need not be distinct by number is evident, because one contrition for several things together in general can correspond to several of them; but then, for satisfaction to be total and undiminished, something of it must suffice for one sin and something for another—something, I say, not as actual integral parts, but as degrees of intensity: it must be of such a degree of intensity that a much lesser degree would suffice for one sin, and the additional degree would suffice for another. Several satisfactions, total or partial, can also correspond to one sin. They can be total because there is no sin that cannot be remitted by contrition alone, and then that alone is total satisfaction. The same sin can also be remitted by less intense contrition, with other punishments making up for the imperfection of the contrition. Intense contrition on one side and that same contrition in a less intense form together with other punishments on the other side differ also in kind, although they are equivalent in divine acceptance. In brief, therefore, a satisfaction does not correspond to each sin as its own in such a way that it corresponds to no other, nor does another correspond to that sin; rather, a satisfaction corresponds to each sin as its own for the time being, though another could be its own. I mean ‘its own for the time being’ either as distinct in itself or as something virtually included in the satisfaction.” So the Doctor says, and these words plainly explain our assertion.

It is proved: First, from the Tridentine Catechism, On Penance, n. 29, where it says: “The faithful must be most earnestly exhorted and admonished to strive to apply a particular sorrow of contrition to each mortal crime. For thus Hezekiah describes contrition when he says:” “I will recall to you all my years in the bitterness of my soul.” For to recall all one’s years is to examine sins individually, so that we may grieve for them from the heart. But we also read in Ezekiel: “If the wicked do penance for all his sins, he shall live.” And Augustine says to the same effect: “Let the sinner consider the kind of crime, its place, time, circumstances, and person.” Lest anyone suppose that these words were spoken as though such things were necessary for the remission of sins, the example is then added: “Yet let the faithful not despair on this account of the supreme goodness and clemency of God. For, since he is most desirous of our salvation, he delays no time in granting pardon, but embraces the sinner with paternal love as soon as he has gathered himself together, detested all his sins, and turned to the Lord, intending later, if opportunity allows, to recall each one to mind and detest it. For thus the Prophet bids us hope when he says: ‘The wickedness of the wicked shall not harm him on whatever day he turns from his wickedness.’” Thus far the Catechism.

It is also proved by reason: nothing should be asserted in a matter of the greatest importance concerning human salvation unless it has some foundation in Sacred Scripture, the Councils, or the holy Fathers. But none of these teaches that it is necessary for perfect contrition that a person regularly recall each sin individually and grieve for it. Therefore, and so on.

Furthermore, perfect contrition sufficient for the remission of sins can be made in an instant; but in an instant a person cannot recall each sin and grieve for it. Therefore, such individual contrition for each sin is not necessary. The minor premise is clear. The major is proved: first, true and perfect contrition does not require a long duration of time, as we said in the preceding question; second, the worst sinners can grieve for their sins and obtain pardon and forgiveness in a short time, as is clear from the example of the thief crucified with Christ the Lord. Hence Pope Celestine writes admirably in his Letter 2, To the Bishops of Gaul, ch. 2: “Let him despair of God’s clemency who does not believe that it can suffice, even in a moment, to help a dying man. The thief hanging on the cross at Christ’s right hand would have lost his reward if an hour of penance had not helped him; in his punishment he repented, and by a single confession he merited, with God’s promise, a dwelling in paradise. Therefore the true conversion to God of those at the point of death must be measured by the mind rather than by time, as the Prophet says: ‘When you groan, then you shall be saved.’” It is no objection that he speaks only of a man at the point of death. For if contrition in that case suffices for salvation, even though instantaneous and presupposing neither recollection nor individual detestation of all sins, why should it not likewise suffice whenever a sinner generally detests his sins because he has offended God?

Finally, when a penitent recalls some sin individually and forms perfect contrition for it, either he is reconciled to God before recalling and grieving for the other sins one by one, or he is not. If he is reconciled, then the other sins are forgiven him, for at least in the ordinary course it is impossible for a man to be at once God’s friend and his enemy. If he is not reconciled, the preceding contrition is useless, since it is frustrated of its effect. This cannot be said, especially since contrition is in itself the final disposition for sanctifying grace, through which we become friends of God and partakers of the divine nature. Therefore true and perfect contrition need not be made for each sin individually.

Nor does the Angelic Doctor oppose this assertion. Although in IIa IIae, q. 114, a. 5, and III, q. 87, a. 1, he seems to require for perfect contrition that the penitent recall each sin to mind, at least afterward, because of the obligation to confess them, even if they had already been remitted through contrition, nevertheless he does not deny that contrition formed generally for sins suffices for the true remission of sin. For in q. 28 of De Veritate, a. 5, ad 4, he says: “All sins agree in turning away from God, by reason of which they impede grace. Hence justification does not require that each sin be thought of at the very moment of justification; it suffices that the sinner think that by his guilt he has turned away from God. Individual recollection, however, must precede or at least follow justification.”

Nor does the Seraphic Doctor contradict this assertion. For when treating the same question in d. 16, pt. 2, a. 2, q. 1, he says: “It must be said that repentance for something is twofold: general and particular. It is general when a person grieves generally for every offense against God that he has committed; it is particular when he grieves for this or that one. I say, therefore, that one ought to repent generally for sins committed through ignorance, and say with the Prophet: ‘The sins of my youth and my ignorances,’ etc. One is not bound to repent of them individually, but is bound to do what lies within one’s power to know and recognize the sins. Sins are committed through ignorance of the law, and then, once the law is known, one recognizes that one has sinned, as, for example, someone who committed fornication without knowing it was a sin. Sins are also committed through ignorance of fact when due care was not taken; then they are made known by the Lord’s revelation, and one is bound to pray that the Lord pardon or reveal them.” Thus the Seraphic Doctor—although he speaks only of sins not known, he sufficiently indicates that he does not oppose our assertion.

YOU WILL OBJECT 1. Various passages of Scripture seem to teach that recalling each sin is necessary to obtain pardon. Thus Psalm 76: “I meditated in the night with my heart, and I was exercised, and I swept my spirit.” In Isaiah 38, King Hezekiah, speaking of contrition, says: “I will recall to you all my years in the bitterness of my soul.” In Ezekiel 8¹: “If the wicked do penance for all his sins, he shall give life to his soul; for considering and turning himself away from all his iniquities, he shall live.” But this consideration is nothing other than recalling each sin to mind. Therefore, and so on. —

I answer with the Tridentine Catechism cited above that these and similar sayings of Scripture indicate that it is indeed useful and most salutary to recall each sin to mind, insofar as this concerns remission of the whole punishment due for sins. For the more a sinner grieves for sins because they offend God’s supreme goodness, the more worthy he becomes to have those sins forgiven him not only as to guilt but also as to punishment.

YOU WILL OBJECT 2. Contrition is the movement of man’s conversion to God, opposed to his turning away that took place through sin. But by every mortal sin a man has turned away from God. Therefore, he must also turn back by an individual act of contrition for each sin, and so on. — I answer that if this argument were valid, it would follow that sin could not be remitted unless as many acts of contrition were made as sins had been committed; thus a sinner guilty of many crimes could not repent of them when danger of death was imminent and pressing. Everyone denies this. Therefore, this argument establishes only that, for contrition to be perfect, it must arise from the motive of charity, which is man’s perfect conversion to God; consequently, through contrition the penitent turns sufficiently away from all sins and toward God.

YOU WILL OBJECT 3. Through contrition the penitent performs an act of justice by which he satisfies God for his sins. Therefore there must be as many acts of contrition as there are sins. Furthermore, contrition is medicine for the soul, by which it must be healed of the wounds of sins; therefore a medicine must be applied for each wound of sin. — Denying both consequences: the first, because by a single satisfaction a sinner can punish and avenge in himself all the sins he has committed, just as a defendant guilty of several murders is said to pay an adequate penalty when he is condemned to death to expiate them. To the second consequence I say that curing an illness does not require several medicines when one is entirely sufficient in itself. A single act of contrition suffices to restore the soul’s health and wash away all sins; therefore it is not necessary to apply several acts of contrition.

Second conclusion. — PERFECT CONTRITION MUST DETEST UNEQUAL SINS UNEQUALLY, AND ONE’S OWN SINS MORE THAN ANOTHER’S. This is the common opinion, especially

The reason for the first part is clear: every act must be conformed and proportioned to its proper motive-object. But unequal sins participate unequally in the motive-object of detestation, which is nothing other than an offense against God. Therefore contrition for graver sins must be greater than for lighter ones.

The second part is also evident: one must detest one’s own sins more than another’s, so that a man ought to be more grieved over a mortal, and even venial, sin committed by himself than over a mortal sin committed by someone else. This is evident because the sin that must be avoided more is the one that must be detested more; but one’s own sin, even if only venial, must be avoided more than another’s mortal sin. St. Augustine teaches this plainly in bk. On Lying, ch. 9, where he says: “If it is asked which of the two a man who could not avoid both ought rather to avoid, I shall answer: his own sin rather than another’s, and his own lighter sin rather than another’s graver one.” From this one may conclude that even the least venial sin, such as a lie told to be helpful, must be detested more than another’s greatest mortal sin.

YOU WILL REPLY: Charity more strongly impels us to do what contributes more to God’s glory. But it contributes more to God’s glory that mortal sin be avoided than venial sin, whoever commits it. Therefore charity inclines us more to commit a venial sin than to allow our neighbor to sin mortally. — I distinguish the major premise: Charity impels us more when both things are directly ordered by God and he himself directs them to his glory, I grant; when something contributes to it only indirectly and accidentally, I deny it. God does not intend that I commit a venial sin in order to prevent my neighbor from committing a mortal one: first, because venial sin is not a means in itself ordered to preventing another’s graver sin, and would therefore be adopted in a disorderly way for such an end; second, because God wills me to love my own holiness, however small and slight, more than another’s, however great it may be. Hence I give greater glory to God when I avoid every sin than if I sinned lightly so that my neighbor would not offend God more gravely; third, although another’s sin is apprehended as a greater evil against God, God is nevertheless understood here and now not to will that I sin venially to avoid my neighbor’s grave sin. Since the law of true friendship altogether inclines us not to displease a friend in what he reasonably and prudently wills, it follows that I may not commit a lighter sin lest my neighbor commit a graver one. Finally, as St. Augustine explains lucidly in the same place: “If we open this way for sins, allowing lesser ones so that others may commit greater ones, everything will enter and reign within broad limits—or rather, without any limit, with every boundary torn down and removed, in infinite space. For once it has been settled that a man must sin less so that another may sin more, our thefts will certainly be used to prevent others’ adulteries; and if some impiety is seen, even worse than incest, we shall be said to commit incest too, if it could be done in such a way that others do not commit that impiety … What is this way of thinking but folly, or rather madness? For I must guard against damnation for my own iniquity, not another’s, whether it is committed in me or in others.”

YOU WILL PRESS: It is permissible to follow the examples of the Saints. But at times they wished to admit lesser sins to prevent graver ones in their neighbor, as is clear from Lot’s example. In Genesis 19 he said to the Sodomites: “I have two daughters who have not known a man; I will bring them out to you, and abuse them as you please, provided you do no harm to these men.” Therefore, and so on. — St. Augustine answers in the same place: “That righteous man, in fear of another’s sins—which cannot defile anyone unless he consents—was so disturbed that he did not consider his own sin, by which he wished to subject his daughters to the lusts of wicked men. When we read these things in the Holy Scriptures, we must not believe that because we think they happened, they must also be done, lest we violate the commandments by following examples indiscriminately. Or because David swore that he would kill Nabal, but in a merciful reconsideration did not do so, shall we say that he is to be imitated by our rashly swearing to do what we later see ought not to be done? Rather, fear drove Lot to wish to prostitute his daughters, just as anger stirred the just David to swear rashly.” Yet it will not be so difficult to excuse Lot, a righteous man, from every sin, as St. Augustine testifies above: “Unless someone should perhaps confine himself to such narrow straits in defending this man as to say that it is better to suffer injury than to inflict it; his guests, however, were not going to inflict injury but to suffer it. The righteous man preferred that his daughters suffer injury rather than his guests, by the right he had as their father, and knowing that they would not sin if this happened, since they would suffer the acts of sinners without consenting to them and thus without personal sin. Indeed, they offered themselves to be violated, though women in place of the male guests, so that their non-prevention of another’s lust would not make them consenting in their own will. Their father did not permit this to be done to himself when those men attempted it, nor did he betray his guests, although the evil would have been less if it had been done to one rather than two. But he resisted as much as he could, lest his own consent stain him; even if lustful fury had prevailed by bodily force, it would not have stained him against his consent. His daughters, however, were not sinning, and he too was not sinning, because he did not incite them to sin if they were violated; rather, he made them endure the sins of others, as if he were offering his servants to be beaten by wicked men, so that his guests would not suffer the injury of murder.” Thus far St. Augustine, excusing Lot’s act from sin because it was only the permitting of a lesser sin to prevent a greater one. It should be carefully observed, however, that he did not simply and absolutely urge the Sodomites to violate his daughters, but spoke comparatively: “Abuse them as you please, provided you do no harm to these men.” As if he said: if you wish to do one or the other, do what is lesser rather than what is greater.