Scotus Academicus, Tomus decimus: De Baptismo, De Poenitentia, De Extrema Unctione

Claude Frassen

Scotus Academicus, Tomus decimus: De Baptismo, De Poenitentia, De Extrema Unctione

Claude Frassen (1620–1711)

First published 1902

The tenth volume of Claudius Frassen's Scotus Academicus in the Roman edition of 1902 (Editio nova, Ex Typographia Sallustiana), containing the first treatise of the fourth book: the sacraments instituted and ordained as a remedy for sin, namely baptism, penance with its appendix on public penance, and extreme unction. The Latin follows the printed page; the English is an original translation.


Tractatus I: On the sacraments instituted and ordained as a remedy for sin

Disputatio I: On the sacrament of baptism

Articulus I: On the institution and nature of the sacrament of baptism

Quaestio I: Whether the baptism of John was the same as the baptism of Christ, and had power to remit sins

Quaestio II: What baptism is, when it was instituted, and when it began to be under a precept

Quaestio III: How many kinds of baptism there are

Quaestio IV: What is the remote matter of baptism, namely water

Quaestio V: What the proximate matter of baptism is, and of what sort

Quaestio VI: What is the lawful form of baptism

Articulus II: On the minister and the subject of baptism

Quaestio I: Who is a fit minister of baptism

Quaestio II: Who are bound to receive baptism, and in what way

Quaestio III: Whether it is lawful validly and licitly to baptize the infants of unbelievers who do not yet have the use of reason, against the will of their parents

Quaestio IV: What prior dispositions are required in an adult so that he receive baptism validly and rightly

Articulus III: On the effects of baptism, and the rites customarily observed in its solemn administration

Quaestio I: How baptism remits sin and the penalties due to it, and confers grace

Quaestio II: On the rites and ceremonies customarily observed in the solemn administration of baptism

Disputatio II: On the virtue and the sacrament of penance

Articulus I: On the essence, necessity and efficacy of the virtue of penance

Sectio I: On the nature of the virtue of penance

Quaestio I: What penance is

Quaestio II: Of what sort penance is, and to which of the virtues it is reduced

Quaestio III: What is the object of penance

Quaestio IV: What is the subject, both immediate and mediate, of the virtue of penance

Sectio II: On the necessity of penance

Quaestio I: Whether, and for what reason, the virtue of penance is necessary to the sinner for obtaining salvation

Quaestio II: Whether there is any precept about doing penance, and when it must be fulfilled

Sectio III: On the efficacy of the virtue of penance

Quaestio I: Whether all mortal sins, however grave, can be remitted through penance

Quaestio II: By what means, and in what way, venial sin is remitted both in this life and after death

Quaestio III: Whether, the guilt of mortal and venial sin being remitted through penance, the debt of temporal punishment remains, and how it can be paid

Quaestio IV: Whether, and in what way, meritorious works slain by sin revive by the power of penance

Quaestio V: Whether sins once remitted through penance revive through a subsequent sin and are imputed again, both as to guilt and as to punishment

Articulus II: On the sacrament of penance

Quaestio I: Whether penance is a sacrament distinct from the others, and at what time it was instituted by Christ the Lord

Quaestio II: What is the matter of the sacrament of penance

Quaestio III: What is the form of the sacrament of penance

Quaestio IV: Whether the form of absolution can validly be spoken in deprecative words, and under a condition

Quaestio V: What is the effect of priestly absolution, or how it remits the debt of guilt and of punishment

NOTE 1. It is certain, and sufficiently established by what has been said several times already, that in the justification of a sinful man sin is truly wiped away with respect to the debt of guilt, and is not merely covered or not imputed. For, besides the fact that Sacred Scripture constantly asserts that sins are remitted, erased, taken away, and that a person is cleansed from them and made whiter than snow—whence those whose sin is remitted are called sons and friends of God, holy and immaculate—none of these things can truly and properly be said if the stain of sin remains, a stain that cannot be hidden from the eyes of God, who knows all things; and consequently, on its account, the man would necessarily be hated by God. For Wisdom 14 says: The impious man and his impiety are hateful to God. Hence the Council of Trent, sess. V, in the decree On Original Sin, can. 5, defines: If anyone denies that the guilt of original sin is remitted through the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, which is conferred in baptism, or even asserts that not everything that has the true and proper character of sin is taken away, but says that it is merely scraped off or not imputed, let him be anathema. It could have said in like manner: If anyone denies that the guilt of actual sin is remitted through the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, which is conferred in the sacrament of penance, or even asserts that not everything that has the true and proper character of sin is taken away, but says that it is merely scraped off or not imputed, let him be anathema. It is therefore certain that through the sacrament of penance sin is truly remitted with respect to the debt of guilt. How this happens, however, is disputed among theologians.

NOTE 2. There have been various opinions, especially among earlier theologians, concerning the power of absolution. First, some, with Hugh of St. Victor, bk. I, On the Sacraments, pt. 14, ch. 8, and likewise Richard of St. Victor, pt. I, On the Power of Binding and Loosing, ch. 12, taught that the priest absolves from the eternal punishment due for sin after God alone has remitted the debt of guilt, before the priest’s absolution. Second, some, with John of Medina, treatise 2, On Penance, q. 38, said that by contrition people are absolved from guilt and eternal punishment, but not from exile from the heavenly homeland; and because the priest opens that homeland by absolving, he is said to hold the keys of the kingdom of heaven. Third, some taught—especially the Nominalists, with Ockham as reported by Gabriel, d. 18, q. 1—that people are absolved from guilt and punishment by the priest’s absolution not actually received but held in desire. Hence, when absolution is subsequently granted, the person is released from the obligation to confess and to submit the remitted sins to the keys of the Church. Fourth, Alexander of Hales and the Seraphic Doctor seem to teach that the priest’s power has no force concerning the remission of guilt or eternal punishment, but only concerning the remission of temporal punishment; the latter is sometimes called absolution from sin, in keeping with 2 Maccabees, ch. 12: It is therefore a holy and wholesome thought to pray for the dead, that they may be loosed from sins, that is, from the punishment due for sins. Fifth and finally, some, with the Master of the Sentences in In IV Sent., d. 18, taught that when the priest says, I absolve you, he only signifies that he declares the person absolved from sins by prior contrition. We shall have to contend against all these opinions in the First Conclusion.

NOTE 3. According to the Subtle Doctor, d. 19, n. 4, the authority to absolve from sins—which Christ expressed by the name key of the kingdom of heaven—is threefold: “The judicial authority,” he says, “to pronounce a sentence that heaven is to be opened to someone, or that it is open, can be understood in three ways: first, as authority that is simply principal; second, as authority that is not principal but pre-eminent; third, as authority that is neither principal nor pre-eminent, but particular. The first belongs to God alone for two reasons. First, because he alone is just of himself, indeed justice itself; and the first judgment can belong only to the first just one, since judgment is not perfect unless it is also just, according to Psalm 118: I have done judgment and justice. For to judge is to dictate what is right or just; and the first just one must be most perfect, and thus most just: therefore he is the first just one. Second, because to judge belongs to the presiding authority, according to the Apostle in Romans 15: Who are you to judge another’s servant? The first Presider, however, can be none but God alone. Therefore, just as he cannot communicate his divinity to another, neither can he communicate the first power of judging, and consequently neither the simply principal key for opening heaven. The second key, namely, one that is not principal but nevertheless pre-eminent, can be understood in terms of a twofold pre-eminence: one in the universality of the causes to be judged, the other in the firmness of the definitive sentence. In either respect, pre-eminence can belong to one who knows all the merits and demerits that are the causes for which heaven is to be opened or closed, and who also has a will inseparably conformed to divine justice. For the first reason, he can pronounce sentence in all cases, because he knows them all; for the second, his sentence can be absolutely firm and irrevocable, because it is always just. This key, with both kinds of pre-eminence, belongs properly to Christ, who knows all the merits and demerits of those to be judged and always judges in conformity with divine justice. Nor can this key fittingly belong to the Church militant, since no one in the Church knows all judicial cases or has an immutably just will. The third key, namely, the particular one with respect to the cases known, and infirm with respect to the sentence pronounced—that is, one whose sentence may sometimes be revoked—can be conferred on someone in the Church militant, who may fail to know something in that case yet judge rightly in it according to divine law; and if at some point he judges beyond it, his sentence will not be firm, but in that case it will be firm.”

Thus, two matters in particular present themselves here for determination: first, whether priests of the New Law truly have the power to absolve from the debt of guilt, or merely to declare that guilt has been remitted; second, whether sacramental absolution releases the whole punishment due for sins, or at least diminishes some part of it.

First conclusion. — PRIESTS OF THE NEW LAW HAVE THE POWER, THROUGH SACRAMENTAL ABSOLUTION, TRULY AND PROPERLY TO REMIT THE SINS SUBJECT TO THEM WITH RESPECT TO THE DEBT OF GUILT.

This is now so certain and common among theologians that Suárez, disp. 18, sect. 2, memb. 3, does not hesitate to say that contrary and opposed opinions are erroneous, since they conflict with the teaching of the Council of Trent, which teaches and says, sess. XIV, ch. 6: Although the absolution of a priest is the dispensing of a benefit (namely, God’s own), nevertheless it is not merely the bare ministry either of announcing the Gospel or of declaring that sins have been remitted; rather, it is like a judicial act, in which a sentence is pronounced by the priest as by a judge, etc. Hence canon 9 says: If anyone says that the sacramental absolution of a priest is not a judicial act, but merely the ministry of pronouncing and declaring to the penitent that sins have been remitted, provided only that he believes himself absolved, or the priest absolves not seriously but in jest … let him be anathema. In these words the Council teaches plainly that a priest’s absolution is not merely declarative of the remission of sin, but a true judicial act by which such sins are remitted. Although the Council’s principal intention there was to define, against heretics, that faith alone without penance or contrition does not suffice for true justification, nevertheless it also sufficiently and plainly intimates our assertion. This is further proved from the same Council, ch. 1, where, after prefacing the words of Christ the Lord, Whose sins you shall forgive, etc., it adds: By this so remarkable a deed and such clear words, the consensus of all the Fathers has always understood that the power of remitting and retaining sins, for reconciling the faithful who have fallen after baptism, was communicated both to the Apostles and to their lawful successors. Hence this proposition of Baius was rightly condemned by the Supreme Pontiffs Pius V, Gregory XIII, and Urban VIII: The repentant sinner is not brought to life by the ministry of the absolving priest, but by God alone, who by suggesting and inspiring repentance brings him to life and raises him up; by the priest’s ministry, however, only the debt is removed.

Second, this assertion of ours is proved by the authority of the holy Fathers, who recognized in the priests of the New Law a true and perfect power to absolve from sins. Above all, St. Ambrose, bk. I, On Penance, ch. 2, explaining the words, Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them, and whose sins you shall retain, they are retained, says: This right has been granted to priests alone; therefore the Church rightly claims it, since it has true priests; heresy cannot claim it, since it has no true priests. And in bk. II, ch. 2, he says: It seemed impossible for sins to be remitted through penance. Christ granted this to his Apostles, and it was transmitted by the Apostles to the ministry of priests. Thus what seemed impossible became possible. But the bare power to declare sins remitted by God did not seem to be anything impossible, since the prophet Nathan declared to David that his sin had been remitted by God. Therefore, Ambrose’s meaning is not that a priest’s absolution is merely a declaration of the remission itself. St. John Chrysostom teaches the same, Hom. 5 on the words of Isaiah, and bk. III, On the Priesthood, ch. 1, where he says plainly: Our priests have been granted not merely to forbid bodily leprosy or the blemishes of the soul once cleansed, but altogether to cleanse them. St. Augustine teaches the same in many places, especially bk. On Catechizing the Uninstructed, ch. 17, as do St. Jerome, Letter 1 to Heliodorus, and many other Fathers whom Canisius cites in pt. II of the Catechism, ch. 1.

Third, the Subtle Doctor proves this truth by the following argument: the sacraments of the New Law truly effect what they signify, for they are practical signs; but sacramental absolution signifies the remission of sin as to guilt and eternal forgiveness; therefore, etc. The Doctor says: “If the sacrament of penance did not truly remit guilt, it would plainly follow that it was not a sacrament of the New Law and had no causality or causal disposition toward first grace, because it would never be worthily received unless by someone who already had first grace; for no one is regarded as worthily absolved by God unless he has first been absolved. Further, reception of this sacrament is an instrument toward grace, that is, an efficacious disposition, necessary by divine ordinance for the succession of grace. But an instrument or prior disposition is not a commemorative or indicative sign of something already past, but of what is to come. Therefore, for the sacrament of penance to be worthily conferred, it need not be a sign of a prior divine absolution.” So he says. Accordingly, he grants that the sacrament of penance can be worthily received by one who has attrition, and with attrition so great that it would not suffice by way of merit to receive justification at the point of attrition; and that if it is not received hypocritically at that point, first grace is received, because it is conferred by God. Sacramental absolution is an efficacious sign of that subsequent absolution at its final instant, just as the utterance of the words is a sign of the confection of Christ’s Body. Hence the Doctor concludes: “According to this, it is clear how a sacrament—that is, an instrument toward first grace—is a prior disposition, in the way that alteration can be called an instrument with respect to the generation of substance, because it is a prior disposition. Otherwise, as he says in d. 11, q. 1, n. 7, it would not be apparent how the sacrament of penance could be a second plank after shipwreck, if through it, as a sacrament, the second grace once lost could never be recovered, but only through attrition as a prior disposition and through contrition as a completing disposition.” So says the Doctor. By these words he plainly indicates that the sacrament of penance would not be distinct from the sacraments of the Old Law, nor would it be a second plank after shipwreck, if priests truly did not remit sins through sacramental absolution. For this sacrament would never rescue a shipwrecked person from the danger of drowning, since he would already have escaped that danger through contrition before receiving the sacrament.

This assertion is confirmed by refuting the other opinions. First, it is false that the priest absolves only from the eternal punishment due for sin after God alone has remitted the debt of guilt. For according to the Council of Trent, sess. VI, ch. 14, eternal punishment is remitted together with guilt; therefore, if guilt had been remitted before reception of the sacrament, eternal punishment too would have had to be remitted. Also, mortal guilt cannot be erased except by the infusion of grace; but, in the ordinary course, sanctifying grace cannot coexist with a debt and obligation to eternal punishment. Otherwise it would follow that someone could at once be a son of glory and of hell, destined for felicity and damnation; for grace is the seed of glory, whereas the debt of punishment is an obligation to damnation and eternal punishment.

The second opinion likewise cannot stand, namely, that absolution is only an opening, entrance, and way to the heavenly homeland. For only sins can bar this way to us; therefore, once they have been remitted, this way and entrance cannot be closed. Also, as was just said, through contrition eternal punishment is remitted with respect to the punishment of sense; therefore, much more is it remitted with respect to the punishment of loss, which is precisely exclusion and removal from the heavenly homeland. Finally, there is no foundation for the chief support of the proponents of that opinion: namely, that someone may be free of guilt and the debt of punishment and yet remain exiled from heaven, as John the Baptist and others were exiled in Limbo. For the same judgment is not to be passed on the faithful just after Christ’s Resurrection and Ascension as on the Fathers before that Resurrection. They were detained there, not because they had a debt of punishment to be paid, but because the price of Christ’s blood had not yet been paid, and it was not fitting that they enter glory before Christ. Similarly, even now the absence of bodily glory is not some debt of punishment to be paid, but a delay of the glory owed for a just reason.

The third opinion is likewise refuted, namely, that through absolution a person is released from the obligation to confess sins. First, it would follow that the formula of absolution from sins is false, since absolution from sins and the obligation to confess sins are entirely distinct things. Second, absolution given only for venial sins would accomplish absolutely nothing, since there is no necessary obligation to confess such sins. Third, it would follow that the keys and power of the Church were not granted for cleansing the soul, but only for performing an external ceremony.

Finally, the fourth opinion is wholly foreign to the efficacy of this sacrament and overturns its entire efficacy. For many other easier remedies are available to discharge the debt of temporal punishment, as is clear from indulgences and the sacrifice of the Mass; consequently, it would not have been necessary to institute a special sacrament for the remission of temporal punishment itself.

YOU WILL OBJECT 1. God alone can remit sin; therefore priests do not truly remit sin. The antecedent is proved from Isaiah 13, where God says: I am he who blots out your iniquities. And Matthew 9: Who can forgive sins except God alone? Hence St. Augustine, bk. 50, Homilies, hom. 23: No one takes away sins except God alone, who is the Lamb who takes away the sin of the world; and he takes it away by forgiving what has been done, by helping so that it may not be done, and by leading us to the life where it can never be done at all. And in his exposition of Psalm 31, on the words, You have forgiven the wickedness of my sin, he teaches plainly that remission of sin pertains to God alone. Other holy Fathers to be cited below teach the same. — The Doctor, n. 24, distinguishes the antecedent: that God alone can remit sins by his own and principal power, I grant; by delegated power and commission, I deny. For the particle alone does not exclude the possibility that remission be effected by someone other than God; for Psalm 71 likewise says, God alone does great wonders, which is understood only of power that is one’s own and principal. Yet Ecclesiasticus 31 says of a man that he performed wonders in his life. Therefore a priest truly remits sin with respect to the debt of guilt and eternal punishment, but only instrumentally, as the Doctor explains excellently in n. 24, saying: He does it, but only instrumentally: not by attaining that effect either through his own power or in any further way, but by attaining something prior, which is a disposition necessitating that effect—necessitating, I say, by divine covenant. An agent that causes a disposition necessary for an end is called an instrumental agent, as in the case of an agent that alters and one that generates. It belongs properly to God as principal to cleanse and remit that debt by physically attaining that effect; neither of these belongs to the priest, since he attains that effect only morally, and does so by God’s commission and delegation, just as a procurator, by authority from his master, can remit to debtors what they are bound to pay that master. St. Gregory also approves this explanation. In Hom. 26 on the Gospels, considering the words of John, Whose sins you forgive, etc., he says: The Apostles receive the primacy of the heavenly judgment, so that in God’s place they retain the sins of some and remit those of others. Note the primacy of the heavenly judgment and that they remit sins in God’s place: the Apostles remit the same sins that God absolves by his heavenly judgment; otherwise they would pronounce a sentence not of the heavenly primacy but of an inferior judgment if they remitted punishment alone and not guilt. … Their place in the Church is now held by bishops. Those who receive the rank of governance receive the authority to bind and loose. The holy Fathers, especially St. Augustine, certainly meant nothing else. For although, as we have said, he teaches that priests of the New Law have in themselves true authority to absolve from sins, when he says that God alone remits sins for the penitent, he understands this only of principal authority. In the same way, he teaches that a true minister baptizes, though Christ alone is said to sanctify. Thus in bk. II, Against Cresconius, ch. 21, he says: Good and bad men alike can immerse; but no one can wash the conscience except he who is always good. And concerning the sacraments in general, bk. III, ch. 5: Whether someone receives a sacrament from a faithful or an unfaithful minister, it is God alone who sanctifies. Hence the Doctor, d. 14, q. 4, n. 11, says: I grant that a priest remits sin in penance just as in baptism, and absolves just as he baptizes, because in either case it is simply true that he administers a sacrament; but he effects the sacrament’s result ministerially, because he causes something that, according to God’s disposition or action, is regularly followed by the sacrament’s effect.

YOU WILL OBJECT 2. Consider the history of Lazarus, whom Christ the Lord alone recalled to life, but afterward commanded his disciples to unbind and let him go. For we read in John 11: Jesus cried out with a loud voice: “Lazarus, come forth!” And at once the man who had been dead came out, his feet and hands bound with bands, and his face wrapped in a cloth. Jesus said to the disciples: “Unbind him and let him go.” Reflecting on this passage, the holy Fathers infer that the sinner must first be brought to life by Christ before he is loosed through the ministry of priests. St. Gregory teaches this above all, Hom. 26 on the Gospels. Treating the power to bind and loose entrusted by Christ to the Apostles, he says: Cases must therefore be weighed, and when the power of binding and loosing is to be exercised, one must consider what the sins are, and what penance followed the sin, so that those whom almighty God visits through the grace of compunction may be absolved by the pastor’s sentence. For the superior’s absolution is true when it follows the decision of the eternal Judge. This is well signified by the raising of the man who had been dead four days: it shows that the Lord first recalled and brought the dead man to life, saying, “Lazarus, come forth!” and afterward the disciples loosed the man who had come forth alive, as it is written: “When he who had been bound with bands came out, then he said to the disciples: ‘Unbind him and let him go.’” Behold, the disciples loose Lazarus when he is already alive, the one whom the Master had raised when dead. For if the disciples were to loose Lazarus while dead, they would appear to be his creator rather than to exercise a power. From this consideration we must understand that by pastoral authority we should loose those whom we know our Creator has brought to life by his life-giving grace. St. Gregory says two things here. First, the sentence of the absolving priest does not precede or accompany, but only follows, the sentence of God who brings the man to life; consequently, a priest can loose no sinner unless he is already living through grace; and it follows that priests do not truly remit sins. Second, priests loose a man dead in sin in no other way than the disciples loosed Lazarus; therefore, just as the disciples loosed one already living, so do priests. St. Augustine teaches the same in tract. 6 on John, where from this miracle he concludes that Christ kept to himself the power of remitting sins, while giving his servants the ministry, so that a servant would not place his hope in another servant. In his exposition of Matthew 16 he says: Christ gives life inwardly by himself, and grants ministers the power to loose after life; they can loose no one unless he lives. And on Psalm 87, explaining Will physicians raise him?, etc., he says: Priests can minister to the living, but cannot raise the dead. And on Psalm 101, sermon 2: The remission of sins can rightly be given through the Church; but the dead can be raised only when the Lord cries inwardly, for God does this within. We speak to your ears; how do we know what is happening in any of you? What happens within is done not by us but by him. Therefore, in the minds of those holy Fathers, remission of sins—which is the raising of a man from the death of sin—is done by God alone and not by a priest. — I distinguish the consequence: it is done by God alone as principal cause, I grant; by God alone in a way that excludes the cooperation of a ministerial cause, I deny. Second, I distinguish St. Gregory in the same way: the priest’s absolution follows the judgment of the eternal Judge in discerning the penitent’s disposition, I grant; in conferring the remission of sin, I deny. St. Gregory intends nothing else, since there he treats the discernment priests must exercise before absolving penitents: if they find them rightly disposed, they absolve them. For he had said earlier: Behold, those who fear God’s strict judgment become judges of souls, and they condemn or free others, though they fear being condemned themselves. Their place in the Church is now held by bishops: a great honor, but a heavy burden! It is difficult for one who does not know how to govern his own life properly to become judge of another’s; and it often happens that one occupies the place of judgment whose life is far from fitting for it. Thus it is often wisely arranged that he either condemns the unlearned or himself, while bound, looses others. A little later he adds the words cited in the objection: Cases must be weighed, etc. — I answer, third, that St. Gregory intends nothing other than that no one should be absolved unless God has already begun to bring him to life through the impulse of the Spirit—not yet indwelling, but merely moving him, as the Council of Trent puts it. For there are three kinds of grace of justification in the ungodly: first, prevenient and arousing; second, cooperating and assisting; third, habitual, formally sanctifying. Each of these, in some proportion, may be called the life, raising, and absolution of the sinner. The first is so called because through arousing grace the sinner, lying dead like Lazarus in the tomb of sin, is called forth by it as by Christ’s divine voice and already gives certain signs of life—not yet perfect life, since the sinner cannot be moved to receive the sacrament of penance rightly without dispositions, namely faith, hope, charity, and supernatural attrition. Since he cannot obtain these dispositions except through grace, which comes from God alone, it is rightly said that the sinner cannot first be absolved by a priest before receiving life from God—not yet perfect life, but imperfect life. Hence St. Gregory rightly said that the superior’s absolution is true when it follows the decision of the eternal Judge: that is, the person is rightly absolved by the priest whom Christ signifies as one to be absolved through the witness of compunction and the desire for penance. Nor is there an objection in the fact that he uses the example of Lazarus, who received perfect natural life before being loosed by the Apostles; one cannot infer from this that a sinner must likewise first live a perfect supernatural life before being loosed by a priest. Since the meaning of the example is allegorical, it need not correspond in every respect to the truth of the matter; it is enough that just as Lazarus was truly loosed by the Apostles, so the penitent is truly loosed by the priest from the bonds that hold him. Moreover, just as Lazarus was not loosed until he was already alive, so the sinner must first live the life of grace—not habitual, but actual—by which he grieves for his sins, moves himself with a vital movement, and comes forth through confession; he obtains perfect life through the priest’s absolution. St. Gregory signifies this when, immediately after the words cited in the objection, he adds: This life-giving, before the doing of righteous deeds, is already recognized in the very confession of sin. Hence it is not said to Lazarus, who was dead: “Come to life again,” but “Come forth.” For every sinner who hides his guilt within his conscience lies hidden inwardly, concealed in his own breast. But the dead man comes forth when the sinner freely confesses his wickedness. Thus Lazarus is told, “Come forth,” as if it were said plainly to every dead man in sin: “Why do you hide your guilt within your conscience? Come out now through confession, you who conceal yourself inwardly by denial.” The disciples then loose the one who comes forth, so that the pastors of the Church may remove the punishment deserved by the one who was not ashamed to confess what he did. Thus St. Gregory. Although this may be interpreted as sacramental absolution, which he denies should be given except to one whom Christ has brought to life, he explains most clearly what life-giving he means when he says that it becomes evident in the confession of sin, which is the effect and sign of inward compunction. — St. Augustine is to be understood in the same way. For, as he says in tract. 49 on John, on the words Lazarus, come forth: You wonder how he came out with his feet bound, but do not wonder that a man dead four days rose? In both cases it was the Lord’s power, not the dead man’s strength. He came forth, still bound and still wrapped, yet he had already come out. What does this signify? When you conceal your sin, you lie dead; and if you conceal sins as great as those I have mentioned, you lie buried. When you confess, you come forth. For what is coming forth except manifesting what was hidden, as though stripping it away? But that you may confess, God acts by crying out in a loud voice, that is, by calling with great grace. Therefore, when the dead man came forth, still bound, confessing and still guilty, so that his sins might be loosed, the Lord said to his ministers: “Unbind him and let him go.” What is “Unbind him and let him go”? “Whatever you loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.” He writes similarly in Serm. 8, On the Words of the Lord: Whoever is weighed down by a bad habit, a bad life, that is, by the mass of earthly desires, so that what is lamentably said in a certain psalm has already come to pass in him—“The fool has said in his heart: There is no God”—is one of those of whom it is said: “From the dead, as from one who is not, confession perishes.” Who will raise him except the one who, after removing the stone, cried out: “Lazarus, come forth”? What is it to come forth except to bring into the open what was hidden? Whoever confesses comes forth; he could not come forth unless he were green with life (incipiently, through prevenient grace assisting him to elicit true supernatural sorrow); he could not live unless he had been raised. Therefore, in confession, self-accusation is praise of God.

YOU WILL SAY: St. Augustine says: What benefit is it to the Church if the sinner, already raised by the Lord’s voice, comes forth? What benefit is it to the confessor, to whom the Lord says, “Whatever you loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven”? — He replies: Consider Lazarus himself. He comes forth bound, already alive through confessing, but not yet able to walk free of his bonds. What, then, does the Church do, to which it was said, “Whatever you loose shall be loosed,” except what the Lord immediately said to the disciples: Unbind him and let him go? Here, under the name of life, he understands only confession, which the penitent has from God alone before the priest’s absolution, and without which the priests have no power to absolve, as St. Augustine rightly said elsewhere: Christ gives life inwardly by himself and grants ministers the power to loose after life; they can loose no one unless he lives—that is, unless he has confessed rightly.

YOU WILL OBJECT 3. St. Jerome, explaining the words of Matthew, Whatever you bind, says: Bishops and presbyters, not understanding this passage, assume something of the Pharisees’ arrogance, so that they think they may either condemn the innocent or absolve the guilty, whereas before God it is the life of the accused, not the priests’ sentence, that is examined. We read in Leviticus about lepers, who are commanded to show themselves to the priests; if they have leprosy, they are then declared unclean by the priest—not because the priests make them lepers or unclean, but because they have knowledge of who is leprous and who is not, and can discern who is clean and who is unclean. Just as there the priest makes the leper clean or unclean, so here the bishop and presbyter bind or loose—not those who are innocent or guilty, but, in fulfillment of their office, once they have heard the variety of sins, they know who must be bound and who loosed. Therefore, in St. Jerome’s view, the priest looses or remits sins only insofar as he declares them loosed or remitted. — I deny the inference, and concerning St. Jerome I say that by these words he rebukes and restrains certain bishops who arrogated excessive license to themselves, admitting or rejecting people from absolution at their own whim and without examining the penitents’ dispositions. Against them he teaches that their power is not absolute, but bound by certain laws, which they must observe so that their sentence is valid, absolving only those whom God judges worthy of absolution. To show this, he uses the example of the Levitical priests, who first judged lepers’ legal cleanness or uncleanness before dismissing them. Therefore he does not compare them in respect of the power itself, but in respect of its use. He adds: When, in fulfillment of his office, he has heard the varieties of sins (that is, noted the kinds and circumstances of sins), he knows who must be bound and who loosed; he does not say who has been loosed or bound—which he certainly would have said if the priest merely declared sins remitted or retained rather than remitting or retaining them.

YOU WILL OBJECT 4. St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 17 on Matthew, says: To free people from the corruption of sins belongs to Christ’s power; to keep them from returning to them is the Apostles’ care and labor. — I answer that St. Chrysostom is not speaking there of the Apostles as priests or secondary judges who, by commission, hear a case and pass sentence, either absolving or retaining the sins of an accused penitent. For in this way the Apostles and their successors have the power to free people from the corruption of sins; as St. Augustine says, bk. I, On the Sermon on the Mount, ch. 6, the Lord sent the Apostolic salt into the world to season and extinguish the stench of sins. Rather, St. Chrysostom speaks of the Apostles as preachers and teachers of the world, who, in that capacity, have no power to heal from sins except by moving sinners through their preaching to do penance. Hence he adds in the same place: The struggle will be for the salvation not of you alone, but of the whole world. For I am not sending you to two cities, or ten, or twenty, nor to a single nation, as I sent the prophets, but to the whole earth, the sea, and the entire world, oppressed by manifold crimes. He sent the prophets as preachers and teachers, not as judges. Therefore St. Chrysostom is speaking there of the Apostles’ mission to preach, not of their commission to absolve.

YOU WILL OBJECT 5. Either the penitent who approaches the sacramental tribunal is contrite, and is thus already free from sin, or he is merely attrite, remains in the state of sin, and is thus unworthy of absolution; therefore the priest cannot truly absolve sin in him. — I answer that either may sometimes be the case: sometimes the penitent is contrite, sometimes only attrite. When he approaches as contrite, his sins have indeed already been remitted, but not independently of sacramental absolution. For the contrition by which he obtained remission of sins actually or virtually contains a vow to make confession and obtain absolution. Hence that remission of sin is rightly attributed to absolution, because it is granted in relation to it; and if, when the opportunity was given, absolution were neglected, this negligence would be the cause that the aforesaid remission of sin did not occur. In the same way, remission of original sin through contrition and love of God, including a vow of baptism, would not benefit someone for salvation if, when the opportunity to receive baptism was given, he neglected it. Likewise, one who approaches the sacrament of penance with attrition alone is not immediately worthy of grace, but only mediately, insofar as he is suitably disposed to obtain grace through absolution.

YOU WILL OBJECT 6. The sacrament of penance is a medicine; but medicine cannot benefit the dead, only the living; therefore, the sacrament of penance presupposes life in those who receive it. — I answer the minor: it is indeed a medicine against the deadly wounds of sin. Although these wounds have not yet inflicted the death of eternal damnation, with respect to which a sinful person may be called alive and curable, they have inflicted the death of grace; and in this sense the sacrament of penance is said to give life.

YOU WILL OBJECT 7. St. Ambrose, in To a Fallen Virgin, ch. 7, addresses her as follows: Hold fast to penance until the end of life, and do not presume that pardon can be granted to you by a human tribunal; whoever promises you this deceives you. Since you sinned directly against the Lord, it is fitting that you await a remedy from him alone on the day of judgment. St. Ambrose says that the virgin sinned against the Lord because she violated the faith she had pledged to Christ to preserve perpetual virginity; he asserts that her sin can be remitted by God alone, not by the Church. — I answer that St. Ambrose is arguing only that the aforesaid virgin must not be confident that her sin will be remitted, but must do penance for it until the end of her life: the most grievous sins of fornication and the destruction of her offspring had to be expiated by perpetual penance. St. Ambrose does not deny that she can obtain pardon not only from God but also from the Church, once she has performed the penance to which he exhorts her in these words: When you have believed that your transgressive soul is destined for the fires of hell, and that no other remedy has been established after baptism than the solace of penance, be content to undergo whatever affliction and labor, provided that you are freed from eternal punishments. Therefore, considering this and turning it over in your mind, be a harsher judge of your own deed. First of all, you must put an end to every concern for this life; and, considering yourself as dead, as you are, think how you may come back to life, and so on. Such a life and such an act of penance, if persevered in, will dare to hope—not for glory, perhaps, but certainly for the removal of punishment. But St. Ambrose would have exhorted the fallen virgin to penance in vain if he had thought that she could not obtain absolution and pardon from the Church. For no one can do penance well unless he hopes for indulgence, as he himself says in bk. I, where he also rebukes the Novatians’ harshness: they called something penance that they would not remit, and by denying pardon they removed the incentive to penance. Therefore, St. Ambrose did not deny that the Church can remit the fallen virgin’s crime. Why, however, linger over the interpretation of Ambrose when in On Penance, against the Novatians, he proves that there is no sin that cannot be remitted by the Church to penitents? These words of ch. 1 should be noted: But they deny that communion ought to be restored to those who have fallen through transgression, if they except only one crime, sacrilege, for which they deny pardon. Their position is harsh, but they seem to yield only to divine judgments; nevertheless, it would be consistent with their own assertions. For the Lord, who forgave all sins, excepted no crime.

YOU WILL OBJECT FINALLY: Priests have the power to loose in no other way than they have the power to bind; but the power to bind serves only to declare someone already bound; therefore the power to absolve also serves only to show that someone is already absolved. — I answer by distinguishing the major: they have this power in the same way with respect to its grant and authority, I grant; with respect to its exercise, I deny. For the power to bind can be exercised in two ways. First, the priest can refuse absolution and thus retain sins; second, positively, he can bind the penitent to sacramental satisfaction. Once the minor is distinguished, the inference must be denied: in both these ways the priest does not merely declare a person bound, but truly binds and obligates him, both to acquire better dispositions so that he may receive absolution rightly and to fulfill the satisfaction prescribed for him.

Second conclusion. — Through the sacrament of penance some part of temporal punishment is remitted, more or less according to the penitent’s disposition. This is gathered from the Council of Trent, sess. VI, ch. 14, where, speaking of satisfaction to be prescribed for penitents through fasting, almsgiving, prayers, and other pious exercises of the spiritual life, it adds: Not indeed for eternal punishment, which is remitted together with guilt either by the sacrament or by the sacrament’s vow, but for temporal punishment, which, as the sacred writings teach, is not always remitted in its entirety, as happens in baptism, for those who, ungrateful to God’s grace, have grieved the Holy Spirit and have not feared to violate God’s temple. In these words the Council signifies plainly enough that, if the punishment due for sins is not always remitted in full together with the remission of guilt, at least some part of it is relaxed through priestly absolution; otherwise it would have written the words not always in its entirety to no purpose. I add that it is the universal practice of the Church and of confessors to impose and prescribe lighter satisfactions on penitents who approach the tribunal with greater contrition or attrition. This is surely a sign that the Church supposes some part of temporal punishment, greater or lesser according to each person’s disposition, is relaxed through the sacrament of penance, apart from the part remitted by fulfilling the satisfaction prescribed by the priest. Nor is there any lack of a reason suggesting the same: why should the infusion of grace be greater or lesser according to the penitent’s more or less perfect disposition, rather than a part of temporal punishment being remitted—especially since the sacrament of penance was instituted for the remission of sins and, consequently, for the release of every bond and obligation by which the sinner was held? Therefore it is instituted not only for release from the debt of guilt, but also from the debt of punishment.

The Seraphic Doctor explains this truth very clearly in In IV Sent., d. 18, pt. I, a. 2, q. 2, n. 24. Inquiring whether the priest remits some part of the punishment due for sins, he sets out three opinions and answers on this matter. The first is that the priest absolves not from the punishment due for sins but from the bond of confession, obligating the penitent to the punishment of satisfaction. This opinion seems to be drawn from Hugh of St. Victor in On the Power of Binding, where seven bonds are distinguished: hardness, servitude, captivity, eternal damnation or punishment, perpetual detestation, confession, and penal expiation. God absolves from the first three through preparatory grace, which softens the heart for penance and is a grace freely given; from the bond of servitude through prevenient grace that makes one pleasing to God and frees one from the slavery of sin; from the bond of captivity through cooperating grace, which sets a person free and looses or moves him to good works. He looses from the bond of eternal damnation by binding to the fifth, namely the bond of perpetual detestation. From the sixth, however, he looses through a minister by binding to the seventh: for the priest looses the confessing sinner so that he is no longer bound to confess, but binds him to the bond of satisfaction. But, says the Seraphic Doctor, this way of speaking must be rejected, since in absolving the priest does not say, I absolve you from confession, but from sins. Hence he adds a second opinion: the priest absolves not only from the bond of guilt but also from the punishment of purgatory, obligating the penitent to satisfactory punishment; consequently, he does not remit any part of the punishment by relaxing it, but only commutes it, and does so on condition that the penitent fulfill the satisfaction imposed. Thus, if the satisfaction is adequate, the priest is said to absolve from the whole; if it is inadequate, he absolves only from so much. Hence, if the sinner dies before making adequate satisfaction, he will be punished in purgatory. But, says the Seraphic Doctor, this way of speaking too must be rejected: if the priest only commuted punishments, he would say to the penitent I absolve you from all sins in vain, since the penitent would gain no benefit from this absolution, at least as regards the relaxation of punishment. Add to this that a sinner approaching the tribunal of penance may have such great contrition that God remits all his guilt and punishment; consequently, there would be no need to commute that punishment into another punishment. Hence the Seraphic Doctor adds a third opinion, which he approves and explains in these words: “And therefore the third way of speaking is more consonant with reason, faith, and piety: that by absolving, the priest remits some part of the punishment by the power of the Keys. We may understand this in the following way: since all the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth, in justification, which is a work of mercy, mercy remits guilt in such a way that it does not transgress the rule of justice. For this reason, the person is still held bound to punishment. But, because of the rigor of divine justice, that punishment is beyond proportion to our powers and unknown to our thought, and for it one must make satisfaction to God. Divine mercy has therefore further provided us with a way: it has appointed the priest as arbiter and given him the power to arbitrate, to relax punishment, to make this known to us, and to remit part of the punishment by the power of Christ’s Passion. Thus divine justice requires payment from the person for that part, but is content with the punishment of Christ’s Passion. It is not for us to determine how great that part is, but for God. Then the sacrament of penance will be not only burdensome but also fruitful. Holding this opinion, then, one must grant that the priest remits some part of the punishment, as the arguments show—not eternal punishment, as the other arguments show, nor the punishment of purgatory, but, in general, that punishment to which God binds the sinner after absolution from guilt, for which he is never punished in purgatory or elsewhere; as to the part from which he is not absolved, he will either be adequately punished here, or the Lord will exact it in purgatory.” He repeats this in his answer to the second, third, and fourth objections: The priest in no way looses from eternal punishment; he absolves from purgatory not per se but per accidens, because when the debt of temporal punishment in the penitent is diminished by the power of the Keys, he is not punished so severely in purgatory as he would be if he had not been absolved. Therefore, when in the body of the Question he says that the priest does not remit any part of purgatorial punishment, he is to be understood as speaking of remission per se. If you object that this remission prejudices divine justice, he replies: Just as in baptism, through the merit and satisfaction of Christ’s Passion, the sinner is released from the whole punishment, so in penance, through the power of that same Passion of Christ, he is released from part of the punishment, in such a way that justice is in no way prejudiced; rather, the Psalmist’s words are fulfilled: Mercy and truth have met; and mercy, by paying more than is owed, satisfies justice.

Corollary. — From what has been said, the heretical opinion of Antonio de Dominis, Archbishop of Spalato, remains sufficiently and abundantly refuted. In bk. V of The Ecclesiastical Republic, he admits that priests of the New Law have the power truly to loose and bind sinners before God, but not with respect to all sins, only some. For he distinguishes two kinds of sins: some are so hidden and concealed that they cannot become known externally in any way and cause no scandal to the Church, such as, for example, a deliberate inward intention to commit adultery that has been manifested by no outward sign. Others are so notorious and public that they cause scandal to the Church and stain its holiness, such as murder, public adultery, etc. He teaches that hidden sins do not impose a bond or bind except before God, by whom alone they can be loosed directly and immediately. Therefore, if a sinner guilty of a hidden sin is perfectly contrite before God and asks pardon for it, he obtains pardon and is not bound to disclose that sin to priests in confession. If he does disclose it in order to be absolved by a priest, this absolution is entirely useless and idle: first, he says, because the sin was remitted before the sinner approached the Church; second, because the Church cannot loose what it did not bind. Public sins, insofar as they offend God, are remitted directly and immediately by God, and by the Church insofar as they offend the Church; this occurs only after satisfactions have been performed and penitential labors endured. From this he concludes that although the Church’s absolution does not benefit penitents as regards the remission of hidden sins, nevertheless, he says, the holy Fathers urged penitents to seek binding and loosing by the Church for hidden crimes because the imposed works of penance benefited them as fruits and effects of interior penance: the more severe exercises of penance imposed by priests were evidence of a contrite and humbled heart. — But this heretical doctrine is effectively condemned by what has been said, since it is established that priests of the New Law receive from Christ the power to remit absolutely any sins, without exception. For Christ the Lord says without distinction and universally, Matthew 16: Whatever you shall loose, etc.; and Matthew 18: Whatever you shall loose, etc.; and John 20: Whose sins you remit, etc. These words signify that the Apostles and their successors have as open and general a power to remit any sins in the Church militant as the loosing or remission conferred by God and Christ in heaven is open and extensive. The holy Fathers interpret these Gospel pronouncements in this way, especially St. John Chrysostom, bk. III, On the Priesthood, ch. 5, where he says: God has entrusted the priests with all heavenly power; and yet, in the matter of remitting sins, as much as God the Father gave to the Son. But the eternal Father gave his Son full power to remit sins, both public and hidden; therefore, etc. Likewise, St. Hilary, can. 16 on Matthew, addresses St. Peter as follows: O Peter, blessed foundation of the Church and worthy of its building, you who will loose the laws of hell, the gates of Tartarus, and all the bars of death! O blessed doorkeeper of heaven, to whose judgment the keys of the eternal palace are entrusted; whose earthly judgment is an authority ratified in heaven, so that whatever things are bound or loosed on earth may receive the same condition of being bound or loosed in heaven! But hidden sins, just as public ones, are, with respect to guilt and punishment, laws of hell, gates of Tartarus, and bars of death, since they kill and impede entry to heaven. Therefore priests can loose not only public sins but also hidden sins. — St. Leo proclaims the same most plainly in Serm. 3 on the anniversary of his elevation to the pontificate. After declaring the supreme authority conferred by Christ on Peter, he says: Peter’s privilege therefore remains wherever judgment is delivered according to his equity; there is neither excessive severity nor remission, when nothing will be bound or loosed except what blessed Peter has loosed or bound. In this matter Spalato falls into the most shameful error by confusing the power of the Keys with respect to the external and contentious forum with the power of the Keys with respect to the internal forum. For in ch. 7, n. 25, he says that the bond with which the Church binds sinners always consists in some excommunication: the Church either entirely separates a public sinner from the number of the faithful if he is obstinate and incorrigible, or does so only temporarily, until he has expiated the scandal by due public satisfaction. Thus he holds that sins are bound or retained by the keys of the Church only when it acts against a public sinner, and loosed or remitted when it removes that excommunication. In this way he wrongly confuses the Church’s external forum with its internal forum. For someone can be released from excommunication and nevertheless remain bound by sin, just as someone can be absolved from sin through perfect contrition and yet remain bound by excommunication. Therefore the power to absolve from excommunication is distinct from the power by which someone is absolved from sins in the interior and secret forum of the sacrament of penance.

YOU WILL SAY 1: God alone can remit an offense committed against him; therefore the Church has no part in such remission. The antecedent is established: it belongs to the one who has been injured to remit the offense. — I distinguish the antecedent: by one’s own and principal authority, I grant; by God’s delegation and commission, I deny. For just as a private judge cannot condemn an offense committed against a prince by his own authority, but only by delegation from the prince, so a priest remits an offense against God not by his own authority, but by God’s grant.

YOU WILL SAY 2: The Church can loose only what it can bind; but it cannot bind hidden sins, because it does not judge what is inward and hidden, since its judgment is entirely external; therefore, etc. — I distinguish the minor: insofar as they remain hidden and wholly interior, I grant; when they are manifested and made known through confession, I deny. For then the Church, through its ministers, can retain such hidden sins if it does not find the required dispositions in the penitent, and absolve them if it finds him suitably disposed.

Articulus III: On the parts of penance in particular

Sectio I: On contrition

Quaestio I: What contrition is, and of what sort

Quaestio II: In what way, and when, contrition has the power and efficacy of remitting sins

Quaestio III: In what way contrition ought to detest sins

Quaestio IV: What imperfect contrition, or attrition, is, and how it contributes to the remission of sin

Sectio II: On sacramental confession

Quaestio I: Whether confession of sins is necessary, and in what way

Quaestio II: Whether confession must be made by the command of the Church, by whom, and about what

Quaestio III: Of what sort confession ought to be in order to be perfect

Quaestio IV: Who ought to be the minister of the sacrament, and of what sort, to whom confession must be made

Articulus IV: On sacramental satisfaction

Quaestio I: Whether a man can and ought to make satisfaction to God for the temporal punishment due to sin

Quaestio II: What works of satisfaction there ought to be, and of what sort

Appendix I: On satisfaction, or public penance

Disputatio III: On the sacrament of extreme unction

Quaestio I: Whether extreme unction is truly a sacrament

Quaestio II: What is the matter and form of the sacrament of extreme unction

Quaestio III: What are the fruits and effects of this sacrament

Approbatio I: Imprimatur

↑ Top of work