Scotus Academicus, Tomus decimus: De Baptismo, De Poenitentia, De Extrema Unctione

It is now clear from what has been said that penance and contrition have the power to remit any sins—not formally, but only dispositively—as we taught in the eighth volume, when treating justification. The Council of Trent also indicates this in sess. XIV, ch. 4, when it says: “The movement of contrition in a man who has fallen after baptism finally prepares him for the remission of sins, if it is joined with confidence in divine mercy and the purpose of performing the other things required for rightly receiving this sacrament.” By these words it plainly teaches that contrition is indeed a disposition for obtaining pardon of sins, but is not the formal remission of sin of this kind: for a form cannot be a disposition toward itself, since some causality obtains between a disposition and a form, and this necessarily presupposes a distinction. Two things remain to be determined here: first, whether contrition, before the actual reception of the sacrament and as soon as it is formed, contributes to obtaining remission of sin; second, what sort of contrition and how intense it must be to produce this effect.

NOTE 1. All theologians agree that when necessity presses and danger of death is imminent, contrition suffices to obtain remission of sin without the sacrament, provided there is a purpose to receive it if a priest could be had. Thus St. Bernard teaches this in Letter 78, concerning the contrition of a catechumen who has no occasion or opportunity to receive baptism. The Council of Trent plainly teaches the same in the place cited above, where it says: “The holy Synod further teaches that, although it sometimes happens that this contrition is perfected by charity and reconciles a man to God before this sacrament is actually received, nevertheless that reconciliation is not to be attributed to contrition itself without the desire for the sacrament, which is included in it.” Yet there are some who, with Estius, In IV Sent., d. 17, § 2, think that it happens neither ordinarily nor frequently, much less always, but rarely, that before the priest’s actual absolution a sinner is absolved before God. Whether or not this opinion is true will be determined in the first conclusion.

NOTE 2. One object can be loved or hated more than another in three ways. First, objectively, when we will and desire greater goods for it than we will for another. Second, intensively, when it is loved with greater effort and ardor than any other, so that the act of love toward it has more degrees of intensity than any other act of love toward another object. Third, estimatively, when it is valued more than another, so that in order to attain or preserve the loved object any other thing would be relinquished, whether meanwhile that loved object is loved more intensely and with greater effort or not. Thus we say that we love God estimatively when we prefer him to anything lovable. Similarly, we are said to hate something estimatively, or in comparison with another thing, when we would rather suffer any other evil than that one. Thus a person is said to hate sin when he would rather endure any other evil than commit sin and mortally offend God. Now intensive love, and likewise intensive sorrow, differ greatly from estimative love and sorrow in this: the former belongs to the subject and faculty that acts with greater or lesser effort, whereas the latter belongs to the object, which is more valuable within its own order of lovableness or hatefulness.

NOTE 3. The Seraphic Doctor, In IV Sent., d. 26, pt. 1, a. 2, q. 1, says that one intensity of love is sensitive, another intellectual. The former accompanies an act of the sensitive appetite; the latter an act of the will insofar as it is will. The former resembles the love with which a mother loves her child with tenderness of heart; the latter the love of a father who loves that same child with constancy and firmness of mind, since he exposes himself to danger for the child’s enrichment or preservation. Furthermore, in the will there is one intensity of love according to the lower part, arising from the soul insofar as it is joined to the body; another according to the higher part, which is governed by the direction of faith and grace and consists in valuing one object willed for its own sake more than another. It is certain that everyone is bound to love God more than father or mother with rational, or intellectual, love and according to the higher part, at least estimatively, more than any created object. It is equally certain that we are not bound to love God more, or more intensely in tenderness according to the lower part of the will. For even the holiest men experience greater tenderness of heart toward their children than toward God, and feel more sensitive sorrow at their children’s death than at losing God through sin, although they would rather that everything else cease to exist and that they lose all their children than mortally offend God. The question, then, is whether we are bound to love God more in another way, and consequently to repent more through contrition.

First conclusion. — PERFECT CONTRITION SUFFICES FOR THE REMISSION OF SIN WITHOUT THE SACRAMENT, EVEN OUTSIDE A CASE OF NECESSITY, WITHOUT ACTUAL RECEPTION OF THE SACRAMENT, PROVIDED THAT THERE IS A DESIRE TO RECEIVE IT. This is the more common opinion among theologians, and

It is proved first by the authority of Scripture. Contrition is no less efficacious under the Gospel Law than under the Mosaic Law; but under the latter it sufficed to obtain remission of sin as soon as it was conceived. Therefore it will suffice for this now as well. The major premise is established, since the grace of the New Law is far more abundant than that of the old, and we now obtain remission of sins more easily than the children of the Synagogue did. The minor premise is proved first by the example of David, who, having scarcely turned to God through penance, spoke these two words in 2 Samuel 12: “I have sinned against the Lord,” and immediately heard from the prophet Nathan: “The Lord also has taken away your sin.” He expressly said, “The Lord has taken it away,” to signify that as soon as David’s act of contrition had been formed, God at once granted him pardon. — The royal Prophet himself testifies to this when he says in Psalm 31: “I said, I will confess my injustice against myself to the Lord, and you forgave the wickedness of my sin.” On these words St. Augustine adds: “He does not yet declare it, but promises that he will declare it, and He already forgives. Attend, brothers: a great thing—‘I said, I will declare it,’ and you forgave; for by saying ‘I will declare it’ he shows that he had not yet declared it. To say ‘I will declare it’ is itself to declare it; therefore you forgave the wickedness of my heart. My confession had not yet come to my mouth, for I had said, ‘I will declare against myself’; nevertheless God heard the voice of my heart. My voice was not yet in his ear, but God’s ear was already in my heart.” The Prophet adds: “For this”—that is, on this account—“every saint will pray to you in a timely moment,” so that he too may rise at once through contrition and likewise obtain pardon of sins. Cassiodorus agrees on the same words of the Psalm, saying: “Great is God’s mercy, that sin is forgiven at the mere promise, for a purpose is reckoned as an action.” — The same truth is inferred from Ezekiel 33: “The justice of the just man will not deliver him on whatever day he sins, and the wickedness of the wicked man will not harm him on whatever day he turns from his wickedness.” Here “day” is taken to mean an hour or a moment, according to Hebrew usage, as when God said to Adam in Genesis 2: “On whatever day you eat of it, you shall die.” From this one may argue as follows: the Prophet speaks in the same way of recovering justice through the sinner’s conversion as of losing and forfeiting it through the just man’s turning away. But the just man loses justice as soon as sin occurs. Therefore the sinner who turns to God through true contrition formed by charity is at once freed from sin; otherwise his wickedness would harm him on the day he turns. — This is confirmed by Isaiah 30. Where the Vulgate reads, “At the voice of your cry, as soon as he hears it, the Lord will answer you,” the Seventy translate: “When you return and groan, then you shall be saved.” He expressly says “then” to signify that no delay intervenes between the sinner’s return through contrite groaning and his salvation by the grace of justification. St. Leo explains this admirably in Letter 89, otherwise 71. Speaking of satisfaction and of reconciliation not to be denied to penitents at the end of life, he says: “For those who, in a time of necessity and the urgency of imminent danger, seek the help of penance and then at once seek reconciliation, neither satisfaction is to be forbidden nor reconciliation denied, because we can set no measure to God’s mercy or determine its time. With him conversion suffers no delay in pardon, since the Spirit of God says through the Prophet: ‘When you return and groan, then you shall be saved.’” Although there he speaks only of penitents at the end of life, nevertheless, by using the Prophet’s words, he signifies that whether in necessity or outside it, whenever anyone returns and groans, then—that is, at that very moment and without any delay—he will be saved. Consequently there is no danger in granting reconciliation in the Church’s forum to someone at the point of death, since he has already truly been reconciled before God. Pope Celestine interprets these words of the Prophet in the same way in his Letter to the Bishops of Gaul, ch. 2, where he says: “True conversion is to be measured by the mind rather than the body, as the Prophet says: ‘If you turn back, you will be saved.’”

It is proved secondly from the bulls of the supreme pontiffs Pius V, Gregory XIII, and Urban VIII, in which these propositions of Baius are condemned. The first is n. 31: “Perfect and sincere charity, arising from a pure heart, a good conscience, and unfeigned faith, can exist without remission of sins in catechumens as well as penitents.” The other is n. 37: “Through contrition, even when joined with perfect charity and the desire to receive the sacrament, guilt is not remitted outside a case of necessity or martyrdom without actual reception of the sacraments.” Those who condemn this doctrine consequently assert that contrition joined with perfect charity and the desire for the sacrament remits guilt outside a case of necessity or martyrdom without actual reception of the sacrament of penance. They therefore hold that such contrition has this power whenever it is present. This is confirmed by the Catechism of Pius V, which, treating contrition at n. 39, says: “Nor should the faithful despair in this matter of God’s supreme goodness and clemency, for, since he most earnestly desires our salvation, he delays no time in granting us pardon, but embraces us with paternal love as soon as the sinner has gathered himself together.” And below, n. 42: “Contrition itself, the Prophet says, is a contrite and humbled heart that God will not despise. Indeed, that God grants us remission of sins as soon as we have conceived contrition in our minds is declared by those words of the same Prophet elsewhere: ‘I said, I will confess my injustice against myself to the Lord, and you forgave the wickedness of my sin.’ We also see a figure of this in the ten lepers, who, sent by our Savior to the priests, were cleansed of leprosy before they reached them. From this we may learn that true contrition, as was said above, has such power that by its benefit we at once obtain from the Lord pardon for all our offenses.”

The theological argument also supports this. Contrition is the final disposition for sanctifying grace; consequently, once it is perfectly in place, sanctifying grace must also be present at the same time. When the final disposition is posited, the form is posited; but in the ordinary course sanctifying grace does not coexist with sin. Therefore contrition necessarily and infallibly brings remission of all sins. Furthermore, contrition is either formally an act of charity, or virtually such an act, or at least has an act of charity joined to it. But, as we said above, charity necessarily brings remission of sin with it, since love of God truly makes a man God’s friend. For Proverbs 8:17 says: “I love those who love me.” Sirach 31:15: “The eyes of God are upon those who love him.” 1 John 4:7: “Everyone who loves is born of God”; and v. 16: “God is charity, and whoever remains in charity remains in God, and God in him.” John 14:21: “Whoever loves me will be loved by my Father”; and v. 23: “If anyone loves me, he will keep my word, and my Father will love him, and we will come to him” (through sanctifying grace) “and make our dwelling with him.” But God cannot make his dwelling in a sinful soul, nor can a sinful soul remain in God. Consequently, since God hates sinners and loves those who love him, anyone who loves God must be saved from sin so that he may be loved by God.

YOU WILL OBJECT 1. ESTIUS: We must reason about the remission of sin through contrition in other sinners in the same way as in Mary Magdalene the penitent. But her sins were not remitted by the power of contrition and love as soon as she formed that act. For in Luke 7 Christ said of her, “Many sins are forgiven her, because she loved much,” thereby signifying that he was then forgiving her sins on account of her preceding act of contrition and charity. Estius confirms this by the example of the martyrs Genesius and Emerentiana, who are said to have been baptized in¹ their own blood. It would seem that the baptism of desire should be attributed to them rather than baptism of blood, if the former, like the latter, had the power to justify immediately. So too St. Paul, though wondrously converted and therefore possessing perfect contrition, nevertheless heard Ananias say to him in Acts 22²: “Rise and wash away your sins.” Therefore his contrition did not have the power to remit sins immediately. — I DENY THE MINOR PREMISE. Since Magdalene’s conversion was extraordinary and had the most outstanding signs of true and perfect love, I do not doubt that before Christ said of her, “Many sins are forgiven her,” etc., she had in fact been cleansed from sins by the power of contrition. Hence those words did not signify that remission was then taking place, but that it had already taken place at the instant of her love and contrition; thus they declared or at least confirmed a remission already accomplished. The same is true of the words of sacramental absolution when spoken over sins already once forgiven: they signify at the same time that the sin has truly been remitted as to the debt of guilt, and additionally release it as to the debt of punishment and unworthiness. Hence, some time later, Christ again said to the same Magdalene, “Your sins are forgiven you.” These words did not signify a repeated absolution of sin but confirmation of the prior one, just as in Mark 7 he said to the woman already healed of the flow of blood: “Daughter, your faith has saved you; go in peace, and be healed of your affliction.” Nor is it an objection that St. Augustine said of her in Homily 32 among the Fifty: “She came to the Lord unclean to return clean, she came sick to return healed, she came confessing to return professing.” This, I say, is no objection: he speaks of her coming insofar as it included her initial intention to approach, or certainly of the time when, as she approached the Lord, she perhaps did not yet have contrition perfected by charity. — As for the example of the holy martyrs Genesius and Emerentiana, I say that remission of their sins should be attributed to baptism of blood rather than baptism of desire: first, because, as Bosco rightly says, disp. 6, n. 829, baptism of blood is more certain, since it is an external act; second, because it is more efficacious, as it erases all guilt and all debt of punishment; finally, because ordinarily it includes, or at least presupposes, baptism of desire, since death for the faith of Christ is an outstanding act of charity, at least materially, according to Christ’s saying in John 15:13: “Greater love than this no one has, that a man lay down his life for his friends.” Finally, regarding the example of St. Paul, one may answer that Ananias spoke in this way either because he was uncertain whether St. Paul had perfect contrition sufficient to obtain pardon of sins, or because he judged that temporal punishments due for sins already remitted still remained to be washed away. Although these do not stain the soul, they are nevertheless called sins, much as concupiscence is called sin because it arises from sin. Such punishments are said to be washed away in baptism because they are relaxed and forgiven through the sacrament of washing.

OBJECTION 2. Contrition in a penitent who desires to receive the sacrament of penance is no more efficacious than in a catechumen who desires to receive baptism. But in the latter it does not suffice for remission of sin until he is baptized. For St. Augustine says, Tractate 13 on John: “However much a catechumen may progress, he still carries the burden of his iniquity; it is not forgiven him until he comes to baptism. As the people of Israel were not freed from the Egyptian people until they came to the Red Sea, so no one is freed from the burdens of sins until he reaches the font of baptism.” Therefore sin is not forgiven any penitent, however contrite, until he has received the sacrament of absolution. — I DENY THE MINOR PREMISE. As for St. Augustine, I say either that he speaks of what happens commonly, since few catechumens truly have perfect contrition before baptism, and so they ordinarily remain in sin until they are baptized; or that he meant that complete remission of sins as to both punishment and guilt cannot be obtained except through baptism. For although a catechumen obtains remission of guilt by virtue of contrition, ordinarily the debt of punishment still remains to be expiated; or, finally, I say that Augustine there speaks of catechumens who neglect to approach baptism and consequently lack an efficacious desire and purpose to receive it, and therefore do not have perfect contrition. Thus St. Bernard says admirably in Letter 77: “Just as no penance remits sin for a man if, when he can, he does not restore what he took, so faith profits this man nothing if, when he can, he does not receive the sacrament of baptism. Indeed, he is shown not to have perfect faith if he neglects it; for true and complete faith embraces all the commandments, and this is a true and indeed the chief commandment. He will therefore rightly be judged not faithful but plainly rebellious and contemptuous if he refuses to obey. How, indeed, is he faithful who despises God’s sacrament?” That this was St. Augustine’s meaning is clear from the text itself, for he says: “Lest anyone, in arrogance over possessing an abundance of some grace, disdain to be baptized with the baptism of the Lord.” Immediately afterward he adds: “However much a catechumen may accomplish,” etc.

OBJECTION 3. The Council of Trent, sess. XIII, ch. 7, speaking of preparation for the Eucharist, says: “Ecclesiastical custom declares that this examination is necessary, so that no one conscious of mortal sin, however contrite he may seem to himself, ought to approach the Holy Eucharist without prior sacramental confession.” And in canon 11: “The holy Synod itself decrees and declares that those burdened in conscience with mortal sin, however contrite they may consider themselves, must necessarily make sacramental confession beforehand when a confessor is available.” But cleansing from sins suffices for the proper disposition required for duly receiving the sacrament of the Eucharist. Therefore, since besides confession the Council still requires absolution, this is a sign that it does not consider contrition to have the power to remit sins outside a case of necessity without actual reception of sacramental absolution. — I DISTINGUISH THE MINOR PREMISE: true cleansing from sins suffices, I grant; merely supposed cleansing, I deny. The Council does not deny that true and perfect contrition suffices for the proper reception of the Eucharist; it denies only that contrition merely supposed to be perfect suffices. Hence it did not say, “However contrite he is,” but “however contrite he seems to himself,” and “however contrite they consider themselves,” so as to remove and restrain the vanity and presumption of certain people who trust themselves too rashly and, supposing they have perfect contrition when in fact they do not, neglect and scorn the benefit of absolution, which they could obtain easily when an opportunity to confess is given. Add that, since true contrition must be a supernatural act, a person can scarcely know whether he has it. For in our present state our intellect depends in its operations on phantasms and cannot judge when an act is supernatural. The Council therefore rightly advises and takes care that no one approach the Eucharist before using the means and remedies by which he can be more certain and secure that he is not wholly unworthy to partake of so great a sacrament. “For,” the Council says in the same place, ch. 7, “the more a true Christian knows the holiness and divinity of this heavenly sacrament, the more diligently he must take care not to approach to receive it without great reverence and holiness.”

OBJECTIONS. 1. The Tridentine Catechism says at n. 16: “Since very few would attain this degree of contrition, it followed that pardon of sins by this way was to be hoped for by very few; therefore the most merciful Lord had to provide for the salvation of men in a more accessible way, which he accomplished by a wonderful plan when he entrusted the keys of the kingdom of heaven.” Therefore very few obtain pardon through contrition before receiving the sacrament. — I ANSWER that nothing can be inferred from this against our assertion. For although we recognize that very few elicit perfect contrition, it would nevertheless always be entirely true that whoever had an act of perfect contrition, in necessity or outside it, would truly obtain remission of sin. From this it is clear how empty and slight are the grounds on which Estius’s particular opinion rests.

Second conclusion. — TO BE PERFECT, CONTRITION MUST DETEST SIN ABOVE ALL EVILS, IF NOT INTENSIVELY, AT LEAST APPETITIVELY; CONSEQUENTLY, TO JUSTIFY OUTSIDE THE SACRAMENT, NO GRADUAL DEGREE OF INTENSITY IS REQUIRED. This seems to be the opinion of the Seraphic Doctor, In IV Sent., d. 16, pt. 1, a. 2, q. 1, where he says: “It must be said that when the amount of sorrow is in question, sorrow can mean rational displeasure, or the passion in the sensitive part that results from it. If it is taken in this second sense, I say it is not necessary to grieve over sin more than over a temporal thing. Nor is such grief necessary, since it is not in everyone’s power: this sorrow does not follow from love but from affection, and affection from experiential knowledge. Since not everyone has experience of divine love, not everyone feels sorrow for sins in this sensible way. Nevertheless, to grieve even more sensibly over sin than over some loss is a perfection and fitting, but not necessary. But if sorrow means rational displeasure, I say that displeasure is measured according to the amount of charity. The amount of charity can be taken in two ways: in itself or in comparison with other loves. In itself, it may be small, greater, or greatest. In comparison with other loves, I say that it claims dominion in the heart as long as it is there, and is never there unless it is mistress. Hence I say that to have charity, it is necessary to love God above all. Do you doubt what it means to love God above all? This means”—St. Bonaventure continues—“to love God above all, so that for no loss or gain would one wish to offend God. The same is to be understood of the displeasure of contrition. Hence I say that sin must so displease reason that one would in no way, for any advantage or disadvantage, wish to consent to it or to have consented to it. The will of those who consent to sin for some reason is not just.” And below he says: “If, then, it is asked whether the sorrow of contrition must be greatest: if this means sensitive sorrow, the answer is clearly no. If it means rational displeasure, either as to the absolute intensity of the movement—and in this respect it need not be greatest—or in comparison with other sorrows, I say, as I do of love, that it must have predominance. That this predominance does not consist in degrees of intensity is clear from what precedes.”

Therefore, in the mind of this holy man, an exemplary Doctor of the Church, justifying contrition requires no determinate degree of intensity—as our Bosco rightly concludes, disp. 6, sect. 2, canon 8—but however slight it may be, it can suffice for remission of sin, provided it is elicited because God has been supremely offended and is formed by charity.

St. Chrysostom plainly teaches this truth in his Letter 17 to Theodore after his fall, cited in On Penance, dist. 3, ch. Talis. He says: “Believe me, God’s mercy toward men is such that he never rejects repentance if it is offered to him sincerely and simply. Even if someone has reached the summit of evils and then wishes to return to the path of virtue, he receives him and gladly embraces him, doing everything to restore him to his former state. What is still more remarkable and outstanding: even if someone has not been able to complete the whole order of satisfaction, God does not reject repentance however slight or brief its duration, but receives it and does not allow the reward of even the smallest conversion to be lost.”

The Seraphic Doctor proves the conclusion in the place cited above. First, greater is the sorrow that has no joy joined to it; but sorrow of contrition has some joy joined to it, since the penitent ought both to grieve for sins and to rejoice in grieving, as St. Augustine says. Indeed, the contrite person rejoices in being delivered from sin and in similar things, whereas sorrow over the loss of a parent³ or child has no joy joined to it. Therefore contrition need not be most intense by a gradual intensity. Second, one ought to grieve more over what has been lost and cannot be restored than over what can be recovered and has in fact been recovered. But parents or children who have died cannot be restored in this mortal state except by a miracle, whereas God, lost by the penitent through sin, can be recovered and is in fact possessed again through contrition. Therefore, and so on. Third, however slight sanctifying grace may be, it erases all guilt. Therefore, similarly, however slight the sorrow of contrition may be, if it has grace and charity joined to it, it will suffice to erase all guilt. This is confirmed because contrition stands to sanctifying grace, for which it disposes, as the final disposition: the final disposition must be proportioned to the form for whose reception it prepares or disposes the subject. But sanctifying grace, which remits sins and for which contrition disposes, is not necessarily most intense and requires no certain degree of intensity below which it would not suffice to erase sin. Therefore however slight and small contrition may be, it will suffice to effect remission of sin. Finally, that the sorrow of contrition need not be most intense or greatest intensively, and need not have any determinate degree of intensity, is shown and supported by examples. David truly had contrition for the sins of adultery, murder, and empty vainglory in numbering the people; yet his contrition was not most intense, for he showed more intense grief at the death of his son Absalom (2 Samuel 18)⁴. St. Paula also truly had contrition, for she was a most holy and penitent woman; yet her sorrow of contrition was not most intense, since she experienced more intense grief at the death of her children. Jerome says in her Life that at their death she was so overcome that she was always in danger of her life, but she never felt such sorrow for her offenses against God.

The reason is that what is most intense is not more intense in one person than in another, whereas one penitent’s sorrow is more intense than another’s, as in David, Magdalene, and Peter. No determinate degree or measure of intensity is required, because in Scripture God promises pardon to the contrite without qualification, imposing no limit on the degree of intensity of sadness or sorrow. Zechariah 1: “Turn to me, and I will turn to you.” Tradition likewise nowhere assigns a determinate degree of contrition or measure of its intensity. Therefore no such degree is fixed below which contrition does not suffice, provided it has the proper motive and object. The reason is that if a fixed degree or measure of intensity were required in contrition, the penitent would have the proper measure of sorrow by chance, not by choice, which is absurd.

The Doctor does not oppose this truth, as Hiquaeus contends in his Commentary on d. 14, q. 2, n. 97, where he defends the contrary opinion. For if the Doctor asserted anywhere that some intensity in the act of contrition is necessarily required, he would seem to do so most of all in d. 27, n. 19, where, speaking of infused habit and supernatural act, he appears to distinguish it from a natural act by a further intensity: “Of the third I say,” he writes, “as was said in d. 17 of the first book, that the habit of charity, as regards the substance of the act, gives it a certain further intensity which the same power, with equal effort, cannot give to its own act.” But in fact the contrary is not proved from this. For the Subtle Doctor reasons as follows in the same distinction, n. 16: “Of the first I say that ‘above all’ can be understood extensively: for example, that one loves God more than all other things, so that one would sooner wish all other things not to exist than that God not exist; and intensively: for example, one wishes God well with greater affection than anyone else. It is commonly granted concerning the first member that nothing other than God, nor all things together, are to be desired as much as God. Concerning the second, one distinction is made: love surpasses love either because it is more ardent or tender, or because it is stronger and firmer. These loves are said to surpass one another in the way a mother is said to love her son more tenderly and ardently, but a father more strongly and firmly, because he would expose himself to greater danger for love of his son. In this way it is said that love of God must be above all as regards firmness, so that nothing else can pull one away from it; but it need not be above all as regards ardor, tenderness, and sweetness, since sometimes someone finds that he loves a creature more ardently than another loves God.” Since this distinction does not please him, he argues against it as follows: “Only what is loved more firmly is loved more. For I love those things more for which I am less willing that evil should occur, and for whose good I expose myself more to save them out of love, because exposure follows love; I speak of love that is an act of the will, not of the passion of the sensitive appetite. Therefore, if some are said to love more ardently or tenderly, yet do not love more firmly, this is not due to an excess of intellectual love in them, but perhaps to a passion of sensitive love. Thus some who are called devout feel a greater sweetness than others who are far more solid in the love of God and would endure martyrdom a hundred times more readily. Sweetness is not an elicited act of the will, but a passion bestowed on the act, by which God attracts and nourishes the little ones lest they fail on the way.” From this the Doctor concludes: “I say, then, that ‘above all’ must be understood in both ways, namely extensively and intensively. For just as I am bound to love God above all other things extensively, so also with greater affection than anything else.” Do you doubt whether this means greater affection on the side of the subject, that is, according to degrees of intensity, or on the side of the object, that is, according to its essence? He continues: “And I say ‘greater’ simply, because it is more opposed to the effect posited, since one could more easily be inclined to the opposite of love for anything else than to the opposite of love for God.” Therefore, according to the Doctor’s mind, the person who loves God above all intensively is one who could more easily be inclined to the opposite⁵ of love for any other thing than to the opposite of love for God. Therefore a greater affection on the side of the object, that is, according to its essence, is not required.

This interpretation is confirmed by the note prefixed to the already cited n. 16. Scotus, it says, holds that God must be loved above all intensively and extensively, and for that reason it is attributed to him that he thinks we are bound to a love of God more intense than any other. Valentia, IIa IIae, d. 3, q. 1, pt. 1, says that no one except Scotus holds this. But Scotus does not hold it, and many others do. Scotus says only that God must be loved above all extensively and intensively, as others explain these terms: that is, God must be loved more tenderly and firmly than other things, since he regards intensity in those two senses as one and the same; but he does not say that God must be loved with a greater love by degrees, only with greater affection, for which a greater appetitive tendency, or an affection more exclusive of its opposite, suffices. Thus one may infer that by the further intensity which the Doctor says the habit of charity gives to a supernatural act in the aforesaid n. 19, he does not mean intensity on the side of the subject, or gradual intensity, but intensity on the side of the object, or essential intensity. “As regards the substance of the act”—that is, its generic character, which is derived from the object and the mode of tendency known by natural light—it gives a further intensity, that is, a correspondence with the object by which the act is constituted in the specific character of a supernatural act. Bosco, n. 246 and following, confirms this interpretation admirably, saying that no more suitable reason for this assertion can be given than that an obligation of this kind should not be prescribed to people unless its foundation is apparent and can be inferred from Scripture, the Councils, or the holy Fathers. But the necessity of such intensity in the act of contrition is inferred from none of these sources, as will appear from the response to the objections and arguments for the opposing opinion.

OBJECTIONS, THEN. 1. With Hiquaeus, n. 97, various passages of Sacred Scripture seem to suggest that just any sorrow does not suffice for true penance, but that the greatest and most intense is necessary. This is evident from Joel 2: “Turn to me with all your heart, in fasting, weeping, and mourning; tear your hearts and not your garments,” etc. Similarly, Deuteronomy 4: “If you seek the Lord your God, you will find him, provided you seek him with all your heart and all the anguish of your soul.” And Deuteronomy 30: “If, moved by sorrow of heart … you return to the Lord with all your heart and all your soul … he will have mercy on you.” 1 Kings 8: “If they sin against you … and return to you with all their heart and all their soul … you will be propitious to your people.” 2 Chronicles 30: “The Lord, who is good, will be propitious to all who seek him with their whole heart.” Jeremiah 29: “You will seek me and find me when you seek me with all your heart.” — I ANSWER that these and similar passages of Scripture do indeed establish that turning away from sin and turning toward God are required for the sinner’s justification. A man must truly put aside every inclination to sin, turn away with his whole heart from creatures that were occasions of sin for him, and turn toward God. But it is not necessary that he do so with the greatest affection and contrition of soul. These passages therefore establish that turning to God with the whole heart includes withdrawing the heart from every love opposed to love of God and involves detesting all sins for God’s sake, with the purpose not to sin again. Such conversion is made with the whole heart even if by a less intense act: it is made with an undivided heart, no part of the heart remaining in an affection for sin. Thus to love God with the whole heart means nothing other than to love him more than finite loves; for we give him our undivided heart when we love nothing more than him. To repent with all the anguish of one’s soul is to be displeased with one’s sins and take pleasure in none.

OBJECTIONS 2. Various authorities of the holy Fathers seem to require for true contrition and penance the greatest sorrow of soul, especially for graver sins. Thus St. Cyprian, in his treatise On the Lapsed, says among other things: “As great as our offenses have been, so greatly let us weep. Let diligent and prolonged medicine not be lacking to a deep wound; let penance not be less than the crime … We must pray more earnestly and plead, spend the day in mourning, pass the nights in vigils and tears, occupy all our time with tearful lamentation, lie prostrate on the ground, cling to ashes, wear sackcloth, and beat our hearts,” etc. Similarly St. Ambrose, Exhortation to a Fallen Virgin, ch. 8, says: “But how great and what sort of penance do you think is needed, such as equals the crimes or at least exceeds them? Consider, then, whether this sin of adultery is simple, or whether it is doubled by the murder committed in secret; and a great measure of penance must be applied according to the weight of the conscience.” Below he says: “Let the heart melt like wax, let it torment itself with fasts,” etc. A little later he adds: “A great crime requires great satisfaction. One must grieve more strongly, because the sin is stronger.” Likewise St. Augustine, Letter 54 to Macedonius, cited in On Penance, dist. 3, ch. 33, introduces a sinner speaking as follows: “Either grant me again the opportunity to repent, or allow me in despair to do whatever I please.… Or, if you turn me away from this wickedness, tell me whether it will profit me in the future life if in this life I spurn the enticements of this most alluring pleasure, restrain the provocations of lust, deprive myself of many things both lawful and permitted in order to chastise my body, exercise myself in repentance more vehemently than before, groan more vehemently, weep more freely, live better, support the poor more generously, and burn more ardently with the charity that covers a multitude of sins. Who among us is so foolish as to say to this man, ‘None of this will profit you hereafter; go, at least enjoy the pleasures of this life’? May God avert such monstrous sacrilegious madness.” — I ANSWER that these and similar sayings of the Fathers teach that, in doing penance, the sinner should deliberately apply all his effort and affection, not only to make satisfaction as far as he can for guilt and for the temporal punishment that remains to be paid after guilt is remitted, either in this age or in purgatory, but also to be more secure, lest by striving less he fail to offer sufficient satisfaction. It is most certain that greater satisfaction is required to erase the punishment corresponding to greater guilt, both interiorly through sorrow and externally through good and penitential works. For we can make satisfaction for sins not only through punishments imposed at the priest’s discretion and judgment according to the measure of the debt, but also through those we willingly take upon ourselves. Therefore the holy Fathers prudently admonish us to undertake graver punishments for expiating crimes in proportion to their gravity. — In the same way we satisfy the Council of Trent, sess. XIV, ch. 1, where it says: “The fruit of baptism differs from that of penance. Through baptism we put on Christ and become in him an entirely new creation, obtaining full and complete remission of all sins. Yet we cannot attain this newness and integrity through the sacrament of penance without great tears and labors, since divine justice requires it; hence the holy Fathers rightly called penance a kind of laborious baptism.” The Council speaks here not of remission of guilt but of the whole punishment, which is freely remitted through baptism but in penance is relaxed only through great groans and labors. Therefore, in sess. VI, ch. 14, likewise assigning the difference between penance and baptism, it says that penance requires not only cessation from sins and detestation of them, or a contrite and humbled heart, “but also their sacramental confession, at least in desire, to be made in its proper time, and priestly absolution, as well as satisfaction through fasts, almsgiving, prayers, and other pious exercises of the spiritual life—not indeed for the eternal punishment, which is remitted together with guilt either by the sacrament or by desire for the sacrament, but for the temporal punishment which, as the sacred writings teach, is not always wholly remitted to them as it is in baptism.” Therefore neither the holy Fathers nor the Council require intense sorrow and the penitent’s utmost effort for perfect contrition in order to obtain remission of guilt, but only to obtain release from the whole punishment that ordinarily remains to be paid after guilt is remitted.

YOU WILL OBJECT 3. God does not confer his grace except on one who does what lies within him. But he promises his grace to the one who has contrition. Therefore, to be truly contrite, a person must apply all his effort and affection. — I answer: the major premise is not to be understood as meaning that, in order to obtain grace, one must expend all one’s effort. There is scarcely anyone among mortals who performs and carries out what is commanded so perfectly that he could not do it in a still better way if he applied absolutely all his effort. Rather, it must be understood in this sense: to obtain from God through penance the grace of sanctification, a person must on his part use all the means necessary to prepare for this benefit. Or I say that he must do all that lies within him by loving God more appetitively than creatures, although he does not love him more intensely.

YOU WILL PRESS: That appetitive love or sorrow weakens concern for sins and diminishes contrition. Therefore it must be rejected. — I deny the antecedent. Sinners must be concerned not only with remission of sins as to guilt but also as to punishment. Since appetitive sorrow contributes only to remission of sins as to guilt, a penitent who has obtained that remission must still strive to obtain release from the punishment due for sins through intense sorrow and penitential works.

YOU WILL OBJECT 4. From the Roman Catechism, n. 36: “Contrition must not only be great but most vehement.” But the most vehement contrition is the most intense, since vehemence of sorrow is this kind of intensity. Therefore, and so on. — I deny the minor premise. By “most vehement contrition” the Catechism means nothing other than efficacious and active contrition, not ineffectual and sluggish contrition; hence it immediately adds: “and must exclude all sluggishness and idleness.” For it is written in Deuteronomy: “When you seek the Lord your God, you will find him, provided you seek him with all your heart and all the anguish of your soul.” And in Jeremiah, ch. 29: “You will seek me and find me when you seek me with all your heart, and I will be found by you, says the Lord.” Although we may not be able to attain that degree, contrition can nevertheless be true and efficacious; for it often happens that things subject to the senses affect us more than spiritual things. Thus some people sometimes feel greater sorrow at the death of their children than at the foulness of sin. The same judgment applies if tears do not accompany the severity of sorrow, although tears are greatly to be desired and commended in penance. Hence the marginal note also says: “Even if contrition is not so great, it is nevertheless true.”

From these points follows the truth of the second part: contrition must be the greatest of sorrows estimatively or appreciatively. The cited sayings of Scripture show that God commands the sinner to turn to him with his whole heart, just as he commands this conversion to be made with weeping and mourning. But he commands it only as to affection, because weeping, mourning, fasting, and the like are not always free or possible for everyone, whether on account of natural insensibility or illness. Furthermore, we are commanded to be contrite with our whole heart in the same way that we are to love God. For, as the Tridentine Catechism, n. 37, says: “Just as God is the supreme good among all things to be loved, so sin is the supreme evil among all things men ought to hate. It follows that, for the same reason we profess that God must be loved supremely, we must also be seized by a supreme hatred of sin.” But we are bound to have the greatest love of God only estimatively, or appreciatively, preferring God to all things in love and being willing to relinquish anything rather than God or God’s friendship, even if we do not have the most intense love for him. Therefore we are bound only to hate sin above all evils, even if we do not have supremely intense hatred and sorrow. Hence the Catechism continues: “That God’s love must be preferred to all things, so that it is not permissible to sin even to preserve one’s life, is plainly taught by the Lord’s words,” Matthew 10: “He who loves father or mother more than me, or son or daughter above me, is not worthy of me.… Whoever wishes to save his life will lose it, and whoever loses his life for my sake will find it.” And, as St. Bernard testifies, no limit or measure is prescribed for charity, because the measure of loving God is to love him without measure; so no measure is to be set for detesting sin. The reason is that sorrow is greatest estimatively when we detest something as the greatest of all evils and to be detested above all; and love is greatest appetitively when we love something as the greatest of all goods and to be loved above all. But sorrow in contrition for the sin we have committed must be of this kind, for no evil is greater or worse than mortal sin, and we must esteem detesting it more highly than attaining any good or avoiding any other evil, because it is an evil that turns us away from our ultimate end.

YOU WILL SAY 1: Every sorrow that is greatest appetitively is also greatest intensively, because the more we value a thing lost, the greater the effort with which we grieve its loss; for sorrow over a lost thing arises from valuing and loving its goodness. But contrition is not the greatest sorrow intensively. Therefore it is not greatest appetitively either. — I deny the major premise. Although as a rule the intensive magnitude of sorrow arises from its appetitive magnitude, this is not absolutely necessary. Intensive magnitude of sorrow arises on the side of the subject and the effort by which sorrow is intensified to detest some evil; appetitive magnitude arises on the side of the object, which is hated above all other objects of sorrow. It often happens, however, that we grieve more intensely over something we value less appetitively, and conversely. Even the Saints often grieve inwardly more over the loss of children than over the debt of their sins, as Jacob did, who would not accept consolation over the loss of Joseph. But they do not have greater estimative sorrow over the loss of their children than over their sins; for they would rather have lost their children than mortally offended God. Even with bodily things, we often grieve more over what we esteem less: toothache or a burn on one’s finger is sharper and more intense than a lingering fever or plague, yet the sorrow caused by that fever is greater estimatively. The same is evident in love: an old father often loves his younger son more intensely and tenderly than his firstborn, but values the firstborn more appreciatively, since he wills and does greater goods for him.

YOU WILL SAY 2: A cause is known through its effect. But contrition does not have as great an effect of sorrow as other griefs, for tears are an effect and sign of sorrow; yet contrition does not produce as many tears as most other griefs, such as loss of children or property, disgrace, a wound, and the like. Therefore the sorrow of contrition is not greatest appreciatively. — I distinguish the major premise: known through the proximate and immediate effect, I grant; through a remote and mediate effect, such as tears in relation to sorrow of the soul, I deny it. For bodily changes follow immediately from passions and affections of the sensitive part. Hence tears flow more readily from sensible sorrow, or from a harmful sensible object, than from the spiritual sorrow of contrition. Tears are indeed to be desired in the contrite; for, according to St. Augustine, “There are no inward parts of Christian charity in you if you mourn the body from which the soul has departed, but do not mourn the soul from which God has departed.” The holy penitents also obtained pardon from God with tears. Nevertheless, true contrition can exist without tears, because tears are not in our power. Contrition must therefore be perfect, since the perfection of sorrow of soul is taken from choice, and the perfection of choice in sorrow is taken from our grieving over what is most grievous and detesting the evil most detestable above all, namely sin.