Scotus Academicus, Tomus decimus: De Baptismo, De Poenitentia, De Extrema Unctione

NOTE 1. There are two kinds of unbelievers. Some gave their name to Christ in baptism, but through heresy and apostasy fell away from the Church and the Catholic faith; for heresy is a kind of unbelief, as the leading theologians commonly teach. Others, however, have never professed the Catholic religion, nor through baptism been made children of the Church and members of the mystical body of Christ the Lord. Such are the Gentiles, Jews, Muslims, etc. The present difficulty concerns both groups: whether their children may be baptized not only validly but also licitly, without their consent.

NOTE 2. Unbaptized unbelievers fall into three classes. Some are so independent that they live under the dominion of no Christian prince. Others are subject to Christian princes with respect to civil dominion, and have the rights of citizens in those provinces and cities over which Christian princes hold sway. The rest are subject to them by despotic and servile subjection, as are those who by right of war, purchase, or some other just title become the chattel of Christian princes and are servilely subject to their authority. It is asked whether the children of each of these three kinds of unbelievers may be baptized both validly and licitly while their parents are unwilling and object.

NOTE 3. The children of such unbelievers may be considered either in extreme danger of death or outside such danger. Moreover, they may be placed in a situation where, whether taken from their parents lawfully or unlawfully, they are transported elsewhere and never to be restored to their unbelieving parents; or they may be viewed in a situation where, after receiving baptism, they would be returned at once to their unbelieving parents, and would live under their dominion, care, and upbringing. — Finally, by “infants” may be understood not only those who have not yet attained the use of reason, but also those who are not yet independent, but are subject to authority and committed to the guardianship and care either of parents or of guardians. The present difficulty concerning all these cases is to be determined in the conclusions that follow.

First conclusion. — THE CHILDREN OF ANY UNBELIEVERS MAY BE VALIDLY BAPTIZED AGAINST THEIR PARENTS’ WILL. This is the common opinion among theologians, with the exception of a few who affirm the contrary with Durandus. St. Augustine teaches it plainly in Letter 13, which is addressed to Boniface, around the middle, where, after saying, “Little ones are presented to receive spiritual grace not so much by those in whose arms they are carried—although also by them, if they too are good believers—as by the whole society of the saints and faithful. For they are rightly understood to be presented by all who are pleased that they are presented and whose holy and undivided charity helps them toward communion with the Holy Spirit. Thus the whole mother Church, which is in the saints, does this: as a whole she gives birth to all, and as a whole she gives birth to each.” A little later he adds: “Let this not mislead you into thinking that the bond of guilt inherited from Adam can be broken in no other way than by parents presenting little ones to receive the grace of Christ.” He had given the reason for this earlier, saying: “But that he may be regenerated through the service of another’s will, when he is presented to be preserved, the one Spirit does this, by whom the one presented is regenerated. For it is not written, ‘Unless anyone is born again by the will of his parents, or by the faith of those presenting or ministering,’ but ‘unless anyone is born again of water and the Spirit.’” As if he were saying that, just as the parents’ consent—or anyone else’s consent apart from Adam’s—is not required to contract original sin, so neither is anyone’s consent or faith, apart from the Church’s faith and the minister’s consent, required for the remission of the original sin contracted: the minister baptizes in the name and by the authority of the Church and Christ. For, as the Apostle says in Romans 5, “If death reigned through one man because of one man’s offense, much more will those who receive an abundance of grace and the gift of righteousness reign in life through the one man Jesus Christ.”

YOU WILL SAY 1: That baptism cannot be valid which is done to the injury and detriment of the parents. But such would be the baptism of children performed against their parents’ will. Therefore, etc. — I deny the major premise: for that act is not intrinsically injurious to the parents, nor is it enough to make the baptism invalid. If a priest baptizes the infant of a faithful person without the parish priest’s knowledge or against his opposition, that baptism is performed to the injury of the parish priest, yet it is no less valid. Therefore, however much injury might be done to the parents when their children are baptized against their will, the baptism will nevertheless not be invalid. This is confirmed by the practice of the Church, which nowhere rebaptizes infants baptized against the will of their unbelieving parents; indeed, whenever it can, it removes them from their parents and, once they have grown up, compels them to observe the precepts of the Christian faith and the Church, as Innocent III decrees in the chapter Maiores, On Baptism: “It is necessary,” he says, “that they be compelled to keep the faith which they received under constraint, lest the name of the Lord be blasphemed and the faith they received be held cheap and contemptible.”

YOU WILL SAY 2: An adult cannot be validly baptized against his own will; therefore neither can an infant be baptized against the will of his parents. — I distinguish the antecedent: on the sacrament’s side, I deny it; on the subject’s side, insofar as the subject must be capable of a means ordained to salvation, I grant it. For God has decreed that no one who has the use of reason is justified unless willing, as St. Augustine teaches admirably in Sermon 15, On the Words of the Apostle, ch. 11: “Without your will,” he says, “the righteousness of God will not be in you. The will is indeed not yours, even though it is in you; righteousness is not yours, but God’s. The righteousness of God can exist without your will, but it cannot exist in you except through your will.” And below: “Therefore, he who made you without you does not justify you without you: so he made you without your knowing, but justifies you when you are willing.” But concerning an infant, who is incapable of exercising his own will, he says in On the Words of the Apostle, Sermon 14, To the words, he says: “By another’s words he is healed, because by another’s deed he is wounded. ‘Does he believe in Christ?’ the question is asked, and the answer is given, ‘He believes.’ For one who cannot speak, for one who is silent, who weeps and by weeping somehow prays for help, the answer is given, and it counts.” By whom is the answer given? You will ask: by those presenting him. What if no one presents him, but the minister alone baptizes? It is rightly understood that the whole mother Church, which is in the saints, answers; for, as we just said from the same holy Doctor in Letter 23, “As a whole she gives birth to all, and as a whole she gives birth to each,” through the will of the minister who baptizes in his own name and in Christ’s. Thus the baptism of the children of any parents is valid, however unwilling and objecting those parents may be, provided the proper matter, form, and intention of the minister are present.

Second conclusion. — THE CHILDREN OF HERETICS AND SCHISMATICS, AND ALSO OF THOSE UNBELIEVERS WHO ARE THE CHATTELS OF CHRISTIANS, MAY BE BAPTIZED NOT ONLY VALIDLY BUT ALSO LICITLY AGAINST THEIR PARENTS’ WILL. This is the common opinion concerning both parts of the conclusion, especially the first: for the Church has the power to compel by force all the baptized to observe the Gospel Law. By the very fact that they have been baptized, they are subject to the Church’s power and jurisdiction; for by reason of their baptismal character they are in some way members of its mystical body. Consequently, they may be compelled to conform themselves to the practices and laws by which that mystical body is governed. Hence the Church has always approved those most just and holy enactments of Christian princes by which heretics were subjected to exile or other penalties unless they returned to the Church’s fold. Therefore, all the more may the Church baptize their children against their parents’ will.

The second part is also established: for slaves, or chattels, together with their children, are subject to the real dominion of those under whose power they are enslaved, so that their master may at his pleasure sell such children, just as he may sell their parents, or separate them from their parents. For the offspring follows the womb. The children of slaves become slaves by the title of birth. Therefore their master can subject them by baptism to the jurisdiction of the Church. — This is confirmed: if anything were an obstacle, it would chiefly be the parents’ natural dominion over their children, by reason of which such subjection of the children to the Church’s authority could not occur without their parents’ consent. But this is no obstacle. For, just as parents are free by natural law yet are deprived of their freedom by the law of nations, so, although by natural law they have power over their own children, they are nevertheless lawfully deprived of that power by the law of nations and by the law of war or purchase, so that their master can sell their children and separate them from their parents’ company. Therefore, all the more can he present them to the Church for baptism. And he not only can, but must procure baptism for them, since he succeeds to the parents’ right and thus assumes the obligation to provide what is necessary for salvation where such parents fail their children. Add that the children of slaves are considered to belong to their master’s household and family, and consequently he is bound in conscience to procure and provide for them what is necessary not only for bodily life but also for the soul. For, as the Apostle says in 1 Timothy 5, “If anyone does not care for his own, especially the members of his household, he has denied the faith and is worse than an unbeliever.” — The same must be said of the children of parents where one is a believer and wants his child baptized, while the other is an unbeliever and refuses. In that case one must act for the good of the child, as the Fourth Council of Toledo decreed, canon 62¹, which reads: “Jews who have Christian women in marriage are to be admonished by the bishop of that city to become Christians if they wish to remain with them. If, when admonished, they refuse, they are to be separated. The children born of such unions, however, are to follow the faith and status of their mother. Likewise, those born of unbelieving women and faithful men are to follow the Christian religion, not Jewish superstition.” The reason for this decree is that each parent has a right over the child, and both are responsible for the children’s care, even in spiritual matters. Consequently, the child should rather be entrusted to the parent who would lawfully raise the child for salvation than to one who would raise the child for ruin and damnation. Gregory IX answered the bishop of Strasbourg accordingly, and this is reported in the final chapter On the Conversion of Unbelievers. Among other things, he says: “Since a son is in his father’s power and follows his family, not his mother’s, and is at an age when he should not remain with persons who may be suspected of plotting against his safety or life, and boys after three years should be brought up and remain with a father who is not suspect; and since the boy’s mother, if he were to remain with her, might lead him into the error of unbelief; above all in favor of the Christian faith, we answer that the same boy is to be assigned to his Christian father.”

Third conclusion. — THE CHILDREN OF UNBELIEVERS WHO ARE SUBJECT TO CHRISTIAN PRINCES ONLY IN CIVIL AND POLITICAL MATTERS MAY LICITLY BE BAPTIZED AGAINST THEIR PARENTS’ WILL, IF THE PRINCE ORDERS OR CONSENTS TO IT. This is the opinion of the Doctor in In IV Sent., d. 4, q. 9, n. 2, where he says: “I say briefly, then, that if the prince acted with due caution—namely, so that the parents, learning beforehand what was going to happen, would not kill their children, and so that he would have the baptized children brought up religiously—it would be well done.” He says the same in Reportata, q. 2, in the same place.

The Doctor proves it by an argument: A superior’s precept must be obeyed despite the opposition and contrary will of an inferior. But baptizing children is God’s precept, whereas the parents’ opposition is the will of a human being inferior to God. Therefore, notwithstanding such a will in unbelievers, their little ones may licitly be baptized. The Doctor proves both the major and the minor: “For,” he says, “God has a greater right of dominion over the little one than the parents do. For in ordered powers universally, an inferior power does not bind in matters contrary to a superior, as St. Augustine teaches in On the Words of the Lord, Homily 6, cited in the final chapter of Book 2: ‘If a power commands you to do what you ought not to do, this person surely disdains that power by fearing a greater power.’ And he explains this by the examples of a curator and a proconsul, a proconsul and an emperor, and an emperor and God. Therefore, if someone has the government of a commonwealth, he ought, as far as he can, to compel everyone to be subject to a higher lord rather than a lower one, when the lower resists the higher in such dominion. Just as an emperor ought to judge that someone must obey a proconsul, disregarding the curator’s command—that is, the proconsul’s inferior—if the latter contradicts the proconsul; so, too, if these powers were arranged under the same dominion, namely, if someone were the slave of Titius and Titius of Peter, the emperor ought rather to compel the slave to serve Peter, who is superior to Titius, than Titius, if Titius wished to use that slave against Peter’s dominion. Therefore, above all the prince ought to be zealous to preserve the dominion of the supreme Lord, namely God; and consequently the prince not only may, but must, take little ones away from the dominion of parents who wish to raise them against the worship of God, their supreme and most worthy Lord, and must devote them to divine worship.”

THE THOMISTS REPLY: The major premise is true when the superior wills his precept to be obeyed notwithstanding a contrary will and any right of the inferior; but it is otherwise when the superior wills his own precept to be obeyed without violation of the inferior’s right. They say this is the case here: for when God commands that all, even little ones, be baptized, he wills this precept to be observed without violating the natural right a father has over his child, because grace does not destroy nature but perfects it. — But this answer is entirely empty. For although God did not explicitly command that baptism be administered to little ones even against their parents’ will, he nevertheless commands it at least implicitly, since he instituted and ordained baptism as a remedy necessary to each and every person for salvation. By that very fact, he sufficiently granted little ones the right to receive baptism, and therefore they cannot be forcibly prevented from it without injustice. Thus, although parents do not sin against justice by failing to procure baptism for their little ones, but only against piety or charity, they nevertheless truly sin against justice by preventing a minister ready to confer baptism, to which their little ones have a right. It is just as, although one is bound only by charity to correct his neighbor, the person who forcibly prevents me from that correction would nevertheless sin against justice, because he would obstruct the execution of a duty divinely entrusted to me; for God has charged each person with his neighbor.

It is proved a second time: If anything were an obstacle preventing the children of unbelievers from being baptized against their parents’ will, it would be chiefly that this would clearly injure the parents, against natural right and paternal authority, which they have over their children so long as the children lack the use of reason, no less than over their own possessions. But this argument is worthless, both because a prince can deprive his subjects of such dominion over their possessions when they abuse it, while parents who refuse to have their children baptized abuse their dominion over them against God’s honor and the children’s salvation. “For he does not bear the sword without cause,” St. Paul says in Romans 13, “as an avenger to bring wrath upon the one who does evil.” What greater evil is there than depriving someone of a remedy necessary for salvation? Therefore unbelievers can be deprived of such paternal right and dominion over their children, and consequently their infants can licitly be baptized. And because, if an unbelieving father wished to kill his child, the infant could be forcibly snatched from his parent’s hands and removed from his power, notwithstanding natural right; therefore, all the more if the parent refuses to have the child baptized, so that through baptism the child may escape eternal death. For spiritual life is far more excellent than bodily life. The antecedent is clear: the power to defend the innocent belongs to everyone by natural right. But children are innocent and are exposed to the greatest harm if they are not baptized. Therefore by natural right it is licit to baptize them against their parent’s resistance.

THE THOMISTS REPLY that a prince can indeed deprive his subjects of the dominion they have over their children when they abuse it against the Law of Nature, but not when they abuse it against a supernatural law unknown to them, such as the law obliging them to baptism. Since civil power is purely natural and derives from human beings, it cannot extend beyond natural right to supernatural law and its observance, such as the law concerning reception of baptism. Consequently, no prince can deprive them of their natural right and dominion over their children when they abuse it against supernatural law and the children’s salvation. — On the contrary, natural right cannot bind to the detriment of the law of faith. For whatever is contained in natural right is included, at least implicitly, in the Decalogue, and is reduced to the precepts of the virtues, all of which are confirmed by the Gospel Law. Moreover, every law is prescribed and ordered to the end of charity and salvation; therefore no law binds to the detriment of faith and charity. Hence piety, on which the entire right of a parent over a child is founded, does not bind against charity and salvation; and consequently grants the parent no right over the child against the precept to receive baptism, which the Gospel Law prescribes as a means necessary for salvation. Second, the faith received does not diminish a faithful person’s paternal right over his own children. Otherwise a baptized and faithful person would be worse off than a Gentile or a Jew with respect to authority over his children. But our opponents agree with us that the children of Catholics and even of heretics may licitly be baptized against their parents’ will, with the authority of the prince and the Church, notwithstanding the parents’ natural right over their children. Therefore the children of unbelieving subjects too may licitly be baptized without prejudice to paternal right, if the prince’s authority is given, however much the parents refuse. This is confirmed because a parent’s having been baptized gives the prince no additional right over that baptized parent’s children, any more than over the children of an unbaptized parent; nor does the child of a baptized parent have a greater right to receive baptism than the child of an unbaptized parent. Therefore, if the former may licitly be baptized, why not the latter as well? Third, a child who has the use of reason may licitly be baptized if he consents, however much his parents refuse. But the child’s use of reason neither obstructs nor diminishes paternal jurisdiction over him. Therefore, without prejudice to paternal jurisdiction, a child who lacks the use of reason may also be baptized. The major premise is established: for no one is bound to obey his parents in matters opposed to his salvation, as Christ the Lord teaches: “If anyone comes to me and does not hate his father and mother … he cannot be my disciple.” That is, as St. Gregory explains, “let us not fail to know that we must hate and flee those whom we suffer as adversaries on the way of God.” If, then, a son can be removed from his father’s company and dominion at an age when he can render obedience to him and be useful to him, so that he may watch over his own salvation, all the more can he be removed from his father’s authority in the weak infancy when he is merely a burden to his parents, so that his salvation may be secured.

YOU WILL SAY 1: If the children of unbelievers were baptized against their parents’ will, either after baptism they would have to be taken away from their parents’ society and company to be raised among the faithful, or they would have to be left with their unbelieving parents. But neither is licit. The first is not licit because it involves a manifest injury: parents are stripped of the natural right they have over their children, who are under their power so long as they lack the use of reason. Yet evil must not be done so that good may come. The second is not licit either, because it would tend to the detriment and profanation of baptism. For there would be a danger that unbelieving parents would infect these children with their most wicked rites and, when they reached adulthood, force them to renounce baptism. Therefore, etc. — I deny the minor premise: for if there were a danger of their being subverted, such infants could be removed from their parents’ dominion and company, for the reason just given. For if a son who has reason and freedom can withdraw from his parents’ company and care to look after his own salvation, at an age when by natural duty he is bound to obey and serve his parents, all the more may he licitly be removed from their presence at an age when, lacking reason, he can render them no service at all, but can impose much burden and labor on them. Moreover, even without any removal or separation, provision can be made for the infant until he reaches the use of reason, since parents are bound to provide the child with everything necessary for natural life, and in that condition they can do nothing to him that would harm his salvation.

YOU WILL SAY 2: Christ the Lord wished no one to be brought to the Catholic faith by force, but freely and without any compulsion, whether one’s own or another’s. Therefore little ones, so long as they have no will other than their parents’, cannot be brought into the Christian religion through baptism against their parents’ resistance. Gonet proved the antecedent, disputation 3, art. 3, § 3. First, he says, no one can be compelled to the faith that leads to eternal life; therefore the Gospel Law, which is received in the heart only through faith, must not be imposed by injury, fear, and violence. Second, since Christ’s intention was to persuade the whole world to the faith—not just any faith, but one that works through love alone—and since nothing is more contrary to charity, or love, than force, injury, and fear, it was fitting that no one be compelled to it by such violence. Third, lest the faith, which exceeds the powers of natural reason, become hateful when preached to the nations by force, and be thought a kind of tyranny and a fabrication of the devil contrary to reason. Fourth, so that by this excellence our law would shine when compared with Muhammad’s perfidy: for the latter, as something that could be persuaded by no reason, was thrust upon the world by force and arms; but our faith, through weak and meek men and by the force and power of truth alone, conquered the world and overcame philosophers and emperors. Thus Chrysostom says admirably in Sermon 3, On Pentecost: “Fishermen traversed the world and, finding it weak, restored it to health; finding it in ruin, they restored it to stability—not wielding shields, not bending bows, not shooting arrows, not distributing money, not trusting in eloquence, but possessing the kingdom of heaven, having no human comforts, yet having the Lord with them. Sheep traversed the whole world among wolves; the sheep were not wounded by the beasts, but rather the wolves were changed into the meekness of sheep.” — I answer: I deny that the antecedent can be maintained. For although God freely called all those invited to the banquet under the parable of the householder, nevertheless he commands: “Go out into the roads and hedges, and compel them to come in, so that my house may be filled.” Hence St. Augustine asks in Letter 48 to Vincentius: “Do you think that no one can be compelled to righteousness, when you read that the householder said to his servants, ‘Compel all whom you find to come in’?” Hence the Doctor says, n. 2: “I would believe it to be done religiously if the parents themselves were compelled by threats and terrors to receive baptism and afterward to preserve what they had received. For even if they were not true believers in their hearts, it would nevertheless be a lesser evil for them not to be able to keep their unlawful law with impunity than to be able to keep it freely. Likewise, if their children were raised well, they would be true believers in the third and fourth generation.” He proves this from the decree of the Fourth Council of Toledo, where we read in canon 56²: “Concerning the Jews, the holy synod decrees that henceforth no one is to use force to make them believe. ‘For God has mercy on whom he wills, and hardens whom he wills.’ For they are not to be saved unwillingly, but willingly, so that the form of justice may be preserved intact. For just as a man perished by obeying the serpent through the will of his own free choice, so each person is saved by believing through the conversion of his own mind when God’s grace calls him. Therefore they are to be persuaded to convert, not forced; not driven, but moved by the free will of their choice. As for those who were compelled long ago to become Christians, as happened in the time of the most religious prince Sisenand, since it is now established that they were joined to the divine sacraments, received the grace of baptism, were anointed with chrism, and became sharers in the Body and Blood of the Lord, they ought to be compelled to keep the faith they received by force or necessity, lest the name of the Lord be blasphemed and the faith they received be held cheap and contemptible.” Although the Council forbids compelling Jews and other unbelievers to receive the faith and baptism, nevertheless, by using the word henceforth, it signifies that this had not always been illicit; and therefore such compulsion, whatever it may be, is not illicit by the nature of the thing, nor by natural or divine law. Hence it adds in the same place: “As for those who were compelled long ago to become Christians, as happened in the time of the most religious prince Sisenand,” etc. “Therefore,” says the Doctor above, n. 3, “in this he approves him as a religious prince,” not because of his outstanding faith and other acts of piety, of which there is no mention there, but “because he compelled unbelievers to the faith.” By the same reasoning, all those Catholic princes who enacted very severe laws against unbelievers and even heretics unless they returned to the Catholic Church are celebrated with praise. Add that if such compulsion were illicit by natural and divine law, it would be chiefly because it would lead to a fictitious and merely external reception of baptism. But it often happens that those compelled in this way receive baptism not only fictitiously but sincerely; for, as St. Augustine says in Letter 60, “It has benefited many—as experience has shown and continues to show—to be first compelled by fear or pain, so that afterward they may be taught, or may put into practice what they had already learned in words.” He proves this for many cases, and especially by the example of the conversion of St. Paul, writing: “When he had called Peter and the other Apostles by the word alone, Paul, formerly Saul, afterward a great builder of his Church but previously a dreadful ravager, he restrained not only by his voice, but also cast him down by his power; and, to urge him, raging in the darkness of unbelief, to desire the light of the heart, he first struck him with bodily blindness.… Where is what these people are accustomed to cry out: ‘It is free to believe or not to believe. Whom did Christ attack? Whom did he compel?’ Behold the Apostle Paul: let them recognize in him Christ first compelling and afterward teaching, first striking and afterward advising.… If the Church did not compel her lost children to return, how did those lost children compel others to perish?” etc. The holy Doctor proves the same point by the example of a sheep that has strayed from the flock, which, once found, it is right to bring back to the Lord’s fold by the threat of blows or even by pain if it wishes to resist. He also proves it by the parable of the householder commanding his servants to compel those they find on the roads and hedges—that is, in heresies and schisms—to come in.

Nor should you say that this is true of heretics, who gave their name to Christ through baptism, but not of unbaptized unbelievers. For although St. Augustine’s chief aim in that letter is to show Boniface, a military man to whom he addresses it, that heretics, especially Donatists, may lawfully be compelled to return to the Church, nevertheless his arguments prove the same concerning any unbelievers. Hence he had written earlier: “If horses and mules, which have no understanding, resist with bites and kicks the people who handle their wounds, and although people are often endangered between their teeth and hooves and sometimes tormented, they do not abandon them, but through medicinal pains and discomfort bring them back to health, how much more must one person not abandon another, a brother not abandon a brother, lest he perish forever, when, once corrected, he can understand what a benefit is being done to him, even as he complains of suffering persecution?” Hence he concludes: “When emperors enact bad laws in favor of falsehood against the truth, those who believe rightly are proved and those who persevere are crowned. But when they enact good laws in favor of the truth against falsehood, those who rage are intimidated and those who understand are corrected. Therefore, whoever refuses to obey the laws of emperors enacted against God’s truth earns a great reward; but whoever refuses to obey the laws of emperors enacted in favor of God’s truth earns a great punishment.” The Subtle Doctor’s opinion is therefore not absurd when he judges that it is sometimes not illicit to compel unbelievers to embrace the faith, especially when that compulsion will benefit their descendants, since their children will eventually become fully Catholic. For he does not mean that every kind of compulsion, in every circumstance, is permitted by divine law, but that it may be moderate where and when right reason dictates that it tends not to the destruction of the faith but to its building up, not to hatred but rather to love, unless the Church has decreed otherwise.