Scotus Academicus, Tomus decimus: De Baptismo, De Poenitentia, De Extrema Unctione

NOTE 1. All the sacraments of the New Law consist of matter and form, as the Council of Florence teaches in the decree of Eugenius. After listing the sacraments of the New Law, it says: All these sacraments are effected by three things: things as matter, words as form, and the person of the minister who confers the sacrament with the intention of doing what the Church does. Moreover, in some sacraments this matter is twofold, namely, remote and proximate: thus, in baptism the proximate matter is the outward washing, while the remote matter is natural water. Further, each of these matters may be twofold: one is that out of which sacraments are made and composed; the other is that with respect to which the sacraments are concerned. The question, then, is what the remote and proximate matter of the sacrament of penance is.

NOTE 2. It is certain that the penitent’s acts, namely, contrition, confession, and satisfaction, concur as matter for the sacrament of penance. The Council of Florence teaches this in the passage cited above, where it says: The fourth sacrament is penance, whose quasi-matter is the penitent’s acts, which are divided into three parts. The first is contrition of heart, to which it pertains that the person grieve for the sin committed, with the purpose of not sinning thereafter. The second is confession by the mouth, to which it pertains that the sinner confess integrally to his own priest all the sins of which he remembers. The third is satisfaction for sin, according to the judgment of the priest; this is chiefly performed through prayer, fasting, and almsgiving. The Council of Trent states the same in sess. XI, ch. 3: The quasi-matter of this sacrament consists of the penitent’s own acts, namely contrition, confession, and satisfaction. Since, by God’s institution, these are required in the penitent for the integrity of the sacrament and for the full and perfect remission of sins, they are for this reason called the parts of penance. These councils pointedly call the penitent’s acts “quasi-matter” because the sacrament of penance is not constituted from them as matter out of which, but is concerned with them only as matter with respect to which.

NOTE 3. Even if several things are so necessarily involved in the making of a sacrament that without them the sacrament could neither be made nor exist, they do not all thereby have the character of the sacrament or count as its essential parts. This is clear in the Eucharist: the words of consecration are necessarily involved in its making, yet the consecrated species have the character of a sacrament even after the words of consecration no longer exist. Similarly, in baptism active washing is absolutely necessary for its making, yet its formal character consists chiefly in the passive washing. Thus, although things and words concur in making a sacrament, they do not both pertain equally to its essence. Rather, its formal character and principal power consist chiefly in one or the other, because one of them bears a greater likeness to the grace it signifies and effects. Thus in baptism, for example, since washing that removes bodily dirt is more like grace that washes the soul from sins, the signification of grace consists more in the washing itself than in the invocation of the Trinity, which takes place together with the actual washing.

Two points, then, must be determined here: first, whether and which sins are the remote matter with respect to which the sacrament of penance is concerned; second, whether and how the penitent’s acts are the proximate matter with respect to which this sacrament is concerned.

First conclusion. — ONLY AND ALL SINS COMMITTED AFTER BAPTISM ARE THE REMOTE MATTER WITH RESPECT TO WHICH THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE IS CONCERNED. This is the common opinion among theologians, and the Council of Trent clearly teaches it in sess. XIV, ch. 1. After recounting the institution of the sacrament of penance, it immediately adds: By this most notable deed and such clear words, the consensus of all the Fathers has always understood that the power of remitting and retaining sins was communicated to the Apostles and their legitimate successors, in order to reconcile the faithful who fell after baptism. In ch. 2, explaining the distinction between the sacrament of penance and baptism on the part of the minister, it says: “It is certain that the minister of baptism need not be a judge, since the Church exercises judgment over no one who has not first entered it through the gate of baptism. For what have I to do, says the Apostle, with those who are outside? It is otherwise with the household of the faith, whom Christ the Lord once made members of his body by the washing of baptism. If they later defile themselves with some crime, he willed that they be brought before this tribunal as accused, so that by the sentence of priests they might be freed—not just once, but as often as, penitent for the sins they have committed, they have recourse to him.” Near the end of the chapter it adds: “This sacrament of penance is necessary for salvation to those who have fallen after baptism, just as baptism itself is necessary for those not yet reborn.” By these words the Council clearly signifies that only sins committed after baptism has been duly received are the remote matter of the sacrament of penance.

No reason a priori can be given for this truth other than the will of Christ the Lord, which is made known to us through the Church’s judgment and teaching. A posteriori, however, the assertion can be confirmed from the praises with which the holy Fathers celebrate the sacrament of penance, especially when they call it the second plank after shipwreck. By this they signify that this sacrament was instituted only as a help for those who, having recovered the soul’s health and reached the harbor of innocence, once again cast themselves into the shipwreck of sin.

The second part—that absolutely all sins committed after baptism can be wiped away through penance—is already clear from what we have said about the efficacy of the virtue of penance. The Council of Trent teaches this plainly in the same place, canon 5: As our Lord Jesus was about to ascend from earth to heaven, he left priests as his own vicars, set over us as governors and judges, to whom all mortal crimes into which the faithful fall must be brought, and who, by the power of the keys, pronounce sentence on the remission or retention of sins. These matters will become clearer from what will be said about the power of the keys and the power of absolution.

Second conclusion. THE PENITENT’S ACTS, NAMELY CONTRITION, CONFESSION, AND SATISFACTION, ARE THE PROXIMATE MATTER AND PARTS OF THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE, NOT ESSENTIAL PARTS BUT INTEGRAL ONES. This conclusion consists chiefly of two parts, which the Council of Trent teaches in sess. XIV, ch. 3. After saying that the principal power of the sacrament of penance resides in the minister’s words, I absolve you, it immediately adds: “The quasi-matter of this sacrament consists of the penitent’s own acts, namely contrition, confession, and satisfaction. Since these are required by God’s institution in the penitent for the integrity of the sacrament and for the full and perfect remission of sins, they are for this reason called the parts of penance. Hence, Canon 4 defines as follows: If anyone denies that three acts in the penitent are required for the full and perfect remission of sins, as the quasi-matter of the sacrament of penance—namely, contrition, confession, and satisfaction, which are called the three parts of penance—let him be anathema.” By these words the Council clearly declares that those three acts of the penitent are not properly the matter out of which the sacrament of penance is essentially composed and constituted, but are “quasi-matter,” since sacramental absolution is directed chiefly and immediately toward them. Hence they are indeed integral parts of the sacrament of penance.

The Doctor teaches that they are not essential parts—that is, parts by which the sacrament of penance is essentially constituted—in d. 16, q. 1, n. 7: “Concerning the sacrament of penance, I say that these are in no way its parts, because, as was said in d. 11, the sacrament of penance is that sacramental absolution made in certain words, etc. Contrition, which is something spiritual in the soul, is no part of it; nor is confession, because it is nothing belonging to the priest’s sentence, but is the act of the person accusing himself; nor is satisfaction, which follows that sacramental absolution. Nevertheless, these three are required for the sacrament of penance, so that it may be received worthily, either beforehand or afterward. Confession is simply required, because the priest does not arbitrarily absolve a guilty person unless that person has first accused himself before him in that forum. That absolution is also not useful unless some contrition or attrition precedes in the one confessing. The parts of this distinction are clear from what was said above: it is enough that some displeasure, even if unformed, precede; then that person is capable of sacramental absolution, and through it becomes contrite. Satisfaction, however, must follow the sacrament of penance if it is to be efficacious, in deed or in intention, unless the judge could determine that other preceding penalties suffice for the payment of the whole punishment, etc.” As is evident from these words, the Doctor does not deny that the penitent’s three acts are necessarily required for the integrity of the sacrament of penance; he denies only that they are essential parts from which it is constituted. For the sacrament of penance is understood chiefly as the priest’s absolution, in which the power of the sacrament chiefly consists, as the Council of Trent taught above.

Moreover, the sacrament is very often—and indeed ordinarily—completed before satisfaction is fulfilled, not only in nature but also in time. Consequently, satisfaction cannot be intrinsic matter or a part that essentially composes the sacrament of penance, and therefore cannot properly have the character of matter, since matter must precede form, or at least accompany it, whereas satisfaction ordinarily follows the form of absolution.

For this reason, too, the Councils of Florence and Trent pointedly call these three acts “quasi-matter,” thereby indicating that they are not matter properly so called, as if this sacrament had to consist of them, just as baptism consists of washing and words.

Nor is it an objection that the Catechism of the Council of Trent, when treating the matter of the sacrament of penance, says in no. 17: The Synod does not call these acts quasi-matter because they lack the character of true matter, but because they are not the kind of matter applied from outside, such as water in baptism and chrism in confirmation. This, I say, is no objection. Apart from the fact that the Catechism was composed for the most part by disciples of St. Thomas, as is clear from article 2 of its preface, it calls these acts true matter only in the sense that they do not constitute the sacrament as matter out of which it is essentially composed, but are matter with respect to which it is concerned. Thus the same Catechism pointedly calls these acts integral parts, saying in no. 2: “These parts are said to belong to the class of parts necessary to constitute a whole. For just as the human body consists of several members—hands, feet, eyes, and other such parts—and if any is missing it is rightly considered imperfect, but perfect if none is lacking, so penance is constituted from these three parts in such a way that, although as far as its nature is concerned contrition and confession, by which a person is made just, suffice, nevertheless, unless the third part, namely satisfaction, is also added, something necessary for its perfection is wholly lacking. These parts are so closely connected that contrition includes in the one confessing the counsel and purpose of making satisfaction; contrition includes confession and the will to make satisfaction; and the other two precede satisfaction.” Thus the Catechism. By these words it clearly signifies that the penitent’s three acts are considered parts of the sacrament of penance insofar as they contribute to its integrity. This teaching is plainly the same as the Doctor’s, as is clear from the words cited above. Although he does not say that the acts can be called parts of penance in this sense, it can easily be inferred from his argument.

I can scarcely express my astonishment, then, at how Lugo dared to write in disputation 12, no. 58: “Not a few theologians condemn Scotus’s opinion, which denies that those parts are intrinsic and says they are required only as dispositions, with a more severe censure. Cajetan, q. 9, a. 2, calls it erroneous; others call it rash, others more than rash. Others try to interpret Scotus’s words in a favorable sense, such as Angelus, who says Scotus did not deny that they are intrinsic parts but only denied that they are properly matter, which seems consistent with the manner of speaking of the Councils of Florence and Trent, where they are called quasi-matter. Others say that Scotus means the sacrament does not directly signify those acts of the penitent but signifies only absolution, while marking the other parts obliquely. Others, such as Vega, in bk. 13 on Trent, ch. 15, say that Scotus does not deny that they are integral parts, but only denies that they are essential parts. Yet these explanations are difficult to reconcile with Scotus’s words, as will be clear to anyone who considers them.” So Lugo. But it seems that he either did not read the Doctor or did not understand his plainly stated meaning when he says Vega’s explanation cannot be reconciled with the Doctor’s words. The opposite is clear enough from the words just cited.

YOU WILL SAY 1: The sacrament of penance was instituted as a judicial act, as may be gathered from John 20 and Matthew 18 and as the Council of Trent teaches in sess. XIII¹, chs. 2 and 5. But a human judgment intrinsically consists not only of the judge’s sentence, but also of other judicial acts, namely the accusation, examination, confession, and satisfaction of the accused. Therefore the sacrament of penance essentially consists not only of priestly absolution but also of the penitent’s acts: accusing himself and, by the fitting sorrow he conceives for his sins, in a certain way defending himself before God; and finally making satisfaction for the injury and offense he inflicted upon God by sin. — I deny the minor premise: for a human judgment essentially and directly signifies only the judge’s sentence, by which the accused is acquitted or condemned; the other things it connotes indirectly, as necessary prerequisites for a just sentence to be pronounced. Thus, just as a sentence in a human judgment signifies only acquittal or condemnation, so in a sacramental judgment the priest’s sentence alone signifies remission of sins and consequently causes remission of sins, since it is proper to sacraments to cause what they signify. This answer is confirmed by the Council of Trent, sess. XIII, ch. 6, where it calls absolution alone a judicial act: “Although the priest’s absolution is the dispensation of a benefit, it is nevertheless not merely a ministry of proclaiming the Gospel or declaring that sins have been remitted, but is like a judicial act in which the judge himself pronounces sentence.” Likewise, canon 9 says: If anyone says that the priest’s sacramental absolution is not a judicial act … let him be anathema.

YOU WILL SAY 2: The sacrament of penance was instituted as a reconciliation; hence it is sometimes called by this name. But reconciliation consists in the voluntary revocation, as it were, by both parties—not only by the offended party but also by the offender, who thereby retracts the offense. Therefore the reconciliation effected in penance consists not only in the priest’s act, as representing the offended God, but also in the penitent’s acts. — I deny the minor premise: for the offender’s retraction is only something prior, or a disposition, to the retraction of the injured party. Formal reconciliation, or remission of the offense, consists in that retraction by the injured party, who rescinds the former sentence of punishment and pardons the offense. Consequently the penitent’s acts, especially confession and contrition, are prior dispositions to the sinner’s reconciliation with God; but this reconciliation formally consists in the priest’s own absolution, by which he pardons the offense in God’s place and by his authority. The Council of Trent approves this answer in sess. XIV, ch. 1. Speaking of contrition, the noblest of the penitent’s acts, it says: At all times this movement of contrition was necessary for obtaining pardon of sins; in a person who has fallen after baptism, it prepares for the remission of sins only if it is joined with trust in divine mercy and with the intention of performing the other things required for rightly receiving this sacrament. The Council therefore teaches that contrition only prepares for remission of sins and the bestowal of grace. Consequently, it is not an essential part of the sacrament: to be an essential part, it would have to do more than dispose; it would actually have to signify and confer grace and remission of sins by the work performed. For an essential part of a sacrament is nothing other than a practical signification of grace—that is, the signification and effecting of grace. Therefore what does not effect grace is neither a sacrament nor an essential part of a sacrament.

YOU WILL PRESS: Not only priestly absolution but also the penitent’s acts signify that remission. For signs of contrition are also signs of interior remission, and confession signifies that just as sins are outwardly disclosed, so they are also removed from the soul. Satisfaction, too, clearly signifies remission of the punishment due for sins. Therefore the penitent’s three acts are true essential parts of the sacrament. — I deny the minor premise: for contrition, confession, and satisfaction signify remission of sins no more than, for example, a prayer by which a person asks for the help of grace in order to receive this sacrament worthily. Thus only priestly absolution formally signifies and effects the grace that remits sins. In a human judgment, similarly, accusation is not taken as signifying remission, but as informing the judge of the case, so that he may, according to his authority and in keeping with equity, pronounce a sentence of acquittal or condemnation. That sentence alone therefore signifies acquittal or condemnation. We must conclude, then, with our Venerable Vega, who attended the Council of Trent, in bk. 13 of On Justification, ch. 15: “It is most true, whatever others think, that by the power of absolution alone the Subtle Doctor and the common school of the Nominalists defend the conferring of grace upon penitent sinners. For the keys were given to priests alone, and they alone are to remit sins; grace is conferred on the confessed through their absolution, with all the other acts of the penitents absent. Absolution alone is the sign of grace; grace granted by reason of the other acts is given by the work of the one acting.”

YOU WILL PRESS: The Council of Trent, sess. XI, ch. 3, says: The Holy Synod further teaches that the form of the sacrament of penance, in which its power chiefly resides, is contained in these words of the minister: I absolve you, etc. Therefore the Council presupposes that there is some sacramental power in the matter, namely, in the penitent’s acts. — I ANSWER: the Council rightly said that the principal power lies in the form of absolution, because all the power present in the penitent’s acts is not properly sacramental. Otherwise it would follow that the penitent himself was a partial minister of this sacrament, and even its principal minister, since he would supply more parts of the sacrament than the priest. This cannot be said, since every minister of a sacrament is distinct from its recipient, and moreover the Councils of Florence and Trent call the priest alone the minister of this sacrament.

From these points it follows that if the sacrament of penance is taken in its common and ordinary sense, its parts are contrition, confession, and satisfaction. But if it is taken in a stricter sense, as formally a practical sign of grace, only absolution has the character of a sacrament, because absolution is where God’s sacred power principally resides: it absolves the penitent from sins and confers on him the grace by which he is absolved from the sins that previously held him bound. Hence the Subtle Doctor rightly defines the sacrament of penance in d. 14 as follows: Penance is the absolution of a penitent person, made in certain words spoken with due intention by a priest who has jurisdiction, and which, by divine institution, efficaciously signify the soul’s absolution from sin. Although this definition may seem a little long, it contains no superfluous part at all, as will be clear to anyone who weighs each part of it. For now, if a shorter definition is sought, these may be offered from our Bosco, disputation 7, section, no. 4: Penance is the sacrament by which a priest, as judge, confers remission of sins on one who confesses with due sorrow, with the obligation of making satisfaction. Or thus: The sacrament of penance is an efficacious sign of grace that remits sin committed after baptism. Or otherwise: It is a sacrament that remits sin by way of judgment. Or I offer this clearer one: Penance is the absolution of sins duly confessed.

IT FOLLOWS, SECOND, that penance stands for priestly absolution, as the Doctor teaches in d. 16, q. 1, n. 7. First, because, as Vega says in bk. 13 on the Council of Trent, ch. 15, the sacrament of penance is a sign of grace, not a prognostic sign of future grace, nor a memorial sign of past grace, but a demonstrative sign of grace conferred in the present. Confession and contrition are not demonstrative signs of grace: confession does not connote present grace, but is formally only a declaration and accusation of sins. Likewise, if contrition is imperfect, or is only attrition, it is merely a disposition toward sacramental grace. Second, absolution alone signifies remission, which is the effect of this sacrament; therefore absolution itself, not contrition or confession, has the complete character of a sacrament. Finally, according to the Council of Trent, sess. XIV, ch. 3, the principal power of the sacrament of penance consists in absolution; consequently, absolution holds primacy in this sacrament.