Scotus Academicus, Tomus decimus: De Baptismo, De Poenitentia, De Extrema Unctione

We said in the preceding Article that the sacrament of penance requires three acts on the part of the penitent, from which it must necessarily consist, as it were, of its matter. The Council of Trent also defines this, sess. XIV, ch. 3, where we read: The acts of the penitent himself are, as it were, the matter of this sacrament, namely contrition, confession, and satisfaction; insofar as by God’s institution they are required in the penitent for the integrity of the sacrament and for the full and perfect remission of sins, they are for this reason called the parts of penance. Hence St. Augustine, explaining Psalm 146, He heals the contrite of heart, says: He heals those contrite of heart, he heals those who confess, he heals those who punish themselves. By these words he signifies the penitent’s three acts: contrition of heart, confession of the mouth, and satisfaction in deed. It remains for us in the present Article to discuss each of these parts, which we shall do in the following three Sections. The first will concern both perfect contrition, commonly called contrition, and imperfect contrition, called attrition; the second, confession; and the third, satisfaction, both sacramental and ecclesiastical, or public.

The name contrition is derived from the verb contero, which means to divide a hard thing into very small parts, as Aristotle teaches in bk. IV of the Meteorologica, giving an excellent comparison. For through sin a man’s will and heart are hardened and made obstinate in evil, according to Job, ch. 41: His heart will be hardened like stone and become firm like a smith’s anvil. Hence the act by which this hardness is removed and sin blotted out is rightly called contrition by theologians. For this reason William of Paris commends and describes penance by the very crushing of the heart: Penance, he says, is the contraction and crushing of the heart, and the reduction of the old man to dust. St. Bonaventure explains this etymology of contrition very well in In IV Sent., d. 16, a. 1, q. 1, ad 7, where he says: “Some say it is called by this name because, just as a healing ointment is made from many herbs crushed together in a mortar, so an ointment of compunction is made from the herbs of sins that grow in our soil when they are crushed in the mortar of conscience; Bernard seems to say this in his commentary on the Song. But then a man would not be called contrite by this contrition, but one who crushes. Therefore it must be added that three things are to be considered in this contrition: what is crushed, by what it is crushed, and toward what end contrition is directed. What is crushed is the sinner’s heart, which is like an earthen vessel filled with the poison of sin, according to the words: The gall of dragons is their wine, etc. By what it is crushed is a twofold millstone: one above, lifting upward, namely hope of pardon through consideration of mercy; the other below, divine justice. Of these millstones it is said: You shall not take the upper and lower millstone as a pledge. This vessel is crushed so that it may be softened, for it is hard. For a hard heart will fare badly at the end. Or, better, so that the delight of sin may be entirely poured out. For this reason it is called contrition, not breaking: breaking makes larger pieces, contrition smaller ones; when the pieces are larger, some flavor remains. So that neither flavor nor reality remains, it is crushed into the smallest pieces, and this delight is entirely removed by eternal punishment and by grace. Therefore it is called contrition in both cases: in eternal punishment, according to the words, The crime will be crushed along with the transgressor; and through grace, according to A contrite and humbled heart, O God, you will not despise. But the cases differ: there the sinner is crushed to dust, not so that another vessel may be made, for of the impious it is said, Not so the impious, not so, but like dust, etc. In the contrition of grace, however, the crushing is meant to generate a new and solid vessel through the honor of grace and tears. Thus it is rightly called contrition, not attrition, because the parts that have been ground are joined together to make a vessel for honor, according to what is said of Paul: He is a vessel of election to me…. If anyone cleanses himself from these things, he will be a vessel, etc.” Thus the Seraphic Doctor.

It is called contrition of the heart because, as the Roman Catechism says, n. 31: Sacred Scripture frequently uses “heart” for the will: for just as the beginning of the body’s movements comes from the heart, so the will moderates and governs all the other powers of the soul. This contrition of the heart is the penitent’s primary and principal act, as well as the foundation and crown of the others. For we would never confess our sins rightly, and would strive in vain to expiate them by works of satisfaction, unless we felt sorrow for the sins of our former life and detested them through contrition. For (says the author of the book Questions on the Old and New Testaments, pt. III, q. 11): injured bodily limbs cannot receive the remedy of health without pain; so sinners cannot redeem their sins unless the soul that sinned has felt sorrow. Since contrition must be practiced frequently—because there is no moment when past sins come to mind at which we ought not at once to conceive salutary sorrow for them and detest them—its nature, power, and dignity must therefore be examined and explained through careful inquiry. We shall do this, as far as we are able, in the following five QUESTIONS. The first will explain what contrition is and of what sort; the second, what things it must concern; the third, how great it must be and how long it must last; the fourth, what its effect is; the fifth, what imperfect contrition, or attrition, is and of what sort.

NOTE 1. In Sacred Scripture the word “contrition” signifies the same as devastation or destruction. Thus Isaiah 51: “Desolation and Contrition, and famine, and sword: who will console you?” And Jeremiah 6: “Evil has been seen from the north, and great Contrition.” And Psalm 13: “Contrition and misery are in their ways.” Among theologians, however, this word is used to signify displeasure over past sins; this meaning indeed has its foundation in Sacred Scripture, for Psalm 50 says: “A contrite and humbled heart, O God, you will not despise.” And Psalm 146: “He heals the contrite of heart and binds up their contritions.” Hence it is also called the humbling of the heart; for, as St. Augustine expounds the words just cited: “Those who do not crush the heart are not healed. What is it to crush the heart? ‘A spirit afflicted is a sacrifice to God.’ Those who have crushed the heart are the humble. Who have not crushed the heart? The proud. What is contrite will be healed; what is lifted up will be cast down—perhaps for this very purpose it is cast down, that, once contrite, it may be healed. ‘He heals the contrite of heart’; therefore humility heals the heart,” etc. It is likewise called “bitterness” of heart, because it makes sins bitter to the penitent’s soul, in keeping with Isaiah 38: “I recall all my years to you in the bitterness of my soul.… Behold, my bitterness is most bitter in peace.” It is also named “compunction,” as it were a piercing of the heart: “For, as William of Paris says in his treatise On the Sacrament of Penance, ch. 5, the thorns and goads of sins are first felt when the Spirit has quickened and sanctified the sinner’s heart by the infusion of his grace; or because they are then fixed in the heart’s depth and innermost part, in keeping with what is read in the Psalm: ‘I was turned in my anguish, while a thorn was fixed.’ For sometimes, before his coming and his life-giving visitation, the heart, being intent upon—or rather, mortified and dead, felt neither the wound of sin nor the iron in the wound, neither the goads of sins nor their pricks. The Psalmist names compunction in Psalm 4: ‘Be pierced in your beds’; and Acts 2: ‘When they had heard these things, they were pierced to the heart.’ Or it is so called, he says in the same place, because, just as trees of frankincense and myrrh are wounded with iron rods, and through the very wounding such trees seem to weep or to coagulate, so the pierced hearts of penitents emit the frankincense of devout prayer and the myrrh of inward bitterness. Finally, it is called compunction because, just as swollen sores are cut with iron so that the enclosed poison may be able to burst forth, so hearts are cut, as it were, with the scalpel of Contrition, so that the deadly poison of sin may be able to burst out. Wherefore the Prophet Joel also calls it a “rending” of the heart: ‘Return’* (he says, ch. 2) *‘to me with all your heart, in fasting, weeping, and mourning, and rend your hearts.’”

NOTE 2. Since Contrition can be considered either according to the very entity of the act, or according to the manner in which the act itself is elicited, or according to the principle from which it is elicited, or finally, according to the effect it produces, it follows that several and varied definitions of Contrition are put forward according to these different respects. First, as regards the substance and entity of the act, the Council of Trent defines it, sess. XIV, ch. 4: “Contrition is sorrow of soul and detestation for a sin committed, together with the purpose of not sinning thereafter.” This definition of Contrition applies to it both as an act of the virtue and as a part of the sacrament of penance, since in either respect it must necessarily be sorrow for a sin committed, together with a firm purpose of not sinning thereafter. Although, insofar as it is a part of the sacrament, it also entails the purpose of confessing and making satisfaction, by which it is distinguished from Contrition insofar as it is an act of the virtue of penance; in the latter respect it did not formerly entail a purpose of confessing and making satisfaction, but only a will to punish and avenge the sin. In view of its principle, however, it is called “a voluntary sorrow punishing what it grieves itself to have committed”; for Contrition is an act of the will, unwilling and grieving that it has sinned, such that, if it could be done, it would efficaciously wish that the sin had not been committed by it. Third, in view of its effect, St. Augustine calls it “sorrow remitting sin,” or St. Gregory calls it “humility of spirit annihilating sin between hope and fear.” Finally, in view of the manner in which it is exercised, St. Isidore describes it: “Contrition is compunction and humility of mind, coming with tears from recollection of sin and fear of judgment.” Moreover, in the first definition, which is the most excellent of them all, three acts are enumerated as belonging to perfect Contrition: namely, sorrow for a sin committed, hatred of it or detestation of it, and a purpose not to sin any more. The question, then, is which of these acts chiefly constitutes the formal character of Contrition, and whether all three are necessarily required for true and perfect Contrition. For Cajetan, in his little work On Contrition, q. 1, contends that Contrition essentially consists in an act of hatred for sin, so that sorrow is merely its property, while the purpose not to sin thereafter is a consequence and effect of that sorrow. Suarez, however, in disp. 4, sect. 1, holds that it is essentially detestation of sin, which he wishes to distinguish both from hatred and from sorrow for sin. Others, such as Conink, disp. 1, tit. 1, teach that Contrition essentially consists both in an act of sorrow and in an act of hatred for sin. The heretics of our time, however, together with Luther, hold that Contrition is only love of righteousness, a new life, and correction of one’s former life, but not hatred, displeasure, detestation, or sorrow for that life; thus Contrition does not imply anything painful or bitter, but only what is pleasing, joyful, or sweet. Hence they infer that sorrow or sadness makes a person more of a hypocrite, and not truly penitent.

NOTE 3. Contrition is customarily distinguished into two kinds: perfect, which is simply called “Contrition,” and is sorrow for sins on account of God, supremely loved; and imperfect, which is called “Attrition,” or sorrow for sins from some other honorable motive that is not God himself, who is to be loved for his own sake insofar as he is the supreme good from which mortal sin turns one away. For it must be known that someone can detest sin for various ends: first, from fear of hell, which he would incur by sinning; second, from desire for the glory and eternal happiness that he would lose by dying in sin; third, from love of virtue, which sin would cloud, and hatred of vice, by which he would be stained; fourth, from love of God, whom he loves ardently, either with a love of desire on account of the various goods he receives from him, or with a love of friendship, namely insofar as God is the supreme, infinitely perfect and lovable good—which is properly to love God for his own sake. The question, then, is in which of these motives the formal character of Contrition consists.

These, then, are the three principal matters that arise for determination in this Question. First, whether the four acts mentioned are required for perfect Contrition: namely, hatred, detestation, and sorrow for a sin committed, together with a firm purpose not to sin thereafter, as well as to confess and make satisfaction. Second, in which of these acts Contrition formally consists. Third, whether perfect Contrition is formally an act of charity and love of God, or at least is commanded by charity.

First conclusion. — THE FOUR AFOREMENTIONED ACTS ARE REQUIRED FOR TRUE AND PERFECT CONTRITION. This is gathered from the Council of Trent, which mentions such acts when it defines and explains Contrition. For sess. XIV, ch. 1, speaking of penance as a virtue—which does not remit sin except insofar as it is true Contrition—it says: “Penance was indeed necessary at all times for all people who had stained themselves with any mortal sin, in order to obtain grace and righteousness, even for those who, washed in the sacrament of baptism, had sought it, so that, having rejected and corrected their wickedness, they might detest so great an offense against God with hatred of sin and devout sorrow of soul.” Here it requires detestation, hatred, and sorrow for sin for perfect penance. But in ch. 4, treating of Contrition, it says: “Contrition, which holds the first place among the aforesaid acts of the penitent, is sorrow of soul and detestation for a sin committed, together with the purpose of not sinning thereafter. At all times this manner of Contrition was necessary for obtaining forgiveness of sins; and in a person who, after baptism, has fallen, it prepares for the remission of sins only if it is joined with confidence in divine mercy and with a vow to perform the rest of what is required for the fitting reception of this sacrament.” Here it delineates two kinds of Contrition: namely, that which occurs outside the sacrament of penance, and that which is joined to the sacrament. For both, under the New Law, it requires not only sorrow and detestation for sin, but also a vow to perform all those things—namely, confession and satisfaction—that are required for sacramental absolution.

That it likewise required hatred is clear enough from the fact that there it calls Contrition—what at first it had called sorrow and detestation—simply “hatred” immediately after the words just cited. For, condemning Luther’s erroneous opinion, it says: “The holy Synod therefore declares that this Contrition contains not only cessation from sin, and a purpose and beginning of a new life, but also hatred of the old,” etc. It again insists on this in the same place. Hence, in canon 5, it defines as follows: “If anyone says that the Contrition which is prepared by the examination, collection, and detestation of sins, whereby someone recalls his years in the bitterness of his soul, weighing the gravity and multitude of his sins, his infidelity, the loss of eternal blessedness, and his incurring of eternal damnation, together with a purpose of better life, is not true and profitable sorrow, nor prepares for grace, but makes a person a hypocrite and more of a sinner; and, finally, that it is sorrow under compulsion and not free and voluntary—let him be anathema.” Although by these words the Fathers of Trent chiefly intended to define, against the heretics of our time, that a bare and sterile purpose of a better life, or cessation from sin, is not sufficient for true penance, they nevertheless suggest clearly enough that, along with hatred and detestation of sins and a purpose of a better life, sorrow for a sin committed is also required, whether that sorrow be sensory or merely intellectual.

For when Contrition is defined by sorrow, “sorrow” is not taken precisely for the very act of sorrow, nor for sadness, which is a passion, but for the cause of sadness and sorrow itself, namely, the unwillingness toward sins. For these three differ: unwillingness, sadness, and sorrow. Unwillingness is an act of the will, namely, not to wish that one had sinned. Sadness, however, is distress and a passion that arises from this very unwillingness and affects the will. Sorrow in turn is a passion that occurs in the sensory faculty, namely, that anguish of heart which the penitent has from unwillingness and detestation of sin. Of these three, only unwillingness seems to belong to the essence of Contrition; the others are its effects.

For, as St. Bonaventure teaches admirably, d. 16, a. 1, q. 1, from St. Augustine, bk. 14 of The City of God, ch. 15: “Just as sin is perpetrated through consent, so, conversely, it is erased and destroyed through the dissent of the rational will; and because dissent from something that cannot not exist generates sorrow, Contrition must therefore be said to be sorrow essentially. But it should be observed that ‘sorrow’ is said in two ways: in one way, the very dissent of the will; in another way, the passion resulting in the sentient person, or in the sensitive appetite, from that dissent, through which a person breaks into tears. That dissent belongs to the essence of Contrition, but that passion is its effect.” This is the Seraphic Doctor. Hence our most learned Vega concludes admirably, bk. 13 of On Justification, ch. 35: If there are some, he says, who would not wish to have committed the sins they did commit, yet do not grieve for them with sensory sorrow, or even intellectual sorrow, their detestation of sins, without any sadness or sorrow, would suffice for justification; Scotus, Almavus, and others consistently taught this, and it is very much in keeping with divine mercy. For among human beings, too, this is sometimes enough to be restored to favor with them. Nor can it be doubted that these sinners already repent of their sins and truly regret them. And insofar as sorrow, or sadness for sins, is properly taken for the passions that follow the affections of those who would in no way have consented to their sins, we can believe certain sinners who say that they cannot grieve over their sins. For this may happen with sensory sorrow, from which tears follow, because of a hard constitution or because the sorrow¹ is excessively intense². Nor is it surprising if other things that are more perceptible cause greater sorrow and draw more tears from us. According to the Subtle Doctor, this is also possible with intellectual sorrow, which is sadness, because, in his view, sadness does not necessarily follow from flight from, hatred of, or unwillingness toward sin, although it is very often joined to it. Hence that well-known saying of St. Augustine, bk. On Penance: “As sorrow is the companion of penance, so tears are witnesses of sorrow.”

If, then, as some sinners are accustomed to say, they grieve over the fact that they do not grieve, and in this way, whether with sensory or intellectual sorrow, simply say that they do not wish to have sinned, they ought to be admitted to penance. If, however, they were to say that they have no affection by which they would wish not to have consented to the sins they committed, because they cannot have such an affection, and were to use the common word “sorrow” for that affection, they must gradually be led, by the common and well-worn arguments drawn from the evils in sins, to wish that they had not committed them. For it is impossible for them to grieve that they do not grieve over their sins if “sorrow” is taken, as it usually is, for an affection by which one wishes not to have sinned. For this affection is always within the power of one who truly wishes to have it. But because it depends more on God’s grace and kindness than on our freedom, God must first of all be begged to deign to impart it: “For who,” as Bernard says most truly in On the Threefold Mercy, “will cleave this hardness, except he who in his Passion cleft the rocks? Who will give a penitent heart, except he from whom every best gift comes?” Thus far Vega.

Since, however, he cites the Subtle Doctor in support of his position, I am pleased to quote his words. Scotus, In I Sent., d. 11, q. 2, n. 17, at the end, says: “Sometimes, from charity or contemplation of God, a certain detestation of sin is present at once, and the greatest sadness follows, even though no act of justice with respect to that sadness has yet been posited; at other times, an act of justice (of vengeance) is present first and is intense in itself, yet its proximate causes—namely, the intellect in considering and the will in detesting—are not efficaciously moved by that command of justice, perhaps because they lack the habits that would be principles of perfection in their acts.” For he continues in n. 18: “And although these are sometimes moved—namely, the intellect in considering and the will in detesting—sadness nevertheless does not follow. Although this could happen for many reasons, it sometimes happens because, just as the intellect is conformed in us to the sensitive part, so the intellectual appetite tends toward the sensitive appetite in being easily pleased and saddened together. Therefore, the will of someone whose sensitive appetite is not naturally disposed to sadness or sorrow is not easily saddened.” From this the Doctor infers: “Someone may have the greatest act of penance in the first way, that is, the greatest act of avenging the sin he committed, and yet have no affect of sadness, or only a slight one; while some, without any act of penance in the first way, have the greatest effect of the same kind as that which is naturally an effect of penance. Whether that effect is greater or lesser is indeed some excellence with respect to the destruction of sin; namely, simply speaking, there is a greater excellence of act in relation to act, for the acts are followed on either side by sadness, since the act that causes sadness merits sin more than sadness itself does.” Therefore, according to the Doctor, detestation of sin, as causative of sadness, can meritously erase sin, even if by accident no sadness, or only slight sadness, follows. For it is not plausible that God, who is the Father of mercies and who does not will the death of the sinner but rather that he turn and live, required for conversion and life something that is not within the sinner’s free power, such as the sorrow or sadness that follows an act of detestation. Moreover, natural reason plainly indicates that detestation itself is necessary when someone takes on a new person and changes his state, unless he casts off the old through some displeasure, and unless his former state displeases him in some way; otherwise there is no cause for changing, indeed it is scarcely possible to change. For the nature both of us and of our affections is such that whatever has once pleased us remains with us so long as we are moved away from it by no hatred or displeasure; and whatever we have once approved, we are considered to approve, and to will to be firm and settled, for so long as, on thinking better about it, we do not reject or retract it. So Vega above.

YOU WILL SAY 1: Just as a truly penitent person ought to grieve, so too ought he to feel shame; but that shame is neither confession nor satisfaction, and consequently neither hatred, nor detestation, nor sorrow: therefore more acts than those listed above are required for Contrition. Moreover, the penitent ought not only to grieve but also to rejoice, as we said when treating of penance as a virtue; consequently, just as Contrition is called sorrow, so it should also be called joy. — The Seraphic Doctor answers both points in the same place: “Shame follows upon the will’s dissent, insofar as it dissents from sin as something shameful; joy also follows, insofar as from that dissent one feels oneself removed from sin. But the passion that is sorrow follows more immediately; for the dissent itself, when vehement, from a thing we do not wish to exist and yet which exists, immediately generates sorrow—because it is dissent; but because it is dissent on account of a shameful thing, it generates shame; and because through that sorrow the sinner is removed from the shameful and hostile thing itself, therefore he grieves over sin and rejoices in his sorrow.”

YOU WILL SAY 2: “Sorrow is dissent from those things that happen against our will,” says St. Augustine, bk. 14 of The City of God, ch. 15; but Contrition is dissent from sins that happen with our will; therefore, etc. — The same Seraphic Doctor answers that sin is voluntary with respect to its delight, but it is not voluntary with respect to the character of its malice, deformity, and punishment. “But if you say that the sorrow of Contrition must be not only for the deformity but also for the delight: he answers that for a sinner to grieve properly, it is enough that what he grieves over be unwanted for the time at which he grieves, though not at every time.” The remaining points that may bear on this difficulty have already been resolved by what we said about the essence of the virtue of penance.

Second conclusion. — CONTRITION MORE PROPERLY CONSISTS IN DETESTATION OR HATRED OF SIN THAN IN THE OTHER ACTS.

It is proved, because Contrition is an act of the appetitive virtue; therefore it is an act of the will insofar as it detests sin. The antecedent is evident, since Contrition is an actual unwillingness toward sin—not absolute, but conditional—as though the penitent were to say: If it were possible, I would not wish to have sinned. But this unwillingness is formally nothing other than detestation of sin itself; therefore, etc. Nor is it an objection that the Council of Trent, in the places cited in the preceding conclusion, equally calls Contrition sorrow and detestation of sin. For these must be understood in due proportion and according to a sense of accommodation: that is, Contrition is essentially detestation, while sorrow is only concomitant or causal, because that detestation is nothing other than wishing not to have sinned, from which sorrow follows. For sorrow is nothing other than sadness and affliction, or a certain anguish, because a person sees that he has done what he would not wish to have done. Therefore that detestation necessarily has sorrow accompanying or following it.

It is confirmed: Contrition must be constituted chiefly in that from which, as streams from a spring, the other acts required for perfect Contrition flow. But they all arise from detestation of sin itself. For sorrow proceeds from it, as we just said; hatred also arises from it, if that hatred is in truth something distinct from detestation itself—which I do not think it is. For in the will, with respect to good and evil, there are only those acts that correspond to the passions of the sensitive appetite; but hatred and detestation correspond to the same passion, which is called “hatred,” and no philosopher seems hitherto to have said that hatred and detestation are two virtues. Likewise, from that detestation proceeds the will not to sin thereafter and to fulfill those things necessary for obtaining remission of sin. For one who truly detests sin has the disposition not to admit it any more, and to apply all the means conducive to its destruction; and consequently to do all that is necessary for sacramental absolution, without which, whether received in fact or by vow, remission under the New Law of a sin committed after baptism cannot take place.

YOU WILL SAY 1: If sorrow essentially consisted in detestation and hatred of sin, since this detestation and that hatred are most perfect in the Blessed, it would likewise follow that they have most perfect Contrition. But this cannot be said; therefore neither can the former be said. — I distinguish the major: if the Blessed had such detestation as would have sorrow for sins accompanying or following it, I grant it: otherwise, I deny it. And with the minor, thus distinguished, I deny the consequence. For detestation of sin can be distinguished in two ways. One is general, diffused through all acts of every virtue, but especially charity, which, insofar as it tends toward an object fitting to itself, turns away from whatever is opposed to that object. The other is special, tending chiefly toward the vengeance and destruction of sin itself; it is nothing other than the will’s very formal, positive unwillingness, by which the penitent, if it were possible, would not wish to have sinned and grieves that he has sinned. The former can be in the Blessed, but not the latter.

YOU WILL SAY 2: Contrition consists chiefly in this, that it is in itself the first thing opposed to sin and destroys it. But that which is in itself the first thing opposed to sin is not its detestation, but the sorrow by which the penitent is affected when he grieves that he has offended God. Therefore Contrition consists more in sorrow for sin than in hatred or detestation of it. The major premise is established: for just as Penance regards sin under the aspect of an offense to be avenged and punished, and capable of being compensated for by the penitent’s acts, so too does its principal and primary act, which is Contrition. The minor premise, however, is proved: the act by which a man avenges sin ought to be opposed to the act by which he committed it. Therefore, just as a man sinned through unlawful pleasure, he ought to avenge that sin and make satisfaction to God through an act opposed to that pleasure; but this can be none other than sorrow. For, says St. Augustine, Serm. 7, On the Time: When you repent in such a way that what was once sweet to you in life now tastes bitter in your heart, and what formerly delighted you in the body now torments you in your mind, then indeed you groan well before God and say: Against you alone have I sinned.” Therefore, etc. — I deny the minor premise: for since sin consists in a voluntary turning away from God, the first movement of Penance must consist in man’s voluntary turning to God, and consequently in hatred and detestation of that which turns him away from God. This detestation is nothing other than the very act of not-willing by which the penitent would wish that he had not sinned; since that cannot be, sorrow then arises over the sin committed. Hence I do indeed admit that sorrow is the avenging of unlawful pleasure insofar as that sorrow is sensual, but not insofar as it is wholly spiritual and something consequent upon the aforesaid act of not-willing.

From these things, then, it follows that detestation or hatred of sin is the primary and chief act of Contrition, from which the other acts spring as from a root. For from a man’s loathing sin, it follows that he grieves that he committed it, and is moved to destroy it by every means and method prescribed by God; and consequently to frequent and make sacramental Confession as soon as possible, by which he may obtain the destruction of that sin and forgiveness.

YOU WILL ASK: Whether all these acts of detestation, hatred, sorrow, and the purpose of not sinning again must be elicited separately for perfect and integral Contrition? — I answer, it does not seem improbable that it suffices for them to be contained virtually in the formal detestation of sin itself. This is indeed proved: for if any one of those acts were required to be elicited formally for perfect Contrition, it would above all be the purpose of not sinning again. But for this it suffices that this purpose be included virtually in the very efficacious and perfect detestation. For, says our Vega, bk. 13, On Justification, ch. 31: “It cannot stand that past offenses displease someone because they are offenses against God, if he intends to offend God gravely or to continue some deadly offense against Him. And no one truly repents of past errors, or wills to change his former life, without having some displeasure at it; thus no one has perfect displeasure at his former life without intending, either actually or virtually, to change it. These affections accompany one another actually or virtually. And one so disposed that he truly grieves over the offenses he has committed never, while that grief endures, commits new ones; indeed, he will avoid them as far as he can, and would say that he desires to shun them if asked about it. This suffices for him to be said to have a virtual purpose of amending his life. And he who truly purposes to avoid them in the future will never, while that purpose stands, acquiesce in or take pleasure in his past deeds; rather, if someone questions him, he will say that he grieves over those he committed. And since ordinarily scarcely anyone truly repents of sins unless he both detests them and purposes henceforth to avoid them, all sinners should be admonished, when they are stirred to penance, not only to detest their former sins and refrain from continuing or repeating them or any others, but also to purpose to avoid all sins henceforth to the best of their ability.” Thus far Vega. And a little later he adds: “Yet all this is consistent with these effects being separable from one another: detestation of one’s past life can stand without a purpose to begin a new one, and a purpose of a new life without detestation of the former. Hence the Fathers set down as two distinct things abstaining from sins and detesting them. Experience also shows that sometimes we remember the past in such a way that we think nothing at all about the future; and, conversely, look to the future in such a way that no recollection of the past enters our minds. This can happen much more readily in the affections. And whether it happens or not, we are discussing only this one question: whether detestation of sins committed can suffice for forgiveness without a formal purpose never to sin again, just as in the preceding chapter we showed, with the agreement of all Catholics, that this purpose does not suffice without detestation of past sins. And indeed, the same author goes on, although I consider the course already mentioned both common and safest, and one that should always be impressed upon the people, yet when I ponder more deeply the riches of God’s mercy toward us, I cannot doubt that sinners are sometimes justified by compunction for the sin committed alone.” That is what he says. He proves this pious opinion by the example of David, who was justified immediately when he said from his heart, 2 Kings, ch. 12, n. 13: I have sinned against the Lord. For he at once heard: The Lord also has put away your sin. No mention is made there of a purpose of amendment. You will find many other similar examples in Sacred Scripture, which Vega cites in that same place in confirmation of his opinion and ours. “But if,” he says, “God never forgave the sins of a sinner in response to any degree of compunction unless a purpose of avoiding sin in the future were actually present, Scripture would also have recalled this purpose in those whom it says were justified through their penance. For why would it have remembered detestation rather than the purpose of ceasing from sins, if both are required equally and neither suffices without the other?” Thus Vega.

YOU WILL SAY: A virtual purpose of not sinning again is nothing other than hatred and detestation of sin itself. But the Council of Trent, besides sorrow, detestation, and hatred of sin, requires a vow and purpose not to sin again and to fulfill what is necessary to obtain sacramental Absolution. Therefore, in the mind of the Council of Trent, a virtual purpose does not suffice, but a formal and actual one is required. — I answer, the Council of Trent joins a purpose of amendment to detestation of sin in order to signify that any simple displeasure at sins is not sufficient for perfect Contrition; rather, an efficacious detestation is necessary, such that, if future sins presented themselves and there were no lack of suitable time, the will would immediately spring into an affection of not sinning again. That this suffices, and that a purpose of not sinning again is virtually included in the will that detests and excludes sin, is gathered from the same Council: first, because in sess. XIV, ch. 4, speaking of imperfect Contrition, which is called Attrition, it says: If it excludes the will to sin, together with hope of pardon, it declares (the holy Synod) that it not only does not make a man a hypocrite or a greater sinner, but is also a gift of God and an impulse of the Holy Spirit—not yet indeed indwelling, but only moving—by which the penitent, aided by it, prepares for himself a way to justice. By these words, what it had called a purpose of not sinning when generally describing Contrition, it here calls an exclusion of the will to sin. It thereby signifies that one who sincerely and efficaciously detests sin is so disposed that, if asked whether he wished to sin again, he would testify that he would rather lay down his life a thousand times than mortally offend God. This affection is nothing other than a virtual purpose of not sinning again. Second, in the same place the Council requires not only a purpose of amendment, but also of Confession and Satisfaction, and even an act of hope; but an explicit vow of Confession, nor a formal act of hope, is required for true and perfect Contrition. Therefore neither is an explicit vow of amendment required. — Vega strongly confirms all these points in these words: “It can happen that some sinners are overtaken by sudden death in such a way that they can indeed remember the sins they committed, and die grieving over them and crying, ‘Lord, have mercy,’ before they have been able to think or determine anything about the future. Will these, then, also be deprived of pardon? What could be more rigid, harsher, or more unmerciful than that? Indeed, God receives with open arms all who flee to Him; He despises no one who does what lies within him; at the very point of death He grants pardon to all who turn to Him. Nor do we read in the Evangelists anything else about that fortunate thief who found pardon in the very moment of death, beside Christ hanging on the cross, except what attests that he turned away from his former life, humbly had recourse to Christ, and prayed for His mercy. Are not sure signs of sorrow for sins sometimes enough for sacramental absolution? Sinners who are overtaken at the point of death and cannot confess their sins certainly can and ought to be absolved if they have at least specified some sin and indicate their inward sorrow by outward signs, even if they show no sign declaring what they purpose for the future. Absolution on this account should in no way be delayed.” Thus far Vega.

Third conclusion. — FOR CONTRITION TO BE PERFECT AND TRULY TO MERIT THE REMISSION OF SIN OUTSIDE THE SACRAMENT, IT MUST DETEST SIN FROM AN AFFECTION OF CHARITY, AND HAVE AN ACT OF CHARITY FORMALLY OR AT LEAST VIRTUALLY, OR ONE COMMANDED BY CHARITY. This conclusion consists chiefly of two parts.

The first of these parts—namely, that for Contrition to be perfect and remit sin outside the Sacrament, it must be elicited on account of God, who has been offended, and have annexed to it a vow to receive the Sacrament—is common among Catholic Doctors. For perfect Contrition differs from imperfect Contrition in this: the latter, which is called Attrition, is not directed toward God for His own sake and insofar as He is the supreme good in Himself, but insofar as He is good to us, that is, as He is our ultimate happiness, from attaining which the sin we detest removes us. The former, however, is directed toward God, to be loved for His own sake, that is, insofar as He is infinite goodness and supremely lovable, and as He is attained by charity. (The Council of Trent indeed teaches this, sess. XIV, ch. 1, where it says: It teaches further (the holy Synod) that, although it sometimes happens that this Contrition is made perfect by charity and a man is reconciled to God before he actually receives this Sacrament, nevertheless that reconciliation must not be ascribed to Contrition itself without the vow of the Sacrament, which is included in it. But that imperfect contrition, which is called Attrition, since it is commonly conceived either from consideration of the shamefulness of sin or from fear of hell and purgatory, etc.) By these words the Council distinguishes perfect from imperfect Contrition in this respect: the former is said to be perfected by charity. This can happen only because the act of this Contrition is either a formal act of charity, or at least has one annexed to it, or contains one virtually, and detests sin insofar as it is offensive to God, who is supremely lovable; and so at least indirectly it is directed toward God as the object of charity. Imperfect Contrition, however, or Attrition, detests sin either on account of its shamefulness, or the evil of hell, or because it removes us from possession of God insofar as He is our highest good and our beatitude. Thus it is not directed toward God from the motive of charity and an affection of friendship, but only of desire. Although this affection is not itself vicious, as the Council defines in the same place, it nevertheless cannot justify outside the Sacrament, as perfect Contrition can.

There is greater difficulty concerning the second part of this conclusion, namely, that the act of Contrition must be elicited by the virtue of charity, or have a formal act of charity annexed to it, or at least contain one virtually. In determining this assertion, three opinions of authors appear. The more probable one seems to us to be that which maintains that Contrition can at once be an act of detestation of sin and of love of God above all things, so that it is at once formal love of God and formal hatred of sin. Nor should this seem surprising, since it belongs to the same virtue to will good for someone and not to will evil for him—for example, to will complete health for Peter and not to will even the least sickness for him. But to will some good for God insofar as it is good for Him—for example, that He be infinite, eternal, etc., and be glorified and honored by all creatures—is a formal act of the virtue of charity. Therefore, likewise, not to will evil for God, insofar as it is an offense against Him, will be a formal act of the virtue of charity. Consequently, detesting sin insofar as it is an extrinsic evil for God and offensive to Him can be a formal act of charity and elicited by it. This is indeed confirmed: formally to love God is nothing other than to wish some positive good for Him insofar as it is His good, and consequently to will removed from Him everything that has the character of an evil in relation to Him. For often the absence and removal of some evil is far more desirable than some positive good. Consequently, the same act of love of God can at once be hatred of sin and have as its formal motivating object both the deformity and malice of sin and the divine goodness, which is, as it were, externally stained by such malice.

This truth can be confirmed by all those testimonies of Sacred Scripture and the holy Fathers by which remission of sin is attributed especially to charity. Thus Luke 7: Her many sins are forgiven, because she loved much. The passage speaks of St. Magdalene, who stood behind the Lord beside His feet, bathed His feet with her tears and wiped them with the hair of her head, and thereby testified to the deepest sorrow of heart and Contrition for the sins she had committed. Nevertheless, remission of sins is attributed to her love and charity, as a sign that this detestation of sin was one and the same with an act of charity and love of God. Likewise, Proverbs 10: Charity covers all offenses. And 1 Peter 4: Charity covers a multitude of sins. And 1 John 3: We know that we have passed from death to life because we love the brothers … he who does not love remains in death. Here Scripture is not speaking of the habit, but of the act of charity; for in those passages it exhorts us to perform an act of charity with actual helps, so that God, in view of it, may grant us remission of sins, which comes through grace or habitual charity. Hence St. Chrysostom, Hom. 7 on 2 Timothy, near the end: Just as fire, once it has seized a forest, is accustomed to cleanse everything, so the fervor of charity, wherever it falls, destroys and breaks through everything that demolishes the divine harvest, and cleanses the soil to receive and nourish seeds deeply. He continues: Where charity is, all evils have been removed. And below: Charity is the fullness of the law: for all crimes that disturb peace are loosed wherever charity is present.

Hence St. Augustine, Serm. 7, On Time, says: Only hatred of sin and love of God make repentance genuine. That is, hatred of sin which proceeds from the motive of charity. For it is clear from the words that follow that St. Augustine does not there understand by love of God an act of love distinct from Contrition itself. For he adds: When you repent in such a way that what was once sweet to you in life tastes bitter in your heart, and what formerly delighted you in the body now torments you in your mind, then you already groan well before God and say, “Against you alone have I sinned.” … This, my little child, is true Penance: when one is converted in such a way as not to return, when one repents in such a way as not to repeat the sin. It is clear that true Contrition on the part of charity suffices to effect this conversion, without any further distinct act of love of God above all things. The author of On True and False Penance, ch. 17, seems to interpret and confirm this opinion of the holy Doctor in this way when he says: The truly penitent must not only fear God as judge, but also love Him as just: let Him not be feared for punishment, but loved for glory. For one must grieve over the crime and all its aforesaid variety; and because this is scarcely possible, Augustine could doubt about that man’s salvation, etc. By these latter words he signifies that the act of love and affection for God which he requires for true Penance is the same as sorrow for or detestation of sin, since he says that sorrow itself suffices for salvation.

YOU WILL SAY: The same St. Augustine, bk. 2, Against Cresconius, ch. 2, shows that no one can be cleansed, however many acts of Contrition he performs, unless he likewise elicits an act of charity. “For this reason,” he says, addressing the Donatists, “you do not think that they are cleansed when they pass over to us from you: because they are not baptized anew, as though men were cleansed from error by baptism alone, which ought not to be repeated, since it is one and the same.” To prove the contrary of this, he immediately adds: “They are cleansed also by the word of truth, by Him who says in John 15: “Now you are clean because of the word that I have spoken to you.” They are cleansed also by the sacrifice of a contrite heart, by Him of whom it is said in Psalm 50: “A spirit afflicted is a sacrifice to God; a contrite and humbled heart, O God, You will not despise.” They are cleansed also by alms, by Him who says in Luke 11: “Give alms, and behold, all things are clean for you.” They are cleansed by charity, which surpasses all things, by Him who said through the Apostle Peter: “Charity covers a multitude of sins.” If charity alone is present, all those things are rightly done; but if it is absent, all are done in vain.” Therefore, according to St. Augustine, acts of charity and Contrition are distinct.

I deny the inference: for it is not sufficiently clear from the words quoted above which charity St. Augustine was speaking of, whether actual or habitual. For he immediately adds: “But as to where this Charity comes from, hear the Apostle teaching: ‘The charity of God,’ he says, ‘has been poured into our hearts,’ etc. Hence those who have received the Church’s baptism outside the Church are rightly believed not to have the Holy Spirit until they adhere to the Church herself in the bond of peace through the bond of charity.” Here he clearly indicates that he is speaking of habitual charity and sanctifying grace, which adults who receive the Church’s baptism outside the Church cannot possess because of their falling away from the Church.

Add that even if St. Augustine is speaking of actual charity, nothing is thereby proved against our assertion. For we readily admit that the sacrifice of a contrite heart avails nothing unless it is either a formal act of charity or at least contains one virtually and is directed toward the same object of charity.

YOU WILL PRESS: If the act of Contrition is not distinct from the formal act of love of God, it follows either that it is the same formal act of love or that it contains that act virtually. But neither can be said, because the act of detestation is a departure from sin as the greatest of all evils, whereas the act of love is an approach to God as the best of all goods; but those approaches and departures are two distinct acts. Therefore, etc. Nor can the second alternative be said, for the act of charity is the most perfect of all acts; therefore it cannot be included virtually in the act of Contrition, which has less perfection, since that which contains virtually is nobler than what is contained. — I DENY the minor premise: and for its first proof I say that the same act of love is at once, at least virtually and equivalently, an approach to God as the highest good and a departure from sin; likewise, the same act of Contrition, which formally is a departure from sin and detestation of it, is at least virtually and equivalently an approach to divine goodness. For, by reason of the same motive, one of these movements necessarily follows from the other, if both are occupied with the same formal and terminating object. For precisely insofar as someone detests sin on account of God, who is supremely lovable, he also loves God; just as, conversely, someone detests sin at least virtually while directing his act and affection of love toward God as supremely lovable for His own sake. Hence the same act is at once pursuit and flight, approach and departure, since it is impossible for someone to approach God through an act of love and charity without departing from and fleeing sin, which is most opposed to Him. For the second proof I say that Contrition is not an act less perfect than the act of charity itself, since, from what has been said, it is itself an act of love, although not so explicit as if it were directed toward God by way of pursuit. Hence the acts of Contrition and charity seem to differ only as to their manner of being directed toward God: the act of charity is directed toward God by way of pursuit, and insofar as He is presented as the highest and supremely lovable good; but the act of Contrition is directed toward God insofar as, on His account, it flees and detests sin as opposed to Him. Thus the act of charity terminates immediately in God as the highest good and mediately in the sin it detests, insofar as that sin is opposed to the highest good; whereas the act of Contrition terminates immediately in the sin to be detested and mediately in the supreme goodness of God, on account of which sin is opposed to Him. It follows, then, that the act of Contrition differs from the act of charity only by its differing direction toward the same object and by its distinct connotation of that same object, mediately or immediately. For since those two objects are so connected—God as the highest and supremely lovable good, and sin as supremely hateful—that one is in some way on account of the other, it follows that both objects can be attained by one and the same simple act. Therefore Contrition can be called love of God by way of flight, because it is not only pursuit of divine goodness, but at the same time flight from sin insofar as it is offensive to God. Consequently, the second part of our assertion is established: Contrition perfected by charity can be a formal act of charity.

The third part is also evident: Contrition must necessarily be an act either elicited through the habit of charity when elicited by a justified person, or at least commanded by charity—namely, when that detestation of sin has an act of charity specially joined to it. Thus it does not suffice for such detestation to be made from the motive of obedience, or Religion, or Penance; it must necessarily be made from the motive of charity. First, because, as we said on the authority of the Council of Trent, for Contrition to justify outside the Sacrament it must be perfected by charity, that is, be made for the motive of charity or elicited by charity itself. Second, because remission of sin does not occur precisely without love of God, as we said on the authority of Sacred Scripture; consequently, that Contrition must be elicited by charity or commanded by it.

The Council of Trent confirms all these points, sess. VI, ch. 6, where it teaches that Penance takes its beginning from the love of God. For it says of penitents: They are disposed to that very justice when, aroused by divine grace and aided … by fear of divine justice, by which they are usefully shaken, they turn to consider God’s mercy, are raised up to hope, trusting that God will be propitious to them for Christ’s sake, begin to love Him as the source of all justice, and therefore are moved against sins by some hatred and detestation, etc. By these words the Council teaches that true Contrition must necessarily arise from love of God. For through it a man is finally disposed for sanctifying grace, by which he is constituted in the city of God. But no one belongs to the city of God except through love of God, even to contempt of self, as St. Augustine teaches, bk. 14, On the City of God, last ch. Therefore Contrition must necessarily presuppose love or have it annexed to it—if not formally, at least imperatively. That is, if it neither presupposes nor has annexed to it a formal act of love, at least it must be commanded by charity and love of God. For Contrition is detestation of sins on account of God, and consequently must necessarily presuppose some act of the will concerning God. But no other act besides love is intelligible: for because we love God, we detest the offense inflicted on Him. Therefore, since Contrition includes hatred of sins on account of God, it must necessarily be made from love and elicited from the motive of charity.

YOU WILL SAY: If love of God is necessary for true Contrition, then Contrition is superfluous for remission of sin. The inference is evident: for, as we have said many times, an act of charity suffices for justification and remission of sin. Therefore, when it precedes Contrition, it truly contributes to the remission of sin, and thus leaves nothing for Contrition to remit. — I DENY the inference: for either the act of Contrition is the same as the act of love of God, or it has that act annexed to it. If the first, Contrition is not useless for justification, since it is itself the final disposition for it. But if it only has an act of love annexed to it, so that the act of detestation of sins comes first and an act of love follows afterwards, or conversely, full remission of sins cannot take place outside the Sacrament until both acts have been elicited. For when someone remembers his sins, love of God alone without actual Penance does not suffice; nor can someone love God and remember that he has offended God without immediately detesting that offense. Thus in loving God he grieves that he offended Him, and in grieving he loves God more fervently.

It is now clear from what has been said that penance and contrition have the power to remit any sins—not formally, but only dispositively—as we taught in the eighth volume, when treating justification. The Council of Trent also indicates this in sess. XIV, ch. 4, when it says: “The movement of contrition in a man who has fallen after baptism finally prepares him for the remission of sins, if it is joined with confidence in divine mercy and the purpose of performing the other things required for rightly receiving this sacrament.” By these words it plainly teaches that contrition is indeed a disposition for obtaining pardon of sins, but is not the formal remission of sin of this kind: for a form cannot be a disposition toward itself, since some causality obtains between a disposition and a form, and this necessarily presupposes a distinction. Two things remain to be determined here: first, whether contrition, before the actual reception of the sacrament and as soon as it is formed, contributes to obtaining remission of sin; second, what sort of contrition and how intense it must be to produce this effect.

NOTE 1. All theologians agree that when necessity presses and danger of death is imminent, contrition suffices to obtain remission of sin without the sacrament, provided there is a purpose to receive it if a priest could be had. Thus St. Bernard teaches this in Letter 78, concerning the contrition of a catechumen who has no occasion or opportunity to receive baptism. The Council of Trent plainly teaches the same in the place cited above, where it says: “The holy Synod further teaches that, although it sometimes happens that this contrition is perfected by charity and reconciles a man to God before this sacrament is actually received, nevertheless that reconciliation is not to be attributed to contrition itself without the desire for the sacrament, which is included in it.” Yet there are some who, with Estius, In IV Sent., d. 17, § 2, think that it happens neither ordinarily nor frequently, much less always, but rarely, that before the priest’s actual absolution a sinner is absolved before God. Whether or not this opinion is true will be determined in the first conclusion.

NOTE 2. One object can be loved or hated more than another in three ways. First, objectively, when we will and desire greater goods for it than we will for another. Second, intensively, when it is loved with greater effort and ardor than any other, so that the act of love toward it has more degrees of intensity than any other act of love toward another object. Third, estimatively, when it is valued more than another, so that in order to attain or preserve the loved object any other thing would be relinquished, whether meanwhile that loved object is loved more intensely and with greater effort or not. Thus we say that we love God estimatively when we prefer him to anything lovable. Similarly, we are said to hate something estimatively, or in comparison with another thing, when we would rather suffer any other evil than that one. Thus a person is said to hate sin when he would rather endure any other evil than commit sin and mortally offend God. Now intensive love, and likewise intensive sorrow, differ greatly from estimative love and sorrow in this: the former belongs to the subject and faculty that acts with greater or lesser effort, whereas the latter belongs to the object, which is more valuable within its own order of lovableness or hatefulness.

NOTE 3. The Seraphic Doctor, In IV Sent., d. 26, pt. 1, a. 2, q. 1, says that one intensity of love is sensitive, another intellectual. The former accompanies an act of the sensitive appetite; the latter an act of the will insofar as it is will. The former resembles the love with which a mother loves her child with tenderness of heart; the latter the love of a father who loves that same child with constancy and firmness of mind, since he exposes himself to danger for the child’s enrichment or preservation. Furthermore, in the will there is one intensity of love according to the lower part, arising from the soul insofar as it is joined to the body; another according to the higher part, which is governed by the direction of faith and grace and consists in valuing one object willed for its own sake more than another. It is certain that everyone is bound to love God more than father or mother with rational, or intellectual, love and according to the higher part, at least estimatively, more than any created object. It is equally certain that we are not bound to love God more, or more intensely in tenderness according to the lower part of the will. For even the holiest men experience greater tenderness of heart toward their children than toward God, and feel more sensitive sorrow at their children’s death than at losing God through sin, although they would rather that everything else cease to exist and that they lose all their children than mortally offend God. The question, then, is whether we are bound to love God more in another way, and consequently to repent more through contrition.

First conclusion. — PERFECT CONTRITION SUFFICES FOR THE REMISSION OF SIN WITHOUT THE SACRAMENT, EVEN OUTSIDE A CASE OF NECESSITY, WITHOUT ACTUAL RECEPTION OF THE SACRAMENT, PROVIDED THAT THERE IS A DESIRE TO RECEIVE IT. This is the more common opinion among theologians, and

It is proved first by the authority of Scripture. Contrition is no less efficacious under the Gospel Law than under the Mosaic Law; but under the latter it sufficed to obtain remission of sin as soon as it was conceived. Therefore it will suffice for this now as well. The major premise is established, since the grace of the New Law is far more abundant than that of the old, and we now obtain remission of sins more easily than the children of the Synagogue did. The minor premise is proved first by the example of David, who, having scarcely turned to God through penance, spoke these two words in 2 Samuel 12: “I have sinned against the Lord,” and immediately heard from the prophet Nathan: “The Lord also has taken away your sin.” He expressly said, “The Lord has taken it away,” to signify that as soon as David’s act of contrition had been formed, God at once granted him pardon. — The royal Prophet himself testifies to this when he says in Psalm 31: “I said, I will confess my injustice against myself to the Lord, and you forgave the wickedness of my sin.” On these words St. Augustine adds: “He does not yet declare it, but promises that he will declare it, and He already forgives. Attend, brothers: a great thing—‘I said, I will declare it,’ and you forgave; for by saying ‘I will declare it’ he shows that he had not yet declared it. To say ‘I will declare it’ is itself to declare it; therefore you forgave the wickedness of my heart. My confession had not yet come to my mouth, for I had said, ‘I will declare against myself’; nevertheless God heard the voice of my heart. My voice was not yet in his ear, but God’s ear was already in my heart.” The Prophet adds: “For this”—that is, on this account—“every saint will pray to you in a timely moment,” so that he too may rise at once through contrition and likewise obtain pardon of sins. Cassiodorus agrees on the same words of the Psalm, saying: “Great is God’s mercy, that sin is forgiven at the mere promise, for a purpose is reckoned as an action.” — The same truth is inferred from Ezekiel 33: “The justice of the just man will not deliver him on whatever day he sins, and the wickedness of the wicked man will not harm him on whatever day he turns from his wickedness.” Here “day” is taken to mean an hour or a moment, according to Hebrew usage, as when God said to Adam in Genesis 2: “On whatever day you eat of it, you shall die.” From this one may argue as follows: the Prophet speaks in the same way of recovering justice through the sinner’s conversion as of losing and forfeiting it through the just man’s turning away. But the just man loses justice as soon as sin occurs. Therefore the sinner who turns to God through true contrition formed by charity is at once freed from sin; otherwise his wickedness would harm him on the day he turns. — This is confirmed by Isaiah 30. Where the Vulgate reads, “At the voice of your cry, as soon as he hears it, the Lord will answer you,” the Seventy translate: “When you return and groan, then you shall be saved.” He expressly says “then” to signify that no delay intervenes between the sinner’s return through contrite groaning and his salvation by the grace of justification. St. Leo explains this admirably in Letter 89, otherwise 71. Speaking of satisfaction and of reconciliation not to be denied to penitents at the end of life, he says: “For those who, in a time of necessity and the urgency of imminent danger, seek the help of penance and then at once seek reconciliation, neither satisfaction is to be forbidden nor reconciliation denied, because we can set no measure to God’s mercy or determine its time. With him conversion suffers no delay in pardon, since the Spirit of God says through the Prophet: ‘When you return and groan, then you shall be saved.’” Although there he speaks only of penitents at the end of life, nevertheless, by using the Prophet’s words, he signifies that whether in necessity or outside it, whenever anyone returns and groans, then—that is, at that very moment and without any delay—he will be saved. Consequently there is no danger in granting reconciliation in the Church’s forum to someone at the point of death, since he has already truly been reconciled before God. Pope Celestine interprets these words of the Prophet in the same way in his Letter to the Bishops of Gaul, ch. 2, where he says: “True conversion is to be measured by the mind rather than the body, as the Prophet says: ‘If you turn back, you will be saved.’”

It is proved secondly from the bulls of the supreme pontiffs Pius V, Gregory XIII, and Urban VIII, in which these propositions of Baius are condemned. The first is n. 31: “Perfect and sincere charity, arising from a pure heart, a good conscience, and unfeigned faith, can exist without remission of sins in catechumens as well as penitents.” The other is n. 37: “Through contrition, even when joined with perfect charity and the desire to receive the sacrament, guilt is not remitted outside a case of necessity or martyrdom without actual reception of the sacraments.” Those who condemn this doctrine consequently assert that contrition joined with perfect charity and the desire for the sacrament remits guilt outside a case of necessity or martyrdom without actual reception of the sacrament of penance. They therefore hold that such contrition has this power whenever it is present. This is confirmed by the Catechism of Pius V, which, treating contrition at n. 39, says: “Nor should the faithful despair in this matter of God’s supreme goodness and clemency, for, since he most earnestly desires our salvation, he delays no time in granting us pardon, but embraces us with paternal love as soon as the sinner has gathered himself together.” And below, n. 42: “Contrition itself, the Prophet says, is a contrite and humbled heart that God will not despise. Indeed, that God grants us remission of sins as soon as we have conceived contrition in our minds is declared by those words of the same Prophet elsewhere: ‘I said, I will confess my injustice against myself to the Lord, and you forgave the wickedness of my sin.’ We also see a figure of this in the ten lepers, who, sent by our Savior to the priests, were cleansed of leprosy before they reached them. From this we may learn that true contrition, as was said above, has such power that by its benefit we at once obtain from the Lord pardon for all our offenses.”

The theological argument also supports this. Contrition is the final disposition for sanctifying grace; consequently, once it is perfectly in place, sanctifying grace must also be present at the same time. When the final disposition is posited, the form is posited; but in the ordinary course sanctifying grace does not coexist with sin. Therefore contrition necessarily and infallibly brings remission of all sins. Furthermore, contrition is either formally an act of charity, or virtually such an act, or at least has an act of charity joined to it. But, as we said above, charity necessarily brings remission of sin with it, since love of God truly makes a man God’s friend. For Proverbs 8:17 says: “I love those who love me.” Sirach 31:15: “The eyes of God are upon those who love him.” 1 John 4:7: “Everyone who loves is born of God”; and v. 16: “God is charity, and whoever remains in charity remains in God, and God in him.” John 14:21: “Whoever loves me will be loved by my Father”; and v. 23: “If anyone loves me, he will keep my word, and my Father will love him, and we will come to him” (through sanctifying grace) “and make our dwelling with him.” But God cannot make his dwelling in a sinful soul, nor can a sinful soul remain in God. Consequently, since God hates sinners and loves those who love him, anyone who loves God must be saved from sin so that he may be loved by God.

YOU WILL OBJECT 1. ESTIUS: We must reason about the remission of sin through contrition in other sinners in the same way as in Mary Magdalene the penitent. But her sins were not remitted by the power of contrition and love as soon as she formed that act. For in Luke 7 Christ said of her, “Many sins are forgiven her, because she loved much,” thereby signifying that he was then forgiving her sins on account of her preceding act of contrition and charity. Estius confirms this by the example of the martyrs Genesius and Emerentiana, who are said to have been baptized in¹ their own blood. It would seem that the baptism of desire should be attributed to them rather than baptism of blood, if the former, like the latter, had the power to justify immediately. So too St. Paul, though wondrously converted and therefore possessing perfect contrition, nevertheless heard Ananias say to him in Acts 22²: “Rise and wash away your sins.” Therefore his contrition did not have the power to remit sins immediately. — I DENY THE MINOR PREMISE. Since Magdalene’s conversion was extraordinary and had the most outstanding signs of true and perfect love, I do not doubt that before Christ said of her, “Many sins are forgiven her,” etc., she had in fact been cleansed from sins by the power of contrition. Hence those words did not signify that remission was then taking place, but that it had already taken place at the instant of her love and contrition; thus they declared or at least confirmed a remission already accomplished. The same is true of the words of sacramental absolution when spoken over sins already once forgiven: they signify at the same time that the sin has truly been remitted as to the debt of guilt, and additionally release it as to the debt of punishment and unworthiness. Hence, some time later, Christ again said to the same Magdalene, “Your sins are forgiven you.” These words did not signify a repeated absolution of sin but confirmation of the prior one, just as in Mark 7 he said to the woman already healed of the flow of blood: “Daughter, your faith has saved you; go in peace, and be healed of your affliction.” Nor is it an objection that St. Augustine said of her in Homily 32 among the Fifty: “She came to the Lord unclean to return clean, she came sick to return healed, she came confessing to return professing.” This, I say, is no objection: he speaks of her coming insofar as it included her initial intention to approach, or certainly of the time when, as she approached the Lord, she perhaps did not yet have contrition perfected by charity. — As for the example of the holy martyrs Genesius and Emerentiana, I say that remission of their sins should be attributed to baptism of blood rather than baptism of desire: first, because, as Bosco rightly says, disp. 6, n. 829, baptism of blood is more certain, since it is an external act; second, because it is more efficacious, as it erases all guilt and all debt of punishment; finally, because ordinarily it includes, or at least presupposes, baptism of desire, since death for the faith of Christ is an outstanding act of charity, at least materially, according to Christ’s saying in John 15:13: “Greater love than this no one has, that a man lay down his life for his friends.” Finally, regarding the example of St. Paul, one may answer that Ananias spoke in this way either because he was uncertain whether St. Paul had perfect contrition sufficient to obtain pardon of sins, or because he judged that temporal punishments due for sins already remitted still remained to be washed away. Although these do not stain the soul, they are nevertheless called sins, much as concupiscence is called sin because it arises from sin. Such punishments are said to be washed away in baptism because they are relaxed and forgiven through the sacrament of washing.

OBJECTION 2. Contrition in a penitent who desires to receive the sacrament of penance is no more efficacious than in a catechumen who desires to receive baptism. But in the latter it does not suffice for remission of sin until he is baptized. For St. Augustine says, Tractate 13 on John: “However much a catechumen may progress, he still carries the burden of his iniquity; it is not forgiven him until he comes to baptism. As the people of Israel were not freed from the Egyptian people until they came to the Red Sea, so no one is freed from the burdens of sins until he reaches the font of baptism.” Therefore sin is not forgiven any penitent, however contrite, until he has received the sacrament of absolution. — I DENY THE MINOR PREMISE. As for St. Augustine, I say either that he speaks of what happens commonly, since few catechumens truly have perfect contrition before baptism, and so they ordinarily remain in sin until they are baptized; or that he meant that complete remission of sins as to both punishment and guilt cannot be obtained except through baptism. For although a catechumen obtains remission of guilt by virtue of contrition, ordinarily the debt of punishment still remains to be expiated; or, finally, I say that Augustine there speaks of catechumens who neglect to approach baptism and consequently lack an efficacious desire and purpose to receive it, and therefore do not have perfect contrition. Thus St. Bernard says admirably in Letter 77: “Just as no penance remits sin for a man if, when he can, he does not restore what he took, so faith profits this man nothing if, when he can, he does not receive the sacrament of baptism. Indeed, he is shown not to have perfect faith if he neglects it; for true and complete faith embraces all the commandments, and this is a true and indeed the chief commandment. He will therefore rightly be judged not faithful but plainly rebellious and contemptuous if he refuses to obey. How, indeed, is he faithful who despises God’s sacrament?” That this was St. Augustine’s meaning is clear from the text itself, for he says: “Lest anyone, in arrogance over possessing an abundance of some grace, disdain to be baptized with the baptism of the Lord.” Immediately afterward he adds: “However much a catechumen may accomplish,” etc.

OBJECTION 3. The Council of Trent, sess. XIII, ch. 7, speaking of preparation for the Eucharist, says: “Ecclesiastical custom declares that this examination is necessary, so that no one conscious of mortal sin, however contrite he may seem to himself, ought to approach the Holy Eucharist without prior sacramental confession.” And in canon 11: “The holy Synod itself decrees and declares that those burdened in conscience with mortal sin, however contrite they may consider themselves, must necessarily make sacramental confession beforehand when a confessor is available.” But cleansing from sins suffices for the proper disposition required for duly receiving the sacrament of the Eucharist. Therefore, since besides confession the Council still requires absolution, this is a sign that it does not consider contrition to have the power to remit sins outside a case of necessity without actual reception of sacramental absolution. — I DISTINGUISH THE MINOR PREMISE: true cleansing from sins suffices, I grant; merely supposed cleansing, I deny. The Council does not deny that true and perfect contrition suffices for the proper reception of the Eucharist; it denies only that contrition merely supposed to be perfect suffices. Hence it did not say, “However contrite he is,” but “however contrite he seems to himself,” and “however contrite they consider themselves,” so as to remove and restrain the vanity and presumption of certain people who trust themselves too rashly and, supposing they have perfect contrition when in fact they do not, neglect and scorn the benefit of absolution, which they could obtain easily when an opportunity to confess is given. Add that, since true contrition must be a supernatural act, a person can scarcely know whether he has it. For in our present state our intellect depends in its operations on phantasms and cannot judge when an act is supernatural. The Council therefore rightly advises and takes care that no one approach the Eucharist before using the means and remedies by which he can be more certain and secure that he is not wholly unworthy to partake of so great a sacrament. “For,” the Council says in the same place, ch. 7, “the more a true Christian knows the holiness and divinity of this heavenly sacrament, the more diligently he must take care not to approach to receive it without great reverence and holiness.”

OBJECTIONS. 1. The Tridentine Catechism says at n. 16: “Since very few would attain this degree of contrition, it followed that pardon of sins by this way was to be hoped for by very few; therefore the most merciful Lord had to provide for the salvation of men in a more accessible way, which he accomplished by a wonderful plan when he entrusted the keys of the kingdom of heaven.” Therefore very few obtain pardon through contrition before receiving the sacrament. — I ANSWER that nothing can be inferred from this against our assertion. For although we recognize that very few elicit perfect contrition, it would nevertheless always be entirely true that whoever had an act of perfect contrition, in necessity or outside it, would truly obtain remission of sin. From this it is clear how empty and slight are the grounds on which Estius’s particular opinion rests.

Second conclusion. — TO BE PERFECT, CONTRITION MUST DETEST SIN ABOVE ALL EVILS, IF NOT INTENSIVELY, AT LEAST APPETITIVELY; CONSEQUENTLY, TO JUSTIFY OUTSIDE THE SACRAMENT, NO GRADUAL DEGREE OF INTENSITY IS REQUIRED. This seems to be the opinion of the Seraphic Doctor, In IV Sent., d. 16, pt. 1, a. 2, q. 1, where he says: “It must be said that when the amount of sorrow is in question, sorrow can mean rational displeasure, or the passion in the sensitive part that results from it. If it is taken in this second sense, I say it is not necessary to grieve over sin more than over a temporal thing. Nor is such grief necessary, since it is not in everyone’s power: this sorrow does not follow from love but from affection, and affection from experiential knowledge. Since not everyone has experience of divine love, not everyone feels sorrow for sins in this sensible way. Nevertheless, to grieve even more sensibly over sin than over some loss is a perfection and fitting, but not necessary. But if sorrow means rational displeasure, I say that displeasure is measured according to the amount of charity. The amount of charity can be taken in two ways: in itself or in comparison with other loves. In itself, it may be small, greater, or greatest. In comparison with other loves, I say that it claims dominion in the heart as long as it is there, and is never there unless it is mistress. Hence I say that to have charity, it is necessary to love God above all. Do you doubt what it means to love God above all? This means”—St. Bonaventure continues—“to love God above all, so that for no loss or gain would one wish to offend God. The same is to be understood of the displeasure of contrition. Hence I say that sin must so displease reason that one would in no way, for any advantage or disadvantage, wish to consent to it or to have consented to it. The will of those who consent to sin for some reason is not just.” And below he says: “If, then, it is asked whether the sorrow of contrition must be greatest: if this means sensitive sorrow, the answer is clearly no. If it means rational displeasure, either as to the absolute intensity of the movement—and in this respect it need not be greatest—or in comparison with other sorrows, I say, as I do of love, that it must have predominance. That this predominance does not consist in degrees of intensity is clear from what precedes.”

Therefore, in the mind of this holy man, an exemplary Doctor of the Church, justifying contrition requires no determinate degree of intensity—as our Bosco rightly concludes, disp. 6, sect. 2, canon 8—but however slight it may be, it can suffice for remission of sin, provided it is elicited because God has been supremely offended and is formed by charity.

St. Chrysostom plainly teaches this truth in his Letter 17 to Theodore after his fall, cited in On Penance, dist. 3, ch. Talis. He says: “Believe me, God’s mercy toward men is such that he never rejects repentance if it is offered to him sincerely and simply. Even if someone has reached the summit of evils and then wishes to return to the path of virtue, he receives him and gladly embraces him, doing everything to restore him to his former state. What is still more remarkable and outstanding: even if someone has not been able to complete the whole order of satisfaction, God does not reject repentance however slight or brief its duration, but receives it and does not allow the reward of even the smallest conversion to be lost.”

The Seraphic Doctor proves the conclusion in the place cited above. First, greater is the sorrow that has no joy joined to it; but sorrow of contrition has some joy joined to it, since the penitent ought both to grieve for sins and to rejoice in grieving, as St. Augustine says. Indeed, the contrite person rejoices in being delivered from sin and in similar things, whereas sorrow over the loss of a parent³ or child has no joy joined to it. Therefore contrition need not be most intense by a gradual intensity. Second, one ought to grieve more over what has been lost and cannot be restored than over what can be recovered and has in fact been recovered. But parents or children who have died cannot be restored in this mortal state except by a miracle, whereas God, lost by the penitent through sin, can be recovered and is in fact possessed again through contrition. Therefore, and so on. Third, however slight sanctifying grace may be, it erases all guilt. Therefore, similarly, however slight the sorrow of contrition may be, if it has grace and charity joined to it, it will suffice to erase all guilt. This is confirmed because contrition stands to sanctifying grace, for which it disposes, as the final disposition: the final disposition must be proportioned to the form for whose reception it prepares or disposes the subject. But sanctifying grace, which remits sins and for which contrition disposes, is not necessarily most intense and requires no certain degree of intensity below which it would not suffice to erase sin. Therefore however slight and small contrition may be, it will suffice to effect remission of sin. Finally, that the sorrow of contrition need not be most intense or greatest intensively, and need not have any determinate degree of intensity, is shown and supported by examples. David truly had contrition for the sins of adultery, murder, and empty vainglory in numbering the people; yet his contrition was not most intense, for he showed more intense grief at the death of his son Absalom (2 Samuel 18)⁴. St. Paula also truly had contrition, for she was a most holy and penitent woman; yet her sorrow of contrition was not most intense, since she experienced more intense grief at the death of her children. Jerome says in her Life that at their death she was so overcome that she was always in danger of her life, but she never felt such sorrow for her offenses against God.

The reason is that what is most intense is not more intense in one person than in another, whereas one penitent’s sorrow is more intense than another’s, as in David, Magdalene, and Peter. No determinate degree or measure of intensity is required, because in Scripture God promises pardon to the contrite without qualification, imposing no limit on the degree of intensity of sadness or sorrow. Zechariah 1: “Turn to me, and I will turn to you.” Tradition likewise nowhere assigns a determinate degree of contrition or measure of its intensity. Therefore no such degree is fixed below which contrition does not suffice, provided it has the proper motive and object. The reason is that if a fixed degree or measure of intensity were required in contrition, the penitent would have the proper measure of sorrow by chance, not by choice, which is absurd.

The Doctor does not oppose this truth, as Hiquaeus contends in his Commentary on d. 14, q. 2, n. 97, where he defends the contrary opinion. For if the Doctor asserted anywhere that some intensity in the act of contrition is necessarily required, he would seem to do so most of all in d. 27, n. 19, where, speaking of infused habit and supernatural act, he appears to distinguish it from a natural act by a further intensity: “Of the third I say,” he writes, “as was said in d. 17 of the first book, that the habit of charity, as regards the substance of the act, gives it a certain further intensity which the same power, with equal effort, cannot give to its own act.” But in fact the contrary is not proved from this. For the Subtle Doctor reasons as follows in the same distinction, n. 16: “Of the first I say that ‘above all’ can be understood extensively: for example, that one loves God more than all other things, so that one would sooner wish all other things not to exist than that God not exist; and intensively: for example, one wishes God well with greater affection than anyone else. It is commonly granted concerning the first member that nothing other than God, nor all things together, are to be desired as much as God. Concerning the second, one distinction is made: love surpasses love either because it is more ardent or tender, or because it is stronger and firmer. These loves are said to surpass one another in the way a mother is said to love her son more tenderly and ardently, but a father more strongly and firmly, because he would expose himself to greater danger for love of his son. In this way it is said that love of God must be above all as regards firmness, so that nothing else can pull one away from it; but it need not be above all as regards ardor, tenderness, and sweetness, since sometimes someone finds that he loves a creature more ardently than another loves God.” Since this distinction does not please him, he argues against it as follows: “Only what is loved more firmly is loved more. For I love those things more for which I am less willing that evil should occur, and for whose good I expose myself more to save them out of love, because exposure follows love; I speak of love that is an act of the will, not of the passion of the sensitive appetite. Therefore, if some are said to love more ardently or tenderly, yet do not love more firmly, this is not due to an excess of intellectual love in them, but perhaps to a passion of sensitive love. Thus some who are called devout feel a greater sweetness than others who are far more solid in the love of God and would endure martyrdom a hundred times more readily. Sweetness is not an elicited act of the will, but a passion bestowed on the act, by which God attracts and nourishes the little ones lest they fail on the way.” From this the Doctor concludes: “I say, then, that ‘above all’ must be understood in both ways, namely extensively and intensively. For just as I am bound to love God above all other things extensively, so also with greater affection than anything else.” Do you doubt whether this means greater affection on the side of the subject, that is, according to degrees of intensity, or on the side of the object, that is, according to its essence? He continues: “And I say ‘greater’ simply, because it is more opposed to the effect posited, since one could more easily be inclined to the opposite of love for anything else than to the opposite of love for God.” Therefore, according to the Doctor’s mind, the person who loves God above all intensively is one who could more easily be inclined to the opposite⁵ of love for any other thing than to the opposite of love for God. Therefore a greater affection on the side of the object, that is, according to its essence, is not required.

This interpretation is confirmed by the note prefixed to the already cited n. 16. Scotus, it says, holds that God must be loved above all intensively and extensively, and for that reason it is attributed to him that he thinks we are bound to a love of God more intense than any other. Valentia, IIa IIae, d. 3, q. 1, pt. 1, says that no one except Scotus holds this. But Scotus does not hold it, and many others do. Scotus says only that God must be loved above all extensively and intensively, as others explain these terms: that is, God must be loved more tenderly and firmly than other things, since he regards intensity in those two senses as one and the same; but he does not say that God must be loved with a greater love by degrees, only with greater affection, for which a greater appetitive tendency, or an affection more exclusive of its opposite, suffices. Thus one may infer that by the further intensity which the Doctor says the habit of charity gives to a supernatural act in the aforesaid n. 19, he does not mean intensity on the side of the subject, or gradual intensity, but intensity on the side of the object, or essential intensity. “As regards the substance of the act”—that is, its generic character, which is derived from the object and the mode of tendency known by natural light—it gives a further intensity, that is, a correspondence with the object by which the act is constituted in the specific character of a supernatural act. Bosco, n. 246 and following, confirms this interpretation admirably, saying that no more suitable reason for this assertion can be given than that an obligation of this kind should not be prescribed to people unless its foundation is apparent and can be inferred from Scripture, the Councils, or the holy Fathers. But the necessity of such intensity in the act of contrition is inferred from none of these sources, as will appear from the response to the objections and arguments for the opposing opinion.

OBJECTIONS, THEN. 1. With Hiquaeus, n. 97, various passages of Sacred Scripture seem to suggest that just any sorrow does not suffice for true penance, but that the greatest and most intense is necessary. This is evident from Joel 2: “Turn to me with all your heart, in fasting, weeping, and mourning; tear your hearts and not your garments,” etc. Similarly, Deuteronomy 4: “If you seek the Lord your God, you will find him, provided you seek him with all your heart and all the anguish of your soul.” And Deuteronomy 30: “If, moved by sorrow of heart … you return to the Lord with all your heart and all your soul … he will have mercy on you.” 1 Kings 8: “If they sin against you … and return to you with all their heart and all their soul … you will be propitious to your people.” 2 Chronicles 30: “The Lord, who is good, will be propitious to all who seek him with their whole heart.” Jeremiah 29: “You will seek me and find me when you seek me with all your heart.” — I ANSWER that these and similar passages of Scripture do indeed establish that turning away from sin and turning toward God are required for the sinner’s justification. A man must truly put aside every inclination to sin, turn away with his whole heart from creatures that were occasions of sin for him, and turn toward God. But it is not necessary that he do so with the greatest affection and contrition of soul. These passages therefore establish that turning to God with the whole heart includes withdrawing the heart from every love opposed to love of God and involves detesting all sins for God’s sake, with the purpose not to sin again. Such conversion is made with the whole heart even if by a less intense act: it is made with an undivided heart, no part of the heart remaining in an affection for sin. Thus to love God with the whole heart means nothing other than to love him more than finite loves; for we give him our undivided heart when we love nothing more than him. To repent with all the anguish of one’s soul is to be displeased with one’s sins and take pleasure in none.

OBJECTIONS 2. Various authorities of the holy Fathers seem to require for true contrition and penance the greatest sorrow of soul, especially for graver sins. Thus St. Cyprian, in his treatise On the Lapsed, says among other things: “As great as our offenses have been, so greatly let us weep. Let diligent and prolonged medicine not be lacking to a deep wound; let penance not be less than the crime … We must pray more earnestly and plead, spend the day in mourning, pass the nights in vigils and tears, occupy all our time with tearful lamentation, lie prostrate on the ground, cling to ashes, wear sackcloth, and beat our hearts,” etc. Similarly St. Ambrose, Exhortation to a Fallen Virgin, ch. 8, says: “But how great and what sort of penance do you think is needed, such as equals the crimes or at least exceeds them? Consider, then, whether this sin of adultery is simple, or whether it is doubled by the murder committed in secret; and a great measure of penance must be applied according to the weight of the conscience.” Below he says: “Let the heart melt like wax, let it torment itself with fasts,” etc. A little later he adds: “A great crime requires great satisfaction. One must grieve more strongly, because the sin is stronger.” Likewise St. Augustine, Letter 54 to Macedonius, cited in On Penance, dist. 3, ch. 33, introduces a sinner speaking as follows: “Either grant me again the opportunity to repent, or allow me in despair to do whatever I please.… Or, if you turn me away from this wickedness, tell me whether it will profit me in the future life if in this life I spurn the enticements of this most alluring pleasure, restrain the provocations of lust, deprive myself of many things both lawful and permitted in order to chastise my body, exercise myself in repentance more vehemently than before, groan more vehemently, weep more freely, live better, support the poor more generously, and burn more ardently with the charity that covers a multitude of sins. Who among us is so foolish as to say to this man, ‘None of this will profit you hereafter; go, at least enjoy the pleasures of this life’? May God avert such monstrous sacrilegious madness.” — I ANSWER that these and similar sayings of the Fathers teach that, in doing penance, the sinner should deliberately apply all his effort and affection, not only to make satisfaction as far as he can for guilt and for the temporal punishment that remains to be paid after guilt is remitted, either in this age or in purgatory, but also to be more secure, lest by striving less he fail to offer sufficient satisfaction. It is most certain that greater satisfaction is required to erase the punishment corresponding to greater guilt, both interiorly through sorrow and externally through good and penitential works. For we can make satisfaction for sins not only through punishments imposed at the priest’s discretion and judgment according to the measure of the debt, but also through those we willingly take upon ourselves. Therefore the holy Fathers prudently admonish us to undertake graver punishments for expiating crimes in proportion to their gravity. — In the same way we satisfy the Council of Trent, sess. XIV, ch. 1, where it says: “The fruit of baptism differs from that of penance. Through baptism we put on Christ and become in him an entirely new creation, obtaining full and complete remission of all sins. Yet we cannot attain this newness and integrity through the sacrament of penance without great tears and labors, since divine justice requires it; hence the holy Fathers rightly called penance a kind of laborious baptism.” The Council speaks here not of remission of guilt but of the whole punishment, which is freely remitted through baptism but in penance is relaxed only through great groans and labors. Therefore, in sess. VI, ch. 14, likewise assigning the difference between penance and baptism, it says that penance requires not only cessation from sins and detestation of them, or a contrite and humbled heart, “but also their sacramental confession, at least in desire, to be made in its proper time, and priestly absolution, as well as satisfaction through fasts, almsgiving, prayers, and other pious exercises of the spiritual life—not indeed for the eternal punishment, which is remitted together with guilt either by the sacrament or by desire for the sacrament, but for the temporal punishment which, as the sacred writings teach, is not always wholly remitted to them as it is in baptism.” Therefore neither the holy Fathers nor the Council require intense sorrow and the penitent’s utmost effort for perfect contrition in order to obtain remission of guilt, but only to obtain release from the whole punishment that ordinarily remains to be paid after guilt is remitted.

YOU WILL OBJECT 3. God does not confer his grace except on one who does what lies within him. But he promises his grace to the one who has contrition. Therefore, to be truly contrite, a person must apply all his effort and affection. — I answer: the major premise is not to be understood as meaning that, in order to obtain grace, one must expend all one’s effort. There is scarcely anyone among mortals who performs and carries out what is commanded so perfectly that he could not do it in a still better way if he applied absolutely all his effort. Rather, it must be understood in this sense: to obtain from God through penance the grace of sanctification, a person must on his part use all the means necessary to prepare for this benefit. Or I say that he must do all that lies within him by loving God more appetitively than creatures, although he does not love him more intensely.

YOU WILL PRESS: That appetitive love or sorrow weakens concern for sins and diminishes contrition. Therefore it must be rejected. — I deny the antecedent. Sinners must be concerned not only with remission of sins as to guilt but also as to punishment. Since appetitive sorrow contributes only to remission of sins as to guilt, a penitent who has obtained that remission must still strive to obtain release from the punishment due for sins through intense sorrow and penitential works.

YOU WILL OBJECT 4. From the Roman Catechism, n. 36: “Contrition must not only be great but most vehement.” But the most vehement contrition is the most intense, since vehemence of sorrow is this kind of intensity. Therefore, and so on. — I deny the minor premise. By “most vehement contrition” the Catechism means nothing other than efficacious and active contrition, not ineffectual and sluggish contrition; hence it immediately adds: “and must exclude all sluggishness and idleness.” For it is written in Deuteronomy: “When you seek the Lord your God, you will find him, provided you seek him with all your heart and all the anguish of your soul.” And in Jeremiah, ch. 29: “You will seek me and find me when you seek me with all your heart, and I will be found by you, says the Lord.” Although we may not be able to attain that degree, contrition can nevertheless be true and efficacious; for it often happens that things subject to the senses affect us more than spiritual things. Thus some people sometimes feel greater sorrow at the death of their children than at the foulness of sin. The same judgment applies if tears do not accompany the severity of sorrow, although tears are greatly to be desired and commended in penance. Hence the marginal note also says: “Even if contrition is not so great, it is nevertheless true.”

From these points follows the truth of the second part: contrition must be the greatest of sorrows estimatively or appreciatively. The cited sayings of Scripture show that God commands the sinner to turn to him with his whole heart, just as he commands this conversion to be made with weeping and mourning. But he commands it only as to affection, because weeping, mourning, fasting, and the like are not always free or possible for everyone, whether on account of natural insensibility or illness. Furthermore, we are commanded to be contrite with our whole heart in the same way that we are to love God. For, as the Tridentine Catechism, n. 37, says: “Just as God is the supreme good among all things to be loved, so sin is the supreme evil among all things men ought to hate. It follows that, for the same reason we profess that God must be loved supremely, we must also be seized by a supreme hatred of sin.” But we are bound to have the greatest love of God only estimatively, or appreciatively, preferring God to all things in love and being willing to relinquish anything rather than God or God’s friendship, even if we do not have the most intense love for him. Therefore we are bound only to hate sin above all evils, even if we do not have supremely intense hatred and sorrow. Hence the Catechism continues: “That God’s love must be preferred to all things, so that it is not permissible to sin even to preserve one’s life, is plainly taught by the Lord’s words,” Matthew 10: “He who loves father or mother more than me, or son or daughter above me, is not worthy of me.… Whoever wishes to save his life will lose it, and whoever loses his life for my sake will find it.” And, as St. Bernard testifies, no limit or measure is prescribed for charity, because the measure of loving God is to love him without measure; so no measure is to be set for detesting sin. The reason is that sorrow is greatest estimatively when we detest something as the greatest of all evils and to be detested above all; and love is greatest appetitively when we love something as the greatest of all goods and to be loved above all. But sorrow in contrition for the sin we have committed must be of this kind, for no evil is greater or worse than mortal sin, and we must esteem detesting it more highly than attaining any good or avoiding any other evil, because it is an evil that turns us away from our ultimate end.

YOU WILL SAY 1: Every sorrow that is greatest appetitively is also greatest intensively, because the more we value a thing lost, the greater the effort with which we grieve its loss; for sorrow over a lost thing arises from valuing and loving its goodness. But contrition is not the greatest sorrow intensively. Therefore it is not greatest appetitively either. — I deny the major premise. Although as a rule the intensive magnitude of sorrow arises from its appetitive magnitude, this is not absolutely necessary. Intensive magnitude of sorrow arises on the side of the subject and the effort by which sorrow is intensified to detest some evil; appetitive magnitude arises on the side of the object, which is hated above all other objects of sorrow. It often happens, however, that we grieve more intensely over something we value less appetitively, and conversely. Even the Saints often grieve inwardly more over the loss of children than over the debt of their sins, as Jacob did, who would not accept consolation over the loss of Joseph. But they do not have greater estimative sorrow over the loss of their children than over their sins; for they would rather have lost their children than mortally offended God. Even with bodily things, we often grieve more over what we esteem less: toothache or a burn on one’s finger is sharper and more intense than a lingering fever or plague, yet the sorrow caused by that fever is greater estimatively. The same is evident in love: an old father often loves his younger son more intensely and tenderly than his firstborn, but values the firstborn more appreciatively, since he wills and does greater goods for him.

YOU WILL SAY 2: A cause is known through its effect. But contrition does not have as great an effect of sorrow as other griefs, for tears are an effect and sign of sorrow; yet contrition does not produce as many tears as most other griefs, such as loss of children or property, disgrace, a wound, and the like. Therefore the sorrow of contrition is not greatest appreciatively. — I distinguish the major premise: known through the proximate and immediate effect, I grant; through a remote and mediate effect, such as tears in relation to sorrow of the soul, I deny it. For bodily changes follow immediately from passions and affections of the sensitive part. Hence tears flow more readily from sensible sorrow, or from a harmful sensible object, than from the spiritual sorrow of contrition. Tears are indeed to be desired in the contrite; for, according to St. Augustine, “There are no inward parts of Christian charity in you if you mourn the body from which the soul has departed, but do not mourn the soul from which God has departed.” The holy penitents also obtained pardon from God with tears. Nevertheless, true contrition can exist without tears, because tears are not in our power. Contrition must therefore be perfect, since the perfection of sorrow of soul is taken from choice, and the perfection of choice in sorrow is taken from our grieving over what is most grievous and detesting the evil most detestable above all, namely sin.

NOTE 1. Theologians agree that contrition must detest absolutely all sins, so that if a penitent took pleasure in any sin, his sorrow and contrition would be wholly useless; for, as St. James says, “Whoever sins in one thing has become guilty of all.” Since contrition is the final disposition for sanctifying grace, which cannot be obtained without man’s perfect conversion to God and turning away from everything that removes him from God, it is therefore necessary that, just as by every mortal sin a man turns away from God, so by contrition he turn his mind away from all sins and consequently detest them. Sacred Scripture teaches the same plainly in various places, especially in Ezekiel, ch. 18, v. 21: “If the wicked,” he says, “do penance for all his sins that he has committed, and keep all my precepts … he shall live, and shall not die.” And v. 28: “For considering and turning himself away from all his iniquities which he has committed, he shall live, and shall not die.” Likewise, v. 30: “Be converted, and do penance for all your iniquities, and iniquity shall not be your ruin.” Hence Pope Innocent II, in the Roman Council, ch. 22, cited in On Penance, dist. 5, ch. 8, says: “We admonish our brother bishops and priests not to allow the souls of the laity to be deceived by false penances and dragged to hell.” It is clear that penance is false when, though many sins are set aside, penance is done for only one, or when it is done for one in such a way that the sinner does not depart from another. Likewise St. Augustine, or whoever is the author of On True and False Penance, ch. 9, found in On Penance, dist. 3, ch. 42: “There are many who regret having sinned, but not wholly, reserving for themselves certain things in which they take pleasure; they do not perceive that the Lord delivered the deaf and mute man from the demon at the same time, thereby teaching us that we are never healed except of all our sins. If he had wished sins to be reserved in part, the man with seven demons could have progressed with one remaining after six were expelled. But he expelled all seven, to teach that all crimes must be cast out together. When he drove out the legion from another man, he left none of them to possess the man who had been freed, showing that even if there are a thousand sins, one must repent of them all.” Reason also supports this: first, when someone detests a sin out of love for God above all—that is, insofar as it is an offense against divine goodness, which he loves above all—it is impossible that an offense of the same kind should not displease him for the same reason wherever it is found, whether formally and explicitly, if the offense is expressly presented, or implicitly and virtually, if it does not specifically come to mind; second, contrition turns toward sins to be detested in the same way as faith toward objects to be believed. But faith cannot turn toward one object while denying another; therefore neither can contrition detest one sin if the penitent takes pleasure in others, since the motive is altogether the same in all. Just as you cannot keep the faith if you deny one article, neither can you have perfect contrition if you take pleasure in any sin. The difficulty, however, is how this detestation must be made: whether perfect contrition requires a person to grieve specifically for each sin one by one, or whether it suffices to detest them all generally.

NOTE 2. The Doctors also agree that if the occasion is pressing, there is no time or opportunity to recall each mortal sin, and clear danger of death is imminent, it suffices for perfect contrition to detest all sins together, conceived confusedly. Sorrow for sins in a confused manner is nothing other than the sorrow a sinner feels because he knows that he has offended God, without any prior examination of conscience; he forms this or a similar act: “I regret having offended God, on account of his supreme goodness and glory, however I may have done so, and I firmly purpose not to sin again and to confess these sins if the opportunity arises.” That this sorrow suffices in such distress is evident; otherwise that man would have no sufficient means of salvation, and it would be false that God so often insists in the divine Scriptures that whenever the sinner groans, he shall live. The difficulty is whether, when time and opportunity are available and a priest is present to whom he can confess, a man is bound to recall each sin distinctly to mind, both as to kind and number, and so grieve for them. On this there are two principal opinions among authors. The first is that of the Halensis, pt. 4, q. 17, memb. 3, a. 2, followed by many recent authors, who affirm that perfect contrition requires the penitent to grieve for each sin individually. The second is the opinion of the Subtle Doctor, d. 15, q. 1, n. 9, who maintains that true penance does not require contrition and satisfaction for each sin one by one, but that it suffices to do so generally and confusedly for absolutely all sins.

NOTE 3. Sorrow or detestation for each sin can occur and be done in two ways. First, a distinct sorrow and detestation may correspond to each sin according to its number or kind, so that there are as many acts of detestation as there are committed sins that come to mind. Second, it may mean that, after examination of conscience and recalling all the sins the penitent wishes to recall, he grieves for them and detests them generally in a single act. The question is whether a penitent, either outside the sacrament of penance or in receiving it, must recall each sin individually and detest each by a distinct act, and whether he ought to grieve more for graver sins and less for lighter sins.

First conclusion. — FOR PERFECT CONTRITION IT IS NOT NECESSARY THAT THE SINNER GRIEVE FOR AND DETEST EACH SIN INDIVIDUALLY. This is the Doctor’s view in the place cited above. Having said that it is not necessarily required for perfect satisfaction that it be individual either in kind or number, he adds: “That it need not be distinct by kind is evident, because contrition can correspond to this sin and to that, and it is the same in kind, especially if the objects are the same in kind. That it need not be distinct by number is evident, because one contrition for several things together in general can correspond to several of them; but then, for satisfaction to be total and undiminished, something of it must suffice for one sin and something for another—something, I say, not as actual integral parts, but as degrees of intensity: it must be of such a degree of intensity that a much lesser degree would suffice for one sin, and the additional degree would suffice for another. Several satisfactions, total or partial, can also correspond to one sin. They can be total because there is no sin that cannot be remitted by contrition alone, and then that alone is total satisfaction. The same sin can also be remitted by less intense contrition, with other punishments making up for the imperfection of the contrition. Intense contrition on one side and that same contrition in a less intense form together with other punishments on the other side differ also in kind, although they are equivalent in divine acceptance. In brief, therefore, a satisfaction does not correspond to each sin as its own in such a way that it corresponds to no other, nor does another correspond to that sin; rather, a satisfaction corresponds to each sin as its own for the time being, though another could be its own. I mean ‘its own for the time being’ either as distinct in itself or as something virtually included in the satisfaction.” So the Doctor says, and these words plainly explain our assertion.

It is proved: First, from the Tridentine Catechism, On Penance, n. 29, where it says: “The faithful must be most earnestly exhorted and admonished to strive to apply a particular sorrow of contrition to each mortal crime. For thus Hezekiah describes contrition when he says:” “I will recall to you all my years in the bitterness of my soul.” For to recall all one’s years is to examine sins individually, so that we may grieve for them from the heart. But we also read in Ezekiel: “If the wicked do penance for all his sins, he shall live.” And Augustine says to the same effect: “Let the sinner consider the kind of crime, its place, time, circumstances, and person.” Lest anyone suppose that these words were spoken as though such things were necessary for the remission of sins, the example is then added: “Yet let the faithful not despair on this account of the supreme goodness and clemency of God. For, since he is most desirous of our salvation, he delays no time in granting pardon, but embraces the sinner with paternal love as soon as he has gathered himself together, detested all his sins, and turned to the Lord, intending later, if opportunity allows, to recall each one to mind and detest it. For thus the Prophet bids us hope when he says: ‘The wickedness of the wicked shall not harm him on whatever day he turns from his wickedness.’” Thus far the Catechism.

It is also proved by reason: nothing should be asserted in a matter of the greatest importance concerning human salvation unless it has some foundation in Sacred Scripture, the Councils, or the holy Fathers. But none of these teaches that it is necessary for perfect contrition that a person regularly recall each sin individually and grieve for it. Therefore, and so on.

Furthermore, perfect contrition sufficient for the remission of sins can be made in an instant; but in an instant a person cannot recall each sin and grieve for it. Therefore, such individual contrition for each sin is not necessary. The minor premise is clear. The major is proved: first, true and perfect contrition does not require a long duration of time, as we said in the preceding question; second, the worst sinners can grieve for their sins and obtain pardon and forgiveness in a short time, as is clear from the example of the thief crucified with Christ the Lord. Hence Pope Celestine writes admirably in his Letter 2, To the Bishops of Gaul, ch. 2: “Let him despair of God’s clemency who does not believe that it can suffice, even in a moment, to help a dying man. The thief hanging on the cross at Christ’s right hand would have lost his reward if an hour of penance had not helped him; in his punishment he repented, and by a single confession he merited, with God’s promise, a dwelling in paradise. Therefore the true conversion to God of those at the point of death must be measured by the mind rather than by time, as the Prophet says: ‘When you groan, then you shall be saved.’” It is no objection that he speaks only of a man at the point of death. For if contrition in that case suffices for salvation, even though instantaneous and presupposing neither recollection nor individual detestation of all sins, why should it not likewise suffice whenever a sinner generally detests his sins because he has offended God?

Finally, when a penitent recalls some sin individually and forms perfect contrition for it, either he is reconciled to God before recalling and grieving for the other sins one by one, or he is not. If he is reconciled, then the other sins are forgiven him, for at least in the ordinary course it is impossible for a man to be at once God’s friend and his enemy. If he is not reconciled, the preceding contrition is useless, since it is frustrated of its effect. This cannot be said, especially since contrition is in itself the final disposition for sanctifying grace, through which we become friends of God and partakers of the divine nature. Therefore true and perfect contrition need not be made for each sin individually.

Nor does the Angelic Doctor oppose this assertion. Although in IIa IIae, q. 114, a. 5, and III, q. 87, a. 1, he seems to require for perfect contrition that the penitent recall each sin to mind, at least afterward, because of the obligation to confess them, even if they had already been remitted through contrition, nevertheless he does not deny that contrition formed generally for sins suffices for the true remission of sin. For in q. 28 of De Veritate, a. 5, ad 4, he says: “All sins agree in turning away from God, by reason of which they impede grace. Hence justification does not require that each sin be thought of at the very moment of justification; it suffices that the sinner think that by his guilt he has turned away from God. Individual recollection, however, must precede or at least follow justification.”

Nor does the Seraphic Doctor contradict this assertion. For when treating the same question in d. 16, pt. 2, a. 2, q. 1, he says: “It must be said that repentance for something is twofold: general and particular. It is general when a person grieves generally for every offense against God that he has committed; it is particular when he grieves for this or that one. I say, therefore, that one ought to repent generally for sins committed through ignorance, and say with the Prophet: ‘The sins of my youth and my ignorances,’ etc. One is not bound to repent of them individually, but is bound to do what lies within one’s power to know and recognize the sins. Sins are committed through ignorance of the law, and then, once the law is known, one recognizes that one has sinned, as, for example, someone who committed fornication without knowing it was a sin. Sins are also committed through ignorance of fact when due care was not taken; then they are made known by the Lord’s revelation, and one is bound to pray that the Lord pardon or reveal them.” Thus the Seraphic Doctor—although he speaks only of sins not known, he sufficiently indicates that he does not oppose our assertion.

YOU WILL OBJECT 1. Various passages of Scripture seem to teach that recalling each sin is necessary to obtain pardon. Thus Psalm 76: “I meditated in the night with my heart, and I was exercised, and I swept my spirit.” In Isaiah 38, King Hezekiah, speaking of contrition, says: “I will recall to you all my years in the bitterness of my soul.” In Ezekiel 8¹: “If the wicked do penance for all his sins, he shall give life to his soul; for considering and turning himself away from all his iniquities, he shall live.” But this consideration is nothing other than recalling each sin to mind. Therefore, and so on. —

I answer with the Tridentine Catechism cited above that these and similar sayings of Scripture indicate that it is indeed useful and most salutary to recall each sin to mind, insofar as this concerns remission of the whole punishment due for sins. For the more a sinner grieves for sins because they offend God’s supreme goodness, the more worthy he becomes to have those sins forgiven him not only as to guilt but also as to punishment.

YOU WILL OBJECT 2. Contrition is the movement of man’s conversion to God, opposed to his turning away that took place through sin. But by every mortal sin a man has turned away from God. Therefore, he must also turn back by an individual act of contrition for each sin, and so on. — I answer that if this argument were valid, it would follow that sin could not be remitted unless as many acts of contrition were made as sins had been committed; thus a sinner guilty of many crimes could not repent of them when danger of death was imminent and pressing. Everyone denies this. Therefore, this argument establishes only that, for contrition to be perfect, it must arise from the motive of charity, which is man’s perfect conversion to God; consequently, through contrition the penitent turns sufficiently away from all sins and toward God.

YOU WILL OBJECT 3. Through contrition the penitent performs an act of justice by which he satisfies God for his sins. Therefore there must be as many acts of contrition as there are sins. Furthermore, contrition is medicine for the soul, by which it must be healed of the wounds of sins; therefore a medicine must be applied for each wound of sin. — Denying both consequences: the first, because by a single satisfaction a sinner can punish and avenge in himself all the sins he has committed, just as a defendant guilty of several murders is said to pay an adequate penalty when he is condemned to death to expiate them. To the second consequence I say that curing an illness does not require several medicines when one is entirely sufficient in itself. A single act of contrition suffices to restore the soul’s health and wash away all sins; therefore it is not necessary to apply several acts of contrition.

Second conclusion. — PERFECT CONTRITION MUST DETEST UNEQUAL SINS UNEQUALLY, AND ONE’S OWN SINS MORE THAN ANOTHER’S. This is the common opinion, especially

The reason for the first part is clear: every act must be conformed and proportioned to its proper motive-object. But unequal sins participate unequally in the motive-object of detestation, which is nothing other than an offense against God. Therefore contrition for graver sins must be greater than for lighter ones.

The second part is also evident: one must detest one’s own sins more than another’s, so that a man ought to be more grieved over a mortal, and even venial, sin committed by himself than over a mortal sin committed by someone else. This is evident because the sin that must be avoided more is the one that must be detested more; but one’s own sin, even if only venial, must be avoided more than another’s mortal sin. St. Augustine teaches this plainly in bk. On Lying, ch. 9, where he says: “If it is asked which of the two a man who could not avoid both ought rather to avoid, I shall answer: his own sin rather than another’s, and his own lighter sin rather than another’s graver one.” From this one may conclude that even the least venial sin, such as a lie told to be helpful, must be detested more than another’s greatest mortal sin.

YOU WILL REPLY: Charity more strongly impels us to do what contributes more to God’s glory. But it contributes more to God’s glory that mortal sin be avoided than venial sin, whoever commits it. Therefore charity inclines us more to commit a venial sin than to allow our neighbor to sin mortally. — I distinguish the major premise: Charity impels us more when both things are directly ordered by God and he himself directs them to his glory, I grant; when something contributes to it only indirectly and accidentally, I deny it. God does not intend that I commit a venial sin in order to prevent my neighbor from committing a mortal one: first, because venial sin is not a means in itself ordered to preventing another’s graver sin, and would therefore be adopted in a disorderly way for such an end; second, because God wills me to love my own holiness, however small and slight, more than another’s, however great it may be. Hence I give greater glory to God when I avoid every sin than if I sinned lightly so that my neighbor would not offend God more gravely; third, although another’s sin is apprehended as a greater evil against God, God is nevertheless understood here and now not to will that I sin venially to avoid my neighbor’s grave sin. Since the law of true friendship altogether inclines us not to displease a friend in what he reasonably and prudently wills, it follows that I may not commit a lighter sin lest my neighbor commit a graver one. Finally, as St. Augustine explains lucidly in the same place: “If we open this way for sins, allowing lesser ones so that others may commit greater ones, everything will enter and reign within broad limits—or rather, without any limit, with every boundary torn down and removed, in infinite space. For once it has been settled that a man must sin less so that another may sin more, our thefts will certainly be used to prevent others’ adulteries; and if some impiety is seen, even worse than incest, we shall be said to commit incest too, if it could be done in such a way that others do not commit that impiety … What is this way of thinking but folly, or rather madness? For I must guard against damnation for my own iniquity, not another’s, whether it is committed in me or in others.”

YOU WILL PRESS: It is permissible to follow the examples of the Saints. But at times they wished to admit lesser sins to prevent graver ones in their neighbor, as is clear from Lot’s example. In Genesis 19 he said to the Sodomites: “I have two daughters who have not known a man; I will bring them out to you, and abuse them as you please, provided you do no harm to these men.” Therefore, and so on. — St. Augustine answers in the same place: “That righteous man, in fear of another’s sins—which cannot defile anyone unless he consents—was so disturbed that he did not consider his own sin, by which he wished to subject his daughters to the lusts of wicked men. When we read these things in the Holy Scriptures, we must not believe that because we think they happened, they must also be done, lest we violate the commandments by following examples indiscriminately. Or because David swore that he would kill Nabal, but in a merciful reconsideration did not do so, shall we say that he is to be imitated by our rashly swearing to do what we later see ought not to be done? Rather, fear drove Lot to wish to prostitute his daughters, just as anger stirred the just David to swear rashly.” Yet it will not be so difficult to excuse Lot, a righteous man, from every sin, as St. Augustine testifies above: “Unless someone should perhaps confine himself to such narrow straits in defending this man as to say that it is better to suffer injury than to inflict it; his guests, however, were not going to inflict injury but to suffer it. The righteous man preferred that his daughters suffer injury rather than his guests, by the right he had as their father, and knowing that they would not sin if this happened, since they would suffer the acts of sinners without consenting to them and thus without personal sin. Indeed, they offered themselves to be violated, though women in place of the male guests, so that their non-prevention of another’s lust would not make them consenting in their own will. Their father did not permit this to be done to himself when those men attempted it, nor did he betray his guests, although the evil would have been less if it had been done to one rather than two. But he resisted as much as he could, lest his own consent stain him; even if lustful fury had prevailed by bodily force, it would not have stained him against his consent. His daughters, however, were not sinning, and he too was not sinning, because he did not incite them to sin if they were violated; rather, he made them endure the sins of others, as if he were offering his servants to be beaten by wicked men, so that his guests would not suffer the injury of murder.” Thus far St. Augustine, excusing Lot’s act from sin because it was only the permitting of a lesser sin to prevent a greater one. It should be carefully observed, however, that he did not simply and absolutely urge the Sodomites to violate his daughters, but spoke comparatively: “Abuse them as you please, provided you do no harm to these men.” As if he said: if you wish to do one or the other, do what is lesser rather than what is greater.

NOTE 1. By the term Attrition theologians commonly mean that detestation and sorrow for sin which is made and conceived from some motive other than God himself, insofar as he is to be loved for his own sake and as supremely good in himself, from whom mortal sin turns us away. Moreover, the Council of Trent assigns a twofold motive for this sorrow, in sess. XIV, ch. 4, where, having distinguished Contrition in general as perfect and imperfect—the former it simply calls Contrition, while the latter it calls Attrition—it immediately adds: Attrition is so called because it is commonly conceived either from consideration of the shamefulness of sin or from fear of hell and punishments, etc. Here the two general motives of this Attrition are assigned, namely, the shamefulness of sin and fear of hell and punishments, to which all other motives can readily be reduced. For the desire for blessedness and fear of losing it are included under fear of hell and punishments; since by the term hell the Council understands not only the punishment of sense, but also the punishment of loss, or the absence of the enjoyment and possession of God, which the sinner would incur eternally if he did not repent and obtain admission to the remission of sin. For to fear the lack of some good is the same as to desire it, and conversely, to wish for the possession of some good is the same as to fear its loss and forfeiture. Hence fear of losing an object entails love of that object, and conversely, love entails fear. Thus the common saying: As great as the love in possessing was, so great is the sorrow in losing. Likewise, every other evil for which we detest sin is included under the shamefulness of sin, such as the mark of disgrace one would incur, not only before mortal men but also before God and the most blessed spirits, as well as the dreadfully disfigured, foul, and horrifying state of a soul corrupted by sin, etc.

NOTE 2. Attrition and Contrition agree in this, that each is sorrow of the mind and detestation for a sin committed, together with a purpose not to sin again. For that is how the Council of Trent defines Contrition in general, sess. XIV, ch. 1, when it says: Contrition, which holds the first place among the penitent’s acts—for it is sorrow and detestation for a sin committed, together with a purpose not to sin again. They also agree in this, that each is sorrow for sin on account of God offended. For Attrition, insofar as it is a means of obtaining remission in the sacrament of penance, must be sorrow for sin with some reference to God. Hence purely human disgrace that one would incur through sin, as well as any punishment insofar as it is inflicted only by a human being, could not be the motive of true and properly so-called Attrition, as Lugo observes, disp. 5, n. 11. For through Attrition a person must turn to God in order to obtain from him remission of sin by virtue of the sacrament of penance. But if one has sorrow for sin only on account of purely human disgrace, or on account of punishment to be inflicted by a human judge, that act is in no way a conversion to God, since it would in no way proceed from love or fear of God, but from fear of a human judge. A person who is moved not by fear or love of God but by fear of a human being in no way gives satisfaction to God, honors God, or prefers God to a creature; for he does not leave sin on account of some perfection he recognizes in God, but on account of the power of a created judge or something similar. Yet every true conversion requires turning away from sin and turning to God, just as sin involved turning away from God and turning to a creature. Therefore, just as turning to a creature was on account of some perfection perceived in that creature, so turning to God must be on account of some perfection of God himself: for example, his power to punish, which we fear; his goodness, which we love; or his superiority, which we obey, etc. Where, then, no perfection of God moves a person, there is no repentance of the kind God requires: namely, that by which a person recognizes something in God on account of which God must not be put second, but rather preferred to a creature. Hence not every shamefulness of sin and fear of punishment is a sufficient motive for Attrition, but only insofar as each has some reference to God—that is, insofar as sin is disobedience, irreverence, ingratitude toward God, or something similar. For all these ground sin’s shamefulness precisely as sin, insofar as it expresses opposition to God. Therefore one who detests sin under this aspect is moved by some excellence of God, in view of which he turns to God and prefers him to the creature whom he previously loved more than God. Third, they agree in this, that each has love of God, as the highest good, annexed to it, at least virtually. For one who truly grieves over having sinned on account of God offended must have love of God, at least virtual love: he grieves over having offended God in precisely the measure that he loves him. Finally, they agree in this, that both sorrow—of Attrition as well as of Contrition—is ordered to obtaining remission of sin through the sacrament of penance, received in fact or by desire.

NOTE 3. Attrition and Contrition differ from one another: first, as to their power and effect. For, the Council of Trent cited above says, Contrition sometimes reconciles a person to God by perfect charity before the sacrament of penance is actually received, provided there is a desire to receive it. Attrition, however, even with a desire to receive the sacrament of penance, does not suffice to obtain remission of sin outside the sacrament of penance, as the Council teaches in the same place, saying that although on its own it cannot lead a sinner to justification without the sacrament of penance, nevertheless it disposes him to obtain the grace of God in the sacrament of penance. Second, they differ in their principle, because Contrition is elicited by the virtue of penance insofar as it has charity annexed to it or is commanded by charity; Attrition, however, proceeds from the virtue of penance insofar as it has the virtue of hope annexed to it. For it sorrows over sin from fear of incurring hell and from fear of losing blessedness. This belongs to the virtue of hope, which, since it has God as its object insofar as he is a good for us and to be possessed by us, also tends toward what opposes and removes that possession, such as the shamefulness of sin and the danger of incurring hell. Third, they differ in their motive: perfect Contrition must be elicited from love of God as the highest good, loved above all things, and from the affection of charity; imperfect Contrition, however, must indeed be elicited from love of God as the highest good, to be loved above all things—not for his own sake, but for ours, or not insofar as he is good for himself, but insofar as he is our good, in whose possession our eternal happiness consists and in whose loss our supreme misery and unhappiness consist. Hence Contrition proceeds from the love of friendship, by which God is loved for his own sake. Attrition, however, proceeds from the love of desire, by which God is loved for our sake and as our good. Hence the love of hope, when compared with the love of charity, can be called imperfect and initial: imperfect, not absolutely, but relatively and comparatively, because its motive is less perfect than charity, which loves God only for his own sake and has no regard to the good of the one who loves; initial, because, as will appear below from St. Augustine, we are advanced and prompted by the love of hope itself and by fear of hell toward the love of charity. Thus this fear and love arising from the affection of hope is, as it were, the seed, first beginning, and initial stage of salvation, when it is conceived under the impulse of the Holy Spirit. For, the Council of Trent cited above says, that fear and love is a gift of God and an impulse of the Holy Spirit, not yet indeed indwelling, but only moving, by which the penitent, helped by it, prepares the way to righteousness.

From these points it is clear that perfect Contrition is not distinguished from imperfect by duration, since prolonged sorrow is not required for perfect Contrition, as we have already said. Moreover, the sorrow of Attrition can last much longer than that of Contrition, since its object is, as it were, perceptible to the senses and affects the mind more powerfully than the object of Contrition. For people are moved more powerfully to flee something by fear of punishment than by love of righteousness. — Nor are Contrition and Attrition distinguished by intensity, since intense sorrow is not required for perfect Contrition: any sorrow, even one elicited at a low degree, is truly an act of Contrition if elicited from the supernatural motive of charity; but greater and lesser degrees do not change the species of a thing. — Finally, Contrition is not distinguished from Attrition on the ground that perfect Contrition is informed by habitual grace and charity, whereas Attrition is not, because it sometimes happens that Attrition is elicited by a person who is just and in a state of grace, while Contrition is produced by a person in a state of sin. Nor is this contradicted by the Council of Trent when it says, sess. XIV, ch. 1: And if it sometimes happens that this Contrition is perfect charity and reconciles a person to God before this sacrament of penance is actually received, etc. For by these words the Council does not mean that Contrition must always be elicited by a person who possesses the habit of charity. Otherwise, it would have said in vain at the beginning of the same chapter that an act of Contrition was necessary at every time for obtaining remission of sins, and that in one who had fallen after baptism it was at last a preparation for remission of sins. For one who possesses habitual charity has already obtained remission of sins, and therefore would be prepared in vain to obtain it. The Council therefore means only that Contrition is deemed perfect when elicited from the motive of charity, in which it differs from imperfect Contrition, which is not elicited from such a motive but only from the motive of hope.

With these points established, two matters remain to be determined in particular in this Question: first, whether sorrow for sins conceived from fear of hell is good and useful for salvation; second, whether Attrition—that is, sorrow elicited from fear of hell and from the affection of hope—suffices for remission of sins when joined to the sacrament of penance.

First conclusion. — ATTRITION, OR SORROW FOR SINS ELICITED FROM FEAR OF HELL OR FROM THE SHAMEFULNESS OF SIN, IS GOOD AND USEFUL FOR SALVATION.

This Conclusion is of faith, determined by the Council of Trent, sess. VI, can. 8, in these words: If anyone says that fear of hell, by which we flee to the mercy of God, grieving over our sins, or abstain from sin, is a sin or makes sinners worse, let him be anathema. And in sess. XIV, ch. 1, it defines that sorrow conceived from fear of hell and punishments, if it excludes the will to sin and is accompanied by hope of pardon, not only does not make a person a hypocrite and a greater sinner, but is also a gift of God and an impulse of the Holy Spirit, not yet indeed indwelling, but only moving, by which the penitent, helped by it, prepares the way to righteousness.

This truth is proved first from Sacred Scripture, which commends servile fear in many places. Thus Proverbs 1: The fear of the Lord is the beginning of Wisdom—an oracle which the Holy Fathers explain as referring to servile fear, for that is what begins wisdom, while filial fear brings it to perfection and completion. Likewise, Ecclesiasticus 2: The fear of the Lord drives out sin, because it disposes one to justification and the expulsion of sin, as St. Augustine, cited below, explains. Similarly, Isaiah 26: We have conceived and have been, as it were, in labor, and have brought forth the spirit; we have not wrought deliverance on earth. There the interpreters of the Septuagint read: From fear of you, O Lord, we conceived and brought forth the spirit of salvation and salutary penance.

The Holy Fathers unanimously teach this very thing, commending and extolling that fear. Thus St. Clement of Alexandria calls it an assistant of faith; St. Ambrose, the rudder of a wavering soul. Tertullian, On the Apparel of Women, ch. 2, says: Fear is the foundation of salvation; presumption is an obstacle to fear. St. Augustine teaches the same in many places, especially in his exposition of Psalm 127, where he distinguishes three kinds of fear: the first is fear of temporal evils, the second fear of hell or eternal punishments, and the third, finally, chaste fear. Concerning the first kind of fear he says: Some fear only for this reason: lest they suffer some evil on earth, lest sickness kill them, lest loss leave them bereft, lest they lose someone dear, lest they lack help, lest they be condemned, imprisoned, or undergo some tribulation. For this reason they fear and tremble. This fear is not yet chaste. Of the second kind he continues: Another person fears not suffering on this earth, but fears hell. The Lord too struck fear in people by this, as you heard when the Gospel was read: “Their worm will not die, and the fire will not be quenched.” People hear these things, and because they will truly befall the wicked, they fear and restrain themselves from sin; they have fear, and through fear they restrain themselves from sin. They fear, indeed, but do not love righteousness. Of the third kind of fear he adds: When through fear they restrain themselves from sin, a habit of righteousness is formed, and what was hard to love begins to grow sweet, and God grows sweet, and a person already begins to live righteously—not because he fears punishments, but because he loves eternity. Fear, then, is driven out by charity, but chaste fear succeeds it. What is this chaste fear? According to it, my brothers, we should understand what was said in Psalm 18: “Blessed are all who fear the Lord, who walk in his ways.” He explains this chaste fear there by comparing a chaste woman with an adulteress: “The chaste woman,” he says, “fears lest her husband depart; the adulteress, lest he come. What if both husbands are away? The adulteress fears he will come; the chaste woman, that he will delay.” Hence he later concludes: “Therefore, my brothers, chaste fear has this character: it comes from love. But that fear which is not yet chaste fears the Lord’s presence and punishments. It does whatever good it does out of fear—not from fear of losing that good, but from fear of suffering that evil. It does not fear losing the embraces of the most beautiful bridegroom, but fears being cast into hell. This fear too is good and useful; it will not last forever and ever, but it is not yet that chaste fear which lasts forever and ever. In what does chaste fear consist? I ask you again something by which you may question yourselves. If God were to come and speak to us in his own voice—although he does not cease speaking through his writings—and say to a person: ‘Do you want to sin? Sin. Do whatever pleases you. Whatever you have loved on earth shall be yours. Whoever has angered you, let him perish; whoever you wish to seize, let him be seized; whoever you wish to beat, let him be beaten; whoever you wish to condemn, let him be condemned; whoever you wish to possess, possess him. Let no one resist you, let no one say to you, “What are you doing?” Let no one say, “Do not do what you wish”; let no one say, “Why did you do it?” Let all those earthly things you coveted abound for you, and live in them not for a time but forever; only you will never see my face.’ My brothers, why do you groan, unless because chaste fear, which lasts forever and ever, has already been born? Why was your heart struck if God were to say, ‘You will never see my face’? Look: you will abound in all this earthly happiness and in every good; temporal goods will overflow in you, you will neither lose nor leave them. What more do you want? Chaste fear would indeed weep, groan, and say: ‘Rather, let all be taken away, so that I may see your face.’ Chaste fear would cry out from the Psalm and say: ‘God of hosts, turn us back, and show us your face, and we shall be saved.’ Chaste fear would cry out from the Psalm and say: ‘One thing I asked of the Lord.’ See how boldly this chaste fear, this true and sincere fear, dares to say: ‘One thing I asked of the Lord; this I shall seek: what? That I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life.’” He says similar things in Sermon 18, On the Words of the Apostle. There, having distinguished this threefold fear in chapters 1 and 5, he finally rejects worldly fear in chapter 7; then, speaking of fear of hell in chapter 8, he writes: What great thing is it to fear punishment? It is a great thing, but to love righteousness is greater. I question you and discover what you are. Look at my spoken question and question yourself in silence. I say to you: overcome by lust, you have a willing partner; why do you not commit adultery? You will answer: “Because I fear hell, I fear the punishment of eternal fire, I fear Christ’s judgment, I fear the company of the devil, lest I be punished by him and burn with him.” What shall I say, that you fear wrongly, as I was saying about the adversary who sought to kill your body? There I rightly said, “You fear wrongly,” because your Lord makes you secure, saying: “Do not fear those who kill the body.” But now, when you say to me, “I fear hell, I fear burning, I fear eternal punishment,” what shall I say? “You fear wrongly”? “You fear in vain”? I do not dare to say so, since the Lord himself, having removed one fear, went on to impose another. He said, after saying, “Do not fear those who kill the body and afterward can do nothing more,” “But fear him who has power to cast both body and soul into the fire of hell. Yes, I tell you, fear him.” Since, then, the Lord has inspired fear, inspired it intensely, and doubled the threat by repeating the word, shall I say, “You fear wrongly”? I will certainly not say that. Fear, then; you fear nothing better, nothing that you ought to fear more. But I ask you: if God did not see you when you act, and no one were to convict you at his judgment, would you do it? Look at yourself. You cannot answer all my questions with words; examine yourself. Would you do it? If you would, then you fear punishment, but do not yet love chastity; you do not yet have charity; you fear in a servile way. It is dread of evil, not yet love of the good. Still, fear, so that this dread may guard you and lead you to love. For this fear by which you fear hell and therefore do not do evil restrains you; it does not let a soul that wants to sin do so. It is a kind of chaste fear, like a tutor. The letter threatens, but grace does not yet help. Still, let this fear guard you while you refrain from doing something out of fear, and let charity come. Let it enter your heart, and as far as charity enters, fear departs. Fear’s task was to prevent you from doing it; charity’s task is to prevent you even from wanting to do it, even if you could do it with impunity. I have told you what you should fear; I have told you what you should desire. — From these passages one may argue as follows: that fear is good which is distinguished from mercenary fear directed toward temporal evils; that fear is good which St. Augustine does not dare call evil, by which a person does not fear in vain, by which one does not sin, which is useful and good, which restrains a person externally from sin—even though it does not let the inner soul that wishes to sin do so—which checks the habit of sinning, which is the beginning of wisdom, and which prepares a place for charity; from it a habit of righteousness is formed, what was hard to love begins to grow sweet, and God grows sweet. Yet Augustine attributes all these things to servile fear. Therefore servile fear is good.

This is confirmed by what he says in Sermon 24, On Time, where he says: When the threatened punishment is feared, one learns to love the promised reward; and so a good life is maintained through fear of punishment. Through a good life a good conscience is acquired, so that through a good conscience no punishment is feared. Therefore, let him who does not wish to fear learn to fear; let him who always wishes to be secure learn to be anxious for a time. For, as John says, “There is no fear in charity, but perfect charity drives out fear.” He spoke truly and rightly. If, then, you do not wish to have fear, first see whether you already have perfect charity, which drives fear out. But if fear is driven out before this perfection, pride puffs up; charity does not build up. For just as hunger in a healthy body is dispelled not by disgust but by food, so in a sound mind fear must be driven out not by vanity but by charity. By these words St. Augustine plainly indicates that fear of failing to attain blessedness, or of incurring hell, can sometimes suffice to exclude every inclination to sin. In this way that fear can be deemed chaste, at least in its initial stage, since by it a person not only avoids sin but filial fear also arises—the fear that proceeds not from hope of reward but from the affection of a person’s goodwill toward God. For this reason that affection is called filial fear: a son obeys his father not because he hopes for some reward from him or fears a punishment to be inflicted, but precisely because he knows that disobedience displeases the father whom he loves; thus, from love of his father, he shuns disobedience, with absolutely no regard for his own advantage.

YOU WILL SAY 1: That fear should not be called good which does not exclude the will to sin; but fear, or sorrow conceived from fear of hell, does not exclude the will to sin. Proof: That sorrow and fear do not exclude the will to sin which virtually and implicitly retain it. But sorrow for sins from fear of hell virtually retains the inclination and will to sin, as St. Augustine teaches very well in Sermon 15 on Psalm 118, where he says: Fear by which one does not love righteousness but fears punishment is servile, because it is carnal. For the will to sin lives on; it appears in action when impunity is available. But when a person believes punishment will follow, it lives in secret; it lives nonetheless. For he would prefer sin to be permitted, and he grieves that the law forbids what he is not permitted to do, because he takes no spiritual delight in its goodness but carnally fears the evil it threatens. But under chaste fear, charity itself—which drives out this fear—fears to sin even if impunity should follow, because charity does not expect impunity to follow when, from love of righteousness, it counts sin itself a punishment. — I DENY the minor premise: although sorrow does not itself include some other motive for hating sins, nevertheless it does not positively exclude every other motive for detesting them. For although the will of one who has Attrition is immediately stirred to avoid sin on account of fear of hell¹, nevertheless it does not rest there, but virtually and mediately tends toward God as its ultimate end. In this way the act of hope immediately and directly tends toward eternal blessedness, or toward God insofar as he is good for the one hoping, but by its power and implicitly is directed toward God in himself as its ultimate end.

YOU WILL PRESS: That is evil in itself which cannot subsist with charity and sanctifying grace. But servile fear, or fear of hell, does not subsist with charity. For St. John says in his First Epistle, ch. 4: There is no fear in charity, but perfect charity drives out fear. Therefore, etc. — I distinguish the major premise: that which cannot subsist with charity on account of its own evil and deformity, which is opposed to charity, I deny; on account of its imperfection, I grant. For, as St. Augustine, cited above, observes very well in his exposition of Psalm 127, there are two kinds of fear which charity drives out. One is fear of temporal things, since some fear only lest they suffer any evil on earth, lest some sickness befall them, or loss or the loss of someone dear, or some tribulation come upon them. The other is fear of hell, by which the Lord frightens people in the Gospel, and on account of which earthly people restrain themselves from sin and thus begin to live righteously and love God. The first fear is always driven out by charity; the latter remains for a time together with charity, especially when charity is not yet perfect. Augustine also teaches this very well in his Tractate 9 on the First Epistle of John: There is no fear in charity—that is, perfect charity—but fear is in charity in its beginning, because the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom. Fear prepares a place for charity, as it were. When charity begins to dwell there, fear is driven out because it prepared a place for charity. The more charity grows, the more fear diminishes; the more charity becomes interior, the more fear is driven out. Greater charity, less fear; less charity, greater fear. If there is no fear, there is no way for charity to enter. A little further down in the same place: There is a fear which charity drives out, and there is a chaste fear which lasts forever and ever. There are people who fear God lest they be sent into hell; this fear introduces charity, but it comes in order to depart. For if you fear God on account of punishments, you do not love him and do not desire good things, but avoid evil things. You correct yourself, you begin to desire good things; when you desire good things, there is in you chaste fear of losing those very good things. Imagine two married women: one wishes to commit adultery but fears her husband may come. She loves wickedness, and her husband’s presence is burdensome to her. The other loves her husband and wishes to defile herself with no impurity of adultery; she longs for her husband’s presence. Each fears, but one fears that her husband may come, the other that he may leave. The one says, “I fear he may condemn me”; the other says, “I fear he may abandon me.” Apply this to the hearts of Christians and see the fear which charity entirely drives out, and the other chaste fear which lasts forever and ever.

YOU WILL OBJECT 2. It is a sin to order a greater good to a lesser; but one who sorrows over sins from fear of damnation alone orders a greater good to a lesser, the corruption of guilt to avoidance of punishment. Therefore he sins. — I distinguish the major premise: to order the greater to the lesser as to the ultimate end, I grant; as to a proximate end, I deny. For God himself orders a greater good to an inferior one, as the Incarnation of Christ to the salvation and glory of human beings. One who sorrows over sins from fear of hell alone orders the greater good to the lesser as to a proximate end, not as to the ultimate end. In this way holy men order sacrifices and prayers to obtain health or some other temporal good from God. Hence, if anyone were so disposed virtually or actually that, if there were no punishment, he would in no way grieve over guilt, this Attrition would not be good, because it would not tend in any way toward God as its ultimate end.

YOU WILL OBJECT 3. What tends toward a creature does not tend toward God as the ultimate end, because no one can have two ultimate ends. But Attrition tends toward a creature as its ultimate end, for everyone who has Attrition but not Contrition remains in sin; Attrition by itself does not justify at all. — I distinguish the major premise: it does not tend toward God effectively, I grant, for no one can effectively desire several ultimate ends; ineffectively, I deny. For otherwise morally good works performed in mortal sin, such as fasting, prayers, and almsgiving, would be mortal sins, because they do not tend effectively toward God as their ultimate end. We have taught the contrary in the treatise On Grace.

YOU WILL OBJECT 1. If servile fear is good, worldly fear will also be good; but the latter is not good, because it makes people evil. Therefore, etc. — I deny the major premise, because worldly fear is fear of a creature, from attachment to which a person does not hesitate to offend God; servile fear is truly fear of God, drawing a person away from sin and guarding him against it. For by it a person fears offending God on account of fear of the punishment that God himself inflicts for sins.

YOU WILL OBJECT 5. An act by which a person sorrows more over punishment than over guilt is evil, because one ought to grieve more over the greater evil than the lesser; guilt is a greater evil than punishment. But Attrition for sins from fear of damnation alone is an act by which a person sorrows more over punishment than guilt, for he sorrows over guilt because of punishment. Yet that on account of which each thing is such is itself more such. Therefore, etc. — I deny the minor premise. For although a servant loves his master for the sake of a wage, and a believer loves God through hope for the sake of receiving glory, it does not follow that the servant loves the wage more than his master, or the believer the reward of glory more than God, whom he always recognizes as the ultimate end. Therefore, although one who has Attrition hates guilt on account of punishment, it does not follow that he hates punishment more than guilt. For the Aristotelian axiom must be understood of that on account of which something else is such as its principal cause, not as its less principal cause. For although a servant loves his master on account of the sustenance he expects from him as a less principal cause, and a believer loves God on account of glory, it does not follow that the servant loves his sustenance more than his master, or the believer glory more than God.

Third conclusion. — ATTRITION CONCEIVED FROM FEAR OF HELL AND FROM THE LOVE OF DESIRE, THAT IS, FROM THE AFFECTION OF HOPE, IS A SUFFICIENT DISPOSITION FOR OBTAINING GRACE IN THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE.

First, this is proved from the Council of Trent, sess. XIV, ch. 1², where, after distinguishing contrition into perfect contrition, which proceeds from charity, and imperfect contrition, which is called attrition, it says: “Since it is commonly conceived either from consideration of the ugliness of sin or from fear of hell and punishments, if it excludes the will to sin, together with hope for forgiveness,” it immediately adds: “That attrition does not make a person a hypocrite or a greater sinner; rather, it is also a gift of God and an impulse of the Holy Spirit, not yet indeed indwelling, but only moving, by which the penitent, aided, prepares the way for himself to righteousness; and although by itself, without the sacrament of penance, it cannot lead to justification, nevertheless it disposes him to obtain the grace of God in the sacrament of penance.” The Council says the same in can. 5. In these words the Council assigns two distinctions between contrition and attrition: one, that attrition tends toward sin from a less noble motive than contrition, namely, from consideration of sin's ugliness or from fear of hell, but not from consideration of God as supremely beloved; the other, that perfect contrition by itself suffices outside the sacrament to obtain remission of sin, provided that the vow to receive it is joined to it, whereas attrition indeed disposes one to obtain that remission through the sacrament, but without actually receiving the sacrament it does not suffice for remission of sin.

YOU WILL REPLY 1: The Council there speaks only of a remote and wholly insufficient disposition, not of a proximate one that prepares a person immediately to obtain justifying grace. — On the contrary, the Council there plainly teaches that attrition conceived from fear of hell, if it excludes the will to sin, truly disposes one to the grace of justification obtained in the sacrament of penance, in the same way as contrition disposes one to it before receiving the sacrament. But contrition disposes proximately and sufficiently to sanctifying grace, and reconciles one to God before priestly absolution is received. Therefore the Council's intention too is that attrition joined to the sacrament should dispose the penitent proximately and sufficiently, and reconcile him to God in the sacrament of penance. Moreover, attrition disposes a person to grace with the sacrament in a different way than it does outside the sacrament, as the Council of Trent teaches; but outside the sacrament it disposes remotely and insufficiently to justification, because, as St. Augustine taught above, fear prepares the way for charity. Therefore, in the Council's understanding, attrition joined to the sacrament disposes proximately to justification. Finally, the Council there especially condemns Luther's error, as it does in sess. VI, can. 8, where it says: “If anyone shall say that fear of hell, by which we flee to God's mercy while grieving over our sins, or abstain from sin, is a sin, or makes sinners worse, let him be anathema.” But Luther taught not only that sorrow arising from fear of hell is evil and makes a person worse and a hypocrite, but also that it is altogether an insufficient preparation for receiving absolution and making communion. For he writes in serm. 2, On Penance: “Contrition (for so he begins) called true inward penance is prepared in two ways: first, by displeasure, recollection, and detestation of sins, by which one, as they say, recalls one's years in the bitterness of one's soul, weighing the gravity, harm, ugliness, and multitude of one's sins; then, by admitting eternal blessedness and the attainment of eternal damnation, and other things that can excite sorrow and grief, in the hope of making satisfaction by good works. But this grief makes a hypocrite, indeed a greater sinner, because one does it only from fear of the precept and grief at loss; and all such people are absolved and admitted to communion unworthily. And if they had to confess freely, with the precept and threats of punishments set aside, they would certainly say that their past life did not displease them, though they are thus compelled to confess that it displeases them. Indeed, the more they are thus contrite from fear of punishment and grief at loss, the more they sin and are attached to their sins, which they are compelled, but do not wish, to hate. This is that contrition which they call non-meritorious outside charity; others call it attrition, disposing proximately to contrition: for so they themselves think, and I call that opinion an error.” These are Luther's words about the first mode of contrition. He describes the other mode of contrition as follows: “Second, (contrition) is prepared by the sight and contemplation of most beautiful righteousness, by which one, meditating on the beauty and form of righteousness, burns with desire for it and is carried away, and begins, with Solomon, to become a lover of wisdom, whose beauty he had seen. This makes one truly penitent, because one acts from love of righteousness, and such people are worthy of absolution.”

YOU WILL REPLY 2: When the Council writes that attrition disposes one to obtain God's grace in the sacrament, it intends only to condemn heretics who, denying the usefulness of attrition's sorrow, said that it makes a person a hypocrite and a greater sinner; it does not intend to settle the controversy among Scholastic theologians about attrition's sufficiency with the sacrament of penance. — Against this, the Council not only shows that attrition's sorrow is good and useful and does not make a person a greater sinner, but also distinctly and expressly signifies that although attrition cannot by itself lead a sinner to justification without the sacrament, nevertheless in the sacrament it disposes him to obtain God's grace; and consequently it declares that attrition in the sacrament has a power it would not have without the sacrament. Here it sufficiently clearly upholds our position and vindicates it from the heretics' calumnies. For after saying that attrition is a good act, conceived under the impulse of the Holy Spirit, and disposes one to obtain God's grace in the sacrament of penance, at the end of the same chapter it concludes: “Wherefore some falsely calumniate Catholic writers, as though they had taught that the sacrament of penance confers grace without any movement on the part of those receiving it; this the Church of God has never taught or held.” But the heretics seized the opportunity to calumniate Catholic writers solely because they thought that attrition arising from fear of punishments was not a good act but an evil one, and made a person a hypocrite. Therefore the Council teaches that attrition conceived from fear of hell and punishments disposes one to obtain God's grace in the sacrament of penance.

YOU WILL PRESS: If the Council had thought that attrition disposes sufficiently to God's grace when joined to the sacrament, it would have said distinctly that attrition disposes “with the sacrament.” But it did not say so; it said only that attrition disposes “in the sacrament,” in order to signify that it disposes remotely and mediately to grace, namely, insofar as it disposes the penitent to receive sacramental absolution and to elicit contrition from God's grace, from which justification then follows immediately. Therefore the Council lends no support at all to our position. — I deny the consequence. In answer to the antecedent, I say that when the Council says attrition disposes one to God's grace “in the sacrament,” it means the same as if it said “with the sacrament.” For when it sets the phrase in the sacrament against without the sacrament, which means the same as separately and apart from the sacrament, when it says that attrition does not lead to justification without the sacrament, it follows that when it also says attrition disposes one to God's grace in the sacrament, it means the same as if it said with the sacrament.

YOU WILL REPLY 3: When the Council says that attrition disposes one to justification in the sacrament, it is not speaking of attrition conceived from fear of punishments, but only of attrition arising from love of God above all things, though imperfect, which is indeed essentially contrition, but imperfect contrition—as the Council itself calls it there, since it divides contrition into perfect and imperfect. — But the person who dreams this is indeed looking for knots in a bulrush and shadows in the sun. First, because the Council asserts that the attrition sufficient to obtain God's grace in the sacrament is the attrition it says is conceived from consideration of hell and fear of punishments. Therefore it is not speaking of attrition that is initial and imperfect love of God. Second, because the Council speaks of the attrition that Luther had taught makes a person a hypocrite and worse. But the attrition Luther speaks of does not proceed from imperfect and incipient charity, but from fear of punishments alone, as is clear from what was said above. Therefore, etc. Third and finally, because the Council says that the attrition which disposes one to grace in the sacrament of penance “is a gift of God and an impulse of the Holy Spirit, not yet indeed indwelling, but moving the soul.” But attrition from love of God above all things, however imperfect, is a movement of the Holy Spirit indwelling the soul. For “he who remains in charity remains in God, and God in him.” Therefore, etc.

Moreover, the Council calls attrition imperfect contrition not merely because of a deficiency in degree, as a boy is called an imperfect man because he has not yet attained the perfection of a man at all; rather, it calls it imperfect because it lacks the essence of contrition, since it is not sorrow for sins arising from the love of friendship with God. So an embryo is an imperfect man because it does not yet have human nature, but is disposed toward it, as we said in the Third Note. This is confirmed: no greater disposition is required to receive grace through the sacrament of penance than to receive it through baptism. But attrition is a sufficient disposition in an adult being baptized to receive justifying grace. Therefore it will also be sufficient in a penitent. The major premise is established, since the reason is the same for the sacrament of penance as for baptism, inasmuch as both are sacraments of the dead. The minor premise is proved by the authority of St. Augustine, who in On Catechizing the Uninstructed, ch. 17 recounts three kinds of people who wish to be Christians and come to baptism. The third kind consists of those who wish to become Christians for the sake of everlasting blessedness and perpetual rest, which is promised to the saints after this life, so that they may not go into eternal fire with the devil, but enter the eternal kingdom with Christ. “He who is such a person,” he says, “is truly a Christian: cautious in every temptation, lest he be corrupted by prosperous circumstances or broken by adversity; moderate and temperate amid an abundance of earthly goods, and strong and patient in tribulations. By making progress he also reaches such a disposition of mind that he loves God more than he fears hell, so that even if God were to say to him, ‘Enjoy carnal delights forever, and sin as much as you wish; you will neither die nor be sent to hell, but only you will not be with me,’ he would shudder and not sin at all—not now to avoid falling into what he feared, but lest he offend the one he loves so much, in whom alone is rest.” In these people there is only attrition concerning the sins of their former life. For if their only motive for attrition is fear of hell, their fear of God is merely servile; they do not yet have filial fear or contrition made perfect by charity, since St. Augustine lists them among those coming to faith and says that they will later reach the point of loving God more than they fear hell. If they were aflame with perfect charity, they would not be on their way to such a state or advancing toward it by making progress; they would already have attained it. But whatever degree of disposition is given suffices for the fruitful reception of baptism, for a person so disposed is called truly Christian, that is, fit to receive the sacrament of baptism, in which the profession of Christian faith is made. Thus in the preceding ch. 16, where the form of a certain prayer or address is given, the catechist congratulates the person who comes to baptism for the rest hoped for after this life, saying: “Thanks be to God, brother; I congratulate you greatly and rejoice on your account, because amid the world's many and very dangerous storms you have thought of true and certain security.” But unless the aforementioned disposition—which is a disposition of attrition—were sufficient for baptism, the person who came to baptism with it would not have thought of certain security. Therefore, since the reason is the same for the sacrament of penance as for baptism, because both are sacraments of the dead—baptism being a sacrament of regeneration, and penance a sacrament of resurrection and restoration—attrition, which is a sufficient disposition for receiving baptism properly, will likewise be sufficient for receiving the sacrament of penance truly and fruitfully.

Finally, this is proved by reason. First, every sacrament of the New Law can immediately effect by itself that for which it was instituted first and in itself, for it acts by the work performed. But the sacrament of penance was instituted in itself to cause first sanctifying grace in a person fallen through sin. Therefore it can produce first sanctifying grace in him. But if attrition did not suffice for that, the sacrament would never produce first grace. For since contrition by itself suffices to produce first grace outside the sacrament, if it were a necessary disposition for the sacrament of penance, grace would in reality have to be produced before that sacrament was received. Therefore, etc. Moreover, a sacrament of the dead, such as penance, does not presuppose in its recipient a formal principle of spiritual life, for it immediately effects that principle. But contrition made perfect by charity is the principle of spiritual life in a person. Therefore the sacrament of penance does not presuppose it as a necessary disposition. Moreover, the sacraments of the New Law are more efficacious than those of the Old Law and consequently require a lesser disposition in the recipient. But the sacraments of the Old Law necessarily required contrition in order to confer first grace on a person who had fallen after circumcision. Therefore penance, which is a sacrament of the New Law, does not presuppose it. It should be added that if perfect contrition were equally necessary in the New Law and the Old, it would follow that remission of sin is far more difficult in the New Law than in the Old. For in the Mosaic Law the act of contrition alone sufficed to obtain it; but in the Gospel Law, in addition to it, confession of all mortal sins according to number and kind would further be required, which certainly seems a very heavy burden. Therefore, so that pardon may appear easier to obtain through the sacraments of the New Law, contrition need not be presupposed for the sacraments of the dead.

All these arguments are confirmed by the censure of the Sacred Faculty of Paris, which it issued on the first of June and the first of July 1638 against certain propositions of Claude Séguenot, a priest of the Oratory, which he had written in his notes on St. Augustine's book On Holy Virginity. Most especially, he had asserted that attrition was not sufficient to obtain remission of sins in the sacrament of penance, but that contrition made perfect by charity was required; and consequently he had added that sacramental absolution was nothing other than a juridical declaration of sin already remitted. The Sacred Faculty noted these propositions in its censure: “The Faculty condemned what he taught concerning the insufficiency of attrition and the absolute necessity of contrition arising from perfect charity for receiving the sacrament of penance, and what he further added and approved concerning absolution, namely, that it is nothing other than a juridical declaration of sin already remitted; and it judged these propositions to be disturbers of the peace of souls, contrary to the common and entirely safe practice of the Church, subversive of the efficacy of the sacrament, and, in addition, rash and erroneous.”

YOU WILL OBJECT 1. True penance requires that the penitent turn to God with his whole heart in order to obtain pardon, and have a new heart. But attrition alone does not accomplish this. Therefore, etc. The major premise is established both from Deuteronomy 4: “When you seek the Lord, you will find him, if indeed you seek him with your whole heart and with all the anguish of your soul”; and from Ezekiel 18: “Make for yourselves a new heart and a new spirit.” The minor premise is also clear: for one who is merely attrite does not seek God with his whole heart and with all the anguish of his soul; nor does attrition make a new heart and a new spirit, because it does not remove the spirit of the old Adam, namely, the inclination to sin, nor introduce the spirit of the new Adam, namely, charity. Therefore, etc. — I distinguish the minor premise: if attrition is without the sacrament, I grant it; if it is joined to the sacrament, I deny it. For the heart will be made new, and God will be sought profitably and sufficiently, when sanctifying grace is conferred on the person, through which he is renewed and recalled to fellowship, union, and friendship with God. As for the authorities from Scripture, I answer that they are to be understood of the penance of the Old Law, and also of the penance of the New Law that is sufficient to obtain remission of sin outside the sacrament. For in the New Law a person is sufficiently reconciled to God by the power of the sacrament of penance when he grieves for his sins and lays aside his will to sin; this indeed is accomplished through attrition, as was said above.

YOU WILL PRESS: The Council of Trent, sess. XIV, ch. 3, teaches that contrition is the matter of the sacrament of penance and that, by God's institution, it is required for remission of sins. In ch. 4 it says: “At every time this movement of contrition was necessary for obtaining pardon of sins.” And in ch. 6 it says that “one who has no contrition is not truly absolved by the sacrament of penance.” Therefore, in the Council's view, attrition does not suffice to obtain pardon of sins even with the sacrament. — I distinguish the antecedent: contrition is required in the general sense, insofar as it is abstracted from perfect and imperfect contrition, I grant it; perfect contrition is required, I deny it. For there the Council teaches that perfect contrition reconciles a person to God through charity before this sacrament is actually received; imperfect contrition, by itself, does not bring the sinner to justification, but only disposes him to obtain God's grace in the sacrament of penance. For the Council says that the contrition required is the kind it defines at the beginning of ch. 4, when it says that it is “sorrow of the mind and detestation of sin, with the purpose of not sinning thereafter.” There, however, contrition is defined in the generic sense, as abstracting from perfect and imperfect contrition, since that definition also applies to attrition, inasmuch as it is sorrow of the mind and detestation of sin, with the purpose of not sinning thereafter.

YOU WILL PRESS: The same Council, sess. VI, ch. 6, when listing the various dispositions presupposed for justification, asserts that a person is disposed toward righteousness not only through acts of faith, fear, and hope, but also through love, from which hatred of sin arises, through the purpose of a new life, and finally through observing the divine commandments. “They are raised to hope,” the Council says, “trusting that God will be propitious to them for Christ's sake; they begin to love him as the source of all righteousness, and are therefore moved against sins by some hatred and detestation—that is, by the penance which must be practiced before baptism; finally, while they purpose to receive baptism, to begin a new life, and to keep the divine commandments.” Here the Council requires incipient love for justification effected through baptism, as is clear from the words, “they begin to love him as the source of righteousness.” Hence, since no lesser disposition is required for justification through penance than for justification through baptism, the adversaries think it plainly follows from this testimony of Trent that incipient and imperfect charity is necessarily required for justification through penance. — I answer that in this passage the Council is speaking of justification effected outside the sacrament and through the mere vow and desire for baptism; hence it says expressly, “while they purpose to receive baptism,” etc. Certainly in that case we do not deny that love of God is necessary, as is also contrition formed by charity. But it is different with justification effected in the sacrament. For the same Council, sess. VI, ch. 6, speaking of penance in adult sinners as preceding baptism, says: “People are moved against sins by some hatred and detestation—that is, by the penance which must be practiced before baptism.” Yet contrition is not absolutely necessary for practicing this penance before baptism, as we said above from St. Augustine. Or I say that the Council is to be understood as speaking of that initial love which we said above belongs to the virtue of hope. This love is called initial because, for the most part, our justification begins from this love; and, as I said above, we are often led from this love to that perfect love which belongs to the virtue of charity.

YOU WILL PRESS: The initial love which the Council of Trent there requires as a disposition for justification is the love by which a sinner begins to love God “as the source of all righteousness.” But this love belongs to the virtue of charity, not to the virtue of hope. Therefore, etc. — I deny the minor premise: for the love of which the Council speaks there is love of God as the source of our righteousness, or justification, which we expect from him as promised through Christ. For that reason it says that God is to be loved not as righteousness in himself, but “as the source of righteousness,” namely, the righteousness he conveys to us. Thus it signifies that he is to be loved as one who is good to us and bestows good things on us. Nor should the word all trouble us. For by that word the Council of Trent means only that sinners begin to love God as the source of any justification whatsoever and of all supernatural dispositions toward justification, since no one can be justified except through God's grace, as is plainly clear from the preceding ch. of the Council of Trent and from our treatise On Grace.

YOU WILL INSIST: The love required by the Council in the passage just cited is a love that, joined to the sacrament of penance, can effect the sinner's conversion. But no love of God can effect this conversion unless it belongs to the virtue of charity. Therefore the love of which the Council speaks there belongs to the virtue of charity. — I answer by denying the minor premise; for love belonging to the virtue of hope suffices for this, and I assume it is joined to the aforementioned attrition, which we hold can effect this conversion, not by itself alone, but when it is joined to the sacrament of baptism or the sacrament of penance, as the cited Council of Trent teaches quite clearly, sess. XIV, ch. 4, where it expressly teaches: “Imperfect contrition, which is called attrition, and which is commonly conceived either from consideration of the ugliness of sin or from fear of hell and punishments, if it excludes the will to sin, together with hope of pardon, not only does not make a person a hypocrite or a greater sinner, but is also a gift of God and an impulse of the Holy Spirit; and although by itself, without the sacrament of penance, it cannot lead a sinner to justification, it nevertheless disposes him to obtain God's grace in the sacrament.” Note the expression that it “disposes him in the sacrament itself,” and indeed “to obtain grace”; for these words make it readily clear that through this attrition, as distinguished from contrition made perfect by charity, grace can be conferred if attrition is joined to the sacrament of penance.

YOU WILL INSIST AGAIN: The same Council, sess. XIV, ch. 6, speaking of the penitent, says: “He ought not to flatter himself so much on account of his faith that, even if he has no contrition, or the priest lacks the intention to act seriously and truly absolve, he should nevertheless think that on account of his faith alone he has truly been absolved before God.” Therefore perfect contrition is absolutely required for remission of sin, and attrition does not suffice even in the sacrament. — I deny the consequence. For there the Council intends only to refute the innovators of the last century, who taught that a person need not be prepared to obtain remission of sins by any movement of the will or by any sorrow or feeling of penance, but that faith alone—or rather, a sure trust and confidence that remission of sins had been obtained—suffices. Hence, after the words cited, the Council adds: “For faith without penance would not bring about any remission of sins.” But attrition is a kind of penance. Therefore the Council understands contrition there in the generic sense to be entirely necessary: one or the other of its two kinds must absolutely be present, either imperfect contrition, called attrition, or perfect contrition, simply and strictly so called. For outside the sacrament perfect contrition is required; in the sacrament imperfect contrition, called attrition, suffices.

YOU WILL OBJECT 2. St. Augustine, who teaches in many places that the person who merely abstains from sins out of fear of punishment and penalty repents in vain, says, for example, in ep. 144, addressed to Anastasius: “He thinks in vain that he has conquered sin, who does not sin from fear of punishment. For even if the business of evil desire is not carried out outwardly, the evil desire itself is still within; and who is found innocent before God who wishes to do what is forbidden if what he fears were removed? Thus the one who wishes to do what is not permitted, but does not do it only because it cannot be done with impunity, is guilty in his very will. For, as far as he himself is concerned, he would rather there were no righteousness forbidding and punishing sins. And surely, if he would rather there were no righteousness, who would doubt that he would take it away if he could? But how is someone just if he is such an enemy of righteousness that, were he given the power, he would abolish it when it commands, so as not to endure it when it threatens or judges? Therefore he who does not sin from fear of punishment is an enemy of righteousness.” Similarly, in bk. On Nature and Grace, ch. 57, he says: “He is under the law who feels that he abstains from the act of sin out of fear of the punishment threatened by the law, not from love of righteousness; for he is not yet free, nor is he free from the will to sin: for in that very will he is guilty.” Further, in bk. I of Against Two Letters of the Pelagians, ch. 9, he says: “He sins inwardly in his very will who does not sin willingly, but out of fear.” And in bk. I, ch. 4: “He who does the commandments from fear of punishment undoubtedly does them unwillingly, and thus does not do them in his mind; and thus in his very will he is inwardly guilty, where he himself, who receives him, looks.” Finally, St. Augustine, in tract. 9 on the Letter of John, as we mentioned above, and also in Psalm 127, says that those who cease from sins out of fear of punishment or hell are like the adulterous woman who refrains from adultery only out of fear of her husband, lest she be discovered by him and severely punished, while always retaining the intention to commit adultery. Therefore, in St. Augustine's view, attrition insofar as it is fear arising from fear of hell does not remove the will to sin, and consequently is not sufficient with the sacrament to obtain remission of sins. — I distinguish the consequence: attrition arising from fear of hell, which moves someone merely to avoid sins because of fear of temporal evils alone and love of earthly goods, does not remove the will to sin, I grant; attrition conceived from fear of hell, by which a person fears being deprived of God and on account of this fear abstains from sin, I deny. For this fear of hell is ordered to God as the ultimate end, and as such it removes the will to sin, because it is ordered to an end contrary to the end of sin. For the one who fears in this way does not place his ultimate end in avoiding punishment itself, but in the deprivation and loss of God. Since God cannot be possessed by a sinner, one who abstains from sin out of this fear proposes to himself an ultimate end contrary to that of sin. But when the sinner regards avoidance of punishment in this way, he does not retain the will to sin. — Hence servile fear in one who ceases from sin through fear of punishment can be of two kinds. One is when the entire reason, both final and moving or motivating, for restraining oneself from sins is flight from punishment: that is, when a person is so disposed that he avoids evil solely because of the punishment intended for that evil of sin, and places his ultimate end in avoiding punishment or in the good contrary to that punishment. Many call this fear servilely serving, because it is characteristic of servants and slaves who abstain from what is forbidden out of no love for their master, but only from fear of punishment, so that they always have an inclination to do what is forbidden unless they would have to undergo punishment. Such fear always leaves in the will some formal or virtual effect of sinning. The other kind of servile fear is when the one who fears does not establish his ultimate end in avoiding such punishment, but freely tends toward an honorable good. Such is the fear of attrition: although it is directed immediately toward avoiding the punishment one fears, nevertheless mediately it tends toward a further end, namely, eternal beatitude and God as the supreme good. One who fears in this way does not wish to be deprived of God, but to enjoy him; consequently, one moved by this fear does not retain the will to sin. From these points one may infer that whenever St. Augustine says that those who cease from sin through fear remain guilty in their inclination and will, he is speaking of the fear that terrifies those who rest content in avoiding punishment and serve servilely and obey the divine commandments; this fear is indeed evil, because through it people rest in love of self as their ultimate end. He is not speaking of the fear that goes beyond avoidance of punishment and tends toward possession of God as the supreme good, whose loss one fears; such is the fear of attrition.

YOU WILL PRESS: St. Augustine also teaches in many places that no one can be justified without love of God. Thus in serm. 7, On Time: “No one does true penance unless there is hatred of sin and love of God”; and in bk. XXI of The City of God, ch. 27: “If they do not cease from sin by having charity, which does not act perversely, it profits them nothing.” Hence the author of On True and False Penance says: without love, no one ever found grace or obtained pardon. This is also confirmed by Scripture. For St. Paul expressly says in 1 Corinthians 13: “Without charity I am nothing; if I have not charity, it profits me nothing.” And in 1 John 3: “He who does not love remains in death.” Therefore, even with the sacrament, attrition conceived from fear of hell does not suffice for justification; rather, an affection and movement of charity are required. — I distinguish the antecedent: love of God, whether actual or habitual, accompanying or subsequent, is required, I grant; actual love alone, preceding justification, I deny. It is indeed true that a sinner cannot be justified without love of God and habitual charity, which is not distinct from sanctifying grace. But it is not absolutely required that actual and formal love of God precede justification itself when the sinner obtains it through the sacrament. Rather, habitual love of God, or charity, suffices; it is the form of this justification, through which the sinner becomes God's friend and acceptable to him. Thus the Doctor resolves these authorities in d. 14, q. 2, n. 20, where he says: “The statement that no one obtains pardon without the love of God may be understood there of pardon not merely as penance, but as the end of penance. And so we understand it when we say that pardon is acquired through penance: that pardon is when someone is accepted into divine friendship through grace.” Or I say that St. Augustine is speaking of love of God arising not from the affection of charity, but from the affection of hope. The fear of hell leads to this love of God. For no one truly attrite fears hell except insofar as it deprives one of the eternal possession of God; consequently, when a person grieves for sins because of fear of hell, that grief tends toward love of God. For he would not fear hell unless it deprived him of possession of God, nor would he grieve over such deprivation unless he loved God; for the grief of losing is as great as the love of possessing. Therefore true attrition always has joined to it love of God arising from the affection of hope, if not explicitly and formally, at least virtually and implicitly.

YOU WILL SAY 3: Since the Gospel Law is far superior to the Old Law, it also requires a more excellent remedy for obtaining remission of sin; for where the law is more perfect, the means for obtaining grace ought to be more excellent. But contrition strictly so called, which was the necessary means for obtaining grace in the Old Law, is a more excellent means than attrition, or imperfect contrition. Therefore this too is necessary in the New Law. — I distinguish the minor premise: perfect contrition is more excellent than attrition if considered according to its entity, I grant; if considered in its order and relation to the end and effect, and in the way it procures the end and effect in the sacrament of penance, I deny. For although the nature and power of contrition are more excellent and perfect than attrition when considered in itself—hence outside the sacrament contrition can lead to justification, which attrition cannot—nevertheless attrition joined to the sacrament can dispose or lead a person to righteousness and grace ultimately just as much as contrition itself can; that is, it can lead to the very grace which the sacrament of penance produces in penitents by the work performed. For this grace requires only that the obstacle of an evil will turned toward a creature be removed; attrition joined to the sacrament can accomplish this. Hence it is said to be equivalent to the ultimate disposition, although contrition strictly so called disposes more perfectly to the grace produced in the sacrament by the work of the one acting, because a person's merit is greater than attrition.

YOU WILL SAY 4: Most of the more eminent theologians, and especially the Seraphic Doctor and the Subtle Doctor, openly teach that attrition does not suffice, together with the sacrament, for the remission of sin, because it does not exclude the will to sin. For first, the Seraphic Doctor, in In III Sent., d. 34, p. 2, a. 1, says: It must be said that, without doubt, servile fear is a gift of the Holy Spirit. The reason is that, just as it is a gift of God to know, or to believe, future punishments, because there is in this a certain illumination and direction of the heart, so it is a gift of God to flee and fear those eternal punishments, because from such a gift come a certain softening of the heart, a restraint of the flow of concupiscence, and in this a certain rectification. And because of that fear a person ceases from committing sins, although he does not cease altogether from the will to sin. For he adds: The will to sin remains in habit and root, because the deformity is present in the one who fears. Likewise, the Subtle Doctor, in In IV Sent., d. 20, q. un., where he treats of penance that takes place only at life’s end and shows it to be doubtful, proves this by various arguments, but especially by the authority of St. Augustine, who says: One must not only fear the judge, but love him; for he seeks freedom of choice, so that one may grieve over the sins committed, not act under compulsion: charity, not fear. Therefore, according to their opinion, sorrow conceived from fear of hell does not suffice for the remission of sin. — I deny the antecedent, and concerning the Seraphic Doctor I say that by “the will to sin,” which he says remains in habit and root, he understands nothing other than habitual sin, that is, the stain that remains after a past actual sin and is not expelled by servile fear unless the sacrament is added; consequently, he says that it is removed by the sacrament rather than by that fear. For in q. 2 he says: “When I say ‘servile fear,’ I mean two things: namely, the very habit by which the soul is disposed to fear God as one who punishes those who transgress; and, further, the name ‘servitude’ conveys the deformity of sin. This deformity is joined to that habit in the same person, on account of which that person is called a slave of sin and the fear existing in him is called servile fear. In the same way, when I say that someone fears servilely, I mean two things: namely, both the act proceeding from that habit and the servitude or deformity of the will that accompanies it.

But it must be observed that this can be the case in two ways: either that deformity of the will accompanies the fear with respect to the habit; in this way someone may fear servilely and yet not sin by that movement. For if, from thinking of punishments, someone abhors offending God, this can occur without actual sin. But if the deformity accompanies the fear in the act, then, although fearing is not evil in itself, it is corrupted by reason of the deformity actually attached to it: as when someone fears punishments and, in fearing, grieves that such punishments are inflicted for guilt, yet in act also desires to sin if that punishment were absent. In this way, servile fear is sin and evil. But this is not always the case when someone is moved by servile fear; otherwise, by using that gift a person would distance himself from grace rather than be prepared for it, which is plainly false. So says the Seraphic Doctor, who therefore concludes: “And so it must be granted that the use of servile fear can be good, although it is not good with the goodness of merit, but rather with the goodness of preparing or directing one toward merit, which coexists with sin. Hence the arguments that show this must also be granted.” Accordingly, in answer to the first objection, he says that what is first objected on the other side—that in servile fear the will to sin lives, and that one grieves over what the law forbids—is to be understood as follows: Augustine’s statement does not mean that whenever someone fears, he always grieves in act, or likewise that the will to sin is always in act; rather, he says this because it remains in habit and root. Although the will has been deformed by sin and evil love reigns in it, it can nevertheless sometimes be moved to some good works in their general character, or by reason of a circumstance, through some freely given grace, without committing guilt, etc. Therefore, the Seraphic Doctor holds that sorrow for sin on account of fear of hell, or attrition, can exclude every actual affection and will to sin, although in itself it does not suffice to remove habitual sin—that is, the deformity and stain that remain in the sinner after the sinful act has passed—unless that attrition is joined to the sacrament of penance. — I answer the Subtle Doctor that first it can be said that he is treating chiefly of penance that suffices for salvation outside the sacrament, for which, without doubt, the love of God, or perfect contrition of charity, is required. Second, it can be said that, if the subject is penance, that is, sorrow of penance joined to the sacrament of penance, the words one must not only fear the judge, but love him signify not so much an affection of charity as one of hope, as can be gathered from what follows: Let the penitent, then, not fear punishment, but be anxious for glory. To be anxious for glory is nothing other than to fear the loss of the blessedness of the eternal inheritance, which is lost through sin and restored through penance. Moreover, this anxiety of the soul cannot arise from any other virtue than the virtue of hope; consequently, neither St. Augustine nor the Subtle Doctor understands by love anything other than an affection of hope. Attrition has this affection, since no one can fear hell through attrition without also having a voluntary displeasure at having sinned, because by sinning he lost his right to the inheritance promised to him. Such displeasure is directed toward God, at least mediately, since God is the objective beatitude that the penitent hopes to recover. That the Doctor is speaking of no other sorrow than attrition, when a penitent receives the sacrament of penance at life’s end, is clear from what he adds at n. 7, where from the foregoing he concludes: A sick person already brought to this point should be urged to labor, according to his ability, toward ordered penance: that is, notwithstanding his sorrow or fear, to use reason as far as he can, to strive to have voluntary displeasure for the proper end, namely, on account of God, and to resist the evil inclination of habit and present pleasures; and to labor to feel as much displeasure as he can, even if it is brief. And, lest he be cast into despair, God’s mercy must be raised up before him by proposing the example of that thief whose penance was late, but whose pardon was not late. By these words the Doctor would undoubtedly be setting out a true, though diminished and imperfect, account and teaching, unless he is to be understood as wishing that love of friendship, or perfect charity, is required for justification outside the sacrament, whereas with the sacrament love of desire, or a less perfect love, suffices. He proves that it is difficult for a sinner at life’s end to have such charity, or rather hope, because, as he said just before, He who until then was unrepentant does not seem then to draw a new displeasure from himself except through fear of the punishment at hand; for it is presumed, etc. And he rightly said “it is presumed,” because the contrary can occur. Nevertheless, it is greatly to be feared that such a sinner still retains an inward satisfaction in his past sins, as well as a conditional affection for sinning if the danger of death were not imminent, etc.

YOU WILL PRESS: For penance to be salutary, it must be voluntary without qualification. But, according to the Doctor in the same place, penance performed at life’s end from fear of hell alone is not voluntary without qualification. Therefore, etc. The major premise is established. The Doctor explains the minor premise as follows at n. 5: For displeasure to be effective and ordered, it must be duly qualified by its circumstances, and especially by the circumstance of its end and of its principal active source, so that it is voluntary on account of God. But it is difficult then to have an act qualified by these circumstances, because he who until then was unrepentant does not seem then to draw a new displeasure from himself except through fear of the punishment at hand. For it is presumed that if he were removed from the punishment, as before, he would not draw that displeasure from himself, just as he did not before. Moreover, something simply involuntary seems to be the cause of this displeasure, for the expectation of death seems to cause this displeasure, while that expectation is involuntary. And what is done only on the supposition of something involuntary is not voluntary without qualification, just as someone does not cast his goods into the sea entirely voluntarily if he does so only on the supposition of some danger that he does not wish to face. At least, what is done only in this way through something involuntary is not very pleasing to another, nor does it seem to have been done very much out of love for him. So says the Doctor. By this he signifies that penance conceived from fear of death is not voluntary or pleasing to God. Therefore penance conceived on account of fear of hell will be voluntary to a much lesser degree, because fear of hell is far greater than fear of death: hell brings a greater harm than natural death, and consequently inspires greater fear, further diminishing the element of voluntariness in someone who regrets having sinned for such a reason. — I answer that “involuntary” is said in three ways: first, of that which has nothing at all of the voluntary; second, of that which has more of the voluntary than of the involuntary; third, of that which is done independently of every circumstance that would impede the act. What is done from fear, even if it is not voluntary without qualification in the first sense, is nevertheless voluntary without qualification in the second sense. The Doctor, moreover, must be understood as speaking of the voluntary in the first sense, as can be gathered from the example he gives and repeats of the person who throws goods into the sea. For that throwing is voluntary without qualification, since it proceeds from an effective will to throw such goods, with sufficient knowledge of the circumstances, although a certain element of the involuntary is mixed into it, and it occurs against the ineffective inclination of that will, which would not want such danger to exist, so that the goods might remain safe and intact. Hence the throwing is voluntary without qualification on the part of the agent, although it is not voluntary without qualification on the part of the object, but is done only because of the circumstance of imminent danger. Therefore displeasure at sin out of fear of hell must also be called voluntary without qualification in this second sense; nevertheless, it is involuntary in a qualified sense, not because of a simple satisfaction in sins or an affection for sinning if the danger of hell were absent—for this conditional will would be sinful, because its object is evil. Rather, it is called involuntary in a qualified sense because of the rejection of that danger, which the penitent certainly would not want to be present. But simply and absolutely he is displeased by his sins, not only external but also internal; otherwise the sinner could not escape the imminent danger of hell. Hence there is a great difference between throwing goods into the sea and attrition. For someone to escape the imminent danger of shipwreck, it suffices to throw the goods overboard; but to escape hell, it is absolutely necessary to detest all sins, not only external ones but also internal ones. Hence someone can escape the danger of shipwreck even while having this conditional will not to throw the goods overboard unless danger presses. But a person with attrition cannot have this conditional affection of not detesting sins unless hell were imminent, because he cannot escape the danger of hell unless he excludes every affection for sin altogether. Nor is it an objection that in the same place the Doctor adds that such detestation, which has something involuntary mixed into it, is not very pleasing and acceptable to God. For I grant that attrition in itself, and apart from the sacrament, is not very acceptable to God and cannot restore the sinner to God’s grace. That this is the Doctor’s opinion is clear from what he teaches in d. 14, q. 4, n. 7, where, speaking of the remission of a sin committed after baptism through the sacrament and without the sacrament, he says that when someone is justified through the sacrament, he receives its effect, namely penitential grace: Not indeed by merit, he says, because the interior disposition was not sufficient by way of merit, but by virtue of God’s agreement to assist his sacrament toward the effect for which he instituted the sacrament. Otherwise it would not be clear how the sacrament of penance could be a second plank, if one could never recover through it, precisely as a sacrament, the second grace that had been lost, but only through attrition as a prior disposition and through contrition as a completing disposition. Therefore, in the Doctor’s view, attrition can suffice together with the sacrament for justification, even if in itself it is little acceptable and pleasing to God.

Corollaries. — From these points it follows first that, for attrition to suffice together with the sacrament for justification, it must be supernatural. For the Council of Trent defines it in this way, sess. XIV, ch. 4, where it says: Attrition not only does not make a person a hypocrite or a greater sinner, but is also a gift of God and an impulse of the Holy Spirit. Hence, in sess. VI, can. 3, it defines: If anyone says that a person can believe, hope, or repent, as is required in order that the grace of justification be conferred on him, without the prevenient inspiration of the Holy Spirit and his help, let him be anathema. The sacred oracles of Scripture also bear witness to this, since God attributes man’s penance to himself. Thus, in Ezekiel 36: I will take from you your heart of stone and give you a heart of flesh. And in Lamentations 5: Turn us, O Lord, to yourself, and we shall be turned. Hence in Luke 22: The Lord turned and looked upon Peter.... and Peter went out and wept bitterly. St. Ambrose interprets these words as follows: “Those upon whom Jesus looks weep for their offense. Peter denied Christ and did not weep, because the Lord had not looked upon him; he denied him a second time and did not weep, because the Lord had not yet looked upon him; he denied him a third time, Jesus looked upon him, and he wept most bitterly.” Accordingly, the Second Council of Orange, can. 4, decrees that through the infusion and operation of the Holy Spirit it comes about in us not only that we are cleansed from sin, but also that we will to be cleansed. But the will to be cleansed from sin is attrition or contrition. Therefore it holds that attrition cannot be salutary unless it is conceived with God’s supernatural help.

YOU WILL SAY 1: Attrition conceived by the powers of nature, such as fear of the punishments of hell that we believe on divine faith, is supernatural, since it is conceived from a supernatural motive. But supernatural attrition suffices for the remission of sin. Therefore, etc. — I distinguish the major premise: supernatural objectively only, and materially, as is the faith by which heretics believe the divine Trinity and the Incarnation of the Word, I grant; formally, by reason of its formal object, and efficiently, through the influx of the cause producing attrition, of the kind required for the grace that remits sin, I deny.

YOU WILL SAY 2: Absolute detestation of sins, not merely hypothetical and ineffective detestation, suffices for the remission of sin. But attrition conceived by the powers of nature can be an effective and absolute detestation of sins. Therefore, etc. — I distinguish the major premise: if it comes from God’s grace, I grant; from nature, I deny. For according to the Second Council of Orange, can. 7: Whoever affirms that by the rigor of nature a person can choose anything pertaining to salvation without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit is deceived by a heretical spirit, not understanding the voice of God in the Gospel, who says: “Without me you can do nothing.”

YOU WILL SAY 3: The Subtle Doctor, in In IV Sent., d. 14, q. 2, n. 14, expressly teaches that sorrow for sins conceived by the powers of nature suffices to obtain remission of sin. Therefore, he does not hold that attrition must necessarily be supernatural. The antecedent is evident: for, treating of sorrow that precedes the remission of sin as a necessary disposition, he says: “For understanding this, it must be known that a sinner living in sins can, in the way stated in the preceding question, a. 1, concerning sin’s remaining after the act, by natural powers with the common influx consider the sin committed as an offense against God, as against the divine law, as turning one away from God, as preventing one from obtaining reward, and as bringing punishment upon one, and under many such aspects. The will can detest that sin, thus considered, under one or several of those aspects, and that movement can continue and intensify before the infusion of grace. This detestation can also be fully qualified by the morally required circumstances. For it is not plausible that, because of this sin that remains, every act concerning the sin committed must be deficient in some moral circumstance. This movement is called attrition, and it is a disposition, or a merit of congruity, toward the deletion of mortal sin, which follows at the last instant of some period during which this attrition has lasted.” So says the Doctor. From this it is clear that he wishes the will, by its own powers and without any special help of God, to be able to elicit an act of penance that is ultimately dispositive for grace. — I deny the antecedent, as well as the two consequences. Concerning the Doctor’s authority, I say that by “by natural powers with the common influx” he does not mean an act elicited by the powers of nature themselves and without any supernatural help, but an unformed act—that is, one not informed by charity and habitual grace. For there the Doctor is asking whether a prior unformed disposition suffices for the remission of sins. He says at n. 13: “Concerning the second main point, namely, whether repentance as an act of virtue is required for the deletion of sin, I say: first, not as the act of one determinate virtue; second, not as the act of just any generated virtue, whichever one; and third, if it is required as an act simply and perfectly qualified by its circumstances, is it required as formed, or does an unformed act suffice?” To this last question he answers: “Concerning the third point, I say that the requirement of some human act for the deletion of sin can be understood in two ways: either as a prior disposition or as a concomitant one. In the first way, an unformed act suffices; indeed it is always unformed, because a disposition prior to the deletion of sin is always without grace and charity, and only through the inherence and inclination of charity toward the act is the act called formed. In the second way, I say that a formed act is required, for at the instant in which sin is deleted, charity is present; and consequently, if an act is required as concomitant, it is required as formed.” This is the Doctor’s statement. From this it is clear that when he says at the following n. 14 that the intellect can consider sin as an offense against God by natural powers with the common influx, and that the will can detest sin considered in this way, by “by natural powers” he excludes only habitual grace, not prevenient and concomitant actual grace, which elsewhere he asserts to be necessary for true penance and justification—especially in In I Sent., d. 44, n. 1, where he says that every sinner can be saved: Because, he says, God can anticipate him with his grace, etc. And in d. 20, q. un., he says that it is the work of God to inspire a person with fruitful penance. And in d. 22, a. 2, he says that God gives grace sooner for rising again on account of extinguished merits, etc. Indeed, in this very d. 14, q. 2, n. 20, the Doctor makes this same point quite plainly. For, answering the authorities he had himself raised—that charity is necessary for the remission of sin—he says: All these authorities have one answer, because penance, whether an act or a virtue (that is, a habit), is not true with respect to attaining the end (extrinsic) of penance without charity; and this is what the second authority says concerning fruitful penance. For penance, taken absolutely, can indeed arise from the natural powers of a person, but it is not fruitful—that is, it does not bear fruit—until it is fruitful at the last instant. The Doctor would contradict himself if at n. 14 he asserted that fruitful penance can arise from natural powers. Therefore it is not plausible that by “by natural powers” he excludes the help of actual or concomitant grace; he means only that, for true attrition, insofar as it is the necessary disposition together with the sacrament of penance for receiving justification, it is not required that the act proceed from habitual sanctifying grace.

COLLECT SECOND: Attrition, when the power of the sacrament is added, can become contrition equivalently, since it obtains the same effect that contrition would have outside the sacrament. In this sense the Doctor, d. 4³, q. 2, n. 15, teaches that attrition can become contrition without a change, when grace comes, for he says: “Although the same movement against sin remains in its natural and moral being, which was previously attrition, at that instant it becomes contrition, because at that instant it is concomitant with grace, and thus is a formed act, since it has charity with it, which is the form of the act, as we are speaking here. Nevertheless, one must distinguish the aspects of nature between the act as such in its natural and moral being, charity, and the act as formed. For in the first aspect of nature there is an act of this kind; in the second, charity; and in the third, an act formed by charity, which now inclines and inheres. Thus attrition becomes contrition without any real change in the act itself.” That is, an unformed act becomes a formed act. For the Doctor does not mean that attrition, which is detestation of sin from the motive of hope, can become contrition, or detestation of sin from the motive of charity. Hence it is easy to understand what the same Doctor intends in In IV Sent., d. 14, q. 4, n. 9, when he says: “I grant that before a worthy reception of penance, one must be raised up either simply, in which case sin is not deleted through the sacrament of penance, but the grace that was present is increased; or raised up in a qualified way, namely, so as to have some displeasure for sins and a purpose of avoiding them thereafter, and to be willing to receive the sacrament of penance, in which attrition becomes contrition. That is, in which, or through which, that imperfect or partial displeasure confers sanctifying grace, which perfect contrition of charity would have conferred without the sacrament. Attrition, then, becomes contrition in the sacrament equivalently, or with respect to its effect, not with respect to its entity.”

COLLECT THIRD: Attrition must extend to absolutely all mortal sins, because one mortal sin cannot be remitted without another. Consequently, since attrition is necessary for the remission of mortal sin, it is also necessary that the attrition required for this sacrament be directed toward all mortal sins, without exception; and that the penitent, who is disposing himself in this sacrament so as to obtain pardon, detest all mortal sins at least in a general and virtual way, and reject every affection for them.

Whether attrition must also be directed toward all venial sins is not agreed among theologians: many affirm this, while the others deny it. The negative opinion nevertheless seems more probable to me, both because a penitent need not be sorry for those sins that he is not required to confess; but to obtain pardon in the sacrament of penance it is not necessary to confess venial sins, as the Council of Trent teaches, sess. XIV, ch. 5. After saying that all mortal sins that come to mind must necessarily be confessed, it adds: Not venial sins, by which we are not excluded from the grace of God and into which we fall more frequently, although it is right and useful to mention them in confession, without any presumption, as the practice of devout people shows. Yet they can be omitted without guilt and expiated by many other remedies. And secondly, because one venial sin can be remitted without another, and consequently it is not necessary for someone to form attrition for each one; rather, it suffices to grieve over some of them, so that this sorrow is the necessary matter for the celebration of this sacrament.

YOU WILL SAY 1: Someone who is not sorry for all the venial sins he has confessed is proposing as matter for the sacrament of penance something that truly cannot be its matter. Therefore, far from being able to obtain pardon, he instead commits a new sin. The antecedent is evident: for that is the matter of the sacrament of penance which must be loosed by priestly absolution, just as that is the matter of the sacrament of the Eucharist which must be consecrated by the words of consecration. Therefore, just as someone would sin gravely by presenting a paper host together with wheat hosts to be consecrated, so too someone would sin gravely by mentioning in confession some venial sins for which he is not sorry, because for want of sorrow he would present as matter something that truly cannot be its matter. — I deny the antecedent: for someone who discloses in confession some venial sins for which he is not sorry does not propose them as matter for the sacrament of penance. He merely sets out such venial sins along with those for which he is sorry, either to have greater humility and shame as a result, or to give his confessor a clearer knowledge of his conscience, just as he is accustomed to disclose vicious habits, occasions of sinning, and temptations that arise. Hence, in proving the antecedent I deny the parity. The reason for the difference is that a paper host cannot be presented at Mass together with wheat hosts except to be consecrated and as matter capable of transubstantiation, which it is not. But it is not necessary to propose as matter for the sacrament all the venial sins that we disclose in confession. We are not required to confess them; rather, we mention them for our own humility and shame and to disclose more fully to the priest knowledge of our condition, in order to receive counsel. In the same way, we praiseworthily disclose in confession to the priest our natural inclinations, occasions, temptations, and the like, which are not sins.

YOU WILL SAY 2: Someone who is not contrite for all the venial sins he discloses in confession makes the form of absolution false and the sacrament partly null and false, insofar as he deprives it of suitable matter for absolution and its proper effect. Therefore, he sins most gravely. — I deny the antecedent: for the meaning of this form, I absolve you from your sins, is “from those that you confessed with sorrow and a due purpose.” Therefore the sacrament is not partly null, because nothing necessary for its validity and fruit is lacking if the penitent has confessed one venial sin, even though it does not have as great an effect as it could have if he were sorry for each one. Hence the penitent should be advised, when he makes an examination of conscience in preparation for confession and recalls each sin he has committed, to elicit sorrow and detestation upon recalling each one as well, so that he may be disposed more effectively and better to receive the effect of the sacrament.

COLLECT FOURTH: It is most salutary for the sorrow that ordinarily comes through attrition to precede confession. For someone who is contrite for his sins declares them far more clearly and carefully, and also with greater devotion of soul and preparation for grace and sacramental absolution. Nevertheless, it is not absolutely necessary for that movement and affection of sorrow to precede confession, as is clear from the common practice of the faithful, who consider that they have duly received sacramental absolution, provided that they have attrition before receiving it. Hence, after hearing the penitents’ sins, confessors exhort them to be sorry for them, with a purpose not to sin again in the future. But this would be useless, and this practice would tend to the penitent’s own harm and to irreverence toward the sacrament, if this sorrow had necessarily to precede the confession being made. Therefore, etc.

Nevertheless, it is necessary that the sorrow of attrition itself come before sacramental absolution. For sacramental absolution is given in the form of a judicial sentence, and such a sentence necessarily presupposes the accused person’s accusation. But because that accusation is voluntary, it must be accompanied—or at least followed—by sorrow on the penitent’s part, as a prior disposition. Therefore the priest cannot absolve the penitent unless the penitent has first declared his sins by confession and has grieved over those sins. This is especially so because the sentence reconciles the sinner with God; consequently, the penitent must be ready and disposed to return to God’s grace. But that return cannot take place unless the sinner is engaged with, and detests, those very things that had been the cause of his turning away from God. This detestation occurs by way of contrition or attrition. Therefore that movement and affection of sorrow must necessarily come before sacramental absolution. From this it follows that whenever anyone confesses sins without such sorrow, absolution is given invalidly, and that person must confess those sins again.

COLLECT FINALLY: Attrition can be defined as follows: Attrition is sorrow and detestation of the soul for sins committed, with a purpose not to sin thereafter, and with hope for and a petition for pardon, conceived from a supernatural motive, either from fear of hell or from the ugliness of sin, together with some love of God belonging to the virtue of hope. All the parts of this definition, or description, are established by what has been said. First, it says sorrow and detestation of the soul for sins committed, with a purpose not to sin thereafter. In these features attrition agrees with perfect contrition, which likewise has the same characteristics. It adds with hope for and a petition for pardon: for someone who is duly contrite hopes to obtain pardon from God and entreats him for it. It then says conceived from a supernatural motive: for someone who grieved over sins for a purely natural motive would not have a sufficient disposition to obtain pardon and sanctifying grace. The remaining words are added to distinguish attrition itself from perfect contrition, which likewise has hope of obtaining pardon and is conceived from a supernatural motive, but solely from the affection of charity and the love of God for his own sake.

The term “confession” properly signifies the private or public, voluntary or compelled declaration and disclosure of something either secret or unknown. Hence Scripture distinguishes three kinds of confession: one is confession of profession, another of praise, and the third of accusation. The first is that by which someone publicly and steadfastly professes some truth, especially one pertaining to the glory of God. Thus the Lord Jesus says, Matthew 10: Everyone who confesses me before men, I too will confess before my Father. Hence the Apostle calls the profession of faith a confession, when he says in Romans 10: With the heart one believes unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation. Thus those who freely profess faith in the Lord Jesus are accustomed to be called Confessors. Second, it is taken to mean praise, or thanksgiving; and so to confess God is to praise Him. Thus Psalm 117: Give praise to the Lord, for He is good. In Matthew 11 and Luke 10, the Lord Jesus, addressing the divine Father, says: I confess to You, Father, Lord of heaven and earth. Third, it signifies the disclosure and declaration of sins; thus Psalm 31: I will confess my iniquity against myself to the Lord. Matthew 3¹: Every region around the Jordan went out, and they were baptized by him in the Jordan, confessing their sins. James 5: Confess your sins to one another. St. Augustine aptly observes these things in Psalm 29: Confession, he says, is twofold: either of sin or of praise. When things go badly for us, in tribulations we confess our sins. When they go well, in the exaltation of righteousness we confess praise to God. Let us not be without confession. And in Psalm 94: In Scripture, confession is understood in two ways: there is confession of praise, which pertains to man; and confession of one who groans, which pertains to the penance of the one confessing. For people confess when they praise God; they confess when they accuse themselves, and the tongue has done nothing more worthy. I truly think that these are the very vows of which it is said in the Psalm: “I will pay You my vows, which my lips have distinguished.” And in Sermon 8, On the Words of the Lord, expounding these words of the Lord Jesus, I confess to You, Father, etc., he says: If I confess, Christ said, from whom all sin is far removed, confession belongs not only to the sinner but sometimes also to one who praises. Therefore we confess either by praising God or by accusing ourselves. Both confessions are devout: whether you rebuke yourself, since you are not without sin, or praise Him, who cannot have sin. — Confession of sins is again twofold: one is made to God, the other to a human being. The first is that by which, acknowledging our sins, we pour out our hearts before God, confessing and detesting them; for this, the speech of the heart is sufficient, because God searches hearts. It pertains, however, more to contrition than to confession. Of this the Royal Prophet says: I have made my offense known to You; I said: “I will confess my iniquity against myself to the Lord.” Confession made to a human being is that by which we disclose our sins to someone with our lips or by another outward sign. — This in turn is twofold: sacramental and non-sacramental. The latter is various: one kind is civil confession, by which a person confesses sins before judges. Thus Joshua addressed Achan: Give glory to God, and confess, and tell me what you have done. Joshua 7. Another is confession for reconciliation, made to appease a neighbor and reconcile him to us if he has been injured by our fault. Another is consolatory, by which we pour our sins into another’s bosom, in order to receive consolation from him. A final kind is for counsel, by which we confess our sins to an educated and wise man, so that we may be instructed by his words to subdue and correct them. — Heretics admit all these kinds of confession. Sacramental confession is the accusation of one’s sins to a priest who has authority, so that through him they may be remitted by the power of the keys. Among the Greeks it is called Exomologesis, a name that has also been adopted among the Latins, although this word has been used for the whole action of penance, and not merely for the accusation of one’s own offense.

Among sacred and ecclesiastical authors, however, “confession” is sometimes used not only to signify the disclosure of one’s own offense, but also the whole action of penance, or satisfaction, as Tertullian most aptly explains in book On Penance, chapter 9. Having said, “Confession of offenses relieves as much as concealment aggravates; for confession is the plan of satisfaction, concealment of obstinacy,” he adds a little later: “This act, which is more often expressed by the Greek word Exomologesis, is confession: by it we confess our offense to the Lord, not as though He were unaware of it, but because satisfaction is ordered through confession, penance arises from confession, and God is appeased by penance. Accordingly, Exomologesis is a discipline of prostrating and humbling a person, enjoining a conversion that entices mercy. It also prescribes the very manner of dress and food: to lie in sackcloth and ashes, to obscure the body with filth, to cast down the soul with afflictions, and to alter by sorrowful treatment those things in which one has sinned; as for food and drink, to know them as pure, not for the stomach, of course, but for the soul; often, moreover, to nourish prayers with fasts, to groan, weep, and moan day and night to the Lord your God, to prostrate oneself before priests, to kneel before God’s beloved, and to enjoin all the brethren to act as ambassadors for one’s supplication. All this is Exomologesis: that it may commend penance, honor the Lord through fear of danger, and, by its very confession in the sinner’s place, serve in place of God’s indignation; and that by temporal affliction it may not merely frustrate but wipe away eternal punishments. Thus, when it casts a person down, it relieves him all the more; when it makes him squalid, it renders him all the cleaner; when it accuses, it excuses; when it condemns, it absolves. To the extent that you have not spared yourself, believe that God will spare you.”

Furthermore, Tertullian first reveals the great dignity and power of confession, and how desirable and admirable its fruit is, in chapter 8 of On Penance: “Confession of offenses relieves as much as concealment aggravates.” A little later, at the beginning of chapter 9, he says: “Exomologesis is that by which we confess our offense to the Lord, not as though He were unaware of it, but because satisfaction is ordered through confession, penance arises from confession, and God is appeased by penance.” Then he inveighs at length against the shame of publicly confessing one’s crimes; but he draws his chief argument from the usefulness of confession and the harm of silence: “Where penance must be done, misery ceases, because it has become salutary. It is miserable to be cut with an axe and cauterized, and to be tormented by the biting of some powder. Yet treatments that heal by their unpleasantness excuse their own harshness by the benefit of the cure, and commend the present injury for the sake of the benefit to come.” Later he refutes another objection of theirs: “What if, besides the shame which they consider a potion, they also fear harm to the body’s well-being?” etc. Origen, in Homily 3 on Leviticus, demonstrates the power of confession with these two scriptural testimonies: First declare your iniquities, that you may be justified. Psalm 31: I said, “I will declare my injustice against myself,” and You remitted the impiety of my heart. From these he immediately concludes: See, then, that to declare one’s sin merits the remission of sin. For when the devil is forestalled in accusing us, he will no longer be able to accuse us. And if we ourselves become our own accusers, it will benefit us unto salvation. In Homily 17, interpreting the same passage from the Psalm, he adds: For if we do this and disclose our sins not only to God but also to those who can heal our wounds and sins, our sins will be erased, etc. Chrysostom likewise says in Homily 20 on Genesis: He who does this, if he wishes to hasten to confess his crimes and show them to the physician as an ulcer, and to tell everything carefully, will easily amend his sins. For confession of past things is absolution from offenses.

St. Pacian, in his Exhortation to Penance, writes at length against those who were restrained by shame from declaring their sins: Will the sinner fear and blush, and by present shame merit eternal life, yet conceal his badly covered wounds from the Lord who offers His hands? Does he have anything to blush about before Him whom he injures, etc.? And therefore he who does not conceal his sins from his brethren is absolved, aided by the tears of the Church and the prayers of Christ. St. Ambrose, in Epistle 3, often tries to turn sinners away from the shame of confessing their crimes, as from a great obstacle to obtaining salvation, and at last concludes: He therefore healed those in whom he found a simple and pure confession, with nothing malicious, nothing deceitful. At the beginning of his exposition of Psalm 37 he says: A shamefaced confession greatly assists the accused, and by our shame we lessen the penalty which we cannot overcome by defense. But in chapter 10 of book On Penance, pressing the same point against the shame of confession, he urges: Do you then disdain to do this in the Church, to beseech God, to seek the patronage of the holy people to intercede with God for you, where there is nothing that ought to cause shame except not confessing, when all are sinners together; where the more humble man is more praiseworthy, and the more abased man more just? He explains the foundation of this power in book 2 of On Cain and Abel, chapter 9: Confession shortens punishment. Hence, in secular courts, those who deny are tortured on the rack, and the judge is moved by a certain compassion for the one who confesses. There is a certain shame in sins, and to confess a crime is part of penance; not to shift the guilt but to acknowledge it mitigates the judge. The shame of the accused moves him, while the obstinacy of those who deny provokes him. And in Sermon 10 on Psalm 118: You have learned that the heart must be cleansed; learn how you may cleanse it. A legitimate means of justification cleanses this spring, namely, confession of sins. Thus that tax collector who acknowledged his own sins left the temple more justified than the Pharisee. St. Augustine says in Homily 12 of the Fifty Homilies: Our God, because He is kind and merciful, wills us to confess these things in this age, lest we afterward be put to shame for them in the future. For if we confess, He spares; if we acknowledge, He forgives. And in his exposition of Psalm 66: He demands confession in order to set the humble free. He condemns the one who does not confess in order to punish the proud. Be sorrowful before you confess; once you have confessed, rejoice, for you will now be healed. For the conscience of the one confessing had gathered pus, and the abscess had swollen; it tormented you and would not let you rest. The physician applies the fomentations of words and sometimes cuts; in correction he applies the healing iron to suffering. Acknowledge the physician’s hand; confess, and see, let all the pus flow out in confession. Rejoice now, be glad now: what remains will be easily healed.

The other holy Fathers say similar things, as will become clear in the course of this Section; from them it is evident how highly this sacramental accusation of sins must be esteemed, and how all Christians ought to value it. Nevertheless, since heretics are such good and fair-minded haters and opponents, it should be no surprise that they assail this salutary confession in every way. First, in Session VIII of the Council of Constance, this seventh article of Wycliffe’s stands condemned: If a man has been duly contrite, all external confession is superfluous for him. In Session XV, the book of that same Wycliffe and of John Hus is condemned, in which one reads: It is grave and alarming for a priest to hear the confession of the people in the manner used by the Latins. Second, Luther, in his Disputation on Confession and the Sacrament of the Eucharist, distinguishes three kinds of confession: the first is confession of faith, which we make to God; the second is of charity, which is made to one’s neighbor; the third, he says, is auricular confession, which the Pope has commanded and which is made before a priest: God did not command it, but the Pope compelled people to it. Yet in the same place he teaches that this very auricular confession is good for two reasons: first, because in confession the penitent hears the words of absolution, spoken to him alone from the mouth of a minister of the Church—by which words he seems to teach that a minister’s absolution is declarative, not practical; second, because the penitent receives counsel and consolation from such confession. The same Luther has this in book On the Babylonian Captivity: Confession and satisfaction have been made into an excellent workshop of profit. And below: Secret confession, as now practiced, although it cannot be proved from Scripture, nevertheless pleases me wonderfully and is useful, indeed necessary; I would not want it not to exist. Indeed, I rejoice that it exists in the Church of Christ, since it is the sole remedy for afflicted consciences. I detest only that this confession has been turned into a tyranny and an exposition of the pontiffs. In the eighth assertion of the Proposition he says: Tell me, where is it commanded that venial sins be confessed to a priest? By what right, by what authority of Scripture, can the Pope command venial sins to pertain to confession? “And below: That you cannot know all mortal sins is most evident.” In the ninth assertion of the Proposition: Thus have those most bloody² things, which have hitherto tormented so many wretched consciences with examinations of every single sin, since they have no support of their own—not even in the whole tyrannical sway of that Scripture—imposed these unbearable burdens on people.

The Augsburg Confession teaches that private absolution ought to be retained in the Churches, although in confession it is not necessary to make an enumeration of offenses, since, as it thinks, an enumeration of all offenses is impossible, in accordance with the saying: Who understands offenses?

Calvin, in book 3 of the Institutes, chapter 3, § 4, says On confession: There has always been a great dispute about confession between the Canonists and scholastic theologians: the latter contending that confession is commanded by divine precept, the former protesting that it is prescribed only by ecclesiastical constitutions. In that controversy the theologians’ remarkable impudence appeared: they both corrupted passages of Scripture and wrested from them by force what they cited in support of their position. He adds in § 7: I wonder with what face they dared contend that confession, of which they speak, is of divine law. We admit indeed that its use is very ancient, but their own annals also relate how easily we could prove that formerly it was free, and certainly that no law or constitution concerning it had been established before the time of Innocent III. And in § 17: By this accusation their souls, who were moved by some sense of God, were tormented with more than cruelty.

The Confession of Faith of the Calvinists, article 24, holds that auricular confession is a human invention by which a yoke is imposed on consciences. The other followers of Calvin agree. Peter Martyr says so in his Commonplaces, paragraphs 25, 27, and 28. Wolfgang, however, in his Commonplaces, says: We assert that the Papist confession which they call auricular is neither of divine law, nor was it in ecclesiastical use in the times of the Apostles and the Fathers who followed them, nor does it contribute to the remission of sins. Antonius de Dominis, in book 5 of The Ecclesiastical Republic, chapter 7, no. 43, distinguishes many kinds of confession, and teaches that there is one by which sins are subjected to the keys of the Church; he says this is free to a person, and that the just are bound to it by no divine or human law, since the remedy for sin lies in interior penance, which alone can suffice to obtain remission from God.

Against all these errors we must fight in the following Questions. The first will disclose whether confession is necessary by natural and divine law; the second, whether and when it is to be made by ecclesiastical law; the third, how it ought to be made; the fourth, who is its minister.

NOTE 1. As we have already said elsewhere, with respect to the administration and reception of the sacraments, one can distinguish a twofold necessity: one of means, the other of precept. Those sacraments are called necessary by a necessity of means without which salvation cannot be obtained, because they positively conduce to attaining salvation itself. Thus baptism is altogether necessary for every human being, without exception, for salvation, either in reality or in desire; so too is the sacrament of penance necessary for an adult who, after baptism, has fallen into mortal sin, because this sacrament, received in reality or in desire, positively conduces to first grace, without which salvation cannot be obtained at all. Those things, however, are called necessary by precept which are prescribed by a special ordinance of God. This necessity is itself twofold: one arising from the institution and precept of Christ the Lord, the other from the ordinance and precept of the Church. The present discussion concerns both: for the question is whether confession is necessary by necessity of means and of precept, and whether this is by natural or positive law.

NOTE 2. From the Subtle Doctor, In I Sent., d. 17, nn. 3 and 4: just as among speculative things there are certain principles whose truth is known from their terms to every intellect that apprehends those terms, and consequently the truth is also known of what is evidently inferred from such known principles, so among practical or actionable things there are first practical principles known from their terms, as well as conclusions inferred from them—for example, that God is to be loved and worshipped, and that no injury is to be inflicted or done to him. “Hence,” says the Doctor, “strictly speaking, nothing is other than of the law of nature except a principle or a demonstrated conclusion. Yet, by extending the term, something is sometimes said to be of the law of nature when it is a practical truth consonant with the principles and conclusions of the law of nature, so much so that everyone at once recognizes that it belongs to that law. From this it is clear that Gratian does not speak correctly of the right of the law of nature when he wishes those things in the Scripture of the Old or New Testament to be of the law of nature: for not all of them are practical principles known from their terms, nor demonstrated practical conclusions, nor truths evidently consonant with such principles and conclusions. He must therefore be interpreted as extending natural law to law posited by the Author of nature, as distinguished from positive law made by someone who is not the author of nature.” Hence three grades of natural law may be distinguished: in the first are practical principles known from their terms; in the second are conclusions evidently drawn from such principles; and in the third, finally, are propositions that do indeed conform to practical principles but are not evidently inferred from them. The question, then, is whether confession and the accusation of sins belong to natural law in one of these three ways.

NOTE 3. Positive divine law is founded especially on the divine precepts written in the sacred Scripture of both the Old and New Testaments. Such were the legal ceremonies to be observed in the Old Law by God’s precept; such too are the divine sacraments of the New Testament, which Christians must frequent, instituted by Christ the Lord and handed down to us through the Apostles. “For whatever,” says the Doctor, n. 4, “is contained in Scripture for the time when it is to be observed, and yet is neither known from its terms, demonstrable from truths known in that way, nor evidently consonant with such truths, is purely of positive divine law. Such are all the ceremonies of the Jews for the time of that law, and those of Christians for the time of our law. For it is neither known from its terms, nor demonstrated, nor evidently consonant with such truths that God is to be worshipped by the immolation of beasts under the Old Law at every time, or that he is to be worshipped by our ceremonies, such as the offering of the Eucharist or the singing of psalms, although these are consonant with the law of nature in that they are not contrary to it. This is also clear because what belongs to the law of nature, whether properly or by extension, is always uniform; such ceremonies are not, but differed according to the time of the other law.” So the Doctor. Ecclesiastical law, however, is that founded chiefly on the pronouncements of councils and decrees of the supreme pontiffs, with the approval and reception of the whole Church. For, says the Doctor, the Church has instituted many things to secure greater propriety in conduct and greater reverence in receiving and administering the sacraments; all these belong to positive ecclesiastical law.

Hence a threefold obligation to do something arises: either from natural law, from divine law and precept, or from ecclesiastical law and precept. The present Question will concern natural and divine law; the next will concern ecclesiastical law.

First conclusion. — SACRAMENTAL CONFESSION OF SINS IS NOT REQUIRED BY NATURAL LAW. So the Doctor, d. 17, n. 5. “I say,” he says, “that one is not bound by a precept of the law of nature to confess the sin in question, since this obligation would then have applied in the state or time of every law, which is false: it did not apply in the state of innocence, nor in the state of the Mosaic Law.” As though he said: if people were bound by natural law to make confession, they would have had to do so in the time of every law. But this is false, since the obligation to make such confession did not apply in the state of innocence or under the Mosaic Law, much less in the state before that law, after the first man’s fall. Therefore, and so forth.

Next, from St. Isidore, Etymologies, bk. 5, ch. 4: “Natural law is the same among all people and common to all nations, since it is found everywhere not by any enactment but by an instinct of nature.” Likewise Cicero, On Invention, bk. 2, says: “Natural law is what opinion did not generate, but a certain inborn force implanted.” Confession is not of this kind: it is not common among all nations, nor is it implanted by any force of nature. For the sacraments are above the dictate of natural reason: they are professions of faith and consequently must be proportionate to it. But faith is above the knowledge of natural reason; consequently, confession is not required by natural law.

Finally, the Doctor says, n. 8, it is not known to belong to the law of nature that one person is the judge of another, especially concerning a hidden sin, since a person ought to judge only what is manifest: a human being judges by appearances, but God looks into the heart. Consequently, it is likewise not naturally known that one person must reveal a hidden sin to another. Add that the confession to be made must be of a kind corresponding to the power to absolve the confessed sin. But that power does not proceed from natural law, nor is it common to every person; it comes from positive divine law, and pertains to the necessity and administration of the sacrament. Hence it was granted to the Apostles by Christ, John 20: “Whose sins you forgive”; therefore, and so forth.

YOU WILL OBJECT 1. Adam, Cain, and Job were subject to no other right or law than the law of nature; yet they were bound to make confession, for Adam and Cain are reproached for not having confessed their sin. Adam, indeed: for the gloss, explaining Genesis 1, “Adam, where are you?” says: “It is the voice of one reproaching and seeking a confession.” Cain likewise is condemned because, when God asked him in Genesis 4, “Where is Abel your brother?”, he answered impudently, “I do not know; am I my brother’s keeper?” Finally, Job says in ch. 13: “If I have hidden my sin as a man, and concealed my iniquity in my bosom”; therefore, and so forth.

I distinguish the minor premise: they were bound to make sacramental confession to another person, I deny; to profess their sins before God with humility of spirit and contrition, I grant. Hence Adam was condemned because, the Doctor says, n. 6, Adam ought not to have concealed his sin from God, for he is the Judge to whom every sin is manifest, and before whom every guilty person ought to acknowledge sin. The Lord required this confession from him, which he not only failed to make but excused his sin, laying it at the woman’s door when he said, “The woman whom you gave me as a companion,” and so forth. Hence this does not establish that under that law confession had to be made to a human being, even though it had to be made to God when he reproved him. So the Doctor. The same must be said of Cain and of Job’s text: for this most holy man speaks not of making sins known before human beings, but of declaring them before God, by which one professes oneself a sinner before God and begs his pardon. Thus St. Gregory, Moralia, bk. 22, ch. 9: “It is a mark of true humility both for each person to recognize his own iniquity and, once recognized, to disclose it in confession; but contrary to the customary vice of the human race are both committing sin in hiding it and concealing it once committed, and multiplying it by defending it once exposed. For we derive these traits of wickedness from the fall of the first man, from which we drew the very root of guilt.”

YOU WILL OBJECT 2. Precepts common to the Old and New Laws belong to the law of nature. But the precept of confession is common to both: to the Mosaic Law, for in Leviticus 16 Aaron and his sons are bound by God’s command to confess the sins of the children of Israel. For of the priest offering the goat it is said: “With both hands placed upon its head, let him confess all the iniquities of the children of Israel, and all their offenses and sins.” Likewise in Joshua 7 Joshua says to Achan: “My son, give glory to the Lord God of Israel, confess, and tell me what you have done; do not hide it.” Hence Proverbs 18 says: “The just person is first to accuse himself”; therefore, and so forth. — I distinguish the major premise: things common to both laws in the same manner, I grant; in different manners, I deny. Although confession of sin was prescribed in some respect in the Mosaic Law, it was not prescribed in the same way as in the evangelical Law. “For,” the Doctor says, n. 6, “in the whole Mosaic Law the confession of which we speak was not made; confession was made to God alone concerning hidden sins, while confession was made concerning certain public faults and observance of the legal rites, and by each person when he offered a sacrifice for such an offense. The priest’s general confession for the people was: ‘We have acted unjustly; we have sinned,’ and the like. In this way the priest’s public confession was a certain preparation for the people to ask God’s mercy, just as now in the Church, by this confession of which we speak, we confess that we have sinned and ask mercy for ourselves and for all the people.” So the Doctor. Hence all the confessions made under the Old Law were not sacramental, but merely private or public declarations of sin, made either before God to obtain pardon or before a legitimate judge to establish a judgment concerning a crime committed; just as Achan was questioned by Joshua so that he might acknowledge the crime he had committed, in order that a judicial sentence might be passed concerning it.

YOU WILL OBJECT 3. Every conclusion that follows from natural principles belongs to natural law. But this conclusion, “a person is bound to confess his sins to another person,” is drawn from natural principles; therefore, it belongs to natural law. The major premise is clear from what was said in the first Note. The minor premise is proved: these principles are naturally known: every guilty person is to be judged by another and not by himself, because no one should be judge in his own case. But one cannot be judged by another unless one is accused before that person; nor can one be accused before him, especially of a hidden sin, unless the guilty person himself confesses that offense. Therefore, from these principles known by natural reason and consonant with the law of nature, it follows evidently that a person ought to confess his sin to another, by whom he may be judged. — The Doctor replies, n. 7, by granting that these principles are known by the light of nature, or at least are very consonant with a proposition known by natural light, namely, that the guilty person must be judged: for no offense should remain unpunished in the universe if there is a just Ruler of the universe, which is naturally known. It is likewise known that the guilty person must be judged by another; but it is not naturally known who that other is, except God. Hence, in every state after the Fall, all the just who had faith that God was the just Ruler of the universe, after sinning against God’s law, confessed their sins to God and asked him for remission, knowing that without such remission he, as a just judge, would exact vengeance for that sin. But it is not naturally known that a person must accuse himself to another human being, especially concerning hidden sins. “For,” the Doctor says, n. 8, “no person can be judge of another person’s sin except as a minister of the supreme Judge. But in this capacity—that is, as a minister of the Judge in avenging or punishing a sin committed—it has been granted more to each person with respect to himself than to one person with respect to another. For God has entrusted each person to be God’s minister in avenging his own sin, by inflicting discipline and sorrow on himself for that sin; it is not similarly known that he granted this to anyone with respect to another. And if you argue that in a human commonwealth one person is the judge of another, I reply that this is true of those things that can become known to him in that court, such as public sins.”

Second conclusion. — CONFESSION OF ALL MORTAL SINS IS COMMANDED BY DIVINE LAW. This is defined as a matter of faith in the Council of Trent, sess. XIV, can. 7, in these words: “If anyone says that, in the sacrament of penance, it is not necessary by divine law to confess all and each mortal sin that is remembered after due and diligent reflection, even hidden ones … let him be anathema.”

✳ “The conclusion is proved from the institution of the sacrament of penance. The Council of Trent, sess. XIV, ch. 5, infers the necessity of confessing all sins from the institution of the sacrament of penance.” ✳ *From the already explained institution of the sacrament of penance, the whole Church has always understood that God also instituted integral confession of sins, and that it is necessary by divine law for all who have fallen after baptism. For our Lord Jesus Christ, as he was about to ascend from earth to heaven, left priests as his own vicars, as presidents and judges to whom all the mortal crimes into which Christ’s faithful had fallen must be brought, together with the power of the keys to pronounce judgment on the remission or retention of sins. For it is clear that priests could not exercise this judgment without knowing the case, nor could they observe equity in imposing penalties if people declared their sins only in general rather than specifically and one by one, etc. At the end of that chapter he condemns those who say that the institution of confession arose from the Lateran Council: “For,” he says, “the Church did not establish through the Lateran Council that Christ’s faithful should confess, since it had understood confession to be necessary and instituted by divine law; rather, it established that the precept of confession be fulfilled at least once a year by all and each person who has reached the age of discretion, etc.” He also adduces many passages of sacred Scripture, but the principal one is John 70.¹ from which he infers the institution of the sacrament and the necessity of confession. Omitting other explanations, Lugo says the force of the inference consists in this: Christ constituted priests not as discretionary judges whom penitents could approach at their own choice to obtain pardon for sins, but as necessary judges, without whom pardon cannot be obtained. This is inferred especially from the word retain, or from the power to retain, which he gave them together with the power to forgive; elsewhere, in Matthew 10, he signified it by the word bind. For one who has the power to bind a sinner, or exclude him from the kingdom of heaven, is not a discretionary judge but a necessary one: by withholding pardon he leaves the sinner excluded from the heavenly kingdom, and so is said to retain sins by withholding remission. In the same sense, the keys of heaven are said to have been received, because when someone is given the keys to a locked house, it thereby becomes necessary to have recourse to him in order to enter that house. Therefore, the penitent must appear before a priest as before a judge in order to obtain pardon for sin. — ✳ “From St. Athanasius, vol. 2, treatise on the Gospel words ‘You will go into the village opposite, and you will find a colt tied,’ etc., p. 990: ‘If the bonds have not yet been loosed,’ he says, ‘hand yourself over to Jesus’ disciples; for they are present to loose you by the power they received from Christ. “Whatever you bind on earth,” he says, etc. What is it to hand oneself over to Christ’s disciples to be loosed from sins, unless to disclose to them the bonds of one’s conscience and ask for the benefit of absolution?’”

The Calvinists reply that these words concern catechumens to be freed from sins through baptism, or sinners guilty of those crimes which, according to the canons, had to be expiated by public penance. — Against this, it is clear that the words are addressed to the baptized, from these words: “Each of us is bound by the bonds of sins; therefore, we hope that Jesus will send his disciples to us as well, to loose the bonds by which each of us is bound.” St. Athanasius could not have spoken in this way to catechumens unless he himself had then been a catechumen, which is absurd. — The other explanation is no more successful for the heretics: the sins subject to public penance were idolatry, adultery, and murder. But St. Athanasius speaks plainly of quite different sins. “For here,” he says shortly afterward in the same Sermon, p. 985, “one is overcome by avarice, another is entangled in fornications, another is bound by drunkenness, another in turn is held fast by empty ambition; one commits injuries, another seizes what belongs to his neighbor and the poor; another heaps interest upon interest. In short, we all labor under our vices and need the healing of our Savior, and we need him to send his disciples to us, that they may free us from the shackles of the devil.”

St. Ephrem, deacon of the Church of Edessa, teaches the same in bk. 1 of Admonitions on Compunction of Heart, where, after listing many crimes, he says: “If you find yourself overcome in this, hasten to recover your health, and seek healing through confession from a spiritual father and physician, lest you suffer the same things again.” — The same is inferred from St. Hilary, ✳ who writes in canon 18 on Matthew: “To instill the greatest fear by which all are now restrained, he set forth the unalterable rigor of the apostolic judgment: those whom they bind on earth—that is, leave entangled in the bonds of sins—and those whom they loose and receive into salvation through the confession of pardon, are by the condition of the apostolic sentence also absolved or bound in heaven.” Here Hilary, explaining how the Apostles loose the bonds of sins, uses the word “confession”; and he explains the binding of sins as leaving the bonds of sin in place, or the lack or denial of pardon, namely, the withholding of remission after confession. — From Jerome, on Matthew 16: “We read in Leviticus about lepers, who are commanded to show themselves to the priests; and if they have leprosy, then they are cleansed by the priests—not that the priests make lepers unclean, but that they have knowledge of the leper and can discern who is clean or unclean. Just as there the priest makes a leper clean or unclean, so here the bishop and priest bind or loose, not those who are innocent and without guilt, but, in virtue of their office, after hearing the variety of sins, they know who should be bound and who loosed. Jerome does not say, ‘He knows who is bound or loosed,’ but ‘who is to be bound or loosed.’ For the priest binds the impenitent and looses the penitent; he does not merely point out those already loosed or bound. But he cannot hear the variety of sins except through confession.”

St. Augustine teaches the same, bk. 50 of the Homilies, hom. 49, ch. 3, where he says: “If you have slept with someone other than your wives, do penance as it is done in the Church, so that the Church may pray for you. Let no one say to himself: ‘I do penance in secret, before God; God knows, and he pardons me, because I do it in my heart.’ Then the saying, ‘Whatever you loose on earth will be loosed in heaven,’ was spoken to no purpose; then the keys were given to the Church of God to no purpose; we frustrate the Gospel, we frustrate Christ’s words, and promise you what he denies; are we not deceiving you, etc.?” And in his Tractate 49 on John, explaining the resurrection of Lazarus, he says: “You marvel that he came out with his feet bound, and do not marvel that a man four days dead rose. In both cases the power was the Lord’s, not the dead man’s strength. He came out still bound, still wrapped up; yet he had already come outside. What does this mean? When you conceal, you lie dead; when you confess, you come forth. For what is it to come forth, unless to be made manifest by coming out, as it were, from hidden things? But so that you may confess, God does great things by calling aloud—that is, by calling with great grace. Hence, when the dead man had come out still bound, confessing and still guilty, the Lord said to the ministers, so that his sins might be absolved: ‘Loose him and let him go.’ What is ‘loose him and let him go’? ‘Whatever you loose on earth will be loosed in heaven.’” By these words St. Augustine signifies that the priests of the New Law cannot, by the Lord’s command, loose penitents whom his grace has raised up unless they come forth from the tomb of sin through true confession, just as the disciples could not loose Lazarus unless he had first come forth from the tomb at the voice of Christ the Lord.

St. Leo speaks similarly in Letter 49, otherwise 91: “God’s manifold mercy so aids fallen humanity that the hope of eternal life is restored not only through the grace of baptism but also through the remedy of penance, so that those who have violated the gift of rebirth, condemning themselves by their own judgment, may attain remission of their crimes. The aids of divine love have thus been ordered so that God’s pardon cannot be obtained without the prayers of priests. For Christ Jesus, the mediator between God and human beings, entrusted to the leaders of the Church the power both to assign the act of penance to those who confess and, after they have been cleansed by salutary satisfaction, to admit them to communion in the sacraments through the door of reconciliation.” Moreover, that St. Leo understands the confession to be made to priests by divine law as the kind ordinarily made in secret is clear from Letter 80 to the bishop of Campania, where among other things he writes: “Since the guilt of consciences need only be disclosed to priests in secret confession.” And below: “That confession is sufficient which is first offered to God and then also to the priest.”

The reason for this truth is drawn from the institution of the sacrament of penance. For whoever institutes some end or office is also understood to have instituted the means necessary to carry out that office and attain that end. But in instituting the sacrament of penance, Christ the Lord ordained and constituted priests as judges of the sins of a baptized person, so that they might retain or loose them at their discretion. But they cannot judge whether sins are to be remitted or retained without sacramental confession. For a judge, in order lawfully and judicially to absolve or punish a defendant, must know the defendant’s status, crime, and the gravity of the offense. He cannot know all this—especially if the crimes are hidden and concealed—unless the penitent himself makes them known through penance. Therefore, and so forth. Next: that is necessary for attaining salvation by divine law, without which mortal sins committed after baptism cannot be remitted, and by which, when observed, they are remitted by Christ’s institution. But when sacramental confession is omitted, sins remain without pardon: for as long as they are retained by the one who alone has judicial power to remit them, they are not remitted; and they are retained by priests until they have been made known to them through confession and remitted by absolution. Therefore, the necessity of confession by divine law is rightly inferred from the institution of the sacrament of penance. Finally: the minister of the sacrament of penance must observe a certain equity in imposing penalties and satisfactions according to the gravity of offenses. But without prior confession he cannot observe such equity, since without it he cannot know the number, kinds, and circumstances of sins. Consequently, confession is of divine law, just as the sacrament of penance itself is.

The Doctor subtly and excellently examines all these arguments in d. 16, where he rejects the Glossator’s opinion in d. 5, On Penance. The Glossator sets out various opinions on the institution of confession and says that it was instituted more by a certain tradition of the universal Church than on the authority of the New or Old Testament. “But,” the Doctor says, “with all due respect, the Glossator speaks irrationally. It would be shameful for a theologian to say that something is in the Bible and not know where to find it; it should be equally inappropriate for a canonist to say that something comes from the universal Tradition of the Church but not find it in the canon, if the canon sufficiently contains the universal traditions of the Church. Yet he cites no chapter of the canon containing this tradition. Also, if this opinion were true, it would seem that the pope would not be bound to confess, because an equal has no power over an equal, etc.” Having rejected the Glossator’s opinion, the Doctor declares, n. 11, that confession must be made by positive divine precept, which he infers from John 20: “Receive the Holy Spirit; whose sins you forgive.” “Here,” he says, “the power to forgive sins was given to the Apostles and, in them, to all priests—not principally, for that is proper to God, but ministerially and judicially. But they cannot judge in an unknown case; therefore, the case in which they are to judge must be made known to them. This disclosure is confession. Therefore, from this grant to priests of judicial power in a case concerning sin, the sinner is bound to accuse himself before them as judges, which is to confess. — If someone says that the argument rightly concludes that the sacrament of penance was instituted by Christ as useful and effective, but that it does not follow that it must necessarily be received as falling under a precept—since extreme unction and the sacrament of confirmation were instituted by Christ, as said above, and yet neither is absolutely necessary nor is there a precept to receive this or that sacrament—then, to state the argument formally: they are judges in a case concerning sin; therefore, people must accuse themselves before them. This is true of those who wish to submit themselves to their judgment and do submit; the priests indeed have the power to judge them. But it does not follow that others are bound by precept to submit themselves to their judgment. For example, there are four priests, each of whom has the authority to absolve this sinner; each is fully his judge with respect to power, yet the sinner is not bound to submit to each one, but only to one, whoever he chooses. This is confirmed by what Christ added: ‘And whose sins you retain, they are retained.’ That statement is not restrictive. For not only those sins are retained by God for punishment which are retained by a priest, since the priest retains only sins in some way accused to him, even if by inadequate signs of penance; and yet God retains for the vengeance of hell those sins that have in no way been shown to a priest. Therefore, neither is the statement ‘Whose sins you forgive, they are forgiven’ restrictive. He did not add a negative that would indicate that remission by the Apostles, or retention by them, was exclusive of remission or retention by God. Although this reply seems very probable, in excluding the argument for a precept from the words of John 20, ‘Whose sins you forgive,’ etc., nevertheless, even if that argument is excluded, the point is established in two ways. First, as follows: judicial or arbitral power is never entrusted to anyone unless someone is also made bound to submit to that person; but this kind of power in a case concerning sin is entrusted directly to the priest. Therefore, someone as such is made bound to submit to his judgment, and this follows from the same grant of power. The major premise is proved: no one is the judge of someone else if it is left to that other person’s choice whether to be judged by this judge or not; for then this person would have no authority to judge if the other could be judged whenever he wished and not judged whenever he refused. What, indeed, is judicial power in someone for, unless to declare the law over someone who is bound to obey it? To judge only by way of punishment, if you wish, is not to judge. But I do not mean this either: I grant that this arbiter has not only the power to declare the law in this case, but that, once another submits to him, his judgment binds or frees that person—unlike the judgment of someone who knows the law but does not have judicial power. I argue as follows: whoever has lost first grace is bound, by necessity of precept—and by the precept ‘You shall love the Lord your God,’ etc.—to do what lies within his power to recover it, and also by the precept ‘You shall love yourself.’ But the sinner has lost first grace through mortal sin and can recover it by receiving the sacrament of penance from that judge, because it was instituted as an effective remedy for receiving first grace, in virtue of the words of John 20: ‘Whose sins you forgive,’ etc. Thus the necessity of the precept of confession is established not from that saying alone, ‘Whose sins you forgive,’ etc., but by joining it with the precept ‘You shall love the Lord your God,’ etc. — If you say the major premise is true, that one is bound to use some way by which one can recover grace, but not specifically this one, if another is possible—and that although receiving the sacrament of penance is a useful way, there is another useful way, since it has not been proved that this is the exclusive way to recover grace—against this: no other way is so easy and so certain. Here nothing is required except not placing an obstacle to grace, which is much less than having some attrition sufficient, by way of a merit de congruo, for justification, as was said above, d. 11. Someone can also be more certain that he has placed no obstacle than that he has sufficient attrition, as it were a merit de congruo. For he can reasonably know that he is not then actually sinning, inwardly or outwardly, and that he intends² to recover what the Church intends to confer in that sacrament; he cannot similarly know that he has attrition sufficient as a merit de congruo for justification. I therefore take this as the major premise: where there is an easier way, that is, one more within a person’s power and more certain for recovering grace, everyone is bound to that way, so that, without having lost access to it, he does not attempt another more difficult and uncertain way, since then he would expose himself to danger of salvation and seem to despise his own salvation. But receiving the sacrament of penance is a way more possible for a person and more certain for recovering first grace. Therefore, by virtue of what gives this sacrament efficacy, and of the precept to love God and oneself, one is bound to this way. If this argument proves that the precept of confession comes from the Gospel, from the words ‘Whose sins you forgive,’ etc., together with ‘You shall love the Lord,’ etc., so much the better; if not, at least it proves that a general precept to make confession is very reasonable for the community. For although some person might have some special remedy, nevertheless, since this remedy is more possible and certain for the community, it is reasonable to give a precept concerning it to everyone in the community. This was said above of baptism: although someone may have baptism of desire without baptism of water, since baptism of water is an easy and certain remedy, a precept about it for the whole community is very reasonable. Thus at least I establish that a general precept to make confession would reasonably have been given. — If you insist that the arguments in this section do not prove that the precept was given in the words of the Gospel, shall we say secondly that this precept is found in the words of an Apostle? It is said to come from the words of James 5: ‘Confess your sins to one another.’ But it does not seem to me that James gave this precept or promulgated a precept from Christ. Not the first: for whence would he have authority to bind the whole Church, since he was bishop of the Church of Jerusalem? Unless you say that this Church was initially the principal one and, consequently, its bishop the principal patriarch—which the Romans would not concede, nor that such authority had been withdrawn from him by his own utterance at that time. Nor does the second seem right: for when the Apostles promulgated the Lord’s precept in their writings, they used a manner of speaking by which it could be recognized that they were Christ’s heralds. This is clear from Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians, ch. 7: when he wishes to promulgate the Lord’s precept not to dismiss one’s wife, he says, ‘I command, not I, but the Lord,’ etc.; but when he offers his own counsel concerning a husband who has come to the faith living with his unbelieving wife, saying that this is permitted without offense to Christ but is not necessary, he says, ‘I say, I, not the Lord.’ Otherwise the Church could not know that he was promulgating a precept as a herald unless he made it clear in what preceded or followed. Both points are also proved by the words attached: by saying ‘Confess to one another,’ James no more says that confession is to be made to a priest than to another person; for he adds, ‘and pray for one another, that you may be saved,’ where no one would say that he instituted or promulgated a divine precept. Its meaning is the same as that of ‘Confess to one another’: an exhortation to humility, namely, that we generally confess among our fellow sinners, according to the saying, ‘If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves,’ etc. By the second saying he likewise exhorts to brotherly charity, namely, that through brotherly love we help one another. It is clear, therefore, that this is not of divine law promulgated through the Church’s Scripture.” So the Doctor, who proves plainly that confession is of divine law.

Since one must contend against the heretics of our time not only by arguments but especially by the Church’s perpetual and constant Tradition, and since they affirm that confession was instituted only by Innocent III at the Lateran Council, I have therefore judged it fitting to append here some of the many authorities from councils and the holy Fathers cited by controversialists.

The divine institution of confession is therefore proved from councils. First, from Laodicea, canon 2, under Pope Sylvester in the year 319: “For those who have fallen into various sins, and persevere in prayer, confession, and penance, showing a complete turning away from their evils, a time of penance is to be assigned according to the kind of sin.” That confession for which a time of penance must be assigned according to the kind of sin must be made specifically to human beings. — ✳ “Nevertheless, Gabriel Albaspinaeus, bishop of Orléans, admits in his notes on that canon that the words ‘persevering in prayer, confession, and penance’ do not directly concern sacramental confession, but external acts of penance. We do not find that a penitent must persevere in sacramental confession; once confessing is sufficient. But the penitent must indeed testify by tears, prayers, prostrations, and bodily mortifications how keenly he grieves for the sins he has committed. Next, those to whom that canon applies are already presumed to have confessed their sins. For this was the reason the canon was promulgated. The Council of Elvira had decreed that ‘whoever commits a very great sin be assigned penance, but if he commits several, be denied it.’ The Fathers of Laodicea seemed to moderate somewhat that severe practice observed in the Church, directing that a person who confessed himself guilty of grave sins, even if numerous, should be admitted to fitting penance after consistently demonstrating his sorrow. Confession therefore preceded the demonstration of sorrow and repentance, and consequently those words ‘persevering in prayer, confession,’ etc., do not pertain to sacramental confession. To confirm this, the aforesaid author notes that those who confessed were either immediately absolved, or immediately granted penance if they merited it, or excommunicated if their guilt merited excommunication. Confessions were used for these three purposes and no others. But the canon does not concern those who were immediately absolved, for it decrees that they be assigned penance for a suitable time; and everyone knows that in ancient times penance was completed before absolution. Nor does it concern those who were immediately admitted to penance, because it requires them first to be tested until they have consistently given signs of sincere repentance and contrition through tears and prayers. The canon must therefore be understood of the third class of penitents, namely, those who were excommunicated; but excommunication was preceded by confession. For two kinds of excommunication must again be distinguished: the first was imposed on the obstinate, the second on grave sinners who voluntarily submitted their crimes to the Church’s authority. ✳ — From the Sixth Synod in Trullo, canon 102: ‘Those who have received from God the power of loosing and binding must consider the kind of sin and the readiness of the sinner to turn from it, and so apply a remedy suited to the illness, lest, if they prescribe treatment without due regard to the sin, they fail in the sick person’s cure. For the illness of sin is not simple, but varied and manifold, and sprouts up in many branches, through which evil spreads far and wide until it resists the remedy’s power.’ Therefore, whoever wishes to demonstrate skill in the spiritual art of healing must carefully examine the condition of the sinner: whether he inclines toward healing, or, by the habits with which he is familiar, struggles against the illness. But a priest cannot do this without confession of hidden sins. — From the Third Council of Carthage, ch. 31: ‘The periods of penance are to be assigned to penitents according to the difference of their sins, at the bishop’s discretion.’ But this difference of sins cannot be established without specific confession. — From the First Council of Chalon, canon 8: ‘The whole body of priests is known to agree that penance should be assigned to penitents by priests after confession has been made.’ — From the Second Council of Chalon, canon 31, around the year 813: ‘We also saw that this needed correction: some people, when confessing their sins to priests, do not do so fully. Since a human being consists of two substances, namely, soul and body, and sin is committed sometimes by a movement of the mind, sometimes through weakness of the flesh, sins must be carefully investigated, so that confession may be complete concerning both: that is, the person must confess both what was done through the body and what is transgressed in thought alone.’ — From the Third Council of Tours, held around the same time, canon 22: ‘Bishops and priests must carefully consider how to assign a period of abstinence to people who confess their offenses to them.’ — ✳ From the First Council of Paris, held in 829, canon 32: ‘Since many priests, partly through negligence and partly through ignorance, impose a measure of penance on those confessing their guilt contrary to what the canon laws prescribe, using certain little books written against canonical authority, which they call penitentials, and thereby do not heal the wounds of sins but rather indulge and soothe them, incurring the prophetic reproach: “Woe to those who sew cushions under every elbow and make pillows to deceive souls”; it has seemed salutary to all of us together that each bishop in his own diocese carefully seek out those erroneous little books and consign them to the fire,’ etc. And immediately afterward: ‘Unlearned priests must also be instructed diligently by their bishops how to inquire discreetly into the sins of those who confess and how to impose on them a fitting measure of penance according to canonical authority, since until now, through their negligence and ignorance, the crimes of many have gone unpunished, and there is no doubt that this leads to the ruin of souls.’ — From Mainz, under Archbishop Rabanus, in the year 847, canon 26: ‘A pure confession must be elicited by priests from the sick who are in danger of death; a measure of penance is not to be imposed on them, but it is to be made known.’ — From Worms, around the year 868, ch. 25: ‘Periods of penance are to be assigned to penitents according to the difference of their sins, at the priest’s discretion.’ Therefore, when imposing penance the priest must examine the causes, origin, and manner of each person’s sins, as well as the effects and groaning of those who offend, and the circumstances of time, person, place, and age, so that by considering the offenses and groaning of each offender he does not turn his eyes away from the sacred canons. — ✳ Add the Lateran Council under Innocent III, canon 21; the Council of Constantinople, sess. 3; the Council of Florence in its decree of union; and the councils against the Arians and Bulgarians mentioned above.” ✳ — From all these ancient and modern councils, held in such different times and places, the unanimous consent of the whole Church makes it clear that the necessity of confession is most ancient and has no origin other than God. For according to Augustine, Rule 14, On Baptism, ch. 24: “What the universal Church holds, and was not instituted by councils but has always been maintained, is most rightly believed to have been handed down by apostolic authority.” But the universal Church has always held this confession, as is clear from the councils and will be clear from the Fathers; nor is this necessity recorded as having begun with any council or decrees of the pontiffs. “For although annual confession was commanded at the Lateran Council, confession itself did not begin there; only the time was prescribed at which confession of sins must be made, which is necessary by divine law,” as the Council of Trent says, sess. XIV, ch. 5.

Second, it is proved from the holy Fathers. For first, St. Irenaeus, who lived close to the age of the Apostles, says in bk. 1, ch. 9, On Certain Women Seduced by the Heretic Marcus: These women, having been converted to the Church of God, confessed that, as to their bodies, they had been corrupted by him through lust, and that they had loved him with great ardor. ✳ “To forestall the heretics’ reply that the words confessed are to be understood only of a spontaneous disclosure of one’s sin, made indifferently to anyone, and not of the confession we call sacramental, we must add what St. Irenaeus reports in the same place about a deacon’s wife, corrupted by that same Marcus and afterward converted to penance. Since, he says, his wife was beautiful, and had been corrupted in mind and body by this magician, and had followed him for a long time; afterward, when the brothers had converted her with much effort, she spent all her time in exomologesis, weeping and lamenting the corruption she had suffered from this magician. Indeed, the conversion and confession of those women whom St. Irenaeus discussed above resembled the conversion and confession of that deacon’s wife just mentioned. But her confession was not purely spontaneous; it was religious, made not indiscriminately to anyone, but only to priests, from whom she received a rule of satisfaction. For that confession belonged to exomologesis, as is clear from these words: “she spent all her time in exomologesis.” But exomologesis was an act of religion and was performed according to the priests’ direction. Therefore her confession, and consequently that of the other women, was religious and necessary, and was made to priests.”

Nor should they say that exomologesis does not mean confession of sins, but the whole penitential practice, which was divided into several stages: the weepers, the hearers, the prostrated, and those standing. For these stages of penance were introduced into the Church almost 150 years after St. Irenaeus, namely in the time of Pope Cornelius, when the heresy of Novatian arose. In the time of St. Irenaeus and the two preceding centuries, however, no penalties were imposed on sinners in the Church other than deposition for clerics and exclusion from communion for laypeople, as is clear from the Apostolic Canons and the Council of Illiberis. Those penalties were never expressed by the word exomologesis. It remains, therefore, that St. Irenaeus understood confession by exomologesis. And indeed this is the word’s first and proper meaning, and it is used in that sense in Matthew 8: ἐξομολογούμενοι τὰς ἁμαρτίας αὐτῶν, confessing their sins. Likewise in 1 John, ch. 2, v. 9, and in St. James, ch. 5, v. 16. It is therefore very credible that the word was extended to the whole penitential practice and its observance because it signified penance’s principal part, namely confession. St. Irenaeus speaks of exomologesis again in bk. 3, ch. 4: Cerdon, often coming into the Church and performing exomologesis, completed it in this way: at one time secretly teaching what it is, at another performing exomologesis. There St. Irenaeus discusses Cerdon’s secret heresy and his hidden lust, or corruption of women, which could not be uncovered without special confession. —

✳ “Tertullian teaches this more explicitly in bk. On Penance, ch. 9, where he says: Exomologesis is that by which we confess our offense to the Lord, not as to one unaware of it, but because satisfaction is arranged through confession, penance arises from confession, and God is appeased by penance. He explains there how that confession should be made, saying that in it the sinner casts himself before the presbyters and kneels before God’s beloved. To show that this confession must necessarily be made not to God alone but also to human beings, he adds in the next chapter: Many avoid this practice of making themselves known, thinking more of their shame than of their salvation, like those who, suffering from an ailment in the more private parts of the body, avoid the physicians’ care and so perish in their embarrassment. Here, plainly, he compares the priest to a physician and confession of hidden crimes to a remedy; those who reject it perish from shame. Hence he adds: Concealment of an offense plainly promises a great advantage to shame. That is, if we hide something from human knowledge, shall we likewise hide it from God? Are human opinion and God’s knowledge so alike? Is it better to lie hidden under condemnation than to be absolved openly? Further, it is clear from ch. 4 that Tertullian speaks of every kind of sin, hidden as well as private, internal as well as external. For the same one, he says, who has assigned punishment by judgment for all offenses committed in the flesh or in the spirit, by deed or by will, has also promised pardon through penance. He later divides penance into that which precedes baptism and that which follows it; he holds that this latter kind consists in confession of sins and satisfaction. Nor should the heretics say that Tertullian speaks there only of public confession: confession of secret and interior sins was not public but private. Moreover, whether it was made publicly or privately does not pertain to the essence of the sacrament of penance. It is enough for us to learn from Tertullian that confession of each and every sin is necessary in order to obtain their remission.”

Four or five passages can be cited from Origen that demonstrate Catholic confession more clearly than other passages. The first is found in Homily 2 on Psalm 37, where he intimates that confession is required by divine law, proving it from Scripture. These are his words: Since I declare my iniquity, we have often said that declaring one’s iniquity is confession of sin. See, then, what divine Scripture teaches us: that a sin once covered must not be kept hidden within. For perhaps, just as those who have undigested food shut up inside, or a quantity of fluid and phlegm pressing on the stomach, are relieved if they vomit, so those who have sinned, if they conceal and retain their sin within themselves, are pressed inwardly and almost choked by the phlegm or fluid of sin. But if someone becomes his own accuser, accusing himself and confessing, he vomits out the offense along with the whole cause of the disease. Only take careful thought about whom you ought to confess your sin to. First test the physician to whom you should disclose the cause of your sickness, one who knows how to be sick with the sick, to weep with those who weep, and who understands the discipline of sympathy and compassion. Then, when the person who is ill has first shown himself to be someone who is learned and merciful as a physician, follow and carry out whatever advice he gives, if he understands and sees that your sickness is such that it ought to be disclosed and treated before the whole Church, so that perhaps others too may be built up and you yourself easily healed. This must be undertaken with much deliberation and with that physician’s thoroughly expert counsel.

✳ “THEY REPLY that by confession and disclosure of sickness before the Church, Origen did not mean a declaration to a priest of each sin by name, but a general acknowledgment of one’s sins and a profession and detestation of one’s wickedness through penitential works and even words. — Against this: if Origen were speaking only of that general confession of sins, why would he require such care and diligence in finding and choosing a physician? Why would he say that the physician himself needed so much deliberation and counsel to reach a sound judgment? That general confession, as the opponents claim, can be made indiscriminately to anyone. But what does the comparison of sins with raw and undigested food mean, unless each sin must be vomited out, lest those who retain them be choked by them? Again, what does the comparison of a priest with a physician show, unless that all the evils of conscience, with their causes and circumstances, must be disclosed so that an appropriate remedy may be applied? Nor should they say that no priest is mentioned here and that the physician could be someone else. Origen teaches who that physician is in Homily 3 on Leviticus. There, anticipating an objection that some of his hearers might have made—since they had already been shaken by reports of Montanus’s heresy, which denied the Church’s power to remit sins committed after baptism—he says: But perhaps the hearers in the Church will say: things were almost better with the ancients than with us, when pardon was granted to sinners who offered sacrifices in various rites. Among us there is one way of pardon for sins, which is granted at the beginning through the grace of baptismal washing. After that, no mercy or pardon is granted to one who sins. To refute these words, which savor of the Montanists’ error, and to show that our condition is no worse than that of the faithful under the Old Testament, he lists various means by which pardon for sins is obtained under the Law of grace: baptism, martyrdom, almsgiving, charity, and others. When he comes to the seventh, he says: There is still a seventh, although hard ✳ and laborious: remission of sins comes through penance, when the sinner washes his bed with his tears and his tears become his bread day and night, and when he is not ashamed to disclose his sin to the Lord’s priest and seek a remedy, according to the one who says: “I said, I will declare my injustice against myself to the Lord, and you forgave the impiety of my heart.””

✳ “THE OPPONENTS ARGUE from this passage: Origen did not even acknowledge the confession used among the Roman Catholics, since he proposed five other ways of remitting sins besides confession and baptism; but Origen did so. — I distinguish: Origen proposed five other ways of remitting mortal sins without the intention of receiving baptism or making confession, I deny; venial sins, or even mortal sins together with the intention of receiving baptism or making confession, I grant. For Origen intended to show that the New Law, like the Old Testament, lacked no varied remedies for sins. He therefore lists all the ways sins can be blotted out, speaking indiscriminately of mortal and venial sins. But venial sins are remitted without confession by the Lord’s Prayer and the pious works of Christian life, as Augustine himself testifies in Homily 49 on John. Perfect charity also obtains pardon for even mortal sins before the sacrament is actually received, according to the teaching of the Council of Trent, sess. XIV. St. Augustine teaches in many places that alms and good works likewise contribute substantially to salvation even before baptism is actually received; yet no one would infer from this that he denied the necessity of baptism. Therefore, although Origen mentions other ways of remitting sins, it cannot be inferred that he denied the necessity of baptism and confession. Rather, when opportunity to receive those sacraments is lacking, Origen wished to show that those could be supplied by other means.”

The third passage is taken from the same homily. He says: Every kind of deed must be declared and brought into public view: all that we have done, whether we have acted secretly, committed something in speech alone, or even done something within the secrets of our thoughts; all must be made public and brought forth. They must be brought forth not by the one who is both the accuser and the instigator of sin—for he first urges us to sin, and then, when we have sinned, accuses us. If, therefore, we forestall him in this life and become our own accusers, we escape the wickedness of the devil, our enemy and accuser. Thus the Prophet says elsewhere: “Declare your iniquities first, so that you may be justified.” And in Homily 17 on Luke: If we have sinned, we ought to say: “I made my sin known to you, and I did not hide my iniquity.” For if we reveal our sins, not only to God but also to those who can heal our wounds and sins, they will be blotted out by him who says: “Behold, I blot out your iniquities like a cloud.”

✳ “From St. Cyprian, On the Lapsed: How much greater in faith and better in reverence are those who, although not stained by the crime of sacrifice or of a certificate, yet because they even considered doing so, confess this very thing sorrowfully and simply before God’s priests, make an exomologesis of conscience, lay bare the burden of their soul, and seek healing medicine even for small and slight wounds. That all are bound to this sincere confession of interior sins, he declares in the following words: Let each one, I beg you, brothers, confess his offense while the one who has sinned is still in this world, while his confession can be received, while satisfaction and remission made through the priests are acceptable to the Lord. —”

✳ “Theodoret, bk. 4 of Heretical Fables, ch. 10, p. 242 of Sismondi’s edition, censures the heretical Audiani as follows: They boast that they grant remission of sins. Dividing the sacred books into two parts, together with the apocryphal ones (for they regard these latter as especially trinitarian and mystical), and arranging them in order on either side, they command each person to pass between them and confess his sins. Then they pardon those who have confessed—not setting a time for penance, as the Church’s laws prescribe, but pardoning by their own authority. Those who pass through in this way know that the proceeding is a sham, and conceal their real sins, saying some small, laughable things that no one would be ashamed to say unless he were held by the same madness as they. — From the apocryphal Letter of Clement of Rome to James, written at least in the fourth century: If envy, unbelief, or another evil of those mentioned above has secretly crept into anyone’s heart, let him who cares for his soul not be ashamed to confess it to the one who presides, so that he may be healed by him with salutary counsel through the word of God. Speaking then of St. Peter, he says: He taught that evil thoughts should immediately be dashed against Christ and made known to God’s priests. — Eusebius, bk. 4 of Ecclesiastical History, ch. 34, in the edition of Henri de Valois, reports that Philip, whom most ancient ecclesiastical writers regard as the first Christian emperor, wished to take part with the rest of the people in the church’s prayers during the last Easter vigil. But the bishop who presided over that church did not allow him to enter until he had made confession and joined those who had fallen through human frailty and stood among the penitents. For because of the many crimes he had committed, the bishop would never have admitted him at all unless he had done so first; and the emperor willingly obeyed, showing by his deeds a sincere and religious fear of God. From this passage it is clear that confession of sins was in use before the Council of Nicaea. To prevent anyone from confusing exomologesis here with the order of penitents, Eusebius distinguishes the two, noting both “confession” and “the order of penitents” as separate things. Then he extends that confession not only to certain especially grave crimes, such as idolatry, adultery, and murder, but to all the crimes he had committed. Finally, these words show that it was not voluntary and optional: “for the bishop would never have admitted him at all unless he had done so first.” — Lactantius Firmianus left us two especially noteworthy testimonies. The first is in bk. 4 of the Institutes, ch. 17, on true wisdom. Explaining how circumcision under the Old Law was a figure of the confession of sins made under the New, he says: Since that part of the body which is circumcised bears a certain likeness to the heart and is shameful, God commanded that it be exposed in circumcision, so that by this sign he might warn us not to keep our breast covered—that is, not to conceal within the secrets of conscience what we do shamefully. This is the circumcision of the heart of which the Prophets speak, which God transferred from mortal flesh to its ruin, and which alone will remain. For, wishing in his eternal goodness to provide for our life and salvation, he set before us penance in that circumcision, so that if we lay bare our heart—that is, confess our sins—we may make satisfaction to God and obtain pardon, which is denied to the obstinate and to those who conceal their offenses by him who looks not upon the face as a human being does, but upon the inmost and secret recesses of the breast.”

To close off the heretics’ usual evasions, here and in other passages to be cited, we must observe: 1. Every sin, of whatever kind, is subject to the law of confession, lest we conceal within the secrets of conscience what we do shamefully. 2. Integral confession is necessary for everyone to obtain pardon, since it is denied, he says, to the obstinate and those who conceal their offenses. 3. That confession must be made not to God alone, who looks upon the inmost and secret recesses of the heart, but to a human being, who judges by appearances and from whom sins can be hidden. To be sure, Lactantius does not show in these words whether that confession was made privately to a priest or before a council of presbyters. But whether it was public or private is immaterial to the essence of the Church’s doctrine, which establishes only that confession of all mortal sins must be made to priests. Elsewhere it will be shown that auricular confession was in use from the earliest times of the Church. 4. A passage from ch. 30 of the same book is offered: Since every gathering of heretics thinks its own church is Catholic, we must know that the true Church is the one in which there are religion, confession, and penance, which healthfully heals the sins and wounds to which the weakness of the flesh is subject. Here Lactantius takes aim at the Novatians. But they did not deny confession made to God alone, since they maintained that sins committed after baptism could not be remitted by the Church, but only by God. Therefore he assigns as a mark of the true Church confession made to priests of all sins contracted through the weakness of the flesh. — We have several testimonies from St. Basil the Great that wonderfully confirm the Catholic doctrine of confession. In his Commentary on Psalm 29, p. 191, Homily 1, Paris edition of 1618, he admits: For propitiation, then, or remission of the things arising from sins, confess the things you formerly did wrongly and without sobriety. St. Basil plainly speaks there of all sins and teaches that confession obtains their remission. To whom such confession must be made, he states in Canon 74 of his third canonical letter to Amphilochius, vol. 2, p. 777: If, then, he says, one of those who have fallen into the aforementioned sins has made confession and become good, and he to whom the power to bind and loose has been entrusted by God’s kindness should become more merciful, seeing the sinner’s full confession for the shortening of his time of punishment, he will not deserve condemnation, since the history given us in Scripture shows that those who confess with greater effort attain God’s mercy more quickly. This is even clearer from St. Basil’s Shorter Rules, question 288, phrased as follows: If someone wishes to confess his sins, is he free to confess them indiscriminately to anyone he chooses, or only to certain people? He answers: Sins must necessarily be disclosed to those entrusted with the administration of God’s mysteries. And in his answer to question 229: The same rule applies to confession of sins as to disclosure of bodily defects. Just as people do not rashly disclose bodily defects to anyone they happen to meet, but only to those who know how to treat them, so confession of sins must be made to those who can cure them. From question 110, phrased thus—Is it appropriate for the superior herself to be present when a sister confesses to a presbyter?—it is clear that nuns at that time confessed their sins to a presbyter. That this practice belonged not only to monks and nuns but to all the faithful is clear from his homily on the words “Take heed to yourself,” p. 345, delivered to the people: Physicians exhort those suffering from illness to take heed to themselves and neglect nothing that concerns their treatment and health. Likewise, the saving word of this command, the physician of our souls (that is, the priest), heals the soul grievously afflicted by the harm of mortal sin with this small remedy. Therefore take heed to yourself, so that in proportion to your offense you may also use this remedy applied to you to restore your health. Is the sin great and grave? You need much confession, bitter tears, and so on. — St. Gregory Nazianzen was joined to St. Basil no less in thought than in friendship when he says in Oration 15, p. 236: Confession is a great remedy for vice, and flight from sin. Among the graces he asks of God he also lists the correction that comes from disclosing sin. Note that he does not use the word exomologesis, which the opponents would transfer to the entire penitential act, but the word homologia, which means a simple declaration of sins. — To these is added the authority of St. Gregory of Nyssa, who lists the disclosure of sins among the Church’s rites in Oration 10, Against Eunomius, p. 277 of the Paris edition of 1617. That this disclosure includes even sins for which the canons prescribe no penalty, such as theft, and is made to priests, is proved by his Letter to Letoius, Bishop of Melitene, vol. 2, p. 954: But the one who secretly takes what belongs to another, if afterward he discloses his sin to a priest, will cure his sickness by turning his zeal for vice in the opposite direction. Finally, in his Oration Against Those Who Judge Others Harshly, he says: Therefore let your confidence be greater in the one who has begotten you in God than in those who begot you bodily. Boldly show him what is hidden. Uncover the secrets of your soul to him, as hidden wounds to a physician. He will have regard for both your honor and your health. The preceding words show that St. Gregory speaks of private confession, not public penance.

But we, he says, promise penance in words, yet show no effort or labor in deeds, but follow the same way of life we followed before confessing and detesting our sins. The same cheerfulness in our face, the same splendor in our dress and food, etc. These words cannot be said of public penitents, for a very austere way of life was prescribed for them. Moreover, St. Gregory would not count himself among them, since the Fathers customarily distinguished themselves and the other faithful from public penitents by using the expression “we.” Finally, he is speaking there of sins not subject to public but to private penance, namely greed, perjury, and lying. But you, he says, whose soul is sick, why do you not hasten to the physician? Why do you not show him your illness by confessing it? Have you fallen ill by indulging in pleasures? Cure it by abstinence and fasting. Is your soul suffering from hunger? Apply the medicine of temperance. Have you fallen into a fever through an excessive and manifold desire for money? Let generosity and almsgiving drive it away. Has your neighbor’s lie led you to destruction? Let zeal for truth avert the danger, etc. — From St. Ambrose, bk. 2 of On Penance, ch. 9: Many, conscious of their sins and fearing future punishment, ask for penance; when they have received it, they are recalled by shame from public supplication.… Some ask for penance so that they may immediately be restored to communion. These wish not so much to loose themselves as to bind the priest: for they do not put off their own conscience but put on the priest’s, to whom it was commanded: “Do not give what is holy to dogs, nor cast your pearls before swine”—that is, the fellowship of sacred communion is not readily to be granted to unclean spirits. Thus you may see those walking in a white garment who ought to mourn and groan, because they have dirtied the garment of cleansing and grace, etc. — In the life of St. Ambrose written by St. Paulinus, we read: Whenever anyone, having fallen, confessed his lapses to him in order to receive penance, he wept so that he made that person weep as well. He seemed to lie with the one lying there. He told no one but the Lord, before whom he interceded, the causes of the crimes that people confessed to him, leaving a good example to later priests: that they should be intercessors before God rather than accusers before human beings. From this testimony we have three points: 1. secret confession of sins; 2. the seal of confession; 3. that bishops often performed the ministry of hearing confessions themselves. Another testimony can also be cited from St. Ambrose, bk. 1 of On Penance, ch. 6, where he says: If you wish to be justified, confess your offense; for shamefaced confession of sins breaks the bonds of crimes. — We have already seen how excellently St. Chrysostom commends the power to bind and loose entrusted to priests. Now we must examine his judgment about confession of sins. In bk. 2 of On the Priesthood, ch. 4, p. 20, vol. 4, he says: Nothing of this should be left unexamined; the bishop must investigate it thoroughly. After he has searched everything accurately and diligently, he must then apply his own remedies suitably, appropriately, and fittingly. The subject here is hidden illnesses of the soul; public sins need not be examined so carefully, since they are known to everyone. Such exact examination of conscience cannot be made except through confession of all sins in their particulars and circumstances. It is also clear that without this no remedies can be applied so suitably and fittingly. St. Chrysostom speaks of that confession in Homily 30 on Genesis, p. 125, vol. 2: By God’s grace we have now come to this great week. Now above all we must pursue the course of fasting, continue our prayers more earnestly, and make a careful and pure confession of sins. Lest the opponents twist the word exomologesis, as they usually do, into mere contrition of heart and prostration of the body, in which they claim ancient penance consisted, we must add what follows immediately concerning the confession by which the faithful prepared themselves for the Paschal feasts. For our enemy knows that during this time we can speak of what concerns our salvation, declare or disclose our sins, uncover our wounds to a physician, and obtain health. Therefore exomologesis consists especially in revealing hidden sins. In Homily 20 on Genesis, ch. 5: For the fornicator, or adulterer, or one who has committed some such act, even if he can escape notice by everyone, nevertheless never triumphs in tranquility, etc. There he speaks of hidden sins; what he thinks about them he adds immediately, in excellent agreement with our point: Yet the one who has done this, if he wishes to use the help of conscience as he ought, hasten to confess his crime, show his sore to a physician who will heal and not reproach him, receive remedies from him, speak to him alone with no one else knowing, and tell him everything carefully, will easily amend his sins. For confession of sins is the abolition of offenses. An exhortation equally effective for proving this point is found in his Homily On the Samaritan Woman, vol. 4, p. 421. After St. Chrysostom says, “The woman began to disclose her sins; she began to confess,” he adds: Let us too imitate that woman and not be ashamed of our own sins, but fear God. I see the opposite happening. We do not fear the one who will judge us, yet we dread those who do not harm us at all, and are not afraid of the disgrace we shall incur from them; therefore we suffer punishment in the things we fear. For whoever is ashamed to disclose sins to a human being, but is not ashamed to make satisfaction to God, refuses to confess and do penance; on that day he will be exposed not before one or two people, but before the whole world looking on. Since many find this disclosure of hidden sins very difficult, St. Chrysostom warns in bk. 2 of On the Priesthood, ch. 3, that much skill is needed to persuade Christians who are struggling to submit willingly and freely to the priests’ treatment, and not only that, but also to be grateful to them for the treatment and medicine. And in Homily 2 on ch. 6 of the Epistle to the Hebrews: What is the medicine of penance, and how is it prepared? First, by condemnation and confession of one’s sins: “I made my sin known to you, and did not hide my iniquity. I will declare my iniquity against myself to the Lord, and you forgave the impiety of my sin.” And again: “Declare your sins first, so that you may be justified.” Second, much humility is needed; for it is like a golden chain, and once it has begun, all things follow. Unless you have confessed your sin as you ought to confess it, the soul becomes humble.… After humility, intense prayers and many tears are needed, by day and night, etc. Then, later in the same homily, he says it is a condition of true penance to conduct oneself properly toward priests and lay one’s sins before them one by one. Otherwise, he says, if someone says “I am a sinner,” but does not consider and reckon his sins by their kinds, and does not say “I committed this and that sin,” he will never cease: he will always be confessing, but will take no care to amend. ✳ — From Pacian, Exhortation to Penance: I address you first, brothers, who refuse penance after committing crimes: you, I say, who are shameless after your impudence, ashamed after your sins; you are not ashamed to sin, yet ashamed to confess.… I beg you by the Lord whom hidden things do not deceive: stop covering your wounded conscience. Wise sick people do not fear physicians, even when they cut and cauterize hidden parts.… Now let me speak to those who wisely and well confess their wounds under the name of penance, yet know neither what penance is nor how wounds are healed. They resemble those who show their sores and confess their swellings while physicians sit by, but, when advised what must be applied, neglect it, and loathe what they must drink. — ✳ “Pope Innocent I plainly teaches that not only graver sins, which were subject to public penance, but also lesser sins must be entrusted to the priest’s judgment, so that he may loose their bonds according to the penitent’s confession and satisfaction. These are his words, Letter 1 to Decentius, Bishop of Gubbio, ch. 7: As for penitents, whether they do penance for graver or lesser offenses, if no illness intervenes, the Roman Church’s custom shows that they are to be absolved on the Thursday before Easter. But it belongs to the priest to assess the weight of offenses, attend to the penitent’s confession and to the tears and weeping of the one correcting himself, and then order absolution when he sees that satisfaction is appropriate; this cannot be done without special confession. — ✳ St. Jerome explains this passage in favor of confession made individually to priests, “If a serpent bites in silence, he who has a tongue is no better off,” in his Commentary on Ecclesiastes, ch. 10, p. 59, vol. 7, Basel edition of 1525: If the serpent devil has secretly bitten someone and, with no one knowing, infected him with the poison of sin, if the one who has been struck remains silent and does not do penance or wish to confess his wound to a brother and teacher, the teacher who has a tongue for healing will not easily be able to help him. For if the sick person is ashamed to confess his wound to a physician, medicine cannot cure what it does not know. There the necessity is clearly expressed of disclosing hidden sins and all sins to priests. — From St. Augustine, Homily 1 among the fifty: Let a person judge himself in these matters (namely, those against the Decalogue, of which Paul says that those who do such things will not possess the kingdom of God, as he said above), lest, when he can do so no longer, he be judged by the Lord against his will. When he has pronounced on himself the sentence of the harshest medicine, yet still medicine, let him come to the bishops, through whom the keys are administered to him in the Church. Let him, now beginning to be a good son, observe the order of the maternal members, and receive from the ministers of the sacraments the measure of his satisfaction, so that, in offering the sacrifice of a contrite heart, he may act devoutly and humbly in a way that benefits not only his own salvation but also serves as an example to others. If his sin has caused not only grave harm to himself but also scandal to others, and the bishop judges it useful to the Church, let him not refuse or resist doing penance in the knowledge of many or even of the whole congregation; through shame, let him not add a swelling to a lethal and deadly wound. And in Homily 41: ✳ A person must keep himself from vices not only after penance, but also before penance while he is healthy, because if he waits until the end of life, he does not know whether he will be able to receive penance itself and confess his sins to God and the priest. ✳ From St. Leo, Letter 80 to the bishops of Campania: That presumption against the apostolic rule, which I recently heard some there were committing by unlawful usurpation, must by all means be removed by an established decree: namely, that a written confession listing each kind of sin be made public. It is more fitting for consciences to be disclosed to priests alone in secret confession. Although the fullness of faith seems praiseworthy when a person does not hesitate, for fear of God, to be ashamed before other people, yet since not everyone’s sins are such that those who seek penance dare to make them public, let this most objectionable custom be removed, lest many be kept from the remedy of penance because they are ashamed or fear that their deeds will be disclosed to their enemies, who might strike them under the law. For that confession is enough which is first offered to God, then also to the priest, who approaches as an intercessor for the penitents’ sins. Then more people will be moved to penance if the confessor’s conscience is not made public to the people’s ears. And in Letter 91 to Theodore of Fréjus: Jesus Christ, the mediator between God and human beings, ✳ entrusted this power to the leaders of the Church, so that they might assign an act of penance to those who confess, and, after purifying them through salutary satisfaction, admit them to communion in the sacraments through the door of reconciliation. — ✳ From Victor of Vita, bk. 2 of The Vandal Persecution, where he relates that the African faithful, seeing their pastors taken from them and exiled by order of the tyrant Hunneric, cried out: To whom do you leave us, wretched as we are, as you go to your crowns? Who will baptize these little ones in the waves of eternal water? Who will confer the gift of penance upon us and free those bound by the bonds of sin through the indulgence of reconciliation? For it was said to you: Whatever you loose on earth will be loosed in heaven. Who will bury us when we die with solemn prayers? etc. — From Sidonius Apollinaris, Letter 14 to Polemius: I want you to know that things are not the same before the judge of the world as before the judge of the civil court. For just as one who does not conceal his own crimes from you is condemned, so among us the one who confesses them to God is absolved. Just before this, he indicated that this confession is made to God through priests, saying: We open the foul ulcer of our consciences with the knife that will heal it, etc. — From Julian Pomerius, to whom bk. 2, ch. 7 of On the Contemplative Life is more plausibly attributed: Those whose sins are hidden from human knowledge, neither confessed by themselves nor made public by others, if they refuse to confess or amend them, will have as witness the God they now have, and as avenger the same God. What does it profit them to escape human judgment if, persisting in their evil, they are going to suffer eternal punishment when God repays them? But if they become their own judges and avengers of their iniquity, and here impose on themselves the voluntary punishment of the strictest correction, they will exchange eternal torments for temporal punishments, and extinguish the fires of eternal fire with tears flowing from true compunction of heart. — From the life of St. Eligius, Bishop of Noyon, written by St. Audoin, Archbishop of Rouen, ch. 7: When Eligius had reached manhood, wishing to present himself to God as a sanctified vessel and fearing lest some sins frustrate his heart, he confessed before a priest all his deeds from adolescence onward; then, imposing a severe penance upon himself, he stoutly resisted the struggle of the flesh with the fervor of the spirit.” ✳ — From Sozomen, bk. 7 of the History, ch. 19: Since to sin not at all belongs to a more divine nature than the human, God commanded that pardon be given to penitents, and it is necessary to confess sins in order to obtain pardon. — ✳ “St. John Climacus, in his book entitled The Ladder of Paradise, step 3, offered these words in support of confession: Before all else, let us confess our faults to our excellent judge alone; and if he commands it, we are ready to confess them to everyone. He considers this confession so necessary that he says there: For this reason I now urge them by this example to confession, without which no one will obtain remission. On that same step of his Ladder, he explains how useful confession made to a superior—that is, a bishop, abbot, or other priest—is: Whoever constantly turns over the confession of sins in his mind is restrained by it like a bridle, lest he sin. For afterward we admit securely what must be concealed and buried in darkness. And further: Do not disdain to make confession with a humble spirit to your helper, namely the priest, as to God. — John, abbot of Raithu, at whose urging St. John Climacus composed the Ladder of Paradise, wrote scholia on that book while its author was still alive. On the words cited above, “without which no one will obtain remission,” he says in support of confession: That we are bound to confess our sins simply by necessity of the divine command is clear from the apostolic traditions and the rules laid down for the Catholic Church by the Holy Spirit. By observing their canons and institutions, confessing our sins to God’s priests according to their command, we may become worthy to receive pardon and remission. These words leave the opponents no escape; they must admit that in that age the faith and practice concerning confession were the same as those now maintained by the Roman Church.” ✳

From Gregory, Homily 26 on the Gospels: Lazarus is told, “Come out,” as if it were plainly said to anyone deserving the penalty of sin: “Why do you hide your guilt within your conscience? Come out now through confession, you who hide below by denying it.” Let the dead man therefore come out—that is, let the sinner confess his guilt—and let the disciples who come out loose him, so that the Church’s pastors may remove the punishment he deserved, since he was not ashamed to confess what he had done. — On the words of James 5, “Confess to one another,” Bede says: Let us confess our daily and lighter sins to one another as equals, and believe that we are saved by their prayer. But let us disclose the uncleanness of graver leprosy to a priest according to the Law, and take care to be purified at his judgment, in the manner and for as long as he orders. ✳ “These words make clear that there are two kinds of confession: of venial sins, which we ought to confess to one another and for which we obtain pardon with the aid of the Lord’s Prayer; and of mortal sins, which are leprosy of the soul and must be disclosed to a priest.”

THE HERETICS REPLY that by Bede’s “uncleanness of graver leprosy” are meant not all mortal sins, but only the crimes of heresy, idolatry, Judaism, and schism. They prove this from bk. 5 of his Commentary on the Gospel of St. Luke, ch. 69, p. 421 of the Basel edition, where Bede, on the words “When he saw them, he said: Go, show yourselves to the priests,” says that lepers are those infected, as if by different colors, with heretical depravity, pagan superstition, Jewish perfidy, or fraternal schism, and that these people alone are bound to show themselves to priests (the whole passage is transcribed among the objections). They also prove this to have been the Venerable Bede’s meaning from William, formerly abbot of the monastery of Goffridus. — Against this: From the fact that in the passage last cited Bede understands leprosy to mean certain sins expiated by public penance, it is inferred without reason that in every other passage he means only those sins and no others. On the contrary, it is clear that he commonly uses leprosy to signify any mortal sins, as in his Commentary on ch. 8 of St. Matthew, bk. 11, p. 32, where, of the leper sent by Christ to the priests, he says: Mystically, this man signifies the human race sick with sins, cleansed by the Savior’s outstretched hand, that is, by the incarnate Word. But by the Incarnation we were cleansed from absolutely all sins; therefore here he signifies all mortal sins by leprosy. That in the passage we cited he also understands all mortal sins by leprosy is clear from his general distinction: he separates lighter and daily sins from graver ones, or mortal sins, so that we confess the former to one another and the latter to a priest. — For the rest, we do not deny that, 300 years after the Venerable Bede, William, whom we have cited, had anticipated this opinion, holding that Bede thought only the four aforementioned kinds of sin were subject to the law of confession. But William’s student, Goffridus, Abbot of Vendôme, openly opposed this opinion in Letter 16 of bk. 5 of his letters, published by Father Sirmond in 1610. — From his words, too, we have an unanswerable testimony that the law and practice of confession existed in the Church 200 years before the Council of Lateran, which the heretics babble introduced confession. Goffridus says to William: It is necessary that whoever is defiled by these sins (namely heresy, idolatry, Judaism, and schism) confess not only to a priest, as is done in other cases, but to the whole Church, and so return to the unity whose faith they had formerly attacked.… But the Lord himself heals and corrects other vices. Although the Lord heals and corrects all things that are healed, some are nevertheless forbidden to be healed and corrected by him directly: namely, those things disclosed privately to him in confession so that they may be healed. I tell you that the one who is known to stand in his place certainly has power to forgive all sins by confession and penance, etc. ✳ — From Rabanus, Bishop of Mainz, bk. 7 on Ecclesiastes: Whoever exceeds measure in the desires of the flesh and is weighed down by them must vomit out the foulness of his sins through confession and thus return to his former health through fasting and bodily discipline. — ✳ “Nicephorus Callistus, who flourished in the seventh century, left us an outstanding testimony about the use and necessity of auricular confession in the third fragment, translated into Latin and printed with the two other surviving fragments from him in vol. 7 of the Library of the Fathers, Cologne edition of 1618, pp. 429–430: The office of binding and loosing was entrusted to the bishops themselves by our most merciful Lord God. Therefore, formerly everyone had to go to those bishops, disclose their hidden things to them, and receive either reconciliation or rejection. I do not know what happened to make this practice less observed. Perhaps the bishops, worn out by the unpleasantness of the task and the tumultuous press of crowds, thought they had transferred the work to monks—to those, that is, who had truly been tested and could be useful to others; for they allowed nothing of this sort to the inexperienced and unlearned. — Chrodegang, Bishop of Metz, under Pepin’s reign, more than 400 years before the Council of Lateran, around the year 760, prescribed a rule for the canons of Metz, published by Father Lucas d’Achery of the Congregation of St. Maur in vol. 1 of the Spicilegium, ch. 32, under the title Order for Receiving Penance and Making Confession. It begins: This is the rule of our penance and confession, which we must perform before God and his priests alike. That is, in each year, on three occasions—that is, during three Lents—the faithful people shall make their confession to their priest; whoever does more does better. Who will not understand from the continuous text of that chapter that this confession had to include all mortal sins, even the most hidden? Afterward inquire carefully whether he has evil deeds with him that separate a person, as the Apostle says, from the kingdom of God. These are evil thought, evil and idle speech, hatred, envy, detraction, cursing, feasting, obscene speech, buffoonery, dissembling, carnal desire, etc. If he wishes to leave these sins, have him confess and finally say: “My sins in deeds, words, and thoughts are many.” Then assign him a measured canonical penance. Care must be taken that those who fall into grave sins and those who offend in some lighter things are not judged alike; medicine must be applied according to the disease. — In the same century flourished Egbert, Archbishop of York, whose penitential contains many passages from which the parts and conditions of auricular confession can be understood individually; it would be too long to transcribe them here. — At about the same time the kings of France had as confessors and counselors men distinguished in piety and learning, as we learn from the life of St. Ansbert, Bishop of Rouen and successor to St. Audoin, found in vol. 2 of the Acts of the Saints of the Order of St. Benedict, p. 1054, where St. Ansbert is said to have been the confessor of King Theodoric. — Alcuin, abbot and teacher of Charlemagne, says in Letter 26: What does priestly power loose if it does not examine the bonds of the one bound? The work of physicians will cease if the sick do not show their wounds. If the wounds of the body await the hand of a physician of the flesh, how much more do the wounds of the soul require the comfort of a spiritual physician? — Theodulf, Bishop of Orléans, Alcuin’s contemporary, says in the capitulary he made for the priests of his diocese, published by Father Sirmond in 1646, ch. 31: Confessions must be made of all sins committed either in deed or in thought. And further: When someone comes to confession, he must be asked carefully how and on what occasion he committed the sin he admits having committed, and penance must be assigned according to the nature of the deed. He must be persuaded to confess his evil thoughts as well, and the priest must name each of the vices among the eight principal ones (which he listed above) and receive his confession of it. — Hincmar, Archbishop of Reims, in Opusculum 40 to Hildebold, Bishop of Soissons, vol. 3, p. 687, says: Finally, as if adding something superfluous, since I do not doubt you have done these things, I remind your good devotion that, besides this general confession, you should strive to confess specifically and individually to God and the priest whatever you know you have committed from the beginning of your life up to the present. — Paschasius Radbertus, Abbot of Corbie, who died in 851, says in his Commentary on the Gospel of St. Matthew, ch. 11, p. 676: Just as under the Old Law the priest makes clean or unclean by discerning, so here the bishop or presbyter binds or looses—not those who are guilty or innocent according to his own judgment, but according to his pontifical office, once he has heard the variety of their sins and knows who must be bound and who loosed. — Theodorus Studites, writing near the end of the eighth century, relates in the life of St. Plato, printed in vol. 6 of Lives of the Saints, p. 270, collected by the Carthusian Laurentius Surius, Cologne 1618, that Plato regarded divine readings as play and church attendance as a spectacle, and used to confess the hidden thoughts and deeds of his mind to those who presided over him; this was a great sign of his piety. That this kind of confession pertains to all Christians is shown by these words from his Homily 36 to the monks: Someone may say, “Our nature is careless and prone to fall.” I admit it; but whenever this happens, confession, repentance, and contrition of heart bring an easy return to the former state. And Homily 122: Therefore let us use frequent confession, since confession is a bridle against sin. — The monk Angelomus wrote several works under Lothair, which are found in vol. 9 of the Library of the Fathers, Cologne edition of 1618. In his commentary on bk. 4 of Kings, ch. 12, he writes in support of confession: No one should trust his own judgment, but should know rather that confession of sins and penance must be carried out by the judgment of priests, who have the knowledge to distinguish clean from unclean and judge the mark of leprosy. — Ralph, monk of the Abbey of St. Sermer in Flavigny, in the diocese of Beauvais, says in bk. 3 of his Commentary on Leviticus, ch. 7, on the words “He who cannot offer birds, let him offer fine flour”: What is fine flour, unless it signifies the disclosure through confession of hidden thoughts and crimes, which are known only to the sinner himself? And further: Let him do what is in his power: let him offer fine flour and disclose to the priest through confession the evils he had concealed within himself.… For it is right that the one who confesses his sins complete that confession, laying everything he can recall before the Lord, revealing some things and concealing none. That Ralph considered this confession necessary is clear from the same chapter: Just as a person cannot examine whether such a confession is true or false, so he cannot judge it or promise the one confessing a sure hope of pardon. For this plainly implies that there can be no hope of pardon without a good confession. — Peter de Honestis, called Cardinal Damian, who flourished in the eleventh century, says in Sermon 58 on St. Andrew, p. 287 of the Lyon edition of 1623: The fourth step is confession by the mouth: it must be made wholly, for one part of the sins must not be told while another is concealed. He had already indicated that this confession must be made to priests with these words: When you resolve to emerge from the abyss of vices, let your chief refuge be the one to whom your soul has been entrusted, whom the Lord has set over your head. And immediately: Let him take care never to mention anything he has received under the seal of confession, or to agree with anyone who speaks of it. And in the same place: God compels us to confess, he who sees us; if we are ashamed to speak here, what will happen in that great confusion where all things will be laid open to everyone? That is, on the day of the final judgment. Finally, at the end: Behold, I have discussed the sacrament of confession as well as I could, though not as fully as I wished.

We may gladly add what is reported in vol. 4 of d’Achery’s Spicilegium, ch. 12, among the ancient customs of the monastery of Cluny, collected by the Venerable Peter, abbot general of the whole Cluniac Order, in 1122: If anyone needs to come to confession for some offense, he approaches a priest.… First, lying prostrate with his whole body, he asks him for pardon; when the priest orders him to rise, after sitting down he says what he has to say. If something of the kind has happened to him at night which we discreetly call a weakness, before confession he says the seven penitential psalms, or, if he does not know the psalms, the Lord’s Prayer seven times. After he has confessed, on that day he does not kiss the Gospel book, approach for the kiss of peace, or make an offering. Hence auricular confession of hidden sins is inferred.

It would not be difficult to add to all these ancient testimonies more recent ones from the writings of Hugh and Richard of St. Victor, Peter the Venerable of Cluny, Peter of Blois, Peter, Abbot of Celle, and countless others who flourished before the pontificate of Innocent III. But since they carry less weight with the heretics, as they come closer to the time of the Council of Lateran, I pass them by here, adding only St. Bernard’s authority as the final confirmation. ✳

From Bernard, Sermon To the Knights of the Temple, ch. 12: What shall I say of Bethphage, where the sacrament of confession and the mystery of the priestly ministry are contained? If confession is a sacrament of divine law… The word in the sinner’s heart works salutary contrition; the word in his mouth removes harmful shame, lest it impede necessary confession. Therefore confession is necessary even for those whose hearts are contrite; yet priests… do not absolve even the contrite unless they have seen him and he has confessed.

THE HERETICS REPLY that when the councils and holy Fathers speak of the confession that must be made, they mean only either a general and indistinct confession, such as is made in the office of Prime, at the beginning of Mass, and at Compline, or only public confession of sins, such as was very common among the faithful in the early Church. Neither kind of confession is necessary by divine law, since each is required only by ecclesiastical institution; hence, as times and churches vary, each kind of confession is conducted differently. Therefore, and so on. — Against this: The holy Fathers and councils commend the confession instituted by Christ the Lord, in which a priest hears the varieties and distinctions among sins, including those that are hidden and lie entirely within the mind. Accordingly, they do not speak only of public and indistinct confession. Furthermore, public confession was made only before the priest-penitentiary, who was appointed to hear the faithful’s public confessions and penances. But the holy Fathers speak of confession to be made not only to one priest: Origen advises that one carefully consider which priest, as a physician, to confess to, and seek among many the wiser and more experienced one to whom the soul’s illnesses and weaknesses may be disclosed. Moreover, only one priest was appointed to receive public confessions, but one could not suffice to hear all the confessions of the faithful in a city. Finally, public confession presupposed another, secret confession made to a priest, by which he would consider which sins the penitent should publicly disclose for his own good and the Church’s edification. Hence, as Sozomen, to be cited below, reports, that priest-penitentiary had to be prudent and discreet about secrets, both to prescribe which sins should be disclosed or withheld and to guard the seal of confession faithfully and prudently in concealing hidden crimes. Therefore neither the councils nor the holy Fathers speak of public and indistinct confession.

THEY REPLY, first, that when the Fathers and councils speak of private and secret confession, they only imply that it is practiced as counsel, for the comfort and instruction of simple people, not by divine command as a remedy for sin. — Against this: The Fathers and councils speak of the confession that was necessary to obtain remission of sins and loosen their bonds. For Tertullian says in bk. On Penance, ch. 9: Confession of sins relieves as much as concealment aggravates. And in ch. 10: Is it better to lie hidden under condemnation than to be absolved openly?… If you hesitate about exomologesis, consider hell in your heart, which exomologesis extinguishes, etc.

ARGUMENTS OF THE HERETICS FROM HOLY SCRIPTURE ARE PROPOSED AND ANSWERED. — THE HERETICS FIRST OBJECT that Scripture contains various texts by which they try to prove that confession of sins is not necessary to obtain their remission and was not commanded under the Gospel Law. First, because God promises in Ezekiel 8³ that whenever a sinner groans, he will live, and God will remember his iniquities no more. Second, observance of the Gospel Law is far more pleasant and lighter than that of the Mosaic Law, according to the words of Christ the Lord in Matthew 18⁴: My yoke is sweet and my burden is light. But under the Old Law the Jews were not bound to confess their sins individually in order to obtain pardon for them; therefore Christians should not be bound to do so either. Third, priests of the New Law must remit sins in no other way than Christ remitted them, since they are ministers of Christ the Lord and act as his representatives. But whenever Christ the Lord remitted sins, he did not require prior confession and particular accusation of them, as is clear from the examples of Mary Magdalene, the paralytic, and the Canaanite woman. Therefore penitents need not enumerate each sin before priests in order to be absolved by them; it is enough to acknowledge generally that they are sinners and seek pardon from God through the priests’ ministry. — I deny the consequence, and in reply to the first I say: I grant that pardon is promised to a sinner who groans and keeps the precepts God established for each law concerning sin; I deny it of one who does not fulfill such precepts. Thus under the Old Law certain legal ceremonies had to be observed and offerings made for someone to obtain pardon for certain sins. Likewise under the New Law, to obtain such remission one must have recourse to receiving the sacraments appointed to cleanse sins. Groans and tears can do nothing for a penitent unless he receives those sacraments in fact or by intention. Otherwise baptism would not be necessary to cleanse iniquities, and a person could be saved without the commanded acts of faith, hope, and charity—an absurdity the heretics themselves readily acknowledge with us. Thus unless someone confesses sins in fact or by intention, he does not groan as he ought, since he is unwilling to apply to his wounds and illnesses the remedies that God has ordained as absolutely necessary. — To the second I say that the obligation of confession does not prevent the New Law from being far easier and lighter than the Mosaic Law. For under the New Law, once remission of sins has been granted, attrition of heart joined to the sacrament suffices to obtain remission; under the Old Law attrition was insufficient, and perfect contrition was required, demanding such firm and constant detestation of sin that perhaps few under that law—where grace did not flow so abundantly—could exercise such perfect contrition. Moreover, the usefulness of confession alleviates and softens its difficulty and burden. The Council of Trent says this in sess. XI, ch. 5: The difficulty of this kind of confession and the shame of disclosing sins might indeed seem burdensome, were it not lightened by so many and such great benefits and consolations that are most certainly conferred through absolution on all who worthily approach this sacrament. Tertullian explains more elegantly the benefits and advantages gained from disclosing sins in bk. On Penance, ch. 12: If you hesitate about exomologesis, consider hell in your heart, which exomologesis will extinguish, and first imagine the greatness of the punishment, so that you will not doubt that remedies can be obtained. After describing the torments of the underworld, he concludes that these penitential labors should be undertaken willingly, since by these remedies we avert the eternal punishments prepared for us: Since you know, then, that against hell, after those first memorials of the Lord’s baptism, there are still second aids in exomologesis, why do you abandon your salvation? Why do you delay being reproved, when you know that this can heal you? He develops this at length afterward. — St. Pacian likewise exhorts penitents to confession and satisfaction: If you hesitate at the torment of exomologesis, remember hell, which exomologesis will extinguish for you. Then, after describing the pain of hell through various comparisons, he teaches the faithful when and how it can be extinguished: Remember, brothers, that there is no exomologesis in the underworld, nor can penance be granted then, when the time for doing penance has passed. Make haste while you are alive.… By the faith of the Church I beg you, brothers; by my concern for you; by the common souls of us all, I implore and entreat you: do not be ashamed in this body, do not be ashamed, do not be reluctant to seize the timely remedies of salvation as soon as possible, to lay low your soul’s diseases, to wrap your body in the sacred, etc. To the extent that you have not spared yourselves punishment, to that extent God will spare you. If memory of labors already endured is pleasant, as the proverb says, how much more pleasant are labors whose fruit is so great and whose reward so abundant? Moreover, the burden of confession wholly serves the penitent’s benefit, since he has nothing to fear from disclosing sins of this kind to a priest, who is strictly bound to keep the seal. In addition, he has that tranquility of mind and confidence that his sins have been remitted by God, since he has taken every possible care to detest and confess them. For although he does not have perfect contrition, it is enough that he has attrition, by which his mind is turned away from sin and does not obstruct the sacrament’s efficacy. — To the third I say that although priests absolve sins only by the authority delegated and entrusted to them by Christ, it does not follow that they must loose sins in the same way as Christ the Lord. Since he possessed full and independent authority and knew all human acts and dispositions perfectly, he could remit sins without any prior particular accusation, and could also forgive them freely without requiring satisfaction. It is otherwise with priests of the New Law, who have been delegated by God as judges not only to loose sins but also to retain them and prescribe penalties according to the greater or lesser number and gravity of sins. They must therefore have distinct knowledge of the sins; they cannot have it, especially concerning hidden sins, unless the penitent himself makes them known through confession. Confession is therefore necessary for this purpose.

THEY OBJECT 2. Many testimonies of the holy Fathers seem to signify that sin can be remitted under the New Law either without any confession or at least by confession made to God alone, not to a human being. Thus St. Ambrose, bk. 10 of On Luke, ch. 22: Peter was sorrowful, he says, and wept because he had erred as a human being. I do not find what he said, but I find that he wept; I read of his tears, but not of satisfaction. What cannot be defended can be washed away; tears wash away the offense that shame forbids one to confess aloud. Likewise St. Augustine, bk. 10 of the Confessions, ch. 3: What have I to do with human beings, that they should hear my confessions, as though they could heal all my illnesses? The human race is curious to know another’s life, but lazy to correct its own. St. Prosper says the same in bk. 2 of On the Contemplative Life, ch. 7: Those whose sins are hidden from human knowledge, neither confessed by themselves nor made public by others, if they refuse to confess or amend them, will have as witness the God they now have, and as avenger the same God. But if they become their own judges and avengers of their iniquity, and impose on themselves the voluntary punishment of the strictest correction, they will exchange eternal punishments for temporal punishments, and restrain the fires of eternal fire with tears flowing from true compunction of heart. He therefore thinks that sinners will obtain pardon even if they do not confess their sins, provided they detest and weep for them. Moreover, Bede, bk. 5 of On Luke, ch. 69, considering the words of Christ the Lord addressed to the lepers he had miraculously cleansed—Show yourselves to the priests—explains them as follows: We find that the Lord sent none of those to whom he had granted these bodily benefits to the priests, except lepers, because the Jewish priesthood was a figure of the future royal priesthood in the Church, through which all who belong to the Body of Christ, the supreme and true Chief of Priests, are preserved. Whoever has been deprived of the true color of faith through heretical depravity, pagan superstition, Jewish perfidy, or even fraternal schism, as though stained by various colors, must come to the Church and show the true color of faith he has received. The Lord himself heals and corrects inwardly in conscience and understanding all other failings of health and, as it were, of the soul’s limbs and senses. Bede therefore thinks that only those afflicted by the uncleanness of spiritual leprosy must necessarily confess to priests, as he says above on James 5—that is, those infected with heresy, Judaism, paganism, or schism. He holds that other faults⁵ do not require a priest’s absolution and therefore do not require vocal confession; they are cleansed by the mutual prayers of equals, that is, any of the brethren, and are healed and corrected inwardly by Christ in conscience and understanding. From all this it is clear, therefore, that sacramental confession is not prescribed for everyone or necessary by divine law. — I deny the consequence. In reply to Ambrose, the Doctor says in d. 17, n. 29: “It may be said that the sacrament of penance was not instituted at the time of Peter’s denial, but after the Resurrection, when Christ said to his disciples, ‘Receive the Holy Spirit; whose sins you forgive,’ etc. Therefore at that time Peter was not bound to confession; nor was he bound after the sacrament was instituted, because his sin had already been blotted out by another remedy before the Resurrection. The same answer can be given concerning all the disciples’ unbelief during Christ’s Passion: afterward they were not bound to confession, because after the Resurrection they repented before the sacrament of penance was instituted. These cases rightly confirm that confession did not belong to the law of nature or the Mosaic Law.” As for St. Ambrose’s words, Tears wash away the offense that shame forbids one to confess aloud, the Doctor says they are not to be understood to mean that an offense is washed away without confession, whether actually or by intention; rather, contrition can be so great that sin is blotted out through it even before confession, although the sin is so grave that the subsequent confession of it is shameful. That is the Doctor’s view. By these words he means, first, that it is no wonder Peter did not have recourse to the sacrament of penance to wash away his offense, because the sacrament had not yet been instituted; it was instituted only after the Resurrection. Second, after the sacrament was instituted, Peter did not have to confess because by the power of his contrition he had already obtained pardon for his sin. Third, Peter’s tears contained a confession of his offense; for it sometimes happens that a person guilty of a crime, when convicted by another, confesses his offense through tears, which he dares not express aloud. Such were Peter’s tears, which made his offense known. For, as St. Ambrose observes in the same place, Peter preferred to confess his sin and be justified by confessing rather than aggravate it by denying it; “the righteous person is his own accuser at the outset,” and therefore he wept: “Modest tears never speak without an advocate; tears confess the crime without violating modesty.” Add to this that Christ the Lord, having supreme power to remit sins, could pardon the offense of Peter, who repented and mourned, without any confession or further satisfaction. — ✳ “The other objection, from Homily 3 of St. Maximus of Turin, On the Penance of St. Peter, is refuted in the same way. The same words of St. Ambrose are found there, and we are all the more willing to apply the same explanation to them because we learn from St. Maximus himself, in the homily on the feast of the most blessed Apostles Peter and Paul, reported in vol. 7 of the Library of the Fathers, p. 32, Cologne edition of 1618, that this power to remit sins was granted to Peter himself and the other Apostles only after the Resurrection.” ✳ — In reply to St. Augustine I say that he is not treating there of sacramental confession, but of a confession that makes satisfaction for past crimes remitted through baptism. It was instituted so that God’s mercy might thereby be more greatly moved and stirred to confer grace, and so that God might be celebrated with praise and thanksgiving; also so that each of the faithful might be moved to amend his life and hope for pardon by this example of penance and satisfaction. Such was the public confession that St. Augustine himself wrote in thirteen books of Confessions about all the sins of his life, to spur himself to more intense and greater compunction of heart, offer greater satisfaction to God, and commend God’s wondrous mercy toward him to everyone. — In reply to St. Prosper I say that he understands there only public confession, which he declares not to be absolutely necessary. For he adds: “Those who hold some ecclesiastical rank and secretly commit a crime will more easily please God if they acknowledge their crime voluntarily, rather than being convicted by a human judgment; they either attest to it through their own confessions or, while others remain unaware of it, impose on themselves the sentence of voluntary excommunication and, separated from the altar they served not in spirit but in office, mourn their life as though it were dead.” That he is really speaking there only of public confession, by which sins are declared to a multitude, is clear from the words while others remain unaware: he means that sins are sometimes remitted without this sort of public confession, but not without private confession, through which sinners can be said to become judges and avengers of their own iniquity. Before they approach the sacramental tribunal, they themselves acknowledge and condemn their sin and exact from themselves the penalties imposed by the priest. — Finally, in reply to Bede, I answer that by those words he excludes only public confession, which must be made to the whole Church by one who attacks the Church’s common faith, such as those who afflict the Church through heretical depravity, pagan superstition, Jewish perfidy, or schism. All these must perform public confession and penance in order to obtain pardon. Other private faults, however, need not be disclosed publicly in this way; it is enough to disclose them to a priest in private confession, so that the Lord may correct such illnesses through that priest, who acts in God’s place and through whose ministry God remits and heals all confessed crimes.

✳ “THE OBJECTIONS drawn from the scholastic Doctors and Gratian, as well as from the practice and teaching of the Greek Church, are ANSWERED.” — THEY OBJECT 1. If confession were of divine law, there would never have been doubt in the Church that it must be made as necessary; yet many theologians and Doctors, and Gratian, the collector of the canons, called this into doubt and said that many others had already done so. For St. Thomas, examining in In IV Sent., d. 17, whether it is enough to confess to God alone, says: The Master and Gratian set this down as an opinion; but now, after the Church’s determination under Innocent III, it must be considered heresy. St. Bonaventure agrees with him in the same distinction, and rightly so. For the Master of the Sentences, bk. 4, d. 17, says: For even learned men are found to hold different views on these matters, because the Doctors seem to have handed down varied and almost opposing teachings about them. And Gratian, the collector of the canons, asks in d. 1 of On Penance: Can anyone satisfy God by contrition of heart and secret satisfaction alone, without confession by the mouth? For some say that anyone can merit pardon for a crime without confession made to the Church of God and the judgment of a priest. Further, in the same distinction, on the canon Omnis, he says: Therefore sin is not remitted in confession, since it is proved to have been remitted already; confession is made, then, to show penance, not to obtain pardon. Just as circumcision was given to Abraham as a sign of righteousness, not as a cause of justification, so confession is offered to a priest as a sign of pardon received, not as a cause of remission to be obtained. And on canon Quamvis in the same distinction, after citing canons on both sides, Gratian adds: We have briefly set out the authorities and arguments on which each view of satisfaction and confession rests; to which of these one should adhere is left to the reader’s judgment, for each has wise and religious men among its supporters. Therefore it was not always known in the Church that oral and sacramental confession was necessary for salvation. — ✳ “I answer: There has never been any reasonable doubt about the necessity of sacramental confession, since it follows clearly from the power to bind and loose given to priests and from the Church’s perpetual practice and tradition. If some Doctors in the time of the Master of the Sentences used to support confession made to God alone, Lombard himself was far removed from their error, as is clear from d. 17 of bk. 4 of the Sentences: For just as interior penance is commanded to us, so too are confession by the mouth and exterior satisfaction, if a priest is available. Hence the person who does not intend to confess is not truly penitent. And in the next paragraph of the same distinction he concludes: From these and other points it is shown beyond doubt that confession must be offered first to God, then to a priest, and that one cannot otherwise enter Paradise if the opportunity is available. From these words, “it is shown beyond doubt,” we understand plainly that Lombard did not consider doubtful the view of those who denied the necessity of confession. Nor do the words cited in the objection favor them. He did not say that the ancient Doctors had fallen into that erroneous opinion because they handed down varied and almost opposing teachings about these matters, but because they seem to have handed them down. Nothing prevents the novelty of this opinion from having provided some occasion for the decree of the Council of Lateran and the canon Omnis utriusque sexus, etc. Besides, it is not so unusual for false opinions to occupy the minds of learned men before the Church has judged them. Before the Council of Nicaea the Fathers did not speak so precisely about the mystery of the Trinity; before the Pelagian heresy arose, the Greek Fathers had not penetrated the mystery of grace and predestination so deeply. — As for Gratian, we read in dialogue 18 of Antonio Agustín’s On the Correction of Gratian: Some think these two treatises on penance are not Gratian’s. And farther on: “I found these words in a note: This treatise on penance does not seem to be Gratian’s, but someone’s a little earlier; it seems to have been transferred here in its entirety and is absent from the ancient copies.” Therefore it is not fully established that Gratian considered this opinion about confession doubtful and uncertain; and if Gratian himself did so, he did not lend his authority to that new opinion that confession should be made to God alone. If we are to believe St. Bonaventure, bk. 4 of the Sentences, d. 17, On Sacramental Confession, part 2: The Master and Gratian cite this in their decretals, he says, as an opinion; yet both disapprove it and determine the contrary. Moreover, there is no room for doubt that Gratian’s entire work abounds in many errors and mistakes, as we learn more fully from the Roman corrections and the dialogues of Antonio Agustín.” ✳ Hence Gregory XIII, in the Bull for the emendation of the Decree, clearly indicates that Gratian and other authors of canon law fell into certain errors, but should nevertheless be pardoned in some measure because that matter had not yet been clearly defined in their time, as it became known after the definitions of the ecumenical councils of Lateran, Florence, and Trent, which were later than they. For Gratian wrote the Decree around the year of the Lord 1150. Moreover, among all the canons and authorities Gratian cites against the necessity of confession, there is no canon that clearly proves confession is unnecessary, and none that cannot readily be explained either as referring to public confession not required for all sins, or to remission of sin obtained through contrition of heart and confession of the mind made to God alone before sacramental confession—which we certainly do not deny.”

URGENT. The necessity of Confession was not always acknowledged and accepted in the Church, whose observance many Churches did not judge necessarily binding; but this is not so with the observance of Confession. For the Greeks assert that it is to be made to God alone, as Gratian himself teaches in the final chapter, De Poenit., d. 1, on the authority of Theodore, Archbishop of Canterbury, a Tharsian by birth and consequently brought up among the Greeks, whom, Baronius says under the year 668, Pope Vitalian sent to England. Theodore writes in his Penitential: Some say that sins ought to be confessed to God alone, as the Greeks do; others judge that they ought to be confessed to priests, as nearly the whole holy Church does. Both practices take place within the holy Church, not without great fruit: the former, provided that it is to God alone, is the practice of the perfect (who, as the Gloss there says, have only venial sins and therefore do not need a special oral Confession), so that we may say with David: “I made my sin known to you, and I did not conceal my injustice. I said: I will confess my injustices against myself to the Lord”; and you forgave the impiety of my sin. Nevertheless, we must follow the institution of the Apostle, that we confess our sins to one another and pray for one another, that we may be saved. Thus Confession made to God alone, which is the practice of the just, purges sins; whereas Confession made to a priest teaches how those sins are purged. For God, the author of salvation and holiness, often provides this remedy of his penance by an invisible administration, and often through the ministry of physicians, that is, through the absolution of priests. Thus Theodore.

I answer, setting aside the various answers of others, that the words (as the Greeks do) seem to have slipped into Gratian's text through the ignorance of an unskilled scholiast, from the margin to which they had been prefixed. For these words are found neither in the Capitularies nor in canon 32 of the second Council of Chalon under Leo III, whose entire canon seems to have been taken from Theodore's Penitential. An indication of the soundness of this answer is that at the Council of Florence, where all those matters in which the Greeks differed from the Latins were discussed, no mention was made of the Greeks'⁶ failure to practice Confession—except that Pope Eugenius asked certain Greek doctors why their priests did not confess their sins before celebrating the sacrifice, as if Eugenius had assumed that oral Confession was in use among the Greek laity, since he questioned them only about their priests. Arcadius, however, an expert in Greek rites, writes, in treating the sacrament of penance, that the abuse among Greek priests of not confessing was introduced because of the severity of the penitential canons: in various canons of penance that he cites, bishops and priests are ordered, on account of certain sins, to remain suspended from office while they confess them. Moreover, certain highly learned Greeks among the schismatics say that this Confession is practiced among them. Nicholas Cabasilas, in Explanation of the Liturgy, ch. 29, plainly teaches sacramental Confession, writing: We know that after Christ's death faith, penance, Confession, and the prayer of priests are also necessary; nor can a person be freed from sins unless these have come first. Jeremias, Patriarch of Constantinople, in his Eastern censure of the Augsburg Confession, ch. 11, accuses the Lutherans of denying the necessity of Confession, for he writes: We say that the one who confesses then obtains a complete cure of his sins, if he recounts all his sins and all their circumstances, insofar as his mind suffices and insofar as he can remember, with a contrite and humbled heart, and resolutely do everything that most directly opposes the sins he has committed, correcting arrogance by humility. But suppose that the words (as the Greeks do) are in Theodore's canon: nothing follows from his attributing the error indefinitely to the Greeks except that some Greeks held it, perhaps only priests in their own case; it cannot be inferred that this custom prevailed among all Greeks. Indeed, Nicephorus Cartophylax says that this custom of confessing was most ancient among the Greeks, in his letter to Theodore on the power of binding and loosing, a fragment of which survives in volume III of the Library of the Fathers. He writes: Of old everyone had to approach the bishops themselves and disclose their hidden matters to them, and thus receive either reconciliation or rejection. I do not know what happened, or why these practices are observed less, though I think that the bishops, wearied by the tedium of the business and the turbulent thronging of the multitude, transferred this task to monks—to those, namely, who are truly approved and are better able to be useful.... If someone is experienced, upright, and also exercises the priesthood, one should approach him first. Whatever Greeks held that error, Theodore does not establish it but entirely rejects it. First, because he sets against it the contrary doctrine of the whole Church, saying that some say sins should be confessed to God alone, as the Greeks do, and others to priests, as nearly the whole holy Church does. For the particle (nearly) excepts only a few Greeks, who, although entangled in this and certain other serious errors, are nevertheless still tolerated in the Church. Second, the particle (nearly) seems to be an addition; it is not found in Ivo of Chartres, part 15 of the Decretum, ch. 155, nor in Burchard, book 19, ch. 149, where that canon is found with only these words: “as the whole holy Church does.” Third, to approve the dogma of the whole Church concerning the necessity of confessing to priests, Theodore says that both practices—to confess to God alone and to confess to priests—take place within the holy Church not without great fruit, because Confession made to a priest presupposes the Confession made to God alone out of humility and contrition of heart. Fourth, he reconciles the contrary opinions in particular—one saying that confession is to be made to God alone, the other that it is also to be made to priests—by saying that for the perfect, that is, the just, and those who are conscious of no mortal sin, it suffices to confess to God alone, and there is no need to confess to priests; for others, however, namely those infected with mortal sin, it is necessary to confess to a priest. Therefore he asserts that we must follow the institution of the Apostle. Only in this way, he says, are we to confess our sins to God, who remits sins, and this is the practice of the perfect, or just, as he says later; nevertheless, we must follow the institution of the Apostle, that we confess our sins to one another; or, as the Capitularies have it: “both practices take place within the holy Church, not without great fruit: only in this way, that we confess to God, from whom comes remission of sins, and that, following the institution of the Apostle, we confess to one another.”

YOU WILL PRESS: From the same canon the efficacy of external Confession made to a priest seems to be denied, for it says: Thus Confession made to God alone, which is the practice of the just, purges sins; whereas that made to priests teaches how those sins are purged. Therefore Confession made to a priest does not remove sins. — I deny the inference: for those words do not deny the efficacy of Confession but determine the manner in which sins are removed, as if he said: God alone, as principal author and chief cause, pardons sins by remission; the ordinary means by which he pardons them is Confession made to a priest. Hence he immediately adds: “For God, the author and giver of salvation and holiness, often provides this remedy of his penance by an invisible administration, and often through the ministry of physicians.” The editors of that Decree observe that these words were so expressed that, by the word operation, the canon teaches that the ordinary means of purging is through the priest's absolutions: for God (they say in the margin), as he immediately adds, grants health often through the ministry of physicians; he does not say merely by showing it.

THEY PRESS AGAIN: The opinion of the canonists could not be made clearer than by the Gloss of John the Teutonic. But at d. 5, De Poenit., at the beginning, he teaches that Confession of sins was introduced by human law, for he says: We must therefore consider when oral Confession was instituted. Some say it was instituted in Paradise immediately after the sin, when the Lord said to Adam, “Adam, where are you?” For he asked so that, when Adam confessed his sin, an example might be given to others for confessing thereafter. But since in that question the Lord seemed to have urged confession less explicitly, afterward he questioned Cain the fratricide more explicitly: “Where is your brother?” Others say that it was first instituted under the Law, when Joshua commanded Achan to confess his crime and he was stoned. Others say it was instituted in the New Testament by James, saying, “Confess your sins to one another.” But it is better to say that it was instituted by a certain Tradition of the universal Church rather than by the authority of the New or Old Testament; and the Tradition of the Church is binding, like a precept. Hence he concludes: therefore Confession of mortal sins is necessary among us, but not among the Greeks, because such a Tradition did not come down among them, just as they do not consecrate with unleavened bread, but with leavened. — I deny the antecedent: “For,” says the Doctor, d. 17, n. 9, “the Church would not have attempted to impose so arduous a precept on all Christians, unless it were a divine precept; or else there is no record of the Church imposing this precept, since before this the Saints held that the precept of Confession was binding. For if the chapter Omnis utriusque sexus is cited, it is clear that it belongs to Innocent III at the Lateran Council; but before that time Augustine had been preaching for more than eight hundred years that Confession was very necessary.... Nor would a canonist readily find a Council or a precept in which the precept to make Confession is properly expressed, as we are speaking of it here.” Hence the Doctor concludes that the Glossator “speaks irrationally”: “For it would be shameful for a theologian to say that something is in the Bible and not know where to find it; and just as inappropriate it must be for a canonist to say that something comes from the universal Tradition of the Church and not find it in the canon, if the canon sufficiently contains the universal Traditions of the Church. Yet he cites no chapter of the canon for this Tradition; he only adds afterward that the Tradition of the Church is binding.” —

✳ “Furthermore, so that no doubt remain that the Greek Church agrees with the Latin Church concerning the faith and practice of Confession, it will not be out of place to consult their own Euchologia, in which are read the prayers and rites containing the whole doctrine of the Church concerning this sacrament. In one of these prayers we find: O Lord, lover of mankind and forbearing toward sinners, hear now also the prayer over your servant, and grant him the means of penance and remission of sins, forgiving him through me, your unworthy servant, every voluntary and involuntary offense. For you, Lord, said to your holy Apostles: Receive the Holy Spirit: whose sins you forgive, they are forgiven them; whose sins you retain, they are retained; and whatever you bind and loose on earth shall be bound and loosed in heaven. And in another prayer we read: May God, who for us became man and takes away the sins of the whole world, in his most gracious kindness himself receive all these things which you, brother, have recounted before my unworthiness, forgiving you everything in this age and in the one to come. And in another: You, good and most merciful Lord, forgive all the things which my spiritual son has confessed to your lowliness with a contrite heart. Finally, in another: I absolve you from all your sins, whatever you have confessed before God and my unworthiness. — This is how the sacrament of penance is administered among the Greeks. The sinner approaches a spiritual father and, sitting with him, confesses his sins. When he has heard them, if he finds the penitent's faults to be light, he gives no absolution, but dismisses him with a friendly admonition to exercise himself in pious works. If the penitent has confessed deadly crimes, he examines them in the Ninth Canon placed beside him and, having assessed them according to the rigor of the canons, chastises him with the penalties they prescribe. Finally, he prays for the penitent and recites over him the prayers cited above. This is not only the discipline of the more recent Greek Church, but also of the ancient Church, as is clear from the Penitential of John the Faster, Patriarch of Constantinople, who was appointed in the place of the deceased Eutychius in the year of the Lord 585. For in that book we read the entire rite for administering this sacrament. The priest takes the penitent and places him before the altar; he sings the Trisagion, psalms, and antiphons with him, recites the prayer written there, makes him kneel with him three times, and then, when he has risen, addresses him thus: Spiritual son, I do not first and foremost receive your Confession, nor do I grant you absolution; rather, God receives the confession of your sins through me (for such a work belongs to him), and through our voice dispenses and grants their remission, as he himself declared in his own voice: Whatever you bind or loose on earth shall be bound or loosed in heaven. Therefore reveal and declare before the holy Angels, and conceal nothing from me of what you have done, as if you were confessing to God, who knows the secrets of hearts; and he, the knower of secrets, will wipe away all that you reveal.... Although it seems to you shameful and disgraceful to reveal deeds liable to shame and disgrace, nevertheless be firmly and fully persuaded that through present shame you are freed from future shame, and by obeying the commandments you become worthy not only of pardon but also of crowns. Then follow the forms of questions about each sin and its circumstances, to which these words are added: And, to speak plainly, he must inquire into everything with the utmost care.... But after he has received the Confession of all the sins, while the confessor lies prostrate, he shall add: May our Lord and Master Jesus Christ God forgive you all the things which you have confessed in his sight to my nothingness. — Similar things are read in the Canonary, or penitential booklet, of John the Monk; in the penitential booklet of an anonymous author, copied by John Morinus from the manuscripts of the library of the Most Eminent Cardinal Barberini; in the book of Simeon of Thessalonica, On the Sacraments; and in the book On the Seven Sacraments of the Church by Gabriel of Philadelphia, Metropolitan, printed at Venice in 1600, where he declares the three parts of penance to be contrition of heart, confession of the mouth, and satisfaction in deed. He defines Confession thus: Confession is the voluntary declaration by the lips made by a sinner on account of former shameful acts, and the voluntary, clear accusation of secrets before one who has legitimate and canonical authority. — From these things it is clear how improperly the heretics of our time invoke the schismatic Greeks in support of their error. For although among them the use of this sacrament is not so frequent, because their discipline has been weakened, just as faith has been emptied, it is nevertheless certain and beyond doubt that they hold the same doctrine of Confession as the Latin Church.” ✳

THE FACT OF NECTARIUS IS PROPOSED AND EXAMINED. — THEY OBJECT 4. If Confession were truly of divine law, no pastor of the Church could rightly abolish it. But Nectarius, Bishop of Constantinople, abolished auricular Confession in his Church on account of a scandal arising from the Confession of a certain noblewoman, as is clear from Sozomen, book 7 of the History, ch. 16, where he recounts the matter thus: “In the Church of Constantinople a priest assigned to penitents discharged this office until a certain noblewoman, on account of the sins she had confessed, was ordered by this priest to fast and supplicate God; and for this reason, because she had disclosed that in the temple, while lingering there, she had been violated by a deacon. When this became known, the people were indignant as if an insult had been inflicted on the Church, and the priests were pressed with the bitterest accusations. Nectarius, therefore, perplexed⁷ as to what remedy to apply to this misfortune, deprived the adulterer himself of the diaconate; and, on the advice of certain people that he should allow each person freely to approach communion in the mysteries according to his own conscience and confidence, he dismissed that priest Penitentiary from office.” He adds that other Eastern Churches imitated this custom. From these things Calvin concludes, book 3 of the Institutes, ch. 4, n. 7: If auricular Confession was God's law, who dared Nectarius repeal and overturn it? Was Nectarius, a holy man of God, approved by all the testimonies of the ancients, accused of heresy and schism? By the same judgment they will condemn the Church of Constantinople, where, Sozomen says, the custom of confessing had not merely been set aside for a time, but had fallen into disuse down to his own memory; indeed, they will accuse not the Church of Constantinople alone, but all the Eastern Churches of defection, for they neglected an irrevocable law—if what they say is true—commanded to all Christians. — I deny the minor premise: for, as Bellarmine, Suarez, d. 17, q. 2, Vazquez, q. 90, a. 1, dub. 3, and others teach very clearly, first, this event may be denied: both because, as St. Gregory declares, book 6 of the Letters, ch. 159, the Apostolic See does not accept Sozomen's history, since it contains many lies; and because Sozomen himself, being strongly devoted to the Novatians, enemies of the sacrament of penance, could have invented this story without basis to favor their party; and because he does not report the story and sequence of this priest Penitentiary's dismissal as a certain, established event of his own time, but as a disputed matter on which different people give different accounts. For he says: What this was, or whence it took its origin, or for what reason it was abolished, others may perhaps report differently; I shall explain what seems to me. By these words he indicates that he is relating something he had not seen or received from trustworthy witnesses, but what he judged more probable. — But since Nicephorus, book 12 of the History, ch. 20, and Socrates, book 5 of his History, ch. 19, recount this event of Nectarius, I answer secondly: Sozomen does not claim that Nectarius abolished auricular and sacramental Confession, as Calvin contends, since in that same passage he asserts that it is necessary to obtain pardon. Rather, he merely reports that public Confession was abolished, along with that ecclesiastical custom by which a priest Penitentiary was appointed to receive public and more serious crimes and to distinguish those for which public penance was to be performed from those for which it was not to be performed publicly. Nectarius abolished this custom because of the scandal that arose. — That this was Sozomen's view is clear from the words he writes before those quoted in the objection: “Since,” he says, “it is known that not to sin is divine and beyond human nature, and God has commanded that pardon be granted to penitents, even if they have frequently offended, and since confession of sins is necessary to obtain pardon, priests from the beginning seem to have regarded it as hateful to pronounce sins as if in a theater, with the multitude of the Church listening. Therefore they appointed to this office a certain presbyter, especially distinguished for integrity of life, and also discreet and wise, to whom those who had sinned came and confessed the events of their lives. He, having prescribed what each ought to do or suffer for each person's offense, absolved them, so that they might exact from themselves the penalties for the sins they had committed. The Novatians, indeed, who had no concern for penance, had no need of this; among the other sects it continues to this day. It is carefully observed in the Western Churches, especially the Roman Church, where the place of the penitents is evident: they stand there sorrowful and as if mourning, and at the end of God's sacrifice, not having received communion, those who were permitted to become true worshippers of God cast themselves face down on the ground with wailing and lamentation. The bishop, meeting them from the opposite side with lamentation, likewise falls to the ground with a cry, and the whole Church of God is drenched in tears. After this the bishop first rises and raises those lying down, and, after praying sufficiently for the penitents, dismisses them privately. Then, each of his own accord, by fasting, abstinence from bathing, food, or other fitting means, afflicts himself for as long as the bishop has prescribed. Finally, when the appointed day has passed and the penalty has been discharged as if a debt, he is absolved from his sins and joined to the people in the Church. The Roman priests have observed these practices from the very beginning down to our own memory. In the Church of Constantinople, however, a presbyter assigned to penitents discharged this office, namely, until the scandal involving a noblewoman occurred.” From this passage of Sozomen it is plainly clear, first, that a certain Penitentiary was appointed to preside over public penances; second, that public penitents disclosed to this priest individually the sins of their whole lives, both public and hidden, in a special Confession—for no other reason was a man of integrity and discretion appointed to this office; for if they had confessed only public sins to him, such great discretion would not have been demanded of him; third, that after privately confessing their lives to the Penitentiary, the penitents, at his command or counsel, later disclosed certain public matters, or even hidden ones, in public Confession. For this reason a wise priest was assigned the office: to prescribe what each person should do for each offense and what penalties they should impose on themselves by fasting, supplication, or even public confession of hidden matters, just as the matron disclosed her liaison with the deacon, though it had been secret. Hence Sozomen disapproves of the dismissal of that Penitentiary, because it removed the restraint on sinning by taking away the shame of those who confessed their own offenses to him. For he immediately adds to the words quoted in the objection: “He dismissed that priest Penitentiary from office, a decision that was soon afterward invalidated; nevertheless, by then, as I think, with age itself and its accompanying laxity and severity beginning gradually to give way to promiscuous and dissolute life—for previously, in my view, sins were fewer both because of the shame of those who declared their own offenses to him and because of the severity of those appointed judges in the matter; above all, that shame belonged to the disclosure of hidden things.” — This answer is confirmed by Socrates, book 5 of the History, ch. 19, who writes as follows: “At that time it seemed good to the Church that the priests who presided over penance in each Church should be removed. The reason was this: from the time when the Novatians had separated themselves from the Church and refused communion with those who had fallen during the persecution under Decius, the bishops of the Churches added a canon that in each Church a certain priest should preside over penance, so that those who had fallen after baptism might confess their sins before the priest appointed for this purpose. This canon still stands firm among other sects; only those who hold the faith of consubstantiality with the Novatians, and agree with them in that faith, rejected the priest Penitentiary. The Novatians, indeed, had never admitted this as a kind of appendage, even at the beginning. Although the bishops now presiding over the Churches maintained this institution for a long time, in the time of Nectarius, bishop, they changed it on account of a certain deed that had then perhaps occurred in the Churches. A certain noblewoman approaches the priest Penitentiary; she confesses in detail the sins she had committed after baptism. The priest commands the woman to devote herself to fasting and continual prayers, so that, together with her Confession of sins, she might show a work worthy of penance. The woman, going further in her confession, accuses herself of another offense and reveals that a deacon of the Church had slept with her. Because this crime was thus disclosed, the deacon was expelled from the Church; a great uproar then arose among the people, who were indignant not only over the crime committed but also because a grave mark of infamy and disgrace had thereby been placed on the Church. Therefore, since the priests were strongly reproached on this account, a certain Eudemon, a presbyter of the Church, an Alexandrian by birth, advised Bishop Nectarius to remove the priest Penitentiary and give everyone free leave to approach the mysteries according to his own conscience; for in this way alone, he said, would the Church be free of every stain of infamy. I myself heard all this from Eudemon and did not hesitate at all to commit it to this history.” — Cassiodorus in the Tripartite History, book 9, ch. 36, and Nicephorus Callistus in the History, book 12, ch. 25, copy and report the same account from Socrates and Sozomen.

From these things it is plainly inferred that Nectarius abolished only three things. First, the authority or office of the priest Penitentiary appointed over public penitents, dismissing him from office either because he had imprudently imposed this on that woman, or because he knew she would disclose it in her public Confession and had not prevented her, or because he had prescribed a longer period of penance for the woman in the Church—hence there arose the occasion for the crime or scandal. Second, he proscribed public penance and its practice, for directing which that priest Penitentiary had been appointed, because that scandal had arisen on the occasion of this public penance. Third, he prohibited public Confession, which was, as it were, a part of public penance and through which the woman's disgraceful act with the deacon became known to the people. But he did not abolish private Confession, nor dismiss the priests appointed by the bishop to receive private and sacramental Confessions, nor take away their power to absolve. This is inferred, first, because he abolished only that Confession which had been instituted on the occasion of the Novatians; but private Confession had long been in use before the Novatians, as is clear from Irenaeus, Origen, etc. Second, he removed only that Confession for which the priest Penitentiary had been specially assigned; but he had not been assigned to hear private Confession, for it could not be that only one priest would suffice to hear the private Confessions of so many people in the very large and populous city of Constantinople, seat of the empire. Third, Nectarius abolished only that Confession which had occasioned the scandal, and whose abolition seemed necessary to quiet the tumult stirred up among the people of Constantinople. This was public Confession, for, according to Socrates, that tumult was stirred up among the people because the woman, going further in her confession, had divulged the disgraceful act committed with the deacon. Nor does it matter that the Greek text of Socrates does not contain the words going further in her confession: for other words added immediately, namely she accuses herself of another offense, plainly show her second Confession. For that self-accusation by which she discloses her disgraceful act with the deacon is an accusation, or Confession, not a private one, which was entirely secret, but a public one through which this crime became known. How could this hidden crime have come to the knowledge of both clergy and people, and have been the cause of the deacon's expulsion from his rank and so great a tumult among the people? Therefore Christo-Phorsonus did not add those words, going further in her confession, to the Greek text of Socrates without good reason in his translation.

YOU WILL PRESS: Nectarius abolished that Confession which a sinner was bound to make before approaching the Eucharist worthily; but this is what we call sacramental Confession. Therefore he abolished it. The minor premise is established. The major is proved: for, according to Socrates, Nectarius gave free leave for each person to approach communion in the mysteries according to his own conscience. According to Sozomen, he allowed each person freedom to approach communion in the mysteries as he himself judged and considered in his conscience. According to Cassiodorus, he left each person to communicate according to the judgment of his conscience. According to Nicephorus, he allowed each person to communicate and partake of the immaculate mysteries according to his conscience and confidence. Therefore he allowed them thereafter to approach the Eucharist without any private sacramental Confession. — I deny the major premise: for the freedom later granted by Nectarius to the penitents consisted in this: before approaching the Eucharist, they were no longer compelled to confess to the priest Penitentiary, but could confess to whichever priest they wished among those appointed by the bishop. For the freedom granted must be understood in conformity with what is reported there, namely, that public penitents were freed from the burden previously imposed on them. That burden was that before approaching the mysteries they had to confess individually the acts of their lives to the Penitentiary, and no one else could absolve them. Nectarius freed them from this obligation, as well as from the burden of public penance and public Confession, by which at times they were compelled to disclose certain matters before the entire multitude of the people. Thereafter they were permitted to communicate without these burdens; but it does not follow that those penitents were permitted to approach the Eucharist without cleansing from sins, and therefore not without private Confession. This is clear even to the heretics against whom we argue, for they say that people ought not to be admitted to the Eucharist unless they have first been examined by a pastor. Hence Melanchthon says in the Augsburg Confession, § On Confession: “Confession has not been abolished among us; for the Body of the Lord is not usually offered unless people have first been examined and absolved.” And Calvin, book 3 of the Institutes, ch. 4, commands “that the sheep present themselves to the pastor whenever they wish to partake of the sacred supper; I will not object to this, and would especially like it observed everywhere.”

YOU WILL PRESS: The Penitentiary, instituted on the occasion of the Novatians, had to be a keeper of secrets, according to Sozomen; one who keeps a secret, according to Cassiodorus; and silent, according to Nicephorus. But if he had been instituted to govern penitents, public penalties, and public Confessions, such strict observance of secrecy and the seal would not have been demanded of him. Therefore he was instituted only to hear private Confessions; and so, once this office was abolished, private Confessions seem to have been abolished. — I deny the minor premise: for, according to Sozomen, he had to prescribe for each person's offense what each ought to do or pay, so that they might exact from themselves the penalties due for their crimes. According to the Tripartite History, he imposed many things according to each person's faults. For this purpose, a most careful examination of hidden faults, intentions, and circumstances was essential, so that he might enjoin satisfactions and penalties proportionate to the offenses and useful to the penitent and the Church, and might even order some hidden matters to be declared in public Confession. But he could not do this without private Confession, which requires a man who is discreet, upright, and prudent. There were therefore two Confessions by which public penitents at that time confessed their sins. One was secret or private, in which, from the beginning of their penance, they disclosed to the Penitentiary each act of their lives, so that they might receive from him the manner and method of penance. The other was public, which they sometimes made as part of satisfaction, when the penitent's benefit or the needs of the Church required it. Socrates indicates both in the penance of a most noble woman. First, the private Confession before the Penitentiary, when she approached that priest and confessed in detail the sins she had committed after baptism. Second, the public Confession before the people, when the priest, having heard the woman's secret Confession, imposed a fine on her and commanded that by fasting and continual prayers, together with Confession of sins, she show a work worthy of penance. While the matron was carrying out this Confession, she went too far in confessing and, perhaps through indiscreet devotion or through the priest's imprudent counsel, disclosed so openly her shameful crime with the deacon that an uproar arose among the people and the deacon was expelled from the Church.

YOU WILL PRESS AGAIN: Women, on account of the modesty and bashfulness of their sex, did not perform public penance. Therefore the matron who gave Nectarius occasion to abolish the Penitentiary did not make a public Confession. — I distinguish the antecedent: they did so less frequently than men, I grant; they never did so at all, I deny. For Jerome says in his Epitaph for Fabiola to Oceanus: “That woman of the highest nobility, because she had married a second husband after repudiating the first—who, we are told, had such great vices that not even a prostitute or a lowly slave could endure them—after the death of her second husband came to her senses so completely that she put on sackcloth, publicly acknowledged her error, and, with the whole city of Rome looking on, before Easter, stood in the order of penitents in the Lateran Basilica, while the bishop, presbyters, and all the people wept; she bowed low, her crime exposed, her face disfigured, her hands rough, and her neck filthy.”

YOU WILL PRESS: Public penance and Confession had prevailed for a long time before the Novatian schism and heresy. Therefore the Confession abolished by Nectarius was not public Confession, but the one we call secret and sacramental. — I distinguish the antecedent: they prevailed in a wholly different way from their being instituted by bishops on the occasion of the Novatian heresy, I grant; in the same way, I deny. I admit indeed that before that Novatian schism most people performed public penance and publicly confessed their sins either to the bishop or to the priest whom they selected from among many designated by the bishop to receive Confessions, as is clear from Origen cited above. For at that time they were not bound to disclose their sins to one priest alone, as happened later on the occasion of the Novatians. The bishops then decreed that public penitents should go to a certain presbyter placed in charge of penances and penitents, to confess their sins to him and fulfill the penance and satisfaction prescribed by him. No mention of the institution of this public Penitentiary is found among the ancient Doctors of the Church before the persecution under Decius and the Novatian schism. But from the time when the Novatians withdrew and separated themselves from the Church, because they refused communion with those who had fallen during the persecution and whom certain prelates had admitted to communion too readily, without due satisfaction and penance—people about whom St. Cyprian complains bitterly in his sermon On the Lapsed—the Church, so as henceforth to counter so grave an evil, established by a new decree that those who had fallen after baptism on account of certain public crimes should not be admitted to participation in the sacred mysteries until they had completed the more private labors of penance prescribed by this Penitentiary. This was so that, against the Novatians, they might show that the Church had some power to remit sins, since they placed a presbyter over penitents so that, after being directed by him through exercises of penance, they could be reconciled by the bishop. It was also so that they might maintain the severity of discipline and place this priest over them, so that through the voluntary penalties of penitents they might make them, in some measure, proportionate to their offenses before receiving them into the mysteries; they would not admit them unless, with the help and guidance of that priest, they had first been cleansed of more serious sins through worthy labors and fruits of penance.

THE HERETICS INSIST: Nectarius abolished that Confession which afterward was no longer practiced in the Church of Constantinople. But every Confession that people were bound to make after this abolition was no longer practiced there. Therefore, etc. The major premise is established from what has been said. The minor is proved from St. Chrysostom, Nectarius's successor in the See of Constantinople, who teaches in many places that one ought not to confess to people but to God alone, especially in homily 2 on Psalm 50, where he says: Tell your sins so that you may wipe them away; if you are ashamed to tell them to someone, tell them each day in your soul. I do not say that you should confess them to your fellow servant, lest he reproach you; tell them to God, who heals them. And in the sermon On Penance and Confession he says: Now, however, it is not necessary to confess before witnesses; let the examination of offenses take place in thought; let this judgment be without a witness; let God alone see you confessing. And in homily 4 On Lazarus: For one ought not to confess to a fellow servant, who might make it public, but to the Lord. Here St. Chrysostom opposes to the Confession he disapproves the one made to God, in the soul and thought, and within one's conscience. Therefore St. Chrysostom disapproves of every Confession made to people. — I deny the minor premise, and in answer to its proof I say that St. Chrysostom disapproves only public Confession, not private Confession. For he speaks of Confession from which reproach might follow; such was public Confession. For, as Origen notes in homily 2 on Psalm 37, when public Confession was made, there were always people present who could reproach the penitent. Hence he says: If such a man, mindful of his offense, confesses the things he has committed and, despite human shame, thinks little of those who reproach him and mark or mock him as he confesses. But Confession made to a priest in the sacrament is not of this kind, for no reproach can follow from it, since it is made without witnesses and priests are bound by the strictest obligation of silence, or the seal. Hence Chrysostom adds: Now, however, it is not necessary to confess before witnesses. For by these words he shows that at some time it had been necessary to confess before witnesses, that is, publicly, but that Nectarius had removed that necessity, so that such public Confession would no longer be a cause and occasion for reproach. Or I say that Chrysostom there is not speaking of sacramental Confession, which must be made by precept, but only of daily Confession. Hence he expressly said in the words cited above on Psalm 50: If you are ashamed to tell them to someone, tell them each day in your soul, etc., as if he said: I do not urge or exhort you to do a great thing, namely, to confess your sins every day to a priest who might reproach you and wound you with his rebukes; rather, I disclose another mode of Confession to you: confess your sins privately to God in your soul each day. Hence he adds: Behold, you have a book in which to write your daily account; take your conscience as your book and write your daily sins. When you have accused yourself on your bed, and suffer no one to trouble you, before sleep comes, bring out the book of your conscience. — He teaches the same in the aforesaid homily on Lazarus, where he urges that if we ever conceive in our soul a corrupt desire, we should suffocate it immediately; but if it has passed into action, we should immediately kill it through Confession. Why, he says, are you ashamed and blush to tell your sins? Take care not to tell a man, lest he reproach you; for you are not confessing to a fellow servant, but to the one who is Lord. By these words he signifies that daily Confession is to be made immediately after we have sinned. Therefore he is not speaking of sacramental Confession, which he nowhere denies, but only of private Confession, which every person can and ought to make so that, through contrition, he may obtain forgiveness of sin.

THEY PRESS AT LAST: What St. Chrysostom's opinion on Confession was is clearly evident from Cassian, his disciple. But Cassian denies that any Confession should be made to people, for in Conferences 20, ch. 8, he says: If shame holds you back and you blush to reveal your sins before people, do not cease to confess them in continual supplication to him from whom they cannot be hidden, who is accustomed to heal without publicizing shame and to pardon without reproach. — I deny the minor premise: for Cassian speaks in the same way as his teacher, either of public Confession, which was made before the people and from which reproach and insult often arose, and not of private Confession made to a priest as the vicar of God or Christ, not as a mere human being. Hence this Confession may be considered to be made to God, because it is made to a man acting in God's place; for the priest serves as Christ's ambassador. Or I say that by those words he exhorts us to a daily examination of conscience and private Confession before God, made each day concerning sins after that examination of conscience. For before the words cited above he says: “Who cannot say: I made my sin known to you, and I did not conceal my injustice? So that by this Confession he may also deserve to add this: and you forgave the impiety of my heart. But if shame holds you back, etc.”

THEY OBJECT 5. Many leading theologians openly admit that Confession was commanded not by divine law, but only by human law. For Hugh of St. Victor, book On the Sacraments, part 14, ch. 14, says that Christ did not give people a precept to confess their sins. The Master of the Sentences, d. 17, sets out opinions both proving and denying the necessity of Confession, and he himself seems to resolve nothing, at least from divine law. And Alexander of Hales, part I, q. 18, member 3, a. 2, says: The Lord did not institute Confession as it was to be practiced by penitents themselves. Finally, St. Bonaventure, d. 17, part 2, a. 1, q. 3, plainly teaches that the Lord Christ did not institute Confession, but that it is a purely human work: Hence, he says, the power of the sacrament was not given to Confession itself, but to Absolution; therefore its institution was rightly left to mere human beings. Therefore Confession is not of divine law.

I distinguish the antecedent: they admit that it is not of divine law explicitly, that is, distinctly and expressly, I grant; tacitly and implicitly, I deny. For they admit that the Lord Christ gave the Apostles, who acted in his place, the power to remit and retain sins, and consequently at least implicitly also commanded that Confession be made, since, as we have said, a priest cannot know which sins are to be remitted and which retained unless the penitent has distinctly declared them. Hugh of St. Victor, the Master of the Sentences, and Alexander of Hales certainly intend nothing else. As for the Seraphic Doctor, however, the difficulty seems greater; nevertheless it can easily be explained. For he distinguishes two things in the sacrament of penance: one formal, which completes the sacrament, namely Absolution, or the power to absolve or heal; the other material, namely the disclosure of sin or sickness. The first, he says, the Lord instituted, when he granted the power of the keys, and in this the power of the sacrament resides; the second, however, he did not institute in itself, but intimated. He gives four reasons for this: “From what has been said,” he says, “four reasons can be drawn why the Lord did not immediately and expressly institute Confession: first, because it was not necessary; second, because he taught that this should be voluntary; third, because it is the sacrament of those who relapse; fourth, because in itself it is a human work.” Hence I believe that he did not institute it in itself; and if he is said to have instituted it, this is to be understood as intimating it and giving it authority.

THE OBJECTIONS OF CALVIN AND HIS FOLLOWERS ARE EXAMINED. — CALVIN OBJECTS, book 3 of the Institutes, n. 16, ch. 1: God neither institutes nor commands impossibilities; but an enumerative Confession of all sins is impossible; consequently it was not instituted by God. Calvin proves the minor premise by various authorities from Sacred Scripture, especially from Psalms 19 and 38, where David testifies that he cannot recount his sins individually: “Who understands offenses? Cleanse me, O Lord, from my hidden sins. And again: My iniquities have passed over my head, etc.” — “That is to say,” Calvin says, “the Prophet understood how great is the abyss of our sins, how many stains of wickedness there are, how many heads this hydra bears and how long a tail it drags. He was not setting out to recite a catalogue, then, but was crying out to the Lord from the depths of evils: I am overwhelmed, buried, and suffocated; the gates of hell surround me; let your hand draw me out, sunk in a deep pit, failing and dying. Who would now think of counting his own sins, when he sees David unable to reckon their number?” These are Calvin's words. — I deny the minor premise: for a particular and enumerative Confession of sins before a priest is just as possible as one before God. Calvin himself, however, admits in n. 18 that it is possible to accuse oneself of all sins before God. For he says: “What, you will ask, then, are individual offenses not to be confessed? Is no Confession acceptable to God unless concluded in those two words, ‘I am a sinner’? On the contrary, one ought rather to strive, insofar as we can, to pour out our whole heart before the Lord: not merely to acknowledge ourselves sinners in a single word, but truly and sincerely to recognize ourselves as such; to consider in our whole thought how great and varied is the stain of sins, not merely that we are unclean, but what our uncleanness is, how great it is, and in how many respects it affects us; not merely that we are debtors, but how many debts weigh upon us and by how many obligations we are bound; not merely that we are wounded, but with how many and how deadly wounds we are pierced: so we believe.” By these words he admits that it is not enough to confess to God generally and to profess before God, in general terms, that one is a sinner; beyond that, after an accurate examination of conscience and a diligent search and scrutiny of sins, the penitent must profess his sins before God. But we require nothing else for sacramental Confession than this accusation of sins before a priest, with the prior examination that prudent men ordinarily use in matters of greater importance.

CALVIN INSISTS: A penitent, even if he devotes every effort of mind, cannot call to account the events of an entire year and gather what he has sinned each day. Experience convinces everyone that when, in the evening, one examines the offenses of only a single day, one's memory is confused; such a crowd and variety of offenses presses upon it. Therefore this enumerative Confession of individual offenses is impossible. — I distinguish the antecedent: if by offenses you mean every human fault, including venial sins, which certainly need not be disclosed in Confession, it is very difficult to recall to mind all the offenses of an entire year, I grant; if you mean the more serious sins that must be disclosed in Confession, I deny. For there is no one who, with a diligent examination of conscience, cannot easily remember all the more serious crimes he has committed over the course of a year. But if any crimes escape the penitent's memory after that diligent inquiry, it will suffice for him to confess generally all those that are hidden and omitted. Calvin cannot contradict this assertion, since he says in n. 18 that when a sinner has poured himself out entirely before God through an accusation of individual sins, he must seriously and sincerely consider that many more still remain and that the recesses of his evils are deeper than he can fully examine; and thus he must cry out with David: Who understands offenses? Cleanse me, O Lord, from my hidden sins.

HE PRESSES: “At least that enumerative Confession disturbs the soul's peace, confidence, and hope in God. For it brings the penitent's conscience into doubt, care, and anxiety that he has not spent enough time searching for his offenses, has not applied sufficient effort, and has passed over many through negligence, for which he could not obtain remission and Absolution. Therefore God is not the author of that Confession, which is a veritable torture, cruelly tormenting the souls of those who have any sense of God.” — I deny the antecedent: for one who has applied all the diligence he could to investigating and confessing his sins has certain peace of mind and confidence that, through the priest's Absolution, he will obtain from God's mercy forgiveness for these sins. Thus his mind is at peace, and he approaches the throne of mercy with confidence; and he strives earnestly to serve God, whom he first knows to be merciful, so that, to the best of his ability, he may repair the injury inflicted upon him by sin.

CALVIN PRESSES AT LAST, book 3 of the Institutes, ch. 7: Before the Lateran Council there was no law of Confession; and at that Council the barbarous wording of the law Omnis utriusque sexus destroys the faith. “For,” he says, “what the good Fathers command—that every person of either sex confess all sins once each year to his own priest—clever jokers wittily evade by saying that this precept binds only hermaphrodites and applies to no one who is male or female.” — I answer: The Lateran Council did not decree that the faithful should confess, for it understood that this had already been decreed by divine law; rather, it decreed that the divine precept of Confession should be fulfilled only once a year by each and every person who has the use of reason. Calvin's objection that the wording is barbarous is frivolous. First, because the Church often disregards the rules of grammar. Second, because this mode of speaking is frequent in Scripture: Deuteronomy 7, “There shall not be among you anyone barren of either sex”; Judges 8, “About three thousand of either sex”; 2 Chronicles 31, “Their children of either sex.” Third, because Pliny Secundus, a most eloquent man, uses this form of speech about Romulus in book 1 of Illustrious Men: “He staged,” he says, “Circus Games, to which, when a multitude of either sex had come, etc.”

NOTE 1. The Church has the power to command, or at least to determine, the use of the sacraments, as well as matters pertaining to their administration and reception, as the Council of Trent teaches, sess. XXI, ch. 2, where it writes: “The holy Synod declares that this power has always been in the Church, so that in the dispensation of the sacraments, their substance being preserved, it might establish or alter those things which, according to the variety of circumstances, times, and places, it judged more expedient for the benefit of those receiving them or for the reverence due to the sacraments themselves.... Therefore, recognizing this authority of hers in the administration of the sacraments, although from the beginning of the Christian religion the use of both kinds had not been uncommon, nevertheless, as that custom had by the passage of time been very widely changed, holy Mother Church, moved by grave and just reasons, approved this custom of communicating under one kind and decreed that it be held as law, which it is not lawful to reject or alter at will without the authority of the Church herself.” The question, then, is whether, on the hypothesis that confession was not commanded by divine law, the Church could legitimately have commanded it—and did in fact command it—and have determined the time at which it was to be made. Theologians do not agree on the answer. Their principal opinions are three. The first is Durand’s, In IV Sent., d. 17, q. 8, n. 7, who teaches that sacramental confession, insofar as it is an accusation of all sins, including interior ones, cannot be commanded by the Church; consequently, either the precept of annual confession is not purely ecclesiastical, or there is no precept but only a counsel. Their second opinion is that of those who teach that the Church could not have commanded confession and determined its time unless confession were already required by divine law; hence the ecclesiastical precept of annual confession is only a determination, modification, or application of the divine precept to observe it at this or that specified time. So teach Soto, In IV Sent., d. 18, q. 1, a. 1, conclusion 1, and Canus in his Relection on Penance, part 5. Their third opinion is that of those who teach that the precept of annual confession is not merely a declaration or determination of divine law, but wholly an ecclesiastical precept, whose observance binds all the faithful.

NOTE 2. All theologians (with few exceptions, at least) agree that the Church has no direct authority or power over purely interior acts, consummated within, such as acts of the intellect’s assent or dissent, or the will’s hatred, love, or delight in a forbidden or illicit thing. For the Church has no direct power over what it cannot prohibit, nor can it punish its transgression; but it cannot punish a transgression of a precept concerning interior acts, because such acts cannot be brought before its judgment. Therefore it cannot command those acts either. Whether, however, it can command such purely interior acts at least indirectly, by reason of another precept to be observed, the Doctor affirms in In III Sent., d. 27, where, treating of the obligation of charity, he says that an act of charity can be commanded by the Church insofar as it must be elicited in order that the commanded holy days be observed religiously and due worship be offered to God at that time with fitting reverence. The question, then, is whether the Church can directly or indirectly command confession of all sins, including interior ones.

NOTE 3. One can distinguish two kinds of obligation to observe a precept. The first is essential and immediate, arising from the force of that precept itself, that is, with every other precept, divine or human, set aside. Thus penance is essentially commanded for a sinner when the danger of death is especially present and imminent. The second is mediated and accidental: it does not arise from a precept concerning the very thing that must be done and fulfilled, but only from a precept concerning another thing to be done or received, which would not be done properly unless something else were first performed as a prior disposition. Thus penance is said to be commanded whenever a person stained by mortal sin must receive the Eucharist, lest, by receiving Christ’s Body unworthily, he eat judgment upon himself. The difficulty, then, is whether confession must be made essentially by an ecclesiastical precept, or only accidentally, once a year, namely on the occasion of fulfilling the precept to receive the Eucharist at Easter.

Three things, then, are to be determined here: first, whether the Church could command confession directly and of itself, and actually did so; second, which sins must be confessed in order to satisfy that ecclesiastical precept; third, who is bound to observe this precept.

First conclusion. — THE CHURCH COULD IN FACT COMMAND, AND DID ACTUALLY COMMAND, CONFESSION TO BE MADE ESSENTIALLY EVERY YEAR.

Both parts are proved from the general Council of Lateran under Innocent III, where it was decreed: “Let every faithful person of either sex, after reaching the age of discretion, alone faithfully confess all his or her sins to his or her own priest at least once a year, and strive with his or her own strength to fulfil the penance imposed; reverently receiving the sacrament of the Eucharist at least at Easter, unless perhaps, on the advice of his or her own priest, he or she judges it right to abstain for a time from receiving it for some reasonable cause. Otherwise, let such a person be barred from entering the Church while alive and deprived of Christian burial when dead. Therefore let this salutary statute be frequently proclaimed in churches, lest anyone take the veil of ignorance as an excuse.” Two things are determined by these words: first, that confession must be made; second, that it must be made at least once a year. Both are commanded by the Church, as is clear not only from the words of this decree but also from the severe penalty imposed there on transgressors. For the Church is not accustomed to act so severely against her children except for the transgression of a precept properly so called, whose observance is necessary for salvation. Nor is it valid to reply with Durand that this severe action of the Church concerns those who have omitted to make confession only insofar as they have neglected to receive the Eucharist at Easter. This answer, I say, is worthless: first, because the word “otherwise,” which threatens the penalty, applies equally to confession and Communion, and specifies the one no more than the other; second, because the intention of the Lateran Council can be known no better than from the Council of Trent. From the latter it is clear that the Lateran Council commanded confession once a year: for Trent says, sess. XIV, can. 8: “If anyone says that confession of all sins, as the Church observes it, is impossible and a human tradition to be abolished by the devout; or that all and each of Christ’s faithful of either sex are not bound to it according to the constitution of the great Lateran Council, and that the faithful should therefore be advised not to confess during Lent, let him be anathema.” In this canon, as is evident, there is no mention of Easter Communion. We may therefore conclude that the Council means that the Lateran Council commanded confession not only accidentally and mediately, insofar as it is a necessary means for communicating worthily, but also immediately and essentially, so that those who would otherwise be excused from the precept of Communion are also bound to this annual confession; and consequently, whoever omits annual confession and Communion at Easter would sin twice. Add that, if the precept of making confession were not distinct from the precept of receiving the Eucharist, it would follow that the Church has not five distinct precepts, which is certainly contrary to the common opinion of the faithful.

You will say: No law can command an act if it cannot justly punish the transgressor; but no human law can justly punish someone who does not confess a sin known only to himself. This is proved because he cannot be punished for a transgression whose occurrence cannot be known; but the Church cannot know with certainty whether a sinner confesses all his hidden sins, interior or exterior. Therefore, and so on. — I deny the minor premise. For the Church legitimately commands Communion, as Durand also admits, although at times it cannot punish a violator of that precept—for example, if someone were to receive the Eucharist only in his mouth but not swallow it. That the Church often commands things over which it cannot readily judge or obtain knowledge in the external forum, and therefore cannot punish transgressors, is evident from the precept that clerics recite the Canonical Hours every day, and that the faithful hear Mass on Sundays and feast days, as well as from similar acts which require a definite interior intention that is not clearly manifested by the external act. The same applies when acts are commanded that need not be performed publicly, since someone could say that he fulfilled the law in secret, though in fact he did not. I answer secondly that the minor premise can be denied: someone who committed public crimes might fail to approach his own priest and then die in the meantime; the Church can take action against him as one who has not confessed and punish him with the penalty prescribed by the Lateran Council. This shows how slight was the ground on which Durand doubted whether the Lateran Council’s determination was a precept rather than a counsel. Add that Durand himself seems to argue against himself: for about halfway through the question he adds that the Church can command confession by Christ’s authority. To say this is nothing other than to admit in fact that the Church can directly command confession by the authority it possesses; for the Church derives all its authority from Christ, and consequently everything it commands concerning the reception or administration of the sacraments, it commands by Christ’s authority. From these points, then, it is clear that even if confession were not required by divine law and precept, the Church could command it. But since it is required by divine law, to be made at least once in life—namely, when a sinner is bound to seek remission of sins through sacramental absolution—the Church has rightly determined a set time at which that divine precept must be fulfilled, as Trent teaches, sess. XIV, ch. 5, near the end: “For the Church did not establish through the Lateran Council that Christ’s faithful should confess what she understood to be necessary and instituted by divine law, but that the precept of confession” (the divine precept) “be fulfilled by all and each once a year, when they had reached the age of discretion.” The Subtle Doctor agrees, In I Sent., d. 17, n. 14: “Concerning the third article, I say that the Church did not specify that precept” (the divine precept of confession) “with respect to some of the matters mentioned above, and specified it with respect to others. The principal specification of this precept is found in that chapter, Omnis utriusque sexus, in the Decretals, On Penance and Remission.” And below, n. 28: “As to when, the Church determined the precept” (the divine precept of confession), “namely, once a year.” The Doctor does not say, “The Church commanded confession,” but “determined the precept,” namely the divine one.

YOU WILL ASK 1. Whether, if confession were not to be made by divine law and had not been commanded by Christ, the Church could have commanded it? — I answer that, if sacramental confession had been instituted by Christ alone as something to be done or omitted at one’s discretion, the Church could not have commanded it in the form in which it is in fact commanded, namely, that confession be made of all mortal sins, even hidden ones. This is so not only because, as some maintain, the Church lacks power, at least direct power, over purely interior acts—for this, as we have just said, is not so certain—but because the Church cannot command something so difficult as confession of all mortal sins unless it had some other means of alleviating that difficulty. In fact, it is alleviated and lessened by the effect of remission, sanctification, and the interior renewal of a person, which takes place through sanctifying grace conferred in priestly absolution. But the Church does not have it within herself to confer such sanctifying grace by her own power, and consequently has nothing by which she can relieve that difficulty; otherwise, she would have in herself the power to institute a sacrament, the contrary of which we established in the preliminary disputation. Therefore, if, despite the power and efficacy of this sacrament—which reconciles us to God and is often followed, in devout men who receive it with devotion, by peace and serenity of conscience together with a strong consolation of the Spirit, as Trent says, sess. XI, ch. 3—if, I say, despite these things, many Catholics, out of excessive shame, do not fulfil the divine precept of confession, which the Church has declared must be fulfilled at least once a year, how much more would they be deterred from fulfilling such a precept if remission of sins could not certainly be hoped for as a result?

The Doctor approves this reasoning. For, In IV Sent., d. 17, n. 9, while attacking the opinion of those who say that confession is binding only by an ecclesiastical precept, he says: “That cannot easily be disproved, except on the ground that the Church would not have ventured to impose so arduous a precept on all Christians unless it were a divine precept, etc.” By this he indicates that fulfilling the precept itself is exceedingly difficult, such that the Church alone would not prescribe it unless it had already been established elsewhere by Christ the Lord. We must therefore admit that, just as the Church cannot command someone to profess the religious state, which Christ the Lord willed to be free because of the difficulty attached to that state, although it has various other advantages, so too, on account of this difficulty, it could not have prescribed for people the obligation to confess their sins if Christ the Lord, in instituting the sacrament of penance and at least implicitly designating confession, had left its use to the freedom and choice of penitents.

You will say: The authority that can prescribe the time for doing something by ordinary power can, by that same power, command the substance of the act, since the time is commanded as an accessory to the act, as one of its circumstances. But the Church, as just stated, can prescribe and in fact has prescribed the time for making confession. Therefore it can also prescribe its use. — I distinguish the major premise: when the substance and exercise of this act do not ordinarily exceed human capacity, I grant it; when they do, I deny it. And, with the minor premise distinguished in the same way, I deny the inference. For the circumstance of the time for making confession does not ordinarily exceed human frailty, whereas the substance of the act does. For, as Coninch very aptly says, Disputation 5, On Penance, doubt 4, n. 42: confession of all mortal sins is very difficult for many in many cases, so that very many dread it as death and would almost rather die than confess certain sins; scarcely any artifice or threat of hell can induce them to confession, and while confessing they feel such anguish as those condemned to execution experience. Yet unless there is some very great, indeed almost extreme, necessity, human authority cannot command something so difficult. Therefore, in the case at hand—if, that is, the sacrament of confession were free of a divine precept—there would be no such necessity, and the Church could not command that confession.

YOU WILL ASK 2. From what point does the year begin within which the Church’s precept of annual confession is in force? — I answer that the year can be reckoned from one Easter to the next, or from one Lent to the next, or from the day on which the last confession was made to the same day in the following year. The more common and truer opinion, however, is that the year is reckoned by the ordinary calendar, from the first day of January to the last day of December. The first part is clear: whichever of these three ways one assigns the beginning of the year, if someone confesses his sins within that interval, he is rightly said to have satisfied the precept of annual confession prescribed by the Lateran Council. Understand this, however, of the precept and obligation essentially arising from the force and efficacy of the precept to make confession itself. For it can happen accidentally—that is, by reason of the precept to receive the Eucharist—that someone is bound to confess again during the Easter fortnight, when the precept of receiving Communion is in force: namely, if he is burdened by some mortal sin and cannot approach the sacred Eucharist without first making confession and receiving sacramental absolution.

The latter part, however, is more common and safer: the words of a law are to be taken as they sound, unless something else stands in the way. Hence, when the Church commands annual confession, the year must be taken according to the ordinary calendar, from the first day of January to the last day of December.

YOU WILL ASK 3. If someone has not confessed during the year, is he bound to confess immediately at the beginning of the following year? — I answer that this seems more probable. For when a time is prescribed not as a deadline at which a precept expires, but only as the limit beyond which its execution must not be extended or deferred, the precept remains binding even after that time has elapsed. Thus, when a fixed time is set for a debtor to pay a debt, once that time has passed the debtor remains bound to pay it always, since the time was not fixed so that the debt would expire then, but so that payment would not be deferred beyond it. But in the aforesaid constitution of the Lateran Council, the year is not set as a deadline at which the precept expires, but as the limit beyond which fulfilment of the precept of confession must not be deferred. For the words “so that he confess at least once a year” are equivalent to “so that he not defer confession beyond a year.” Hence there is not only an affirmative precept to confess once each year, but also a negative one, namely, not to defer it further. Whoever does not confess immediately after the year has elapsed transgresses this precept, since he is delaying beyond what is fitting so salutary a remedy and medicine. From this it is clear that there is a difference between the precept to make confession every year and the precept to recite the Canonical Hours, to hear Mass on feast days and Sundays, and to receive the Eucharist at Easter. In these precepts, the time is prescribed as the deadline for their execution, with the obligation to perform the act attached to that day and time as its due. Thus the precept of Easter Communion, being specially laid down out of reverence for and in celebration of that season, expires with the season itself, just as the precept to hear Mass expires with Sunday or the feast day.

YOU WILL ASK FINALLY: Whether someone who foresees that he will be unable to confess during the rest of the year—because, for example, he is going to sail or travel to a remote region where confession will not be available—is bound to confess immediately, before beginning that voyage or journey? I affirm. The reason is straightforward: since the precept to make confession is prescribed for the whole year and for every part of the year, it follows that it can be fulfilled in any part of the year. Therefore, one who cannot fulfil it during the other parts of the year is bound to satisfy it here and now. Thus one who cannot hear Mass on a feast day at eleven-thirty must anticipate that time, since the entire morning has been prescribed for fulfilling that precept.

You will say: Someone who foresees that he will be prevented from hearing Mass on a feast day is not bound to attend on Saturday; likewise, someone who foresees that he will be prevented from fasting on Saturday is not bound to anticipate that time by fasting on Friday. Therefore, by the same reasoning, someone who foresees that he will be prevented from fulfilling the precept of confession during the rest of the year is not bound to anticipate that time. — I deny the parity. The reason for the difference is that the obligation to hear Mass or to fast does not begin before the appointed day on which that precept is to be fulfilled; hence, however much one might anticipate that time, one would not at all satisfy that obligation. The obligation to confess is different: since it is annual, it begins on the first day of the year and continues until the last—not because the obligation must actually be fulfilled on the first day, but because it is free for me to fulfil it on that day if I wish. Consequently, when I foresee that I cannot discharge that debt on other days, I am bound to fulfil it on the first day on which I may and ought to do so.

Second conclusion. — ONLY AND ALL THE BAPTIZED, AFTER REACHING THE AGE OF DISCRETION, ARE BOUND BY THE PRECEPT OF ANNUAL CONFESSION IF THEY ARE STAINED BY SOME MORTAL SIN. So teaches the Lateran Council (as is clear from its words cited in the preceding conclusion), which Trent interprets, sess. XIV, ch. 5, as follows: “For the Church did not establish through the Lateran Council that Christ’s faithful should confess what she understood to be necessary and instituted by divine law, but that the precept of confession be fulfilled by all and each at least once a year, when they had reached the age of discretion.” Therefore, all and only those who have sinned mortally after baptism are bound by both the divine and ecclesiastical precepts to make confession. Whether unbelievers are bound by divine law to make confession at least once in their lives, and consequently sin mortally not only by neglecting baptism but also by not receiving the sacrament of penance, the Doctor seems to affirm, In IV Sent., d. 17, n. 29, where he says: “If confession were only a precept of ecclesiastical law, it would not seem that unbelievers were bound by the precept of confession, since, according to the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 5, ‘What have I to do with judging those outside?’”

Richard teaches this explicitly, In IV Sent., d. 17, a. 2; so does Sylvester, under the entry “Confession,” and Hiquaeus in his commentary on the Doctor’s d. 17, where he proves his assertion as follows: The Gospel Law, he says, was promulgated for the faithful as well as unbelievers, as were the remedies of that law, such as the sacraments and their precepts. Therefore it includes both faithful and unbelievers. The antecedent is established. The consequence is proved: for an obligation under a law or precept in general, which pertains to the substance of the law, it is not required that an affirmative precept be fulfilled in every state, subject matter, and circumstance; it is sufficient that it be fulfilled in a specified state, matter, time, and circumstances. But this does not prevent someone from being bound by the law, even if he never encounters a time when he must fulfil the affirmative precept of the law or the subject matter it specifies. Therefore the obligation of a law and precept can stand even though it does not bind one to the performance of the act except upon a prior condition determined by the law itself. The major premise is evident: the law itself implies that specified condition, which may not arise or be present. The minor is proved from natural law: everyone is bound to help a neighbor in extreme need when able; yet even if no occasion to fulfil this precept arises, it does not follow that no one is bound by the law. Similarly, everyone is bound to expose life and possessions for the commonwealth, even if the particular necessity in which one must do so never actually arises. So the faithful person is bound to confess the faith and exchange his life for its defense before a tyrant, if the occasion arises, and so on. Therefore the obligation of a law is neither removed nor confused with the performance of the prescribed act, even if the particular circumstance for performing it does not arise. In the same way, an unbeliever is bound by the Gospel Law and its precepts, although not while remaining in the state of unbelief, since in that state he cannot fulfil any positive precept proper to this law—not the precept of faith, which is the foundation of the others, nor of baptism, which is the sacrament of faith—at least not fruitfully for salvation. Thus far Hiquaeus. He immediately adds: whatever one may say about these matters, the precept of the Eucharist includes unbelievers, although that precept cannot be fulfilled while they remain in unbelief.

If you reply that an unbeliever, once he has received faith and baptism, can receive the Eucharist, but not the sacrament of penance unless he has sinned after baptism—and that he is not bound to sin, as he is bound to receive faith and baptism—this is countered by the fact that on this account not all the faithful would be bound by the precept of confession, but only those baptized persons who have sinned mortally. Indeed, Hiquaeus says, even in that state there was never an obligation to penance except on account of personal mortal sin, as Trent presupposes, sess. XIV, ch. 1. Yet the precept of penance bound everyone, not in its performance unless sin were assumed to have been committed. Just as, then, the precept of the Eucharist binds unbelievers, so to speak, in the signified act though not in its exercise, unless the prior condition is fulfilled—namely, by receiving faith and baptism and reaching adulthood—so too the precept of penance binds unbelievers, on the supposition of baptism and the matter of penance itself, namely, an actual mortal sin committed after baptism. But this is also sufficient, since it binds the faithful in no other way: according to everyone, it binds them in its exercise only if such a sin is assumed. Hence, if this argument exempts unbelievers from the obligation of the precept because in that state they cannot perform the act by which it is fulfilled, the faithful who are just must likewise be exempted from the obligation while in the state of justice. I answer: The faithful who are just are indeed to be exempted while in the state of justice, and they are exempted by all who say that the divine precept of confession binds only those baptized persons who have sinned mortally. Nor does Trent anywhere imply that penance is necessary for all the faithful, but, as it says, sess. XIV, ch. 1, “for all people who have stained themselves with some mortal sin.” Nor does Scotus bind all the faithful to confess. For he says, In I Sent., d. 17, n. 18: “Concerning the second article, I say that this precept includes who must confess, because he is an adult.” Does he mean everyone? He continues: “that is, one who has the use of reason and knows the sin he has committed, whether at baptism or after baptism, for that alone is the matter of confession.” Therefore Hiquaeus does not seem to reason in conformity with the Doctor’s own principles, and his argument is not very forceful; for many deny that unbelievers are bound by divine precept to receive the Eucharist.

Moreover, there is a difference between the obligation to the sacrament of the Eucharist and to that of penance. A person is bound to confession by reason of the precept to receive the Eucharist only because confession is a means to such reception for someone guilty of mortal sin; for the Eucharist cannot be received by him worthily and properly unless he has first obtained remission of mortal sin, which he cannot have without confession and absolution, actually or by desire. We must therefore conclude that the divine precept of confession is directed essentially only to baptized persons who have sinned mortally at baptism or after baptism. Consequently it does not include unbelievers, nor are they therefore to be judged guilty of a new mortal sin on account of omitting sacramental accusation of sins.

Indeed, whatever may be the case concerning the divine precept with respect to unbelievers, it is at least certain that they are not bound to annual confession, since this obligation arises only from the Church’s authority and precept. But the Church has no authority over unbelievers who have not yet been baptized, as the Apostle teaches, 1 Corinthians 5: “What have I to do with judging those outside?”

That all adults, even children, as soon as they reach the age of discretion, are bound by ecclesiastical precept to annual confession is clearly gathered from the Councils of Lateran and Trent, where it is decreed that every faithful person of either sex, after reaching the age of discretion, confess all his or her sins at least once a year. These words also include all baptized children who are faithful, have the use of reason, are guilty of mortal sin, and are conscious of it. For they have reached the age of discretion because they can distinguish good from evil, feel shame over a lie or some similar sin, and praise piety and other virtues known to them. Hence the Doctor, In IV Sent., d. 17, n. 21, asking who is bound by the precept of annual confession, says: “As to who, the Church specified a sinful adult, that is, after he has reached the age of discretion, etc.” This means nothing other than an adult according to the interpretation given earlier, namely in n. 18, where he says: “By an adult I do not mean someone of such-and-such an age, but one who has reached the age of knowing what is just or unjust against God’s law.” By these words the Doctor excepts no adult from the ecclesiastical law requiring annual confession, and consequently infers that all children too who have the use of reason are bound by it. And rightly so, because we must not make distinctions where the law itself does not distinguish; for it is odious to distinguish where the laws do not. But the law of the Lateran Council, by a universal statute binding all the faithful, does not except children or distinguish them from other faithful. Therefore, in keeping with the common opinion, we must say that children who have the use of reason and are guilty of mortal sin are bound to annual confession as soon as they reach the age of discretion.

YOU WILL SAY: The Lateran statute commands confession and Communion equally; yet Communion does not bind children as soon as they reach the age of discretion. Therefore neither does confession. — Lugo replies, Disputation 15, n. 151, that the difference can be gathered from the very words, since Communion is commanded with this limitation: “Unless perhaps, on the advice of their own priest, they judge it right to abstain for a time from receiving it for some reasonable cause.” This reasonable cause is prudently judged to apply so long as the child does not yet fully recognize the dignity of this sacrament, so as to approach it with due reverence. Although there are authors who affirm that the age of discretion is the same for confession and Communion, so that every child, upon reaching the age of discretion and being bound by the law of confession, is also bound to receive the Eucharist unless the confessor expressly extends the time. Their chief reason is that the precept of annual confession and of Easter Communion is imposed equally on all the faithful. The limitation “Unless perhaps,” etc., is added because there may be more reasons for extending the time for Communion than for confession.

In what precise year this obligation begins, and whether children have sufficient use of reason, cannot be determined with certainty by us. For, the Doctor says in n. 18, in many cases malice supplies for age before the customary age (that is, before the seventh year), and not only in evil matters, as the common saying has it, because someone may have an earlier prudence for evil and thus be called capable of deceit, but also in good matters, according to the saying in the life of St. Agnes: “Faith is not measured by years.” Hence the Lateran Council also determined no definite age, but said simply, “after they have reached the age of discretion,” leaving it to the discretion and judgment of pastors and confessors to decide and determine this. For it often happens that some in the seventh year of their age are more mature in intellect and better and more fully instructed in matters of faith than others in their twelfth year. Accordingly, the Roman Catechism, II, ch. 17, n. 33, aptly says: “First, from the canon of the Lateran Council, which begins ‘Every faithful person of either sex,’ it is clear that no one is bound by the law of confession before the age at which he can have the use of reason. Yet that age has not been defined by any number of years; rather, it seems generally to be determined that confession is enjoined on a child from the time when he has the power to distinguish between good and evil and deceit can enter his mind. For when each person reaches that period of life in which he must deliberate about eternal salvation, then he must first confess his sins to a priest, since no one burdened by consciousness of crimes may otherwise hope for salvation.”

Third conclusion. — IT IS PROBABLE THAT SOMEONE GUILTY ONLY OF VENIAL SINS IS NOT BOUND BY ECCLESIASTICAL PRECEPT TO ANNUAL CONFESSION. This is the Doctor’s opinion, In IV Sent., d. 17, n. 25, where he says: “Therefore, as far as I understand from the general statutes of the Church, no one is bound to confess venial sins in any case; nor has the Church specified a precept of confession in this matter. And reasonably so, because she uses the sacrament of penance as a second plank after shipwreck, which is not the case with venial sins. Nor is anyone bound to any contrition for venial sins; indeed, someone dying with an actual will or act of venial¹ sin will be saved, though he will suffer punishment. Yet it does not seem that anyone is bound to the second part of penance, which is confession, concerning something for which he is not bound to have contrition or attrition. This is also clear for another reason: as was said above, venial sins are sometimes wholly wiped away with respect to guilt and punishment without any special act, as by a fervent act of contemplation of God, just as a drop is consumed by a powerful flame.”

If you ask, then, how the priest is to know the face of his flock if someone who says he has lived innocently is not bound to confess his venial sins: I answer, if someone confessed to him only venial sins, how would he know that the person had committed nothing but venial sins? From nothing but the person’s own confession. Hence the Extravagants, On the Office of the Ordinary, chapter Significavit, says: “One making a penitential confession is to be believed in all things, since it is not likely that anyone would be forgetful of his own salvation.” Therefore let the priest believe in the same way someone who comes and says: “Lord, I give thanks to God that, since my last confession, I have no consciousness of mortal sin. Give me the Eucharist.” In this penance the priest knows the face of his flock just as much as if the person had recounted his venial sins for two days; if he confessed them, he could have no more certainty about those venial sins than he now has of the person’s innocence, namely, from the person’s own testimony. The Doctor’s words. By these words he teaches clearly that someone who has only venial sins is not bound by ecclesiastical precept to annual confession. St. Thomas teaches the same in this distinction, q. 3, a. 1, question 3, reply to objection 3.

This is further proved, first, because by force of the Lateran Council’s statute all the faithful are bound to confess all their sins; but no one can confess all venial sins or recall them all to mind because of their number. Consequently, the Council did not intend to include venial sins under the word “sins.” Next, the gravest penalty is prescribed, as we said above, for those who do not fulfil this precept, namely, expulsion from the Church and deprivation of ecclesiastical burial. But it does not seem just or reasonable to inflict so severe a penalty on someone who refuses to confess venial sins. Therefore the same conclusion follows. Third, as we showed above, the ecclesiastical precept of annual confession is a determination of the divine precept; but the divine precept binds one to confess only mortal sins. Therefore neither does the ecclesiastical precept. The minor premise is established from the Council of Trent, sess. XIV, ch. 5, where it says: “Venial sins, by which we are not excluded from the grace of God and into which we fall more frequently, may indeed rightly and usefully be mentioned in confession, without any presumption, as the practice of devout people shows; yet they may be omitted without guilt and expiated by many other remedies.”

YOU WILL SAY: The purpose of annual sacramental confession is to enable one to approach the Eucharist with greater reverence and for the pastor himself to know his sheep. But confession of venial sins contributes to both: from knowledge of venial sins, the pastor can understand his subject’s soul and state of conscience quite clearly, so as to give salutary advice and fortify him against future sins, even mortal ones; likewise, freedom from venial sins greatly contributes to receiving the Eucharist worthily. Therefore these sins, even if they are the only ones, must still be confessed. — I answer that the major premise is true as a matter of appropriateness, but not of necessity. For the pastor to recognize the face of his flock and learn the state and conscience of the sheep entrusted to him, it is enough in such a case for the penitent to present himself to the priest and say that his conscience is not burdened with any mortal sin. Likewise, in order for someone to approach the Eucharist worthily and without any defect, even venial, it is not necessary that he confess such venial sins, since they can be expiated by other remedies, as we have just said on the authority of the Council of Trent.

YOU WILL ASK: Whether the Church can command confession of venial sins? Theologians commonly affirm that it can, and prove it as follows. First, this seems in fact to have been commanded of the religious of St. Benedict in the Clementine, Ne in agro Dominico, where it is decreed: “Lest anything unbecoming or vicious creep into the sacred field of the black monks (that is, the Benedictine religious) and perniciously grow among its crops, but rather that flowers of honor and fruits of honesty grow abundantly in it, etc. Here is the reason for the constitution.” The constitution follows: “Indeed, every month, both in monasteries and outside them, with every occasion removed, all and² each of the monks shall come to confession once. And on the first Sunday of each month they shall always receive Communion in monasteries, unless for some cause—which they must not delay in making known to the abbot, prior, or penitentiary of the monastery—they abstain or withdraw on their judgment.” Although that constitution does not mention venial sins, nevertheless, says Canus, Relection, On Penance, ch. 5, and Navarrus, On Penance, d. 6, since those religious are commanded to confess every month, it follows that they are bound to confess venial sins if no others are present. This argument seems weak to me. For that constitution does not absolutely bind them to make confession every month, but only on the supposition that the religious need confession. For if they fell into no sin at all, there is no doubt that they would not be bound to confession by virtue of that constitution. The Supreme Pontiff therefore presupposes that those religious need confession in order to obtain remission of sins. But since venial sins can be remitted without confession, it follows that the Supreme Pontiff did not intend the Benedictines to be bound by virtue of this constitution to confess venial sins, such that they would incur the sin of disobedience if they did not confess them.

But whatever may be the case concerning this constitution, it seems more probable that the Church can command confession of venial sins. First, sometimes the Church imposes a censure for a venial sin, namely, minor excommunication, and disclosure of that sin is necessary for absolution from the censure. Second, confessing venial sins is an act of the virtue of penance; therefore it can fall under a precept, since the Church can command every act of virtue. Finally, confession of venial sins greatly contributes to spiritual progress, since it involves an effective purpose to root out the venial sin into which a person is accustomed to fall, as experience shows in those who confess venial sins. For although they do not confess all of them, but only those they choose, this is nevertheless a great restraint and remedy for correcting ordinary faults and light sins.

YOU WILL SAY: The Church cannot change the matter of a sacrament and therefore cannot make necessary matter which, by Christ’s institution, is not necessary. But if it commanded confession of venial sins, it would change the matter of the sacrament of penance, because it would in fact make necessary matter that is not necessary and is free; for by its precept it would require that venial sins, which need not be confessed, in fact must be confessed. Therefore the Church cannot command confession of venial sins. — I answer, denying the minor premise. For even if the Church commanded confession of venial sins, it would not thereby change the matter of the sacrament of penance instituted by Christ, since its matter is sin, not only mortal but also venial. It would truly change that matter if it declared that something which is sin is not matter for confession, or that something which is not sin is matter for that confession. But the present case is different: by its precept the Church would make necessary matter which was otherwise sufficient, though free.

YOU WILL PRESS: The sacrament of penance is primarily ordered of itself to the remission of guilt. Therefore that guilt whose remission does not require this sacrament, such as venial sins, cannot become necessary matter for this sacrament. — I distinguish the consequent: it cannot become necessary matter such that this sacrament can never be administered without it, I grant; that it cannot become necessary matter which here and now must be remitted by virtue of this sacrament, I deny.

NOTE 1. The ancient theologians desired sixteen conditions for a perfect confession, expressed in the following verses:

Let it be simple, humble, pure, and faithful,

And frequent, unadorned, discreet, willing, and modest,

Complete, secret, tearful, and prompt,

Strong, self-accusing, and ready to make satisfaction.

The Seraphic Doctor explains all these conditions admirably in In IV Sent., d. 21, p. 2, dub. 3, in the explanation of the Master's text: “The sufficiency and number of these conditions,” he says, “may be understood in this way: some are conditions that are and ought to be in confession according to its proper measure; some according to proper order and association; and some according to proper quality and proper measure. The latter are threefold: either with respect to completeness, or frequency, or promptness; and thus there are three conditions, namely, that it be complete, frequent, and prompt. With respect to association, it ought to have the association of two parts, namely, contrition and satisfaction. With respect to contrition, it should be tearful; with respect to satisfaction, ready to make satisfaction; or with respect to both, and thus strong. As for quality, it concerns either the penitent himself or confession. If the penitent, there are five conditions: in respect of the rational power, it is simple; in respect of the concupiscible power, it ought to be willing; in respect of the irascible power, humble; in speech, faithful; and in sign, modest—thus there are five. If considered in itself, it ought to be pure, so that nothing extraneous is mixed in; it ought to be unadorned, so that nothing is kept hidden; with respect to circumstances, it ought to be discreet, adding nothing; it ought to be secret, so as not to harm others; and it ought to be self-accusing, so as to punish itself. Thus three are on the side of measure, three by reason of what is associated with it, five by reason of the subject, and five by reason of confession itself; and so in all there are sixteen.” Thus the Seraphic Doctor.

NOTE 2. The meaning of all these conditions is that confession should be first, simple: that is, made in plain words, not artfully composed, either to hide something or to make the penitent appear learned and eloquent—which would surely be vain and altogether perverse; second, humble: that is, with abasement of spirit and humility, apparent both in words and in bearing and bodily posture; third, pure: that is, without adding anything irrelevant to the accusation, which requires each person to confess his own sins, not those of others; fourth, faithful: that is, truthful and without lying, since in confession one must neither say what was not done nor deny what was committed; fifth, frequent: that is, performed often, rather than put off for a long time, lest many sins slip from memory; sixth, unadorned: that is, distinct and clear, so that neither the gravity nor the kind of sin is concealed, and each sin is stated by the penitent according to its gravity, as he reasonably judges it; seventh, discreet: that is, decent and expressed in fitting words; eighth, willing: that is, voluntary, so that it is done with deliberation of mind in order to appease God and obtain pardon for sin; ninth, modest: that is, showing confusion and shame of mind because of the shamefulness of sin, so that no one recites and announces his sins as if reading from a tablet; tenth, complete: that is, reporting absolutely all sins, both as to number and kind, and their aggravating circumstances; eleventh, secret: that is, performed in private and not publicly, and also auricularly, to one priest alone; twelfth, tearful: that is, accompanied by sorrow for the sins committed; thirteenth, prompt: that is, performed as soon as an opportunity to receive absolution presents itself after the sin has been committed; fourteenth, strong: so that nothing that must be said is omitted through fear or shame; fifteenth, self-accusing: that is, attributing the crime committed to oneself, not to the devil or temptation. Finally, it should be ready to make satisfaction: that is, the penitent should be disposed to fulfill what the confessor prescribes for satisfaction and expiation of his offenses. Many of these conditions overlap and pertain only to showing greater reverence for the Sacrament or receiving fuller fruit from confession. Accordingly, it is not our purpose to discuss each of them at length, but only the eleventh and twelfth: namely, that confession ought to be secret and complete.

NOTE 3. Two kinds of completeness in confession may be distinguished: one material, the other formal. Material completeness is when confession truly includes every mortal sin in its kind, number, and aggravating circumstances, so that no such sin at all remains unconfessed. Formal completeness, however, is considered complete and valid even though it does not disclose absolutely every mortal sin, because none is withheld without reasonable cause, or without excusable forgetfulness or ignorance; it is therefore truly informed and perfected by sacramental absolution. The question, then, is whether confession must be complete in either of these ways. Three matters therefore call for discussion here: first, whether confession must necessarily be made in secret; second, whether it must include absolutely all sins, both as to number and as to kind and circumstances; third, whether confession may sometimes be divided.

First conclusion. — AURICULAR CONFESSION WAS INDICATED BY CHRIST, NOT ENJOINED, ALTHOUGH IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN PRACTICED BY THE FAITHFUL AND RECEIVED IN THE CHURCH. The Council of Trent teaches this, sess. XIV, ch. 5, where it says: “As for the manner of confessing in secret to a priest alone, although Christ did not forbid anyone from publicly confessing his sins, in punishment for his crimes and humiliation of himself, both for the example of others and for the edification of the Church that had been offended, nevertheless this was not commanded by divine precept, nor would it have been prudent for any human law to prescribe that offenses—especially secret ones—be disclosed in public confession. Therefore, since secret sacramental confession, which the holy Church has used from the beginning and still uses, has always been commended by the most holy and ancient Fathers with great and unanimous consent, the empty slander of those who do not hesitate to teach that it is alien to divine command, a human invention, and originated with the Fathers assembled at the Council of Lateran is plainly refuted.” And in the same session, canon 6: “If anyone denies that sacramental confession was instituted by divine law or is necessary for salvation, or says that the manner of confessing in secret to a priest alone, which the Catholic Church has always observed and still observes from the beginning, is alien to Christ’s institution and command and is a human invention, let him be anathema.”

The same is proved by the authority of the Fathers, especially Origen, Homily 2 on Psalm 37: “Only,” he says, “consider carefully to whom you ought to confess your sin. First test the physician to whom you ought to disclose the cause of your illness, and so on, so that at last, if the one who has first shown himself to be a learned and merciful physician says anything, you may do and follow his advice. If he understands and foresees that your illness is such that it ought to be disclosed and treated in the assembly of the whole Church, from which perhaps others too may be edified and you yourself easily healed, this must be undertaken only after much deliberation and on the sufficiently expert advice of that physician.” From this it is clear how shamefully Rhenanus is mistaken in his argument on Tertullian’s book De Poenitentia, when he says that secret confession originated from public exomologesis, or confession. Rather, public penance proceeded conversely from secret confession: sins were not first declared publicly until after they had been privately and secretly disclosed to a priest, so that he might judge which called for public or private penance. Hence, since among some people the custom of confessing sins only in public had taken hold, St. Leo decreed that it be abolished as contrary to apostolic teaching, in ep. 80, addressed to the bishops of Campania. Among other things, he writes: “I have also recently learned of a presumption contrary to the apostolic rule, unlawfully practiced by some there. I decree that it be abolished in every way: namely, the practice whereby a written statement concerning the kind of each person’s sins is publicly read out, as penance is imposed on the faithful. The guilt of consciences is sufficiently disclosed to priests alone in secret confession. Although the fullness of faith that does not blush before men for fear of God seems praiseworthy, not everyone’s sins are such that they do not fear to make public what may call for penance. Let so unacceptable a custom therefore be removed, lest many be barred from the remedies of penance because they either blush or fear that their deeds will be revealed to their enemies, who could strike them under the law. For that confession is sufficient which is first offered to God and then also to the priest, who approaches as intercessor for the offenses of penitents. Only then can more people be stirred to penance, and the conscience of the one confessing will not be made public to the ears of the people.” St. Jerome teaches the same. Explaining the passage in Ecclesiasticus, ch. 10, “If a serpent bites in silence,” he says: “If the serpent, the devil, bites someone in secret and infects him with the poison of sin without anyone knowing, and the one bitten remains silent, does not do penance, and is unwilling to confess his wound to a brother or teacher, the teacher, though he has a tongue able to help heal, cannot help. If the sick man is ashamed to confess his wound to the physician, medicine does not cure what it does not know.”

That secret sacramental confession was indicated by Christ the Lord may be gathered from the Church’s perpetual and constant tradition and practice. For St. Augustine says, De Baptismo Contra Donatistas, bk. 7, ch. 23: “There are many things held by the universal Church, and therefore rightly believed to have been enjoined by the Apostles, although they are not found written down.” Since the whole Church has used secret confession from the beginning and still uses it, it follows that it was transmitted to us by Christ the Lord through the Apostles. The Council of Lateran therefore rightly prescribed the obligation to confess each year, saying: “One confesses one’s sins faithfully to one’s own priest alone, at least once a year.” There the word alone signifies that this obligation is not to declare one’s sins publicly and before many, but only before a priest alone. This reasoning will be confirmed in the response to the objections.

YOU WILL SAY: Nowhere in Scripture is Christ the Lord recorded as commanding penitents to disclose their sins to priests in private and secret confession; therefore he did not institute that secret manner of confessing. — I deny the inference. For the careful and never-interrupted custom of secret confession, from the earliest times of the Church down to our own, a custom that did not originate with councils or supreme pontiffs, is sufficient evidence that its author is none other than Christ. Add that, since the Sacrament of Penance was instituted in John 20, its institution also entails the institution of confession; from this its secret manner may likewise be inferred, as more fitting to the remarkable gentleness of the New Law and the gracious disposition of Christ the Lord, who willed his yoke to be easy and his burden light. Since disclosure of all sins, including hidden and interior ones, by its nature involves shame and therefore great difficulty, there is no doubt that Christ the Lord wished that declaration to be made in a less laborious and painful way, such as the secret way. It is plausible that he taught this manner when, after rising from the dead, he appeared to the disciples for forty days, speaking of the kingdom of God—that is, of matters concerning the governance of the Church and the salvation of human beings—among which the remission of sins through sacramental confession and the reception of absolution holds a foremost place.

YOU WILL SAY 2: Public confession of sins can be sacramental and valid, as is clear from the words of Trent quoted above; therefore Christ did not institute or ordain that confession of sins be made in secret. — I deny the inference. A superior may prescribe something to an inferior in either of two ways. First, by determining it, when he prescribes not only the action to be performed in particular but also the manner in which it is to be done. Thus Christ prescribed to the Church not merely that it baptize, but that it baptize in water with invocation of the most holy Trinity. Second, a superior may determine in particular the manner of carrying out a law he has made, while leaving the inferior free to use that manner or another which he prudently judges more expedient for the private or public good of the Church. Christ the Lord ordained confession to be made in secret in this latter way; nevertheless, he did not forbid anyone to confess publicly where he prudently judged it conducive to the greater edification of the Church or his own salvation.

YOU WILL ASK: Whether it is ever permitted to confess through an interpreter, when the penitent does not know the priest’s language, nor the priest the penitent’s, but a third person is present who knows both languages? — I affirm that it is. Lugo says, d. 15, n. 60, that all theologians, with a few exceptions, agree without controversy that this can be done; the practice of the faithful proves it, and reason supports it. For by this means sins are sufficiently made known to the priest for the purpose of absolution, and the priest can likewise sufficiently know the penitent’s disposition for receiving absolution. This is confirmed by the Sacrament of Matrimony, which everyone agrees may be celebrated through an interpreter in the presence of a parish priest and witnesses. Why, then, could confession not also be made through an interpreter? For, as Lugo says, greater knowledge seems to be required of a parish priest for him validly to assist at a marriage than of a confessor for him to absolve. The parish priest and witnesses are required at a marriage so that the Church may have legitimate proof that it was celebrated, should one spouse later deny it, or so that the spouses may prove it before the Church. For that purpose, consent given through an interpreter might seem insufficient, since the parish priest cannot testify to the consent when he does not understand the contracting parties’ language; he could only say that the interpreter said they consented. If the spouses later denied their consent and said the interpreter had lied, nothing could be clearly proved against them, since the whole matter would depend on the testimony of a single interpreter. If, then, the knowledge supplied through an interpreter is held sufficient for the parish priest validly to assist, much more readily should similar knowledge be held sufficient for sacramental confession. There, knowledge is not required so that the sin or its confession can later be proved before the Church, but so that the confessor in the internal forum may believe the penitent speaking against himself; for that, the manner of speaking through an interpreter suffices, just as it does in other human affairs and dealings. So far Lugo. From this, at the very least, and sufficiently for our purpose, it follows that the contracting party’s presence at marriage, to manifest consent to the priest, is required no less than the penitent’s presence in the Sacrament of Penance to manifest his sins. Therefore, just as the former sufficiently declares his consent through an interpreter¹ before the parish priest and witnesses, and is considered to contract validly, so the penitent will sufficiently disclose his sins to a priest who is present through an interpreter, and may legitimately be absolved by him. For the validity of the Sacrament requires nothing more than that sins be disclosed to a priest as judge, in order to obtain their remission.

YOU WILL SAY: The Subtle Doctor, in In IV Sent., d. 17, n. 31, responding to an argument he himself proposed at n. 2—namely, that not everyone is bound to confess his sins to a priest, because, he says, no one is obliged to do what is impossible, but a mute cannot speak, and every foreigner among those whose language is barbarous is mute, and therefore is not bound to confess—answers: “To the other point, one must say that such a person ought to confess through an interpreter, or through other signs besides words that can be understood by the priest. The second point should readily be granted, if there are such signs common to the mute or foreigner and to the priest. But the first does not seem necessary, because this forum is by its nature most secret; therefore no one is bound to this forum in such a way as to make it in some manner public. Although an interpreter may wish to keep the secret and is bound to do so, as is the priest, if he wishes to act maliciously, he and the priest can be witnesses against the accused; thus by the nature of this kind of accusation it can become public, and so it is not penitential. From this it is clear that one need not necessarily confess to several priests together so that they may judge better. If this is done, it is not sacramental confession. Above all, it seems that one should not confess through an interpreter when there is fear that he is not a suitable keeper of secrets; and even if in such a case this person is unable to confess to a suitable man, let him confess to God with the intention of confessing to a man when an opportunity arises.” Thus, according to the Doctor, confession through an interpreter is neither sacramental nor valid. — I deny the inference. The Doctor means nothing more by these words than that confession through an interpreter is not absolutely necessary for salvation, since it is neither commanded by Christ nor prescribed by the Church as something that must necessarily be done—especially when there is fear that the confession of the crime will be disclosed. For it is not plausible that Christ the Lord, who wills all people to be saved and gave himself as a redemption for all, instituted and commanded a manner of confession that would prejudice the penitent and make the Sacrament excessively difficult and burdensome—especially since, by commanding fraternal correction, he willed it to be done in secret. For he says in Matthew 18: “If your brother sins against you, go and correct him between yourself and him alone.” St. Augustine explains these words in Sermon 16, De Verbis Domini: “You know that he sinned against you, because he sinned against you. Since it was secret when he sinned against you, seek secrecy when you correct what he did against you. For if you alone know that he sinned against you, and you wish to accuse him before everyone, you are not a corrector but a betrayer.” If Christ the Lord therefore willed fraternal correction to be done secretly, who would think that he willed sacramental confession of hidden sins to be made publicly? The Doctor rightly holds, then, that one is not bound to confess through an interpreter, especially when there is fear that he will not keep the secret. Accordingly, such confession through an interpreter is not considered the sacramental confession to which all the faithful are ordinarily and in itself bound by Christ’s institution, although it can in fact be sacramental when the penitent freely resorts to it as he chooses. In the same way, public confession is not necessary, but is sufficient for salvation and sometimes useful both to the penitent and for the edification of the Church and the faithful.

Second conclusion. — ABSOLUTELY ALL MORTAL SINS THAT COME TO MEMORY AFTER A DILIGENT EXAMINATION OF CONSCIENCE MUST BE DISCLOSED IN CONFESSION, NOT ONLY GENERALLY BUT ALSO SPECIFICALLY AND ONE BY ONE; THEREFORE, FOR CONFESSION TO BE VALID, IT MUST BE FORMALLY COMPLETE. This is defined as a matter of faith by the Council of Trent, sess. XIV, ch. 5, where it says: “From the institution of the Sacrament of Penance already explained, the universal Church has always understood that integral confession of sins was also instituted by the Lord and is necessary by divine law for all who have fallen after Baptism. For our Lord Jesus Christ, ascending from earth to heaven, left priests as his own vicars, as prelates and judges, to whom all the mortal crimes into which Christ’s faithful have fallen must be brought, so that by the power of the keys they may pronounce sentence of remission or retention of sins. For it is clear that priests could not exercise this judgment without knowing the case, nor could they maintain equity in imposing penances if penitents declared their sins only in general and not rather specifically and one by one. From this it follows that penitents must enumerate in confession all mortal sins of which they are conscious after a diligent examination of themselves, even if these are most secret and committed only against the last two commandments of the Decalogue, which sometimes wound the soul more gravely and are more dangerous than those committed openly. Venial sins, by which we are not excluded from the grace of God and into which we fall more frequently, may indeed rightly and usefully be declared in confession, without any presumption, as the practice of devout people shows; yet they may be omitted without fault and expiated by many other remedies. But since all mortal sins, even those of thought, make people children of wrath and enemies of God, it is necessary to seek from God pardon for all of them through open and modest confession. Thus, while Christ’s faithful strive to confess all the sins that come to mind, they undoubtedly lay them all open to divine mercy. Those who do otherwise and knowingly retain some propose nothing for the priest to remit by divine goodness; for if the sick person is ashamed to reveal his wound to the physician, medicine does not cure what it does not know.” Thus the Council. These words plainly declare that absolutely all mortal sins that occur to one after a diligent examination of conscience must be disclosed in confession. It proves this by two arguments. First, in the Sacrament of Penance God remits sins by way of judgment, through the penitent’s accusation and the priest’s sentence of absolution. But the priest cannot legitimately pass sentence without knowing the case, nor could priests maintain equity in imposing penances if penitents declared their sins only generally rather than specifically and one by one. Therefore, sins must be declared in this way. Second, in this Sacrament the priest is not only a judge but also a physician. A physician cannot prudently and wisely prescribe a remedy suited to illnesses without knowing all such illnesses and understanding the patient’s whole condition. Therefore, a priest cannot prescribe salutary penance for a penitent unless he distinctly knows all his sins; and he cannot know them unless the penitent discloses them. It follows, then, that absolutely all sins must be disclosed in confession. Accordingly, the Council admirably defines in canon 7: “If anyone says that, in the Sacrament of Penance, it is not necessary by divine law to confess all and each mortal sin of which one is mindful after due and diligent reflection, and the circumstances that change the kind of sin . . . let him be anathema.” Nor should one think that the Council introduced this doctrine into the Church as some new dogma. For what has been said sufficiently establishes that it is the common teaching of the holy Fathers that absolutely all mortal sins must be disclosed in confession. Thus St. Cyprian teaches in his sermon De Lapsis, speaking of those who were not guilty of apostasy or idolatry but had nevertheless fallen into other sins: “How much greater in faith and better in fear are those who, although bound by no crime of sacrifice or certificate, because they have nevertheless thought of this, confess it sorrowfully and simply to the priests of the Lord, make an exomologesis of their conscience, lay bare the burden of their soul, and seek salutary medicine even for small and slight wounds, knowing that it is written: God is not mocked.” The author of De Vera et Falsa Poenitentia, ch. 15, teaches the same: “Let him be careful not to divide confession privately within himself, led by shame, and wish to disclose different sins to different priests.” For some conceal from one what they preserve to be disclosed to another; this is to praise oneself, tend toward hypocrisy, and remain forever without the pardon they foolishly think they can reach in fragments. St. Ambrose likewise teaches this in bk. De Paradiso, ch. 14; St. Gregory, Homily 10 on Ezekiel; and St. Jerome, on Ecclesiasticus, ch. 10. Their testimonies are cited in part II of the Roman Catechism, title On the Sacrament of Penance, n. 61.

Theological reasoning also supports this. For the precept of confession, instituted by Christ the Lord, was substituted for the precept of contrition. But contrition must necessarily be made for all sins: by the ordinary means one sin cannot be blotted out without all being blotted out together. Thus contrition does not blot out sins unless it detests them all. Therefore confession and absolution likewise cannot blot them out unless all sins are submitted to the keys of the Church.

YOU WILL ASK 1: What should be thought about the circumstances of sins? — I ANSWER: Circumstances are of three kinds. Some change the kind of sin. For if someone has relations with an unmarried woman who consents, it is simple fornication; with a married woman, adultery; with a close relative, incest; with one consecrated to God by a vow, or in a sacred place, sacrilege. All these circumstances make a different sin. Other circumstances only aggravate the sin notably within the same kind. For someone who steals one hundred or two hundred gold coins sins more gravely than one who steals only a single gold coin. Still other circumstances neither change the kind nor aggravate it notably, such as whether someone kills a person by striking him with iron, wood, or stone. As for circumstances that change the kind, all theologians agree that they must necessarily be explained in confession, as the Council of Trent also teaches in the aforementioned ch. 5, where it says: “It further follows that those circumstances that change the kind of sin must also be explained in confession. Without them, the sins themselves would not be fully disclosed by penitents, nor become known to judges, and they would be unable to judge the gravity of the crimes correctly and impose on the penitents the penance that is fitting for them. It is therefore unreasonable to teach that these circumstances were invented by idle people, or that only one circumstance must be confessed, namely, that one sinned against a brother.” As for circumstances that neither aggravate the sin nor change its kind, all agree with the Subtle Doctor, d. 17, n. 20, that they need not necessarily be disclosed in confession. “As for other circumstances,” the Doctor says, “which have no bearing on the matter and without which the gravity would be the same as with those irrelevant circumstances, it is foolish to confess them—for example, that someone sinned with a woman named Iberta or Lucia, or the like.” As for circumstances that aggravate notably, authors disagree. Some contend that they must necessarily be disclosed in confession: thus Alexander of Hales, 4th part, q. 18, memb. 4; Cajetan, I–II, q. 4; Maior, In IV Sent., d. 4, q. 1, and others. Others deny it with St. Bonaventure, d. 17, p. 3, art. 2, q. 3. The Subtle Doctor, in the place just cited, says: “There are many circumstances by which a sin is in some way more grave, either on the side of the object or on the side of the person sinning. It is not so certain that these must be confessed; nevertheless, it is safe and useful to do so.” This is especially so because St. Augustine, or whoever the author of De visitatione infirmorum may be, seems to indicate it in ch. 5: “The deeds that more gravely disturb the mind,” he says, “must be made plain to God’s manifest messenger, concealing nothing and enveloping guilt in no evasions, and so on. The places where you sinned should also be identified, if you remember them, as well as the times; the persons with whom you sinned, but not their names; and the relationship, which should be corrected privately so that they may desist from sin; whether you were of a susceptible age, what rank you served in the Church, whether you sinned in old age or from habit, from necessity or by choice. For judgments are relevant to all these matters. In secular courts, places distinguish one case from another: murder in the king’s court is punished by a different censure from murder on a public road or in a country village. Sometimes the age of childhood is forgiven on account of the time of life; sometimes allowance is made for old age, while the middle years are held to a stricter rein. Crimes committed especially on the solemn feast days of the Nativity are punished with fierce severity. Likewise, other deeds must be removed by stricter penalties in places sacred to God, at times dedicated to God’s feasts, at a more discerning age, among persons specially dedicated to God, and in higher ranks. Is not more required of one to whom more has been entrusted? Is it not less to have killed one man than many? Is it not lighter to have sinned as an old man than a hundred times? Does not one who fell through necessity obtain pardon sooner than one who did so by choice? And so on.”

I admit, however, that many circumstances are listed in those accounts which everyone agrees need not be disclosed in confession as a requirement of the Sacrament—namely, the age of reason, the time of fasting, and age. The strongest argument, then, is drawn from the authority of the Council of Trent. Although it did not expressly define this question, which is disputed among Doctors, it nevertheless plainly supports our affirmative position in the places cited above. For the Council teaches that sins must be confessed specifically and one by one because, it says, priests plainly cannot maintain equity in imposing penances if they know sins only generally rather than specifically and one by one. In explaining why circumstances that change the kind must be confessed, it gives this reason: “without them, the sins themselves would not be fully disclosed by penitents, nor become known to judges, and they would be unable to judge the gravity of the crimes correctly and impose on the penitents the penance that is fitting for them.” These arguments equally prove the necessity of confessing circumstances that notably aggravate: for it is self-evident that a greater penance must be imposed on someone who in a single act took many thousands of gold coins—for example, from a prince, by unjustly dispossessing many subjects in one edict—than on someone who took only three gold coins in three separate thefts. Add that if an aggravating circumstance within the same kind did not bring new malice, it would follow that someone who committed incest in the first degree did not sin more gravely than someone who committed it in the third or fourth degree. It would likewise follow that someone who cut off another’s ears, nose, and arms and legs, and gouged out his eyes, provided he did not kill him, would satisfy the precept of confession by saying that he had gravely wounded someone. Likewise, someone who voluntarily killed several people by firing a cannon in war would explain his offense sufficiently by saying he was guilty of homicide. These conclusions are absurd. We must therefore conclude with the Roman Catechism, title On Penance, ch. 62: “One must explain not only grave sins by recounting them, but also the circumstances surrounding each sin that greatly increase or lessen its gravity.” Nor is it an objection that circumstances that notably aggravate within the same kind do not formally constitute distinct sins; it suffices that they constitute them virtually or equivalently. For a single sin that is notably grave because of some circumstance is morally equivalent to many sins distinct in number, as the examples already given show. It therefore seems that mortal sins are not sufficiently explained as to number unless circumstances that notably aggravate within the same kind are explained.

YOU WILL OBJECT 1: No one is bound to do what there is no precept to do. But there is no divine or ecclesiastical precept to confess circumstances that notably aggravate within the same kind; therefore no one is bound to do so. — I DENY THE MINOR: for we are bound by divine precept to express in confession everything necessary for the perfect administration and reception of the Sacrament of Penance. The declaration of such circumstances is necessary for this. Since this Sacrament was instituted by Christ the Lord as a judgment, whatever is required for a priest to judge correctly the gravity of crimes and prescribe the due penance falls under divine precept. Since explaining circumstances that notably aggravate within the same kind is necessary for the confessor to form a correct judgment about the gravity of sins, we must admit that confession of those circumstances falls under divine precept.

YOU WILL OBJECT 2: If circumstances that notably aggravate within the same kind had to be confessed, then, by the same reasoning, circumstances that notably lessen the gravity of a sin would have to be disclosed in confession. But that seems contrary to the nature of confession, which ought to be an accusation, not an excuse; therefore, and so on. — I DENY THE MINOR: just as a small number of sins must be explained so that a correct judgment may be made about the penitent, so a circumstance that notably lessens guilt must also be disclosed—for example, if someone sinned through ignorance, under a strong temptation, or from fear of imminent danger of death. These matters especially help the priest to judge the crime correctly. As for the proof, I say that although confession is an accusation rather than an excuse, that accusation must nevertheless be such that the priest can recognize the gravity of the offense from it and prescribe the due satisfaction, without exceeding it. Explaining a circumstance that lessens the gravity of the sin contributes to this; therefore it must be disclosed in confession.

YOU WILL OBJECT 3: It does not seem necessary or safe to assert and practice something that inflicts excessive anxiety of mind on the penitent and leaves him always uncertain about the validity of his confession. But that is what would happen if grave circumstances had to be disclosed: who could determine how intense or how long an act must be in order for a sin to be considered notably aggravated within the same kind? Therefore, and so on. — I DENY THE MINOR: first, an aggravating circumstance is readily apparent with respect to magnitude or multitude. The same is true of the intensity and duration of a sinful act. Through an exact examination of his conscience, any penitent can learn how long he persisted in an act of hatred toward his neighbor, and how fiercely that hatred burned in him, so that he may disclose it in confession. The same must be said of other cases. Accordingly, it is not so difficult to recall such aggravating circumstances and express them in confession.

YOU WILL ASK 2: How thorough and extensive should the examination of conscience be before a salutary and complete confession? — The Doctor, d. 17, n. 19, answers that the examination should be as thorough as someone would undertake for a very difficult matter that he cared deeply about. He should undertake the same care regarding all mortal sins, bringing them back to memory, and, once recalled, confessing them together rather than dividing confession. For, as Augustine says in De vera et falsa Poenitentia, cited in De Poenitentia, distinction 5, ch. Consideret: “Some conceal from one priest what they keep to disclose to another; this is to praise oneself, tend toward hypocrisy, and remain forever without the pardon they think they can reach in fragments.” The Roman Catechism teaches the same, title On Penance, n. 62, saying: “In confession, however, we must apply that supreme care and diligence that we usually devote to very serious matters, directing all our effort toward discerning the wounds of the soul and tearing out the roots of sin.”

These statements must nevertheless be understood so that the examination is made with as much diligence as human frailty permits, lest perhaps, as the same Catechism says in n. 66, “we examine our conscience too carelessly and laxly, and so negligently strive to recall our committed sins that we may rightly seem not even to have wished to remember them. If that has happened, confession must certainly be repeated.” Prudence is therefore needed, so that the penitent neither examines himself too lightly nor torments himself excessively in this inquiry, to the detriment of bodily health and peace of mind.

Third conclusion. — MATERIAL COMPLETENESS IS NOT ABSOLUTELY REQUIRED FOR A PERFECT CONFESSION, FOR PHYSICAL AND MORAL IMPOTENCE EXCUSES FROM IT. This is the common opinion, and the Council of Trent teaches it in express words, sess. XIV, ch. 5, where it says: “It is clear that the Church requires penitents to do nothing more than, after each person has examined himself carefully and searched all the recesses of his conscience, confess those sins by which he remembers having mortally offended the Lord his God. The other sins, which do not come to mind after careful reflection, are understood to be included in that confession as a whole.”

The reason for this conclusion is that God does not command the impossible, and Christ the Lord did not institute as a necessary means of salvation something that is sometimes impossible. But sometimes a materially complete confession of all sins is physically and morally impossible; therefore, and so on. The major premise is clear. The minor premise is proved, as to the first part, namely, that such completeness is sometimes physically impossible, either on the penitent’s part—if he suddenly becomes speechless while confessing, or is so overtaken by death that he cannot declare any sin specifically and one by one, but can only show signs of contrition and a desire to receive absolution. In these cases, everyone agrees that he must necessarily be absolved. Or it may be impossible on the confessor’s part: if he is deaf or speaks a different language and no one else is available to hear the sins one by one; or if many people need absolution and, because of the shortage of time, he cannot hear them individually—for example, when a shipwreck, fire, or some other disaster is imminent. In these cases, as is clear, material completeness of confession is physically impossible. Yet it is not plausible that God willed such people to be excluded in these cases from receiving the Sacrament of Penance, which was instituted for all who have fallen after Baptism as a necessary means of salvation. Therefore, and so on. The same minor premise is proved as to moral inability. For many cases occur in which confession seems to be divisible and the precept of confessing absolutely every sin that comes to mind is not considered to apply. You may consult the authors of cases of conscience for these. The chief cases are as follows:

First, when confessing such a sin would bring grave inconvenience and harm to the penitent—for example, if there were a probable imminent danger of bodily death or of an equivalent evil, such as mutilation, perpetual imprisonment, exile, and so forth; or if, during a plague, the confessor reasonably feared infection from remaining long with a penitent infected by the plague. In these cases, the penitent may confess the more serious sins and receive absolution.

The second case is when there is a danger of spiritual death to either the penitent or the confessor. For example, a woman prone to sexual sin may prudently judge that the confessor will solicit her to such a sin if she discloses that sin and her propensity to sin. Lugo, however, d. 16, n. 734, thinks a distinction must be made. If, he says, the woman fears that the solicitation will put her in danger of consenting, or that the confessor will make importunate requests or press her—something that causes her no slight hardship—she may remain silent about it. If she fears none of these things, there is no reason for her to concern herself with the confessor’s wickedness. The common rule usually given in matters of scandal must nevertheless be observed: if harm to one’s neighbor can conveniently be avoided without harm to ourselves, charity obliges us to avoid it. Thus, just as one who seeks the Sacrament from a person in mortal sin needs some special benefit to himself, so in the present case there must be a special cause excusing him from confessing to this priest rather than another.

Third, when the penitent prudently fears that the confessor will reveal a sin to another without his consent, because he knows him to be less discreet and unable to keep a secret. The penitent must nevertheless beware, says Coninck, d. 7, dub. 2, n. 57, of suspecting such things of his confessor without very serious grounds. Such grounds would include knowing that he had at some time revealed a confession, mistreated people because of sins heard in confession, solicited someone to vice, or was inclined to vices and used any pretext to solicit people close to him to shameful acts. Otherwise, by suspecting these things, he would sin most gravely. For the penitent legitimately to be excused from completeness of confession in these cases, three conditions must concur. First, there must be a necessity of making confession, either from divine precept—for example, if danger of death is imminent—or from the ecclesiastical precept of annual confession. For if someone confesses only out of devotion, there seems to be no reason why he could legitimately divide his confession for such motives. Second, it must not be easy to have recourse to another confessor to whom a complete confession could be made without fear of these harms and dangers. Third, these inconveniences must be grave and extraordinary to confession. For, as Coninck rightly observes at n. 58, it is not enough to omit a sin in confession that a confessor, who thought me healthy, devout, and chaste, will consider me a very grave sinner after hearing my sins, or that he will rebuke me severely and make me feel ashamed. Such things are not extraordinary to confession but almost incidental to it.

Fourth, the Doctor gives the following case in d. 20, q. 2, n. 21, where he says:

“A confessor who has administered the Sacrament of Penance indiscreetly is not bound to confess his indiscreet act immediately when his own confessor could at once learn the identity of the person concerning whom he exercised the power of the keys indiscreetly. This is for the greater good: he need not specify the particular sin or the manner in which he exercised the power of the keys indiscreetly, but may say only in general, ‘You committed a sin and administered the Sacrament of Penance.’ Or, if his conscience presses him to confess this specifically, as the argument states, because it is a distinct mortal sin with specially aggravating circumstances, he is bound to wait for an opportunity to confess to someone who could not learn from the confession of the sin and its circumstances the identity of the person who confessed it to him. If no such confessor can ever be found, without learning from the explanation of the sin and its circumstances the guilt and identity of the person who confessed it to him, this man is in a case of impossibility of confessing to another person. For he is more bound by precept not to disclose guilt confessed to him than to confess and explain his own guilt: he is bound to the former in many ways by natural law, as the arguments for the first conclusion prove, and in many ways by positive divine law, as the arguments for the second conclusion prove. But to the latter he is bound, at most, by positive divine law, as stated in d. 17. Therefore, he confesses to God.”

Fourth, some authors give the following case, and say confession may not even then be divided: when a sin cannot be revealed to another without also revealing the sin of the accomplice, or the person with whom the penitent sinned. Thus teach Navarrus, ch. 7, n. 3, and many other casuists. But the opposite opinion is more common and safer, and the Subtle Doctor indicates it, d. 21, q. 2, n. 16, where he says: “What do I say?² That not only must the penitent’s principal sin and its circumstances be confessed—for circumstances cannot properly be disclosed without revealing the deed—but also the other person with whom the sin was committed. For the penitent ought to wish to preserve the person with whom he sinned just as he preserves himself; indeed, all the more because that person was joined to him in the crime. For he is all the more bound to restore to that person the good he lost through it, and to protect the good he can protect, notwithstanding any crime committed.” Thus the Doctor. Although he expressly teaches only that the confessor must conceal the accomplice’s identity under the seal of confession, he nevertheless sufficiently indicates that the accomplice’s identity may be disclosed in confession, since the priest must conceal the person once disclosed in confession.

The Angelic Doctor plainly teaches this in In I Sent., d. 16, q. 3, a. 2, q. un., fifth point, where he says: “To the fifth point, one must say that in confession a person ought to preserve another’s reputation as much as he can, but he ought more to cleanse his own conscience. Therefore, if a circumstance that leads to the identification of a person is necessary for confession, according to the rule given, then he ought to confess while concealing that person as much as he can. But if it is not necessary for confession, he ought to omit it, lest he betray another’s sin.” St. Bonaventure, the Seraphic Doctor, holds the same opinion, In IV Sent., d. 21, p. 2, art. 1, q. 3, n. 51, where he writes: “One’s neighbor’s sins are either irrelevant to the accusation of our own sin, though the one confessing mentions them by association and as a kind of excuse—for it is a comfort to the wretched to have companions in their punishments—and he acts badly in confessing this way, as do many simple people who accuse others by naming all their neighbors so that they may feel less ashamed, saying, ‘We are thieves, usurers, perjurers,’ and the like. Confessors must correct such people, because they do not keep to the strict form of confession. Or another’s sins are joined and mixed with our own, so that our own guilt cannot be properly explained without them; in that case, it is permissible to confess them insofar as our own guilt cannot be explained without another’s sin. Thus, sometimes in general terms: for example, if a woman was known by a bishop (God forbid), it suffices to say that some great prelate knew her. If it was a religious person, it suffices to remain general, since the kind of guilt is sufficiently evident. If one goes on to identify the individual, the person confessing must be rebuked. But if the sin cannot be explained without identifying the particular person—as when a woman was improperly known by a man—then, if she names her husband, she does not sin, because she cannot otherwise confess her own guilt. In this case, one must attend not to the accusation of another but to one’s own accusation. Thus it is generally true that another’s sins must not be mentioned in confession except insofar as they are our own, and confessors must not inquire into them. Therefore, confessors who probe into the details of confessions, hear evil of others, and tolerate it can scarcely ever be excused from the sin of detraction; they do not know how to heal souls, since they allow those who come for medicine to inflict a serious wound on themselves by accusing others.” So far St. Bonaventure. St. Bernard also supports this in his Formula of an Upright Life, near the end: “Speak ill of no one at all, however true or evident it may be, except in confession, and then only when you cannot otherwise disclose your own sin.”

That a penitent may lawfully reveal the identity of an accomplice in confession is proved first as follows. It is lawful to exercise one’s right and seek one’s own bodily or spiritual benefit, even if inconvenience to one’s neighbor follows. For it is lawful to do something in defense of one’s own life from which another’s death follows indirectly. But the penitent has the right to make a complete confession to provide for his own salvation and spiritual care. Therefore, he may lawfully disclose a sin whose disclosure entails identifying the accomplice, even if that disclosure brings some loss of reputation to the accomplice before the confessor—especially since that loss is slight, because the accomplice’s crime is disclosed to only one person, who acts in God’s place and is strictly bound to conceal the sin. Furthermore, by voluntarily making himself an accomplice and participant in a crime, a person also subjects himself to the penalties due and all the consequences of that crime. Therefore, since this committed sin must be submitted to the keys of the Church and explained to the confessor in the manner in which it was committed, whenever that manner changes the kind of sin or notably aggravates it, it follows that if the sin cannot otherwise be disclosed, the accomplice’s sin must also necessarily be explained. This is confirmed: Christ the Lord willed the faithful to disclose all their sins, even secret ones, to a priest despite the loss of reputation that follows from such confession, because the penitent derives the greatest benefit from a complete confession. “For,” says the Council of Trent, sess. XIV, ch. 5, “the difficulty of this kind of confession and the shame of disclosing sins might indeed seem grave, were it not relieved by so many and such great benefits and consolations, which are most certainly conferred through absolution on all who worthily approach this Sacrament.” Therefore, if I may disclose all my hidden sins to a confessor despite the loss of my own reputation, for the great benefit that follows, why may I not likewise disclose the accomplice’s identity to obtain the fruit and benefit of a complete confession? Finally, I may lawfully disclose another’s crime to someone, says Lessius, De Iustitia, ch. 11, dub. 12, when this is necessary for that person to help me in an important matter, since I am not bound to keep another’s reputation wholly unharmed at notable cost to myself. Therefore, much more may I disclose it in confession when this is necessary to avoid having to confess my sins again and to receive salutary counsel from the confessor for ordering my spiritual life, so that I may especially avoid the danger of falling into the same sin again.

That the penitent is bound to disclose the accomplice’s identity for completeness of his confession is clear from what has just been said. For the penitent is bound to confess all mortal sins completely whenever this is lawful and he is not prevented from doing so by some greater precept. Therefore, if he may lawfully reveal the accomplice’s identity when completeness of confession requires it, and cannot otherwise disclose his own sin, he is bound to do so by divine precept. Furthermore, by virtue of the precept to make a complete confession, a person is bound to confess his own sins, even the most shameful, despite the greatest shame and loss of his own reputation before the confessor, who may previously have considered him a devout and religious man. Therefore, he is much more bound to declare those sins at the risk and prejudice of another’s reputation when he cannot otherwise explain his own sin completely. The inference is clear: by charity, a person is more bound to avoid his own disgrace than another’s; thus he would be less bound to confess his own sins than another’s. Therefore, since he is bound to disclose his own sins, however monstrous, even at the risk of harming his reputation, he is much more bound to do so even if some loss of his neighbor’s reputation follows. Finally, if a penitent were not bound to disclose the accomplice’s identity in confession when he cannot otherwise declare his own sin, it would follow that married people would not be bound to confess sins sometimes committed in the marital act, especially when both are known to the confessor, and consequently that the confessor could not judge and retain those sins. But this seems absurd, since it would prejudice the salvation of married people and lead to an excessively lax administration of this Sacrament.

YOU WILL OBJECT 1: A penitent cannot disclose his accomplice’s sin in confession without damaging the accomplice’s reputation before the confessor. But for the completeness of his confession he cannot damage his neighbor’s reputation before the confessor; therefore he cannot reveal the other’s sin. The major premise is clear. The minor is proved: when two precepts must be observed together, one of natural law and the other of positive divine law, and they cannot both be observed at once, the precept of natural law must be observed rather than that of positive law. For if there were a positive precept to make confession, while a natural precept to protect one’s neighbor’s life arose at the same time, I would be more bound to protect my neighbor’s life than to make confession. But completeness of confession belongs only to positive law, while the prohibition against damaging a neighbor’s reputation belongs to natural law. Therefore, the penitent is more bound not to damage his neighbor’s reputation than to make a complete confession. — I deny the minor, and in response to its proof I say that in this case the natural-law precept against damaging one’s neighbor’s reputation is not in force, because of the precept and benefit of a complete confession—not because this positive precept by itself derogates from that natural precept, but because it changes the circumstances included in that natural precept and under which it alone binds. For the natural precept to preserve one’s neighbor’s reputation is not absolute and general for every time and place and every possible circumstance; it applies only when no reasonable cause to the contrary arises, as is clear of other precepts of natural law. For, as our Bosco rightly observes, d. 7, sect. 9, n. 28, the natural precept “You shall not kill” does not bind simply and absolutely—for it is lawful to kill evildoers by public authority, and lawful to kill an unjust aggressor who privately attacks one’s life, and so on—but with this limitation: “You shall not kill the innocent and the just,” Exodus 23:7. Likewise, avoiding scandal is a precept of natural law, but not at grave harm to oneself. Hence the positive precept to hear Mass on Sunday can allow a woman, who would otherwise have to remain at home to avoid giving scandal to a young man who loves her inordinately, to go to church to fulfill this precept; she is not bound to deprive herself of Mass and fulfillment of the precept in order to help someone who will sin out of malice, at such a cost to herself. The same applies to the natural precept to defend the commonwealth. If, however, I cannot do so without revealing the sacramental seal, whose observance belongs in some way to positive law, I am under no obligation, because I am bound to defend the commonwealth only when I can do so without greater harm than the benefit the commonwealth will receive from my defense. The harm that would follow from revealing the seal is much greater than any benefit to the commonwealth. Accordingly, in our case, the natural right that forbids revealing an accomplice’s identity and damaging his reputation is understood to apply unless there is a reasonable cause, such as the completeness of confession, whose good far outweighs the damage to the accomplice’s reputation before the confessor alone. This damage therefore does not excuse the penitent from material completeness of confession. Add to this that greater consideration must be given to the reverence due to the Sacrament of Penance and the penitent’s spiritual good, which require him to confess completely, than to the accomplice’s very small loss of reputation. The accomplice himself voluntarily exposed his reputation to this risk when he committed such a sin with the penitent. Therefore, the precept of completeness of confession does not here require anything contrary to natural law, but something fully in accord with it—just as an external-court judge does not act contrary to natural law when he compels an accused person to disclose his accomplices and orders a witness to state the accused person’s crime.

YOU WILL SAY 2: One should not recommend for practice what makes confession especially hateful. But revealing an accomplice makes confession most hateful to the penitent and so risks turning him away from it; therefore it should not be recommended or asserted.

I deny the major premise. For the penitent’s own loss of reputation makes confession hateful to him and, by itself, turns him away from confession more than an accomplice could. Nevertheless, confession would not legitimately be divided because of the penitent’s shame and loss of reputation. Therefore it must not be divided because of the accomplice’s loss of reputation either.

YOU WILL OBJECT 3: Confession of sins is necessary for salvation only because Christ the Lord instituted and ordained it in this way. But it is not plausible that Christ the Lord wished to institute this Sacrament at the cost and harm of a neighbor’s reputation, and to bind the penitent to disclose the accomplice’s crime when he cannot confess completely without such disclosure. Therefore the penitent is neither bound nor permitted to reveal the accomplice’s identity to preserve the completeness of confession. — I deny the minor. Since Christ the Lord instituted the Sacrament of Penance as a true judgment, it follows that, just as in an ordinary court an accused person has the right to disclose his accomplice’s crime when the judge requires and commands it, and a prosecutor or witness has the right to disclose the crime of the accused and his accomplices when this is necessary for the completeness of the trial, even if the accomplice suffers harm to his reputation, property, or life as a result, so in the tribunal of Penance the penitent, accusing himself, has the right to disclose the partner in his crime in confession if this disclosure is necessary for its completeness, even if the accomplice thereby suffers some harm to his reputation before the confessor.

YOU WILL OBJECT FINALLY: If a penitent is bound to reveal the accomplice’s identity in order to confess completely, he will also be bound to disclose another person’s sin, even if that person is not an accomplice, when he cannot explain his own sin to the confessor without such disclosure—for example, if he gave a potion to an unmarried woman to destroy a child conceived through fornication or adultery. But this is false, since a penitent has no right to reveal a sin in which he did not share or participate, and which was not committed in partnership with him. Therefore, by the same reasoning, he is not bound to disclose the accomplice’s identity to preserve the completeness of confession. — I deny the inference of the major, and the reason for the difference is that a neighbor who did not commit a sin together with the penitent did not subject himself to the completeness of the judgment exercised in the tribunal of Penance concerning that penitent. Nor does the confessor, from his right to know the penitent’s offense, also have a right to know the neighbor’s offense, which is not a circumstance of the sin the penitent himself accuses. For whether the child was conceived through adultery or fornication is irrelevant to the potion given to suffocate the fetus and procure an abortion. The accomplice’s case is different, since his offense is a circumstance that changes the kind or notably aggravates the sin the penitent confesses.

NOTE, HOWEVER, that the penitent may not disclose the accomplice’s identity except when it is necessary for the completeness of confession. Thus, if a sister had sinned only venially by not resisting promptly enough the violence of her brother, who was trying to rape her, she would not be permitted to disclose her brother’s identity and crime in confession. In that case she would have no right, for the sake of the completeness of her own confession, to reveal her brother’s sin, since venial sins and their circumstances do not necessarily have to be disclosed in confession. It would suffice for her to say that she had not resisted with the promptness and strength of mind she ought to have shown toward the man who was urging her to carnal sin. The same must be said of sins already committed: when they are disclosed again in confession, the accomplice’s identity should not be stated if it could be known to the confessor, since accusing oneself of such sins is not necessary for the completeness of confession. In that case, it is better not to confess such sins again, or at least not with the circumstance that would identify the accomplice.

NOTE SECONDLY that someone who reveals an accomplice’s sin without any necessity or benefit sins against justice, and is therefore bound to restore the reputation that such an indiscreet confession took away before the confessor. For the reason why a person’s reputation is damaged in confession is the same as outside confession when confession itself does not require it. But damaging someone’s reputation outside confession without necessity or benefit is unjust and in itself obliges one to restore it in whatever suitable way is possible. Therefore the same must be said of damage to reputation caused through confession.

YOU WILL ASK 1: Whether someone who has reserved cases may, when necessity arises, confess sins that are not reserved to a priest who lacks the faculty to absolve from reserved cases, without disclosing the reserved sins to him? — Alexander of Hales teaches the affirmative, 4th part, q. 18, memb. 5, art. 2, reply to the last point. In response to this argument—“For certain sins one must have recourse to the supreme pontiff, who has the fullness of power to absolve; but one need not have recourse to him for lesser sins, from which an ordinary priest can absolve; therefore sometimes it is necessary to divide confession”—he says: “One must say that it is one thing to confess some sins to one priest and some to another, so that one’s wickedness may appear less; and another thing, when one cannot be absolved by the person who immediately has care of one’s soul, to go with his consent and will to a superior who can absolve, because one cannot be absolved by the first. In the first way, the person dividing confession is moved by a disordered and perverse will, by which he wishes to justify himself in part, when he ought to humble himself. In the second way, he is moved by good will toward himself and another, because he intends in this way to provide for his own salvation. Such a person is not said to divide confession, since with one priest’s consent and counsel he confesses to another.” Yet it is clear that Alexander does not deny that the penitent must disclose the reserved sins to the priest who absolves him from the nonreserved sins, since he plainly says that, on that priest’s counsel, the penitent must have recourse to a superior so that he may be absolved from the reserved sins. But how could the priest give this counsel if the penitent did not disclose those sins?

The negative opinion is therefore more probable: someone confessing to a priest who cannot absolve from reserved sins is also bound to confess the reserved sins. First, since the priest will at least indirectly absolve the penitent from the reserved sins, he must also know and judge them. Second, disclosure of these sins greatly helps determine whether the penitent is worthy of absolution, since because of them he may not be absolved at all—for example, if he has a concubine he is unwilling to abandon, or refuses to restore another’s property, and so on.

YOU WILL OBJECT 1: No one is bound to confess the same sins twice, otherwise the burden of confession would be too heavy. But the penitent is bound to confess reserved sins to the person who has the power to absolve directly from them; therefore he should not confess them to a priest who lacks that power. — I deny the major premise for this case. The burden of repeating confession is not so significant that the completeness of confession should therefore be violated, especially since the penitent must blame himself for this burden, because he freely incurred this obligation.

YOU WILL OBJECT 2: A penitent is bound to confession only when it is sacramental and made before a legitimate judge who can loose or bind. But an ordinary priest is not a legitimate judge with respect to reserved sins, and consequently a confession made to him cannot be sacramental; therefore the penitent is not bound to confess those sins to him. — I deny the minor premise. Although that priest is not the legitimate judge of such sins in themselves and directly, so that if the penitent confessed only reserved sins he could not judge them sacramentally, nevertheless he is at least their indirect judge, insofar as they are joined to other sins about which he can judge, as well as to the penitent’s condition. For that reason the accusation of those reserved sins can be called sacramental confession: they are, as it were, circumstances of the sins from which the penitent must be absolved directly, and concern the present condition of the sinner that must be disclosed in confession, so that it may be judged whether he should be absolved.

YOU WILL ASK 2: Whether a dying person may legitimately be absolved if he could not confess any particular sin but could only show general signs of sorrow? — I answer that such a dying person may be considered in two ways: either while a priest is present, he gives certain signs of sorrow by which he shows that he has sinned and grieves over it, but because he is suddenly deprived of the power of speech he cannot confess any particular sin; or he may be considered as having shown certain signs of penance and asked for a confessor before the priest arrived, but in the meantime lost the use of reason entirely, so that the priest, on arriving, cannot obtain any sign of penance from him and can learn only from those present that he gave signs of penance and asked for a confessor. I say, then, that a dying person considered in either way may legitimately be absolved, as is gathered from the Council of Orange, ch. 11, where it says: “A person who suddenly becomes speechless, as provided, can be baptized or receive Penance if he has the testimony of others concerning his previous will, or shows it presently by a nod, by which he signifies sorrow for his sins.” The Council of Carthage III, ch. 34, likewise says: “If the sick cannot answer for themselves, let them be baptized when their will has been attested; the same must be done for penitents.” Carthage IV, ch. 67, likewise says: “If someone asks for Penance while ill, and by chance, while the invited priest is coming to him, is struck speechless by illness or becomes delirious, let those who heard him testify, and let him receive Penance. If he is believed to be about to die at once, let him be reconciled by the laying on of hands, and let the Eucharist be poured into his mouth.” It is no answer to say that these councils speak only of absolution from censures; that is asserted entirely without grounds. First, the councils compare this reconciliation with Baptism, indicating that they speak of reconciliation through the Sacraments. Second, they speak of reconciliation that must take place before receiving the Eucharist. For those infected with mortal sin, this must be sacramental, as the Council of Trent teaches, sess. XIV, canon 7.

St. Leo also clearly teaches this truth, ep. 91, addressed to Theodore, bishop of Forum Iulii, where he writes about those to be reconciled through the Sacrament of Penance: “If they have been so weighed down by some illness that they cannot indicate, in the priest’s presence, what they had sought shortly before, the testimony of the faithful standing around them ought to help, so that they may receive together the benefit of Penance and reconciliation.” He is not speaking there of absolution from censures, since he had previously said: “The mediator between God and human beings, the man Jesus Christ, gave this power to the leaders of the Church, so that they might impose the satisfaction of Penance on those who confess and admit to sacramental communion, through the door of reconciliation, those cleansed by that same salutary satisfaction.” Here he clearly teaches that he is speaking of sacramental absolution. Next, after explaining with what charity and diligence priests ought to devote themselves to this work, he adds: “But if one of those for whom we beseech the Lord, hindered by any obstacle, fails to receive the present gift of pardon and, before reaching the prescribed remedy, ends his temporal life according to the human condition, what he did not receive while remaining in the body he will be unable to obtain once stripped of the flesh.” From this it is plainly clear that St. Leo is not speaking of absolution from censures, which can also be granted to the dead, as is evident from ch. A nobis 28, and so on.

Reason also supports this. If such absolution were invalid, it would be above all because it did not presuppose true matter or a genuine accusation of oneself accompanied by signs of sorrow, from which the priest could know that the penitent was worthy of absolution. But that is not so: by asking for Penance, the penitent sufficiently shows that he is sorry for his sins and has already begun to confess them in general by asking for a priest to be summoned. This is almost like someone confessing through an interpreter, when he writes down his sins for the interpreter to explain to the priest. For when those present explain to a priest who is there the dying person’s request for Penance and desire for it, they explain his confession to the priest as interpreters do; thus, with the priest already present, he makes his sins known to him, as it were, through interpreters and presents signs of penance.

YOU WILL OBJECT 1: Confession is required before sacramental absolution so that the penitent’s condition may be known. But his condition cannot be known from signs of this kind; therefore, and so on. Furthermore, through those signs the confessor learns nothing he did not already know, since he learns only generally that the person has sinned. But he cannot exercise judgment without distinct knowledge of the case; therefore the priest cannot pronounce judicial and sacramental absolution over this dying person. — I answer the first point by denying the minor: through signs of this kind the priest sufficiently knows that this person needs the Sacrament of Penance and is therefore guilty of sin. For to be absolved directly, one need not confess any particular sin. If someone who had lived for many years in the gravest sins confessed only one venial sin—for example, that he had once been voluntarily distracted while praying—and then suddenly lost his senses, everyone agrees that he ought to be absolved. Yet, speaking morally, the priest could judge his condition no better from that confession than if he had said only in general that he had sinned. Therefore, in this case too he ought to be absolved. To the second point, I deny the major premise: by the signs shown by the penitent, the priest knows, as a judge in the tribunal of Penance, that this man has offended God and is sorry for it. The priest did not previously know either of these things, at least the latter, under his judicial aspect.

YOU WILL OBJECT 2: If a penitent who showed a sign of penance while the priest was absent could validly and lawfully be absolved, it would follow that one could sacramentally confess sins to an absent confessor by letter or messenger. But Clement VIII and Paul V condemned this as an erroneous doctrine, as we already said when discussing the form of this Sacrament; therefore, and so on. — I deny the inference of the major premise. The case of a dying person is entirely different from that of someone who declares his sins by letter to a priest who is absent. For the dying person confesses, as it were, through an interpreter: through the testimony of those who heard him ask for a confessor and saw the signs of contrition he made. Moreover, in this case the priest is not considered absent, since he has the person to be absolved present, as well as witnesses present who declare that the dying person has an effective will to receive the Sacrament of Penance. The case is different for someone who is entirely absent, because the confessor has no moral certainty and cannot have it that the penitent who confessed by letter is in the proper condition to be absolved. In response to the minor premise, then, I say that this assertion does not conflict with the definition of Clement VIII, who condemned the proposition: “It is permissible to confess sacramentally through a letter or messenger to an absent confessor and to obtain absolution from that absent person.” First, as we have said, this case is entirely different from ours. Second, when the pontiff himself was asked whether a dying person in this situation should be absolved sacramentally, he replied that he ought to be absolved and that he himself would absolve him if such an occasion arose, and that he did not intend his decree to include this case in any way. For, as Coninck reports, disp. 7, n. 105, on April 16, 1608, the most illustrious Cardinal Bellarmine and the most illustrious Archbishop of Armagh testified that they had heard this from him. This is confirmed by the Roman Ritual, published by authority of Paul V, in which the supreme pontiff not only permits but also commands all parish priests to confer sacramental absolution on a dying person in such a case. For it says: “If, while confessing or even before beginning to confess, the sick person loses his voice and power of speech, the priest should try, insofar as possible, to learn the penitent’s sins by nods and signs. Once they are known in some way, either generally or specifically, or even if the desire to confess has been shown either by the person himself or through others, he must be absolved.”

Three chief matters must be determined in this Question: first, whether the priest alone is minister of the sacrament of penance; second, whether this belongs to every priest by virtue of his character and Order; third, whether the confessor must be so strict a keeper of secrecy that he may under no circumstances ever disclose to anyone other than the penitent the sin confessed to him. In order that these matters may be resolved more distinctly and made clear,

NOTE 1. Among the other errors of Wycliffe was the claim that a priest was not a necessary minister of the sacrament of penance, as Waldensis testifies, vol. 2, ch. 135; some of the more recent heretics followed him in this error, as is gathered from the Council of Trent, sess. XIV, ch. 6, where it declares: Concerning the minister of this sacrament, the holy Synod declares that all doctrines are false and wholly alien to the truth of the Gospel which perniciously extend the ministry of the keys to any other persons whatever besides bishops and priests, supposing that those words of the Lord, “Whatever you bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatever you loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven,” and “Whose sins you forgive, they are forgiven them, and whose you retain, they are retained,” were spoken indiscriminately and promiscuously to all Christians, contrary to the institution of this sacrament, as though anyone had power to remit sins: public sins, indeed, through correction, if the corrected person has accepted it, but secret sins through spontaneous confession made to anyone whatever. Nor were there lacking certain Catholics who, following the Master of the Sentences in bk. I, d. 17, although they granted that the priest alone is minister of this sacrament, nevertheless thought that in necessity, when no priest is present, the sinner is bound to confess to a layman. For they said, as St. Bonaventure reports in the same distinction, part 3, doubt 1, that the power of absolving is possessed in five ways: by authority, and thus it belongs to God; by excellence, and thus it belongs to Christ as man; by power, or authority committed, and thus it belongs to the priest; by merit of life, and thus it belongs to the just and holy man; and by virtue of the unity of the Church, and thus it belongs to any faithful man. Therefore they say that such confession is in a certain way a sacrament of the Church. It is more probable, however, to say that it is not a sacrament of the Church, since its formal element is lacking, namely, the power of the key; rather, it is something in place of it.

NOTE 2. The power to absolve from sins, granted by Christ the Lord to the priests of the New Law, is declared metaphorically under the name keys in Matthew 16, where the Lord, promising this power to Peter, says: I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and whatever you bind on earth, etc. “Moreover,” says the Seraphic Doctor, d. 18, a. 1, “the name key is transferred to spiritual things from bodily things themselves; among bodily things a key is an instrument for removing some obstacle. Since, then, in spiritual things we find an obstacle to entering the heavenly kingdom, it must be removed. Hence we transfer the name key to spiritual things, calling that power a key by which the obstacle is removed, or by which one is excluded or admitted. Accordingly, it must be observed that, since there are three obstacles to entering the kingdom and three powers that remove them, there is a threefold spiritual key, differing according to degree and dignity. The obstacle to entering heaven is a debt arising from some sin, and this is threefold. First, the debt of a sin committed, namely, mortal sin, which is a debt of eternal punishment. God alone removes this obstacle, because it is removed by the deletion of guilt; therefore the power removing it is divine power, which some call the key of authority. The second obstacle is the debt of contracted sin, namely, the debt of paying a price; it could be paid by him who could make satisfaction, and such was Christ alone. Therefore this power, which removes that obstacle, belongs to Christ alone, and some call it the key of excellence. The third obstacle is the debt of a remitted sin, because after guilt has been remitted, a person is still bound to temporal punishment. This can be removed by one who can determine the penalty for sin, and such is Christ’s minister, not Christ alone. This power has been communicated to men and is called the key of ministry. Since, then, the obstacle is threefold, the key is threefold: the first, namely, that of authority, from which comes the second, that of excellence, which belongs to Christ alone; and the third is the key of ministry, which descends from the key of authority through the key of excellence. Of this it was said to Peter: I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven.” The Doctor explains this truth somewhat differently in d. 19, n. 1, where he says: “Judicial authority to pronounce sentence that heaven is to be opened to someone, or is open, can be understood in three ways: first, as authority that is simply principal; second, as not principal but pre-eminent; third, as neither principal nor pre-eminent, but particular. The first belongs to God alone for two reasons. First, because he alone is just of himself—indeed, justice itself. The first judgment can belong only to the first just one, since judgment is not perfect unless it is just, as in the Psalm: I have done judgment and justice; for to judge is to declare what is right or just. The first just one must be most perfect, and hence most just: therefore, the first just one. Second, because to judge belongs to the presiding authority, according to the Apostle’s words in Romans 14: Who are you to judge another’s servant? The first presiding authority can be God alone. Thus, just as he cannot communicate divinity to another, neither can he communicate the first power of judging, and consequently neither the simply principal key for opening heaven. The second key, which is not principal yet is pre-eminent, can be understood in relation to two kinds of pre-eminence: one in the universality of the causes to be judged, the other in the firmness of the definitive sentence. Both can belong to one who knows all the merits and demerits that are the causes for which heaven is to be opened or closed, and whose will is also inseparably conformed to divine justice. On the first account he can pronounce sentence in every case, because he knows them all… On the second, his sentence can be absolutely firm and irrevocable, because it is always just. This key, with both kinds of pre-eminence, belongs properly to Christ, who knows all the merits and demerits of those to be judged and always judges in conformity with divine justice. Nor can it belong to the Church militant, at least not suitably, because no one in the Church knows all judicial causes or has a will immutably just. The third key, particular with respect to the causes known and weak with respect to the sentence pronounced, in that it can sometimes be revoked, may be conferred on someone in the Church militant who can know the case in question and judge rightly in it according to divine law; if he judges beyond that case, his sentence will not be firm, but within that case it will be firm. Thus there can be in the Church one key for opening heaven: the authority to pronounce a particular sentence, not irrevocably, that heaven is open to someone. It is also fitting that this key be in the Church, and in a priest, so that the ecclesiastical hierarchy may be ordered and the last things brought back to the first through an intermediary.”

NOTE 3. The seal of confession is nothing other than the obligation by which a confessor is bound to keep secret all that he has heard in confession. This obligation is called metaphorically a seal because, just as secrets are customarily sealed so that they do not become known to others, so sins made known to a confessor must be sealed in perpetual silence, as though by a sacred and inviolable seal, lest they become known to others. Since there are three kinds of right by which someone may be bound to keep a secret entrusted to him—natural, divine positive, and ecclesiastical—the question is whether the confessor is bound by each of these three kinds of right to conceal the sin disclosed to him in confession.

First conclusion. — THE PRIEST ALONE OF THE EVANGELICAL LAW IS THE LAWFUL MINISTER OF THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE, TO WHOM SACRAMENTAL CONFESSION MUST BE MADE. This is a matter of faith, defined by the Council of Trent, sess. XIV, ch. 10: If anyone says that priests who are in mortal sin do not have the power to bind and loose, or that not priests alone are ministers of absolution, but that these words were spoken to all the faithful, “Whatever you bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatever you loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven,” and “Whose sins you forgive, they are forgiven them, and whose you retain, they are retained,” by the power of which words anyone may absolve sins—public sins through correction only, if the corrected person has accepted it, but secret sins through spontaneous confession—let him be anathema. This truth is evident from the action of Christ the Lord, who, when he conferred the power to absolve from sins in John 20¹, gave it to the Apostles alone. For after he had breathed on them and said, Receive the Holy Spirit, he immediately added, Whose sins you forgive, etc., clearly indicating that only those who by a special ordination would receive the grace of the Holy Spirit for this purpose were to speak these words; such are priests alone. Therefore, etc.

This same truth is further proved by the authority of the holy Fathers, who unanimously teach that this power of absolving was granted to the priests of the New Law alone. Thus St. Ambrose, in On Paradise and On Penance, speaking of the power to bind and absolve, says: This right has been permitted to priests alone. Explaining the words of Matthew 16, I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven, St. Jerome says: The other Apostles have judicial power, and so does the whole Church in its bishops and priests; but Peter received it especially so that all might understand that whoever is separated from the truth of the faith and the fellowship of the Church can neither be loosed from sins nor enter heaven. The other Fathers attest the same, especially St. Leo, ep. 91, and before them St. Pacian, in Against the Novatians. Moreover, the Subtle Doctor praised above proves this truth, n. 6, from the fact that a priest is a mediator between God and the sinner: “It is fitting,” he says, “that this authority be in the Church, and in a priest, so that the ecclesiastical hierarchy may be ordered and the last things brought back to the first through an intermediary. The hierarchy is the intermediary between God and the sinner who is to be brought back. This also accords with the perfection of secondary causes in moral being: God does not universally deny creatures the causality that can belong to them; indeed, he communicates it and assists secondary causes in their action. Since, then, in the order of grace it is possible for a human being to have this reductive causality, called the key, it is fitting that it be given to the highest authority in the Church, namely, the priest.”

The Seraphic Doctor declares the same truth plainly and clearly in d. 19, a. 2, q. 1, where he says: “It must be said, as the Saints say, and as the very manner of conferring Orders also indicates, that the power of the keys is conferred in the priestly Order. The reason is divine institution. We can see the fittingness of the institution: the keeper of these keys has the efficacy of a mediator and the office of a reconciler. A mediator stands between God and man; a reconciler restores someone to the Church and reconciles him to the Church. To be a perfect and competent mediator between God and man, one must be able to offer gifts and sacrifices for sins, by which God is appeased. To be a reconciler, one must be able to restore someone to the mystical body of Christ, whose head is Christ himself; and for this power to be rightly ordered, one must be able to consecrate the most holy body of Christ. This belongs to priests alone. Therefore God’s wondrous wisdom, ordering ecclesiastical powers in the most orderly way, entrusted this power of binding and loosing to priests alone; thus the keys are given in the priestly Order.”

OBJECTIONS 1. St. James, ch. 5, admonishes them to confess their sins to one another, for he says: Therefore confess your sins to one another and pray for one another, that you may be saved; the constant prayer of a just man is very powerful. Therefore he does not think confession must be made to a priest alone. — I answer: Scripture distinguishes three kinds of confession of sins made to one’s neighbor: one is satisfactory, made to an offended brother to obtain his pardon and peace; another is consultative, made to obtain advice necessary for salvation; the third is sacramental, made to obtain pardon through absolution. The first may be made to any neighbor who has been offended. The second may be made to a just and learned man, especially to pastors and religious men, whose office is to enlighten the faithful publicly and privately with evangelical teaching and console them with salutary exhortation. The third, however, may be made only to the Church’s priests, to whom alone the power of absolving from sins has been granted. St. James seems to speak only of this last kind when he urges that sins be confessed to another; for he had first spoken of priests, admonishing the faithful that if anyone among them is sick, he should summon the presbyters of the Church to pray over him and anoint him with oil. Hence he immediately concludes: Therefore confess your sins to one another, thereby indicating plainly enough that sins are to be laid before those whom he had already said should be summoned to pray over the sick man and anoint him. Lest anyone think that the mortal sins burdening the sick person’s conscience could be wiped away through the priests’ prayer and the holy unction they administered, he adds: Confess your sins to one another—as Hugh of St. Victor explains in On the Sacraments: that is, among you, human beings to human beings, sheep to pastors, subjects to prelates, laymen to priests, those who have sins to those who have the power to remit sins.

OBJECTIONS 2. St. Cyprian, bk. 3 of the Letters, according to Pamelius’s edition, ep. 13, teaches: If someone, overcome by illness, cannot wait for the priest’s arrival, let him be reconciled through a deacon, after first making an exomologesis, that is, a confession. Similarly, in On Thefts, ch. “Thieves,” we read: We have decided that prayers should not be said for thieves and robbers if they are killed while stealing and plundering; but if, when captured or wounded, they have confessed to a presbyter or deacon, we do not deny them communion. — I answer: Cyprian is speaking not of sacramental absolution but of that by which public penitents were received into the communion of the Church, so that they could share communion with others and take part in divine worship. As to the second passage, I say that it does not say there that a deacon can sacramentally absolve a thief, but that he can hear his confession and judge whether he is truly contrite and worthy to receive the sacrament of the Eucharist, which at that time deacons customarily administered to the faithful when no priest was present.

OBJECTIONS 3. Various authorities of the holy Fathers seem to indicate that the power of the keys belongs to all the faithful, especially the good and devout, and is exercised by them whenever they forgive penitents for offenses committed against them, or leave the obstinate and impenitent to be punished by divine judgment. Among these, St. Augustine says most notably in bk. 3 of Against the Donatists, ch. 18, speaking of the Apostles to whom it had been said, Whose sins you forgive: “Therefore, if they represented the Church and this was said to them as though it were said to the Church itself, the Church’s peace forgives sins, and alienation from the Church’s peace retains sins—not according to the judgment of men, but according to God’s judgment, and the prayers of the spiritual saints, who judge all things but are themselves judged by no one. For the rock retains, the rock forgives; the dove forgives; unity retains, unity forgives. The peace of this unity is found only among the good, whether they are already spiritual or are advancing toward spiritual things through harmonious obedience; it is not found among the wicked, etc.” Further on, concerning the wicked, he says: “They did not grant the remission² of sins that is given through the prayers of the saints, that is, through the dove’s sighs. For the Lord would not say to robbers and fornicators, If you forgive anyone’s sins, etc.” And in bk. 5, ch. 21: “Therefore,” he says, “God gives the sacrament of grace even through the wicked, but grace itself only through himself or his saints; thus he effects the remission of sins either through himself or through the members of that dove to whom he said, If you forgive anyone’s sins, etc.” In bk. 6, ch. 4 of the same work he says: “When sins are remitted to an evil man truly converted to God, they are remitted by those to whom he is joined through true conversion. For the same Holy Spirit remits them, the Spirit who has been given to all the saints bound to one another by charity, whether or not they know one another. Likewise, when someone’s sins are retained, they are retained by those from whom he is separated by a difference of life and the estrangement of a perverse heart.” Moreover, in Tractate 58 on John he says that when we forgive one another’s sins, we loose them on earth so that they may also be loosed in heaven. And in Tractate 121, on the words Whose sins you forgive, etc., he says: “The charity of the Church forgives the sins of those who share in it and retains the sins of those who do not.” A similar passage occurs in St. Ambrose, bk. 9 on Luke, on the words Loose him and let him go, where he says: The apostolic hand looses; such be your action, such your life, such your grace; be such yourself, that you may loose those who are bound. Origen also writes in Homily 1 on Matthew 16: All who follow in Peter’s footsteps have the power of loosing and binding. Theophylact likewise states plainly in Matthew 18: Not only what priests loose is loosed, but whatever we, when injured, bind or loose is also bound or loosed. — I answer that we have already partly answered all these authorities in the Provincial Disputation, where we showed that sacraments are validly administered even by wicked ministers. I add that in the passages just cited St. Augustine and St. Ambrose are not speaking of ministers of the sacrament or of the sacramental manner of remitting sins, which occurs through ministerial authority, but of the intercessory manner proper to holy and devout men. For outside the sacrament God remits sins to no one in answer to the prayers of the wicked, but in answer to those of the just. St. Augustine distinguishes these two matters most clearly in bk. 4 of Against the Donatists, ch. 4, where, discussing whether a heretic and a robber remit sins, he says: If it is through the power of God’s sacrament, then each does so just as the other; if through his own merit, neither does so. By this he means that sins are sometimes remitted either through the ministry of the one absolving or through the merit of the one interceding. The Church also recognizes this latter manner of remitting sins in the saints reigning with God. Estius says that in d. 20, § 2, the Church says in a hymn to the Blessed Virgin: Loose the bonds of the guilty, and again, Make us, freed from sins, gentle and chaste; to the Apostles: We beg you, loose us from all sins by command; and to a martyr: The bonds of your sacred body are now loosed; loose us from the bonds of the world, etc. By command is said because of the certainty of the effect that follows from their intercessions. Likewise, to the Forerunner: Holy John, loose the guilt of a polluted lip. Conversely, the saints are said to bind the impenitent and retain their sins when they approve divine justice toward the impenitent, especially the condemned. Hence their voice is heard in the Psalm: Have no mercy on all who work iniquity. For just as the saints will be judges on the day of the Last Judgment, so now, in a certain way, they judge the wicked and impious by approving the sentence that divine justice passes on them even in this life. As for the objection from Origen and Theophylact, it has already been answered above in reply to the first objection, where we said that confession is threefold: one kind is satisfactory, and these two authors are to be understood as speaking of it.

YOU WILL ASK: When no priest is present and the danger of death is imminent, is someone conscious of mortal sin bound to confess to a layman or a deacon? — I answer: various authors advise such confession. First, the author of the book On True and False Penance, ch. 10, and Gratian after him, in the chapter “Whoever repents,” d. 1, On Penance, says: Such is the power of confession that, if there is no priest, one should confess to a neighbor. It often happens that a penitent cannot feel shame before a priest; and even if the one to whom he confesses has no power to absolve, the penitent nevertheless becomes worthy of the priest’s pardon through his desire, when he confesses to a companion. For lepers were cleansed while they went to pray or show themselves to the priests, before they reached them. Hence it is clear that God looks into the heart when necessity prevents people from reaching priests. Often they seek them while healthy and joyful, but as they seek them they die before arriving. Yet God’s mercy is everywhere: he knows how to spare the just, even if not as quickly as if they were absolved by a priest. Peter the Chanter of Paris teaches the same in his Summa on the Sacraments, fol. 203, defending the same opinion as common and relying on the same authority from On True and False Penance: Behold, from this authority we learn that in necessity one must confess to a layman if no priest is available, and not only venial sins but mortal ones as well. He then raises against himself the authority of Bede, who seems to understand this only of venial sins, and answers: Perhaps this was said of a case in which a priest can be found, as appears from what follows, namely, that sins cannot be remitted without the correction of confession. For if confession is so necessary that, when no priest is available, one must confess to anyone at all in danger of death, must one confess to a Jew, a Gentile, or an avowed heretic? It does not seem so, since they are despisers and mockers of the Christian religion, etc. He then proves that one should not confess to a dead person or a child, but to a discreet layman who will not be scandalized by such a confession. Peter further asks and answers matters that seem worth inserting here, to show more clearly what the widespread practice of many was at the time: And likewise, may one confess to a woman who will not be scandalized by such a confession? Again, if a faithful servant of a Jew is dying on the road, with only his master present, and has no sins that the Jew could or would use to detain the penitent or the Church; and before dying he confesses to that Jew and adjures him by God and the faith he owes him to attest his penance and confession to the Church, will he be believed later when he attests this? Will the Church not commend such a confession, since no danger follows from it? I answer: I believe that the Lord, who in such a case gives the penitent contrition, will teach him through inward inspiration what he should do. Because of such great necessity, I believe he may confess even to this Jew or heretic; yet he may commendably abstain from confessing to them if his conscience so directs. Praepositivus likewise taught this as a widely accepted doctrine, as is gathered from his manuscript Summa, bk. 2, ch. “On Confession,” where he writes: It is asked whether one may confess to a companion. It seems so, and this is proved. On the passage “Confess your sins to one another,” Bede says that sins committed deliberately should be confessed to a priest, but those committed through weakness or ignorance may be confessed to a companion. Objection: Some sin committed through weakness is graver than every sin committed deliberately. For the sin of fornication committed through weakness is graver than an idle word spoken deliberately. Therefore someone must confess a mortal sin to a companion and a venial sin to a priest. Solution: By sins of weakness Bede understood daily sins, without which life can scarcely be lived, since these often proceed from weakness or ignorance. But what does confessing to a companion achieve? It seems to achieve nothing, since a companion has no power to bind and loose; moreover, one can find a priest. Solution: Whatever Bede may say, we say that it is always better to confess to a priest than to a companion, and one should confess to a companion only in necessity. Necessity, however, arises even in the case of the smallest sins: it would be almost impossible to find a priest every time we sin, whereas it is easy to find a companion; and when someone confesses to a companion, he is loosed through his desire for a priest, as Augustine says. That is what he says. Albert the Great, in In IV Sent., d. 17, a. 58, poses the question: Can someone confess to a companion, and what is such confession worth? He answers: Confession made to a layman is of value when necessity, and not contempt for religion, rules out one’s own or another priest. He then teaches that the Fathers asserted various powers of absolving: “There is,” he says, “the power to absolve by authority, which belongs to God; the power of supreme excellence, which belongs to Christ as man, etc. A third power comes from the merit of life and the suffrages of prayers; this belongs to the saints in the Church, whereby one person merits for another the first grace that absolves from sins. Another power, conferred on priests by the office of ministers, is the last; by virtue of the unity of faith and charity, in a case of necessity it descends to every person to help his neighbor. A layman has this power in a case of necessity, and so does a woman.” In the following article he teaches that such absolution is sacramental, like baptism administered by a layman, and that in this case the layman is a true minister, that is, the priest’s substitute. St. Raymond likewise says in bk. 3 of On Penance and Remission, § 20: Graver sins too should be disclosed to one’s equals when no priest is available and danger is pressing; when no priest is available, it is permissible to confess venial sins to one’s equals, and this suffices, as most Doctors say, provided the priest is not omitted out of contempt. Others say—and I believe this the safer view—that sins of both kinds should be disclosed to priests, to whom the power of binding and absolving has been granted, if one can be found. Earlier, in session 15, relying on St. Augustine, the Decree On Penance, d. 1, “Whoever repents,” and On Consecration, d. 4, ch. “The Holy,” he had said: Such is the power of confession that if a case of necessity arises—because someone who wishes to confess is sick unto death or must enter a just war, and no priest is available—he may confess to a neighbor; thus he may confess not only to a cleric but also to a layman or companion. Alexander of Hales, Summa, part 4, q. 19, memb. 1, a. 1, says confession made to a layman is useful for many reasons and that absolution given by a layman is a petition for absolution from God; in proof he cites the saying of St. Augustine already quoted, but attributes it to St. Gregory. St. Bonaventure, in d. 17, part 3, doubt 3, and a. 2, q. 1, attests that some Doctors consider this confession sacramental, though he judges the contrary more probable. It matters little, however, whether it is sacramental or not, provided it produces in the penitent in some way the primary effect of sacramental absolution, namely, salvation. Cardinal Hostiensis, in bk. 5 of the Summa, title On Penance and Remission, ch. 14, explains cases in which it is permissible not to confess to one’s own parish priest: “Seventh, in a time of necessity, 26, q. 6, ‘If a priest,’ On Penance, d. 3, ‘Any priest’; for, as Augustine says, confession has such power that, if a case of necessity is imminent—for example, one who wishes to confess is sick unto death, or must enter a war, and no priest is available, neither his own nor any other—in such a case he may confess even to a layman or, if no one else is present, to a woman, On Penance, d. 1, ‘Whoever repents,’ and d. 3, ‘Whoever wishes,’ and On Consecration, d. 4, ‘It is holy,’ etc. One must not, however, confess to a heretic or an excommunicate.” Shortly afterward he explains the power of such confession: “What was said about a layman or woman should be understood as concerning the manifestation of sacramental faith; hence, if someone dies in this way, he is saved. Yet the proper sacrament is lacking, because no one can truly absolve so as to make it the true sacrament of penance unless he is a priest. Therefore, if such a person survives, he must confess again to his own priest.” Likewise, St. Thomas says in d. 17, q. 3, a. 3, question 2: “It must be said that, just as baptism is a sacrament of necessity, so too is penance. Baptism, as a sacrament of necessity, has two ministers: one whose office it is to baptize, namely, a priest; the other to whom the administration of baptism is entrusted by reason of necessity. So too the minister of penance, to whom confession must be made by office, is a priest; but in necessity a layman also takes the priest’s place, so that confession may be made to him.” In his reply to the first objection he later teaches that such confession contains the character of a sacrament, and those things that pertain to its essence, though not all of them; what is lacking, namely, a priest, is supplied by the High Priest. When necessity is imminent, the penitent must do what lies on his part: be contrite and confess to whomever he can. A little later he says: “Nevertheless, confession made to a layman out of desire for a priest is sacramental in a certain way, though it is not a perfect sacrament.” In reply to the second objection he says that the layman is the confessor’s judge, because the penitent has submitted to him by reason of necessity and to obtain the sacrament.

In truth, I say that these and similar authorities and opinions do not mean that the confession made by a penitent, and absolution given by deacons or laymen, are sacramental. For absolutely all the Doctors of the Church consistently teach that the power of the keys belongs to bishops and presbyters alone, as the Council of Trent plainly defines, sess. XIV, ch. 6. Hence such confession can indeed be salutary on account of the contrition, shame, and humility attached to it. For, as the Doctor says in d. 17, q. 27: “Such confession can be an occasion of shame, which is one penalty due for sin; by confessing, a person pays some penalty that he would pay if he confessed to a priest. But since the precept requires accusation for this purpose, and no other, namely, that a sentence follow, and since a layman has no authority to pronounce sentence in this forum, it follows that there is no precept to accuse oneself to a layman. Perhaps it would be more useful not to accuse oneself to him, if one could feel the same shame by recalling the same sins privately and thus be punished equally. Someone might say that it is necessary not to confess to a layman because one may not defame oneself or disclose one’s hidden sin, especially when the person to whom it is disclosed is not presumed to keep the secret and does not know better than the sinner himself how to advise him. Perhaps it is permissible to disclose one’s sin to some more discreet layman in order to seek counsel. But even this is not clear, since one could seek counsel by presenting the case in general terms, without disclosing one’s own sin. What, then, of condemned criminals confessing to laymen? I answer that their simplicity excuses them from sinning in this, and their humility is meritorious for them, insofar as they wish to supply as best they can what pertains to the sacrament of penance. But for a discreet man who knows well the purpose for which confession was instituted, it would perhaps not be useful and would certainly not be necessary to make such a confession.” That is what the Doctor says.

Second conclusion. — NOT EVERY PRIEST, OUTSIDE IMMINENT DANGER OF DEATH, IS A MINISTER OF THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE TO WHOM CONFESSION MUST BE MADE; ONLY ONE WHO HAS BEEN GRANTED JURISDICTION FOR THIS PURPOSE IS. This is the common view among theologians and is expressly

Deduced from the Council of Florence, in the Decree of Eugenius, where it teaches that the minister of this sacrament is a priest having ordinary or delegated authority to absolve. By these words, since it explains what is required by divine law for the essence of the sacraments, it indicates that this authority, or power of jurisdiction, is required by divine law. The Council of Trent teaches the same quite plainly, sess. XIV, ch. 5³, where it says that absolution from sins is a judicial act instituted by Christ; jurisdiction is required for this act. Hence in ch. 7 it says: Since, therefore, the nature and character of judgment require that a sentence be passed only upon subjects, it has always been held in the Church of God, and this Synod confirms as most true, that an absolution is to be considered null when a priest pronounces it upon someone over whom he has neither ordinary nor delegated jurisdiction. Hence the chapter “If a Bishop,” On Penance and Remission, in the sixth book, also establishes that no custom can be introduced or prescription acquired by which anyone may choose a confessor for himself without his superior’s permission; for no custom or prescription can prevail against divine law. From this it is clear that the requirement of jurisdiction follows from the very nature and institution of the sacrament. For if the fact that any priest cannot absolve anyone whatever arose only from human law, a contrary prescription could be acquired, since, according to the more probable opinion, prescription can prevail against every human law.

The difficulty, however, is where this jurisdiction comes from. Some theologians, with Armachanus, bk. 11 of Armenian Questions, ch. 4, teach that in this sacrament the power of jurisdiction is not distinct from the power of Order; thus a priest receives both together, fully, at ordination, and any priest can validly absolve anyone properly disposed, though illicitly, because of the Church’s prohibition. But this opinion plainly conflicts with the Council of Trent, ch. 7, which decrees: The reservation of sins is consonant with divine authority and has force not only in external government but also before God. Nevertheless, with great piety, lest anyone perish on this very account, it has always been observed in the same Church of God that there is no reservation at the point of death; therefore all priests can absolve any penitents whatsoever from any sins and censures. Outside that point, since priests can do nothing in reserved cases, they should strive only to persuade penitents to approach their superiors and lawful judges for the benefit of absolution. These words plainly teach that certain priests absolve from reserved sins not merely illicitly but also invalidly; consequently, it is false that they all possess complete jurisdiction by virtue of their ordination.

Some, with Navarro in the Summa, ch. 4, n. 3, and ch. 27, n. 54, think that priests do indeed receive habitual jurisdiction at their ordination, but not jurisdiction so full and extensive that they can validly absolve when the Church’s prohibition prevents it. But this opinion nearly coincides with the preceding one. For if every priest by divine law and virtue of his ordination had sufficient power actually to absolve from all sins, the Church could in no way make it the case that he validly absolves a penitent properly disposed; just as none of its prohibitions can make a bishop ordain or confirm someone invalidly.

Third, some teach, with St. Antoninus, part 3, title 17, ch. 4, that priests do receive the power of jurisdiction at ordination, but that even without any prohibition by the Church it cannot be reduced to act, owing to a lack of material: for a judge to exercise an act of jurisdiction, it is not enough that a prince appoint him judge; he must also have subjects and a definite place in which to exercise that jurisdiction. Hence, for priests to be able validly to absolve a penitent, the Church must assign them some subjects, because Christ the Lord instituted this sacrament so that no one can pronounce sentence upon another without the Church’s authority and designation. I consider this opinion the more correct.

A fourth and final opinion teaches that the power of Order, which alone a priest receives at ordination, is distinct from the power of jurisdiction, which he later receives from the prelates of the Church. Consequently, he cannot absolve anyone until he has first received this authority, which can be freely granted and likewise freely suspended and revoked. So teach Medina, On Penance, tract 2, q. 39, conclusion 3; Soto, In IV Sent., d. 18, q. 4, a. 2; and Suarez, disp. 16, sect. 3, n. 7. They support this opinion especially with the following arguments, which we shall examine elsewhere when treating Order. The Councils of Trent and Florence distinguish this jurisdiction as ordinary and delegated; consequently, they consider this power delegable. But that would be false if the power of jurisdiction were the same as the power of Order, since no one would say that the power of Order can be delegated; therefore the Councils consider the power of jurisdiction distinct from the power of Order. Further, every jurisdiction is essentially a superiority, which intrinsically implies a relation to subjects: just as no one can truly be a master without having a servant, neither can anyone be a superior or have jurisdiction without having subjects. But a priest acquires no subjects by virtue of his ordination; therefore he does not obtain jurisdiction by virtue of it. Finally, it belongs to the same authority to confer jurisdiction as to assign the subjects over whom that jurisdiction is exercised. But the Church assigns ordained priests subjects over whom they exercise jurisdiction and sacramental judicial authority; therefore it also grants them this jurisdiction.

YOU WILL SAY 1: Urban II, as cited in the chapter “It has been decided,” On Penance, established that henceforth no priest may receive for penance anyone committed to another priest without the consent of the priest to whom he had first committed himself. Therefore, previously anyone could receive whomever he wished for penance and absolution. — I DENY THE CONSEQUENCE: the passage concerns not sacramental penance but public penance alone. It decrees that someone performing solemn penance may not, after committing himself to one priest to perform it according to that priest’s judgment and prescription, commit himself to another in the same matter without the first priest’s permission—unless perhaps that priest had imposed something indecent on him through ignorance, in which case he could consult another.

YOU WILL SAY 2: The power of jurisdiction, or of remitting sins, is granted to every priest at his ordination, as the Council of Trent decrees, sess. XIV, ch. 6, in these words: The holy Synod also teaches that priests held in mortal sin exercise the function of remitting sins as ministers of Christ through the power of the Holy Spirit conferred at ordination, and that those who contend that this power is absent in wicked priests judge wrongly. Here the Council teaches that priests possess the power of jurisdiction by virtue of their ordination; therefore that power is not distinct from the power of Order. Consequently, just as any priest can exercise the power of Order independently of any prohibition by the Church, so he can exercise jurisdiction and the authority to absolve. Add that the Council says priests have the same authority that was granted to the Apostles by the words of John 20, Whose sins you forgive; but by virtue of these words the Apostles could absolve anyone whatever; therefore priests can do the same. — I DENY THE CONSEQUENCE, in accordance with the third opinion. For although the power of remitting sins is conferred on every priest in its substance and efficacy at ordination, it is not conferred for exercise until subjects are assigned over whom it may be exercised. Consequently, it is conferred as intrinsically complete in respect of its efficacy, but as externally incomplete in respect of its exercise and the application of a subject upon whom that power is exercised. It is like a king granting certain men the power of judging and appointing them judges, but not assigning them subjects, instead allowing the provincial governors to designate the people over whom they judge as they consider expedient for the good of the kingdom. As for the further claim that every priest receives at ordination no other power than the one granted to the Apostles when it was said to them, Whose sins you forgive, etc., I answer that I grant they receive precisely no other power by virtue of those words; but just as, in addition to this power, they were sent by Christ’s will into the whole world, and by that mission received the complement of the power of jurisdiction, so every priest, in addition to the power received at ordination, must receive its complement from the Church, which assigns him subjects.

YOU WILL OBJECT 2. If our opinion were true, it would follow that priests receive from the Church the power to absolve, which is absurd; otherwise one would have to say, “I absolve you by the authority of the Church.” — I answer by denying the consequence: priests receive from Christ at their ordination the power of jurisdiction, from which the remission of sins efficiently proceeds, provided subjects are assigned. Thus they have from Christ the power to absolve, while from the Church they receive only the designation of subjects. This is not receiving the power itself, but only its complement; hence one cannot say that a priest in this way receives the power to absolve. It is like fire not receiving the power to burn from the person who brings combustible matter near it. A judge appointed by a prince receives judicial power from the prince; he has subjects designated for judgment by the provincial governor.

Third conclusion. — A CONFESSOR IS STRICTLY BOUND BY NATURAL, DIVINE POSITIVE, AND ECCLESIASTICAL LAW TO KEEP THE SEAL OF CONFESSION, SO THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES MAY HE REVEAL TO ANOTHER WHAT HAS BEEN DISCLOSED TO HIM IN CONFESSION. This is the common view among Catholics and, as regards the obligation under ecclesiastical law, was defined by the Fourth Lateran Council under Innocent III, ch. “Everyone of either sex,” which decrees: Let the priest take the utmost care not to betray the sinner in any way, by word, sign, or any other means. If he needs wiser counsel, let him seek it cautiously without any expression of the person’s identity. For we decree that one who presumes to reveal a sin disclosed to him in the tribunal of penance is not only to be deposed from the priestly office but also confined in a strict monastery to perform perpetual penance. The Council of Trent, sess. XIV, ch. 5, approves this decree. As for the obligation under natural law, theologians labor to assign the true reason for it. Some derive it from lying, saying that one may never lie: if a priest revealed a confession, he would lie, since he would say that, as a man, he knows something that he does not know as a man but only as God’s vicar. But the Doctor refutes this reason in d. 21, n. 4. First, the priest, by the power of the keys entrusted to him, knows and judges in his own person in the sinner’s case; for the one who knows in a case is the same as the one who pronounces sentence in it. But when absolving a penitent, the priest does not pronounce sentence in God’s person; therefore he also hears and knows in his own person. The minor premise is clear: he does not absolve principally but only ministerially. To absolve ministerially belongs to him only in his own person. For if he spoke in God’s person when absolving a penitent, he could truly say without first saying, “May the Lord absolve you”: “I absolve you principally and infuse grace”—just as the Angel truly said in God’s person, “I brought you out of Egypt.” Moreover, the priest does not hear or absolve in the forum of confession in God’s person any more than he consecrates the Eucharist in God’s person. The former act is no more excellent than the latter, and in both a sacramental act is performed in which divine power works; indeed, the priest seems to act more in God’s or Christ’s person there than here. For there he speaks Christ’s words, “This is my body,” in Christ’s person, having first said of him, “Who, on the day before he suffered,” etc. Thus he says the whole passage, “Take… this is my body,” by reciting Christ’s words; that is not so in the present case. Here he does not first say, “Christ, wishing to absolve the sinner, said, ‘I absolve you’”; rather, I stands here for the person of the minister. It is therefore clear that he consecrates in Christ’s person as much as, or no less than, he absolves or hears confessions in Christ’s person. But he consecrates in his own person; hence after Mass he does not lie by saying, “I know that today I consecrated.” Therefore neither would he lie by saying, “Today I heard this person confess this sin.” Third, if this reason were sound, it would follow that a priest could not disclose to another a sin heard in confession, without revealing the penitent’s identity, unless he lied. But this appears false from the chapter Officii, Extra, On Penance and Remission, where Innocent III replies to a cardinal legate who had written about a case he had heard in confession and sought the pope’s advice on it. The pope did not rebuke him for revealing such a sin in general terms in writing, but replied with advice on how the person who had confessed should be counseled. Fourth, the common practice of confessors shows that outside confession a confessor may say that this or that was confessed to him, when there is no danger of disclosing the penitent’s identity. But on the proposed reasoning this would not be allowed, since lying is never permitted. Therefore, etc. Hence the Doctor concludes that since a priest hears confessions and absolves not as God’s person but only as his minister and representative, he would not lie if he disclosed to another a sin confessed to him.

The Doctor therefore offers four other arguments, n. 8, to show that the seal of confession is a matter of natural law. Since they are clear and evident in themselves, I have chosen to transcribe them here. The first is based on charity, the second on fidelity, the third on truth or truthfulness, and the fourth on unity or mutual benefit. The first is this: “The natural law of brotherly charity is expressed in Matthew 7: Whatever you wish that men would do to you, do so to them; for this is the Law and the Prophets. And in Luke 6: As you wish that men would do to you, do so to them. But this principle of the natural law of brotherly charity must be understood as ‘what you wish for yourselves’, that is, what you ought to wish for yourselves according to right reason; this is understood in Matthew 22: You shall love your neighbor as yourself. Everyone ought according to right reason to wish for his own good reputation; therefore he ought also to wish that his confessed sin be concealed. Consequently the confessor ought to love and wish the same for the penitent; but disclosure would take away the penitent’s good reputation. Therefore, etc. The minor premise is proved from Scripture. Ecclesiasticus 11 says: Take care of a good name, and gives its reason: for it will remain with you more than a thousand great and precious treasures. It proves this also by adding: The number of the days of a good life; but a good name will remain forever. Proverbs 22 says: A good name is better than great riches. It is also proved by reason: everyone ought according to right reason to wish for a civic life; this is taken away by the loss of reputation, because someone lives a civic life insofar as he is fit for certain acts appropriate to him in that city. Once his reputation is lost, he is deprived of fitness for such acts, because he has lost the standing of unimpaired dignity, namely, fitness for acts for which he would otherwise be worthy. The second part of the minor premise, that disclosure of a confessed sin takes away the penitent’s good reputation, is proved as follows: what may be disclosed to one person may be disclosed to another and thus to everyone; but such disclosure plainly takes away from him the standing of unimpaired dignity that consists in his reputation among his fellow citizens.”

The second argument is this: “Everyone is bound by natural law to preserve for his neighbor the fidelity that he would and ought to wish to be preserved for himself. But when someone entrusts another with a very great secret, he would and ought to wish it to be kept for him as a secret. Therefore the other, to whom he entrusts it, is bound to keep it for him. This argument is touched on in Proverbs 11: He who goes about deceitfully reveals secrets, but he who is faithful conceals what his friend has entrusted to him.”

The third argument: “Everyone is bound by natural law to keep a lawful promise. But one who receives a secret, especially this one disclosed in confession, implicitly promises to keep it even if he does not promise explicitly, since without such a promise, at least understood, this secret would not be entrusted to him. Therefore, etc. This argument is proved, or can be drawn, from the words: Speak truth, each one with his neighbor.”

The fourth argument: “In this matter the community has a unity proportioned to the unity of a body, for there is an order of superior and inferior, and the superior is bound to influence the inferior while the inferior serves the superior, according to Paul’s parable of the mystical and natural body in various places. In a city the inferior is less capable and less knowledgeable; in the Church the sinner is inferior. The superior, however, is the hierarch, who can counsel and reconcile him. Therefore natural law requires that no one exclude an inferior from access to a superior, since this is the members’ common benefit to one another. But disclosure of the secret excludes the inferior from such access to a superior for counsel about his soul, and consequently prevents the superior from helping the inferior; for no one would seek advice if, as a general rule, the matter for which he asks counsel or a remedy were not to remain secret. Therefore by the same natural law by which everyone is bound to preserve the unity of the mystical body of Christ and to promote the common good of others as of members of a body, he is bound to conceal this secret.”

The Doctor likewise proves that the obligation is imposed by divine positive law: “Every Christian,” he says, n. 11, “is bound not to give another an occasion to be drawn away from the law of Christ. But the law of Christ requires confession to be made, as was shown in d. 17. Therefore everyone under the law of Christ is bound not to deter anyone from making confession. But one who reveals a confession gives an occasion for deterring some people from confession. Therefore, etc. If you say that, even if that priest reveals it, another person will keep the secret, that is no answer, because by the very kind of act he performs, this priest gives the other person an occasion to take the same precaution with respect to each confessor. Second, Christ established the tribunal of penance as final on earth with regard to the confessed crime, as is clear from his words in Matthew 16: Whatever you loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven, that is, finally and ultimately approved; and John 20: Whose sins you forgive, etc., that is, those remitted here are finally approved as remitted in the divine judgment. Therefore anyone who brings before another public forum something examined and finally settled in this forum sins against the law of Christ. But one who reveals a confession, insofar as it lies with him, makes it possible for the matter to be brought before another forum. Therefore, etc. Third, one who gives occasion for mortal sin by carrying out a precept of Christ sins mortally, because he makes a precept that ought to be properly carried out be carried out improperly, as far as he can. But one who reveals a confession gives an occasion for Christ’s precept of confession to be carried out improperly and deceitfully: he gives occasion for someone in confession to praise himself and disparage another whom he hates, so that he himself may be unjustly advanced by the confessor and the other punished. Therefore, etc.”

YOU WILL OBJECT 1. St. Bernard says in bk. 4 of On Precept and Dispensation: What is instituted for charity ought not to work against charity. But in some cases the seal of confession would work against charity: for example, if someone learned in confession that a pastor and ruler of souls was a heretic and could not persuade him to stop spreading errors and infecting the flock entrusted to him. In this case, not reporting him would be against charity, just as it would be against charity for someone who knew that a person infected with plague was mixing with others not to warn them to flee his company. Therefore such a seal should not be upheld. — The Doctor denies the minor premise. It is not against the order of charity that some evil sometimes go unchecked in order to preserve the reverence due to the sacrament, which is a far greater good than any harm that could result from revealing a confession. For the order of charity and justice requires that the greater good be preferred to the lesser: Deuteronomy 16 says, You shall carry out what is just and right; therefore, the Doctor says, you shall carry out charitably what belongs to charity. Hence he concludes that the lawyers’ verse, Heresy is a crime that not even confession conceals, must be rejected, since it is false. Add that the confessor can provide for this in another way and prevent the evil from spreading further: for example, by advising the bishop to inquire diligently into the conduct and faith of the pastors subject to him and to learn from their congregations whether they teach Catholic doctrines, but in such a way that he does not, by any sign, directly or indirectly reveal the person who confessed to him.

YOU WILL SAY 2: No one can be bound to do something that damages his own conscience. But concealing a confessed sin would sometimes damage the confessor’s conscience: for example, if he were summoned to court and sworn to tell the truth that he knew from confession. If he did not tell the truth, he would incur the crime of perjury and thus commit a mortal sin. — I deny the minor premise. Concealing this secret would not prejudice the confessor’s conscience, nor would he incur the crime of perjury, since he is not bound by his oath to reveal this truth. As we have said, when various precepts arise that cannot all be observed together, one must observe most carefully the one of greater weight and importance. Here, however, the seal of confession is plainly weightier than the precept of an oath, because the obligation to keep the seal is grounded in natural law, divine positive law, and ecclesiastical law.

YOU WILL SAY 3: A priest who learns in confession that an ambush has been set for him in a wood he is about to enter, by one of the conspirators who has become penitent and sacramentally confessed this to him before he enters, may use this knowledge to take another route. But by doing so he would reveal the confession. Therefore it is sometimes lawful not to keep the seal. — The Doctor denies the minor premise, n. 20: “It can be said that this priest may have many reasons other than the malice of the robbers disclosed to him for not entering the wood. He can think of various other reasons and state them before the others, such as: ‘I want to do this and that, and turn aside to this or that place before going farther.’ If he seems to turn aside for some such reason, he reveals the confession neither by word nor by deed. But if he cannot turn aside for some reason without the others realizing he is turning aside because of the confession, and by this action he would reveal it, someone says that he is bound to enter; even if he exposes himself to death, he does so for a just cause, namely, to keep God’s law concerning the seal of confession, and consequently, if he dies, he is a martyr. But it can be said otherwise: actions can be equivocal signs, since different people may understand them in different ways, as pointing to this or that action. Therefore an action should not be considered revealing of a confession unless by its nature it discloses the confessed sin. But turning aside from the wood does not do so; for if those men had not previously discussed the planned murder, they would never learn from his turning aside that he had confessed his intention to kill this man. Yet if turning aside by its nature led people to know that such a sin had been confessed, it would lead everyone to that knowledge, these men as much as anyone, whether or not they had spoken beforehand. In general, therefore, a sign that is in itself indifferent as to whether a certain sin has been confessed, even if some particular circumstance makes it a more definite sign to certain people, is not a sign revealing confession and consequently is not simply unlawful for a confessor.”

YOU WILL SAY 4: Suppose a priest absolved a simoniac bishop, although he had no power to absolve him, and the priest is bound to confess immediately in order to celebrate Mass. He will also be bound to reveal the confession made to him by declaring that he wrongly absolved this bishop from the sin of simony, because that is a mortal sin and these circumstances aggravate it: simony committed by a bishop is graver than that committed by any other cleric because of the bishop’s greater knowledge and dignity. But by confessing in this way he reveals the sin of the simoniac bishop. Therefore it is sometimes lawful to reveal a confessed sin. — The Doctor replies, n. 21: “First, one who administered the sacrament of penance so indiscreetly is not bound to confess this indiscreet act immediately when the confessor could come to know the identity of the person on whom he indiscreetly exercised the power of the keys. Or, if he is bound to confess, he should at least not specify the particular fault or the manner in which he acted indiscreetly, but should say generally, ‘I am guilty of having administered the sacrament of penance indiscreetly and wrongly.’ If, however, his conscience urges him to think that he must disclose the aggravating circumstances, he should wait for an opportunity to confess to someone who could not learn from the confession of the sin and its circumstances the identity of the person who had confessed to him. If no such confessor can be found without the person who confessed becoming identifiable from the explanation of the sin and circumstances, then in that case this confessor must not confess the sin to a man, but it suffices for him to confess it to God. For,” says the Doctor, “he is more bound not to disclose the fault confessed to him than to confess his own fault explicitly: he is bound to the former by natural law and divine positive law, but to the latter only by divine positive law.” So says the Doctor.

FROM THIS IT FOLLOWS FIRST that violation of the seal is a sin against religion insofar as it opposes the reverence and good of the sacrament; and that it also has grave malice against justice insofar as it violates the natural right to secrecy, which would bind the confessor to keep the secret even if the sacrament were set aside, even if what was revealed were only a venial sin.

IT FOLLOWS SECOND that no one may use knowledge acquired through confession to do or avoid anything unless he has that knowledge from another source outside confession. This was expressly defined by Clement VIII in his motu proprio, issued on 26 May 1594, concerning regulars and reserved cases, where he commands both superiors currently in office and confessors who are later promoted to a position of superiority to take the greatest care not to use for external governance the knowledge they have gained in confession of other people’s sins. The Doctor had taught this earlier, n. 33. In reply to the sixth argument—namely, that an abbot who learns in confession that one of the monks living outside the monastery has a suspicious association there that continually tempts him to sin may recall him to the monastery to provide for his salvation—the Doctor says: “If it is the common custom in a college that anyone living outside the monastery with a charge, or staying there without a charge, may be recalled at the president’s discretion without reproach, or even not indiscriminately at his discretion but sometimes for another reasonable cause, so that one monk now rests in the cloister, another works with Martha in an external ministry, and another is assigned wherever the president considers useful, then I say that the abbot may recall to the monastery a monk who has confessed to a crime committed in some place outside the monastery where he is staying. For in this he in no way betrays the confessed sin, even though someone may say that a confessor can never treat someone who has confessed differently, because of the confession, in any act outside that forum than if he had heard nothing at all. But if the custom in the college is that a monk is not transferred from an outside place to the cloister except because of a crime or inadequacy in the work he does there, then it does not seem lawful for the abbot to recall the person who confessed to the monastery. If you say that he is not providing a remedy for the salvation of his sheep, I answer that he should counsel him in the forum of penance, as best he can, to leave that dangerous place. If he refuses, let him not presume to act as God, but leave hidden faults that cannot be corrected under justice to God’s correction.” He says the same about avoiding an excommunicate known only through confession: “For if a confessor can learn by another means that someone is excommunicated, he may avoid his company; otherwise, he not only ought not but is not permitted to avoid him, because such avoidance would violate ecclesiastical positive law alone, whereas the confessor is bound not to disclose him by natural law and divine and ecclesiastical positive law. When precepts seem to conflict, the higher precept is more binding and must be kept more firmly; one who keeps it and omits the other does not sin.” So says the Doctor.

MAY YOU ASK 1. May a confessor, at a penitent’s request, sometimes reveal confessed sins that he knows in no other way than through confession? St. Thomas affirms this in d. 21, q. 3, a. 3; the Doctor of Hales denies it in part 4, q. 19, memb. 2, a. 2, as does the Subtle Doctor in d. 21, q. 2, n. 18: “The obligation to conceal a confessed sin belongs not only to the penitent but also to the rights of the whole community of the faithful and the entire Church, as well as to the reverence due to the sacrament. For if a confessed sin were disclosed, constant disturbance would follow in the community, since everyone would readily regard another as abominable. The penitent is not entitled to renounce the rights of the community or the reverence due to the sacrament; therefore, even at his request, the confessor cannot reveal this sin.” Next, if a confessor could reveal a confession with the penitent’s permission, an immediate opportunity would be given to lie in confession, deceive the confessor, and fail to confess one’s sins fully. For people defamed for a crime they committed, though not convicted of it, could refrain from confessing that crime and thus give the confessor permission to reveal sins, thereby making it known that the penitent was not guilty of the sin of which he was defamed. But this would make a mockery of the sacrament and would plainly be sacrilege. Therefore, etc. Finally, if this were lawful, the confessor could be bound by the penitent’s permission to reveal sins whenever there was sufficient motive; the penitent could also be obliged, or induced by force or promises, to give such permission. But this would undermine the freedom so necessary for the frequent reception of this sacrament. Therefore, though a secret can be revealed with the consent of the person who entrusted it, the secret of confession cannot be revealed, because insofar as it is a sacramental obligation of secrecy it is not within the penitent’s power. What, then, should a confessor do when the penitent wants to disclose his sin? “I say,” the Doctor replies, “that the penitent may afterward speak of his sin outside confession. If he speaks of it as a secret, however, the subsequent permission does not release the confessor from natural law, under which he remains bound to conceal it. But if he says it is not to be kept secret, especially from some other person or particular persons to whom it may be disclosed for some good that could follow from their learning it, then the confessor may speak of it as something told to him publicly, outside all secrecy. But may he then say, ‘I heard this in confession’? I answer: it is said that the words ‘I heard this person’s sin in confession’ in themselves include mortal sin, because they disclose it as having been known in a way in which it may not be revealed. Therefore, if someone reveals it to him after confession outside all secrecy, he must take care how he relates it, lest he report it as something told to him in a way in which it may not be revealed.”

MAY YOU ASK 2. Is the priest alone bound by the seal of confession? The Doctor replies, n. 18, that not only the confessor, but also those who receive the penitent’s confessed sin from him directly or indirectly, or to whom the sin is in any way made known in connection with confession, are bound to keep the seal. “I say,” the Doctor says, “that not only the confessor but also the person to whom the confessor reveals it, though illicitly, is bound to conceal it. This is proved because one who in fact transfers something to another that cannot lawfully be transferred does not give the other person the right to use or transfer it to someone else: since he had no right, he could not transfer a right to another, for no one gives what he does not have. But a confessor who reveals it had no right to transfer it. I say the same of someone who hears a penitent’s confession besides the confessor. If he hears it by chance, he does not sin, but he is bound to keep silent; if he listens deceitfully, he sins mortally and is still bound to keep silent.” So says the Doctor. Hence the seal binds: first, one who hears the penitent’s sins maliciously or by chance and without fault, for the matter passes with the penitent’s own words; otherwise confession would be burdensome and odious. Second, interpreters when a penitent uses one in making confession, because the interpreter ministers not only to the penitent but also to the priest, who thereby learns the penitent’s sins through the interpreter just as the penitent speaks through him. Third, one who is not a priest but acts as a priest by hearing confessions. Fourth, a doctor and anyone consulted in connection with sacramental confession, to whom, with the penitent’s permission, both his person and his sin are disclosed. Fifth, a superior from whom the power to absolve the penitent from a reserved case is requested, with an equal or similar disclosure. Sixth, someone to whom a confessor unjustly reveals the penitent’s confession. Seventh, someone who finds a written list prepared for confession; he is bound to return or burn it.

MAY YOU ASK 3. May a judge or prelate use knowledge gained from a discovered list to punish the person who wrote down the sins that were erased from it? — I answer that he may not. Henriquez teaches this especially in his book On Sacramental Penance, where he says: “One who finds, by chance or deliberately searching, a paper on which a defendant had written sins as an aid to memory in preparation for confession is not bound by the seal, but is bound to great secrecy, since that paper was a means to confession. But if a judge or prelate has learned of the sins because of such writings, or from one sacrilegious confessor or several, or even, while investigating in good faith and proceeding with a case, realizes that the knowledge originated from the disclosure of a confession, he must immediately cease the investigation and judicial proceedings and treat what was done as undone. Nor may he question the defendant about the matter, since he did not come to know it by human means.” Antonius Diana teaches the same: “Is one who finds a paper on which someone’s sins were written bound to hide it under the seal of confession?” He answers: “One who finds sins written down, perhaps by someone who put them in writing to help his memory and confess them more exactly, is bound by the seal, whether confession has already been made or is yet to be made. The common reasoning of the Doctors is that the contents of the paper are something belonging to confession, and almost a written confession. The paper should be treated as equivalent to the case in which someone accidentally hears a confession, for the paper is like a messenger aiding the penitent’s memory; thus it is considered sealed with the sacred seal—and rightly so, for the paper can be called a confession begun.” Likewise, Navarrus, ch. 18, n. 31, says: “He sins who finds a writing in which someone has written his sins as a reminder for confession and publishes them; the same applies to one who reads it even if he does not publish it, if at the beginning of the sheet it was written, ‘A reminder of my sins,’ or something similar, by which he should know that its author does not want another to read them.” Dominic Soto agrees, In IV Sent., d. 18, a. 50: “But what if someone learns the matter not through confession but by way of confession, as when someone writes down his sins, loses the paper, and a prelate finds it? I know this has happened in practice, when a prelate proceeded to investigate in this way; but he was rightly punished for it by his superior. For confession is so sacred that even what is directed toward it must be buried in perpetual silence. What was said of ecclesiastical prelates is to be understood also of secular magistrates and judges.” Rodericus Acugna, Archbishop of Braga, confirms the same in his treatise On Confessors Who Solicit, q. 13, n. 38, with an example taken from St. Thomas of Villanova, which he relates as follows: “A certain Catalan,” he says, “killed an adversary and secretly gave his corpse burial. Later, to expiate the sin of homicide, he sought an unknown cleric, to whom he plainly confessed all the circumstances of the killing, the time and place, the dispute and the reasons for the killing, and the burial; he was condemned to the ultimate punishment. When, according to custom, a confessor approached to hear the condemned man’s confession, the wretched man refused to be brought to it, repeatedly saying that the sacrament of confession had been instituted by the Lord and Savior and was a source of the greatest danger and harm. The priest insisted and his friends urged him not to take upon himself so great a crime that he would lose his soul along with his body; but the stubborn man refused to change his mind. Those present thought he had lost his senses out of fear of death. “N. 39. When this matter was reported to the Archbishop of Valencia, St. Thomas the Almoner, the good shepherd asked the magistrate to delay the execution and allow the man to be brought to him, lest that sheep perish. Moved by respect for so great a man and the urgency of such a just request, the magistrate agreed and ordered that the condemned man be brought under guard before the prelate. The latter tried to soften the man with admonitions and earnestly urged him to disclose the cause of his great stubbornness. The man destined for death, breaking into tears, explained that the sacramental confession of his crime was the cause of his final punishment: the confessor was the brother of the man he had killed, though he had not known this at the time, and no one else could have revealed it. The pious prelate told him to be of good courage and, with the magistrate’s consent, kept him with himself after promising that he would return him once he had first conducted a proper inquiry. He summoned the confessor, who was unaware of the matter, and, removing witnesses, so earnestly adjured him before a devout crucifix that, with signs of penance, he fell at the prelate’s feet and confessed his error and breach of the seal, pleading the grief of his murdered brother and his love for him. The archbishop ordered the priest to be kept in a chamber in his own palace, explained to the magistrate what had happened and that the accusation had originated in the sacrament of confession, and easily persuaded the prudent magistrate, a religious man devoted to sacred things, that under divine law the proceedings and execution must cease, using the opinions of learned men. The murderer was released amid the people’s astonishment and reverence for the sacraments, while the confessor was punished with a penalty milder than his crime deserved.”

From all this it is clear that no one may use knowledge obtained from lists of confession in order to punish sins that someone was preparing to accuse himself of. I do not deny, however, that when such lists come to the attention of a prelate or judge, they may serve as some aids to a more diligent investigation of a crime about which the person who wrote the list was already infamous or had already been accused before a judge or prelate.

MAY YOU ASK AT LAST: From what kind of confession does this seal arise? — I answer that it arises from every sacramental confession, whether valid or invalid: that is, whether it truly has attached to it the remission of sin through sacramental absolution because of the penitent’s proper disposition, or not, because that disposition is lacking. For even if an invalid confession is not a complete sacramental confession, since it does not attain the effect of the sacrament or have priestly absolution attached to it because the penitent is manifestly indisposed, it is at least an incomplete beginning of a sacramental confession. Add that if only a valid confession bound one to the seal, penitents would take this as an occasion not to frequent confession. Since they would be uncertain whether, because of a lack of contrition or some other disposition, they were worthy to receive absolution, they could scarcely be moved or persuaded to confess their sins if a sin not followed by absolution could be revealed to someone. Therefore a priest is bound to keep the seal with respect to all those whom he knows to have approached confession with the genuine intention of receiving sacramental absolution; but not if he discovers that the penitent came only in pretense, intending by making an accusation in confession to entice and lead the priest into some evil.

FROM THIS GATHER that confession can be defined as follows: Sacramental confession is an accusation to a priest of one’s own sins committed after baptism, made in order to obtain their remission by virtue of the keys of the Church. It is called, first, an accusation, both because it must be an external acknowledgment of one’s own fault, made in the manner of an accusation by the penitent, who is to be regarded as a defendant seeking pardon, and so that it may be understood that confession must not take the form of an excuse, a mere narrative, or a commendation of one’s own virtues, as some sometimes do—not, I think, from a spirit of boasting, but from some ignorance and inexperience or from a habit of excessive talkativeness. It is called, second, of sins committed after baptism, because these are the remote matter of the sacrament of penance, and confession of them is its partial proximate matter. Third, it is called one’s own, to indicate that the sins of others should not be disclosed together with one’s own, unless perhaps they become one’s own or are so closely shared through some participation or in some other way that they cannot be disclosed otherwise. In this case the penitent should try not to disclose the accomplice’s identity unless the sin cannot otherwise be made known. Fourth, it is called made to a priest, because no one inferior to a priest can administer this sacrament to penitents, as will become clear from what is said below when we treat the minister of the sacrament of penance. Fifth, it is made to obtain remission of sins committed after baptism, to mark the special effect of this sacrament. Sixth, it is made by virtue of the keys of the Church, because in this sacrament sins are remitted only through the power that the Church received from Christ.