Scotus Academicus, Tomus decimus: De Baptismo, De Poenitentia, De Extrema Unctione

NOTE 1. In Sacred Scripture the word “contrition” signifies the same as devastation or destruction. Thus Isaiah 51: “Desolation and Contrition, and famine, and sword: who will console you?” And Jeremiah 6: “Evil has been seen from the north, and great Contrition.” And Psalm 13: “Contrition and misery are in their ways.” Among theologians, however, this word is used to signify displeasure over past sins; this meaning indeed has its foundation in Sacred Scripture, for Psalm 50 says: “A contrite and humbled heart, O God, you will not despise.” And Psalm 146: “He heals the contrite of heart and binds up their contritions.” Hence it is also called the humbling of the heart; for, as St. Augustine expounds the words just cited: “Those who do not crush the heart are not healed. What is it to crush the heart? ‘A spirit afflicted is a sacrifice to God.’ Those who have crushed the heart are the humble. Who have not crushed the heart? The proud. What is contrite will be healed; what is lifted up will be cast down—perhaps for this very purpose it is cast down, that, once contrite, it may be healed. ‘He heals the contrite of heart’; therefore humility heals the heart,” etc. It is likewise called “bitterness” of heart, because it makes sins bitter to the penitent’s soul, in keeping with Isaiah 38: “I recall all my years to you in the bitterness of my soul.… Behold, my bitterness is most bitter in peace.” It is also named “compunction,” as it were a piercing of the heart: “For, as William of Paris says in his treatise On the Sacrament of Penance, ch. 5, the thorns and goads of sins are first felt when the Spirit has quickened and sanctified the sinner’s heart by the infusion of his grace; or because they are then fixed in the heart’s depth and innermost part, in keeping with what is read in the Psalm: ‘I was turned in my anguish, while a thorn was fixed.’ For sometimes, before his coming and his life-giving visitation, the heart, being intent upon—or rather, mortified and dead, felt neither the wound of sin nor the iron in the wound, neither the goads of sins nor their pricks. The Psalmist names compunction in Psalm 4: ‘Be pierced in your beds’; and Acts 2: ‘When they had heard these things, they were pierced to the heart.’ Or it is so called, he says in the same place, because, just as trees of frankincense and myrrh are wounded with iron rods, and through the very wounding such trees seem to weep or to coagulate, so the pierced hearts of penitents emit the frankincense of devout prayer and the myrrh of inward bitterness. Finally, it is called compunction because, just as swollen sores are cut with iron so that the enclosed poison may be able to burst forth, so hearts are cut, as it were, with the scalpel of Contrition, so that the deadly poison of sin may be able to burst out. Wherefore the Prophet Joel also calls it a “rending” of the heart: ‘Return’* (he says, ch. 2) *‘to me with all your heart, in fasting, weeping, and mourning, and rend your hearts.’”

NOTE 2. Since Contrition can be considered either according to the very entity of the act, or according to the manner in which the act itself is elicited, or according to the principle from which it is elicited, or finally, according to the effect it produces, it follows that several and varied definitions of Contrition are put forward according to these different respects. First, as regards the substance and entity of the act, the Council of Trent defines it, sess. XIV, ch. 4: “Contrition is sorrow of soul and detestation for a sin committed, together with the purpose of not sinning thereafter.” This definition of Contrition applies to it both as an act of the virtue and as a part of the sacrament of penance, since in either respect it must necessarily be sorrow for a sin committed, together with a firm purpose of not sinning thereafter. Although, insofar as it is a part of the sacrament, it also entails the purpose of confessing and making satisfaction, by which it is distinguished from Contrition insofar as it is an act of the virtue of penance; in the latter respect it did not formerly entail a purpose of confessing and making satisfaction, but only a will to punish and avenge the sin. In view of its principle, however, it is called “a voluntary sorrow punishing what it grieves itself to have committed”; for Contrition is an act of the will, unwilling and grieving that it has sinned, such that, if it could be done, it would efficaciously wish that the sin had not been committed by it. Third, in view of its effect, St. Augustine calls it “sorrow remitting sin,” or St. Gregory calls it “humility of spirit annihilating sin between hope and fear.” Finally, in view of the manner in which it is exercised, St. Isidore describes it: “Contrition is compunction and humility of mind, coming with tears from recollection of sin and fear of judgment.” Moreover, in the first definition, which is the most excellent of them all, three acts are enumerated as belonging to perfect Contrition: namely, sorrow for a sin committed, hatred of it or detestation of it, and a purpose not to sin any more. The question, then, is which of these acts chiefly constitutes the formal character of Contrition, and whether all three are necessarily required for true and perfect Contrition. For Cajetan, in his little work On Contrition, q. 1, contends that Contrition essentially consists in an act of hatred for sin, so that sorrow is merely its property, while the purpose not to sin thereafter is a consequence and effect of that sorrow. Suarez, however, in disp. 4, sect. 1, holds that it is essentially detestation of sin, which he wishes to distinguish both from hatred and from sorrow for sin. Others, such as Conink, disp. 1, tit. 1, teach that Contrition essentially consists both in an act of sorrow and in an act of hatred for sin. The heretics of our time, however, together with Luther, hold that Contrition is only love of righteousness, a new life, and correction of one’s former life, but not hatred, displeasure, detestation, or sorrow for that life; thus Contrition does not imply anything painful or bitter, but only what is pleasing, joyful, or sweet. Hence they infer that sorrow or sadness makes a person more of a hypocrite, and not truly penitent.

NOTE 3. Contrition is customarily distinguished into two kinds: perfect, which is simply called “Contrition,” and is sorrow for sins on account of God, supremely loved; and imperfect, which is called “Attrition,” or sorrow for sins from some other honorable motive that is not God himself, who is to be loved for his own sake insofar as he is the supreme good from which mortal sin turns one away. For it must be known that someone can detest sin for various ends: first, from fear of hell, which he would incur by sinning; second, from desire for the glory and eternal happiness that he would lose by dying in sin; third, from love of virtue, which sin would cloud, and hatred of vice, by which he would be stained; fourth, from love of God, whom he loves ardently, either with a love of desire on account of the various goods he receives from him, or with a love of friendship, namely insofar as God is the supreme, infinitely perfect and lovable good—which is properly to love God for his own sake. The question, then, is in which of these motives the formal character of Contrition consists.

These, then, are the three principal matters that arise for determination in this Question. First, whether the four acts mentioned are required for perfect Contrition: namely, hatred, detestation, and sorrow for a sin committed, together with a firm purpose not to sin thereafter, as well as to confess and make satisfaction. Second, in which of these acts Contrition formally consists. Third, whether perfect Contrition is formally an act of charity and love of God, or at least is commanded by charity.

First conclusion. — THE FOUR AFOREMENTIONED ACTS ARE REQUIRED FOR TRUE AND PERFECT CONTRITION. This is gathered from the Council of Trent, which mentions such acts when it defines and explains Contrition. For sess. XIV, ch. 1, speaking of penance as a virtue—which does not remit sin except insofar as it is true Contrition—it says: “Penance was indeed necessary at all times for all people who had stained themselves with any mortal sin, in order to obtain grace and righteousness, even for those who, washed in the sacrament of baptism, had sought it, so that, having rejected and corrected their wickedness, they might detest so great an offense against God with hatred of sin and devout sorrow of soul.” Here it requires detestation, hatred, and sorrow for sin for perfect penance. But in ch. 4, treating of Contrition, it says: “Contrition, which holds the first place among the aforesaid acts of the penitent, is sorrow of soul and detestation for a sin committed, together with the purpose of not sinning thereafter. At all times this manner of Contrition was necessary for obtaining forgiveness of sins; and in a person who, after baptism, has fallen, it prepares for the remission of sins only if it is joined with confidence in divine mercy and with a vow to perform the rest of what is required for the fitting reception of this sacrament.” Here it delineates two kinds of Contrition: namely, that which occurs outside the sacrament of penance, and that which is joined to the sacrament. For both, under the New Law, it requires not only sorrow and detestation for sin, but also a vow to perform all those things—namely, confession and satisfaction—that are required for sacramental absolution.

That it likewise required hatred is clear enough from the fact that there it calls Contrition—what at first it had called sorrow and detestation—simply “hatred” immediately after the words just cited. For, condemning Luther’s erroneous opinion, it says: “The holy Synod therefore declares that this Contrition contains not only cessation from sin, and a purpose and beginning of a new life, but also hatred of the old,” etc. It again insists on this in the same place. Hence, in canon 5, it defines as follows: “If anyone says that the Contrition which is prepared by the examination, collection, and detestation of sins, whereby someone recalls his years in the bitterness of his soul, weighing the gravity and multitude of his sins, his infidelity, the loss of eternal blessedness, and his incurring of eternal damnation, together with a purpose of better life, is not true and profitable sorrow, nor prepares for grace, but makes a person a hypocrite and more of a sinner; and, finally, that it is sorrow under compulsion and not free and voluntary—let him be anathema.” Although by these words the Fathers of Trent chiefly intended to define, against the heretics of our time, that a bare and sterile purpose of a better life, or cessation from sin, is not sufficient for true penance, they nevertheless suggest clearly enough that, along with hatred and detestation of sins and a purpose of a better life, sorrow for a sin committed is also required, whether that sorrow be sensory or merely intellectual.

For when Contrition is defined by sorrow, “sorrow” is not taken precisely for the very act of sorrow, nor for sadness, which is a passion, but for the cause of sadness and sorrow itself, namely, the unwillingness toward sins. For these three differ: unwillingness, sadness, and sorrow. Unwillingness is an act of the will, namely, not to wish that one had sinned. Sadness, however, is distress and a passion that arises from this very unwillingness and affects the will. Sorrow in turn is a passion that occurs in the sensory faculty, namely, that anguish of heart which the penitent has from unwillingness and detestation of sin. Of these three, only unwillingness seems to belong to the essence of Contrition; the others are its effects.

For, as St. Bonaventure teaches admirably, d. 16, a. 1, q. 1, from St. Augustine, bk. 14 of The City of God, ch. 15: “Just as sin is perpetrated through consent, so, conversely, it is erased and destroyed through the dissent of the rational will; and because dissent from something that cannot not exist generates sorrow, Contrition must therefore be said to be sorrow essentially. But it should be observed that ‘sorrow’ is said in two ways: in one way, the very dissent of the will; in another way, the passion resulting in the sentient person, or in the sensitive appetite, from that dissent, through which a person breaks into tears. That dissent belongs to the essence of Contrition, but that passion is its effect.” This is the Seraphic Doctor. Hence our most learned Vega concludes admirably, bk. 13 of On Justification, ch. 35: If there are some, he says, who would not wish to have committed the sins they did commit, yet do not grieve for them with sensory sorrow, or even intellectual sorrow, their detestation of sins, without any sadness or sorrow, would suffice for justification; Scotus, Almavus, and others consistently taught this, and it is very much in keeping with divine mercy. For among human beings, too, this is sometimes enough to be restored to favor with them. Nor can it be doubted that these sinners already repent of their sins and truly regret them. And insofar as sorrow, or sadness for sins, is properly taken for the passions that follow the affections of those who would in no way have consented to their sins, we can believe certain sinners who say that they cannot grieve over their sins. For this may happen with sensory sorrow, from which tears follow, because of a hard constitution or because the sorrow¹ is excessively intense². Nor is it surprising if other things that are more perceptible cause greater sorrow and draw more tears from us. According to the Subtle Doctor, this is also possible with intellectual sorrow, which is sadness, because, in his view, sadness does not necessarily follow from flight from, hatred of, or unwillingness toward sin, although it is very often joined to it. Hence that well-known saying of St. Augustine, bk. On Penance: “As sorrow is the companion of penance, so tears are witnesses of sorrow.”

If, then, as some sinners are accustomed to say, they grieve over the fact that they do not grieve, and in this way, whether with sensory or intellectual sorrow, simply say that they do not wish to have sinned, they ought to be admitted to penance. If, however, they were to say that they have no affection by which they would wish not to have consented to the sins they committed, because they cannot have such an affection, and were to use the common word “sorrow” for that affection, they must gradually be led, by the common and well-worn arguments drawn from the evils in sins, to wish that they had not committed them. For it is impossible for them to grieve that they do not grieve over their sins if “sorrow” is taken, as it usually is, for an affection by which one wishes not to have sinned. For this affection is always within the power of one who truly wishes to have it. But because it depends more on God’s grace and kindness than on our freedom, God must first of all be begged to deign to impart it: “For who,” as Bernard says most truly in On the Threefold Mercy, “will cleave this hardness, except he who in his Passion cleft the rocks? Who will give a penitent heart, except he from whom every best gift comes?” Thus far Vega.

Since, however, he cites the Subtle Doctor in support of his position, I am pleased to quote his words. Scotus, In I Sent., d. 11, q. 2, n. 17, at the end, says: “Sometimes, from charity or contemplation of God, a certain detestation of sin is present at once, and the greatest sadness follows, even though no act of justice with respect to that sadness has yet been posited; at other times, an act of justice (of vengeance) is present first and is intense in itself, yet its proximate causes—namely, the intellect in considering and the will in detesting—are not efficaciously moved by that command of justice, perhaps because they lack the habits that would be principles of perfection in their acts.” For he continues in n. 18: “And although these are sometimes moved—namely, the intellect in considering and the will in detesting—sadness nevertheless does not follow. Although this could happen for many reasons, it sometimes happens because, just as the intellect is conformed in us to the sensitive part, so the intellectual appetite tends toward the sensitive appetite in being easily pleased and saddened together. Therefore, the will of someone whose sensitive appetite is not naturally disposed to sadness or sorrow is not easily saddened.” From this the Doctor infers: “Someone may have the greatest act of penance in the first way, that is, the greatest act of avenging the sin he committed, and yet have no affect of sadness, or only a slight one; while some, without any act of penance in the first way, have the greatest effect of the same kind as that which is naturally an effect of penance. Whether that effect is greater or lesser is indeed some excellence with respect to the destruction of sin; namely, simply speaking, there is a greater excellence of act in relation to act, for the acts are followed on either side by sadness, since the act that causes sadness merits sin more than sadness itself does.” Therefore, according to the Doctor, detestation of sin, as causative of sadness, can meritously erase sin, even if by accident no sadness, or only slight sadness, follows. For it is not plausible that God, who is the Father of mercies and who does not will the death of the sinner but rather that he turn and live, required for conversion and life something that is not within the sinner’s free power, such as the sorrow or sadness that follows an act of detestation. Moreover, natural reason plainly indicates that detestation itself is necessary when someone takes on a new person and changes his state, unless he casts off the old through some displeasure, and unless his former state displeases him in some way; otherwise there is no cause for changing, indeed it is scarcely possible to change. For the nature both of us and of our affections is such that whatever has once pleased us remains with us so long as we are moved away from it by no hatred or displeasure; and whatever we have once approved, we are considered to approve, and to will to be firm and settled, for so long as, on thinking better about it, we do not reject or retract it. So Vega above.

YOU WILL SAY 1: Just as a truly penitent person ought to grieve, so too ought he to feel shame; but that shame is neither confession nor satisfaction, and consequently neither hatred, nor detestation, nor sorrow: therefore more acts than those listed above are required for Contrition. Moreover, the penitent ought not only to grieve but also to rejoice, as we said when treating of penance as a virtue; consequently, just as Contrition is called sorrow, so it should also be called joy. — The Seraphic Doctor answers both points in the same place: “Shame follows upon the will’s dissent, insofar as it dissents from sin as something shameful; joy also follows, insofar as from that dissent one feels oneself removed from sin. But the passion that is sorrow follows more immediately; for the dissent itself, when vehement, from a thing we do not wish to exist and yet which exists, immediately generates sorrow—because it is dissent; but because it is dissent on account of a shameful thing, it generates shame; and because through that sorrow the sinner is removed from the shameful and hostile thing itself, therefore he grieves over sin and rejoices in his sorrow.”

YOU WILL SAY 2: “Sorrow is dissent from those things that happen against our will,” says St. Augustine, bk. 14 of The City of God, ch. 15; but Contrition is dissent from sins that happen with our will; therefore, etc. — The same Seraphic Doctor answers that sin is voluntary with respect to its delight, but it is not voluntary with respect to the character of its malice, deformity, and punishment. “But if you say that the sorrow of Contrition must be not only for the deformity but also for the delight: he answers that for a sinner to grieve properly, it is enough that what he grieves over be unwanted for the time at which he grieves, though not at every time.” The remaining points that may bear on this difficulty have already been resolved by what we said about the essence of the virtue of penance.

Second conclusion. — CONTRITION MORE PROPERLY CONSISTS IN DETESTATION OR HATRED OF SIN THAN IN THE OTHER ACTS.

It is proved, because Contrition is an act of the appetitive virtue; therefore it is an act of the will insofar as it detests sin. The antecedent is evident, since Contrition is an actual unwillingness toward sin—not absolute, but conditional—as though the penitent were to say: If it were possible, I would not wish to have sinned. But this unwillingness is formally nothing other than detestation of sin itself; therefore, etc. Nor is it an objection that the Council of Trent, in the places cited in the preceding conclusion, equally calls Contrition sorrow and detestation of sin. For these must be understood in due proportion and according to a sense of accommodation: that is, Contrition is essentially detestation, while sorrow is only concomitant or causal, because that detestation is nothing other than wishing not to have sinned, from which sorrow follows. For sorrow is nothing other than sadness and affliction, or a certain anguish, because a person sees that he has done what he would not wish to have done. Therefore that detestation necessarily has sorrow accompanying or following it.

It is confirmed: Contrition must be constituted chiefly in that from which, as streams from a spring, the other acts required for perfect Contrition flow. But they all arise from detestation of sin itself. For sorrow proceeds from it, as we just said; hatred also arises from it, if that hatred is in truth something distinct from detestation itself—which I do not think it is. For in the will, with respect to good and evil, there are only those acts that correspond to the passions of the sensitive appetite; but hatred and detestation correspond to the same passion, which is called “hatred,” and no philosopher seems hitherto to have said that hatred and detestation are two virtues. Likewise, from that detestation proceeds the will not to sin thereafter and to fulfill those things necessary for obtaining remission of sin. For one who truly detests sin has the disposition not to admit it any more, and to apply all the means conducive to its destruction; and consequently to do all that is necessary for sacramental absolution, without which, whether received in fact or by vow, remission under the New Law of a sin committed after baptism cannot take place.

YOU WILL SAY 1: If sorrow essentially consisted in detestation and hatred of sin, since this detestation and that hatred are most perfect in the Blessed, it would likewise follow that they have most perfect Contrition. But this cannot be said; therefore neither can the former be said. — I distinguish the major: if the Blessed had such detestation as would have sorrow for sins accompanying or following it, I grant it: otherwise, I deny it. And with the minor, thus distinguished, I deny the consequence. For detestation of sin can be distinguished in two ways. One is general, diffused through all acts of every virtue, but especially charity, which, insofar as it tends toward an object fitting to itself, turns away from whatever is opposed to that object. The other is special, tending chiefly toward the vengeance and destruction of sin itself; it is nothing other than the will’s very formal, positive unwillingness, by which the penitent, if it were possible, would not wish to have sinned and grieves that he has sinned. The former can be in the Blessed, but not the latter.

YOU WILL SAY 2: Contrition consists chiefly in this, that it is in itself the first thing opposed to sin and destroys it. But that which is in itself the first thing opposed to sin is not its detestation, but the sorrow by which the penitent is affected when he grieves that he has offended God. Therefore Contrition consists more in sorrow for sin than in hatred or detestation of it. The major premise is established: for just as Penance regards sin under the aspect of an offense to be avenged and punished, and capable of being compensated for by the penitent’s acts, so too does its principal and primary act, which is Contrition. The minor premise, however, is proved: the act by which a man avenges sin ought to be opposed to the act by which he committed it. Therefore, just as a man sinned through unlawful pleasure, he ought to avenge that sin and make satisfaction to God through an act opposed to that pleasure; but this can be none other than sorrow. For, says St. Augustine, Serm. 7, On the Time: When you repent in such a way that what was once sweet to you in life now tastes bitter in your heart, and what formerly delighted you in the body now torments you in your mind, then indeed you groan well before God and say: Against you alone have I sinned.” Therefore, etc. — I deny the minor premise: for since sin consists in a voluntary turning away from God, the first movement of Penance must consist in man’s voluntary turning to God, and consequently in hatred and detestation of that which turns him away from God. This detestation is nothing other than the very act of not-willing by which the penitent would wish that he had not sinned; since that cannot be, sorrow then arises over the sin committed. Hence I do indeed admit that sorrow is the avenging of unlawful pleasure insofar as that sorrow is sensual, but not insofar as it is wholly spiritual and something consequent upon the aforesaid act of not-willing.

From these things, then, it follows that detestation or hatred of sin is the primary and chief act of Contrition, from which the other acts spring as from a root. For from a man’s loathing sin, it follows that he grieves that he committed it, and is moved to destroy it by every means and method prescribed by God; and consequently to frequent and make sacramental Confession as soon as possible, by which he may obtain the destruction of that sin and forgiveness.

YOU WILL ASK: Whether all these acts of detestation, hatred, sorrow, and the purpose of not sinning again must be elicited separately for perfect and integral Contrition? — I answer, it does not seem improbable that it suffices for them to be contained virtually in the formal detestation of sin itself. This is indeed proved: for if any one of those acts were required to be elicited formally for perfect Contrition, it would above all be the purpose of not sinning again. But for this it suffices that this purpose be included virtually in the very efficacious and perfect detestation. For, says our Vega, bk. 13, On Justification, ch. 31: “It cannot stand that past offenses displease someone because they are offenses against God, if he intends to offend God gravely or to continue some deadly offense against Him. And no one truly repents of past errors, or wills to change his former life, without having some displeasure at it; thus no one has perfect displeasure at his former life without intending, either actually or virtually, to change it. These affections accompany one another actually or virtually. And one so disposed that he truly grieves over the offenses he has committed never, while that grief endures, commits new ones; indeed, he will avoid them as far as he can, and would say that he desires to shun them if asked about it. This suffices for him to be said to have a virtual purpose of amending his life. And he who truly purposes to avoid them in the future will never, while that purpose stands, acquiesce in or take pleasure in his past deeds; rather, if someone questions him, he will say that he grieves over those he committed. And since ordinarily scarcely anyone truly repents of sins unless he both detests them and purposes henceforth to avoid them, all sinners should be admonished, when they are stirred to penance, not only to detest their former sins and refrain from continuing or repeating them or any others, but also to purpose to avoid all sins henceforth to the best of their ability.” Thus far Vega. And a little later he adds: “Yet all this is consistent with these effects being separable from one another: detestation of one’s past life can stand without a purpose to begin a new one, and a purpose of a new life without detestation of the former. Hence the Fathers set down as two distinct things abstaining from sins and detesting them. Experience also shows that sometimes we remember the past in such a way that we think nothing at all about the future; and, conversely, look to the future in such a way that no recollection of the past enters our minds. This can happen much more readily in the affections. And whether it happens or not, we are discussing only this one question: whether detestation of sins committed can suffice for forgiveness without a formal purpose never to sin again, just as in the preceding chapter we showed, with the agreement of all Catholics, that this purpose does not suffice without detestation of past sins. And indeed, the same author goes on, although I consider the course already mentioned both common and safest, and one that should always be impressed upon the people, yet when I ponder more deeply the riches of God’s mercy toward us, I cannot doubt that sinners are sometimes justified by compunction for the sin committed alone.” That is what he says. He proves this pious opinion by the example of David, who was justified immediately when he said from his heart, 2 Kings, ch. 12, n. 13: I have sinned against the Lord. For he at once heard: The Lord also has put away your sin. No mention is made there of a purpose of amendment. You will find many other similar examples in Sacred Scripture, which Vega cites in that same place in confirmation of his opinion and ours. “But if,” he says, “God never forgave the sins of a sinner in response to any degree of compunction unless a purpose of avoiding sin in the future were actually present, Scripture would also have recalled this purpose in those whom it says were justified through their penance. For why would it have remembered detestation rather than the purpose of ceasing from sins, if both are required equally and neither suffices without the other?” Thus Vega.

YOU WILL SAY: A virtual purpose of not sinning again is nothing other than hatred and detestation of sin itself. But the Council of Trent, besides sorrow, detestation, and hatred of sin, requires a vow and purpose not to sin again and to fulfill what is necessary to obtain sacramental Absolution. Therefore, in the mind of the Council of Trent, a virtual purpose does not suffice, but a formal and actual one is required. — I answer, the Council of Trent joins a purpose of amendment to detestation of sin in order to signify that any simple displeasure at sins is not sufficient for perfect Contrition; rather, an efficacious detestation is necessary, such that, if future sins presented themselves and there were no lack of suitable time, the will would immediately spring into an affection of not sinning again. That this suffices, and that a purpose of not sinning again is virtually included in the will that detests and excludes sin, is gathered from the same Council: first, because in sess. XIV, ch. 4, speaking of imperfect Contrition, which is called Attrition, it says: If it excludes the will to sin, together with hope of pardon, it declares (the holy Synod) that it not only does not make a man a hypocrite or a greater sinner, but is also a gift of God and an impulse of the Holy Spirit—not yet indeed indwelling, but only moving—by which the penitent, aided by it, prepares for himself a way to justice. By these words, what it had called a purpose of not sinning when generally describing Contrition, it here calls an exclusion of the will to sin. It thereby signifies that one who sincerely and efficaciously detests sin is so disposed that, if asked whether he wished to sin again, he would testify that he would rather lay down his life a thousand times than mortally offend God. This affection is nothing other than a virtual purpose of not sinning again. Second, in the same place the Council requires not only a purpose of amendment, but also of Confession and Satisfaction, and even an act of hope; but an explicit vow of Confession, nor a formal act of hope, is required for true and perfect Contrition. Therefore neither is an explicit vow of amendment required. — Vega strongly confirms all these points in these words: “It can happen that some sinners are overtaken by sudden death in such a way that they can indeed remember the sins they committed, and die grieving over them and crying, ‘Lord, have mercy,’ before they have been able to think or determine anything about the future. Will these, then, also be deprived of pardon? What could be more rigid, harsher, or more unmerciful than that? Indeed, God receives with open arms all who flee to Him; He despises no one who does what lies within him; at the very point of death He grants pardon to all who turn to Him. Nor do we read in the Evangelists anything else about that fortunate thief who found pardon in the very moment of death, beside Christ hanging on the cross, except what attests that he turned away from his former life, humbly had recourse to Christ, and prayed for His mercy. Are not sure signs of sorrow for sins sometimes enough for sacramental absolution? Sinners who are overtaken at the point of death and cannot confess their sins certainly can and ought to be absolved if they have at least specified some sin and indicate their inward sorrow by outward signs, even if they show no sign declaring what they purpose for the future. Absolution on this account should in no way be delayed.” Thus far Vega.

Third conclusion. — FOR CONTRITION TO BE PERFECT AND TRULY TO MERIT THE REMISSION OF SIN OUTSIDE THE SACRAMENT, IT MUST DETEST SIN FROM AN AFFECTION OF CHARITY, AND HAVE AN ACT OF CHARITY FORMALLY OR AT LEAST VIRTUALLY, OR ONE COMMANDED BY CHARITY. This conclusion consists chiefly of two parts.

The first of these parts—namely, that for Contrition to be perfect and remit sin outside the Sacrament, it must be elicited on account of God, who has been offended, and have annexed to it a vow to receive the Sacrament—is common among Catholic Doctors. For perfect Contrition differs from imperfect Contrition in this: the latter, which is called Attrition, is not directed toward God for His own sake and insofar as He is the supreme good in Himself, but insofar as He is good to us, that is, as He is our ultimate happiness, from attaining which the sin we detest removes us. The former, however, is directed toward God, to be loved for His own sake, that is, insofar as He is infinite goodness and supremely lovable, and as He is attained by charity. (The Council of Trent indeed teaches this, sess. XIV, ch. 1, where it says: It teaches further (the holy Synod) that, although it sometimes happens that this Contrition is made perfect by charity and a man is reconciled to God before he actually receives this Sacrament, nevertheless that reconciliation must not be ascribed to Contrition itself without the vow of the Sacrament, which is included in it. But that imperfect contrition, which is called Attrition, since it is commonly conceived either from consideration of the shamefulness of sin or from fear of hell and purgatory, etc.) By these words the Council distinguishes perfect from imperfect Contrition in this respect: the former is said to be perfected by charity. This can happen only because the act of this Contrition is either a formal act of charity, or at least has one annexed to it, or contains one virtually, and detests sin insofar as it is offensive to God, who is supremely lovable; and so at least indirectly it is directed toward God as the object of charity. Imperfect Contrition, however, or Attrition, detests sin either on account of its shamefulness, or the evil of hell, or because it removes us from possession of God insofar as He is our highest good and our beatitude. Thus it is not directed toward God from the motive of charity and an affection of friendship, but only of desire. Although this affection is not itself vicious, as the Council defines in the same place, it nevertheless cannot justify outside the Sacrament, as perfect Contrition can.

There is greater difficulty concerning the second part of this conclusion, namely, that the act of Contrition must be elicited by the virtue of charity, or have a formal act of charity annexed to it, or at least contain one virtually. In determining this assertion, three opinions of authors appear. The more probable one seems to us to be that which maintains that Contrition can at once be an act of detestation of sin and of love of God above all things, so that it is at once formal love of God and formal hatred of sin. Nor should this seem surprising, since it belongs to the same virtue to will good for someone and not to will evil for him—for example, to will complete health for Peter and not to will even the least sickness for him. But to will some good for God insofar as it is good for Him—for example, that He be infinite, eternal, etc., and be glorified and honored by all creatures—is a formal act of the virtue of charity. Therefore, likewise, not to will evil for God, insofar as it is an offense against Him, will be a formal act of the virtue of charity. Consequently, detesting sin insofar as it is an extrinsic evil for God and offensive to Him can be a formal act of charity and elicited by it. This is indeed confirmed: formally to love God is nothing other than to wish some positive good for Him insofar as it is His good, and consequently to will removed from Him everything that has the character of an evil in relation to Him. For often the absence and removal of some evil is far more desirable than some positive good. Consequently, the same act of love of God can at once be hatred of sin and have as its formal motivating object both the deformity and malice of sin and the divine goodness, which is, as it were, externally stained by such malice.

This truth can be confirmed by all those testimonies of Sacred Scripture and the holy Fathers by which remission of sin is attributed especially to charity. Thus Luke 7: Her many sins are forgiven, because she loved much. The passage speaks of St. Magdalene, who stood behind the Lord beside His feet, bathed His feet with her tears and wiped them with the hair of her head, and thereby testified to the deepest sorrow of heart and Contrition for the sins she had committed. Nevertheless, remission of sins is attributed to her love and charity, as a sign that this detestation of sin was one and the same with an act of charity and love of God. Likewise, Proverbs 10: Charity covers all offenses. And 1 Peter 4: Charity covers a multitude of sins. And 1 John 3: We know that we have passed from death to life because we love the brothers … he who does not love remains in death. Here Scripture is not speaking of the habit, but of the act of charity; for in those passages it exhorts us to perform an act of charity with actual helps, so that God, in view of it, may grant us remission of sins, which comes through grace or habitual charity. Hence St. Chrysostom, Hom. 7 on 2 Timothy, near the end: Just as fire, once it has seized a forest, is accustomed to cleanse everything, so the fervor of charity, wherever it falls, destroys and breaks through everything that demolishes the divine harvest, and cleanses the soil to receive and nourish seeds deeply. He continues: Where charity is, all evils have been removed. And below: Charity is the fullness of the law: for all crimes that disturb peace are loosed wherever charity is present.

Hence St. Augustine, Serm. 7, On Time, says: Only hatred of sin and love of God make repentance genuine. That is, hatred of sin which proceeds from the motive of charity. For it is clear from the words that follow that St. Augustine does not there understand by love of God an act of love distinct from Contrition itself. For he adds: When you repent in such a way that what was once sweet to you in life tastes bitter in your heart, and what formerly delighted you in the body now torments you in your mind, then you already groan well before God and say, “Against you alone have I sinned.” … This, my little child, is true Penance: when one is converted in such a way as not to return, when one repents in such a way as not to repeat the sin. It is clear that true Contrition on the part of charity suffices to effect this conversion, without any further distinct act of love of God above all things. The author of On True and False Penance, ch. 17, seems to interpret and confirm this opinion of the holy Doctor in this way when he says: The truly penitent must not only fear God as judge, but also love Him as just: let Him not be feared for punishment, but loved for glory. For one must grieve over the crime and all its aforesaid variety; and because this is scarcely possible, Augustine could doubt about that man’s salvation, etc. By these latter words he signifies that the act of love and affection for God which he requires for true Penance is the same as sorrow for or detestation of sin, since he says that sorrow itself suffices for salvation.

YOU WILL SAY: The same St. Augustine, bk. 2, Against Cresconius, ch. 2, shows that no one can be cleansed, however many acts of Contrition he performs, unless he likewise elicits an act of charity. “For this reason,” he says, addressing the Donatists, “you do not think that they are cleansed when they pass over to us from you: because they are not baptized anew, as though men were cleansed from error by baptism alone, which ought not to be repeated, since it is one and the same.” To prove the contrary of this, he immediately adds: “They are cleansed also by the word of truth, by Him who says in John 15: “Now you are clean because of the word that I have spoken to you.” They are cleansed also by the sacrifice of a contrite heart, by Him of whom it is said in Psalm 50: “A spirit afflicted is a sacrifice to God; a contrite and humbled heart, O God, You will not despise.” They are cleansed also by alms, by Him who says in Luke 11: “Give alms, and behold, all things are clean for you.” They are cleansed by charity, which surpasses all things, by Him who said through the Apostle Peter: “Charity covers a multitude of sins.” If charity alone is present, all those things are rightly done; but if it is absent, all are done in vain.” Therefore, according to St. Augustine, acts of charity and Contrition are distinct.

I deny the inference: for it is not sufficiently clear from the words quoted above which charity St. Augustine was speaking of, whether actual or habitual. For he immediately adds: “But as to where this Charity comes from, hear the Apostle teaching: ‘The charity of God,’ he says, ‘has been poured into our hearts,’ etc. Hence those who have received the Church’s baptism outside the Church are rightly believed not to have the Holy Spirit until they adhere to the Church herself in the bond of peace through the bond of charity.” Here he clearly indicates that he is speaking of habitual charity and sanctifying grace, which adults who receive the Church’s baptism outside the Church cannot possess because of their falling away from the Church.

Add that even if St. Augustine is speaking of actual charity, nothing is thereby proved against our assertion. For we readily admit that the sacrifice of a contrite heart avails nothing unless it is either a formal act of charity or at least contains one virtually and is directed toward the same object of charity.

YOU WILL PRESS: If the act of Contrition is not distinct from the formal act of love of God, it follows either that it is the same formal act of love or that it contains that act virtually. But neither can be said, because the act of detestation is a departure from sin as the greatest of all evils, whereas the act of love is an approach to God as the best of all goods; but those approaches and departures are two distinct acts. Therefore, etc. Nor can the second alternative be said, for the act of charity is the most perfect of all acts; therefore it cannot be included virtually in the act of Contrition, which has less perfection, since that which contains virtually is nobler than what is contained. — I DENY the minor premise: and for its first proof I say that the same act of love is at once, at least virtually and equivalently, an approach to God as the highest good and a departure from sin; likewise, the same act of Contrition, which formally is a departure from sin and detestation of it, is at least virtually and equivalently an approach to divine goodness. For, by reason of the same motive, one of these movements necessarily follows from the other, if both are occupied with the same formal and terminating object. For precisely insofar as someone detests sin on account of God, who is supremely lovable, he also loves God; just as, conversely, someone detests sin at least virtually while directing his act and affection of love toward God as supremely lovable for His own sake. Hence the same act is at once pursuit and flight, approach and departure, since it is impossible for someone to approach God through an act of love and charity without departing from and fleeing sin, which is most opposed to Him. For the second proof I say that Contrition is not an act less perfect than the act of charity itself, since, from what has been said, it is itself an act of love, although not so explicit as if it were directed toward God by way of pursuit. Hence the acts of Contrition and charity seem to differ only as to their manner of being directed toward God: the act of charity is directed toward God by way of pursuit, and insofar as He is presented as the highest and supremely lovable good; but the act of Contrition is directed toward God insofar as, on His account, it flees and detests sin as opposed to Him. Thus the act of charity terminates immediately in God as the highest good and mediately in the sin it detests, insofar as that sin is opposed to the highest good; whereas the act of Contrition terminates immediately in the sin to be detested and mediately in the supreme goodness of God, on account of which sin is opposed to Him. It follows, then, that the act of Contrition differs from the act of charity only by its differing direction toward the same object and by its distinct connotation of that same object, mediately or immediately. For since those two objects are so connected—God as the highest and supremely lovable good, and sin as supremely hateful—that one is in some way on account of the other, it follows that both objects can be attained by one and the same simple act. Therefore Contrition can be called love of God by way of flight, because it is not only pursuit of divine goodness, but at the same time flight from sin insofar as it is offensive to God. Consequently, the second part of our assertion is established: Contrition perfected by charity can be a formal act of charity.

The third part is also evident: Contrition must necessarily be an act either elicited through the habit of charity when elicited by a justified person, or at least commanded by charity—namely, when that detestation of sin has an act of charity specially joined to it. Thus it does not suffice for such detestation to be made from the motive of obedience, or Religion, or Penance; it must necessarily be made from the motive of charity. First, because, as we said on the authority of the Council of Trent, for Contrition to justify outside the Sacrament it must be perfected by charity, that is, be made for the motive of charity or elicited by charity itself. Second, because remission of sin does not occur precisely without love of God, as we said on the authority of Sacred Scripture; consequently, that Contrition must be elicited by charity or commanded by it.

The Council of Trent confirms all these points, sess. VI, ch. 6, where it teaches that Penance takes its beginning from the love of God. For it says of penitents: They are disposed to that very justice when, aroused by divine grace and aided … by fear of divine justice, by which they are usefully shaken, they turn to consider God’s mercy, are raised up to hope, trusting that God will be propitious to them for Christ’s sake, begin to love Him as the source of all justice, and therefore are moved against sins by some hatred and detestation, etc. By these words the Council teaches that true Contrition must necessarily arise from love of God. For through it a man is finally disposed for sanctifying grace, by which he is constituted in the city of God. But no one belongs to the city of God except through love of God, even to contempt of self, as St. Augustine teaches, bk. 14, On the City of God, last ch. Therefore Contrition must necessarily presuppose love or have it annexed to it—if not formally, at least imperatively. That is, if it neither presupposes nor has annexed to it a formal act of love, at least it must be commanded by charity and love of God. For Contrition is detestation of sins on account of God, and consequently must necessarily presuppose some act of the will concerning God. But no other act besides love is intelligible: for because we love God, we detest the offense inflicted on Him. Therefore, since Contrition includes hatred of sins on account of God, it must necessarily be made from love and elicited from the motive of charity.

YOU WILL SAY: If love of God is necessary for true Contrition, then Contrition is superfluous for remission of sin. The inference is evident: for, as we have said many times, an act of charity suffices for justification and remission of sin. Therefore, when it precedes Contrition, it truly contributes to the remission of sin, and thus leaves nothing for Contrition to remit. — I DENY the inference: for either the act of Contrition is the same as the act of love of God, or it has that act annexed to it. If the first, Contrition is not useless for justification, since it is itself the final disposition for it. But if it only has an act of love annexed to it, so that the act of detestation of sins comes first and an act of love follows afterwards, or conversely, full remission of sins cannot take place outside the Sacrament until both acts have been elicited. For when someone remembers his sins, love of God alone without actual Penance does not suffice; nor can someone love God and remember that he has offended God without immediately detesting that offense. Thus in loving God he grieves that he offended Him, and in grieving he loves God more fervently.