Scotus Academicus, Tomus decimus: De Baptismo, De Poenitentia, De Extrema Unctione

NOTE 1. Penance, insofar as it is distinguished from the sacrament, is twofold: habitual, that is, and actual. Habitual penance is a permanent quality in the soul, making it ready and disposed, and cooperating with it in eliciting acts of the virtue of penance. Actual penance, however, is the very act of penance by which the sinner wishes to punish and detest the sin he has committed; this act, generally speaking, is twofold: interior and exterior. Interior penance is that movement of the soul by which the sinner is moved to expiate the sin he has committed. The Doctor there, n. 15, distinguishes four forms of it: first, the will to avenge and punish sin, following the intellect’s prior knowledge, which makes its deformity and malice known to the will; on account of this knowledge the will is moved to will its punishment and execration; second, detestation and hatred of that sin; third, voluntary acceptance of the punishment inflicted on its account; fourth, voluntary endurance and suffering of that same punishment. Exterior penance, in turn, is twofold: namely, external confession of the sin committed, accompanied and followed by embarrassment and shame, which is no slight punishment of the soul for the sin committed; and, second, every laborious bodily act by which the penitent who has confessed is punished and makes satisfaction to God for the crime admitted and committed. Here, however, the chief question concerns those four acts of penance: whether those four acts are truly elicited by the virtue of penance, so that, just as habits are distinguished by their acts, penance may thereby appear to be a true virtue, entirely distinct from the others.

NOTE 2. According to the same Doctor in the same place, penance receives four definitions or descriptions from these four acts. The first is: to do penance is to avenge the sin one has committed. The author of the book On True and False Penance, attributed to St. Augustine, agrees with this description, saying in ch. 8: Penance is a kind of vengeance by which the will punishes itself for what it grieves to have admitted. Hence, in ch. 19: To do penance is to undergo punishment, so as always to punish oneself by avenging what one admitted in sinning. St. Augustine also supports this in Letter 308 to Seleucianus: There is also penance, he says, the work of good and humble faithful people, in which we beat our breasts, saying: Forgive us our debts. Isidore of Seville adds, in bk. 6 of the Etymologies, final chapter, where we read: It is called penance, as it were “penal suffering,” because in doing penance a person himself punishes himself for what he wrongly admitted. The second description is: to do penance is to detest or hate the sin one has committed, or to be displeased with the sin one has committed. This description of penance is very common among the holy Fathers, and the Council of Trent approves it, sess. VI, ch. 6, where, speaking of the dispositions necessary for justification, it says, among other things: Therefore they are moved against their sins by a certain hatred and detestation, that is, by the penance which ought to be undertaken before baptism. And sess. XIV, ch. 6: Contrition, it says, is sorrow of soul and detestation for the sin committed, together with the purpose not to sin again. The third description is: to do penance is to accept gladly the punishment inflicted for the sin committed. Hence the Council of Trent says in the same place, ch. 1: Having cast off their perversity and amended their lives, they detested so great an offense against God with hatred of sin and pious sorrow of soul; by pious sorrow of soul it signifies voluntary acceptance of punishment. The author of On True and False Penance also approves this description, saying in ch. 3: Hence let the sinner always grieve, and rejoice in his grief. Finally, the Doctor formulates the fourth description of penance thus: To do penance is patiently to bear the punishment inflicted on oneself for one’s sin. The Council of Trent approves this description along with the preceding one, sess. XIV, ch. 9, saying: “Finally, it teaches that divine generosity is so great that we can make satisfaction not only by punishments which we willingly undertake to avenge sin, or which the priest imposes at his discretion according to the measure of the offense, but also by temporal scourges inflicted by God and patiently borne by us.” The question, then, is whether penance under this fourfold aspect is a virtue—not a general virtue, but a special one.

NOTE 3. Aristotle says in Ethics II, ch. 6: Virtue is a habit of choice, consisting in a mean relative to us, as the prudent person would determine it. Virtue, generally speaking, is twofold: general and special. General virtue is spoken of in four ways. First, by predication, because it is predicated of all other virtues; in this sense justice, taken commonly, is called a general and common virtue, insofar as it is rectitude of soul dictating how good is to be done and evil avoided. Thus the Lord Christ said to St. John the Baptist, Matthew 3: For thus it is fitting for us to fulfill all righteousness; for there is no virtue to which this account of justice does not apply. Second, a virtue is called general by regulation: thus prudence is called the rule of all virtues, since all virtues must be regulated by prudence; for prudence teaches us to keep the mean and avoid extremes. Third, a virtue is called general by informing other virtues, because it confers worth and dignity on them; thus charity is a general virtue, for it informs the other virtues and makes them worthy and pleasing to God. Fourth, a virtue is called general by the aggregation of all virtues, because all the other virtues seem to cooperate in its act. In this way some call penance, insofar as it detests sin, a general virtue, since there is no virtue that does not execrate its opposing vice.

With these preliminaries, the questions are whether penance is mere regret of soul and renewal of one’s past life, or sorrow of soul and vengeance for sin; second, whether in its fourfold act it attains the dignity of virtue; third, whether it is a special or general virtue. These questions will be resolved in the following three Conclusions.

First conclusion. — PENANCE IS NOT MERE REGRET AND BARE CESSATION FROM SIN; IT ALSO INCLUDES SORROW FOR PAST SIN AND OFFENSE. This is against the heretics, and the Council of Trent clearly teaches it, sess. XIV, ch. 1, where it speaks of contrition as follows: Therefore the holy Synod declares that this contrition contains not only cessation from sin, and a purpose and beginning of a new life, but also hatred of the old life. It proves this truth with these passages from Ezekiel 18: Cast away from yourselves all your transgressions by which you have transgressed, and make for yourselves a new heart and a new spirit. The Council immediately adds: Certainly whoever considers those cries of the saints: “Against you only have I sinned, and done evil before you”; “I have labored in my groaning; every night I wash my bed”; “I will recall all my years in the bitterness of my soul”; and others of this kind, will readily understand that they sprang from a certain intense hatred of their past life and a great detestation of their sins. Hence in Canon 5 it condemns the heretics’ doctrine as follows: If anyone says that the contrition prepared by examination, recollection, and detestation of sins, by which someone recalls his years in the bitterness of his soul, weighing the gravity, number, and foulness of his sins, the loss of eternal blessedness, and the incurring of eternal damnation, together with a purpose of better living, is not true and useful sorrow, and does not prepare for grace, but makes a person a hypocrite and a greater sinner… let him be anathema.

The same truth is proved from all those passages of Scripture in which, whenever penance is mentioned, sorrow and punishment to be undergone are expressed. Thus Job, final chapter: I reproach myself, and do penance in dust and ashes. Ashes and dust signify sorrow of soul and affliction of the flesh. Likewise, Matthew 11: speaking of the penance neglected by the people of Chorazin, the Lord Christ says: If the mighty works done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would long ago have done penance in sackcloth and ashes. Ashes and sackcloth show displeasure of soul and grief for sins committed, not merely a change of mind and judgment, nor only the beginning and institution of a new life. — Likewise, in Luke 10¹ the Lord Christ praises the penance of the Ninevites. But their penance involved sorrow, tears, and bodily affliction, as we read in Jonah 3, where the Ninevites put on sackcloth and sprinkled their heads with ashes—not only to show their sorrow for the sins of their former life, but also, through penal practices and laborious works, to avenge in some way their offenses and faults against God. This penal and laborious penance was not merely a change of mind, or regret, but presupposed regret. — Finally, in 2 Corinthians 7 the Apostle speaks of the penance the Corinthians conceived over the fornicator’s sin, and refers to his first letter: For you were grieved according to God, he says; for sorrow according to God produces penance for lasting salvation. Therefore godly sorrow makes penance salvific; but sorrow is a kind of grief.

The holy Fathers teach the same. Gregory Nazianzen, in his Oration for the Holy Lights, calls penance a baptism of tears. St. Augustine, in On the Trinity III, ch. 4, calls it the crucifixion of the inner man. Hence, in Fifty Homilies, final homily, ch. 5: It is not enough to change one’s conduct for the better and turn away from evil deeds unless satisfaction is made to God for what has been done: by the sorrow of penance, the groaning of humility, the sacrifice of a contrite heart, and alms cooperating with these. Most clearly of all, St. Isidore teaches this in bk. 6 of the Etymologies, ch. 19, where he says: Penance is so called because a person grieves in doing penance for what he wrongly admitted. For those who truly repent do nothing else than refuse to let what they did wrongly go unpunished; in this way he does not spare himself, and no contemptuous person will escape the profound and just judgment of Him who does not spare.

Theological reasoning also supports the conclusion. For the name penance signifies the complete correction and amendment of one’s past life, which signifies three things: first, knowledge of the error, which causes sorrow; second, displeasure with one’s former life, or inward grief over what was done or omitted; third, voluntary chastisement, which is the effect and completion of that inward grief, or displeasure with one’s former life. Penance is named chiefly from this effect of voluntary punishment or vengeance for our sins, from the old and obsolete verb poenio, which is the same as punio; hence poenitet is said as if it meant poenam tenet (“he holds fast to punishment”).

YOU WILL OBJECT 1: Tertullian, Against Marcion II, ch. 24, asks what the word penance means and answers: It is understood as nothing other than a simple change of a former judgment, which can be admitted without reproach—even in a human being, much less in God, whose every judgment is free of fault. Therefore penance in itself does not imply sorrow and punishment. — I distinguish the consequence: if the word penance is taken generally, insofar as sacred Scripture attributes it both to God and to a human being, I grant; if it is taken as proper to a human being and as serving to obtain remission of sins, I deny. Tertullian there is speaking of penance insofar as it is attributed to God, who is often said in Scripture to repent. Just before, he had said: It remains now to learn what the repentance of God is. But divine penance is very different from human penance; or, as Tertullian says there: This definition establishes another character for divine repentance in every respect: it is not to be judged to arise from imprudence, fickleness, or condemnation of any good or evil deed, as human repentance is. By these words he distinguishes divine from human penance on three grounds: first, the latter is based on fickleness or instability of mind; second, it includes condemnation of a deed omitted or committed; third, it signifies sorrow and vengeance for a deed committed, as well as satisfaction to be offered to God.

YOU WILL PRESS: Tertullian says there that the word penance means only a change of mind: for even in its Greek sound, he says, the word penance is formed not from confession of an offense but from a change of mind. Therefore, etc. — I ANSWER: That is true if one considers only the name’s etymology, or its derivation from Greek. For poenitio is said from μετὰ, meaning “trans.” or “post.”, and νοῦς, which means “mind” or “thought”; thus μετάνοια means a subsequent judgment or second thought, a change of judgment. But it is otherwise if one considers the word’s frequent use in Scripture and among sacred authors, where the word signifies human penance: in this use it implies not merely a change of judgment but also sorrow of soul. Although sacred Scripture sometimes uses penance to mean only a change of mind: thus the effective graces by which God certainly leads the elect to eternal life are called in Romans 11: the gift of God without repentance, because once God has destined them somewhere, he does not change his plan.

YOU WILL OBJECT 2: Lactantius, Institutes II, ch. 24, says that μετανοεῖν is best rendered in Latin by resipiscentia (“returning to one’s senses”). Therefore penance means nothing other than a change and recall of the mind. — I DENY the consequence. For Lactantius says there: A person comes to his senses and, as it were, recalls his mind from madness when he regrets his error, chastises himself for his folly, and strengthens his mind to live more rightly; then he takes care not to fall again into the same snares. Therefore, according to Lactantius, penance signifies not only recognition of error and amendment of one’s former life, but also sorrow of soul, chastisement and punishment for folly—that is, sin—and a purpose to set one’s life in better order.

YOU WILL OBJECT 3: Among the best authors, the verb poenitet sometimes means the same as “it wearies,” “it shames,” “it displeases,” and so on. Thus Cicero, in On Old Age: If he had lived to his hundredth year, he would have regretted his old age. And in The Dream of Scipio: The earth itself seemed small to me, this earth of our empire, of which we touch, as it were, a mere point; I would have regretted it. Pliny, bk. 1, ch. 17, speaking of the religious Essenes among the Jews, says: An everlasting people, among whom no one is born; so fertile are they in regret for the lives of others. Therefore this word does not always mean punitive sorrow for sin. — I DENY the consequence. All these expressions are metaphorical: in things that weary, shame, or offend us, there seems to be a certain punishment, distress, and displeasure. Hence whatever wearies, shames, or displeases is also considered in some sense to cause grief.

Second conclusion. — PENANCE, ACCORDING TO ITS FOURFOLD MEANING AND DESCRIPTION, CAN BE AN ACT OF VIRTUE. So teaches the Subtle Doctor, d. 14, q. 2, and

He proves the first part, n. 2, where he says: “The first meaning of penance is that it is vengeance for a sin committed by the person who committed it. But this vengeance can be an act of virtue and conform to right reason. For, he says, according to right reason every legislator avenges a transgression of the law. Hence at the end of bk. 10 of the Ethics, after his teaching about vices and virtues, the Philosopher immediately introduces positive law as the avenger of vices and the rewarder of virtues. But if a legislator avenges according to right reason, his minister executes the vengeance according to right reason, because the rectitude of an act of service universally derives from its conformity to the agent whom it serves. Therefore, according to right reason, someone may, as a minister of the legislator, avenge a sin committed against the law, and do so upon the person entrusted to him for this vengeance, since otherwise he would not be serving. But everyone is entrusted with being a minister of God, who bears his law, to avenge upon himself the sins he has committed. To do penance, in its first sense, means to avenge oneself in this way; for tenere, when no dative is added to express to whom something is held, means that it is held by the person himself, as common usage shows. Therefore, although God punishes the sinner, he is not said to do penance, since he inflicts punishment not on himself but on another; but when someone inflicts it on himself, he is said to do penance, that is, to hold fast to punishment by applying it to himself.” So says the Doctor. Lest he seem to assert that vengeance for sin always proceeds from the habit of virtue, he immediately adds: “I do not say that doing penance in the first sense is always an act of virtue, that is, elicited by virtue. It is called an act of virtue because it is naturally apt to be elicited by virtue or to generate virtue, since it conforms to right reason; and moral goodness consists in being generated by virtue or generating virtue.” Since all this is evident from the terms themselves, there is no need to dwell on it further.

He proves the same concerning the other three meanings of penance, nn. 21 and 12: “As for the second meaning of the word “to do penance,” he says, namely, detesting a sin committed or being displeased with what was committed, I say that this can be an act of virtue. It is proved as before, because it can be an elective act in accord with right reason. For just as right reason dictates that we take pleasure in an honorable good, so it dictates that we be displeased by a dishonorable evil. — From this the second conclusion is clear, namely, whose act it can be: not of any one special virtue, but of any appetitive virtue. For every virtue that inclines us to take pleasure in an honorable good also inclines us to detest and be displeased by the opposing dishonorable evil. Thus chastity inclines us to displeasure at something disordered against chastity, humility at a disordered act of pride, and so on. Yet every virtue inclining us to such displeasure is an appetitive virtue, since nothing is a principle of hating, just as nothing is a principle of loving, except an appetitive virtue. Hence it is clear that it is wrong to posit detestation of sin as an act of the virtue of penance, if we speak of penance in the first sense, as a species of justice; for this act is much more general than the proper act elicited by the virtue of penance as justice. — As for the third meaning, gladly accepting the punishment inflicted for a sin committed, I say that this act too can be virtuous, because it accords with right reason. Second, it can belong to many virtues, each of which is appetitive, since whatever can be a principle for accepting one object can be a principle for accepting another in relation to it; different objects can be accepted through different virtues, in relation to which the punishment inflicted for sin can be accepted. If God is loved through charity, punishment can be accepted through charity insofar as it restores one to God’s friendship. If God is desired through the virtue of hope as a good for me, punishment can be accepted through hope as ordering one to the reward one can attain. If the loss of eternal life is avoided through the virtue of fear, punishment can be accepted through that virtue as excluding that loss. If someone loves purity and innocence for himself through an honorable friendship with himself, he can through that friendship accept punishment, which dissolves the debt that was incurred. — As for the fourth meaning, patiently bearing the punishment inflicted, it is clear that this can be an act of virtue, and of a special virtue, namely patience.” So says the Doctor. By all this he openly admits that, according to the fourfold meaning set out above in the second Note, penance can receive the character and name of an actual virtue, whether commanded or elicited by a virtue, or ordered and directed toward one. But only its primary meaning belongs specifically to the virtue of penance; for the other three acts, which sometimes occur in perfect penance, complete in every respect, can be elicited by other virtues, as will appear from what is said in the third Conclusion. — That penance, taken generally, insofar as it tends to detest and destroy sin as an offense against God, is a virtue, is proved first as follows: there is no divine precept except concerning a virtuous and praiseworthy act; but there is a divine precept to do penance. Matthew 4 says that when Christ began to preach, he said: Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand. And Mark 1: Repent, and believe the Gospel. Therefore penance is a virtue. Moreover, no act is praiseworthy and meritorious unless it is an act of virtue; but doing penance is praiseworthy and meritorious; therefore, etc. Finally, Aristotle says in Ethics II, ch. 6: Virtue is a habit that makes its possessor good and makes his work good. Penance makes its possessor good; indeed, it often makes him better and holier than he was before his fall. For St. Paul says in Romans 5: Where sin abounded, grace abounded all the more. Hence Peter Damian, Sermon 56: God is accustomed to honor penitents more than the innocent. For, as St. Gregory says in Moralia XI, ch. 19: Anyone who recognizes that he has done evil is brought back to the rule of discernment and thereby advances higher in justice, in the very place where he seemed for a time to have fallen from justice. St. Ambrose aptly confirms this in his sermon On the Chair of St. Peter, where he says, among other things: Peter became more faithful after he wept over having lost the faith; and so he found greater grace than he had lost. St. Maximus agrees beautifully: Peter, he says, makes progress through his trials, rejoices in his failings, grows through his dangers. For Peter received the flock as a good shepherd so that he who had previously been weak for himself might become a support for all. It is therefore clear that penance is highly praiseworthy and makes its possessor good; consequently, it has the dignity and character of virtue.

YOU WILL OBJECT 1: Virtue is a disposition of the perfected toward the best; but an act of penance does not have this character, since the primary act of doing penance is only a wish, or conditional will, by which the sinner would wish, if it were possible, not to have committed the sin. He cannot will this absolutely, since it is impossible. Therefore, etc. — I DENY the minor. For although doing penance is a mere wish insofar as it is directed toward a past and completed sin, if the sin is considered as presently remaining in its turning toward creatures and turning away from God, and as the stain on the soul resulting from an offense against God, then it is an absolute act: the will turns away from the creature it had loved with excessive and disordered love and returns to God, so as, to the extent of its power, to restore the honor it took from him and, to the extent that it glorified itself in delights, to undergo torment and mourning. In this respect the penitent has not a mere wish but an absolute will.

YOU WILL BE PRESSED BY ARISTOTLE, Ethics I: Nothing virtuous is foolish or stupid; but willing that a sin had not been committed, whether by an absolute or a conditional will, is foolish, stupid, and inept, since it is entirely impossible for what is past not to have been past. Therefore, etc. — I DISTINGUISH the minor: willing that what is past had not happened is inept, let it pass; willing to reject an evil committed and to wish it had not happened is inept, I deny. Penance does not reach toward the past as though the penitent thought it possible for an act actually committed not to have been committed. Rather, he rejects it as wrongly done; for the penitent’s sorrow, displeasure, and rejection of a past deed intend to remove its consequence, namely, offense against God and the debt of punishment. This is not inept, but most prudent.

YOU WILL OBJECT 2: Every virtue is desirable for its own sake, or for its own proper end; but penance is desired not for its own sake, but to expiate the evil of guilt. Therefore, it should not be considered a virtue. — I DENY the minor. Penance is desired for its own sake, that is, for its own proper end, which is to erase the evil of guilt and make satisfaction to God who has been offended. It is not desired for the sake of a some other end, distinct from its own proper end.

YOU WILL PRESS: What tends toward evil insofar as it is evil cannot be desired for its own sake, that is, for its own goodness and perfection; but penance tends toward sin, which is evil in itself. Therefore, etc. — I DISTINGUISH the major: what tends toward evil by an act of pursuit, I grant; by an act of aversion and flight, I deny. The minor must likewise be distinguished, and the consequence denied. For medicine tends toward illness, yet it is desirable—conditionally before illness, but absolutely after illness—because medicine tends toward illness not to cause or preserve it, but to destroy it. Penance likewise tends toward sin not to commit it, but to turn away from it. Hence the penitent wills sin, not to be done, but to be destroyed.

YOU WILL OBJECT 3: Every virtue must have a good for its object; but penance does not have a good for its object, since it concerns sin. Therefore, it should not be called a virtue. — The Seraphic Doctor DENIES the major, d. 11, art. 1, q. 1, ad 3; the contrary, he says, is evident in temperance, mercy, and fortitude, which concern what is evil. Alternatively, I distinguish the major: virtue must have a good object when pursuing, I grant; when turning away, I deny. For pursuing evil and fleeing good are indeed evil, whereas pursuing good and turning away from evil are right and good. For this reason punitive authority is good, although it is directed toward an evil to be punished. For there is no authority except from God, says St. Paul in Romans 13. He adds: If you do evil, be afraid; for he does not bear the sword without cause: he is God’s minister, an avenger for wrath against the one who does evil. Since the virtue of penance turns away from and destroys evil, it thereby receives the dignity of virtue. Add that penance has two acts, says the Seraphic Doctor: to flee and detest evil, and to amend the sinner and reform him into a better condition and life; this is good in itself, and through this act penance tends toward good.

YOU WILL OBJECT 4: Every act of virtue brings some pleasure; but penance does not bring pleasure, but sorrow. Therefore, it is not a virtue. — I DISTINGUISH the major: virtue brings pleasure by reason of its act, I grant; by reason of its object, I deny. Fortitude, because of its particular object—for example, dangers to be endured or confronted in war—brings distress, since that object causes sadness and pain; nevertheless, the act itself delights the courageous person, who approaches dangers with ready eagerness of spirit. Similarly, although doing penance has a sad and distressing object in itself, it nevertheless delights because of the eagerness and readiness with which the will exercises its acts through repeated practice and voluntarily determines itself to detest sin. — To make this clearer, we should observe with the Doctor, in the place cited above, n. 4, that five acts concur in perfect penance, in order: our Pitigianus explains them well at d. 14, q. 2, art. 2. First is an imperative willing, commanding and joining together the causes of sorrow; second are the causes themselves that produce sorrow; third is sorrow itself; fourth is approval and willing, or acceptance, of that sorrow; fifth, from that willing follows joy in the sorrow, according to St. Augustine’s saying: Let the sinner grieve over sin and rejoice in grief. For example, Peter committed the sin of fornication. In doing penance he follows this order: first, he has an imperative willing by which he commands the causes of sorrow, of which there are two: the apprehension of the fornication and the refusal or hatred of that fornication. I say, then, that the imperative willing by which the will commands the intellect to consider and apprehend that fornication, and commands itself to detest it, is the first act. The second is the apprehension of that fornication and refusal, or hatred, of it. The third is the sorrow caused by apprehending the fornication and refusing it. The fourth is a willing by which the will wills to have that sorrow. The fifth is the joy that follows upon this willing to have sorrow; then St. Augustine’s saying is verified: Let the sinner grieve over sin, etc. Moreover, the Doctor assigns this order or distinction among the five: the first is related as the principal but remote cause of sorrow; the second as its proximate and immediate cause; the third as its effect; the fourth as an effect following from that act. Thus the first is distinguished from the second as a principal and remote cause from a secondary and proximate one; the second from the third as cause from effect, or action from passion; the third from the fourth as object from the action that passes over it; and the first from the fifth as object from the appetitive passion for that object.

Third conclusion. — PENANCE IS A SPECIAL VIRTUE, NOT A GENERAL ONE. This is the Doctor’s teaching in the place cited above, n. 1, where he says: Doing penance is an act of a special virtue. It is proved: that act is naturally apt to have a special object and ordered special circumstances. The object is sin that can be avenged; the circumstances are those appropriate to an act rightly directed toward such an object. He means that a virtue is special when its formal object is not common to the other virtues. But the object of penance, namely, sin that can be avenged, does not belong to the other virtues, since no other virtue concerns sin as something to be avenged and expiated by due satisfaction. Therefore, penance is a special virtue.

It is confirmed: wherever there is a special difficulty in tending toward an object, not found in the other virtues, there must be a special virtue. But in the offense against God, insofar as it can be avenged and expiated through satisfaction and compensation for injuries, there is a special difficulty not found in the objects of the other virtues: namely, that the person who sinned should grieve over the offense, and that the person who has experienced the will to sin should wish to make satisfaction for it and undergo punishment. Therefore, penance is a special virtue.

The Doctor confirms this again from the circumstances: a virtue is special when it tends toward its object differently from every other virtue. But penance concerns sin differently from the other virtues, since no virtue other than penance concerns sin as something to be avenged and expiated by due satisfaction. Therefore, etc.

YOU WILL OBJECT 1: A virtue that extends to the objects of all the other virtues is not special; but penance concerns the objects of the other virtues. Therefore, it is not a special virtue but a general one. The major is established. The minor is proved: penance concerns every sin, since it undertakes its punishment and destruction; but sin in its whole range is included among the objects of the other virtues, since every virtue stands as a mean between two vicious extremes and intends to flee and destroy them. Therefore, penance is not a special virtue. — I DISTINGUISH the major: if it extends to the objects of the other virtues under the same motive by which those virtues concern them, I grant; under a distinct motive, by which no other virtue attains them, I deny. And I similarly distinguish the minor and deny the consequence. For the Seraphic Doctor says, d. 11, art. 1, q. 2, in the body: “Although penance concerns evil in general, it nevertheless concerns it under its proper aspect and has a special act, which requires a virtue not merely to command it but to elicit it. Thus zealous anger, which detests every sin in one’s neighbor, is a special virtue because it regards sin as deserving punishment; and obedience is a special virtue because it regards what is to be done under the aspect of a command. Likewise, penance is a special virtue because it regards sin as a personal evil committed by oneself against God, by which a person is deserving of punishment.” Hence, answering the third objection, he says: “To the objection about the object, one should say that, although it is not restricted to a particular sin, it nevertheless considers sin under a special and proper aspect: namely, insofar as it was committed by oneself and is an offense against God, to whom one wishes to be reconciled and for whom one wishes to make amends. It is therefore a special virtue, because a virtue is called special or general not by reason of its object, which is material, but according as it has the character of a motive.”

YOU WILL OBJECT 2: What is contrary to all sins is not a special virtue. For just as virtue has a determinate good from which it receives its specification, so it has a determinate evil to which it is opposed. But penance is contrary to all sins. For whatever expels something from a subject and cannot coexist with it is contrary to it; penance, however, strives to expel all sins from the soul. Therefore, it is not a special virtue. — I ANSWER first that the major can be denied if taken universally, since charity is contrary to every mortal sin and is no less a special virtue for that reason. I answer second by distinguishing the major: what is contrary to something and expels it formally, I grant; effectively, I deny. As to the minor, I say that every virtue formally expels the vice opposed to it, as cold expels heat and whiteness blackness, because vicious and virtuous habits are formally opposed concerning the same object. Penance, however, expels all sins only effectively, insofar as it works toward the destruction of sin, as far as sin can be remitted with the divine grace that assists it. Therefore, it does not follow that penance is not a special virtue.

YOU WILL PRESS: Every virtue tends not only formally but also effectively toward the destruction of the vice and sin opposed to it. Therefore, no special virtue of penance is needed for this. — I DISTINGUISH the antecedent: it tends toward the destruction of the vice opposed to it according to the aspect under which it is specially opposed to that virtue—for example, faith tends toward the destruction of unbelief insofar as it is unbelief—I grant; it tends toward that destruction insofar as no special virtue is opposed to it alongside the virtue itself, namely, insofar as it is an offense against God to be avenged and repaired by due satisfaction, I deny. Therefore, to destroy sin under the aspect of an offense against God, a special virtue is needed, namely, penance.

YOU WILL PRESS: There is even less need for a special virtue tending toward the destruction of evil insofar as it offends God than for one tending toward the pursuit of good insofar as it honors God. But no special virtue is needed for the latter, since every virtue is referred to God’s honor and glory, or else it would be fruitless and vain. Therefore, etc. — I DENY the minor, since the virtue of Religion is specially ordered to this: to tend toward good insofar as it honors God; it has this as its particular object and special end. For although the other virtues must be referred to that end if they are to be true virtues, they are not referred to it as their proximate end and immediate object. Therefore, by analogy, a special virtue is needed to tend toward sin’s being avenged insofar as it is an offense against God.

Fourth conclusion. — PENANCE IS A SPECIAL VIRTUE ONLY ACCORDING TO ITS PRIMARY MEANING, NOT ACCORDING TO THE OTHER THREE. This is likewise the Doctor’s teaching in the same place, n. 11, where he grants that detestation of sin can be an act of virtue: Because, he says, it can be an elective act in accord with right reason; for just as right reason dictates that we take pleasure in an honorable good, so it dictates that we be displeased by a dishonorable evil. Yet there he denies that this detestation is an act of a special virtue distinct from the others, because it can be an act of any appetitive virtue: “Every virtue,” he says, “that inclines one to take pleasure in an honorable good also inclines one to detest and be displeased by the opposing dishonorable evil. Thus chastity inclines one to displeasure at something disordered against chastity, humility at a disordered act of pride, and so on. Yet every virtue inclining one to such displeasure is an operative virtue, since nothing is a principle of hating, just as nothing is a principle of loving, except an appetitive virtue. From this it is clear that it is wrong to posit detestation of sin as an act of the virtue of penance, when speaking of penance as a virtue in the first sense, as a species of justice, because this act is much more general than the proper act of the virtue of penance as justice, elicited by that virtue.” The Doctor does not deny that detestation of any sin can be an act commanded by the virtue of penance; he means only that it is not an act elicited by it. — At the same place, n. 12, he teaches the same about the third meaning of penance, insofar as it is voluntary acceptance of punishment inflicted for a sin committed: “I say that this act too can be an act of virtue, because it accords with right reason. Second, it can belong to many virtues, each of which is appetitive; for whatever can be a principle of accepting some object can be a principle of accepting another object in relation to it. Different objects can be accepted through different virtues, in relation to which the punishment inflicted for sin can be accepted. If God is loved through charity, punishment can be accepted through charity insofar as it restores one to God’s friendship. If God is desired through the virtue of hope as a good for me, punishment can be accepted through hope as ordering one to that attainable reward. If the loss of eternal life is avoided through the virtue of fear, punishment can be accepted through that virtue as excluding that loss. If someone loves purity and innocence for himself through an honorable friendship with himself, he can accept through that friendship punishment which dissolves the debt incurred.” — (As for the fourth act, the Doctor teaches in the same place that it is not a special act of the virtue of penance, but of patience, since patience is to bear punishment inflicted steadfastly and patiently tolerate every adversity.) From this it follows that penance has the character of a special virtue insofar as it inclines one to avenge sin, but not insofar as it is detestation of sin, or unwillingness to have sinned, as the Thomists maintain. For that detestation of sin can be elicited by any virtue to which sin, in general or in a particular kind, is opposed; for it belongs to the same virtue to pursue good and flee from, detest, and be displeased by evil. And the virtue by which one is displeased by something is also the virtue by which one grieves over it insofar as it is present and applied; hence whichever virtue detests sin also detests the vice opposed to it.

THE THOMISTS REPLY that this is indeed true if detestation occurs insofar as sin is opposed to the dictate of right reason and the particular honesty intended by each virtue. But it is otherwise if sin to be expiated and detested is considered insofar as it is an offense against God; in this respect, they say, it is a special act of the virtue of penance, which does not belong to another virtue. — Against this: it belongs not only to penance to grieve over sin insofar as it is an offense against God and to execrate it, but also to charity. For it belongs to the same virtue to pursue a good and turn away from and execrate what is opposed to it; but every sin, under the aspect of an offense, is opposed to God, who is the object of charity. Therefore, charity must execrate sin under this aspect. The minor is proved: charity grieves over sin insofar as it is contrary to its object, or ultimate end, and to God toward whom it tends. But sin is precisely contrary to God under the aspect of offense; for it is an offense insofar as it removes God’s friendship with humanity, turns one away from the ultimate end, and turns one toward a creature. These two things are most opposed to charity, which tends toward God under the motive of friendship and conversion. Therefore, charity execrates sin for no other reason than that it is an offense against God. Consequently, this detestation pertains to the virtue of penance only insofar as it is at least remotely commanded by penance; and so an act of command proper to penance must be presupposed to that act.

YOU WILL OBJECT 1: The holy Fathers and Councils usually express penance only by sorrow and detestation for sins, and assert that this detestation is the final and perfect disposition for justification, both within the sacrament and outside it. Thus the Council of Trent, sess. XIV, ch. 6, defines contrition by sorrow and detestation: Contrition, it says, is sorrow of soul and detestation for the sin committed. Hence, in sess. VI, ch. 6, when assigning the manner of preparation for justification, it mentions not vengeance for sin but detestation alone: They are moved, it says, against their sins by a certain hatred and detestation, that is, by the penance which ought to be undertaken before baptism. Therefore, etc. — I answer that the Fathers and Councils speak this way because sorrow and detestation for sin are included as a primary effect in the will to avenge it. If this will is effective for the remission of sins, it must inflict punishment and consequently command sorrow. Since, according to the etymology of its name, to do penance means the same as to undergo punishment, and since punishment is undergone when sorrow is elicited and detestation formed, penance is therefore considered complete only when it has its term or effect and obtains the character of justice, which restores God’s right through vengeance. It is under this aspect that the holy Fathers and Councils consider penance when they call it sorrow of soul and detestation for sin committed.

As to the Council of Trent’s latter authority, I say that it treats of detestation of sin arising not from the motive of penance but from charity, as is clear from the preceding words: They begin to love him (God) as the source of all justice and are therefore moved against their sins by a certain hatred and detestation. By these words it signifies that the motive and cause of that hatred and detestation is love of God; consequently, it is not an act elicited by the virtue of penance, but one commanded by it.

YOU WILL OBJECT 2: Willing to avenge sin and detesting it are one and the same act: for whoever detests sin, insofar as it is in him, wills it to be absent and consequently wills to avenge it. Therefore, if the act of vengeance is an act of the virtue of penance, the act of detestation will be so as well. — I DENY the antecedent. For the act of vengeance is an act of pursuit, since it is a willing of punishment to be inflicted in retribution for sin; the act of detestation, however, is an act of flight, since it is an unwillingness for sin. Therefore, just as love of some honorable thing and hatred of the opposing disgraceful thing are not in reality one and the same act but several acts, at least formally distinct, even if perhaps elicited by the same virtue, so willing to avenge and detest sin are not one and the same act—especially when they can proceed from different virtues, as happens here. Detestation of sin can proceed solely from the motive of charity, hope, or another virtue opposed to that sin; for this reason it cannot be an act of vengeance, since that requires the motive of justice.

YOU WILL PRESS: At least, detestation of sin virtually contains the will to avenge sin; consequently, at least virtually they are one and the same act. — I answer that the discussion concerns the act considered formally, insofar as it proceeds from a special virtue, and therefore the objection is irrelevant. Further, if detestation of sin includes the will to avenge only virtually, it follows that those two acts are formally distinct, just as every act is formally distinct from the cause in which it is virtually contained.

From these points, therefore, it follows that penance is not a general virtue either by way of predication, as though it were a general condition and transcendent predicate extending to all virtues, as the Altissiodorensian, Major, and certain other theologians maintain, or by the aggregation of all virtues, as our own Alensis seems to suggest. He indeed admits that penance is a special virtue insofar as it is an act by which the penitent punishes himself in compensation for his offense; but he considers it general with respect to the act of hating and detesting all sins, since each virtue contributes to the act of hating all sins, at least by commanding it. For hatred of the object contrary to a virtue—that is, sin—arises from love of that virtue’s object. Hence Alensis thinks penance can be called a general virtue by concomitance and aggregation of all virtues. The contrary, however, is evident not only from what we have said but also from this reasoning: if the virtue of penance were general by the concomitance and aggregation of the other virtues, it would follow that the penitent could not detest all sins through a single act elicited by the virtue of penance. Since each virtue has its own limited and distinct object and cannot tend toward the object of another virtue, it would follow that detesting sins against all virtues would require an act of every virtue. Thus the sinner could not be justified through penance in a single instant, since he could not be justified unless he detested all sins; but he could not detest all sins without exercising acts of every virtue, which he cannot exercise in an instant. This is absurd; therefore the conclusion from which it follows is absurd as well.