Scotus Academicus, Tomus decimus: De Baptismo, De Poenitentia, De Extrema Unctione

NOTE 1. Divine precepts are of two different kinds: some are negative, others affirmative. Negative precepts are expressed in negative words and remove an action; affirmative precepts, however, command some action and urge us to perform some act. There is, moreover, this great difference between them: negative precepts bind always, at every point of time, not only with respect to the disposition and inclination of the mind, but also with respect to the negative act. Thus, for example, the precept against theft obliges one not only never to intend to steal—or always to intend not to steal—but also never to commit theft. An affirmative precept, by contrast, does indeed bind always with respect to the disposition and inclination of the mind, but not with respect to carrying out the affirmative act: it requires this only at the time determined by God or the Church. Thus the precept to honor one’s parents binds always with respect to that disposition of mind by which we must always have an inclination toward the honor, respect, and obedience to be shown them at the fitting time; yet it does not always bind us to perform the act, but only at those times when our parents may need our aid and support. The question, then, is whether there is an affirmative or a negative precept to do penance.

NOTE 2. Every affirmative precept also entails a negative one, forbidding the performance of an act contrary to that precept. Thus the precept to honor one’s parents includes a negative precept never to dishonor them or insult them in word or deed. I said “an act contrary,” for affirmative precepts do not entail the negation of a contradictory act. For example, the precept of faith does entail the negation of unbelief—that is, the negative precept not to be unbelieving, by performing an act of faith contrary to it, since it forbids positive unbelief. But it does not forbid negative or privative unbelief, such as that of those upon whom the Law of the Gospel has not yet shone and who have heard nothing of Christ the Lord. Likewise, the precept to love God includes the contrary negative precept never to hate God, but it does not include its contradictory, namely, never to be someone who does not love God; for it would follow that we were bound to an uninterrupted act of love for God, which plainly seems impossible.

NOTE 3. Divine precepts can be fulfilled in two ways: either with respect to the substance of the act commanded, or with respect to the end of the one commanding. For example, someone who fasts in a state of mortal sin does fulfill the precept with respect to the substance of the act—that is, abstaining from eating meat and observing moderation in food or drink—but does not fulfill it with respect to the end of the one commanding, namely, God’s intention that this fast be meritorious of eternal life, for the attainment of which it is prescribed. Hence every precept gives rise to a twofold obligation: one on the part of the deed, and the other on the part of the end for which the act must be performed. The difficulty, then, is whether in either of these ways there is a precept to do penance, and at what time it binds. Two matters must therefore be determined here above all: first, whether there is a divine precept to do penance; second, when it must be fulfilled—whether immediately after a sin is committed, or only on feast days or in manifest danger of death.

First conclusion. — A SINNER IS BOUND BY PRECEPT TO DO PENANCE, SO THAT HE COMMITS A NEW SIN IF HE NEGLECTS IT AT THE TIME WHEN HE IS BOUND TO PERFORM IT. All Catholic Doctors agree on this with the Subtle Doctor, d. 17, q. unica, n. 13, where he says: “Whoever has lost the first grace is bound, by the necessity of the precept—and by that precept, ‘You shall love the Lord your God,’ etc.—to do what lies within him toward its restoration, and also by virtue of that precept, ‘you shall love yourself.’ But this sinner has lost the first grace through mortal sin, and can recover it by receiving the sacrament of penance from that judge, because it was instituted as an efficacious remedy for receiving the first grace, in accordance with those words of John, ‘Whose sins you shall forgive,’ etc. And thus the necessity of the precept of confession is concluded not from those words alone, ‘Whose sins you shall forgive,’ etc., but from those words together with that precept, ‘You shall love the Lord your God,’ etc. By these words the Doctor declares that the sacrament of penance must be received under precept, and consequently, by the same reasoning, penance must also be done under precept.”

It is proved, then, by the authority of Sacred Scripture. First, from Luke 13: Unless you do penance, you will all likewise perish. These words certainly signify not only that penance is necessary as a means, as some maintain, but also that it is necessary by precept. For Catholic Doctors infer the precept to receive baptism in reality or by desire from John 3: Unless a man be born again of water, etc.; and likewise the precept to receive the Eucharist from John 6: Unless you eat the flesh of the Son of Man, etc. Therefore, since Scripture uses the same manner of speaking about doing penance, the same precept must likewise be inferred. — I admit, however, that this oracle more strongly suggests the necessity of penance as a means than as a precept: all sinners who have not done penance will necessarily perish, not on account of the sin of failing to do penance, but on account of their past, unforgiven sins. I therefore think it truer to say, with the Doctor, that the precept to do penance is derived rather from love of God and of ourselves. For by the precept of love of ourselves we are bound to secure eternal beatitude for ourselves and, consequently, to remove everything that keeps us from attaining it, such as sins, which can be washed away only by penance. The same may likewise be inferred from love of God, since Christ the Lord said in John 14: If anyone love me, he will keep my word, and my Father will love him. It is impossible for a sinner truly to will to love God without also implicitly willing God’s love toward himself, and thus to remove everything that would impede that divine love. Nor would someone seem to love God sincerely if he refused to remove, when he can, what he knows to be supremely displeasing to God and to provoke God’s aversion and hatred toward him. Hence, from the Doctor’s reasoning set out above, the conclusion is formally proved as follows: whoever has lost sanctifying grace and divine friendship is bound, by the precept of loving God, to do what lies within him toward recovering that divine grace and friendship; but a sinner has lost God’s grace and friendship through mortal sin and can recover neither unless he does penance; therefore, from the precept of loving God, taken together with the necessity of doing penance, the precept to perform it is inferred.

YOU WILL SAY: If there were a precept to do penance, it would follow that no one could be damned for a single mortal sin; but this is false; therefore so is the proposition from which it follows. The major consequence is evident: a sinner who died after committing a mortal sin without having done penance would necessarily be damned, not only for that mortal sin but also for omitting the precept to do penance; that omission would itself be a distinct sin, since it would violate a distinct precept. Therefore, etc. — I answer first that nothing at all absurd follows from a sinner being damned for only one mortal sin, even though a single sin alone would suffice for damnation; indeed, this would make the divine justice shine forth more clearly, since it would with even greater right consign a man to eternal punishment as guilty in two ways. I answer second that the major premise may be denied. A sinner might be damned for only one mortal sin even if he omits the precept to do penance—for example, if immediately upon falling into mortal sin he loses the use of reason and then dies. Such a man would be damned only for the mortal sin he committed, not for omitting the precept to do penance, since the loss of the use of reason made it impossible for him to observe that precept. Add that even if he lives for some time in a state of mortal sin with the use of reason and dies in that state, he will not for that reason be damned for omitting the precept to do penance; for he is not bound to fulfill that precept immediately after sinning, as will be shown.

Second conclusion. — THE PRECEPT TO DO PENANCE DOES NOT, OF ITSELF, OBLIGE A SINNER TO REPENT AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY AFTER COMMITTING A SIN. This is the Doctor’s position, d. 17, n. 21, where he determines that the precept to make confession, and consequently to do penance, binds only at a certain, determined time, especially at the point of death. That it does not bind immediately after a sin is committed, he teaches in n. 28, where he rejects the opinion of Alexander of Hales, who maintained in Summa, I, q. 77, memb. 1, art. 2, that the precept to make confession, and consequently to do penance, binds as soon as an opportunity presents itself. The Doctor denies this, saying: “For penal precepts are not to be extended, but restricted, and no occasion is found when this affirmative precept binds or obliges except at some time,” etc.

The Conclusion is proved first as follows. If a man were bound to do penance immediately after sinning, it would follow that he committed mortal sin at every single moment in which he could repent, since at every such moment he would transgress the precept imposed upon him. But this seems false in light of the common practice of the faithful: when they confess their sins, they never accuse themselves of delaying or postponing penance, unless perhaps the delay has gone beyond the time determined by the Church for confessing sins and doing penance. Nor are they questioned by confessors about such a delay. It is not likely that this omission in confession arises from inadequate instruction of penitents and confessors; otherwise the Church would be blameworthy, since it knows of this omission in confession and yet does not correct or remedy it. This is therefore a sign that such an accusation is not necessary for salvation.

Next, if such delay were contrary to a precept and sinful, it would follow that baptism once conferred on adults did not give them the first grace, although it was principally ordered to that end. For in former times the Church did not allow catechumens to be solemnly baptized except at Easter and Pentecost. Consequently, if they had been required to confess immediately after committing an actual sin, they could not have approached baptism with that sin: it would already have had to be washed away and blotted out through contrition, which would suffice for justification. For the question is not about a simple repudiation of sin, but about that repudiation and penance by which the sinner is placed outside the danger of eternal damnation. This is precisely why the opponents require penance immediately after a sin is committed: lest a man expose himself manifestly to the danger of eternal damnation during the interval between sin and death.

Finally, the precept to do penance is affirmative; therefore it does not bind at every time, but only at a determined time. The antecedent is established: the precept to do penance is one that commands the eliciting of an act of virtue, but an act of virtue is commanded to be elicited only by an affirmative precept; therefore, etc. The consequence is evident from the parity of reasoning with other affirmative precepts, which bind only at some determined time, as is clear of love of God, reverence for parents, hearing Mass, etc. All these precepts do not oblige one to elicit a positive act at every determined moment, although they do oblige one to refrain from the contrary act. “For,” says the Doctor in the aforementioned n. 28, “one must always have the will to confess at the time when the precept binds; by this I mean, if someone¹ has the will to do so at no time.”

YOU WILL SAY 1: Sacred Scripture warns sinners, under the gravest threats and denunciations, not to delay penance; therefore it judges that penance cannot be postponed without sin. The antecedent is evident from Isaiah 65: You shall all fall by the sword, because I called and you did not answer; I spoke and you did not hear. Jeremiah says the same in ch. 8: They were confounded, he says, who committed abomination; indeed, they were not confounded with confusion, nor did they know how to blush; therefore they shall fall among those who fall, and in the time of their visitation they shall fall, says the Lord. — I answer: These and similar oracles of Sacred Scripture do not condemn delay of penance when every present inclination toward the past sin has ceased—which is all that we are discussing here—but rather rebuke perseverance in actual sin. For Isaiah immediately adds: And you did evil in my sight, and chose the things that I would not. Jeremiah likewise continues in the same place: All have turned to their own course, like a horse rushing headlong into battle.

YOU WILL PRESS: The same Sacred Scripture, under the gravest threat, forbids postponing penance; therefore the solution is no solution. The antecedent is proved from Ecclesiasticus 5: Do not delay to turn to the Lord, and do not put it off from day to day; for his wrath will come suddenly, and in the time of vengeance he will destroy you. And in ch. 21: Flee from sin as from the face of a serpent. And in Revelation 2 the Angel warns the Bishop of Ephesus: Remember from where you have fallen, and do penance, and do the first works; but if not, I will come to you and remove your candlestick from its place, unless you do penance. Therefore penance cannot be delayed without sin. — I answer first that all these oracles and similar ones signify that it is a most wholesome counsel to do penance for one’s sin immediately, but not that it must be done under precept. Next, I say that even if they refer to the divine precept to do penance, they do not signify that anyone is bound to do it at every moment, but only at a fitting time and when some necessity requires it. For someone is not considered to delay who does not do what he can, but rather one who does not do it when it ought to be done. As St. Peter says, 2 Peter 3: The Lord does not delay his promise, as some consider delay, but deals patiently for your sake, etc. By these words he signifies that God does not delay the intention of his promise, even though he does not fulfill it immediately when he can do so, because he will fulfill it at the fitting time and delays no longer than is fitting. By parity of reasoning, then, a man should not be said to delay penance when he does it at the fitting time and when necessity requires it.

SUBSUMES: Sacred Scripture plainly signifies that God condemns and punishes procrastination of penance, as is clear from Proverbs 1: I called you, and you refused; I stretched out my hand, and there was no one who looked; you despised all my counsel and neglected my reproofs; I too will look on when you are destroyed and mock when what you feared comes upon you. — I ANSWER: Scripture is to be understood as speaking of sinners who persevere in actual sin, as is gathered from the preceding words, since shortly before it had said: How long, little ones, will you love childishness, and fools desire the things that are harmful to them, and the imprudent hate knowledge? St. Paul is to be understood in the same way in Romans 2, when he says: Do you despise the riches of his goodness, patience, and long-suffering? Do you not know that the goodness of God leads you to penance? But according to your hardness and impenitent heart, you treasure up wrath for yourself on the day of wrath and of the revelation of the just judgment of God. There he is not speaking of merely delaying penance, but of repeating sins. For earlier he had said: Do you think this, O man, who judge those who do such things and do them yourself, that you will escape the judgment of God? Hence immediately after the words quoted above he adds: He will render to each according to his works: to those who by patience in good work seek glory, honor, and incorruption, eternal life; but to those who are contentious and do not obey the truth, but believe iniquity, wrath and indignation. The Apostle is therefore speaking against those who actively pursued the same evil deeds.

YOU WILL PRESS AGAIN: The meaning of Sacred Scripture is no other than that which the holy Fathers have adopted; but from these divine oracles the holy Fathers teach an obligation to repent immediately and assert that penance postponed will be useless, as St. Augustine especially affirms in bk. 50, hom. 12. After saying that sincere and true penance is effective at any moment of time, he adds that late penance is very uncertain: “One who does penance and is reconciled while well, and afterward lives well, will depart secure; one who does penance at the very end and is reconciled, if he departs secure, I am not secure; where I am secure, I give security; where I am not secure, I do not give security. I can give penance, but I cannot give security,” etc. — I ANSWER, St. Augustine there rebukes only those who delay penance too long and put it off until death. Thus in Serm. 57, De Tempore, he says beautifully: “The penance asked by a sick man is sickly; the penance asked by a dying man—I fear that it too may die.” Therefore in Serm. 110, De Tempore, he wisely warns: “The day that overtakes us is the day that is accustomed to overtake us: a man deceives himself and trifles with his death when he thinks that the pardon of his final hour can come to his aid. This is foolish: first, because security promised for the last day is most perilous; next, it is most foolish to entrust a matter concerning eternal necessities, while devoted to the vanities of life, to one’s final moments. It is hateful to God when a man sins more freely in the confidence of penance reserved for old age.” Eucherius of Lyon agrees with him: “It is most foolish,” he says, “to entrust a matter concerning eternal necessities to the final moments of a life that is passing away.” How dangerous such postponement of penance until death is, however, we shall show near the end of this Question.

YOU WILL SAY 2: One is bound to greater charity toward oneself than toward one’s neighbor; but by the precept of charity I am bound immediately to apply fraternal correction to a neighbor who sins, when opportunity and hope of amendment are present; therefore I am much more bound to help myself through the remedy of penance as soon as this can conveniently be done. — I ANSWER that the minor premise is true only when there is danger of relapse and a serious suspicion that, if the neighbor is corrected, he will immediately fall into another sin. For a past sin is not the subject matter for fraternal correction, nor is a sin that persists in its guilt when there is no danger of relapse; only a sin foreseen in the future is, as Ecclesiasticus teaches in ch. 19: “Correct your friend, lest perhaps he did not understand and say, ‘I did not do it’; or, if he did it, that he may not do it again. Correct your neighbor, lest perhaps he did not say it; and, if he did, that he may not repeat it. Correct your friend, for a fault is often committed.” These words signify that a future sin, not a past one when there is no danger of repetition, is the subject matter of correction. Consequently it is false, speaking absolutely, that one is bound to correct a neighbor immediately after he sins. — This is confirmed by the fact that I am not bound to correct a neighbor except when he himself is bound to listen and accept correction. For Christ the Lord prescribed the precept of fraternal correction under this condition in Matthew 18, where he signifies that we are not bound to correct someone who is not bound to listen, but must report him to the Church. Yet a neighbor is not bound to amend himself immediately after sinning; therefore he is not bound to listen to me when I correct him, and consequently in that case I myself am not bound to amend him—unless, as I said above, there is danger of relapse. Add to this that one may be bound to help a neighbor in matters of great temporal importance, even if one is not bound to do so toward oneself, since the neighbor may be absolutely or irrationally willing, whereas I am willing rationally and prudently.

YOU WILL SAY 3: Someone who has taken away another’s due honor or some possession is bound to restore it to him immediately; but someone who sins takes away the honor owed to God; therefore he is bound to make satisfaction to God immediately through penance. — I DISTINGUISH THE ANTECEDENT: if danger arises from delaying such restitution, lest the harm inflicted on the neighbor increase, I grant it; if there is no such danger, I deny it. Thus if there is danger that the violation of God’s name will increase through delaying penance—for example, if someone has spread false doctrine—he is bound to do penance immediately and retract the false teachings he spread. But the case is otherwise if no such danger is imminent, as usually happens.

YOU WILL PRESS AGAIN: Someone who has taken another’s property by theft is bound to restore it to its owner as quickly as possible and repair the harm inflicted on his neighbor; therefore much more is he bound to compensate for the injury done to God by mortal sin through the penance owed, and to restore the honor taken from God. — I DENY THE CONSEQUENCE. The reason for the difference is that a person suffers harm to necessary and useful goods through theft; hence, by delaying restitution, he suffers a new injury, a real one, since he is compelled to do without something necessary or useful to him. God, however, suffers no real injury from our sins; hence the delay of our contrition does not compel him to do without anything necessary or useful to him, in keeping with Psalm 50: You have no need of my goods. And Job 22: What does it profit God if you are just, or what does he gain if your way is blameless?

YOU WILL PRESS: A thief is bound to restore what he stole immediately because, for as long as he keeps it, he commits an injustice, since it is unjust to retain another’s property; but for as long as a sinner remains in a state of sin, he unjustly withholds divine honor, since sin is an injustice against God; therefore he is bound to make satisfaction to God immediately and restore the honor owed him through penance. — I DENY THE MINOR PREMISE. As a rule, sin is not a true injustice against God any more than against a human legislator. For God has not expressly declared that when he commands something to be done or omitted, he exercises a power of ownership or dominion by which he could exact all human acts as debts owed under strict justice.

If you press the point: a thief commits an injustice because he takes a thing from another that was under that person’s dominion; but that thing was much more under God’s dominion than under man’s; therefore, for the same reason that he commits an injustice against a man and is bound to make restitution immediately, he is also bound to repair the injury done to God immediately through the penance owed. — I WILL DENY THE PARITY. The reason for the difference is that someone who takes a thing from an unwilling person also takes away that person’s dominion over his property. But through theft God does not lose dominion over the thing stolen; consequently, the cases are not on a par. Theft is indeed against God’s precept, You shall not steal, and is therefore disobedience toward him, but not injustice.

YOU WILL SAY 1: Mortal sin consists in being in danger of mortal sin; but as long as a sinner does not repent, he is in danger of falling into another mortal sin; therefore he is bound to repent as soon as possible. The major premise is evident from Ecclesiasticus 3: He who loves danger will perish in it. The minor premise is proved by the authority of St. Gregory, Hom. 11 on Ezekiel, where he says: “A sin that is not soon blotted out by penance is itself sin, the cause of sin, and the punishment of sin at once. For whatever is first committed is sin; but if it is not soon wiped away by doing penance, Almighty God, in just judgment, allows a mind bound by sins to fall into another fault, so that one who refused to cleanse by weeping and correction what he had done begins to heap sin upon sin. A sin, then, that is not washed away by the lament of penance is at once sin and the cause of sin, because from it arises what binds the sinner’s mind still more deeply.” — I DISTINGUISH THE MAJOR PREMISE: if the danger is imminent and near, I grant it; if it is merely remote, I deny it. For according to Aristotle, Rhetoric, II, danger is “the approach of something to be feared.” Thus, if someone recognizes that delaying penance does not bring an imminent danger of a near fall, he does not seem to sin by delaying penance. As to St. Gregory, I say that by these or similar words he warns against delaying penance for long after a sin has been committed; he does not assert that penance is necessary immediately. This is gathered from the words immediately preceding, for he says: “The judgments of Almighty God are diverse, and he who long waits for the sinner to return assigns the one who does not return and shows contempt for him a place where he may stumble more grievously.”

YOU WILL SAY 5: We are bound by a negative precept not to be enemies of God, as in fact we are through sin; but negative precepts bind always and at every moment; therefore a man is bound by precept never to be in a state of sin, and consequently sins for as long as he remains in sin. — I ANSWER the major premise: someone may be an enemy of God in three ways: first, actively, when a man hates God; second, passively, when he is hated by God; third, demeritoriously, when he deserves to be hated by God. Hence, in response to the argument, I distinguish the major premise: that a man is bound by a negative precept not to be God’s enemy actively, I grant, because we are bound never to hate God; passively or demeritoriously, I deny it, both because avoiding this enmity is not within our power except through an act of penance, which we are not bound to elicit immediately, and also because this enmity toward God consists only in the state of a man who is a sinner. But we do not merit or demerit according to a state, nor are there any precepts about maintaining some state; for there is no precept requiring us always to remain in a state of grace, only a counsel.

YOU WILL PRESS AGAIN: Whoever does not love God hates him; but as long as a sinner remains in a state of sin, he does not love God and therefore hates him; consequently, he is God’s enemy not only passively and demeritoriously, but also actively. — I DENY THE MAJOR PREMISE. Not loving God is one thing, and hating God another. For between friend and enemy there is a middle term, namely, one who is not a friend. In the same way, between penance and impenitence there is a middle term, namely, not doing penance: for penance is displeasure at a sin committed, while impenitence is complacency in that very sin. Thus it is not the same to be unpenitent and to be impenitent, just as it is not the same to hate God and not to love God. Hence, although the affirmative precept to love God includes a negative precept concerning the contrary act—namely, never to hate God, which binds always and at every moment—it does not include a negative precept concerning its contradictory, namely, never not loving God, that is, always loving him. From this it is clear that although someone who delays penance does not have an actual love of God, he does not thereby hate him or become guilty of that precept: You shall love the Lord your God.

YOU WILL PRESS: Not to will to be loved by God is opposed to love of God; but a sinner, for as long as he persists in sin, does not will to be loved by God, since in that state he is hated by God—for the impious man and his impiety are abominable to God; therefore, etc. — I DISTINGUISH THE MAJOR PREMISE: not willing this through a positive act by which someone would reject and scorn divine love, I grant; not willing it through a negative act—that is, by suspending action, when someone knows that he is not in God’s friendship yet neglects to withdraw himself from that state in which he merits divine indignation—I deny it. For persistence in that state is not forbidden by the precept of loving God, since that precept is affirmative and does not bind always and at every moment.

YOU WILL PRESS AGAIN: At least, delaying penance without a just cause is contrary to the friendship and reverence owed to God. For if a son had seriously offended his father, or a servant his master, they would certainly provoke greater displeasure if, without any cause, they delayed even briefly in begging pardon and seeking reconciliation. — I ANSWER by denying the antecedent, if the matter concerns a new offense, and the example does not compel us. Perhaps among human beings there is an obligation, at least indirect, to make satisfaction immediately, because human beings do not judge hidden things, especially what is merely interior. When they do not see an outward request for pardon, and there is no just cause for delay, they judge that the interior disposition still persists and are therefore rightly angered anew. But God’s relation to man is different: since God knows human hearts perfectly, when he sees that a man has entirely ceased freely willing sin, he does not have a new displeasure toward him merely because the man remains habitually in sin for some time.

SUBSUMES: No one remains voluntarily in habitual sin without taking pleasure in it; for one takes pleasure in sin for as long as it does not displease him. It does not displease him as long as he does not detest it or grieve that he committed it; but complacency and inclination toward sin provoke divine indignation; therefore, etc. — I DISTINGUISH THE MAJOR PREMISE: that he takes pleasure in it through a new act of will, by which he wills and approves that sin, I deny; that he takes pleasure in it by the absence of an act of displeasure, I grant. Hence the consequence is invalid: sin does not displease him in that state; therefore he takes pleasure in it. For between taking pleasure and being displeased there is a middle term, namely, not being displeased through the absence of an act.

SUBSUMES AGAIN: But in that state the sinner not only lacks an act; he really has an act of will and an actual inclination toward sin. For precisely by not willing to do penance, he wills to remain in a state of sin. Whoever wills the antecedent of a good consequent also wills the consequent: for if Peter wills to run, he also wills to move. But to will to remain in that state is to take pleasure in sin; therefore, etc. — I DENY THE SUBSUMPTION. It does not follow that if a sinner does not positively will to do penance, he thereby wills to be in a state of sin. As to the proof, I say that the rule “whoever wills the antecedent of a good consequent also wills the consequent” is not universally true. It does indeed follow: Christ the Lord redeemed human beings; therefore they sinned. But it does not follow: Christ willed to redeem human beings; therefore he willed them to sin. Likewise, it does follow: I am doing penance; therefore I sinned; and yet I will to do penance, which is the antecedent, while I do not will to have sinned, which is the consequent. Indeed, doing penance itself is willing not to have sinned. Therefore this rule is true only when the antecedent is ordered toward attaining the consequent, or conversely. Thus it rightly follows: you will beatitude; therefore you will the means to beatitude, and conversely. In the present case, then, although from the fact that penance is not done one may infer, “therefore he is in a state of sin,” it does not follow: “I will not do penance; therefore I will to be in a state of sin.” For not doing penance is not ordered toward attaining such a state, since we do not enter that state by failing to do penance, but rather when we actually sin. Thus to will not to do penance at a time when one is bound to do it is not an act good or evil by its species, and is therefore not a new sin.

YOU WILL SAY 6: The loss of spiritual life is more grievous than that of temporal life. But if someone falls ill bodily or is wounded, he is immediately bound, by the obligation of nature, the precept of self-love, and the commandment You shall not kill, to apply remedies at once lest he lose his life. Therefore, much more, when he has received the mortal wound of sin, must he apply the remedy of penance lest he lose spiritual life. — SOME ANSWER that even if spiritual life is more excellent than bodily life, there is a difference in the obligation to preserve or recover it. They say that a man is not master of his bodily life as he is master of his spiritual life, which he acquires and procures for himself by his own acts. Perhaps there would indeed be a difference insofar as someone who took away his bodily life would sin against justice, since he would take something over which he had no ownership, whereas he would not sin in the same way if he took away his spiritual life. Nevertheless, it is certain that taking away one’s spiritual life is contrary to the precept of charity toward oneself, which obliges each person to avoid every evil, whether of body or soul, insofar as this can conveniently be done. Consequently it obliges one to the penance necessary to recover the spiritual life abandoned through sin, especially since spiritual death is the gravest harm, making a man liable to eternal damnation. Hence others answer by distinguishing the minor premise: everyone is bound to apply remedies immediately if necessity presses and delay in treatment is dangerous; otherwise, if no such necessity presses, he is not. Now someone in a state of sin is not always in danger either of relapse or of damnation. Of the many sinners, very few die immediately after committing a sin and before they can do penance. Otherwise, if this argument were valid, it would also prove that baptism could never be delayed, at least for infants, since they can die suddenly; and yet it is certain that it can be delayed for several days.

Third conclusion. — THE PRECEPT TO DO PENANCE, OF ITSELF, BINDS UNDER PAIN OF A NEW MORTAL SIN WHENEVER DANGER OF DEATH IS IMMINENT; BUT ACCIDENTALLY, IT BINDS ON MANY OTHER OCCASIONS.

The first part is proved, first, by the authority and example of St. Augustine, who, as Possidius relates, used to say that “no one, even if conscious of no crime, ought to let himself depart this life without penance.” Thus when he himself understood that his departure was near, he recited the penitential Psalms of David, placed before him, with abundant tears.

Reason also commends this: when danger of death is imminent, a man is bound by the precept of penance to make satisfaction to God for the offenses he has committed against him and to compensate for the injuries done to him. Indeed, if ever he must do this, he must do so especially when that necessity presses, so that he may obtain divine pardon. This is to be understood, however, provided that at that moment the man is not anticipated by some nobler affection toward God—for example, an ardent desire to undergo martyrdom, an exceedingly fervent movement of charity, or an elevation of the mind to God through the delights of heavenly contemplation. In such a case, a just man would not be bound to perform an act of penance and sorrow for sins.

That a man may also be bound, accidentally, to do penance many times even apart from danger of death can be shown as follows. First, since holy things must be handled and received in a holy manner, a sinner is bound to do penance so that by its benefit he may wash away sin and obtain sanctifying grace whenever the Sacraments are to be administered, and also whenever the Sacraments called “of the living” are to be received. For a minister who administers a sacrament without penance sins mortally, as we said when treating of the minister of the sacraments; much more gravely, however, would someone sin who received such sacraments in a state of mortal sin. — Likewise, there is an obligation to do penance when a vehement temptation presses and grave danger of sinning is imminent. For no remedy for avoiding sin is more opportune than detesting past sins: this detestation not only turns the mind away from tempting concupiscence and an assaulting temptation, but also obtains new aids of grace by which such danger may vanish. There is also an obligation to do penance when there is a public necessity and divine vengeance threatens a community on account both of its own sins and of the sins of others. For then each person is bound, out of affection and love for the community, to soften and turn aside the divine anger as far as he can by his own penance, since members must care for one another and for the whole body to which they belong.

YOU WILL ASK: Whether it is dangerous to postpone penance until the end of life?

I AFFIRM this with the holy Fathers, who constantly proclaim this truth with unanimous agreement. This is especially true of St. Augustine, in bk. 50, Homilies, hom. 41, and St. Ambrose, bk. 2, On Penance, ch. 12, where they write: “If someone, placed in the final crisis of his illness, wishes to receive penance and receives it, and is at once reconciled and then departs this life, I confess to you: we do not deny him what he asks, but we do not presume that he fares well. I do not presume; I do not deceive you. A faithful man who lives well departs secure; one baptized at the last hour departs secure; one who does penance and is reconciled while well, and afterward lives well, departs secure. One who does penance at the very end and is reconciled—if he departs secure, I am secure; where I am secure, I give security; where I am not secure, I can give penance, but I cannot give security.” St. Caesarius of Arles offers the same reasoning in Hom. 13 and 44. After saying that he doubted whether penance benefits a penitent at the very end, he says: “What shall I tell you? I do not know; I do not presume or promise; I know nothing at all of God’s will.” He immediately adds: “Do you wish, brother, to free yourself from doubt? Do you wish to put aside what is uncertain? Do penance while you are well. For if you do true penance while well, let the last day find you hastening to be reconciled. If you act this way, you are secure. Do you want me to tell you why you are secure? Because you did penance at a time when you could also have sinned. There, I have told you why you are secure. But if you wish to do penance only when you can no longer sin, your sins have left you; you have not left them.” St. Eligius teaches the same in Hom. 6, writing against those who delay penance until the end of life: “Although all men wish to receive penance at the end of their lives, we see scarcely a few attain it as they desire.” He then draws the conclusion. But no one describes and amplifies that uncertainty more fully and eloquently than Salvian of Marseilles in his letter To the Catholic Church, where he writes: “I certainly do not think that it suffices for eternal life for anyone entangled in carnal vices, if he has persisted in shameful deeds until death and arranges everything well at his passing, unless he has previously renounced his sins.… Some do not cease to sin; when placed at the point of death, they are made to withdraw from crimes by necessity alone, not by their will. For one who departs from evil deeds only in death does not abandon his crimes but is abandoned by them, because as far as his mind is concerned, he has not yet ceased to sin if he still wishes to sin, were he able.” He adds much more afterward: “But if either the force of the illness or the negligence of the sick is so great that they carry the damage to their health all the way to their final days, what shall I say? I do not know; I have absolutely nothing to promise. To recall those in danger from seeking the final remedy would be harsh and impious; but to promise anything in so late a treatment would be rash. Still, it is undoubtedly better for hands dried up by long paralysis to be raised toward heaven by some effort than to collapse in utter, deadly despair. It is better to leave nothing untried than to neglect the dying, especially since I do not know whether attempting some remedy at the end is medicine; certainly, to attempt nothing is ruin.” Isidore of Seville teaches the same, Sentences, bk. 2, ch. 13, as does St. Bernard in On the Manner of Living Well, ch. 27, where he says: “When a man who is able to sin repents and, while living his life, corrects himself from every crime, he will without doubt reach eternal rest when death comes. But for one who lives badly and does penance at death, just as his damnation is uncertain, so is his remission doubtful. Whoever, then, wishes to be secure at death concerning pardon should do penance while in health and mourn his sins while in health; therefore, since God’s mercy is hidden, it is necessary to weep without ceasing.”

The Subtle Doctor assigns three other causes of this danger in Reportata, d. 20 of the fourth book of the Sentences. He derives the first from the effects of illness and danger, which occupy the mind so powerfully because of their intensity—the illness through pain, the danger through fear—that a person can scarcely think of anything else. “But,” he says, “in order to reject sin, the intellect must engage in great reflection and detestation, so that there may be sufficient attrition, by fitting means, for the remission of sin, just as there was previously intense delight in sin.” St. Raymond also offers this reason, on the authority of St. Jerome and St. Augustine, bk. 3, On Penance, § 23. “In extreme illness,” he says, “someone can scarcely repent or even think. For Jerome says: ‘When you are oppressed by illness, you can scarcely think of anything other than what you feel, and the mind’s attention is swept there, where the force of the pain lies.’” For many impediments arise then, as Augustine says: illness presses, punishment terrifies, and children whom the man loved illicitly, his wife, and the world call him back to themselves. Whoever this Eusebius may be, he presses this reasoning excellently in writing to Damasus about the death of St. Jerome, where he says: *“Perhaps someone will again say: ‘A man who lived wickedly throughout his life will obtain pardon from God if he receives penance at the point of death.’ Alas, how vain a suspicion and false a thought! Of a hundred thousand men whose life has always been evil, scarcely one deserves to obtain pardon from God. A man born and raised entirely in sins, who has neither seen nor known God, nor wished to hear of him, who does not know that he has sinned or what penance is—unless perhaps he learned it in his sleep—still bound up in worldly affairs, pressed by anxiety for the children he is leaving behind, crushed by illness, shaken by grief over his wealth and temporal goods when he sees that he can no longer enjoy them: how does he receive penance as pleasing to God, which he would not receive if he still believed he could be healed? I shall certainly conclude in truth that someone who, while healthy and young, does not fear to offend God will not deserve to obtain divine pardon at death.”

The Doctor derives the second reason from fear, which at that time occupies the whole man and is not a sufficient disposition for meriting grace. “For,” he says, “there must be a voluntary detestation and the proper circumstance of the end: a man must repent not only through fear of punishment, but with filial fear. It is difficult then to feel sorrow except from fear alone; and if it is not joined with love, it does not dispose one by fitting means. Therefore it is difficult.” The Author of bk. On True and False Penance, ch. 17, gives the same reason: “One who truly repents must not only fear God as Judge, but also love him as Just; he should not be feared on account of punishment, but loved for the sake of glory.” We must therefore conclude with Thomas of Argentina, art. 1: “In truth, at the end it is very difficult to gather the mind in such a way that a man grieves that he has offended God by sin not only through fear of punishment but from love of God, and also resolves that, if he were to live a long time, he would always guard against this in the future. For true and salutary repentance consists in these two things.”

The Doctor derives the third reason from the habit contracted through sins, which cannot but be strong. “Therefore it is especially difficult then to turn against this habit by detesting what was previously delightful. Finally, he writes that a much greater displeasure is required in a sick man than in a healthy one, because a healthy man repents more freely. Therefore,” he says, “I believe that for a sick man to merit grace by fitting means, he would require much greater attrition, since he is near death, than if he were healthy. But it is difficult to have attrition as great as one has in health, let alone greater.” Hence he finally concludes that when someone truly repents in such a state, this is exceedingly rare, like a miracle. The Author of bk. On True and False Penance, ch. 17, certainly agrees: “He is converted who is now turned wholly and completely, who no longer merely fears punishments but hastens toward the good God. If this conversion happens to anyone even at the end, we must not despair of his remission. But since such a just conversion happens scarcely or rarely, we must fear for one who repents late. For the illness presses him, punishment terrifies him, and he comes to the true path of satisfaction, especially when the children he loved illicitly are present, and his wife and the world call him back to themselves.”