Scotus Academicus, Tomus decimus: De Baptismo, De Poenitentia, De Extrema Unctione

I assume, first, that according to the Council of Trent works of satisfaction must be morally good. For by evil works we cannot merit the remission of punishment, since rather we merit a new punishment; hence the Council, sess. XIV, ch. 8, says that our satisfactions derive their efficacy from Christ, are offered through him to the Eternal Father, and are accepted by the Father through Christ. And in can. 14 it defines: If anyone says that the satisfactions by which penitents redeem their sins are not the worship of God but human traditions, obscuring the doctrine of grace and the true worship of God, as well as the very benefit of Christ’s death, let him be anathema. It is certain, however, that an evil or indifferent work is not the worship of God, nor is it accepted by the Father or made effective through Christ; for the Eternal Father cannot accept or regard as pleasing works that displease him, such as all evil works. For the Wise Man says, ch. 14: The impious man and his impiety are hateful to God. Likewise, God cannot be duly appeased by works that are indifferent to him and do not please him; for these neither concern his worship nor are offered through Christ. Indeed, by the very fact that a work is directed to the worship and glory of God, it is not indifferent but truly good and meritorious. Therefore it follows that every work of satisfaction must necessarily be morally good.

I assume, second, that a work of satisfaction must be morally good with supernatural goodness: both because it must proceed from Christ’s merits and be offered through him to the Father—for what is done from Christ’s merits is supernatural; and because the Council of Trent sufficiently indicates this when it says that works of satisfaction pertain to the worship of God, are accepted by him for the remission of the punishment due for sins and for obtaining the eternal reward, and are consequently meritorious. Hence the Council teaches, ch. 8: Nor, indeed, it says, has any safer way ever been thought to exist in the Church of God for removing the punishment impending from the Lord than that people frequently perform these works of penance with true sorrow of heart. But what is true sorrow of heart except a supernatural act of hope or charity? Hence the Council there concludes: Yet this satisfaction of ours, which we make for our sins, is not so ours that it is not through Jesus Christ. For we who can do nothing of ourselves, as of ourselves, can do all things with the help of him who strengthens us. Thus a person has nothing in which to glory, but all our glorying is in Christ, in whom we live, in whom we merit, in whom we make satisfaction, producing fruits worthy of penance, which derive their efficacy from him, are offered to the Father by him, and are accepted by the Father through him. But what is done through Christ must be done by the benefit of his grace and consequently must belong to the supernatural order.

I assume, third, that a work of satisfaction must be voluntary and free: both because a satisfactory act is a moral and human act, while freedom is the principle of morality and moral goodness; and because just as a person sins only by acting freely, so one can make satisfaction for sins only by freely and voluntarily enduring a punishment, whether imposed by the priest or undertaken by the penitent himself; and because a work of satisfaction must redound to God’s glory, since it is ordered to restoring the divine right and compensating for the injury inflicted on the divine Majesty, and therefore must be a praiseworthy work. But nothing is praiseworthy unless it is free and within our power, as the Doctor teaches in Quodlibet 18, n. 9, where he says: I say that what is praiseworthy and blameworthy, or, more generally, rewardable and punishable, is contained under the common notion of what is imputable; and the one account of this common notion is that the act be within the free power of the agent. It follows that a satisfactory act must be free, at least by denomination from that pious disposition or true sorrow of heart by which it is elicited or commanded. I said “by denomination” at least, for many think that satisfaction is increased by an external work or suffering: thus one who actually fasts merits more than one who merely wishes to fast but cannot because of illness or bodily weakness, although in the interior act and the will to fast they are equal and alike. Hence the Council of Trent, ch. 9, teaches that although temporal scourges sent by God upon a person are not in that person’s power but come from without, nevertheless, if the person voluntarily accepts and patiently endures them, they are satisfactory, because in some manner they become that sufferer’s own, insofar as the sufferer accepts them for the cleansing of sins and patiently makes use of them to obtain the full remission of the offense.

These points having been established, three matters remain to be determined in this question: first, whether a work of satisfaction must be penal; second, whether it must be external or internal; third, what works of satisfaction are fitting.

First conclusion. — A WORK OF SATISFACTION SHOULD ORDINARILY BE PENAL.

This is gathered from the Council of Trent, sess. XIV, where it calls works of satisfaction “satisfactory punishments”; and in can. 13, “punishments willingly undertaken, inflicted by God, or imposed by a priest.” The same is also apparent from Sacred Scripture, which whenever it mentions a sinner’s need to make satisfaction also indicates that penal works must be undertaken for this purpose. Thus Joel 2: Turn to me with all your heart, in fasting, in weeping, and in mourning. And Matthew 11, where the Lord Christ, speaking of the people of Tyre and Sidon, says that if the miracles he had worked in Bethsaida and Chorazin had been done among them, they would have done penance in sackcloth and ashes. This is likewise established by the authority of all the holy Fathers praised in the first conclusion of the preceding question, who unanimously attest that satisfaction must be made through afflictive and punitive works. Hence St. Gregory, Homilies on the Gospels, hom. 20: It is just that the sinner inflict upon himself greater lamentation through penance in proportion as he inflicted greater harm upon himself through guilt.

Hence the Subtle Doctor, d. 15, q. 1, n. 11, defining satisfaction, says: I say that satisfaction is a laborious or penal action, voluntarily accepted in order to punish the sin one has committed and to appease the divine offense; or it is suffering, that is, a punishment, voluntarily endured for the aforesaid purpose. And earlier, n. 8, he had said: Satisfaction in this sense consists more in penal acts or voluntary sufferings than in other good, non-penal acts, although at times satisfaction can be made through some good, non-penal act. For God can rightly accept a great act of charity as punishment due for one sin; for although it is not the proper punishment, it is nevertheless a greater good and gives greater honor to God than the punishment proper to that sin would. But ordinarily, just as guilt is set right through punishment and not through some other good greater than the guilt, so satisfaction, so called, consists in actions or sufferings having the character of punishment. This is what St. Augustine says in On True and False Penance, cited in d. 16, ch. 1: “The fruits of virtues are worthy, yet they do not suffice for penitents; for penance demands a graver fruit, so that one dead through sorrow and groaning may obtain life.” These penal acts or voluntary sufferings are generally reduced to the interior act of displeasure or the passion of sorrow, and to the exterior act of confessing one’s own sin, which is very painful, or to the accompanying passion of shame; or to a wholly external act or suffering, namely, mortifying the flesh—and every such mortification is said to be contained in or reduced to fasting; or to raising the mind to God, which is done through prayer; or to giving away one’s temporal goods, which is done through almsgiving.

The Council of Trent confirms this truth of the Subtle Doctor, sess. XIV, ch. 2. First, because penance is a laborious baptism. For, speaking of the renewal and restoration of a person that comes through the merit of penance, it says: We can in no way attain this newness and integrity through the sacrament of penance without great weeping and labors of our own, divine justice so requiring; hence penance was rightly called by the holy Fathers a kind of laborious baptism. Second, because, it says in ch. 11, satisfaction serves to avoid future sin: These satisfactory punishments, it says, undoubtedly greatly turn people away from sin and restrain them as if by a certain bridle, making penitents more cautious and watchful for the future. For when a person has experienced punishment, he does not readily fall back into guilt; hence the Philosopher says in Ethics II that punishments are remedies for sins. Third, because through satisfaction we are made conformed to Christ: While, it says, we suffer in making satisfaction for sins, we are conformed to Jesus Christ, who made satisfaction for our sins and from whom all our sufficiency comes; and from this we also have the surest pledge that if we suffer with him, we shall also be glorified with him. The Roman Catechism teaches the same, part II, ch. 5, n. 58, where it says: Two things in particular are required for satisfaction. First, the person making satisfaction must be just and a friend of God, for works done without faith and charity can in no way be pleasing to God. Second, such works must be undertaken as by their nature bring distress and pain. Since they compensate for past crimes and, as St. Cyprian the Martyr says (bk. 1, ep. 13, near the end), are “redemptions of sins,” they must necessarily contain some bitterness, although they do not always produce the result that those who engage in these troublesome actions feel pain. For often the habit of suffering, or charity kindled toward God, makes even what is most grievous to endure go unfelt. Yet this does not prevent those very works from having the power of satisfaction; for this is proper to the children of God: they are so inflamed with love and devotion toward him that, tormented by the sharpest labors, they either feel almost no discomfort or endure everything with a most wounded spirit.

The Seraphic Doctor likewise proves this truth in In IV Sent., d. 15, pt. 2, a. 1, q. 3, by four arguments: The reason, he says, why satisfaction must be made through penal works is fourfold. The first is that it is a repayment of honor taken away; hence a person must render this honor in greater measure than if he had not taken it away, and so it is required that he not only serve God through a good action but also humble himself through an assumed punishment. The second reason is that it is the reordering of what was first disordered; and because what is disordered through guilt is best ordered through punishment, and so on. The third reason is that it is the healing of what was weakened; for what was weakened by the heat of pleasure is healed by the chill of punishment, and so on. The fourth reason is that it is the discharge of a debt; and since the sinner is a debtor to punishment, he must make satisfaction through punishment. So he.

✳ “Neither divine nor ecclesiastical law commands that sacramental satisfaction must necessarily precede Holy Communion; therefore this proposition was rightly condemned by Alexander VIII: Those who claim a right to Communion before they have performed due penance for their offenses are to be judged sacrilegious.” ✳

YOU WILL SAY 1: St. Anselm, in Cur Deus Homo, chs. 19 and 20, says: To make satisfaction is to render to God the honor due to him. But this is done by every good work. Therefore satisfaction can be made not only through penal works but through all other works. — The Seraphic Doctor replies: There is an honor due that arises from a good received, and this we owe through thanksgiving; there is one that arises from a command imposed, and this we owe through obedience and submission; there is one that arises from the command of Majesty, and this we owe through adoration of latria; there is also one that arises from a sin committed, and this honor is rendered to God through penance imposed upon oneself—and this is what satisfaction consists in.

YOU WILL SAY 2: God takes no delight in our punishments; therefore penal works do not please God more than others. But satisfaction is better made by that which pleases more the one to whom satisfaction is owed. Therefore, and so on. — St. Bonaventure replies: To the objection that God does not delight in punishments, it should be said that this is true insofar as they are punishments; but insofar as they heal our guilt and honor divine justice, he does indeed delight in them.

YOU WILL SAY 3: Some sins, such as envy and sloth, are committed with sadness. But satisfaction must be made by means of the contrary; therefore satisfaction for these sins must be made without punishment. — The Seraphic Doctor replies: Although sadness accompanies certain sins, their root nevertheless comes from disordered pleasure.

YOU WILL SAY 4: Satisfaction, speaking properly, is penal; therefore the more penal something is, the more satisfactory it is. But for a miser it is more painful to give a small coin than for a generous person to give a mark; therefore the miser makes more satisfaction with the small coin than the other with the mark. The same may be said of fasting and prayer. It is unreasonable that the wicked should derive an advantage from their wickedness. — The same Doctor replies: Something is painful by nature, as fasting, abstinence, and the giving away of goods by which human weakness is sustained; something else is painful by reason of guilt and disordered will. The first kind of painfulness is considered in itself in satisfaction; the second is not, and the objection concerns this second kind.

Second conclusion. — ALTHOUGH ORDINARILY A WORK OF SATISFACTION SHOULD BE PENAL, NEVERTHELESS EVERY MERITORIOUS WORK, BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL, CAN TRULY BE SATISFACTORY. This is common to both the Angelic and Subtle schools, for the Doctor did not teach the contrary, as some Thomists wrongly attribute to him. For, as is clear from what was said in the first conclusion, he expressly declared at n. 8 that although satisfaction ordinarily consists in some penal act, nevertheless, he says, satisfaction can be made through some good, non-penal act, because God can rightly accept a good act of charity as punishment due for one sin; for although it is not the proper punishment, it is nevertheless a greater good and gives greater honor to God than the punishment proper to that sin would. There he expressly includes among penal acts the interior act of displeasure or the passion of sorrow. And there, n. 11, he says: Of the first kind I say that satisfaction is an outwardly laborious or penal action, voluntarily undertaken in order to punish the sin one has committed and to appease the divine offense; or it is suffering, that is, a punishment, voluntarily endured for the aforesaid purpose. Satisfaction is taken in this way much more narrowly and particularly than satisfaction in the first sense, because the latter could consist in an interior or exterior act of voluntary penal suffering. Therefore he does not deny all power of satisfaction to interior acts; rather, if he denies any, it is satisfaction taken strictly and distinguished from the other parts of penance, such as contrition and confession. For he immediately adds: The second point (namely, what this satisfaction consists in) is clear, because when an external work or suffering is distinguished from an interior act or passion of the mind (that is, contrition) and from an act of the mouth (that is, confession) or an accompanying passion, satisfaction consists only in those three difficult works, namely fasting, prayer, and almsgiving, discussed in the preceding article, or in voluntary sufferings accompanying these three most difficult works.

Moreover, the reason for the conclusion is first, that a person can sin through a purely interior act; therefore it was fitting that one could also make satisfaction for sin through a purely interior act. Next, our satisfaction contributes to the remission of sin only insofar as it is accepted by God; but God can accept an act of charity as compensation for an injury done to him; therefore that act can truly be satisfactory. Finally, if anything would prevent a purely interior work from being satisfactory, it would be chiefly that it is not penal. But that is not so: since every meritorious act is an act of virtue, it always has some difficulty and distress attached to it, even though it also brings delight in another respect, as is clear of contemplation, which refreshes the mind even as it afflicts it. Therefore every meritorious act can be satisfactory.

Third conclusion. — WORKS OF SATISFACTION ARE GENERALLY REDUCED TO THREE HEADS, NAMELY, FASTING, PRAYER, AND ALMSGIVING. So the Council of Trent, sess. VI, ch. 14, where it numbers satisfaction among the acts of the penitent, saying that it is made through fasts, almsgiving, prayers, and other pious exercises of the spiritual life.

The Doctor proves this conclusion, n. 12: Because, he says, sins are generally divided into three kinds, namely, the sin of the flesh, the sin of the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life (1 John 2), corresponding fittingly to them are proper kinds of satisfaction in general: for the sin of the flesh, fasting, or, universally, any mortification of the flesh more ordered to repressing that sin of the flesh. Under this I include vigils, pilgrimages, rough clothing, nakedness, going barefoot, and, indeed, generally any fatiguing labor. Prayer corresponds more appropriately to the sin of pride and the other spiritual sins, since it both humbles the spirit before God and strengthens it against spiritual sins. The giving of alms corresponds more appropriately to sins concerning temporal things, such as avarice or any kind of covetousness, such as robbery, theft, or unjust taking. The reason for these correspondences is the greater correspondence between punishment and guilt: “by the same things by which a person sins, by these also he is tormented.”

The Seraphic Doctor agrees in In IV Sent., d. 15, pt. 2, a. 1, q. 4. By prayer he understands every contemplative act referred to God; by fasting, every affliction of the flesh, consisting in vigils, scourging, and fasting properly so called; and by almsgiving, every work of kindness done for one’s neighbor, whether spiritual or bodily. He proves the sufficiency and distinction of these parts, first, by their appropriation: Since, he says, the root of sin is threefold, as is said in John: either the concupiscence of the flesh, against which is fasting; or the concupiscence of the eyes, against which is almsgiving; or the pride of life, against which is prayer. I say this by appropriation, because each of these is effective against them all, but they are more appropriately opposed in this way. Second, by their proper character: A penal work, he says, either orders us toward God, and thus it is prayer; or toward ourselves, and thus it is fasting, which mortifies our flesh; or toward our neighbor, and thus it is almsgiving. Third, by reconciliation: For, he says, we are reconciled to God through prayer. But, as Augustine says in On the Lord’s Sermon on the Mount: If you wish your prayer to fly to heaven, give it two wings, namely fasting and almsgiving. Tobit 12: Prayer is good with fasting and almsgiving. Fourth, sufficiency is taken because, he says, life is twofold, namely active and contemplative; prayer pertains to the contemplative, almsgiving to the active; fasting, however, disposes a person for both.

YOU WILL SAY 1: Contraries must be cured by contraries; but there are far more kinds of sins; therefore there must also be far more remedies. — I DISTINGUISH the minor: there are far more particular kinds of sins, I grant; common and universal kinds, I deny. For there is no particular kind of sin that cannot be reduced to one or another of the three assigned.

YOU WILL SAY 2: If almsgiving were satisfactory, it would be so especially when it is given from one’s own goods, justly acquired and necessary. But in that case it cannot be satisfactory, because everyone is bound to love himself more than another and consequently ought not to spend for another’s use what is necessary for himself. — I DISTINGUISH the minor: if it is absolutely necessary for oneself, I grant; otherwise, I deny. Moreover, the Seraphic Doctor says, a. 2, q. 1, that what is necessary is said in two ways: either according to the strict necessities of nature or according to the common way of life. If according to the strict necessities of nature, the one who has sinned is not bound to give it, nor should it be imposed on him, since this belongs to the perfection of those who expect their entire livelihood from Christ, such as those in the state of perfection. Therefore, if almsgiving is given, it should be from what remains after this necessity is met, and it is indeed satisfactory. In another way, something is called necessary when it is useful to a person according to the common way of life. Augustine says of this: We will be found to have many superfluities if we keep only what is necessary. Almsgiving properly made from such goods is satisfactory; strictly speaking, it is not made from what is superfluous. Nevertheless, I believe that the goodness of divine mercy is so great that he accepts everything and saves us as if for nothing. So the Seraphic Doctor.

YOU WILL SAY 3: If prayer could be satisfactory, it would be so especially if mental or vocal; but neither has that character. Mental prayer does not, because it is not laborious; vocal prayer does not either, because it is often imperfect. Therefore, and so on. — The Seraphic Doctor denies the minor, q. 3, where, distinguishing three kinds of prayer, he says they are satisfactory: There is, he says, purely mental prayer, some vocal prayer, and some intermediate. Prayer is purely mental when the lips do not move but the heart speaks to God. It is purely vocal when the person thinks nothing of what he says, either in general or in particular, so that he directs his intention neither to the meaning of the words nor to their purpose; rather, while he prays, he is building castles in the air, and thus the mental wholly surpasses the vocal. Another kind is mixed, in which one prays both mentally and vocally. This requires a distinction: either the words impede the affection, because the person is so inflamed that he is borne immediately toward God—in this case mental prayer is more useful—or the words help him—in this case vocal prayer is more useful. Many are of this kind, especially those who are not spiritual persons, for whose affections vocal prayers were instituted.

“IF IT IS ASKED which prayer is satisfactory, I believe that all of it is, because in every kind the animal powers labor; and to the extent that the spirit delights, the flesh often wastes away and the animal powers are less intent on governing the body. Nevertheless, I believe that the most satisfactory prayer among them is that in which a person is moved to groaning, because God delights most in this. Since this is a special grace, it is therefore not imposed by a priest; rather, vocal prayer is a preparation for it. And because the goal is not in the words but they are ordered to the understanding, the Lord and Gregory lead from vocal prayer to mental prayer.”

YOU WILL ASK 1. Which of these three good works is more satisfactory? — The Seraphic Doctor replies, a. 1, q. 4, ad 6 and 7: To the question which is more satisfactory, it should be said that each is so according to its own proper character. Yet if we speak generally, there are three things in satisfaction: first, avoidance of guilt, against which prayer is especially effective; second, an increase of grace, for which almsgiving is especially effective, since one makes friends who obtain grace; third, payment of punishment, which is found especially in fasting, and this is the lowest aspect of satisfaction, for the other two outweigh it. — But whatever the case, we should heed St. Augustine’s counsel and admonition, Sermon 59, On Time: Whoever wishes his prayer to fly to God should give it two wings, that is, almsgiving and fasting; then it will ascend swiftly and be heard. He says the same in On the Psalms 42, near the end: How swiftly, he says, the prayers of those who do good works are received; and this is a person’s righteousness in this life: fasting, almsgiving, prayer. Do you wish your prayer to fly to God? Give it two wings, fasting and prayer.

YOU WILL ASK 1. Can satisfaction be made through scourges sent by God or brought about by secondary causes?

The Council of Trent affirms this, sess. XIV, ch. 9, where it says: The holy Synod further teaches that the generosity of divine munificence is so great that we are able to make satisfaction to God the Father through Jesus Christ not only by punishments we willingly undertake to avenge sin, or those imposed at a priest’s discretion in proportion to the offense, but also—and this is the greatest proof of love—by temporal scourges inflicted by God and patiently endured by us. Likewise, can. 13: If anyone says that, as regards temporal punishment, satisfaction is in no way made to God through the merits of Christ by punishments inflicted by him and patiently endured, or imposed by a priest, or willingly undertaken, etc., let him be anathema. Since no distinction is made here between scourges inflicted by God specifically for the purpose of satisfaction and those that God permits to occur naturally for other purposes, the same seems to be said of both.

The reason for this assertion is simply the will of the Lord Christ, which is made known to us by the Church’s explicit judgment in the cited words of the Council, especially with respect to scourges specially inflicted by God for satisfaction and the sinner’s correction. For Proverbs 3 says: The Lord chastises the one he loves. Likewise Hebrews 12: The Lord chastises the one he loves and scourges every son whom he receives—because sinners make satisfaction to God for their offenses by patiently enduring such scourges and chastisements.

Saint Jerome splendidly confirms this in his commentary on the first chapter of the prophet Nahum, where he says: “Why, then, do you plot against the Lord? He who created the world will also bring it to completion. If it seems to you that he is cruel, harsh, and bloodthirsty because he destroyed the human race in the Flood, rained fire and brimstone upon Sodom and Gomorrah, drowned the Egyptians in the waves, and laid the corpses of the Israelites low in the desert, know that he imposed punishments in the present so as not to punish eternally. The things spoken by the prophets are either true or false. If what they seem to teach about his severity is true, they themselves said: The Lord will not avenge these things twice in their affliction. But if they are false, and what is said, Affliction shall not rise up a second time, is false, then the cruelty described in the Law is false as well. But if it is true, as they will not be able to deny, that the prophet says, The Lord will not avenge these things twice in their affliction, then those who have been punished will not be punished afterward. But if they will be punished afterward, Scripture lies, which it is impious to say. Therefore those who perished in the Flood, the people of Sodom, the Egyptians, and the Israelites in the wilderness received their evils during their lifetime.”

“Someone may ask here: if a believer caught in adultery is beheaded, what will happen to him afterward? Either he will be punished, and what is said, The Lord will not avenge these things twice in their affliction, is false; or he will not be punished, in which case one might wish that adulterers, by suffering brief and swift torment now, might escape eternal torments. To this we reply that God knows the measures of all things, including punishments, and that a judgment’s sentence cannot forestall him; nor can his power to exact punishment for sins in the future be taken away, and great sin must be atoned for by great and lasting torments. But if someone has been punished as was the man in the Law who cursed the Israelites, or the man who gathered wood on the Sabbath, such people are not punished afterward, because their slight guilt was compensated by the punishment they suffered in the present.”

Hence the Doctor teaches, d. 15, q. 1, that a confessor can impose upon a poor person as satisfaction for his offenses the punishment he undergoes daily on account of poverty and need: The priest’s discernment is required, he says at n. 13, so that he not impose on anyone a punishment too unsuitable for him, but another more fitting one that he may perhaps fulfill better. For example, a poor person can neither give alms nor pray, but must labor continually for his necessary sustenance; nor can he fast, since then he would not be able continually to acquire the food necessary for his labor and livelihood. Therefore, since his continual labor is a continual fast for him, being a continual mortification of the flesh, he should only be led to undertake that labor for the remission of sins, intending to refer it to this end, at least until an opportunity arises for him to perform some other satisfaction; and other satisfactions can be moderated and imposed on him in a reduced measure so that they are possible for him. Similarly, if a rich person who has fallen into a sin of the flesh is so delicate that he will not fast or undergo any other notable mortification, or it is presumed that if one were imposed he would soon cast it off and thus commit a new sin, he should be led to prayer and almsgiving. What he receives more willingly and is believed more likely to fulfill perseveringly should be imposed on him.

“Or, if he is wholly unwilling to receive any penance imposed by a priest, yet says that he is displeased with the sin committed and has a firm purpose not to fall again, he should be absolved and not rejected, lest he fall into despair. He should be told what punishment must be undergone for his sins and urged to undertake it himself, or its equivalent, without an imposition; otherwise he will pay it in full in Purgatory. This mercy accords well with that prophecy of Isaiah 42 concerning Christ, which Matthew recounts in ch. 12: He will not break a bruised reed, and he will not extinguish a smoldering wick. A bruised reed is a sinner bruised by temptations and sins; a smoldering wick is a wick made too damp by sins, yet still having some fire of charity. This fire is extinguished if, through a priest’s harshness, the person is bound to something too difficult; it is not extinguished if he is told that he must pay the punishment here or elsewhere, and should strive to pay here as much punishment as his sins deserve, lest a sharper penalty be exacted elsewhere.” So the Doctor.

By this he indicates, first, that satisfaction should be imposed, insofar as possible, as equivalent and corresponding to the sins¹, so that the penitent makes satisfaction and is punished in the kind of thing in which he sinned. Where this cannot be done, it suffices to impose satisfaction of another kind, equivalent and proportionate to the penitent’s capacity and strength. In this matter discernment must especially be sought and observed, so that by imposing a lighter satisfaction through excessive leniency the confessor does not become a participant in and responsible for another’s sin, or make worthless the medicine necessary for the sick person; and, on the other hand, so that by failing to take sufficiently prudent account of the penitent’s weakness, he does not prescribe a kind of satisfaction that the penitent cannot fulfill without danger of despair or of a new sin. Second, when a penitent cannot suitably pay a satisfaction corresponding to his sins, the confessor may impose as satisfaction the punishments and misfortunes that the penitent himself suffers. The reason is clear: everything accepted by God in satisfaction for temporal punishment is also an appropriate means for the one making satisfaction. Therefore, when the means to pay anything else are lacking, the priest, who is an inferior and ministerial judge, must conform himself to God’s law and will, and prescribe as satisfaction those things that have some correspondence with the offense, even if it is neither complete nor proportionate.

YOU WILL ASK 2. Can a penitent make satisfaction to God through works otherwise commanded?

I ANSWER, there are three opinions on this matter among the scholastic Doctors. The first denies that satisfaction can be made through works otherwise commanded, on the ground that, to be perfect, it must be made through works that are otherwise not owed. So most Scotists contend², especially Faventinus, d. 29, disp. 35, ch. 7. The second affirms that satisfaction can be made through works commanded by human law, but not by divine or natural law. So Sylvester, under the entry Satisfaction. The third opinion finally teaches that satisfaction can also be prescribed through works otherwise commanded. This now seems more common among recent theologians and also more probable to us: both because it is gathered from the Council of Trent, sess. VI, ch. 10, where it says: Through the observance of God’s and the Church’s commandments, those who have received justification through Christ’s grace, with faith cooperating with good works, grow and are more fully justified. And in ch. 6: Nothing further should be thought lacking to those who have been justified, so that they may be considered truly to have fully satisfied the divine law, for the state of this life, by those works done in God, and to have truly merited eternal life in its own time, provided that they depart this life in grace. Why, then, could they not for the same reason be considered to have truly made satisfaction for temporal punishment, especially if these commanded works are penal? For if good works do not lose their power to merit grace and glory merely because they are owed under a precept, why should good and penal works lose their power to make satisfaction because they are otherwise commanded? — Next. The Church prescribes fasts as satisfaction; therefore it judges that commanded works can be satisfactory. The antecedent is clear from the Collect said on the Saturday before the Third Sunday of Lent: Grant, we beseech you, O Lord, the saving effect of our fast, so that the chastisement of the flesh undertaken may pass over to the nourishment of our souls. And Pope St. Leo says in Sermon 1, On Lent: With the great sobriety of divine institution it has been provided that a forty-day exercise should govern us for the recovery of purity of mind, during which the sins of other times may be redeemed by pious works and expiated by chaste fasts, through the extinction of temporal punishment. — Finally, as Lugo says, disp. 27, n. 35, the entire condignity of satisfaction rests on this: by chastising himself laudably, a person thereby appeases the Judge’s anger so that he will not punish him again. But one who chastises himself under a precept chastises himself no less, but more laudably; other things being equal, it is no less honorable and praiseworthy, but rather more so, to do something under a precept than without one. Therefore such chastisement through commanded works pleases God more and consequently appeases him more than spontaneous works do.

YOU WILL SAY 1: A person cannot discharge two debts by the same payment, because there would be no equality between the debt and the price. Therefore, if some work is already owed to God under a precept, the debt contracted through sin cannot be discharged by it. — I DISTINGUISH THE ANTECEDENT: if the thing offered in payment does not have multiple goodness and value, I grant; otherwise, I deny. For then it can satisfy several debts according to its different values. Moreover, commanded works can have a twofold value: one moral and meritorious, drawn from their object and circumstances, as well as from the end for which the work is elicited and from the principle of habitual grace by which it is produced; the other satisfactory, derived from its difficulty, that is, the punishment and labor found in performing it. By the first value we can fulfill the debt of the precept and satisfy the debt of obedience and religion; by the second we can make condign satisfaction to God for the temporal punishment due for mortal sin. For example, if a gold coin has two values, one by reason of its metal and another by reason of the image or the prince’s seal engraved on it, and if it were worth five silver coins by the first value and as many by the second, someone who owed another ten silver coins—five on account of a loan and five on account of goods—could discharge both debts equally and under both titles by handing over that gold coin. By analogy, the same should be said of commanded works, which can be applied both to satisfaction for the virtue of obedience and religion and to satisfaction for sins. For if someone can satisfy three precepts with a single fast—for example, when a religious is bound by his Rule to fast every Friday, by a precept of the Church throughout Lent, and also on the Ember Days, so that when all three coincide a single fast fulfills them—why, by the same reasoning, could that same fast not satisfy both the Church’s precept and the confessor’s command prescribing that fast?

YOU WILL SAY 2: If someone owes the Church one chalice by vow and another by the will and bequest of the person whose heir he is, he will not satisfy both by giving a single chalice: what he gives by vow he does not pay, and what he pays by force of the will he does not give. Similarly, if someone owes Peter a hundred coins on account of a loan and has also stolen another hundred from him, he does not satisfy him by giving him a hundred coins just once. Therefore no one will satisfy God by a single fast when he is bound to fast by a precept and also to compensate for the injury inflicted on God. — I DENY THE CONSEQUENCE. The reason for the difference must be sought in the matter: for the matter of commutative justice consists in complete equality of payment with debts or rights, which cannot be preserved in a single payment when those debts or rights are several or distinct. It is otherwise with legal debts, such as those of a vow, a law, an imposed penance, and the like, in which the legislator’s mind and intention are given greater consideration than the thing itself. Since the legislator’s intention can be directed toward the same work being done for different reasons—for example, if someone is bound on the same day to fast by a Church precept because the day is the vigil of a saint, and by a vow because he is bound to do so under the Rule he professed—if a confessor prescribes a fast on that same day as penance for a penitent whom he knows to be otherwise bound to fast by vow and by the Church’s precept, that penitent will satisfy the vow, the law, and the penance imposed upon him by the same fast.

YOU WILL ASK 3. Whether a penitent who fulfills an imposed satisfaction while in a state of mortal sin truly performs it in such a way as to discharge the debt completely, so that he is not bound to fulfill it again in a state of grace?

The Doctor answers that the affirmative side does not seem improbable to him, n. 15: The negative opinion, he says, seems excessively harsh toward sinners and an occasion for greater obstinacy. For if this person, truly penitent today and humbly accepting a satisfaction, say a three-day fast, falls again into mortal sin and, without repenting of it, fasts on the second day because this was imposed upon him, if you say that the fast on the second day is not any external satisfaction, there is a greater reason to induce this person, already fallen, not to fast on the third day, and consequently to commit a new mortal sin. For by transgressing this punishment imposed by a priest and accepted by him, he seems to commit a mortal sin, since it is a transgression of the precept of the Church and of God’s vicar in this act.

“From this the following argument can be formed: if after falling and before new penance a person does not perform the earlier satisfaction imposed upon him, he commits a new mortal sin; therefore if he does perform it, he acts well, because he performs an act of obedience. But he performs no act of obedience except insofar as this was imposed upon him as part of the satisfaction. I therefore say, without prejudice, that one who once truly repents and receives a condign satisfaction or penance imposed upon him by the Church, with the key not erring, will never be bound to fulfill more than that one satisfaction, however much he may afterward fall again. If he fulfills it in charity, that is better, because he not only pays the punishment but merits as well. But if he fulfills it voluntarily outside charity, he pays the punishment but does not merit grace. If it is exacted from him outside charity, the punishment is paid even though he does not pay it. In the first case, satisfaction is made simply, because it reconciles and appeases; in the second, there is indeed satisfaction, because there is a voluntary payment, but it neither reconciles nor appeases; in the third, there is satisfaction beyond which no further punishment is exacted. From the second case it follows that if he fulfilled a large part of the satisfaction imposed on him while in mortal sin and afterward repents again of the new sin, penance must not be imposed on him again for the sin for which he made satisfaction, even outside charity, but only for the new sins that caused that satisfaction to be dead.”

THE DOCTOR OBJECTS: “If you argue, ‘It is dead; therefore it is not satisfaction,’ he replies: that does not follow, except that it is not appeasing or reconciling satisfaction. He presses: And if one says, ‘Therefore it is not satisfaction,’ he replies: that does not follow, because it is enough for God that someone voluntarily pay the punishment due for the sin committed; for even what appears to be less suffices as a satisfactory suffering. This is clear in human affairs: if the law prescribes specifically that a hand be cut off in response to an offense against a king, and someone’s hand is cut off even against his will, satisfaction is made. It suffices for the king to such an extent that, according to law and justice, he ought not exact further punishment from him; and yet he does not receive him into favor or friendship. Much more, then, could it suffice for the punishment of guilt if someone inflicted upon himself the punishment due, even though he was not in the favor or friendship of the offended Judge.”

“From the third case it can be said that if such a person were condemned because of a new sin into which he falls again, before he had completed the entire punishment imposed upon him, he would be punished temporarily in hell with the punishment corresponding to what had not been paid here. When that punishment had been paid after some time, he would no longer be punished by it, just as with venial sin: for one who dies in venial sin together with mortal sin would not be punished eternally for the venial sin, as will be said below. The same applies to the present case: since, according to the full punitive justice, a temporal punishment was once imposed on this person for the sin of which he truly repented, no temporal punishment will ever be owed by him for that sin except that one; and once it has been paid, none other is owed.” So the Doctor.

From these things it appears that the Doctor considers it probable that satisfaction can truly be validly made in a state of sin. He proves this especially by refuting the contrary opinion: first, because that opinion is excessively harsh; second, because it causes sinners to become obstinate; third, because it gives an occasion for sin, since a penitent who has fallen again, judging that the satisfaction imposed on him does him no good, will not pay it, which is a sin of disobedience against the confessor’s precept.

This is certainly confirmed because the sinner’s burden ought not to be increased, nor the benefit of the sacrament and Christ’s death withheld from him. But there is no basis for asserting that a penitent cannot make satisfaction or validly fulfill the satisfaction prescribed for him. For if there were some basis for this assertion, it would be chiefly either that satisfaction is an effect or part of the sacrament, or that it is a special benefit of God, or that it must be made through Christ. But none of these reasons establishes the conclusion. Not the fact that it is a sacramental effect: the imprinting of character is also a sacramental effect of baptism, confirmation, and order, yet a state of grace is not required for it. Nor the fact that it is a unique and extraordinary benefit of God, of which a sinner is unworthy: the imprinting of character is also such a benefit, yet it is conferred on a sinner. Nor the fact that our satisfaction is through Jesus Christ, that is, by the power of the sacrament through which Christ’s merits are applied or communicated to the faithful; for the sinner receives an impressed character. Therefore, in like manner, a sinner will be able to make satisfaction and will do so by the work performed through Christ, that is, by the power of the sacrament of penance, through which the merits and satisfactions of Christ are applied or communicated to the faithful.

THE ADVERSARIES REPLY that satisfaction in a state of sin is null not only for the reasons given above, but also because, to be valid, it must be accepted by God and offered to him through Christ. But satisfaction in a state of sin cannot be accepted by God, for the Most High does not approve the gifts of the wicked. The Council of Trent confirms this when it says in the passage just cited: In him (Christ) we live, in him we merit, in him we make satisfaction, producing fruits worthy of penance, which derive their efficacy from him, are offered to the Father by him, and are accepted by the Father through him. Hence the Roman Catechism, pt. 2, ch. 5, n. 103, says: Two things in particular are required for satisfaction. First, the person who makes satisfaction must be just and a friend of God; works done without faith and charity can in no way be pleasing to God. Second, such works must be undertaken as by their nature bring pain and distress. — The contrary is true: a state of grace is no more required for valid satisfaction than for a perfect act of contrition. But a state of grace is not presupposed for contrition to be valid. Therefore, and so on. The major premise is established: contrition not only erases sin but also part of the temporal punishment due for sin; indeed, it sometimes pays the whole punishment, as the Council of Trent assumes, sess. XIV, ch. 2. — Next, a state of grace would be required for the person making satisfaction to be pleasing and acceptable to God. But this is not absolutely necessary for worthy satisfaction, because a person’s worthiness consists in friendship with God and in being a child in view of attaining the inheritance, as well as in what directly orders one toward it, such as merits. But the payment of temporal punishment can take place separately from these circumstances; therefore, for that payment to be valid, the person making satisfaction need not be pleasing and acceptable to God. The minor is clear: a right to the inheritance is not increased precisely by such payment of temporal punishment, especially when it consists in works that are not meritorious, although an obstacle that removes or delays its attainment is taken away. Consequently, that payment does not increase a person’s friendship with God, which is founded upon sanctifying grace, from which a person’s worthiness derives; nor does satisfaction in itself confer greater essential glory when it is not otherwise meritorious. Accordingly, satisfaction does not increase through the worthiness of the person except insofar as merit is joined to satisfaction. For the worthiness of a just person does not influence an act except when the act is elicited from the inclination of justice itself, which is charity. But good acts that are indifferent as regards merit do not establish merit, are not elicited according to that inclination, and in this way do not contribute more to life in a just person than in a sinner. Therefore indifferent satisfaction as regards merit, that is, satisfaction that is not specifically meritorious of grace or glory, receives no value from the justice or worthiness of the person when it is not elicited by a just person according to charity’s inclination. Hence, concerning the Council of Trent, I say that in the cited words it speaks of satisfaction simply, namely insofar as it reconciles and is condignly meritorious, for which life in Christ, or a state of grace, is undoubtedly required. But that is not the satisfaction under discussion here; rather, it is satisfaction insofar as it is payment of a debt and punishment for sin, which can indeed be made in any state. The Roman Catechism speaks of this reconciling and meritorious satisfaction, as is gathered from the preceding number, where it says: Thus it seems that the just lack nothing: through works they perform by God’s power, they can satisfy the divine law according to the mortal condition of this life and merit eternal life, which they will attain if they depart this life adorned with God’s grace. As is apparent, in these words the Catechism speaks of satisfaction that reconciles and is condignly meritorious of eternal life, not of satisfaction as payment of the punishment due for sin.

The same Catechism also acknowledged this twofold meaning of satisfaction when it says, n. 89: Some have defined satisfaction in this way: To make satisfaction is to render to God the honor due to him. It is quite clear that no one can render due honor to God unless he resolves to avoid sins altogether. To make satisfaction is also to cut off the causes of sins and not to yield access to their suggestions. Others have agreed with this opinion, defining satisfaction as a cleansing by which whatever filth remained in the soul apart from the stain of sin is removed, and we are released from punishments to which we were bound for a fixed period of time. These two parts of satisfaction—the cleansing of filth and release from punishments—are such that the first does not pertain to the satisfaction of a sinner, because, as Scotus says above, it neither reconciles nor appeases; the second does pertain, because it is the voluntary payment of a debt, that is, the full discharge of what is owed. Since by the power of the Keys the temporal punishment of Purgatory has been changed into a temporal punishment of this life, what does it matter whether the one who voluntarily pays it is a friend or an enemy of the person to whom he pays it? Can an enemy not satisfy a debt of commutative justice by paying the price of something purchased? No one doubts it. Why, then, could he not similarly satisfy a debt of vindicatory or punitive justice?

THE ADVERSARIES OBJECT: Sacred Scripture plainly testifies that God rejects all penance and satisfaction offered by a penitent while in a state of sin. Thus Isaiah 58: Why have we fasted, and you have not looked upon us? We have humbled our souls, and you have not known? Behold, on the day of your fast you find your own will, etc. And Proverbs 15: The Lord is far from the wicked, but he hears the prayers of the just. And 1 Corinthians 13: If I deliver my body so that I burn, but do not have charity, it profits me nothing. — I answer, regarding the earlier oracles of Scripture, the works of sinners are rejected not precisely because they are done in a state of sin but because they are elicited with an inclination to sin. For this is why Isaiah says that the fasts of the Jews are rejected: they were accompanied by the light sins of strife and enmity. Behold, he says, you fast for quarrels and contentions, and you strike with a wicked fist, etc. Regarding the Apostle, I say that he speaks not only of habitual charity but also of actual charity. It is clear, moreover, that someone can be justified without actual charity, as happens with infants who undergo martyrdom, and also with an adult who dies in good faith for Christ, although the sin for which he is liable does not come to mind, and he therefore cannot detest it through an act of charity. The Apostle is not speaking universally, then, but only of an adult who intends by his good works to merit eternal life. He cannot accomplish this unless he is in a state of grace and has habitual charity.

THEY OBJECT 2: Punishments of this life, taken in themselves and simply as such, are not comparable to the punishment of the life to come and have no proportion to it; consequently, in themselves they have no value for remitting that punishment. Therefore grace is necessary, from which they receive this value. But this grace is sanctifying grace, by which satisfaction is made worthy and has a moral proportion to the punishment of the other life. Therefore such grace is required beforehand for valid satisfaction. — I distinguish the first consequence: grace that assists and helps is necessary for it, I grant, because, as we said, that satisfaction must be made through Christ; that it is necessary by the benefit of sanctifying and habitual grace, I deny, especially when satisfaction is only payment of the punishment owed.

YOU WILL PRESS: That satisfaction in a state of sin would pay the punishment owed either condignly or congruously. Not the first, because a penitent in a state of sin is unworthy of any good and consequently incapable of making condign satisfaction or meriting condignly. And therefore grace is the principle of all justice before God. — Moreover, a divine promise is required for this, on which the justice of both satisfaction and merit is founded. But this promise is not made to those who remain in mortal sin, but to the just. Nor can the second be said, except by pure gratuity: for where has it been revealed, or how is it known, that God shows such generosity to his enemies as to remit punishments for which they do not truly make satisfaction, when the general law is that as much torment is given to one as he glorified himself in delights, and, conversely, the general law is also that what is done without charity profits nothing? So Suárez. — I answer 1. It is wholly irrelevant to the character of satisfaction whether it is made condignly or congruously, provided that it pays the debt; just as it is likewise irrelevant whether it is accepted by God freely and through mercy or exactly, that is, through justice. — I answer 2. Satisfaction offered in a state of sin is payment of punishment condignly as regards the payment of the temporal punishment owed, but not as regards reconciliation. For this satisfaction, the Doctor says, does not reconcile or appease; therefore it does not dispose the one making satisfaction for eternal life, nor remove the obstacle preventing its attainment, namely sin. Moreover, this satisfaction is not condign through the work of the one acting, nor does it borrow its value or its moral proportion for paying the debt from the person’s worthiness. Rather, it has that condignity by the work performed, that is, insofar as it is sacramental, and receives its value and moral proportion for paying the debt from the worthiness of the sacrament, through which this work is elevated and constituted an integral part of the sacrament. For it is imposed by the power of the keys and accepted by God insofar as, by pardoning sin through sacramental absolution, he has commuted eternal punishment into this temporal satisfaction.

I therefore acknowledge that satisfaction performed in a state of mortal sin is not condign through the work of the one acting; but no one has yet proved that it must not be performed in this way, or that it cannot suffice if it is condign only by the work performed. Nevertheless, although these things may perhaps be true as a matter of speculation, if you consider practice it is safer to advise penitents to strive with all diligence to fulfill the satisfactions imposed upon them while in a state of grace, according to their prudent judgment—that is, when they are not conscious of any mortal sin. For satisfaction performed in that state not only pays the punishment owed but also merits a further degree of grace, as well as a new right to an increase of glory.