Scotus Academicus, Tomus decimus: De Baptismo, De Poenitentia, De Extrema Unctione

This special prerogative Penance claims for itself: that it possesses the dignity and character both of a virtue and of a sacrament. For the other sacraments, since they are instruments divinely instituted for conferring grace, and consist rather in the action of the minister than in the operation of the recipient, by their formal character do not obtain the name and essence of a virtue. The case is otherwise with Penance, which, since it is constituted both by the penitent’s acts and by God’s gift, is at once a virtue and a sacrament, especially under the Gospel Law, in which Christ the Lord conferred on priests the authority to absolve penitent offenders from all the sins by which they were defiled and bound to divine justice. — Although, however, Penance, insofar as it is a sacrament, far surpasses the merit and dignity of the virtue of penance, nevertheless, because the virtue of penance (says the Council of Trent, sess. XIV, ch. 1) is necessary at all times for all people who have stained themselves with any mortal sin, in order to attain grace and righteousness, even for those who had sought to be washed in the Sacrament of Baptism, so that, having cast off and corrected their perversity, they might detest so great an offense against God with pious sorrow of heart... But the Lord instituted the Sacrament of Penance especially then, when, having risen from the dead, he breathed upon his disciples, saying: “Receive the Holy Spirit; whose sins you forgive, they are forgiven them.” etc. Therefore, in the three following Sections, Penance is to be discussed first as a virtue and then as a sacrament: the first will set forth the nature of the virtue of penance; the second, its necessity; and the third, finally, its efficacy.

Since penance, as a virtue, is a certain spiritual quality of the soul, whose being, as exceedingly subtle, can be clearly known only through its relation to the object toward which it tends and the subject in which it resides, its nature must therefore be investigated from both. Moreover, the word penance is derived either from punishment or from penalty. St. Isidore gives the former derivation, bk. VI, Etymologies, last ch.: “Penance,” he says, “is so called, as it were, from punishing, because a person punishes himself by doing penance for what he has wrongly admitted; for those who truly repent do nothing else than ensure that what they have done wrongly is not left unpunished.” St. Augustine agrees with him, writing in ep. 54: “One who truly repents does nothing else than ensure that what he has done wrongly is not left unpunished; for in this way he who does not spare himself will be spared by Him whose lofty and just judgment no contemptuous person escapes.” The latter derivation, namely from penalty, is given by the author of On True and False Penance, ch. 19, where he says: “To repent is to hold to a penalty, so as always to punish oneself by taking vengeance for what one committed in sinning. For penalty properly means an injury that punishes and avenges whatever one has committed. Therefore, he holds to a penalty who always punishes what he grieves to have committed. Penance, then, is vengeance that continually punishes within oneself what one grieves to have committed.” The Doctor subscribes to this latter derivation in In IV Sent., d. 14, q. 1, n. 15, where he says that “penance,” according to the etymology of the word, is the same as “holding to a penalty”; for “to repent,” says the Doctor, is the same as “to hold to a penalty.” Hence μετάνοια, in Latin poenitendo, signifies generally grief over things done or omitted, according to that epigram of Ausonius:

I am the goddess who exacts penalties for deed and misdeed:
Indeed, that one may repent: thus I am called Metanoia.

Nevertheless, the heretics of the present day protest—especially the Lutherans and Calvinists, together with their forerunners. For Luther, in a letter to the vicar of his Order, says that “penance does not signify sorrow or hatred for one’s past life, but love of justice and of instituting a new life.” Calvin agrees with him in bk. III of the Institutes, ch. 3, where he declares that the word “penance” chiefly denotes a conversion from one’s past life and a change of mind. Before them, Lorenzo Valla had written that the word μετάνοια is more correctly rendered in Latin by resipiscentia than by poenitentia. Erasmus too supports this view: whenever he encounters the word μετάνοια in the Greek text of the Bible, he renders it by resipiscentia. Hence, in ch. 3 of St. Matthew, he declares that penance is the same as “holding to a penalty,” and that poenitere is as it were “to hold to a penalty,” that is, to become wise afterward, or to recover one’s senses; for resipiscentia is derived from re and sapientia, and resipiscere from re and sapere. Against all these errors, the following Questions must lay down the rule: the first will explain what penance is; the second, what kind it is; the third, what its object is; and the fourth, in what subject it resides.

NOTE 1. Penance, insofar as it is distinguished from the sacrament, is twofold: habitual, that is, and actual. Habitual penance is a permanent quality in the soul, making it ready and disposed, and cooperating with it in eliciting acts of the virtue of penance. Actual penance, however, is the very act of penance by which the sinner wishes to punish and detest the sin he has committed; this act, generally speaking, is twofold: interior and exterior. Interior penance is that movement of the soul by which the sinner is moved to expiate the sin he has committed. The Doctor there, n. 15, distinguishes four forms of it: first, the will to avenge and punish sin, following the intellect’s prior knowledge, which makes its deformity and malice known to the will; on account of this knowledge the will is moved to will its punishment and execration; second, detestation and hatred of that sin; third, voluntary acceptance of the punishment inflicted on its account; fourth, voluntary endurance and suffering of that same punishment. Exterior penance, in turn, is twofold: namely, external confession of the sin committed, accompanied and followed by embarrassment and shame, which is no slight punishment of the soul for the sin committed; and, second, every laborious bodily act by which the penitent who has confessed is punished and makes satisfaction to God for the crime admitted and committed. Here, however, the chief question concerns those four acts of penance: whether those four acts are truly elicited by the virtue of penance, so that, just as habits are distinguished by their acts, penance may thereby appear to be a true virtue, entirely distinct from the others.

NOTE 2. According to the same Doctor in the same place, penance receives four definitions or descriptions from these four acts. The first is: to do penance is to avenge the sin one has committed. The author of the book On True and False Penance, attributed to St. Augustine, agrees with this description, saying in ch. 8: Penance is a kind of vengeance by which the will punishes itself for what it grieves to have admitted. Hence, in ch. 19: To do penance is to undergo punishment, so as always to punish oneself by avenging what one admitted in sinning. St. Augustine also supports this in Letter 308 to Seleucianus: There is also penance, he says, the work of good and humble faithful people, in which we beat our breasts, saying: Forgive us our debts. Isidore of Seville adds, in bk. 6 of the Etymologies, final chapter, where we read: It is called penance, as it were “penal suffering,” because in doing penance a person himself punishes himself for what he wrongly admitted. The second description is: to do penance is to detest or hate the sin one has committed, or to be displeased with the sin one has committed. This description of penance is very common among the holy Fathers, and the Council of Trent approves it, sess. VI, ch. 6, where, speaking of the dispositions necessary for justification, it says, among other things: Therefore they are moved against their sins by a certain hatred and detestation, that is, by the penance which ought to be undertaken before baptism. And sess. XIV, ch. 6: Contrition, it says, is sorrow of soul and detestation for the sin committed, together with the purpose not to sin again. The third description is: to do penance is to accept gladly the punishment inflicted for the sin committed. Hence the Council of Trent says in the same place, ch. 1: Having cast off their perversity and amended their lives, they detested so great an offense against God with hatred of sin and pious sorrow of soul; by pious sorrow of soul it signifies voluntary acceptance of punishment. The author of On True and False Penance also approves this description, saying in ch. 3: Hence let the sinner always grieve, and rejoice in his grief. Finally, the Doctor formulates the fourth description of penance thus: To do penance is patiently to bear the punishment inflicted on oneself for one’s sin. The Council of Trent approves this description along with the preceding one, sess. XIV, ch. 9, saying: “Finally, it teaches that divine generosity is so great that we can make satisfaction not only by punishments which we willingly undertake to avenge sin, or which the priest imposes at his discretion according to the measure of the offense, but also by temporal scourges inflicted by God and patiently borne by us.” The question, then, is whether penance under this fourfold aspect is a virtue—not a general virtue, but a special one.

NOTE 3. Aristotle says in Ethics II, ch. 6: Virtue is a habit of choice, consisting in a mean relative to us, as the prudent person would determine it. Virtue, generally speaking, is twofold: general and special. General virtue is spoken of in four ways. First, by predication, because it is predicated of all other virtues; in this sense justice, taken commonly, is called a general and common virtue, insofar as it is rectitude of soul dictating how good is to be done and evil avoided. Thus the Lord Christ said to St. John the Baptist, Matthew 3: For thus it is fitting for us to fulfill all righteousness; for there is no virtue to which this account of justice does not apply. Second, a virtue is called general by regulation: thus prudence is called the rule of all virtues, since all virtues must be regulated by prudence; for prudence teaches us to keep the mean and avoid extremes. Third, a virtue is called general by informing other virtues, because it confers worth and dignity on them; thus charity is a general virtue, for it informs the other virtues and makes them worthy and pleasing to God. Fourth, a virtue is called general by the aggregation of all virtues, because all the other virtues seem to cooperate in its act. In this way some call penance, insofar as it detests sin, a general virtue, since there is no virtue that does not execrate its opposing vice.

With these preliminaries, the questions are whether penance is mere regret of soul and renewal of one’s past life, or sorrow of soul and vengeance for sin; second, whether in its fourfold act it attains the dignity of virtue; third, whether it is a special or general virtue. These questions will be resolved in the following three Conclusions.

First conclusion. — PENANCE IS NOT MERE REGRET AND BARE CESSATION FROM SIN; IT ALSO INCLUDES SORROW FOR PAST SIN AND OFFENSE. This is against the heretics, and the Council of Trent clearly teaches it, sess. XIV, ch. 1, where it speaks of contrition as follows: Therefore the holy Synod declares that this contrition contains not only cessation from sin, and a purpose and beginning of a new life, but also hatred of the old life. It proves this truth with these passages from Ezekiel 18: Cast away from yourselves all your transgressions by which you have transgressed, and make for yourselves a new heart and a new spirit. The Council immediately adds: Certainly whoever considers those cries of the saints: “Against you only have I sinned, and done evil before you”; “I have labored in my groaning; every night I wash my bed”; “I will recall all my years in the bitterness of my soul”; and others of this kind, will readily understand that they sprang from a certain intense hatred of their past life and a great detestation of their sins. Hence in Canon 5 it condemns the heretics’ doctrine as follows: If anyone says that the contrition prepared by examination, recollection, and detestation of sins, by which someone recalls his years in the bitterness of his soul, weighing the gravity, number, and foulness of his sins, the loss of eternal blessedness, and the incurring of eternal damnation, together with a purpose of better living, is not true and useful sorrow, and does not prepare for grace, but makes a person a hypocrite and a greater sinner… let him be anathema.

The same truth is proved from all those passages of Scripture in which, whenever penance is mentioned, sorrow and punishment to be undergone are expressed. Thus Job, final chapter: I reproach myself, and do penance in dust and ashes. Ashes and dust signify sorrow of soul and affliction of the flesh. Likewise, Matthew 11: speaking of the penance neglected by the people of Chorazin, the Lord Christ says: If the mighty works done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would long ago have done penance in sackcloth and ashes. Ashes and sackcloth show displeasure of soul and grief for sins committed, not merely a change of mind and judgment, nor only the beginning and institution of a new life. — Likewise, in Luke 10¹ the Lord Christ praises the penance of the Ninevites. But their penance involved sorrow, tears, and bodily affliction, as we read in Jonah 3, where the Ninevites put on sackcloth and sprinkled their heads with ashes—not only to show their sorrow for the sins of their former life, but also, through penal practices and laborious works, to avenge in some way their offenses and faults against God. This penal and laborious penance was not merely a change of mind, or regret, but presupposed regret. — Finally, in 2 Corinthians 7 the Apostle speaks of the penance the Corinthians conceived over the fornicator’s sin, and refers to his first letter: For you were grieved according to God, he says; for sorrow according to God produces penance for lasting salvation. Therefore godly sorrow makes penance salvific; but sorrow is a kind of grief.

The holy Fathers teach the same. Gregory Nazianzen, in his Oration for the Holy Lights, calls penance a baptism of tears. St. Augustine, in On the Trinity III, ch. 4, calls it the crucifixion of the inner man. Hence, in Fifty Homilies, final homily, ch. 5: It is not enough to change one’s conduct for the better and turn away from evil deeds unless satisfaction is made to God for what has been done: by the sorrow of penance, the groaning of humility, the sacrifice of a contrite heart, and alms cooperating with these. Most clearly of all, St. Isidore teaches this in bk. 6 of the Etymologies, ch. 19, where he says: Penance is so called because a person grieves in doing penance for what he wrongly admitted. For those who truly repent do nothing else than refuse to let what they did wrongly go unpunished; in this way he does not spare himself, and no contemptuous person will escape the profound and just judgment of Him who does not spare.

Theological reasoning also supports the conclusion. For the name penance signifies the complete correction and amendment of one’s past life, which signifies three things: first, knowledge of the error, which causes sorrow; second, displeasure with one’s former life, or inward grief over what was done or omitted; third, voluntary chastisement, which is the effect and completion of that inward grief, or displeasure with one’s former life. Penance is named chiefly from this effect of voluntary punishment or vengeance for our sins, from the old and obsolete verb poenio, which is the same as punio; hence poenitet is said as if it meant poenam tenet (“he holds fast to punishment”).

YOU WILL OBJECT 1: Tertullian, Against Marcion II, ch. 24, asks what the word penance means and answers: It is understood as nothing other than a simple change of a former judgment, which can be admitted without reproach—even in a human being, much less in God, whose every judgment is free of fault. Therefore penance in itself does not imply sorrow and punishment. — I distinguish the consequence: if the word penance is taken generally, insofar as sacred Scripture attributes it both to God and to a human being, I grant; if it is taken as proper to a human being and as serving to obtain remission of sins, I deny. Tertullian there is speaking of penance insofar as it is attributed to God, who is often said in Scripture to repent. Just before, he had said: It remains now to learn what the repentance of God is. But divine penance is very different from human penance; or, as Tertullian says there: This definition establishes another character for divine repentance in every respect: it is not to be judged to arise from imprudence, fickleness, or condemnation of any good or evil deed, as human repentance is. By these words he distinguishes divine from human penance on three grounds: first, the latter is based on fickleness or instability of mind; second, it includes condemnation of a deed omitted or committed; third, it signifies sorrow and vengeance for a deed committed, as well as satisfaction to be offered to God.

YOU WILL PRESS: Tertullian says there that the word penance means only a change of mind: for even in its Greek sound, he says, the word penance is formed not from confession of an offense but from a change of mind. Therefore, etc. — I ANSWER: That is true if one considers only the name’s etymology, or its derivation from Greek. For poenitio is said from μετὰ, meaning “trans.” or “post.”, and νοῦς, which means “mind” or “thought”; thus μετάνοια means a subsequent judgment or second thought, a change of judgment. But it is otherwise if one considers the word’s frequent use in Scripture and among sacred authors, where the word signifies human penance: in this use it implies not merely a change of judgment but also sorrow of soul. Although sacred Scripture sometimes uses penance to mean only a change of mind: thus the effective graces by which God certainly leads the elect to eternal life are called in Romans 11: the gift of God without repentance, because once God has destined them somewhere, he does not change his plan.

YOU WILL OBJECT 2: Lactantius, Institutes II, ch. 24, says that μετανοεῖν is best rendered in Latin by resipiscentia (“returning to one’s senses”). Therefore penance means nothing other than a change and recall of the mind. — I DENY the consequence. For Lactantius says there: A person comes to his senses and, as it were, recalls his mind from madness when he regrets his error, chastises himself for his folly, and strengthens his mind to live more rightly; then he takes care not to fall again into the same snares. Therefore, according to Lactantius, penance signifies not only recognition of error and amendment of one’s former life, but also sorrow of soul, chastisement and punishment for folly—that is, sin—and a purpose to set one’s life in better order.

YOU WILL OBJECT 3: Among the best authors, the verb poenitet sometimes means the same as “it wearies,” “it shames,” “it displeases,” and so on. Thus Cicero, in On Old Age: If he had lived to his hundredth year, he would have regretted his old age. And in The Dream of Scipio: The earth itself seemed small to me, this earth of our empire, of which we touch, as it were, a mere point; I would have regretted it. Pliny, bk. 1, ch. 17, speaking of the religious Essenes among the Jews, says: An everlasting people, among whom no one is born; so fertile are they in regret for the lives of others. Therefore this word does not always mean punitive sorrow for sin. — I DENY the consequence. All these expressions are metaphorical: in things that weary, shame, or offend us, there seems to be a certain punishment, distress, and displeasure. Hence whatever wearies, shames, or displeases is also considered in some sense to cause grief.

Second conclusion. — PENANCE, ACCORDING TO ITS FOURFOLD MEANING AND DESCRIPTION, CAN BE AN ACT OF VIRTUE. So teaches the Subtle Doctor, d. 14, q. 2, and

He proves the first part, n. 2, where he says: “The first meaning of penance is that it is vengeance for a sin committed by the person who committed it. But this vengeance can be an act of virtue and conform to right reason. For, he says, according to right reason every legislator avenges a transgression of the law. Hence at the end of bk. 10 of the Ethics, after his teaching about vices and virtues, the Philosopher immediately introduces positive law as the avenger of vices and the rewarder of virtues. But if a legislator avenges according to right reason, his minister executes the vengeance according to right reason, because the rectitude of an act of service universally derives from its conformity to the agent whom it serves. Therefore, according to right reason, someone may, as a minister of the legislator, avenge a sin committed against the law, and do so upon the person entrusted to him for this vengeance, since otherwise he would not be serving. But everyone is entrusted with being a minister of God, who bears his law, to avenge upon himself the sins he has committed. To do penance, in its first sense, means to avenge oneself in this way; for tenere, when no dative is added to express to whom something is held, means that it is held by the person himself, as common usage shows. Therefore, although God punishes the sinner, he is not said to do penance, since he inflicts punishment not on himself but on another; but when someone inflicts it on himself, he is said to do penance, that is, to hold fast to punishment by applying it to himself.” So says the Doctor. Lest he seem to assert that vengeance for sin always proceeds from the habit of virtue, he immediately adds: “I do not say that doing penance in the first sense is always an act of virtue, that is, elicited by virtue. It is called an act of virtue because it is naturally apt to be elicited by virtue or to generate virtue, since it conforms to right reason; and moral goodness consists in being generated by virtue or generating virtue.” Since all this is evident from the terms themselves, there is no need to dwell on it further.

He proves the same concerning the other three meanings of penance, nn. 21 and 12: “As for the second meaning of the word “to do penance,” he says, namely, detesting a sin committed or being displeased with what was committed, I say that this can be an act of virtue. It is proved as before, because it can be an elective act in accord with right reason. For just as right reason dictates that we take pleasure in an honorable good, so it dictates that we be displeased by a dishonorable evil. — From this the second conclusion is clear, namely, whose act it can be: not of any one special virtue, but of any appetitive virtue. For every virtue that inclines us to take pleasure in an honorable good also inclines us to detest and be displeased by the opposing dishonorable evil. Thus chastity inclines us to displeasure at something disordered against chastity, humility at a disordered act of pride, and so on. Yet every virtue inclining us to such displeasure is an appetitive virtue, since nothing is a principle of hating, just as nothing is a principle of loving, except an appetitive virtue. Hence it is clear that it is wrong to posit detestation of sin as an act of the virtue of penance, if we speak of penance in the first sense, as a species of justice; for this act is much more general than the proper act elicited by the virtue of penance as justice. — As for the third meaning, gladly accepting the punishment inflicted for a sin committed, I say that this act too can be virtuous, because it accords with right reason. Second, it can belong to many virtues, each of which is appetitive, since whatever can be a principle for accepting one object can be a principle for accepting another in relation to it; different objects can be accepted through different virtues, in relation to which the punishment inflicted for sin can be accepted. If God is loved through charity, punishment can be accepted through charity insofar as it restores one to God’s friendship. If God is desired through the virtue of hope as a good for me, punishment can be accepted through hope as ordering one to the reward one can attain. If the loss of eternal life is avoided through the virtue of fear, punishment can be accepted through that virtue as excluding that loss. If someone loves purity and innocence for himself through an honorable friendship with himself, he can through that friendship accept punishment, which dissolves the debt that was incurred. — As for the fourth meaning, patiently bearing the punishment inflicted, it is clear that this can be an act of virtue, and of a special virtue, namely patience.” So says the Doctor. By all this he openly admits that, according to the fourfold meaning set out above in the second Note, penance can receive the character and name of an actual virtue, whether commanded or elicited by a virtue, or ordered and directed toward one. But only its primary meaning belongs specifically to the virtue of penance; for the other three acts, which sometimes occur in perfect penance, complete in every respect, can be elicited by other virtues, as will appear from what is said in the third Conclusion. — That penance, taken generally, insofar as it tends to detest and destroy sin as an offense against God, is a virtue, is proved first as follows: there is no divine precept except concerning a virtuous and praiseworthy act; but there is a divine precept to do penance. Matthew 4 says that when Christ began to preach, he said: Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand. And Mark 1: Repent, and believe the Gospel. Therefore penance is a virtue. Moreover, no act is praiseworthy and meritorious unless it is an act of virtue; but doing penance is praiseworthy and meritorious; therefore, etc. Finally, Aristotle says in Ethics II, ch. 6: Virtue is a habit that makes its possessor good and makes his work good. Penance makes its possessor good; indeed, it often makes him better and holier than he was before his fall. For St. Paul says in Romans 5: Where sin abounded, grace abounded all the more. Hence Peter Damian, Sermon 56: God is accustomed to honor penitents more than the innocent. For, as St. Gregory says in Moralia XI, ch. 19: Anyone who recognizes that he has done evil is brought back to the rule of discernment and thereby advances higher in justice, in the very place where he seemed for a time to have fallen from justice. St. Ambrose aptly confirms this in his sermon On the Chair of St. Peter, where he says, among other things: Peter became more faithful after he wept over having lost the faith; and so he found greater grace than he had lost. St. Maximus agrees beautifully: Peter, he says, makes progress through his trials, rejoices in his failings, grows through his dangers. For Peter received the flock as a good shepherd so that he who had previously been weak for himself might become a support for all. It is therefore clear that penance is highly praiseworthy and makes its possessor good; consequently, it has the dignity and character of virtue.

YOU WILL OBJECT 1: Virtue is a disposition of the perfected toward the best; but an act of penance does not have this character, since the primary act of doing penance is only a wish, or conditional will, by which the sinner would wish, if it were possible, not to have committed the sin. He cannot will this absolutely, since it is impossible. Therefore, etc. — I DENY the minor. For although doing penance is a mere wish insofar as it is directed toward a past and completed sin, if the sin is considered as presently remaining in its turning toward creatures and turning away from God, and as the stain on the soul resulting from an offense against God, then it is an absolute act: the will turns away from the creature it had loved with excessive and disordered love and returns to God, so as, to the extent of its power, to restore the honor it took from him and, to the extent that it glorified itself in delights, to undergo torment and mourning. In this respect the penitent has not a mere wish but an absolute will.

YOU WILL BE PRESSED BY ARISTOTLE, Ethics I: Nothing virtuous is foolish or stupid; but willing that a sin had not been committed, whether by an absolute or a conditional will, is foolish, stupid, and inept, since it is entirely impossible for what is past not to have been past. Therefore, etc. — I DISTINGUISH the minor: willing that what is past had not happened is inept, let it pass; willing to reject an evil committed and to wish it had not happened is inept, I deny. Penance does not reach toward the past as though the penitent thought it possible for an act actually committed not to have been committed. Rather, he rejects it as wrongly done; for the penitent’s sorrow, displeasure, and rejection of a past deed intend to remove its consequence, namely, offense against God and the debt of punishment. This is not inept, but most prudent.

YOU WILL OBJECT 2: Every virtue is desirable for its own sake, or for its own proper end; but penance is desired not for its own sake, but to expiate the evil of guilt. Therefore, it should not be considered a virtue. — I DENY the minor. Penance is desired for its own sake, that is, for its own proper end, which is to erase the evil of guilt and make satisfaction to God who has been offended. It is not desired for the sake of a some other end, distinct from its own proper end.

YOU WILL PRESS: What tends toward evil insofar as it is evil cannot be desired for its own sake, that is, for its own goodness and perfection; but penance tends toward sin, which is evil in itself. Therefore, etc. — I DISTINGUISH the major: what tends toward evil by an act of pursuit, I grant; by an act of aversion and flight, I deny. The minor must likewise be distinguished, and the consequence denied. For medicine tends toward illness, yet it is desirable—conditionally before illness, but absolutely after illness—because medicine tends toward illness not to cause or preserve it, but to destroy it. Penance likewise tends toward sin not to commit it, but to turn away from it. Hence the penitent wills sin, not to be done, but to be destroyed.

YOU WILL OBJECT 3: Every virtue must have a good for its object; but penance does not have a good for its object, since it concerns sin. Therefore, it should not be called a virtue. — The Seraphic Doctor DENIES the major, d. 11, art. 1, q. 1, ad 3; the contrary, he says, is evident in temperance, mercy, and fortitude, which concern what is evil. Alternatively, I distinguish the major: virtue must have a good object when pursuing, I grant; when turning away, I deny. For pursuing evil and fleeing good are indeed evil, whereas pursuing good and turning away from evil are right and good. For this reason punitive authority is good, although it is directed toward an evil to be punished. For there is no authority except from God, says St. Paul in Romans 13. He adds: If you do evil, be afraid; for he does not bear the sword without cause: he is God’s minister, an avenger for wrath against the one who does evil. Since the virtue of penance turns away from and destroys evil, it thereby receives the dignity of virtue. Add that penance has two acts, says the Seraphic Doctor: to flee and detest evil, and to amend the sinner and reform him into a better condition and life; this is good in itself, and through this act penance tends toward good.

YOU WILL OBJECT 4: Every act of virtue brings some pleasure; but penance does not bring pleasure, but sorrow. Therefore, it is not a virtue. — I DISTINGUISH the major: virtue brings pleasure by reason of its act, I grant; by reason of its object, I deny. Fortitude, because of its particular object—for example, dangers to be endured or confronted in war—brings distress, since that object causes sadness and pain; nevertheless, the act itself delights the courageous person, who approaches dangers with ready eagerness of spirit. Similarly, although doing penance has a sad and distressing object in itself, it nevertheless delights because of the eagerness and readiness with which the will exercises its acts through repeated practice and voluntarily determines itself to detest sin. — To make this clearer, we should observe with the Doctor, in the place cited above, n. 4, that five acts concur in perfect penance, in order: our Pitigianus explains them well at d. 14, q. 2, art. 2. First is an imperative willing, commanding and joining together the causes of sorrow; second are the causes themselves that produce sorrow; third is sorrow itself; fourth is approval and willing, or acceptance, of that sorrow; fifth, from that willing follows joy in the sorrow, according to St. Augustine’s saying: Let the sinner grieve over sin and rejoice in grief. For example, Peter committed the sin of fornication. In doing penance he follows this order: first, he has an imperative willing by which he commands the causes of sorrow, of which there are two: the apprehension of the fornication and the refusal or hatred of that fornication. I say, then, that the imperative willing by which the will commands the intellect to consider and apprehend that fornication, and commands itself to detest it, is the first act. The second is the apprehension of that fornication and refusal, or hatred, of it. The third is the sorrow caused by apprehending the fornication and refusing it. The fourth is a willing by which the will wills to have that sorrow. The fifth is the joy that follows upon this willing to have sorrow; then St. Augustine’s saying is verified: Let the sinner grieve over sin, etc. Moreover, the Doctor assigns this order or distinction among the five: the first is related as the principal but remote cause of sorrow; the second as its proximate and immediate cause; the third as its effect; the fourth as an effect following from that act. Thus the first is distinguished from the second as a principal and remote cause from a secondary and proximate one; the second from the third as cause from effect, or action from passion; the third from the fourth as object from the action that passes over it; and the first from the fifth as object from the appetitive passion for that object.

Third conclusion. — PENANCE IS A SPECIAL VIRTUE, NOT A GENERAL ONE. This is the Doctor’s teaching in the place cited above, n. 1, where he says: Doing penance is an act of a special virtue. It is proved: that act is naturally apt to have a special object and ordered special circumstances. The object is sin that can be avenged; the circumstances are those appropriate to an act rightly directed toward such an object. He means that a virtue is special when its formal object is not common to the other virtues. But the object of penance, namely, sin that can be avenged, does not belong to the other virtues, since no other virtue concerns sin as something to be avenged and expiated by due satisfaction. Therefore, penance is a special virtue.

It is confirmed: wherever there is a special difficulty in tending toward an object, not found in the other virtues, there must be a special virtue. But in the offense against God, insofar as it can be avenged and expiated through satisfaction and compensation for injuries, there is a special difficulty not found in the objects of the other virtues: namely, that the person who sinned should grieve over the offense, and that the person who has experienced the will to sin should wish to make satisfaction for it and undergo punishment. Therefore, penance is a special virtue.

The Doctor confirms this again from the circumstances: a virtue is special when it tends toward its object differently from every other virtue. But penance concerns sin differently from the other virtues, since no virtue other than penance concerns sin as something to be avenged and expiated by due satisfaction. Therefore, etc.

YOU WILL OBJECT 1: A virtue that extends to the objects of all the other virtues is not special; but penance concerns the objects of the other virtues. Therefore, it is not a special virtue but a general one. The major is established. The minor is proved: penance concerns every sin, since it undertakes its punishment and destruction; but sin in its whole range is included among the objects of the other virtues, since every virtue stands as a mean between two vicious extremes and intends to flee and destroy them. Therefore, penance is not a special virtue. — I DISTINGUISH the major: if it extends to the objects of the other virtues under the same motive by which those virtues concern them, I grant; under a distinct motive, by which no other virtue attains them, I deny. And I similarly distinguish the minor and deny the consequence. For the Seraphic Doctor says, d. 11, art. 1, q. 2, in the body: “Although penance concerns evil in general, it nevertheless concerns it under its proper aspect and has a special act, which requires a virtue not merely to command it but to elicit it. Thus zealous anger, which detests every sin in one’s neighbor, is a special virtue because it regards sin as deserving punishment; and obedience is a special virtue because it regards what is to be done under the aspect of a command. Likewise, penance is a special virtue because it regards sin as a personal evil committed by oneself against God, by which a person is deserving of punishment.” Hence, answering the third objection, he says: “To the objection about the object, one should say that, although it is not restricted to a particular sin, it nevertheless considers sin under a special and proper aspect: namely, insofar as it was committed by oneself and is an offense against God, to whom one wishes to be reconciled and for whom one wishes to make amends. It is therefore a special virtue, because a virtue is called special or general not by reason of its object, which is material, but according as it has the character of a motive.”

YOU WILL OBJECT 2: What is contrary to all sins is not a special virtue. For just as virtue has a determinate good from which it receives its specification, so it has a determinate evil to which it is opposed. But penance is contrary to all sins. For whatever expels something from a subject and cannot coexist with it is contrary to it; penance, however, strives to expel all sins from the soul. Therefore, it is not a special virtue. — I ANSWER first that the major can be denied if taken universally, since charity is contrary to every mortal sin and is no less a special virtue for that reason. I answer second by distinguishing the major: what is contrary to something and expels it formally, I grant; effectively, I deny. As to the minor, I say that every virtue formally expels the vice opposed to it, as cold expels heat and whiteness blackness, because vicious and virtuous habits are formally opposed concerning the same object. Penance, however, expels all sins only effectively, insofar as it works toward the destruction of sin, as far as sin can be remitted with the divine grace that assists it. Therefore, it does not follow that penance is not a special virtue.

YOU WILL PRESS: Every virtue tends not only formally but also effectively toward the destruction of the vice and sin opposed to it. Therefore, no special virtue of penance is needed for this. — I DISTINGUISH the antecedent: it tends toward the destruction of the vice opposed to it according to the aspect under which it is specially opposed to that virtue—for example, faith tends toward the destruction of unbelief insofar as it is unbelief—I grant; it tends toward that destruction insofar as no special virtue is opposed to it alongside the virtue itself, namely, insofar as it is an offense against God to be avenged and repaired by due satisfaction, I deny. Therefore, to destroy sin under the aspect of an offense against God, a special virtue is needed, namely, penance.

YOU WILL PRESS: There is even less need for a special virtue tending toward the destruction of evil insofar as it offends God than for one tending toward the pursuit of good insofar as it honors God. But no special virtue is needed for the latter, since every virtue is referred to God’s honor and glory, or else it would be fruitless and vain. Therefore, etc. — I DENY the minor, since the virtue of Religion is specially ordered to this: to tend toward good insofar as it honors God; it has this as its particular object and special end. For although the other virtues must be referred to that end if they are to be true virtues, they are not referred to it as their proximate end and immediate object. Therefore, by analogy, a special virtue is needed to tend toward sin’s being avenged insofar as it is an offense against God.

Fourth conclusion. — PENANCE IS A SPECIAL VIRTUE ONLY ACCORDING TO ITS PRIMARY MEANING, NOT ACCORDING TO THE OTHER THREE. This is likewise the Doctor’s teaching in the same place, n. 11, where he grants that detestation of sin can be an act of virtue: Because, he says, it can be an elective act in accord with right reason; for just as right reason dictates that we take pleasure in an honorable good, so it dictates that we be displeased by a dishonorable evil. Yet there he denies that this detestation is an act of a special virtue distinct from the others, because it can be an act of any appetitive virtue: “Every virtue,” he says, “that inclines one to take pleasure in an honorable good also inclines one to detest and be displeased by the opposing dishonorable evil. Thus chastity inclines one to displeasure at something disordered against chastity, humility at a disordered act of pride, and so on. Yet every virtue inclining one to such displeasure is an operative virtue, since nothing is a principle of hating, just as nothing is a principle of loving, except an appetitive virtue. From this it is clear that it is wrong to posit detestation of sin as an act of the virtue of penance, when speaking of penance as a virtue in the first sense, as a species of justice, because this act is much more general than the proper act of the virtue of penance as justice, elicited by that virtue.” The Doctor does not deny that detestation of any sin can be an act commanded by the virtue of penance; he means only that it is not an act elicited by it. — At the same place, n. 12, he teaches the same about the third meaning of penance, insofar as it is voluntary acceptance of punishment inflicted for a sin committed: “I say that this act too can be an act of virtue, because it accords with right reason. Second, it can belong to many virtues, each of which is appetitive; for whatever can be a principle of accepting some object can be a principle of accepting another object in relation to it. Different objects can be accepted through different virtues, in relation to which the punishment inflicted for sin can be accepted. If God is loved through charity, punishment can be accepted through charity insofar as it restores one to God’s friendship. If God is desired through the virtue of hope as a good for me, punishment can be accepted through hope as ordering one to that attainable reward. If the loss of eternal life is avoided through the virtue of fear, punishment can be accepted through that virtue as excluding that loss. If someone loves purity and innocence for himself through an honorable friendship with himself, he can accept through that friendship punishment which dissolves the debt incurred.” — (As for the fourth act, the Doctor teaches in the same place that it is not a special act of the virtue of penance, but of patience, since patience is to bear punishment inflicted steadfastly and patiently tolerate every adversity.) From this it follows that penance has the character of a special virtue insofar as it inclines one to avenge sin, but not insofar as it is detestation of sin, or unwillingness to have sinned, as the Thomists maintain. For that detestation of sin can be elicited by any virtue to which sin, in general or in a particular kind, is opposed; for it belongs to the same virtue to pursue good and flee from, detest, and be displeased by evil. And the virtue by which one is displeased by something is also the virtue by which one grieves over it insofar as it is present and applied; hence whichever virtue detests sin also detests the vice opposed to it.

THE THOMISTS REPLY that this is indeed true if detestation occurs insofar as sin is opposed to the dictate of right reason and the particular honesty intended by each virtue. But it is otherwise if sin to be expiated and detested is considered insofar as it is an offense against God; in this respect, they say, it is a special act of the virtue of penance, which does not belong to another virtue. — Against this: it belongs not only to penance to grieve over sin insofar as it is an offense against God and to execrate it, but also to charity. For it belongs to the same virtue to pursue a good and turn away from and execrate what is opposed to it; but every sin, under the aspect of an offense, is opposed to God, who is the object of charity. Therefore, charity must execrate sin under this aspect. The minor is proved: charity grieves over sin insofar as it is contrary to its object, or ultimate end, and to God toward whom it tends. But sin is precisely contrary to God under the aspect of offense; for it is an offense insofar as it removes God’s friendship with humanity, turns one away from the ultimate end, and turns one toward a creature. These two things are most opposed to charity, which tends toward God under the motive of friendship and conversion. Therefore, charity execrates sin for no other reason than that it is an offense against God. Consequently, this detestation pertains to the virtue of penance only insofar as it is at least remotely commanded by penance; and so an act of command proper to penance must be presupposed to that act.

YOU WILL OBJECT 1: The holy Fathers and Councils usually express penance only by sorrow and detestation for sins, and assert that this detestation is the final and perfect disposition for justification, both within the sacrament and outside it. Thus the Council of Trent, sess. XIV, ch. 6, defines contrition by sorrow and detestation: Contrition, it says, is sorrow of soul and detestation for the sin committed. Hence, in sess. VI, ch. 6, when assigning the manner of preparation for justification, it mentions not vengeance for sin but detestation alone: They are moved, it says, against their sins by a certain hatred and detestation, that is, by the penance which ought to be undertaken before baptism. Therefore, etc. — I answer that the Fathers and Councils speak this way because sorrow and detestation for sin are included as a primary effect in the will to avenge it. If this will is effective for the remission of sins, it must inflict punishment and consequently command sorrow. Since, according to the etymology of its name, to do penance means the same as to undergo punishment, and since punishment is undergone when sorrow is elicited and detestation formed, penance is therefore considered complete only when it has its term or effect and obtains the character of justice, which restores God’s right through vengeance. It is under this aspect that the holy Fathers and Councils consider penance when they call it sorrow of soul and detestation for sin committed.

As to the Council of Trent’s latter authority, I say that it treats of detestation of sin arising not from the motive of penance but from charity, as is clear from the preceding words: They begin to love him (God) as the source of all justice and are therefore moved against their sins by a certain hatred and detestation. By these words it signifies that the motive and cause of that hatred and detestation is love of God; consequently, it is not an act elicited by the virtue of penance, but one commanded by it.

YOU WILL OBJECT 2: Willing to avenge sin and detesting it are one and the same act: for whoever detests sin, insofar as it is in him, wills it to be absent and consequently wills to avenge it. Therefore, if the act of vengeance is an act of the virtue of penance, the act of detestation will be so as well. — I DENY the antecedent. For the act of vengeance is an act of pursuit, since it is a willing of punishment to be inflicted in retribution for sin; the act of detestation, however, is an act of flight, since it is an unwillingness for sin. Therefore, just as love of some honorable thing and hatred of the opposing disgraceful thing are not in reality one and the same act but several acts, at least formally distinct, even if perhaps elicited by the same virtue, so willing to avenge and detest sin are not one and the same act—especially when they can proceed from different virtues, as happens here. Detestation of sin can proceed solely from the motive of charity, hope, or another virtue opposed to that sin; for this reason it cannot be an act of vengeance, since that requires the motive of justice.

YOU WILL PRESS: At least, detestation of sin virtually contains the will to avenge sin; consequently, at least virtually they are one and the same act. — I answer that the discussion concerns the act considered formally, insofar as it proceeds from a special virtue, and therefore the objection is irrelevant. Further, if detestation of sin includes the will to avenge only virtually, it follows that those two acts are formally distinct, just as every act is formally distinct from the cause in which it is virtually contained.

From these points, therefore, it follows that penance is not a general virtue either by way of predication, as though it were a general condition and transcendent predicate extending to all virtues, as the Altissiodorensian, Major, and certain other theologians maintain, or by the aggregation of all virtues, as our own Alensis seems to suggest. He indeed admits that penance is a special virtue insofar as it is an act by which the penitent punishes himself in compensation for his offense; but he considers it general with respect to the act of hating and detesting all sins, since each virtue contributes to the act of hating all sins, at least by commanding it. For hatred of the object contrary to a virtue—that is, sin—arises from love of that virtue’s object. Hence Alensis thinks penance can be called a general virtue by concomitance and aggregation of all virtues. The contrary, however, is evident not only from what we have said but also from this reasoning: if the virtue of penance were general by the concomitance and aggregation of the other virtues, it would follow that the penitent could not detest all sins through a single act elicited by the virtue of penance. Since each virtue has its own limited and distinct object and cannot tend toward the object of another virtue, it would follow that detesting sins against all virtues would require an act of every virtue. Thus the sinner could not be justified through penance in a single instant, since he could not be justified unless he detested all sins; but he could not detest all sins without exercising acts of every virtue, which he cannot exercise in an instant. This is absurd; therefore the conclusion from which it follows is absurd as well.

Three things above all must be determined in this Question: first, whether penance is an acquired or infused virtue, theological or moral; second, on the supposition that it is moral, to which of the four cardinal virtues it is reduced; third, granted that it must be reduced to some species of justice, whether it is comprised under commutative or distributive justice. These matters may be made known more easily and clearly as follows.

NOTE 1. Virtues, considered generally in relation to God, are of three kinds. Some have God as their object and proximate end, so that it belongs to the nature of these virtues to refer their acts to God; such are the theological virtues, whose object is God himself, either to be believed, hoped for, or loved. Others have God neither as their object nor as their proximate end, as fortitude, whose object is death or something similar, while its proximate end, at least intrinsically, is not God but something else: for example, when someone exposes himself to death for his country, so that, once the enemy has been driven off, people may live in peace. For the material object of this act of fortitude is death; its formal object, or intrinsic end, is peace, or a peaceful and tranquil life. Hence, if such an act is referred to God, this reference will be only to an extrinsic end, and will take place through the virtue not of fortitude but of charity or religion. Others, finally, although they do not have God as their object, nevertheless have him as their end to whom, that is, the proximate end toward which all their acts are directed. Such are religion and penance, whose acts are immediately ordered to God. They are therefore close to the theological virtues, and are for the most part commanded by them.

NOTE 2. According to the Doctor, d. 14, q. 3, n. 5: “A virtue is not judged moral for the reason that it is known and elicited solely from prior natural cognition, rather than from revelation or faith. For, he says, according to the Philosopher a moral virtue is so called because it is generated by custom or habit. But through any kind of knowledge, whether acquired by the light of nature or by faith, the appetite can be inclined accordingly, and by frequent action can generate in itself a habit inclining it in this way. This will be an elective habit, because it is appetitive, and is according to right reason, though not natural reason but another kind of reason. In this way poverty, humility, chastity, and the like are moral virtues, because they are generated according to perfect and right reason, though not purely natural reason, through custom—that is, through frequently choosing in this way.” Hence he concludes: “Therefore, once this rule known from the Gospel, ‘Do penance,’ Matthew 3, is presupposed, the will can, by frequently eliciting an act conformed to this rule, generate in itself a habit inclining it to similar acts; and this will truly be a virtue, because it accords with right reason, indeed with the most perfectly right reason, and yet it will be moral, because generated by habit and custom.” Thus the Doctor. By these words he indicates that although, in order to be a Christian virtue, penance must be elicited for the sake of God who has been offended, on the supposition of a divine precept known through revelation, it will nonetheless be a moral virtue, generated and acquired through repeated acts. Hence, for a virtue to be infused and supernatural, it is not enough that it presuppose knowledge received from revelation; in addition, its acquisition must wholly exceed human powers, so that it cannot be obtained except by God’s giving and infusing it.

NOTE 3. All moral virtues are reduced to the four cardinal virtues, which are called cardinal because the others turn upon them as a door turns on its hinges. They are justice, fortitude, temperance, and prudence. It is clear that penance is not reduced to prudence, fortitude, or temperance, since those virtues are concerned only with moderating and regulating the passions of the sensitive appetite, whereas penance concerns all sins, both spiritual and bodily. Hence the only difficulty remaining to be weighed is the reduction of penance to justice. Since the formal character of justice consists in the obligation and duty of rendering what is owed according to right reason, it extends to various species of virtue: for twenty-two virtues are counted, both immediate and mediate, of which justice is predicated as of its species. These are latria, piety, dulia, hyperdulia, legal justice, equity, benevolence, affability, beneficence, truthfulness, friendship, liberality, penance, reverence, observance, mercy, vindication, gratitude, and punitive, restitutive, distributive, and commutative justice. The sufficiency and proper enumeration of all these are gathered from the four principal debts a person may have: either in relation to the cause on which one depends as an effect; or in relation to one’s own condition and nature; or with respect to a second and added perfection; or with respect to voluntary action. Since the present discussion is especially about the ordering of a person in respect of an obligation that arises through voluntary action, it should be understood that this voluntary action presupposes a deed, or does not. If it presupposes a deed, that deed is either good or bad for the person. If good, the person is obliged to make recompense according to his ability, which he does through the virtue of gratitude. If bad, he is bound by office to correct it, toward which punitive justice inclines him; and in particular, if the wrongdoer has injured his neighbor, he is bound to make satisfaction, toward which restitutive justice inclines him. If, however, the voluntary action presupposes no deed but is on equal terms, then a twofold obligation may arise: either to equality according to geometric proportion, which is exercised by distributive justice, or to equality according to arithmetic proportion, which is exercised by commutative justice.

First conclusion. — PENANCE IS A MORAL VIRTUE, NOT A THEOLOGICAL ONE; ACQUIRED, NOT INFUSED. This is the Doctor’s position with respect to both parts, the first of which

He explains in In IV Sent., d. 14, q. 2, n. 9, where he says: “From this there could be a doubt about the relation of this virtue to charity: for since penance, through its act, commands an act of charity, it seems to be superior to charity. But the contrary is clear, because the per se object of charity is God under the most noble objective character, whereas the proper object of this virtue is a punishable wrong, or the guilty person against whom punishment is to be inflicted.” Hence he concludes that “penance is not only not a theological virtue, but is not even simply the most noble virtue among those concerned with a created object.” Accordingly, at n. 20 he says: “Finally, I say that it is not a theological virtue, but is concerned with a created object.”

This truth is therefore proved by an argument of the Doctor, drawn from In III Sent., d. 26, q. 1, n. 15, where he says: Three conditions are held to belong to a theological virtue: first, it regards God as its object; second, it has as its rule the first rule of human acts, not an acquired rule; third, it is infused immediately by God as efficient cause. But none of these conditions applies to penance. Not the first, since penance is directed immediately not toward God but toward sin, to be avenged and punished. For, as we shall say presently, it is punitive or vindictive justice, whose formal object is the correspondence of punishment to guilt, and whose material object is punishment and guilt themselves.

YOU WILL SAY: In avenging sin, the penitent intends to make satisfaction to God for the injury inflicted; therefore penance is directed toward God as its object. — I deny the inference, for he does not intend to make satisfaction to God as though the satisfaction or punishment itself were the proximate end and ultimate motive he proposes to himself. He intends it only because making satisfaction to God and punishing sin are good. Thus the one making satisfaction, and consequently punishing himself, has as the formal object to which he is directed, not God, whom he does not love by that act, but the will by which he desires to make satisfaction to God, and this is certainly something created. Accordingly, just as obedience, although it wills to obey God, and religion, although it wills to worship God, are not for that reason theological virtues, because they are not immediately concerned with God but obedience with the thing commanded and religion with divine worship, which are created beings; so penance, although it intends to make satisfaction to God, should not on this account be judged a theological virtue, because it is not immediately concerned with God but with sin to be avenged.

YOU WILL PRESS: Penance intends to appease God; but that appeasement is something uncreated, for it is an act of the divine will accepting our acts of service and pardoning our offenses; therefore, and so on. — I distinguish the minor premise: that appeasement is something uncreated on God’s part and in its completed state, I grant, because pardoning sins belongs to God alone; on the penitent’s part and in its becoming, I deny. For the penitent is not immediately concerned with that appeasement and remission, but only with works suited to appease God, which he wills to offer in order to obtain that remission of sins. The offering of these works is in itself good and honorable, even if no pardon of sins were to follow from it. Hence the primary act of penance is to will to punish sin and to offer works of satisfaction by which God may be appeased.

The second condition of a theological virtue is likewise absent from penance, since it is not regulated by the first rule of human acts, namely, either God under some essential or attributive character, or the divine will known through revelation, but by the dictate of reason, which declares that punishment must be proportioned to sin and satisfaction to the gravity of the offense.

It has still less of the third condition, namely, that it be infused by God as efficient cause. For, as the Doctor says in the aforementioned d. 14, q. 2, n. 20: From many acts of justly avenging the guilty person in oneself, a habit can be acquired that remains along with mortal sin; it could be acquired before mortal sin is blotted out, were it not perhaps that God justifies before sufficient acts for the generation of penance can be had. This position is proved as follows. Infused virtues are admitted only so that they may incline the recipient to acts necessary for salvation: thus the habit of faith inclines one to believe, of hope to hope, and of charity to love God as one ought. But the habit of penance, if considered in itself, could not incline its recipient to an act of repenting necessary for salvation; therefore it would be pointless. The major premise is established. The minor is proved: an act of penance is said to be necessary for salvation insofar as it disposes the soul to the infusion of the virtues at the moment of justification. But the act that is the dispositive cause of a subject’s reception of an infused habit cannot be produced by that infused habit itself; therefore, and so on. The major premise is taught by the Council of Trent, sess. VI, chs. 9 and 7, where penance is listed among the dispositions required beforehand in an adult for receiving justification. And in sess. XIV, ch. 4, it says of attrition conceived from fear of hell and punishments, if it excludes the will to sin and is accompanied by hope of pardon, that it does not make a person a hypocrite and greater sinner, but is truly a gift of God and an impulse of the Holy Spirit, not yet indeed indwelling, but only moving, by which the penitent, helped, prepares the way for himself to righteousness. The minor is proved: every form to be introduced follows the disposition for it; therefore an act of a penitent necessary for salvation cannot be elicited by an infused habit of penance, for which it is a disposition, especially according to the Thomists, who admit moral virtues infused in themselves and maintain that they are infused only at justification.

YOU WILL SAY 1: Natural and acquired penance does not suffice for the blotting out of guilt; therefore infused penance is required for this. The antecedent is proved from the Council of Trent, sess. III, can. 3: If anyone says that a person can believe, hope, love, or repent as he ought, without the prevenient inspiration of the Holy Spirit and his help, so that the grace of justification may be conferred on him, let him be anathema. Therefore, just as believing, hoping, and loving are supernatural acts in their substance, so too repenting, in order to be a proper disposition for the remission of sins, must be supernatural. — I distinguish the antecedent: natural penance does not suffice both in substance and in manner, I grant; natural in substance and supernatural in manner, I deny. Therefore the act of penance that is preparation for justification is indeed supernatural in manner, because it is elicited only by the benefit of grace and the help of the Holy Spirit. In this respect acts of the moral virtues, insofar as they are meritorious, are called supernatural—not in substance but in manner, since they cannot be pleasing and acceptable to God in the order of salvation without the benefit of grace. The Council intended nothing else: there it defines only, against the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians, that a person cannot be justified by the powers of nature alone, without God’s special help. Hence one cannot infer from it that penance is supernatural in substance, but only in manner, which is certainly necessary for fruitful penance.

YOU WILL INSIST: Acquired habits naturally incline one to produce acts like those from which they were generated. Therefore, if a natural habit is generated from acts of penance that contribute to salvation, it will follow that this habit inclines one to produce acts sufficient for salvation, and consequently that we can repent by the powers of nature alone, which is Pelagian. — I distinguish the antecedent: they incline one to produce like acts in substance, I grant; in manner, I deny. For just as a divine precept may be kept with respect to the substance of the act, even though it is not observed with respect to the end intended by God who commands it—for example, if someone fasts during Lent while in a state of mortal sin, he fulfills the precept with respect to the substance of the act, but not with respect to the end intended by God who commands and intends that the act be meritorious—so an acquired habit of penance can indeed incline the will to an act of repentance with respect to the being and substance of the act, namely, to wish one had not sinned; yet it does not incline it with respect to the end intended by the one commanding, namely, God’s intention that this act of repentance be the final disposition for grace.

Second conclusion. — PENANCE IS REDUCED TO JUSTICE. This is the Doctor’s position, In IV Sent., d. 14, q. 2, n. 5, where he proves that willing to punish sin is not an act of the friendship by which a person is reconciled with God, because it is not an act of an appetitive virtue that orders one to oneself, but to another. “There follows,” he says, “another conclusion: repenting is not an act of an appetitive virtue that orders one to oneself, such as temperance and fortitude; therefore it is an act of a virtue that orders one to another, such as justice. This argument holds on the supposition of that famous division of the appetitive virtues, according to which they are reduced entirely to two classes. The antecedent is proved, because a person can exercise this act of avenging in the same way, according to right reason, upon another as upon himself. Even if he exercises it upon himself, he does so upon himself only as upon another, because he exercises it upon himself only insofar as the Legislator commits to him the task of avenging this accused person. But it is accidental that the person to whom this is committed as a minister of the Judge is the accused person himself, since he would exercise it according to the right reason of a minister upon the accused in the same way if the accused were an entirely different person. Therefore this virtue, whose nature consists in this act, is contained under justice, insofar as justice is generally defined as every virtue that orders one to another.” By these words the Doctor makes clear that this act, which is avenging sin, may be elicited by someone with respect to another just as with respect to himself; and when someone avenges his own sin, he deals with himself as though he were acting toward another. Consequently, this act does not belong to a virtue that orders one to oneself, but to another. But if you object that willing to avenge sin is not an act directed toward another but of a person toward himself, the Doctor replies in the same place that “it is no obstacle that, in his act, he is ordered to himself, because he is ordered to himself only as to another, that is, as the minister of the Judge against the accused who has acted against the law, over whom authority has been entrusted to him by the Judge.” That is, when someone punishes himself for sin, he acts as God’s minister. Hence, although he is at once accused and judge, in order to chastise himself he is, as it were, virtually distinguished from himself insofar as he is accused.

YOU WILL SAY 1: Penance is reduced to charity; therefore it is not referred to justice. The antecedent is proved: penance is reduced to the virtue from which its proper act, contrition, is elicited. But contrition is elicited by charity: for sorrow over sins on account of God, loved above all, is an act of contrition, since it belongs to the same virtue to rejoice in a friend’s good and to grieve and be sorrowful over his evils. Therefore the act of contrition proceeds from charity. — I DENY the antecedent; and in answer to its proof I say that contrition can be considered in two ways: namely, insofar as it is sorrow for sin through simple displeasure at sin, or insofar as it is sorrow for sin with the intention of avenging it and making satisfaction to God who has been offended. In the former way it belongs to charity, but not in the latter.

YOU WILL INSIST: It belongs to the same virtue to hate and intend the destruction of that which is opposed to the object pursued by that virtue. But charity intends God as the supreme good, to which sin is opposed; therefore to grieve over sin with the intention of destroying it belongs to charity. — I distinguish the major premise: under the aspect in which that evil is opposed to the good intended by the virtue itself, I grant; under another aspect, I deny. To the minor premise I say that charity grieves over sin with the intention of destroying it under the aspect in which sin is opposed to the divine good intended by charity. But to grieve over sin with the intention of avenging and punishing it is not an act of charity but of penance, as has already been demonstrated.

YOU WILL SAY 2: Justice consists in a mean, since it is a moral virtue; but penance does not consist in a mean, since it tends toward excess, according to Jeremiah 6: “Make for yourself the mourning of an only child, a bitter lamentation.” Therefore it is not reduced to justice. — I answer first, to the major premise, that a virtue is not said to consist in a mean because it must necessarily stand between two vices, one deviating from the dictate of right reason by excess, the other by defect. For virginity, which is the most noble virtue, not only moderates but altogether excludes venereal pleasure, and so it does not concern pleasurable passions by moderating excess or defect, but by wholly excluding pleasure. Therefore virtue in general is said to consist in a mean insofar as it is measured by the dictate of right reason. I answer second, by explaining the minor premise: for the mean of justice is equality, which exists between those among whom justice is found, as Aristotle says in bk. V of the Ethics. But in certain cases perfect equality cannot be established because of the excellence of one party, for example, between father and son, or between God and man. Therefore one who falls short in such cases ought to do whatever he can, so as to accomplish to the best of his ability what contributes to equality. Thus penance ought to be intensified as much as possible, so that the penitent may, to the best of his ability, restore the divine right. Accordingly, no matter how much someone repents, his penance will not be vicious on the part of justice. Hence, however much someone detests his sins for God’s sake, he does not sin; indeed, the greater his detestation and avenging of sin, the more perfect his penance. I answer third, with Pitiganis, that virtue in general can consist in a mean in either of four ways: “First, both on the part of the object and on the part of the circumstances, as temperance, against which one may sin by excess or defect, and likewise against certain circumstances, by eating too much or too little, or when and where one ought not. Second, some virtues have superabundance on the part of the object, but are at the mean on the part of the circumstance. For the Philosopher says in bk. IV of the Ethics, ch. 4, that the magnanimous person is extreme in greatness, yet is at the mean in doing what is fitting; such are magnanimity and fortitude. This is because magnanimity concerns the greatest things, and fortitude has the utmost terrors as its object; and because if a magnanimous person deemed himself worthy of more than he ought, he would be vain, whereas if of less, he would be pusillanimous; and if a brave person exposed himself to death for empty glory, he would be rash, and so on. Third, there are virtues that are in a state of deficiency on the part of the circumstance, such as virginity, which rejects all venereal pleasure and thus takes an extreme with respect to matter; but it holds the mean with respect to circumstances, because it observes this for the time when it is expedient to observe it—that is, for a time when abstaining from carnal union is neither commanded nor counseled by God—and also observes it for the proper purpose, namely, so that the mind may be more freely devoted to spiritual things. Fourth, some virtues have superabundance and not defect, such as magnanimity and fortitude; conversely, some have more superabundance, such as latria; and some have more defect, such as temperance.” These points having been established, it may be said that penance consists in a mean by way of defect and excess: for example, if someone detests a small sin more than a great one, or grieves more over a sin because of the loss of some temporal good than of a spiritual one. Thus Pitiganis.

Third conclusion. — PENANCE IS NOT STRICTLY SPEAKING COMMUTATIVE OR DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE, BUT VINDICTIVE JUSTICE. This is the Doctor’s position, In IV Sent., d. 14, q. 2, n. 8, where, speaking of the act of penance, he says: This act, then, is an act of punitive justice, which is distinguished from commutative justice and also from friendship.

The first two parts of the conclusion are proved together, namely, that penance is neither commutative nor distributive justice. For virtues that have different formal objects are distinct from one another; but penance, commutative justice, and distributive justice regard different formal objects. For commutative justice regards equality of thing to thing, that is, a strict debt to be repaid in equality; distributive justice regards equality of rewards or punishments in proportion to praiseworthy acts and faults. But penance cannot restore to equality the divine right injured by sin, because an offense committed against God cannot be sufficiently expiated by any human satisfaction unless God intervenes and freely pardons the offense out of clemency and mercy. Therefore penance is reduced to neither species of justice. — This is confirmed, especially with respect to distributive justice, because it is the justice of a superior toward an inferior: for it belongs to a superior to distribute common goods and punishments to inferiors, to each in proportion to his merit or demerit. Penance, however, belongs rather to an inferior, namely, a creature in relation to God. Furthermore, distributive justice assigns punishments or goods to one person in relation to another, whom it also punishes or rewards; but penance does not punish one penitent in relation to another, but in relation to the guilt committed against God. Therefore, and so on.

Finally, the third part is proved, namely, that penance is vindictive justice. First, by an authority drawn from the book On True and False Penance, cited above by us, which defines penance as follows: It is the vengeance of one who grieves, always punishing in himself what he grieves to have committed. If it is vengeance, then it is vindictive. — Moreover, the sacrament of penance is a tribunal of justice, but of no justice other than vindictive justice; therefore, and so on. The Council of Trent simultaneously confirms the major and minor premises, sess. XIV, ch. 2, where, speaking of the baptized, it says: For it willed that if these should later defile themselves with some crime, they should not be cleansed by a repetition of baptism, since this is in no way permitted in the Catholic Church, but should be brought as guilty persons before this tribunal (of penance).... They obtain full and complete remission of sins, which we can in no way attain through the sacrament of penance without our great weeping and labors, since divine justice (vindictive justice) demands this. And in ch. 5 it indicates that a sinner may publicly confess his sins in order to avenge them: However, it says, although Christ did not forbid anyone to confess his sins publicly for the avenging of his crimes and his humiliation, both for the example of others and for the edification of the Church, which has been offended, and so on. And in ch. 8, On Works of Satisfaction, it establishes: Let them (the priests) keep before their eyes that the satisfaction they impose is not only for the preservation of new life and as a remedy for weakness, but also for the avenging and chastisement of past sins. — This is confirmed: God, by vindictive justice, ordains that sin be remitted through punishment and penitential acts in the sacrament of penance; therefore, when exercising penitential acts, the sinner ought to have this same end and motive. The inference is clear, because a minister, in proceeding rightly to inflict punishment, must act according to the end of the law and the lawgiver, since this is the end of ministerial power, which is intended by the principal delegating cause. But in carrying out punishment upon himself through the virtue of penance, the sinner acts as a minister of God the Judge. For, as Tertullian says in On Penance, this virtue in pronouncing judgment upon the sinner performs the office of God’s indignation. Therefore, just as God prescribes punishment from the motive of vindictive justice, so the penitent ought to prescribe punishment for himself from the same motive.

St. Augustine teaches this admirably when he advises in bk. 50 of the Homilies, hom. 50: Let a person set up the tribunal of his mind against himself, if he fears what ought not to be presented before the tribunal of Christ, where each will receive what he has done in the body, whether good or evil. Let him place himself before his own face; and, once judgment has been established in his heart, let accusatory thought be present, conscience as witness, fear as executioner. From there the blood of the confessing soul indeed flows in tears. Finally, let such a sentence be pronounced by the mind itself that a person judges himself unworthy to share in the Body and Blood of the Lord. Let one who fears being separated from the kingdom of heaven by the final sentence of the supreme Judge be separated for a time, through ecclesiastical discipline, from the sacrament of the heavenly homeland. Let the image of the future judgment turn before his eyes, so that when others approach the altar of God, while he does not, he may consider how greatly he must tremble at that punishment by which, while others receive eternal life, he himself with others will be cast into eternal death.

YOU WILL SAY 1: Penance is not reduced to commutative justice; but according to the Doctor, In IV Sent., d. 19, q. 1, n. 26, punitive justice is the same as commutative justice, for he says: I say, then, that just as in other exchanges commutative justice allows a certain latitude, since in exchanges it does not regard an indivisible point but the mean of right reason, so punitive justice, which is the commutation of punishment for guilt, does not necessarily regard an indivisible degree of punishment corresponding to this guilt; rather, there is some latitude, below which the punishment is insufficient, and beyond which a greater punishment ought not to be imposed. He says something similar in In IV Sent., d. 16, q. 1, n. 4: For the present purpose, commutative justice properly regards punishment and reward, so that rewards are rendered, as it were, in exchange for merits, and punishments for sins. — I answer that in those places the Doctor does not take commutative justice strictly, as that which regards the mean to be observed in things and in exchanges properly so called. In this sense it is distinguished from punitive justice: the latter preserves a certain equality in punishments in relation to the debt of faults, whereas the former does so in exchanges of things. Hence he also pointedly adds “as it were, in exchange,” by which he indicates that punishment is not an act of commutative justice taken strictly, but in a somewhat broader sense, insofar as it preserves equality of quantity and regards arithmetic proportion like commutative justice strictly so called. It does not preserve geometric proportion, as distributive justice does; hence it is reduced to commutative rather than distributive justice, although properly it is neither, but only resembles them in a certain proportion and likeness.

YOU WILL SAY 2: Vindictive justice exists only in a Judge or superior who inflicts punishment, not in a subject and accused person; therefore a sinner who punishes himself through penance does not do so by vindictive justice. — I DISTINGUISH the antecedent: it exists in a superior principally and with authority, I grant; ministerially and executively, I deny. For it exists in a subject and inferior in this latter way.

YOU WILL PRESS: To carry out and inflict punishment is not, properly speaking, to do penance; therefore penance is not vindictive justice even executively. The antecedent is proved: someone could will to take on punishment for his sins without having a purpose of not sinning again or sorrow for past sins, which penance certainly requires. — I deny the antecedent, and in answer to its proof I say that such an undertaking of punishment would not be true vengeance for past sins, at least in this life, because it would not be according to the laws of vindictive and punitive justice prescribed by God, which first of all require sorrow and a purpose of amendment. Hence, just as someone does not truly worship God, even if he has the will to worship, if he does not join an interior act of religion to external worship, so neither does someone truly repent or avenge sin if he does not employ the means ordered to that end.

YOU WILL SAY 3: The punishment that the penitent inflicts must be voluntary in the person who undergoes it, since it is an act of a virtue existing in his will; but the punishment inflicted by vindictive justice is involuntary with respect to the one who suffers it; therefore penance is not vindictive justice. — THE DOCTOR REPLIES, In IV Sent., d. 11, q. 1, n. 13, that punishment is involuntary when compared with the will that follows the desire for what is advantageous. Yet, he says, it can be voluntary by an antecedent will, namely, through the voluntary application of causes from which it follows. It can also be voluntary by a just will that accepts it, and this by a consequent will following the desire for justice, because in this way it accepts whatever is ordered to something justly willed for its own sake; but this sorrow can be ordered to something justly willed for its own sake. He had said beforehand, at n. 11, that what is simply involuntary is that against which the will simply remonstrates; and conversely, by opposition, the voluntary can be understood in three ways: first, that against which the will does not altogether remonstrate, but patiently endures; second, what it voluntarily accepts; third, what it voluntarily causes; and this in two ways, namely, either as a proximate partial cause that does not intend the effect joined to it, or as a principal remote cause that does intend the effect; thus there are four members. He adds the reason for this distinction: For, he says, in the first two ways sorrow is only the object of volition; in the third it is only an effect, and not an object; but in the fourth it is both object and effect, unless something impedes it.

NOTE 1. Since a habitual virtue becomes known only through acts, and acts through their objects, the being and nature of the virtue of penance can be declared and made manifest no better than through knowledge of its object. Its object, however, is twofold: one is material, the other formal, so named by analogy with the matter and form that physically constitute some whole. For just as matter is of itself indifferent to various forms, and consequently to the constitution of various composites, but through form is determined to a certain composite, so a thing about which virtues are occupied, since of itself it is indifferent to various reasons for love or hatred, and consequently to the constitution of various virtues, is called the material object; whereas the very motive reason for love or hatred, by which that thing is determined to constitute a certain virtue, is called the formal object. Thus, for example, money to be given to a needy person can be called the material object, because it is indifferent to the virtue of almsgiving, of liberality, and of restitutive justice; but the giving of that money to relieve the needy person’s misery out of compassion determines the very bestowal of the money to the virtue of almsgiving, just as giving it in order to restore what was taken determines that money to the virtue of restitutive justice.

NOTE 2. The material object of a virtue is again twofold, namely, remote and proximate. I call the proximate object that about which the virtue is occupied first: thus an internal or external act of divine worship, taken as a sign of God’s supreme excellence and of our reverence and subjection toward him, can be called the proximate object of the virtue of Religion. Likewise, the proximate material object of Penance, insofar as it is vindicative justice, can be called everything taken to constitute equality between guilt and punishment, namely, the punishment itself corresponding to the guilt. (This, indeed, is nothing other than an internal or external act taken for vindication; for punishment is that about which the primary effect of Penance is concerned, that is, what Penance immediately intends, since it intends to inflict punishment for a sin committed.) But I call the remote object that between which and the internal act elicited by the virtue of Penance something intervenes: thus between sin, or evil insofar as it is subject to vindication, and the internal act of Penance, namely, the will to vindicate, there intervenes vengeance. Hence it follows that evil insofar as it is subject to vindication is the remote object.

NOTE 3. Evil subject to vindication is nothing other than that which merits punishment in vengeance and which God wills to be punished. It follows that every sin, not only mortal but also venial, is included under the aspect of evil subject to vindication. For although venial sin does not gravely offend God, and therefore does not merit a grave punishment or penalty, nevertheless it is certain that it merits some punishment: punishment is correlated with guilt; therefore, where the guilt is light, the punishment and penalty must at least be light. This punishment is owed for the sin so long as it remains under the aspect of sin and offense against God, and consequently until it is washed away through Penance: “For, says the Doctor, In IV Sent., d. 14, q. 1, n. 7, after the act of sin, when the offense, stain, and debt have ceased, nothing remains except this relation of reason, namely, an ordering to punishment, which, as it is something unfitting to the soul itself, is called its stain, just as the opposite is called beauty; but insofar as it is an obligation formally to that punishment, it is called debt; and insofar as it is an act of the divine will, in which this whole reality consists, by which act it is ordered to such punishment, it is called offense. For in God to be offended or angry is nothing other than to will to avenge with this punishment; and although God is said figuratively to be angry or offended, yet, taking this account of being angry to mean willing to avenge, with the passion accompanying this willing excluded, God is formally angry or offended, because he formally wills to avenge a sin committed against his law.” Hence, he adds in n. 8 that what was said to remain in the sinner after the act can be erased, and sometimes is erased, in accord with that of the Creed, the remission of sins. And in n. 9: “I say that it is not remitted without punishment, or an equivalent in divine acceptance, because by every sin God is offended, as Scripture sufficiently proclaims; but his offense or anger, as was said, is his willing to avenge, or to exact something sufficient to appease him. Therefore, given any sin whatsoever, God wills to avenge himself upon the sinner; but to will to avenge is to will to punish. Therefore, after a sin has been committed, some punishment or equivalent in divine acceptance is required for its removal. So says the Doctor.” By these words he signifies that habitual sin, too, is included under the object of the virtue of Penance.

These points being established, three things remain to be determined: first, what is the proximate object toward which Penance tends; second, what is its remote material object; third, what is its formal object.

First conclusion. — THE PROXIMATE OBJECT OF THE VIRTUE OF PENANCE IS ANY ACT OF THE PENITENT, WHETHER INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL, THAT IS ELICITED AND TAKEN UP TO AVENGE SIN.

The truth of this assertion is evident from the second Note. For just as the proximate material object of commutative justice is everything taken to constitute equality between what is given and what is received, while the objects of distributive justice are rewards or common goods distributed according to each person’s merit, so, by the same reasoning, the proximate material object of Penance, insofar as it is vindicative justice, will be what is taken up in vengeance for an offense committed. This, however, is nothing other than a punitive internal or external act taken up to avenge; therefore both these acts can be considered the primary object of Penance.

Furthermore, that is the primary material object of the virtue of Penance which it intends first. But Penance primarily intends a punishment to be inflicted in vengeance for a crime; for Penance primarily intends that from which it obtains its formal character and denomination. But it obtains both from the punishment taken up in vengeance: for Penance is named from the enduring of punishment, and its formal character, insofar as it is a special virtue, consists chiefly in the character of vengeance. Therefore, it derives its formal character from that punishment taken up in vengeance.

YOU WILL SAY: Punishment is an effect of penance; therefore it cannot be considered its primary object. — I DENY the consequence: for in the moral virtues the same external acts that are done by a virtue, and are effects of the internal acts of the will elicited by the virtue—I mean those very same acts—are, insofar as they are prior in the order of intention, the object or matter of other virtues, as is clear from the example of distributive and commutative justice. Why, then, could not punishment taken up in vengeance, which is as it were an effect of Penance itself, be considered its primary object?

YOU WILL PRESS: The primary object has the character of an end, at least an immediate one; but end and effect cannot be one and the same. Therefore, since the acts by which punishment is taken up in vengeance for sin have the character of an effect of Penance, they cannot be considered its primary object. — I DENY the minor premise. For it is a familiar teaching among philosophers that end and effect can coincide in the same thing under different respects. Health, for example, can be both an effect and an end of walking; and divine worship—that is, an internal or external act taken as a sign of God’s supreme excellence and of our subjection—is an effect of the virtue of Religion and also its proximate end, which that virtue intends, or the object which it intends proximately. Why, then, could not the same punishment that the penitent inflicts upon himself be both an effect and a proximate end, or the object which Penance intends proximately?

Second conclusion. — THE REMOTE MATERIAL OBJECT OF THE VIRTUE OF PENANCE IS EVERY SIN, BOTH ACTUAL AND HABITUAL, COMMITTED BY THE PENITENT.

It is proved: that is the remote material object of the virtue of Penance which it intends through some means. But Penance is directed toward sin by means of punishment taken up in vengeance; therefore one’s own sin, committed by the penitent, is considered the remote object of Penance. It could nevertheless be called the proximate object insofar as it is reached by the elicited act of Penance itself. For, as our Bosco very aptly observes, disp. 6, sect. 1, conc. 7, Penance, by the force of the same affection and effect that proceeds proximately from it, in the same movement by which it is concerned with some act, also reaches the sin. For the virtue of penance does not consist in that bare operation, that is, in the will to avenge, signified by the expression I will avenge, but through it passes to the sin itself, so that this will, I will avenge the sin, in fact applies the punishment owed for the sin. — I said that every sin, both actual and habitual, is the object of the virtue of Penance. For although sometimes a vicious habit remains even in the justified, nevertheless, as Lugo teaches, disp. 3, n. 15, this habit, as it persists, can be matter for Penance with respect to an act of retractation: for I can will that the sin had not been, so that God might not have been offended, just as after a wound or disease has been cured I can grieve over the cause that brought on the disease or wound. Moreover, I can will to avenge that sin and to make satisfaction for it, if its remission is doubtful or conditional, on the supposition that it has not been remitted. This is much truer, indeed, of habitual sin once remitted. For, as the Doctor teaches admirably, In IV Sent., d. 14, q. 1: “What remains in the sinner after the act can be erased, and sometimes is erased, in accord with that of the Creed: I believe in the remission of sins. God remits sins and sometimes remits them; this is proved as follows: sometimes a predestined person falls into mortal sin. This is clear in the cases of David, Peter, and Paul, and almost countless others. But he cannot be beatified, which is what he is principally ordained to by predestination, unless the sin is erased, taking ‘sin’ in the manner just described. For no one is beatified while remaining bound to pay a punishment, either to be paid simultaneously with glory—which is impossible, since, at the very least according to the divine disposition, that glory and any punishment whatsoever are incompatible—or to be paid after glorification, which is likewise impossible, since God ordains that glory to be final in everyone, so that no punishment will follow. Therefore, before glorification, this obligation to undergo punishment at some time must be remitted or erased. Second, I say that it is not remitted without punishment, or an equivalent in divine acceptance, because by every sin God is offended, as Scripture sufficiently proclaims; but his offense or anger, as was said, is his willing to avenge or to exact something sufficient to appease him. Therefore, given any sin whatsoever, God wills to avenge himself upon the sinner; but to will to avenge is to will to punish. Therefore, after a sin has been committed, some punishment or equivalent in divine acceptance is required for its removal.” Thus the Doctor. By these words he signifies that not only the debt of guilt remaining after a sinful action, but also a vicious habit, is subject to vengeance, or can be ordered to punishment, and consequently is the material object of the virtue of Penance.

YOU WILL SAY: A special virtue must have a special object; but Penance is a special virtue; therefore it must have a determinate object. Yet every sin is not the determinate object of some one virtue, but of all of them, since all the virtues, taken generally, contend against all sins, for each has some determinate vice to which it is opposed. — I DISTINGUISH the consequent: it must have a determinate formal object, I grant; a material one, I deny. Although Penance tends toward all sins, which are separately and distributively opposed by the other virtues, nevertheless penance tends toward sins in some special respect in which the other virtues do not reach them, namely, under the aspect of being subject to vengeance and punishment, as will appear from the following Conclusion.

Third conclusion. — THE FORMAL AND SPECIFYING OBJECT OF THE VIRTUE OF PENANCE IS SIN AS SUBJECT TO VENGEANCE. This is the Doctor’s teaching, In IV Sent., d. 14, q. 2, n. 1, where he says: “To repent is a special act” of virtue. It is proved, because that act is naturally apt to have a special object and special ordered circumstances: an object, namely, sin subject to vengeance; and circumstances that befit the act as rightly tending toward such an object, namely, its end, manner, and the like. And further on, in n. 9, he shows that Penance is less perfect than an act of charity, “because, he says, the object of charity in itself is God” under the noblest objective aspect; but the proper object of this virtue is evil subject to vengeance, or the guilty person upon whom vengeance is to be taken.

The Conclusion is proved as follows: the sin toward which Penance tends must be reached under a special aspect under which it is not reached by the other virtues; but that aspect is none other than liability to vengeance, or the obligation to punish sin; therefore, and so forth. The major premise is established. The minor premise is proved: if there were some aspect under which Penance tended toward sin, it would most likely be its malice insofar as it is to be detested and abhorred. But this aspect is not peculiar to Penance, since all the virtues, at least those tending toward God, also tend toward detestation of sin. For charity abhors sin insofar as it is an evil opposed to God’s infinite goodness, which charity considers; for every sin is an evil against God, at least extrinsically, because it displeases God and is opposed to his glory. But since it belongs to the same virtue to detest the evil opposed to the object whose pursuit belongs to that virtue, charity for this reason detests every sin. Likewise, since every sin deprives us of supernatural beatitude and subjects us to eternal punishments inflicted by God as avenger, detestation of sin from such a motive pertains not to Penance but to hope. Sin can also be considered insofar as it militates against God’s honor, reverence, and worship; and in this respect its detestation pertains to the virtue of Religion. The same must be said of the other virtues that tend toward God. Consequently, the reason for detestation cannot be proper to the virtue of Penance alone; and therefore sin as detestable is not the formal and specifying object of that virtue.

Furthermore: sin as subject to vengeance must be reached by some virtue; but it cannot be reached by any virtue other than Penance; therefore, as such, it is the specifying object of Penance. The major premise is established: for, as St. Augustine says, Confessions, bk. 1, “You have ordained, Lord, and so it is, that every sinner be a punishment to himself.” And with good reason. For, as the Doctor said above, since by every sin God is offended and is therefore moved toward the sinner by an impulse of vengeance, and since willing to avenge is the same as willing to punish, it follows that a sinful person cannot be reconciled to God or appease him without first avenging and punishing sin in himself. The minor premise is also established: for no virtue tends toward sin insofar as it is to be punished in order to make satisfaction to God, except Penance alone; therefore, and so forth.

YOU WILL SAY: The divine right, injured by the offense and to be repaired by satisfaction and a certain compensation, is the formal object of Penance; therefore, that object is not sin as subject to vengeance and punishment. — I answer, denying the antecedent: divine right considered in this way can indeed be called the end of Penance, but not its object. For Penance tends toward vengeance for sin so that, insofar as lies within the sinner, with God’s help, he may make satisfaction to God and repair the injury inflicted upon him. Thus the restoration of that divine right and the reparation of the offense are the end moving the penitent to avenge sin. Hence that divine right, insofar as it is to be compensated, has rather the character of an end than of an object with respect to the virtue of Penance.

NOTE 1. Habit in general is divided into the intellectual and the appetitive. An intellectual habit is one received subjectively in the intellect; and it is twofold: one is acquired through one’s own repeated acts; the other is infused by God, through God’s special generosity. The infused is again twofold: either as to substance, namely, one that cannot be acquired at all by any human effort, but comes from God’s sole generosity, such as the theological virtues; or as to mode, namely, one that could be acquired through one’s own effort and generated by repeated acts, but not with such ease or in so short a time; such are habits of knowledge, or of the moral virtues, sometimes granted by God to human beings. The acquired is likewise twofold, namely, speculative and practical. Speculative is that which inclines one to the bare contemplation of an object and undertakes nothing concerning it that pertains to regulating the will. This too is twofold: either real, such as metaphysics, mathematics, and physics; or rational, such as grammar, rhetoric, and logic. Practical is that which concerns things to be done, such as prudence, or things to be made, such as both mechanical and liberal arts. An appetitive habit is one that resides subjectively in the appetitive faculty. It too is twofold: acquired and infused¹. The acquired is again twofold: directed to oneself, such as fortitude and temperance, or directed to another, such as justice. The infused is likewise twofold: directed to oneself, such as hope, and directed to another, such as charity. The question, then, is to which order of habits Penance of this kind should be assigned.

NOTE 2. In general, any virtue habit has a twofold subject, namely, immediate and mediate. The first is the faculty in which that habit immediately resides and which it makes ready and prepared to elicit its acts. Some distinguish three such subjects: intellect, will, and sensitive appetite. For prudence is located in the intellect, justice in the will, and temperance and fortitude, according to St. Thomas, in the sensitive appetite. But the Subtle Doctor objects, arguing that it is received also in the will. The second consists of the persons, or supposits, in which those virtues reside. The question, therefore, is what the immediate and mediate subject of the virtue of Penance is, that is, in which faculty and in which persons it resides.

NOTE 3. An appetitive virtue is a habit that inclines the will to will and avoid something. In general, two kinds are assigned according to the twofold ordering intended by that habit. For one orders its subject toward itself, namely, to will rightly those things that concern the subject in which it resides, such as temperance and fortitude; for these virtues order a person concerning things that are fitting for that person. Another orders one toward another, namely, to render and hand over to that other what is his own, such as justice, which inclines its possessor to will for another what is his own. Hence some virtues make a person upright in himself, without any ordering toward another, such as temperance, whose effect is the moderation of the passions of the concupiscible appetite in relation to oneself; while others make a person upright in relation to another, such as justice, whose office is to govern a person so that he render to another what is his own.

These points having been observed, two matters remain to be determined: what the immediate as well as the mediate subject of the virtue of Penance is.

First conclusion. — THE VIRTUE OF PENANCE RESIDES IMMEDIATELY IN THE WILL, INSOFAR AS IT IS ORDERED TOWARD ANOTHER. So says the Doctor, d. 14, q. 2, n. 5, where he says: To repent is not an act of any intellectual virtue, because it is an act of appetite as appetite, which commands the intellect to consider and the will to detest… Moreover, this commanding belongs only to appetite, or to the will; for no sensitive power can command the intellect and the will and unite them in their acts; nor can the intellect command itself and the will: only the will commands itself and the intellect. That is, Penance is willing to avenge sin. But this willing belongs to the will alone, because commanding the intellect to consider and the will to detest the gravity of the offense belongs to the will alone. It does not belong to a sensitive power, since no sensitive faculty can command the intellect or the will; for sensitive appetite is subject to the rational appetite, in accordance with Genesis: Your desire shall be subject to you, and you shall rule over it. Nor does it belong to the intellect, because the intellect cannot command itself or the will. Therefore, that command, or willing to avenge sin, pertains to the will alone.

The Doctor confirms this, because the will alone can command itself, and also the intellect, as St. Augustine teaches in bk. XI of De Trinitate, ch. 3, where he writes that the will joins the parent to its offspring: that is, it joins the intellect, according to the intelligible species, with actual cognition, which is its offspring. Hence the parent of cognition is fecund memory, namely, the intellect made fruitful by an object or intelligible species; the offspring, however, is the act of understanding, or understanding itself. Thus the will joins the parent to its offspring when it commands the intellect to produce an act of understanding together with the object. Likewise, the will commands itself, since nothing is more within the will’s power than the will itself, that is, its act. Therefore, since commanding pertains to the will, it follows that imperative willing, or the will to avenge sin, which is the very act of the virtue of Penance, pertains to the will and not to the intellect.

Second, the Doctor proves in the same place that an intellectual virtue is ordered to cognition of the true insofar as it is true. For an intellectual virtue judges that something is true or is not true, whether in speculative or practical matters, and dictates that this is to be considered or not considered, done or not done. But Penance, or willing to avenge sin, is not an act by which something is thus dictated as to be done or avoided, considered or not considered; rather, it commands that sin be punished. Therefore, willing to avenge is not an act of the intellect or of the sensitive appetite, but of the will; and consequently the virtue of Penance resides in the will alone.

The Doctor proves the second part in the same place, namely, that willing to avenge a sin one has committed is an act of an appetitive virtue ordered toward another, of the kind that justice is, “because,” he says, “someone can exercise this act of avenging in another in the same way according to right reason as in himself. For even if he exercises it in himself, he exercises it in himself only as in another, because he avenges in himself only insofar as the Lawgiver entrusts him with avenging this accused person. It is accidental that the person entrusted to act as the judge’s minister is this accused person, since in the same way he acts according to the right reason of a minister toward the accused if that person were entirely distinct in person. Therefore this virtue, whose nature this act is², is contained under justice, insofar as justice is said generally of every virtue ordering toward another, or as it were toward another. Nor is it an obstacle that in this act he is ordered toward himself, because he is ordered toward himself only as toward another: that is, as the Judge’s minister toward the accused against the law, in which the Judge has entrusted authority to him.” So says the Doctor. By these words he signifies that when a penitent avenges a sin he has committed, he acts toward himself as though he were a distinct person: for when he prescribes and inflicts a penalty upon himself, he represents³ the person of the Judge; but when he suffers that penalty, he represents the accused, to whom the Judge prescribes a penalty to be paid.

YOU WILL SAY 1: Penance is a judgment by which the intellect dictates that a penalty must be undergone for sin, so that insofar as the sinner glorified himself in delights, he ought to undergo just so much torment and grief. But this judgment is an act of the intellect, not of the will. Therefore Penance resides in the intellect rather than in the will. — I distinguish the major premise: it is such⁴ a judgment presuppositively, I grant; formally and entitatively, I deny. Indeed, I admit that to exercise true Penance it is required beforehand that the intellect know the malice and gravity of sin, insofar as it dictates a penalty to be paid in proportion; for Deuteronomy 25 says: According to the measure of the sin shall the measure of the blows be. But the formal character of Penance does not consist in this dictation. Beyond it, the will must command vengeance for sin through sorrow of spirit, contrition of heart, and mortification of the body; and this command is precisely where the formal character of Penance chiefly consists.

YOU WILL SAY 2: Penance is ordered to wash away every sin. But it cannot wash away and expel sin unless it is in the subject in which sin resides; for it cannot expel sin except insofar as it is contrary to it. A virtue habit and a vice, like other contraries, are not considered opposed and incompatible except with respect to the same subject in which they can inhere. Therefore, for Penance to expel sin, it must be in the same subject in which sin resides. But sin is in every faculty, since one sins through the operation of any faculty. Therefore Penance must reside in every faculty. — I distinguish the major premise: it must wash away and expel sin formally, I deny; effectively, I grant. I likewise distinguish the minor premise: it cannot wash away sin formally unless it is in the subject in which sin resides, I grant; it cannot wash it away effectively and imperatively, I deny. Hence the inference must be denied. For since the formal character of Penance consists in willing to avenge sin, and this willing, by reason of the will’s dominion over the other faculties of soul and body, extends to them all and directs its command toward them, it is therefore not necessary that it exist formally in those faculties. It is enough that it reside in the will, which is the ruler and regulator of the other faculties. Add that sin does not exist formally in any faculty other than the will; for every sin is sin precisely insofar as it is free.

Second conclusion. — PENANCE COULD EXIST IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE, AND IN ANGELS AND THE BLESSED, AT LEAST ACCORDING TO SOME ASPECT OF ITS RATIONALE; BUT PROPERLY AND FORMALLY IT EXISTS IN SINNING PENITENTS AFTER THE FALL. This is the Doctor’s position with respect to all its parts.

He explains the first part in d. 11, q. 2, n. 19, where, speaking of the angels and our first parents in the state of innocence, after saying, “To the third argument one may reply in two ways. First, since virtue is a supplement in us for natural defect (whence some do not posit moral virtues in angels), and since they would not then have been in a nature such as ours now, they would not then have needed all the virtues that we need now. This is especially so of virtues that have not the good as their object but evil, such as Penance; for in that state there would not have been that evil, just as perhaps there would not then have been Patience, since there would have been no matter for patience,” he adds another view: “Alternatively, one may say that Penance is a habit inclining one readily to avenge the accused in oneself, and that ‘in oneself’ is material, since the formal rationale of the virtue would be the same if one were entrusted to avenge another accused person. But the blessed and the innocent can have a habit of readily avenging another accused person; therefore they can have it with respect to themselves as well, if guilt were present. And so it may be granted that this virtue remains in the state of innocence and in beatitude.” Here, as is plainly evident, the Doctor presents both views as probable. Likewise, in d. 3, q. 1, he discusses problematically whether true moral virtues are found in angels. “To the first,” he says, n. 16, “one may grant that if an angel were created in pure natural powers, not having moral virtues in the will, they could be generated in him from many right choices—not with respect to passions inhering in the sensitive appetite, nor even those that were, are, or could be present, but only with respect to such passions shown universally by the intellect. Once this presentation is posited, and the intellect has dictated what would be chosen if it were possible for them to have those passions, his will, consonant with such a dictate, could acquire a right moral habit from many choices.” So says the Doctor, clearly indicating that Penance, like the other moral virtues, can concern an object not only that exists, existed, will exist, or can exist, but also an object proper to those virtues considered universally. Hence Penance, insofar as it inclines the will to avenge sin universally, abstracting from whether it was committed by one’s own person or another’s, could have existed not only in angels but also in Adam in the state of innocence. I add that Penance could truly and properly have been found in the state of innocence. For since Adam could sin venially in that state, as the Doctor teaches in In II Sent., d. 21, q. 1, n. 73, it is clear that Adam could repent of that venial sin and take vengeance for it, as the Doctor indicates plainly enough in the same place. In replying to the second opposing argument, which concerned excluding punishment from that happy state and consequently excluding every venial sin as well, he says: A punishment other than death may correspond to a venial sin, for example, some displeasure or something of that kind. Or one may say that no punishment properly corresponds to it, but one who commits a venial sin is indebted to a more fervent act of the will than before, whose fervor would consume the venial sin. Nor would it have been incompatible with Adam’s innocence to have the punishment due for a venial sin in addition to death.

YOU WILL SAY: Sacred Scripture, the Holy Fathers, and the Councils, whenever they speak of Penance, always understand by it vengeance for one’s own sin, or detestation and sorrow for sin committed together with a purpose of not sinning again. Therefore the virtue of Penance cannot exist in those in whom there is no sin; and consequently it could not have existed in angels or in Adam in the state of innocence. — I answer: that is indeed true, because they speak of Penance insofar as it is in fact a necessary disposition for the remission of sins, and not as some moral virtue inclining the will to bring about equality between punishment and guilt, in the sense in which the Doctor uses it in his second reply. In this sense Penance could also have existed in the will of the Blessed Virgin, indeed of Christ our Lord, concerning sin shown universally by the intellect. Once this presentation is posited together with the intellect’s dictate concerning what would be chosen, on the hypothesis that that sin were possible, a will also consonant with such a dictate could have repeatedly chosen vengeance for sin. From these many choices it could acquire a right moral habit of the virtue of Penance, by which the will would be inclined to bring about equality between punishment and guilt, on the supposition that the guilt itself were admitted. Hence, although the will of Christ and of the Blessed Virgin was impeccable, and consequently they could not have an absolute act of avenging sin in themselves, they could nevertheless have had a conditional act, saying: If I had sinned, I would avenge sin in myself. Since those acts, insofar as they are elicited absolutely by us, are true and perfect acts of Penance, and a perfect habit of Penance is generated in us from such acts, by similar reasoning a perfect habit could have been generated in Christ and in the Blessed Virgin from that conditional willing, since no reason for a difference is apparent.

I nevertheless admit that Penance, insofar as it signifies sorrow of spirit and detestation of sin committed, together with a purpose of not sinning again, as the Council of Trent describes it, sess. XIV, ch. 4, dividing it into contrition made perfect by charity and imperfect contrition, which is called attrition, can exist only in the will of a sinful human being. For only such a person can perform the precise act of this Penance, namely, willing to avenge a sin he has committed, with sorrow and laborious satisfaction, as well as a purpose of not sinning again. Consequently, the subject of attribution, or mediate subject, of the virtue of Penance, insofar as theologians commonly use the term, is only a sinful human being in the state of this life.

TERTULLIAN, book De Poenitentia, chapter 1, commends the necessity and supreme usefulness of penance on the basis of the divine command: “I consider it audacious,” he says, “to debate the goodness of a divine command. We ought not to obey it because it is good, but because God commanded it: in rendering obedience, the majesty of divine power and the authority of the commander take precedence over the servant's usefulness. Is it good to repent or not? Why hesitate? God commanded it; indeed, he not only commanded it but also exhorts us. He invites us to salvation with a reward, and even swears an oath in Ezekiel 33, saying, ‘As I live,’ wishing to be believed. O how blessed we are, for whose sake God swears! O wretched are we if we do not believe the Lord even when he swears! What God so strongly commends, and even attests in human fashion by an oath, we must certainly undertake and observe with the utmost seriousness, so that, remaining steadfast in our profession of divine grace, we may likewise persevere in its fruit and benefit.” By these words he infers the necessity of penance from the divine command alone. Since there are customarily two kinds of necessity among things that serve salvation—one called necessity of the means, the other called necessity of precept—the principal question to be addressed in this Section is therefore whether penance is necessary for the sinner's salvation in both these ways.

NOTE 1. As was said just above, for present purposes there is a twofold necessity with respect to salvation: namely, that of the end or means, and that of a precept, or divine command. That is called necessary by necessity of the end or means which is simply necessary for attaining eternal life, even if no obligation of a precept exists; conversely, that is called necessary by necessity of a precept which is ordered to salvation solely by divine precept. Hence, if someone is excused from the obligation of a precept, either through lack of mental capacity or bodily infirmity, he can attain eternal life without that means. Thus infants and the mentally incapable, because they do not possess the use of reason, can be saved without observing the precepts of God and the Church; likewise the infirm can be saved even if they do not satisfy the precept of fasting, from which they are excused on account of infirmity.

NOTE 2. Those things that are necessary by necessity of the end fall into two classes. Some have intrinsic necessity from an intrinsic connection found between the means themselves and the ultimate end, namely eternal life; in this way grace, or charity, is necessary by necessity of the end. Others are necessary solely by the institution of God, who so establishes and orders some means as necessary for salvation for a particular period, though otherwise it was not necessary in this way. Thus baptism is necessary for salvation under the Gospel Law, although before then it did not impose such necessity under the natural Law or the written, that is, Mosaic Law. Moreover, there is this difference between these two kinds of means: the means of the first kind are necessary for eternal salvation in every state and in every way, whereas those of the second kind are not, but only for the state for which they were instituted. The question, then, is whether the virtue of penance was necessary for salvation by intrinsic necessity and in every state, or only by divine ordinance and for a particular state.

NOTE 3. Among those things necessary by necessity of the end through God's institution, some are simply necessary, so that eternal life cannot be obtained without such means either in itself or accidentally. Thus baptism actually received is necessary for infants. Others are indeed necessary in themselves for eternal life, but accidentally, in some particular case, either because of invincible ignorance or because there is no opportunity to apply such means, they become unnecessary: salvation can therefore be attained without using those means. For this reason baptism actually received is not said to be necessary for some adults who lack the opportunity to procure it for themselves. The question, then, is whether the virtue of penance, whether taken generally for detestation of and sorrow for sins or specifically as a distinct special virtue, is necessary in itself for salvation and the remission of sin.

First conclusion. — PENANCE, INSOFAR AS IT IS A SPECIAL VIRTUE DISTINCT FROM THE OTHERS AND MEANS ONLY A WILL TO VINDICATE SIN, IS NOT ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY FOR THE REMISSION OF SIN. This is the Doctor's teaching, d. 11, q. 2, n. 23, where he says: Concerning the second principal point, namely whether repenting, as an act of virtue, is required for the deletion of sin, I say that it is not required as an act of one determinate virtue. This indeed is so.

He proves it: Because, he says, repenting in any of the four senses (that is, vindicating a sin committed, detesting that same sin, accepting an imposed punishment, and patiently bearing it) suffices, as is proved by the testimony of Ezekiel 18 and 33: “At whatever hour the sinner shall groan,” etc. But the first act and the others are not necessarily acts of the same determinate virtue: the first belongs to justice, the last to patience, and the two between them to any appetitive virtue. By these words he signifies that the virtue of penance, insofar as it is distinct from the others, is not absolutely necessary for remission of sin, and consequently is not absolutely necessary for salvation, since sin can be remitted not only through an act of love of God, as we shall say below, but also through penance taken generally, insofar as it means detestation of and sorrow for a sin committed. That, indeed, can proceed from a virtue other than penance, as we said in the preceding Section. — This truth is confirmed by the divine testimonies which, whenever they speak of the necessity of penance, express penance as turning away from sins and detesting them, as can be seen in the Council of Trent, sess. XIV, ch. 20¹, where it gathers various testimonies of Scripture to establish the necessity of penance. But in ch. 4 it indicates what sort of penance it declares so necessary: “At every time,” it says, “this movement of contrition was necessary for obtaining pardon for sins.” There it explains what it understands by that contrition, saying at the beginning of the chapter: “Contrition of heart is sorrow for and detestation of a sin committed, with the purpose of not sinning thereafter.” Thus it defines contrition as follows: “It is sorrow of heart and detestation of a sin committed, with the purpose of not sinning thereafter.” Moreover, this sorrow and detestation can be elicited by different virtues, such as charity, hope, religion, and so on. Therefore, when penance is said to be absolutely necessary for remission of sin, whether in Scripture, in Councils, or by the holy Fathers, this should not be understood in itself of penance insofar as it is a special virtue distinct from the others.

Second conclusion. — PENANCE TAKEN GENERALLY, AND INSOFAR AS IT IS SORROW OF HEART AND DETESTATION OF A SIN COMMITTED, WITH THE PURPOSE OF NOT SINNING THEREAFTER, WAS NECESSARY FOR SINNERS AT ALL TIMES IN ORDER TO OBTAIN PARDON FOR SINS. This is defined as a matter of faith by the Council of Trent, sess. XIV, ch. 1, where it says: “Penance was indeed necessary at every time for all men who had stained themselves with some mortal sin, in order to attain grace, even for those who could have been washed in the sacrament of baptism: so that, casting off and correcting their perversity, they might detest so great an offense against God with hatred of sin and devout sorrow of heart. Hence the Prophet says: ‘Turn, and do penance for all your iniquities, and iniquity will not bring you to ruin.’ The Lord also said: ‘Unless you do penance, you will all likewise perish.’ And Peter, Prince of the Apostles, commending penance to sinners about to be initiated by baptism, said: ‘Do penance, and let each of you be baptized.’”

The Doctor clearly explains this conclusion, d. 14, q. 1, n. 9, where, speaking of the remission of mortal sin, he says: “Second, I say that it is not remitted without a punishment equivalent in divine acceptance. For by every sin God is offended, as Scripture cries out plainly; but His offense, or anger—as was said—is His will to vindicate, or to require something sufficient to appease Him. Therefore, given any sin, God wills to vindicate Himself against the sinner; but to will to vindicate is to will to punish. Therefore, after a sin has been committed, some punishment, or its equivalent in divine acceptance, is required for its deletion. And further on: By ordinary power this is the universally prescribed way by the law of divine ordinance, namely, that sin be punished by a penalty as its proper counterpart. Moreover, n. 10: As a matter of fact, this conclusion holds: that ordinarily a penalty or voluntary punishment is required for the deletion of sin.”

YOU WILL SAY 1: The Lord Christ several times remitted sins without any prior penance; therefore penance is not necessary for the remission of sin according to the ordinary course. The antecedent is proved from Luke 5, where we read that when some men carrying a paralytic lowered him through the roof before Jesus, He said to him, “Man, your sins are forgiven you.” Likewise, in John 8, Christ remitted the sins of the adulterous woman, who had given no signs of penance beforehand. For when He asked her, “Has no one condemned you?” and she answered, “No one, Lord,” He immediately said, “Neither will I condemn you; go, and sin no more.” Therefore penance is not necessary for the remission of sin. — I deny the consequence. As for the antecedent, I say first that the Lord Christ, by His absolute and divine authority in remitting sins, could remit and pardon sins without prior formal penance, but with only virtual penance, which that paralytic certainly had virtually. For faith and hope shone forth greatly in him, since Matthew 9 records that the Lord Himself said to him, “Take heart, son; your sins are forgiven you.” The word “take heart” suggests not only the faith and confidence of those carrying him, but also the paralytic's own hope of pardon through faith; for unless he had believed and trusted, he would never have allowed himself to be lowered through the tiles. And so, since faith and hope in a sinner produce penance, he seems to have had at least virtual penance. To the second point I say that the woman likewise had penance and sorrow for the sin committed, as St. Ambrose indicates in Letter 52, where he says: “The adulterous woman deserved to be absolved: when her Jewish accusers withdrew, she remained alone with Christ; by that very remaining, she seems to have confessed her crime and, through sincere penance, borne witness to it.”

YOU WILL SAY 2: The Lord Christ says in Luke 11, “Give alms, and behold, all things are clean for you.” And in Matthew 6: “If you forgive men their sins, your heavenly Father will likewise forgive you your sins.” Therefore penance is not required for the remission of sin according to the ordinary course. — I deny the consequence: for perfect charity is opposed to sins and destroys them outside the sacrament, whereas imperfect charity does not. But perfect charity either presupposes penance, produces it, or at least includes it virtually. Hence, when the giving of alms and the forgiving of injuries are said to have the power to remit sins, they necessarily presuppose perfect charity and, consequently, at least virtual penance.

YOU WILL SAY 3: What God can do in children He can also do in adults, for His power toward adults is no less than toward infants. But God remits sins in infants without penance; therefore He does so in adults as well. — I distinguish the major: concerning what is common on equal terms to both, I grant it; otherwise, I deny it. The justification of an infant and that of an adult are not on an equal footing. For infants have only original sin, which does not consist in an actual disorder of the will, but only in a certain habitual depravity of nature. Thus their sin is remitted through a merely habitual change, by the infusion of grace and virtues, not through an actual change made by the exercise of some act. The case is otherwise with an adult, who has actual sins; since these consist in an actual disorder of the will, their remission—even through baptism—requires an actual change of will, which occurs only through penance.

Third conclusion. — MORTAL SIN CAN BE REMITTED THROUGH VIRTUAL PENANCE ALONE, THAT IS, THROUGH AN ACT OF EXCEEDING CHARITY IN WHICH SORROW FOR SINS IS INCLUDED VIRTUALLY. This is the more common view, against Soto, In IV Sent., d. 15, q. 1, a. 2, where he teaches that formal penance must be so necessarily presupposed for the remission of sin that no act of charity, however outstanding, suffices for it, except the act of martyrdom; and also against Cano, Relectio de Poenitentia, pt. 3, § On Charity, who does not even except the act of martyrdom. It is proved first by the authority of the Lord Christ, who says in John 14: “Whoever loves me will be loved by my Father, and I will love him,” etc. And in Matthew 10: “Whoever confesses me before men, I also will confess before my Father… He who loses his life” (that is, bodily life) “for my sake will find it.” By these words He plainly signifies that an act of love, and also martyrdom, suffices for salvation and the remission of sins.

The same truth is explained by the Doctor, n. 17, where, speaking of the penance he had said was necessary for remitting sins, he says: “The conclusion is understood also of being required not with absolute necessity, the opposite of which involves a contradiction, since God could remit without any act at all on the part of the one to whom He remits; but it is not understood of being required with necessity on the supposition of an act by the person to whom He remits. For God could remit through some fervent movement of love of God, without any of the four aforesaid acts under their proper description, as, for example, in an act of fervor toward undergoing martyrdom at once, where perhaps there would be no thought of some mortal sin previously committed, and consequently none of the aforementioned forms of repenting; and this would be formally so, although virtually there would be repenting in that movement, according to the second meaning. This is proved because no one is excluded from the Kingdom of Heaven who does what is simply necessary. But it is possible for someone who, until an instant A, exists in mortal sin, from instant A onward to be compelled to devote his whole heart to acts that distract him from thinking of the sin committed, as when he is immediately exposed to an extremely severe martyrdom. For this reason the conclusion said that it is required for mortal sin to be deleted ordinarily: for an act is said to occur ordinarily when it occurs according to rules determined by divine Wisdom. One such rule is that a sin committed is not deleted without displeasure at the sin committed. This seems highly reasonable: just as sin turns one away from the end and turns one toward a creature, so it is reasonable that sin be deleted only through an opposing movement that turns one away from sin, or from the creature toward which one turned in sin, and turns one toward God. The other three elements of what it means to punish can be reduced to this displeasure at sin, etc.”

From all this the Doctor teaches three things. First, that penance is necessary for remission of sin according to the ordinary course, because God ordained that remission of sin should not occur according to the common and ordinary disposition of things. — Second, that by His absolute power God could pardon sin without any act of sorrow or detestation on the penitent's part. This can also be further confirmed: both because penance, which precedes the infusion of grace and the remission of sin, has only the character of a fitting disposition by divine ordinance. For if it were required by the nature of the thing, it would follow that grace of baptism could not be conferred on those in immediate danger of death, since they cannot perform acts of penance, which adults are bound to perform before baptism; consequently those acts are required for justification only by divine ordinance. But what is required only by divine ordinance can be removed by extraordinary power. Therefore, independently of those acts, God can confer sanctifying grace and remission of sin on penitents. Also because, as the Council of Trent defines it, justification in fact includes remission of sin and the infusion of grace, or renewal of the inner person; but neither consists in an act of the sinner, as Hiquaeus rightly observes in his commentary on the Doctor's aforesaid words. For remitting sin belongs precisely to God, just as infusing grace freely does. Therefore justification can take place without an act of the sinner. Finally, because if there were some absolutely necessary connection between penitential acts and justification, it would be chiefly in the respect of merit or satisfaction; but neither can be maintained. Not the first, otherwise sinners would merit justification and it would not be given freely, contrary to the Council of Trent, sess. VI, ch. 8. Nor the second: by His absolute power God can require no such satisfaction and can freely release the sinner from it out of clemency. Therefore, and so on. — Third, the Doctor also teaches that justification and the remission of sins sometimes occur through the sole act of love of God above all things, without explicit sorrow or formal penance for sin. This is clear from the example of a man unexpectedly seized for martyrdom who had forgotten some mortal sin and did not recall it, while he underwent martyrdom, burning with the fire of charity. In that case this man would be justified through an act of charity and through martyrdom, without an act of formal penance.

All this is confirmed by those testimonies of Scripture in which the efficacy of remission of sins is attributed to formal love of God, with no mention of penance, sorrow, or detestation of sin. Thus Luke 7: “Many sins are forgiven her, because she loved much”; but “the one to whom less is forgiven loves less.” Proverbs 8: “I love those who love me.” Ecclesiasticus 34: “The eyes of God are upon those who love Him.” 1 John 4: “Everyone who loves is born of God.” And in v. 16: “God is charity, and whoever abides in charity abides in God, and God in him.” John 11: “Whoever loves me will be loved by my Father.” And in v. 23: “If anyone loves me, he will keep my word, and my Father will love him, and we will come to him” (through sanctifying grace) “and make our dwelling with him.” Zechariah 1: “Turn to me, says the Lord of hosts, and I will turn to you, says the Lord of hosts.” Who of sound mind could doubt that through love of God alone, for His own sake and above all things, a person is perfectly turned to God? Therefore, where the Lord is good, let our eye not be evil, begrudging the remission of sins to those to whom God has promised it. Nor is it an objection that in other places Scripture mentions penance as necessary for the remission of sins: Ezekiel 28.² “Turn, and do penance for all your iniquities, and iniquity will not bring you to ruin.” Luke 13: “Unless you do penance, you will all perish together.” Acts 2: “Do penance, and let each of you be baptized.” I say this is no objection because these passages can suitably be understood either of formal and explicit penance or of an act equivalent to it, such as an act of love of God above all things. Otherwise, a person to whom no sin, in general or in particular, occurred as something to detest could not be justified, and consequently could not be saved. I do not deny, however, that an act of love above all things contains an act of penance virtually: both because when occasion arises, that act determines one to penance, since perfect charity cannot coexist with consideration of sin without sorrow for sin insofar as it is an offense against God; and because an act of love of God above all things contains the whole motive of this sorrow. For to love God above all things is to love Him above every sin; moreover, it is to prefer Him to all things not only for the future and present, but also for the past, and therefore implicitly to will not to have sinned. But this is to hate having sinned and to grieve that one did it. Therefore such an act of love of God suffices for justification.

YOU WILL SAY: Penance is no less necessary for a sinner's salvation than faith is for an unbeliever; but faith is necessary as a means, so that without faith it is impossible to please God. Therefore without formal penance it is impossible for a sinner to be justified. — I deny the major. For although penance is necessary for a sinner as a means to justification according to the ordinary course, just as faith is for an unbeliever, there is this difference between faith and penance: faith cannot be supplied by some other act in which it is virtually contained, whereas penance can be supplied by an act of love of God in which it is virtually contained.

YOU WILL INSIST: An act of love suffices for justification without formal penance either because by its nature it is opposed to sin as a form, or because by the divine will it is accepted as a merit of congruity. But neither can be maintained. Not the first, otherwise it would justify formally and not merely dispositively. Nor the second, for it would follow that it contributes to justification and is required for it according to God's ordinary disposition, which is certainly untrue. — I answer: An act of love is considered a sufficient disposition by divine will, just as penance is, whose efficacy is drawn from the root of charity when charity is perfect. But this love of God above all things is never accompanied by consideration and memory of sin without also having penance attached to it in a wayfarer guilty of some crime; for no one loves God above all things without grieving vehemently that he has offended Him. In that case both acts concur in justification.

Fourth conclusion. — PENANCE, INSOFAR AS IT IS SORROW OF HEART AND DETESTATION OF SINS, IS NECESSARY FOR THE REMISSION OF SINS, SO THAT ABANDONING THE OLD LIFE AND BEGINNING A NEW ONE DO NOT SUFFICE. This is against Luther, as appears from his articles condemned by the sacred Faculty of Paris, one of which was: “Contrition, which is prepared by examining, gathering, and detesting sins, as a person recalls his years in bitterness of soul, weighing the gravity, number, and enormity of his sins, the loss of eternal beatitude, and the attainment of eternal damnation—this contrition, I say, makes a person a hypocrite, indeed a greater sinner.” The sacred Faculty rightly condemns this proposition as follows: “This proposition is false, obstructs the way to penance, and is at variance with the sacred Scriptures and the teaching of the Saints.”

And rightly so. Sacred Scripture bears witness in its oracles that penance is necessary to appease divine indignation and attain remission of sin. Thus Ezekiel 18: “But if the wicked man does penance for all his sins that he has committed, and keeps all my precepts, and does judgment and justice, he shall live and not die. I will remember none of all his iniquities that he has committed.” By these words God promises remission of sin to a penitent who does judgment and justice. For a penitent sinner to do judgment and justice means nothing other than to vindicate sin and make satisfaction to God through due satisfaction, turning back from creatures and turning toward God. This turning back and conversion must take place especially through laborious and penitential works, according to that oracle in which God admonishes through Joel: “Turn to me with all your heart, in fasting, weeping, and mourning; rend your hearts,” etc. But this contrition of heart and mourning concern not merely the beginning of a new life, but especially the purging of sins, according to Revelation 2, where John is commanded to write to the bishop of Ephesus in God's name: “I have this against you: you have abandoned your first charity. Remember, therefore, from where you have fallen, and do penance and perform your first works; otherwise I am coming to you, and I will move your lampstand from its place, unless you do penance.” By these words, not only renewal of life but also remembrance and mourning for the past are prescribed as salutary penance. — Hence David, in Psalm 50, not only pleads for the present and future: “Create a clean heart in me, O God, and renew a right spirit within me,” but cries out concerning the past: “Have mercy on me, O God, according to your great mercy… For I know my iniquity, and my sin is always before me.” Thus Christ in Luke 13 requires from a sinner not only the institution of a new life but also the vindication and correction of the former life, when He says: “Unless you do penance, you will all perish together.” The word penance signifies holding a penalty. But one does not bear a penalty for instituting a new life, which is good, but for the wickedness of the past; for a penalty arises only from an evil that is repudiated.

Therefore the Council of Trent rightly says, speaking of contrition in sess. XIV, ch. 1: “The holy Synod declares that this contrition contains not only cessation from sin, a purpose of new life, and its beginning, but also hatred of the old life, according to the words: ‘Cast away from yourselves all your iniquities in which you have transgressed, and make for yourselves a new heart and a new spirit.’” Hence, in canon 5, condemning the Lutheran doctrine, it says: “If anyone says that contrition, which is prepared by examining, gathering, and detesting sins, by which a person recalls his years in bitterness of soul, weighing the gravity, number, and enormity of his sins, the loss of eternal beatitude, and the incurring of eternal damnation, together with a purpose of better life, is not true and beneficial sorrow, nor does it prepare for grace, but makes a person a hypocrite and a greater sinner; or, finally, that it is forced sorrow, not free and voluntary, let him be anathema.”

The holy Fathers teach the same truth, especially St. Cyprian in his little book De lapsis. He indeed promises pardon for their error to the faithful who had fallen into idolatry, provided they implore it through laborious penance: “Do you think,” he says, “that you can quickly appease the Lord, whom you denied with treacherous words?” etc. “Do you think He will easily show mercy to you, when you said that you did not belong to Him? You must pray to Him more earnestly and entreat Him, spend the day in grief, pass the nights in vigils and tears, occupy all your time with tearful laments, lie prostrate on the ground, cling to sackcloth, roll in sackcloth and ashes; having lost Christ's garment, desire no garment hereafter; having tasted the devil's food, prefer fasting; devote yourself to good works, by which sins are purged; persist frequently in almsgiving, by which souls are freed from death.” And a little later: “If anyone prays with his whole heart, if he groans with true lamentations and tears of penance, if by just and continual works he moves the Lord toward pardon for his offense, He can show mercy to such people, etc.; He can grant indulgence, He can turn aside the sentence.” — St. Ambrose adds in bk. I of De Poenitentia, ch. 4: “He awaits our groans, but temporary ones, so that He may remit eternal ones; He awaits our tears, so that He may pour out His mercy.” And in bk. II, ch. 5: “Whoever does penance must not only wash away his sin with tears, but also cover and veil earlier offenses by making amends, so that the sin may not be charged against him. Therefore let us cover our falls with later deeds and cleanse them with tears, so that the Lord our God may hear us groaning,” etc. — St. Augustine teaches this especially in various places, above all in Serm. 34, De diversis, ch. 12: “There are certain grave and deadly sins which are not remitted unless through the most vehement distress of humbled heart, contrite spirit, and the tribulation of penance.” Hence, in Serm. 1, De Communibus, he defines penance as follows: “Penance is a remedy for a wound, hope of salvation, by which God is moved to mercy. Penance takes its name from punishment, because the soul is tormented and the flesh is mortified.” Thus in Serm. 7, De Tempore, he says strikingly: “Many constantly call themselves sinners, and yet they still take pleasure in sinning. It is a profession, not a correction. The soul is accused, but not healed.”

“The offense is declared, but not removed. Nothing makes penance sure except hatred of sin and love of God. When what was sweet in life before becomes bitter to you in your soul, and what once delighted you in the body now torments you in your heart, then you groan well before God and say: ‘Against you alone have I sinned³, and done evil before you.’ I have indeed sinned against you alone, because no human being is without sin. And therefore I have sinned against you alone, because you alone are without sin. Show mercy to the wretched man, you who have spared the criminal for so long. Let the humility of the penitent incline Him to a remedy, when the long duration of the sinner's offense could not move Him. Say to Him in the weeping of your heart: ‘Look upon the unhappy one, boundless mercy; regard the cruel one, universal compassion. In despair I come to the Almighty; wounded, I run to the physician. Preserve the mercy of gentleness, you who have so long suspended the sword of vengeance. Remove the multitude of crimes by the multitude of mercies.’”

The other holy Fathers teach the same: true and sincere penance requires not only instituting a new life, but also expiating the former one. Tertullian supplies an excellent reason for this in ch. 9 of bk. De Poenitentia: our penance must take the place of divine Justice; for that reason it must punish the sinner and amend earlier offenses through sorrow and tears. “All these things,” he says, “Exomologesis does, both to commend penance, to honor the Lord through fear of danger, and, by pronouncing sentence against the sinner, to act in place of God's indignation; by temporary affliction, I will not say to frustrate eternal punishments, but to cancel them. And in ch. 11: ‘I have sinned,’ I said to God, ‘and am in danger of perishing eternally.’ Therefore now I hang in suspense, mourn, and am tormented, so that they may reconcile to me the God whom I injured by sinning. And at the beginning of ch. 12: ‘If you hesitate about Exomologesis, consider hell in your heart, which Exomologesis will extinguish for you; first imagine the magnitude of the punishment, so that you may not doubt attaining remedies.’ A little later he compares Exomologesis in its effect and efficacy to baptism. ‘Therefore,’ he says, ‘since you know that, after those first lessons of the Lord's instruction, there are still second aids in Exomologesis against hell, why do you abandon your salvation? Why do you cease to undertake what you know can heal you?’” He takes Exomologesis as the external act and all the labors by which the Church purges a sinner, as he himself had defined it shortly before in ch. 9, before the first words quoted, to which all this pertains, etc.

St. Ambrose teaches the same in Ad virginem lapsam, ch. 8, where, after describing the afflictions and labors the penitent must undergo, he adds: “Therefore, if a sinner has not spared himself, God spares him; and if he has made compensation in this short span of life for the future punishments of hell, he frees himself from eternal judgment.” St. Prosper agrees, in bk. II of De vita contemplativa, ch. 7, concerning laypeople who voluntarily confess their crimes and willingly undertake penance for them: “If they themselves become judges and, as avengers of their own iniquity, willingly inflict on themselves here the punishment of the severest correction, they will exchange eternal torments for temporal punishments and, with tears flowing from true compunction of heart, will restrain the fires of eternal flame.” Therefore we must conclude with St. Peter Damian, ch. 2 of the book he entitled Gomorrhianus: “Whoever has defiled himself with the contagion of that shameful depravity in any of the ways we distinguished above, unless he is cleansed by the satisfaction of fruitful penance, will never be able to have God's grace, will never be worthy of the Body and Blood of Christ, and will never enter the threshold of the heavenly homeland.”

LUTHER OBJECTS various oracles of Scripture in which God requires nothing else of the sinner than ceasing from sins, observing the commandments, and beginning a new life. Thus Isaiah 55: “Seek the Lord while He can be found; call upon Him while He is near. Let the wicked man abandon his way and the unrighteous man his thoughts, and let him return to the Lord, and He will have mercy on him, and to our God, for He is rich in forgiving.” Likewise, in Matthew 19, Christ answers a man who asks what he must do for salvation: “If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments.” But there is no commandment in the entire Decalogue that orders us to remember or detest our former life. Therefore, for remission of sin it is enough for a person to begin a new life and walk in the way of God's commandments. Likewise, in Galatians 5 and 6: in Christ Jesus neither circumcision nor uncircumcision has any force, but a new creation. Therefore detestation of one's former life is not necessary for obtaining pardon of sins; renewal of the present and future life suffices. — I deny the consequence. As for the first oracle, I say that the wicked man must abandon his ways, not merely by ceasing from sins in a negative sense, but positively, through a purpose to avoid sin thereafter. This purpose pertains to contrition and detestation of one's former life: for a person is properly said to cease from or abandon sins when they displease him, and he grieves that he committed what he earnestly desires to abandon. As for the second, I deny the minor, for, as will appear in the following Question, the precept to do penance is included at least virtually in the precept to love God. For no one can love God perfectly without willing to restore the honor taken from Him and render Him due satisfaction. As for the third, I say that a new life established through grace does indeed avail for salvation; but it cannot be perfect unless it presupposes detestation of the former life and the rendering of due satisfaction to God for the injuries inflicted.

NOTE 1. Divine precepts are of two different kinds: some are negative, others affirmative. Negative precepts are expressed in negative words and remove an action; affirmative precepts, however, command some action and urge us to perform some act. There is, moreover, this great difference between them: negative precepts bind always, at every point of time, not only with respect to the disposition and inclination of the mind, but also with respect to the negative act. Thus, for example, the precept against theft obliges one not only never to intend to steal—or always to intend not to steal—but also never to commit theft. An affirmative precept, by contrast, does indeed bind always with respect to the disposition and inclination of the mind, but not with respect to carrying out the affirmative act: it requires this only at the time determined by God or the Church. Thus the precept to honor one’s parents binds always with respect to that disposition of mind by which we must always have an inclination toward the honor, respect, and obedience to be shown them at the fitting time; yet it does not always bind us to perform the act, but only at those times when our parents may need our aid and support. The question, then, is whether there is an affirmative or a negative precept to do penance.

NOTE 2. Every affirmative precept also entails a negative one, forbidding the performance of an act contrary to that precept. Thus the precept to honor one’s parents includes a negative precept never to dishonor them or insult them in word or deed. I said “an act contrary,” for affirmative precepts do not entail the negation of a contradictory act. For example, the precept of faith does entail the negation of unbelief—that is, the negative precept not to be unbelieving, by performing an act of faith contrary to it, since it forbids positive unbelief. But it does not forbid negative or privative unbelief, such as that of those upon whom the Law of the Gospel has not yet shone and who have heard nothing of Christ the Lord. Likewise, the precept to love God includes the contrary negative precept never to hate God, but it does not include its contradictory, namely, never to be someone who does not love God; for it would follow that we were bound to an uninterrupted act of love for God, which plainly seems impossible.

NOTE 3. Divine precepts can be fulfilled in two ways: either with respect to the substance of the act commanded, or with respect to the end of the one commanding. For example, someone who fasts in a state of mortal sin does fulfill the precept with respect to the substance of the act—that is, abstaining from eating meat and observing moderation in food or drink—but does not fulfill it with respect to the end of the one commanding, namely, God’s intention that this fast be meritorious of eternal life, for the attainment of which it is prescribed. Hence every precept gives rise to a twofold obligation: one on the part of the deed, and the other on the part of the end for which the act must be performed. The difficulty, then, is whether in either of these ways there is a precept to do penance, and at what time it binds. Two matters must therefore be determined here above all: first, whether there is a divine precept to do penance; second, when it must be fulfilled—whether immediately after a sin is committed, or only on feast days or in manifest danger of death.

First conclusion. — A SINNER IS BOUND BY PRECEPT TO DO PENANCE, SO THAT HE COMMITS A NEW SIN IF HE NEGLECTS IT AT THE TIME WHEN HE IS BOUND TO PERFORM IT. All Catholic Doctors agree on this with the Subtle Doctor, d. 17, q. unica, n. 13, where he says: “Whoever has lost the first grace is bound, by the necessity of the precept—and by that precept, ‘You shall love the Lord your God,’ etc.—to do what lies within him toward its restoration, and also by virtue of that precept, ‘you shall love yourself.’ But this sinner has lost the first grace through mortal sin, and can recover it by receiving the sacrament of penance from that judge, because it was instituted as an efficacious remedy for receiving the first grace, in accordance with those words of John, ‘Whose sins you shall forgive,’ etc. And thus the necessity of the precept of confession is concluded not from those words alone, ‘Whose sins you shall forgive,’ etc., but from those words together with that precept, ‘You shall love the Lord your God,’ etc. By these words the Doctor declares that the sacrament of penance must be received under precept, and consequently, by the same reasoning, penance must also be done under precept.”

It is proved, then, by the authority of Sacred Scripture. First, from Luke 13: Unless you do penance, you will all likewise perish. These words certainly signify not only that penance is necessary as a means, as some maintain, but also that it is necessary by precept. For Catholic Doctors infer the precept to receive baptism in reality or by desire from John 3: Unless a man be born again of water, etc.; and likewise the precept to receive the Eucharist from John 6: Unless you eat the flesh of the Son of Man, etc. Therefore, since Scripture uses the same manner of speaking about doing penance, the same precept must likewise be inferred. — I admit, however, that this oracle more strongly suggests the necessity of penance as a means than as a precept: all sinners who have not done penance will necessarily perish, not on account of the sin of failing to do penance, but on account of their past, unforgiven sins. I therefore think it truer to say, with the Doctor, that the precept to do penance is derived rather from love of God and of ourselves. For by the precept of love of ourselves we are bound to secure eternal beatitude for ourselves and, consequently, to remove everything that keeps us from attaining it, such as sins, which can be washed away only by penance. The same may likewise be inferred from love of God, since Christ the Lord said in John 14: If anyone love me, he will keep my word, and my Father will love him. It is impossible for a sinner truly to will to love God without also implicitly willing God’s love toward himself, and thus to remove everything that would impede that divine love. Nor would someone seem to love God sincerely if he refused to remove, when he can, what he knows to be supremely displeasing to God and to provoke God’s aversion and hatred toward him. Hence, from the Doctor’s reasoning set out above, the conclusion is formally proved as follows: whoever has lost sanctifying grace and divine friendship is bound, by the precept of loving God, to do what lies within him toward recovering that divine grace and friendship; but a sinner has lost God’s grace and friendship through mortal sin and can recover neither unless he does penance; therefore, from the precept of loving God, taken together with the necessity of doing penance, the precept to perform it is inferred.

YOU WILL SAY: If there were a precept to do penance, it would follow that no one could be damned for a single mortal sin; but this is false; therefore so is the proposition from which it follows. The major consequence is evident: a sinner who died after committing a mortal sin without having done penance would necessarily be damned, not only for that mortal sin but also for omitting the precept to do penance; that omission would itself be a distinct sin, since it would violate a distinct precept. Therefore, etc. — I answer first that nothing at all absurd follows from a sinner being damned for only one mortal sin, even though a single sin alone would suffice for damnation; indeed, this would make the divine justice shine forth more clearly, since it would with even greater right consign a man to eternal punishment as guilty in two ways. I answer second that the major premise may be denied. A sinner might be damned for only one mortal sin even if he omits the precept to do penance—for example, if immediately upon falling into mortal sin he loses the use of reason and then dies. Such a man would be damned only for the mortal sin he committed, not for omitting the precept to do penance, since the loss of the use of reason made it impossible for him to observe that precept. Add that even if he lives for some time in a state of mortal sin with the use of reason and dies in that state, he will not for that reason be damned for omitting the precept to do penance; for he is not bound to fulfill that precept immediately after sinning, as will be shown.

Second conclusion. — THE PRECEPT TO DO PENANCE DOES NOT, OF ITSELF, OBLIGE A SINNER TO REPENT AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY AFTER COMMITTING A SIN. This is the Doctor’s position, d. 17, n. 21, where he determines that the precept to make confession, and consequently to do penance, binds only at a certain, determined time, especially at the point of death. That it does not bind immediately after a sin is committed, he teaches in n. 28, where he rejects the opinion of Alexander of Hales, who maintained in Summa, I, q. 77, memb. 1, art. 2, that the precept to make confession, and consequently to do penance, binds as soon as an opportunity presents itself. The Doctor denies this, saying: “For penal precepts are not to be extended, but restricted, and no occasion is found when this affirmative precept binds or obliges except at some time,” etc.

The Conclusion is proved first as follows. If a man were bound to do penance immediately after sinning, it would follow that he committed mortal sin at every single moment in which he could repent, since at every such moment he would transgress the precept imposed upon him. But this seems false in light of the common practice of the faithful: when they confess their sins, they never accuse themselves of delaying or postponing penance, unless perhaps the delay has gone beyond the time determined by the Church for confessing sins and doing penance. Nor are they questioned by confessors about such a delay. It is not likely that this omission in confession arises from inadequate instruction of penitents and confessors; otherwise the Church would be blameworthy, since it knows of this omission in confession and yet does not correct or remedy it. This is therefore a sign that such an accusation is not necessary for salvation.

Next, if such delay were contrary to a precept and sinful, it would follow that baptism once conferred on adults did not give them the first grace, although it was principally ordered to that end. For in former times the Church did not allow catechumens to be solemnly baptized except at Easter and Pentecost. Consequently, if they had been required to confess immediately after committing an actual sin, they could not have approached baptism with that sin: it would already have had to be washed away and blotted out through contrition, which would suffice for justification. For the question is not about a simple repudiation of sin, but about that repudiation and penance by which the sinner is placed outside the danger of eternal damnation. This is precisely why the opponents require penance immediately after a sin is committed: lest a man expose himself manifestly to the danger of eternal damnation during the interval between sin and death.

Finally, the precept to do penance is affirmative; therefore it does not bind at every time, but only at a determined time. The antecedent is established: the precept to do penance is one that commands the eliciting of an act of virtue, but an act of virtue is commanded to be elicited only by an affirmative precept; therefore, etc. The consequence is evident from the parity of reasoning with other affirmative precepts, which bind only at some determined time, as is clear of love of God, reverence for parents, hearing Mass, etc. All these precepts do not oblige one to elicit a positive act at every determined moment, although they do oblige one to refrain from the contrary act. “For,” says the Doctor in the aforementioned n. 28, “one must always have the will to confess at the time when the precept binds; by this I mean, if someone¹ has the will to do so at no time.”

YOU WILL SAY 1: Sacred Scripture warns sinners, under the gravest threats and denunciations, not to delay penance; therefore it judges that penance cannot be postponed without sin. The antecedent is evident from Isaiah 65: You shall all fall by the sword, because I called and you did not answer; I spoke and you did not hear. Jeremiah says the same in ch. 8: They were confounded, he says, who committed abomination; indeed, they were not confounded with confusion, nor did they know how to blush; therefore they shall fall among those who fall, and in the time of their visitation they shall fall, says the Lord. — I answer: These and similar oracles of Sacred Scripture do not condemn delay of penance when every present inclination toward the past sin has ceased—which is all that we are discussing here—but rather rebuke perseverance in actual sin. For Isaiah immediately adds: And you did evil in my sight, and chose the things that I would not. Jeremiah likewise continues in the same place: All have turned to their own course, like a horse rushing headlong into battle.

YOU WILL PRESS: The same Sacred Scripture, under the gravest threat, forbids postponing penance; therefore the solution is no solution. The antecedent is proved from Ecclesiasticus 5: Do not delay to turn to the Lord, and do not put it off from day to day; for his wrath will come suddenly, and in the time of vengeance he will destroy you. And in ch. 21: Flee from sin as from the face of a serpent. And in Revelation 2 the Angel warns the Bishop of Ephesus: Remember from where you have fallen, and do penance, and do the first works; but if not, I will come to you and remove your candlestick from its place, unless you do penance. Therefore penance cannot be delayed without sin. — I answer first that all these oracles and similar ones signify that it is a most wholesome counsel to do penance for one’s sin immediately, but not that it must be done under precept. Next, I say that even if they refer to the divine precept to do penance, they do not signify that anyone is bound to do it at every moment, but only at a fitting time and when some necessity requires it. For someone is not considered to delay who does not do what he can, but rather one who does not do it when it ought to be done. As St. Peter says, 2 Peter 3: The Lord does not delay his promise, as some consider delay, but deals patiently for your sake, etc. By these words he signifies that God does not delay the intention of his promise, even though he does not fulfill it immediately when he can do so, because he will fulfill it at the fitting time and delays no longer than is fitting. By parity of reasoning, then, a man should not be said to delay penance when he does it at the fitting time and when necessity requires it.

SUBSUMES: Sacred Scripture plainly signifies that God condemns and punishes procrastination of penance, as is clear from Proverbs 1: I called you, and you refused; I stretched out my hand, and there was no one who looked; you despised all my counsel and neglected my reproofs; I too will look on when you are destroyed and mock when what you feared comes upon you. — I ANSWER: Scripture is to be understood as speaking of sinners who persevere in actual sin, as is gathered from the preceding words, since shortly before it had said: How long, little ones, will you love childishness, and fools desire the things that are harmful to them, and the imprudent hate knowledge? St. Paul is to be understood in the same way in Romans 2, when he says: Do you despise the riches of his goodness, patience, and long-suffering? Do you not know that the goodness of God leads you to penance? But according to your hardness and impenitent heart, you treasure up wrath for yourself on the day of wrath and of the revelation of the just judgment of God. There he is not speaking of merely delaying penance, but of repeating sins. For earlier he had said: Do you think this, O man, who judge those who do such things and do them yourself, that you will escape the judgment of God? Hence immediately after the words quoted above he adds: He will render to each according to his works: to those who by patience in good work seek glory, honor, and incorruption, eternal life; but to those who are contentious and do not obey the truth, but believe iniquity, wrath and indignation. The Apostle is therefore speaking against those who actively pursued the same evil deeds.

YOU WILL PRESS AGAIN: The meaning of Sacred Scripture is no other than that which the holy Fathers have adopted; but from these divine oracles the holy Fathers teach an obligation to repent immediately and assert that penance postponed will be useless, as St. Augustine especially affirms in bk. 50, hom. 12. After saying that sincere and true penance is effective at any moment of time, he adds that late penance is very uncertain: “One who does penance and is reconciled while well, and afterward lives well, will depart secure; one who does penance at the very end and is reconciled, if he departs secure, I am not secure; where I am secure, I give security; where I am not secure, I do not give security. I can give penance, but I cannot give security,” etc. — I ANSWER, St. Augustine there rebukes only those who delay penance too long and put it off until death. Thus in Serm. 57, De Tempore, he says beautifully: “The penance asked by a sick man is sickly; the penance asked by a dying man—I fear that it too may die.” Therefore in Serm. 110, De Tempore, he wisely warns: “The day that overtakes us is the day that is accustomed to overtake us: a man deceives himself and trifles with his death when he thinks that the pardon of his final hour can come to his aid. This is foolish: first, because security promised for the last day is most perilous; next, it is most foolish to entrust a matter concerning eternal necessities, while devoted to the vanities of life, to one’s final moments. It is hateful to God when a man sins more freely in the confidence of penance reserved for old age.” Eucherius of Lyon agrees with him: “It is most foolish,” he says, “to entrust a matter concerning eternal necessities to the final moments of a life that is passing away.” How dangerous such postponement of penance until death is, however, we shall show near the end of this Question.

YOU WILL SAY 2: One is bound to greater charity toward oneself than toward one’s neighbor; but by the precept of charity I am bound immediately to apply fraternal correction to a neighbor who sins, when opportunity and hope of amendment are present; therefore I am much more bound to help myself through the remedy of penance as soon as this can conveniently be done. — I ANSWER that the minor premise is true only when there is danger of relapse and a serious suspicion that, if the neighbor is corrected, he will immediately fall into another sin. For a past sin is not the subject matter for fraternal correction, nor is a sin that persists in its guilt when there is no danger of relapse; only a sin foreseen in the future is, as Ecclesiasticus teaches in ch. 19: “Correct your friend, lest perhaps he did not understand and say, ‘I did not do it’; or, if he did it, that he may not do it again. Correct your neighbor, lest perhaps he did not say it; and, if he did, that he may not repeat it. Correct your friend, for a fault is often committed.” These words signify that a future sin, not a past one when there is no danger of repetition, is the subject matter of correction. Consequently it is false, speaking absolutely, that one is bound to correct a neighbor immediately after he sins. — This is confirmed by the fact that I am not bound to correct a neighbor except when he himself is bound to listen and accept correction. For Christ the Lord prescribed the precept of fraternal correction under this condition in Matthew 18, where he signifies that we are not bound to correct someone who is not bound to listen, but must report him to the Church. Yet a neighbor is not bound to amend himself immediately after sinning; therefore he is not bound to listen to me when I correct him, and consequently in that case I myself am not bound to amend him—unless, as I said above, there is danger of relapse. Add to this that one may be bound to help a neighbor in matters of great temporal importance, even if one is not bound to do so toward oneself, since the neighbor may be absolutely or irrationally willing, whereas I am willing rationally and prudently.

YOU WILL SAY 3: Someone who has taken away another’s due honor or some possession is bound to restore it to him immediately; but someone who sins takes away the honor owed to God; therefore he is bound to make satisfaction to God immediately through penance. — I DISTINGUISH THE ANTECEDENT: if danger arises from delaying such restitution, lest the harm inflicted on the neighbor increase, I grant it; if there is no such danger, I deny it. Thus if there is danger that the violation of God’s name will increase through delaying penance—for example, if someone has spread false doctrine—he is bound to do penance immediately and retract the false teachings he spread. But the case is otherwise if no such danger is imminent, as usually happens.

YOU WILL PRESS AGAIN: Someone who has taken another’s property by theft is bound to restore it to its owner as quickly as possible and repair the harm inflicted on his neighbor; therefore much more is he bound to compensate for the injury done to God by mortal sin through the penance owed, and to restore the honor taken from God. — I DENY THE CONSEQUENCE. The reason for the difference is that a person suffers harm to necessary and useful goods through theft; hence, by delaying restitution, he suffers a new injury, a real one, since he is compelled to do without something necessary or useful to him. God, however, suffers no real injury from our sins; hence the delay of our contrition does not compel him to do without anything necessary or useful to him, in keeping with Psalm 50: You have no need of my goods. And Job 22: What does it profit God if you are just, or what does he gain if your way is blameless?

YOU WILL PRESS: A thief is bound to restore what he stole immediately because, for as long as he keeps it, he commits an injustice, since it is unjust to retain another’s property; but for as long as a sinner remains in a state of sin, he unjustly withholds divine honor, since sin is an injustice against God; therefore he is bound to make satisfaction to God immediately and restore the honor owed him through penance. — I DENY THE MINOR PREMISE. As a rule, sin is not a true injustice against God any more than against a human legislator. For God has not expressly declared that when he commands something to be done or omitted, he exercises a power of ownership or dominion by which he could exact all human acts as debts owed under strict justice.

If you press the point: a thief commits an injustice because he takes a thing from another that was under that person’s dominion; but that thing was much more under God’s dominion than under man’s; therefore, for the same reason that he commits an injustice against a man and is bound to make restitution immediately, he is also bound to repair the injury done to God immediately through the penance owed. — I WILL DENY THE PARITY. The reason for the difference is that someone who takes a thing from an unwilling person also takes away that person’s dominion over his property. But through theft God does not lose dominion over the thing stolen; consequently, the cases are not on a par. Theft is indeed against God’s precept, You shall not steal, and is therefore disobedience toward him, but not injustice.

YOU WILL SAY 1: Mortal sin consists in being in danger of mortal sin; but as long as a sinner does not repent, he is in danger of falling into another mortal sin; therefore he is bound to repent as soon as possible. The major premise is evident from Ecclesiasticus 3: He who loves danger will perish in it. The minor premise is proved by the authority of St. Gregory, Hom. 11 on Ezekiel, where he says: “A sin that is not soon blotted out by penance is itself sin, the cause of sin, and the punishment of sin at once. For whatever is first committed is sin; but if it is not soon wiped away by doing penance, Almighty God, in just judgment, allows a mind bound by sins to fall into another fault, so that one who refused to cleanse by weeping and correction what he had done begins to heap sin upon sin. A sin, then, that is not washed away by the lament of penance is at once sin and the cause of sin, because from it arises what binds the sinner’s mind still more deeply.” — I DISTINGUISH THE MAJOR PREMISE: if the danger is imminent and near, I grant it; if it is merely remote, I deny it. For according to Aristotle, Rhetoric, II, danger is “the approach of something to be feared.” Thus, if someone recognizes that delaying penance does not bring an imminent danger of a near fall, he does not seem to sin by delaying penance. As to St. Gregory, I say that by these or similar words he warns against delaying penance for long after a sin has been committed; he does not assert that penance is necessary immediately. This is gathered from the words immediately preceding, for he says: “The judgments of Almighty God are diverse, and he who long waits for the sinner to return assigns the one who does not return and shows contempt for him a place where he may stumble more grievously.”

YOU WILL SAY 5: We are bound by a negative precept not to be enemies of God, as in fact we are through sin; but negative precepts bind always and at every moment; therefore a man is bound by precept never to be in a state of sin, and consequently sins for as long as he remains in sin. — I ANSWER the major premise: someone may be an enemy of God in three ways: first, actively, when a man hates God; second, passively, when he is hated by God; third, demeritoriously, when he deserves to be hated by God. Hence, in response to the argument, I distinguish the major premise: that a man is bound by a negative precept not to be God’s enemy actively, I grant, because we are bound never to hate God; passively or demeritoriously, I deny it, both because avoiding this enmity is not within our power except through an act of penance, which we are not bound to elicit immediately, and also because this enmity toward God consists only in the state of a man who is a sinner. But we do not merit or demerit according to a state, nor are there any precepts about maintaining some state; for there is no precept requiring us always to remain in a state of grace, only a counsel.

YOU WILL PRESS AGAIN: Whoever does not love God hates him; but as long as a sinner remains in a state of sin, he does not love God and therefore hates him; consequently, he is God’s enemy not only passively and demeritoriously, but also actively. — I DENY THE MAJOR PREMISE. Not loving God is one thing, and hating God another. For between friend and enemy there is a middle term, namely, one who is not a friend. In the same way, between penance and impenitence there is a middle term, namely, not doing penance: for penance is displeasure at a sin committed, while impenitence is complacency in that very sin. Thus it is not the same to be unpenitent and to be impenitent, just as it is not the same to hate God and not to love God. Hence, although the affirmative precept to love God includes a negative precept concerning the contrary act—namely, never to hate God, which binds always and at every moment—it does not include a negative precept concerning its contradictory, namely, never not loving God, that is, always loving him. From this it is clear that although someone who delays penance does not have an actual love of God, he does not thereby hate him or become guilty of that precept: You shall love the Lord your God.

YOU WILL PRESS: Not to will to be loved by God is opposed to love of God; but a sinner, for as long as he persists in sin, does not will to be loved by God, since in that state he is hated by God—for the impious man and his impiety are abominable to God; therefore, etc. — I DISTINGUISH THE MAJOR PREMISE: not willing this through a positive act by which someone would reject and scorn divine love, I grant; not willing it through a negative act—that is, by suspending action, when someone knows that he is not in God’s friendship yet neglects to withdraw himself from that state in which he merits divine indignation—I deny it. For persistence in that state is not forbidden by the precept of loving God, since that precept is affirmative and does not bind always and at every moment.

YOU WILL PRESS AGAIN: At least, delaying penance without a just cause is contrary to the friendship and reverence owed to God. For if a son had seriously offended his father, or a servant his master, they would certainly provoke greater displeasure if, without any cause, they delayed even briefly in begging pardon and seeking reconciliation. — I ANSWER by denying the antecedent, if the matter concerns a new offense, and the example does not compel us. Perhaps among human beings there is an obligation, at least indirect, to make satisfaction immediately, because human beings do not judge hidden things, especially what is merely interior. When they do not see an outward request for pardon, and there is no just cause for delay, they judge that the interior disposition still persists and are therefore rightly angered anew. But God’s relation to man is different: since God knows human hearts perfectly, when he sees that a man has entirely ceased freely willing sin, he does not have a new displeasure toward him merely because the man remains habitually in sin for some time.

SUBSUMES: No one remains voluntarily in habitual sin without taking pleasure in it; for one takes pleasure in sin for as long as it does not displease him. It does not displease him as long as he does not detest it or grieve that he committed it; but complacency and inclination toward sin provoke divine indignation; therefore, etc. — I DISTINGUISH THE MAJOR PREMISE: that he takes pleasure in it through a new act of will, by which he wills and approves that sin, I deny; that he takes pleasure in it by the absence of an act of displeasure, I grant. Hence the consequence is invalid: sin does not displease him in that state; therefore he takes pleasure in it. For between taking pleasure and being displeased there is a middle term, namely, not being displeased through the absence of an act.

SUBSUMES AGAIN: But in that state the sinner not only lacks an act; he really has an act of will and an actual inclination toward sin. For precisely by not willing to do penance, he wills to remain in a state of sin. Whoever wills the antecedent of a good consequent also wills the consequent: for if Peter wills to run, he also wills to move. But to will to remain in that state is to take pleasure in sin; therefore, etc. — I DENY THE SUBSUMPTION. It does not follow that if a sinner does not positively will to do penance, he thereby wills to be in a state of sin. As to the proof, I say that the rule “whoever wills the antecedent of a good consequent also wills the consequent” is not universally true. It does indeed follow: Christ the Lord redeemed human beings; therefore they sinned. But it does not follow: Christ willed to redeem human beings; therefore he willed them to sin. Likewise, it does follow: I am doing penance; therefore I sinned; and yet I will to do penance, which is the antecedent, while I do not will to have sinned, which is the consequent. Indeed, doing penance itself is willing not to have sinned. Therefore this rule is true only when the antecedent is ordered toward attaining the consequent, or conversely. Thus it rightly follows: you will beatitude; therefore you will the means to beatitude, and conversely. In the present case, then, although from the fact that penance is not done one may infer, “therefore he is in a state of sin,” it does not follow: “I will not do penance; therefore I will to be in a state of sin.” For not doing penance is not ordered toward attaining such a state, since we do not enter that state by failing to do penance, but rather when we actually sin. Thus to will not to do penance at a time when one is bound to do it is not an act good or evil by its species, and is therefore not a new sin.

YOU WILL SAY 6: The loss of spiritual life is more grievous than that of temporal life. But if someone falls ill bodily or is wounded, he is immediately bound, by the obligation of nature, the precept of self-love, and the commandment You shall not kill, to apply remedies at once lest he lose his life. Therefore, much more, when he has received the mortal wound of sin, must he apply the remedy of penance lest he lose spiritual life. — SOME ANSWER that even if spiritual life is more excellent than bodily life, there is a difference in the obligation to preserve or recover it. They say that a man is not master of his bodily life as he is master of his spiritual life, which he acquires and procures for himself by his own acts. Perhaps there would indeed be a difference insofar as someone who took away his bodily life would sin against justice, since he would take something over which he had no ownership, whereas he would not sin in the same way if he took away his spiritual life. Nevertheless, it is certain that taking away one’s spiritual life is contrary to the precept of charity toward oneself, which obliges each person to avoid every evil, whether of body or soul, insofar as this can conveniently be done. Consequently it obliges one to the penance necessary to recover the spiritual life abandoned through sin, especially since spiritual death is the gravest harm, making a man liable to eternal damnation. Hence others answer by distinguishing the minor premise: everyone is bound to apply remedies immediately if necessity presses and delay in treatment is dangerous; otherwise, if no such necessity presses, he is not. Now someone in a state of sin is not always in danger either of relapse or of damnation. Of the many sinners, very few die immediately after committing a sin and before they can do penance. Otherwise, if this argument were valid, it would also prove that baptism could never be delayed, at least for infants, since they can die suddenly; and yet it is certain that it can be delayed for several days.

Third conclusion. — THE PRECEPT TO DO PENANCE, OF ITSELF, BINDS UNDER PAIN OF A NEW MORTAL SIN WHENEVER DANGER OF DEATH IS IMMINENT; BUT ACCIDENTALLY, IT BINDS ON MANY OTHER OCCASIONS.

The first part is proved, first, by the authority and example of St. Augustine, who, as Possidius relates, used to say that “no one, even if conscious of no crime, ought to let himself depart this life without penance.” Thus when he himself understood that his departure was near, he recited the penitential Psalms of David, placed before him, with abundant tears.

Reason also commends this: when danger of death is imminent, a man is bound by the precept of penance to make satisfaction to God for the offenses he has committed against him and to compensate for the injuries done to him. Indeed, if ever he must do this, he must do so especially when that necessity presses, so that he may obtain divine pardon. This is to be understood, however, provided that at that moment the man is not anticipated by some nobler affection toward God—for example, an ardent desire to undergo martyrdom, an exceedingly fervent movement of charity, or an elevation of the mind to God through the delights of heavenly contemplation. In such a case, a just man would not be bound to perform an act of penance and sorrow for sins.

That a man may also be bound, accidentally, to do penance many times even apart from danger of death can be shown as follows. First, since holy things must be handled and received in a holy manner, a sinner is bound to do penance so that by its benefit he may wash away sin and obtain sanctifying grace whenever the Sacraments are to be administered, and also whenever the Sacraments called “of the living” are to be received. For a minister who administers a sacrament without penance sins mortally, as we said when treating of the minister of the sacraments; much more gravely, however, would someone sin who received such sacraments in a state of mortal sin. — Likewise, there is an obligation to do penance when a vehement temptation presses and grave danger of sinning is imminent. For no remedy for avoiding sin is more opportune than detesting past sins: this detestation not only turns the mind away from tempting concupiscence and an assaulting temptation, but also obtains new aids of grace by which such danger may vanish. There is also an obligation to do penance when there is a public necessity and divine vengeance threatens a community on account both of its own sins and of the sins of others. For then each person is bound, out of affection and love for the community, to soften and turn aside the divine anger as far as he can by his own penance, since members must care for one another and for the whole body to which they belong.

YOU WILL ASK: Whether it is dangerous to postpone penance until the end of life?

I AFFIRM this with the holy Fathers, who constantly proclaim this truth with unanimous agreement. This is especially true of St. Augustine, in bk. 50, Homilies, hom. 41, and St. Ambrose, bk. 2, On Penance, ch. 12, where they write: “If someone, placed in the final crisis of his illness, wishes to receive penance and receives it, and is at once reconciled and then departs this life, I confess to you: we do not deny him what he asks, but we do not presume that he fares well. I do not presume; I do not deceive you. A faithful man who lives well departs secure; one baptized at the last hour departs secure; one who does penance and is reconciled while well, and afterward lives well, departs secure. One who does penance at the very end and is reconciled—if he departs secure, I am secure; where I am secure, I give security; where I am not secure, I can give penance, but I cannot give security.” St. Caesarius of Arles offers the same reasoning in Hom. 13 and 44. After saying that he doubted whether penance benefits a penitent at the very end, he says: “What shall I tell you? I do not know; I do not presume or promise; I know nothing at all of God’s will.” He immediately adds: “Do you wish, brother, to free yourself from doubt? Do you wish to put aside what is uncertain? Do penance while you are well. For if you do true penance while well, let the last day find you hastening to be reconciled. If you act this way, you are secure. Do you want me to tell you why you are secure? Because you did penance at a time when you could also have sinned. There, I have told you why you are secure. But if you wish to do penance only when you can no longer sin, your sins have left you; you have not left them.” St. Eligius teaches the same in Hom. 6, writing against those who delay penance until the end of life: “Although all men wish to receive penance at the end of their lives, we see scarcely a few attain it as they desire.” He then draws the conclusion. But no one describes and amplifies that uncertainty more fully and eloquently than Salvian of Marseilles in his letter To the Catholic Church, where he writes: “I certainly do not think that it suffices for eternal life for anyone entangled in carnal vices, if he has persisted in shameful deeds until death and arranges everything well at his passing, unless he has previously renounced his sins.… Some do not cease to sin; when placed at the point of death, they are made to withdraw from crimes by necessity alone, not by their will. For one who departs from evil deeds only in death does not abandon his crimes but is abandoned by them, because as far as his mind is concerned, he has not yet ceased to sin if he still wishes to sin, were he able.” He adds much more afterward: “But if either the force of the illness or the negligence of the sick is so great that they carry the damage to their health all the way to their final days, what shall I say? I do not know; I have absolutely nothing to promise. To recall those in danger from seeking the final remedy would be harsh and impious; but to promise anything in so late a treatment would be rash. Still, it is undoubtedly better for hands dried up by long paralysis to be raised toward heaven by some effort than to collapse in utter, deadly despair. It is better to leave nothing untried than to neglect the dying, especially since I do not know whether attempting some remedy at the end is medicine; certainly, to attempt nothing is ruin.” Isidore of Seville teaches the same, Sentences, bk. 2, ch. 13, as does St. Bernard in On the Manner of Living Well, ch. 27, where he says: “When a man who is able to sin repents and, while living his life, corrects himself from every crime, he will without doubt reach eternal rest when death comes. But for one who lives badly and does penance at death, just as his damnation is uncertain, so is his remission doubtful. Whoever, then, wishes to be secure at death concerning pardon should do penance while in health and mourn his sins while in health; therefore, since God’s mercy is hidden, it is necessary to weep without ceasing.”

The Subtle Doctor assigns three other causes of this danger in Reportata, d. 20 of the fourth book of the Sentences. He derives the first from the effects of illness and danger, which occupy the mind so powerfully because of their intensity—the illness through pain, the danger through fear—that a person can scarcely think of anything else. “But,” he says, “in order to reject sin, the intellect must engage in great reflection and detestation, so that there may be sufficient attrition, by fitting means, for the remission of sin, just as there was previously intense delight in sin.” St. Raymond also offers this reason, on the authority of St. Jerome and St. Augustine, bk. 3, On Penance, § 23. “In extreme illness,” he says, “someone can scarcely repent or even think. For Jerome says: ‘When you are oppressed by illness, you can scarcely think of anything other than what you feel, and the mind’s attention is swept there, where the force of the pain lies.’” For many impediments arise then, as Augustine says: illness presses, punishment terrifies, and children whom the man loved illicitly, his wife, and the world call him back to themselves. Whoever this Eusebius may be, he presses this reasoning excellently in writing to Damasus about the death of St. Jerome, where he says: *“Perhaps someone will again say: ‘A man who lived wickedly throughout his life will obtain pardon from God if he receives penance at the point of death.’ Alas, how vain a suspicion and false a thought! Of a hundred thousand men whose life has always been evil, scarcely one deserves to obtain pardon from God. A man born and raised entirely in sins, who has neither seen nor known God, nor wished to hear of him, who does not know that he has sinned or what penance is—unless perhaps he learned it in his sleep—still bound up in worldly affairs, pressed by anxiety for the children he is leaving behind, crushed by illness, shaken by grief over his wealth and temporal goods when he sees that he can no longer enjoy them: how does he receive penance as pleasing to God, which he would not receive if he still believed he could be healed? I shall certainly conclude in truth that someone who, while healthy and young, does not fear to offend God will not deserve to obtain divine pardon at death.”

The Doctor derives the second reason from fear, which at that time occupies the whole man and is not a sufficient disposition for meriting grace. “For,” he says, “there must be a voluntary detestation and the proper circumstance of the end: a man must repent not only through fear of punishment, but with filial fear. It is difficult then to feel sorrow except from fear alone; and if it is not joined with love, it does not dispose one by fitting means. Therefore it is difficult.” The Author of bk. On True and False Penance, ch. 17, gives the same reason: “One who truly repents must not only fear God as Judge, but also love him as Just; he should not be feared on account of punishment, but loved for the sake of glory.” We must therefore conclude with Thomas of Argentina, art. 1: “In truth, at the end it is very difficult to gather the mind in such a way that a man grieves that he has offended God by sin not only through fear of punishment but from love of God, and also resolves that, if he were to live a long time, he would always guard against this in the future. For true and salutary repentance consists in these two things.”

The Doctor derives the third reason from the habit contracted through sins, which cannot but be strong. “Therefore it is especially difficult then to turn against this habit by detesting what was previously delightful. Finally, he writes that a much greater displeasure is required in a sick man than in a healthy one, because a healthy man repents more freely. Therefore,” he says, “I believe that for a sick man to merit grace by fitting means, he would require much greater attrition, since he is near death, than if he were healthy. But it is difficult to have attrition as great as one has in health, let alone greater.” Hence he finally concludes that when someone truly repents in such a state, this is exceedingly rare, like a miracle. The Author of bk. On True and False Penance, ch. 17, certainly agrees: “He is converted who is now turned wholly and completely, who no longer merely fears punishments but hastens toward the good God. If this conversion happens to anyone even at the end, we must not despair of his remission. But since such a just conversion happens scarcely or rarely, we must fear for one who repents late. For the illness presses him, punishment terrifies him, and he comes to the true path of satisfaction, especially when the children he loved illicitly are present, and his wife and the world call him back to themselves.”

The remarkable and truly divine efficacy of the virtue of penance, as St. Chrysostom excellently commends in his sermon On Penance, where among other things he exclaims: “O penance, which, when God is merciful, remit sins and open Paradise; heal the contrite, cheer all sadness, recall life from destruction, restore one’s state, renew honor, give confidence, renew strength, and pour back grace in greater abundance! You loose everything bound, preserve everything loosed, soften every adversity, heal all that is contrite, make clear everything confused, and revive all that is in despair. Through you, O penance, David, afflicted and contrite, became holy; through you the prodigal son merited his father’s embrace; through you Peter, after denying the Lord, received pardon; through you, O penance, Christ suddenly snatched the thief into the eternal kingdom,” etc. Since all these praises of its dignity especially concern the remission of sins, this Section will therefore speak chiefly of penance’s efficacy in the general remission of all sins: first, concerning the remission of all mortal sins; second, concerning the remission of venial sins; third, concerning the payment and release of the punishment due for those sins. To these we shall append the fifth Question, on the return of sins remitted through penance, and the sixth, on the return of merits extinguished through sins.

NOTE 1. Around the present Question there have been chiefly five erroneous opinions. The first error was that of the Novatians, who asserted that sins after Baptism are altogether irremissible, and hence that Penance is of no assistance whatever to sinners, as St. Cyprian reports, bk. 1, ep. 1; Jerome, ep. To Marcella; and Eusebius, bk. 6, Church History, ch. 33. But since those heretics chiefly attacked the efficacy of Penance as a Sacrament, we shall begin to relate and refute their error where we treat of the efficacy of the Sacrament of Penance. The second error was that of certain Jews who asserted that a third sin after receiving the grace of remission is remissible, but not a fourth or any subsequent sin. They supported this from Amos 1–2, where God repeatedly declares that He will pardon the third sin but not the fourth. The third error was that of Armachanus, bk. 9, On the Questions of the Armenians, ch. 27, where he teaches that some wayfarers are so hardened in wickedness that, according to the ordinary disposition, they cannot make a saving repentance, just as the Apostles, confirmed in grace, could not sin mortally at all. The fourth error is that of certain others who assert that there is a fixed number of sins, and that whoever completes it cannot obtain pardon under the ordinary prescribed laws of divine justice and mercy, even though he has not completed the course of this life or the state of a wayfarer, unless perhaps God’s surpassing mercy comes to his aid. The fifth error, finally, was that of the impious Luther, who taught that all our works are sins, by God’s will and consent, yet are not imputed for punishment except for the single sin of unbelief. Against all these, then, let us set out Catholic teaching.

NOTE 2. The subject here is not Sacramental Penance, which consists chiefly in absolution from sins confessed by the penitent, but Penance as a virtue, which the Holy Fathers call Penance of the heart. This is customarily distinguished as twofold: imperfect and perfect. The former is called attrition; it is called imperfect Penance not because it is evil, but because outside the Sacrament of Penance it is insufficient for the perfect remission of sin. Perfect Penance is called contrition: it suffices for remission of sin together with the vow and purpose of making confession and receiving absolution, since the time of the Law of the Gospel. Whether this Penance is necessary and effective for the remission of any sin, however grave, Luther denies both points, as is clear from the articles condemned by the sacred faculty of Paris and by Leo X, Supreme Pontiff. For Luther is condemned there, first, for asserting that to remit sin it is enough to begin a new life, without any Penance or detestation of sins; second, for teaching, as just said, that only the sin of unbelief is counted for punishment.

NOTE 3. Some sinners are so hardened in evil that Penance, though not impossible for them, is nevertheless very difficult to perform. This difficulty arises both from the sinner and from God. It arises from the sinner when, through habitual wrongdoing, he has become hardened, according to Proverbs 38¹: “When the sinner has come into the depth of evils, he will despise”—that is, sin; for through excessive habit of sinning, his crimes seem to him lighter offenses. Hence he no longer feels shame for his sins, according to Jeremiah 3: “You have acquired the forehead of a harlot; you would not blush.” Since a habit formed from repeated acts impresses something like a new nature, sinners are carried into sin as if by a natural impulse, like natural agents, and can scarcely turn away from it, according to Jeremiah 13: “If the Ethiopian can change his skin, or the leopard his spots, then you too will be able to do good, once you have learned evil.” The difficulty also arises from God, who justly punishes sinners and often denies them special helps to repent. St. Paul speaks of both difficulties in Acts 13: when he saw the Jews’ faithlessness and obstinacy in rejecting God’s word, he said: “It was necessary that the word of God should first be spoken to you; but since you reject it and judge yourselves unworthy of eternal life, behold, we turn to the Gentiles.”

With these points laid down, two matters remain to be determined: first, whether every sin, however grave, can be remitted through Penance; second, whether one mortal sin can be remitted without another.

First conclusion. — NO SIN IS SO GRAVE THAT IT CANNOT BE WIPED AWAY BY PERFECT PENANCE. This is a matter of faith, and

This is gathered first from the testimonies of Scripture, in which remission of all sins is promised without any limitation or restriction to those who are truly contrite and repentant. Thus Wisdom 11: “You have mercy on all, because you can do all things, and you overlook the sins of all for the sake of Penance.” And Ezekiel 18: “If the wicked man does Penance for all his sins, I will remember none of his iniquities.” He immediately adds: “Is it My will that the wicked should die, says the Lord God, and not that he should turn from his ways and live?” And in ch. 33: “As I live, says the Lord, I do not will the death of the wicked”—that is, I will the death of no wicked person, whatever his wickedness.

Second, it is proved by the authority of Councils, especially the Fourth Lateran Council under Innocent III, as cited in ch. Firmiter, On the Supreme Trinity, where it says: “If anyone after receiving Baptism falls into sin, he can always be restored through true Penance.” It is also proved from Trent, sess. XIX, can. 2, which decrees that all sins committed after Baptism can be remitted through Penance.

The Holy Fathers support the same doctrine with the clearest testimonies. Chrysostom, hom. 33 on Matthew: “There is no sin that does not yield to the power of Penance.” And hom. 9 on Psalm 50: “Have you sinned? Repent. Have you sinned a thousand times? Repent a thousand times.” Likewise St. Ambrose, bk. 2, On Penance, ch. 5: “So great,” he says, “is God’s reconciliation toward men that Judas could have been excluded from pardon had he done Penance not among the Jews but before Christ.” He writes that Judas was unworthy of pardon because he did not repent with inward conversion and did not diligently do Penance; for “Christ is so compassionate that He would have granted him pardon if Judas had hoped in His mercy.” St. Augustine says in the Enchiridion, ch. 65: “Even in the remission of these crimes, however great, those who do Penance in the holy Church according to the measure of each one’s sin must not despair of God’s mercy.” St. Peter Chrysologus clearly draws the same truth from the parable of the prodigal son, Serm. 3: “The power of love does not see offenses, and therefore the father redeemed his son’s sins with a kiss and enclosed him in an embrace. Surely, if we have departed, if we have squandered all the Father’s substance in wantonness, if ever we have committed any crime or offense, if we have come to the brink of impiety and fallen into utter ruin, let us at last rise and, invited by such an example, return to such a Father.”

This is also supported by reason. If some sin could not be wiped away through Penance, it would be either because the sinner could not repent of it, as is the case with demons and the damned, who are exceedingly displeased by the punishment they suffer for sin but, since their will is hardened in evil, cannot grieve for sin with true Penance that includes hope of pardon; or because Penance could not wipe away some sin. But while we live the mortal life of this way, no sin can be called irremissible in either sense. Not in the first sense: as long as a man is a wayfarer, his free will remains pliable toward good and evil, and divine grace can bend the heart of any sinner, however hardened, to true Penance. Hence St. Augustine says admirably, Hom. 50 from the Fifty Homilies: “Perhaps you say: ‘I have already been baptized in Christ, by whom all my past sins were forgiven. I have become exceedingly vile by repeating my ways, like an abominable dog in the Lord’s sight, returned to its vomit. Where shall I go from His spirit, and where shall I flee from His presence?’ Where, brother, except to His mercy by repenting, the power of which you had scorned by sinning? No one rightly flees from Him except to Him, from His severity to His goodness. What place will receive the fugitive, where His presence will not find you? If you ascend to Heaven, He is there; if you descend to hell, He is present. So spread your wings straight before you and dwell in hope at the end of this world; for there His hand will lead you, and His right hand will bring you. Whatever you do, whatever sins you commit, you are still in this life, from which God would wholly remove you if He did not wish to heal you. Why then do you not understand that God’s patience leads you to Penance? He who persuaded you by crying out not to depart now cries out by sparing you, that you may return.” — These are St. Augustine’s words, clearly signifying that there is absolutely no sin whose pardon we cannot obtain through true Penance as long as we lead this mortal life. — Nor can a sin be called irremissible in the second sense: that would be contrary to the eternal Father’s divine love for mankind, who “so loved the world that He gave His only-begotten Son, that everyone who believes in Him may not perish,” and who, as the Apostle says in Romans 8, “did not spare His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all.” For how would He have delivered His Son up for us all, so that everyone who believes in Him may not perish, if all sins could not be wiped away through true conversion to Christ? Second, it would contradict divine mercy, of which Joel 2 says that God “is gracious and merciful, patient and of great mercy, and ready to relent from evil”; for in a certain way man would overcome God if man wished a sin to be wiped away which God did not wish to wipe away. It would also detract from the power of Christ’s Passion and His abundant redemption, from which no mortal, however sinful, is excluded, and to which it belongs to be the universal Redeemer of all sins. Hence St. John, 1 John 2, declares without qualification: “If anyone sins, we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the just, and He is the propitiation for our sins—not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world.” Therefore, since God expresses His will for the sinner’s conversion and salvation, and promises him pardon if he converts, it follows that every sin in this life can be wiped away through Penance.

THEY OBJECT 1. The Novatians cite 1 Samuel 2: “If a man sins against a man, God can be reconciled to him; but if a man sins against the Lord, who will pray for him?” Therefore sins directly against God cannot in any way be pardoned. — I DENY the consequence. One may answer, first, that these words are not the Prophet’s but Eli the Priest’s, rebuking his sons for their grave sins, which, since they caused public scandal, were turning the Israelites away from sacrifices and divine worship. Second, one may say that a distinction is drawn there between sins that directly offend God and those that directly offend one’s neighbor; the latter are lighter, and some just man can readily be found to obtain through his prayers both pardon from God, offended by the sin, and the grace of conversion for the sinner. But sins committed directly against God are graver, and it may be very difficult to find someone who can obtain pardon for them from God. Thus the interrogative “who” does not mean the same as “no one,” as St. Ambrose aptly notes, bk. 1, On Penance, ch. 8: “For it is not written, ‘No one will pray for him,’ but ‘Who will pray for him?’ The question is who can pray in such a case; the possibility is not excluded. Thus Psalm 14 says: ‘Lord, who will dwell in Your tabernacle, or who will rest on Your holy mountain?’ Not ‘no one’ will dwell there, but a proven man; nor does it say that no one rests there, but that the elect do. And Psalm 23 says: ‘Who will ascend the mountain of the Lord, or who will stand in His holy place?’ That is, not just anyone from the crowd, nor some person of common lowliness, but a man of eminent life and singular merit. For it was not just anyone from the crowd who prayed for the people of the Jews, but Moses prayed, merited, and obtained. Therefore the question ‘Who will pray for him?’ requires only a man of outstanding holiness and singular life to pray for one who has sinned directly against the Lord, especially by open and manifest sacrilege, as were the sins of Eli’s sons. For it is said there that they “lay with the women who kept watch at the door of the tabernacle,” and that they took by force the meat from those offering animals in sacrifice before they were sacrificed to the Lord; hence it concludes: “The sin of the young men was very great before the Lord, for they were turning people away from the sacrifice of the Lord.”

THEY OBJECT 2. In 2 Maccabees 9, King Antiochus, after committing many crimes, was struck by a grave and deadly illness and did Penance: humbled before the Lord, he testified “that it is just for man to be subject to God, and that a mortal should not think himself equal to God”; he acknowledged his crimes, grieved for them, and promised to make restitution to the Jews for what had been taken, “to adorn with the best gifts the holy Temple which he had previously despoiled, to multiply the holy vessels, and to provide from his revenues the expenses pertaining to the sacrifices; moreover, to become a Jew and travel through every place on earth, proclaiming God’s power.” Yet it says there: “This wicked man prayed to the Lord, from whom he was not to obtain mercy.” — I answer: Antiochus’s repentance was fruitless because it was imperfect and merely natural. He grieved for his past guilt because of the severity of his illness, not because he had offended God. This is indicated by the author of Maccabees in the same place. After recounting God’s vengeance falling upon him and the bitter pain of his body—“so that,” he says, “worms swarmed from the body of the impious man, his flesh flowed away while he still lived in pain, the army was burdened by his stench and foul odor, and the man who shortly before thought he touched the stars of heaven could not be carried by anyone because of the intolerable stench”—he immediately adds: “Thus, brought down from his great pride, he began to come to knowledge of himself,” etc. By this he signifies that his affliction, not offense against God, caused his repentance; so it is no wonder that his repentance was useless and ineffective, since its motive was wholly natural.

THEY OBJECT 3. God’s oracle in Proverbs 1 warns sinners who neglected God’s counsel and reproofs by delaying Penance: “When sudden calamity rushes in,” He says, “and destruction comes like a storm; when tribulation and distress come upon you, then they will call upon Me and I will not hear; though they rise early, they will not find Me.” Jeremiah 14 says likewise: “When they fast, I will not hear their prayers; and if they offer holocausts and victims, I will not receive them.” And Ecclesiastes 7: “Consider the works of God, for no one can correct what God has despised.” Therefore some sins cannot be expiated by Penance. — I deny the consequence: all these oracles concern only sinners who, after long scorning God’s warnings, turn to Him to avert temporal punishments more than from inward conversion of heart. For the most part such people invoke God only out of self-love, to escape punishments, not with true humility or sincere displeasure at sin, that is, repentance. If they truly convert and grieve for having offended God, God receives them when they return, however atrocious or numerous their sins. Isaiah 1 says: “Though your sins be as scarlet, they shall be made white as snow; and though they be red as crimson, they shall become white as wool.”

THEY OBJECT 4. Three testimonies of the Apostle seem to teach that in Christ’s Church there is no remedy by which sins committed after Baptism can be expiated and wiped away. The first is in Hebrews 6, where the Apostle says: “It is impossible for those who have once been enlightened, have tasted the heavenly gift, become partakers of the Holy Spirit, tasted the good word of God and the powers of the coming age, and then fallen away, to be renewed again to Penance, since they crucify the Son of God again for themselves and expose Him to contempt.” The second is from ch. 10 of the same epistle: “If we sin willfully after receiving knowledge of the truth, there is no longer left a sacrifice for sins, but a certain fearful expectation of judgment and a zeal of fire which will consume the adversaries.” The third is from ch. 12: “Know that even afterward, when he desired to inherit the blessing, he was rejected; for he found no place for repentance, although he had sought it with tears.” — I answer the first: the Apostle speaks of Penance which adults must do before Baptism, not of the Penance necessary after Baptism for the justification of a sinful man. An adult’s Penance is twofold: one precedes Baptism, of which St. Peter speaks when he says, “Do Penance, and let each of you be baptized”; this Penance is never repeated, just as Baptism is not repeated. The other follows Baptism, and it is the one we are discussing; St. Paul himself did not reject it, since he did not hesitate to absolve the incestuous Corinthian, though he had sinned after Baptism. St. Peter also approved and urged it when he said to the already baptized Simon Magus in Acts 8: “Do Penance, therefore, for this wickedness of yours, and pray to God, if perhaps this thought of your heart may be forgiven you,” etc. Indeed, St. Peter himself was already baptized and ordained a priest when he denied Christ three times; nevertheless, through tears and Penance he was reconciled. The Council of Trent mentions this twofold Penance, sess. VI, ch. 14: “Hence it must be taught that the Penance of a Christian after a fall is very different from baptismal Penance, and consists not only in ceasing from sin and detesting sins, or in a contrite and humbled heart, but also in their sacramental confession, at least by vow and to be made in due time, and in priestly absolution, and likewise in satisfaction through fasts, alms, prayers, and other pious exercises of the spiritual life—not for eternal punishment, which is remitted together with guilt either by the Sacrament or by the vow of the Sacrament, but for temporal punishment, which, as the sacred Scriptures teach, is not always remitted in the same way as in Baptism for those who, ungrateful for the grace of God they received, have grieved the Holy Spirit and have not feared to violate God’s temple”—as if to say: those who “tasted the heavenly gift, became partakers of the Holy Spirit, and fell away.” “Of this Penance it is written: ‘Remember from where you have fallen; do Penance and do your first works.’” And again: “Godly sorrow works Penance unto lasting salvation”; and again: “Do Penance.” — That the holy Apostle spoke of baptismal Penance is clear from the context of the whole passage. In the preceding words he says: “not laying again the foundation of Penance from dead works and of faith in God, the doctrine of baptisms, the laying on of hands, the resurrection of the dead, and eternal judgment.” He understood the second passage in the same way. This is also gathered from the words “those who have once been enlightened, to be renewed again,” which show that the whole statement refers to Baptism, which the Fathers of the earlier centuries called the Sacrament of illumination and renewal, as is clear from St. Gregory Nazianzen’s Oration On the Holy Lights and other ancient writers. The words “crucifying the Son of God again for themselves” show the same: in Baptism we are conformed to Christ crucified; therefore, just as Christ cannot be crucified forever, Baptism cannot be repeated. Whoever attempts it crucifies the Son of God again for himself, that is, for the renewal he hopes to receive from another Baptism. St. Ambrose explains this passage of the Apostle in the same way, bk. 2, On Penance, ch. 2: “That it was said of Baptism is shown by the very words, by which he signified that those who have fallen cannot be renewed to Penance. For through the washing we are renewed, through which we are born, as the Apostle Paul himself says: ‘We were buried with Him through Baptism into death, so that just as Christ rose from the dead through the glory of the Father, we too might walk in newness of life.’ Thus he teaches one Baptism, as elsewhere: ‘one faith, one Baptism.’ He also makes clear that in it the Son of God is crucified in the one who is baptized, because our flesh could not abolish sin unless it had been crucified in Christ Jesus. Finally it is written: ‘As many of us as have been baptized in Christ Jesus have been baptized into His death,’ etc. Therefore, when he says in this epistle to the Hebrews that it is impossible for those who have fallen to be renewed to Penance, crucifying the Son of God again and triumphing in a display, he means that we should understand this as spoken of Baptism, in which we crucify the Son in ourselves, so that through Him the world may be crucified to us. For in a certain display we triumph when we assume the likeness of His death, He who displayed and triumphed over principalities and powers on His cross, so that in the likeness of His death we too may triumph over the principalities whose yoke we lay down. Christ was crucified once and died once, and therefore there is one Baptism, not many.” — St. Augustine interprets the passage in the same way in his unfinished exposition of the Epistle to the Romans: “We say that those who have already been baptized are better cured through Penance, not renewed; for renewal takes place in Baptism, where Penance indeed operates, but as on a foundation. While the foundation remains, the building can be repaired; but if anyone tries to lay the foundation again, the whole building must be overturned. Therefore he says this to the Hebrews, who seemed to be turning from the New Testament back to the old priesthood. So he says: ‘Let us leave the beginning of Christ’s word and look to its completion. Let us not lay again the foundation of Penance from dead works and of faith in God, the doctrine of washing, the laying on of hands, the resurrection of the dead, and eternal judgment.’ All these things are handed down in Baptism, which he says must not be repeated in the consecration of the faithful.” Let St. John Damascene, bk. 1, On the Orthodox Faith, ch. 10, also be consulted.

The second passage is resolved in the same sense: “For those who sin willfully, no sacrifice for sins remains”—that is, no other death and Passion of Christ to be represented through Baptism and applied again for the full remission of guilt and all punishment. For St. Paul there seems to speak of Jews wavering in the faith and wishing to join the Law of Moses to Christ; he declares to them that no sacrifice for sin remains, because neither could the sacrifice offered on the altar of the cross benefit those defecting to Moses instead of Christ, nor could the legal sacrifices, since they had already been abolished and annulled by the sacrifice of Christ the Lord. St. Chrysostom also explains this passage in this way, in his homily on Hebrews 10: “For he did not say, ‘There is no more Penance, nor is there any more remission,’ but ‘There is no more sacrifice’; that is, there is no more cross, for this is what he calls the sacrifice.” St. Augustine likewise explains the passage in his unfinished exposition of the Epistle to the Romans: “Those who treat the passage in Hebrews more carefully understand it thus: what is said, ‘There still remains a sacrifice for sins,’ is not to be understood of a sacrifice contributed through Penance of the heart, but of the sacrifice of which the Apostle was speaking, namely, the holocaust of the Lord’s Passion, which each person offers for his sins at the time when he is dedicated by faith in that same Passion and is imbued with the name of Christian believers by Baptism. The Apostle meant to signify that one who has sinned cannot thereafter be cleansed again by being baptized. This interpretation does not exclude a place for repentance, provided we admit that those who have been baptized have not yet received full knowledge of the truth. Hence everyone who has received knowledge of the truth is understood to have been baptized; but not everyone baptized has received knowledge of the truth, because some later make progress while others are miserably negligent. Yet that sacrifice of which he spoke, the holocaust of the Lord, which is offered in a certain way for each person when he is marked with His name in Baptism, cannot be offered again if he sins. Those once baptized cannot be baptized again, even if they have sinned after Baptism through ignorance of the truth.” I answer the third: the Apostle uses “repentance” there not for sorrow over sins committed, but for a change in an accomplished act, purpose, or disposition of mind toward some act. In this sense God is said to repent, as St. Augustine explains on Psalm 109: “Repentance signifies a change of things. When you repent of something, you grieve over what you did; when God changes something contrary to men’s expectation—that is, contrary to what men expect—He is said to repent, so much so that He repents of our punishment if we repent of our evil life.” He teaches the same in Serm. 10: “Does God repent as if He were in error? Repentance is spoken of God as a change in created things, while He Himself remains unchanging.” In this sense the Apostle said in Romans 11, “The gifts of God are without repentance,” that is, God does not change His purpose of doing good once He has formed it. Thus, when the Apostle says Esau found no place for repentance, he means the repentance of his father Isaac, that is, the revocation of the blessing given to Jacob, which Esau could not obtain though he sought it with tears. For we read in Genesis 27 that when Isaac had given his blessing to Jacob, whom he thought was his firstborn, “Esau heard his father’s words, roared with a great cry, and, dismayed, said: ‘Bless me too, my father.’” — I answer secondly: even if “repentance” there were understood properly, it is no wonder that Esau’s was fruitless, since it was joined to a wicked disposition of mind, namely, the intent to kill his brother. For Genesis 27 says: “Esau always hated Jacob because of the blessing with which his father had blessed him, and he said in his heart: ‘The days of mourning for my father will come, and I will kill my brother Jacob.’” Therefore before the words quoted in the objection the Apostle had written: “Pursue peace with all and holiness, without which no one will see God; take care that no one fail of the grace of God, that no root of bitterness springing up may hinder and through it many be defiled, that no fornicator or profane person be found, like Esau, who for one meal sold his birthright,” etc.

THEY OBJECT 5. The saying of Christ the Lord in Matthew 12: “Every sin and blasphemy will be forgiven men, but the blasphemy of the Spirit will not be forgiven; and whoever speaks against the Holy Spirit will not be forgiven, either in this age or in the age to come.” Therefore Penance does not wash away every sin. — The consequence is proved by the authority of the Fathers, who interpret these words of Scripture literally and according to the sense they immediately convey. Thus St. Athanasius, in his book on that Gospel passage, admits that some crime is irremissible: “But those who think they possess knowledge of the Law, such as the Pharisees of that time who had gone mad, wholly deny the Word who is in the heart and attribute the works of the Divinity to the devil and his demons; they justly suffer an unappealable punishment for such impiety, since they take the devil for God and believe that the one true God does nothing more than a demon. The Jews of that time, and among the Jews the Pharisees, had fallen into this sort of impiety.… Hence our Savior shows that they blasphemed inexcusably.” St. Pacian likewise interprets the passage in ep. 3, To Sympronian the Novatian: “You have above what is written: when the Lord drove out demons by a word and performed many mighty works, the Pharisees said, ‘This man does not cast out demons except by Beelzebub, the prince of demons.’ This was to sin against the Holy Spirit, to blaspheme against the works done through the Holy Spirit. In other sins we slip through error, are broken by fear, or are overcome by the weakness of the flesh. This is blindness: not to see what one sees, and to assign the works of the Holy Spirit to the devil, calling the devil’s power that glory of the Lord by which the devil himself is overcome. This, then, is what will not be forgiven; all the rest is granted to good penitents, brother Sympronian.” — St. Ambrose says the same, bk. 2, ch. 4: “The Lord’s answer to the Pharisees’ blasphemy was that He denied them the grace of His power, which brings remission of sins, because they claimed that His heavenly power was supported by the devil; He also says that those who divide the Church of God use a devilish spirit, thereby including heretics and schismatics of every age, to whom He denies pardon, since what one sin is among individuals, this sin is among all. For they alone seek to undo the grace of Christ, who have torn apart the members of the Church, for which the Lord Jesus suffered and the Holy Spirit was given to us. Finally, so that you may know He speaks of those who scatter, we read: ‘He who is not with Me is against Me, and he who does not gather with Me scatters.’ And so that we might know He spoke of these people, He immediately added: ‘Therefore I say to you, every sin and blasphemy will be forgiven men, but the blasphemy of the Spirit will not be forgiven men.’ By saying ‘therefore I say to you,’ did He not plainly wish us to understand that this was meant above all?” — Finally St. Hilary writes in canon 12 on Matthew: “He condemns with the severest judgment the opinion of the Pharisees and of those who share their perversity, promising pardon for all sins and denying forgiveness for blasphemy against the Spirit. For while other words and deeds are released by generous pardon, there is no mercy if God is denied in Christ; and where one sins without pardon, He offers the kindness of repeated admonition, so that sins of every kind are to be remitted, but blasphemy against the Holy Spirit is not to be remitted. For what is farther from pardon than to deny in Christ that He is God and to remove from Him the substance of the Father’s Spirit dwelling in Him?” — I answer first, distinguishing: I deny that blasphemy against the Holy Spirit is irremissible in itself, and with respect to God’s mercy and the Church’s power of the keys. I grant that it is irremissible accidentally, either because the sinner perseveres in it to his last breath, or because that blasphemy is nothing other than final impenitence itself. This explanation of the passage cited in the objection is St. Augustine’s, as is clear from his ep. 50, To Boniface, where he writes against the Donatists, who interpreted Christ’s words about blasphemy against the Holy Spirit perversely: “Let them understand, then, that not every sin, but some particular sin against the Holy Spirit was signified as wholly irremissible. For when He said, ‘If I had not come, they would not have sin,’ He surely did not mean every sin, since they were full of many great sins, but some particular sin which, if they did not have it, would allow all their other sins to be forgiven: namely, that they did not believe in Him who had come. They would not have had this sin if He had not come. So too, when He spoke of those who sin against the Holy Spirit, or speak a word against the Holy Spirit, He did not mean every sin against the Holy Spirit by deed or word, but some definite and particular sin. This is the hardness of heart by which a man refuses, until the end of this life, to receive remission of sins within the unity of the Body of Christ, which the Holy Spirit gives life to. For after saying to the disciples, ‘Receive the Holy Spirit,’ He immediately added: ‘Whose sins you forgive, they are forgiven; whose you retain, they are retained.’ Whoever resists and opposes this gift of God’s grace, or in any way remains alienated from it until the end of this temporal life, will not be forgiven in this age or the next of this very great sin, by which all sins are held bound. It cannot be proved that anyone has committed it until he has departed from the body; for as long as he lives here, God’s patience, as the Apostle says, leads him to Penance. But if by his own most grievous wickedness, as the Apostle goes on to say, ‘according to the hardness of his heart and impenitent heart he stores up wrath for himself on the day of wrath and of the revelation of God’s just judgment,’ he will not be forgiven in this age or the next.” And in the Enchiridion, ch. 82: “Whoever does not believe that sins are forgiven in the Church, and scorns so great a generosity of the divine gift, and ends his life in this obstinacy of mind, is guilty of that irremissible sin against the Holy Spirit, in whom Christ forgives sins.” Finally, in Serm. 11, On the Lord’s Words, where he carefully examines this question of irremissible blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, after first saying that Christ’s words cannot be understood of every blasphemy, lest hope of remission be taken from pagans, Jews, heretics, and every kind of person who blasphemes against the Holy Spirit through diverse errors and contradictions, if they correct themselves, he adds in ch. 12: “This blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, which according to Christ’s words can never be forgiven, is final impenitence. The impenitent heart speaks against this gift, against this grace of God. Therefore impenitence itself is blasphemy against the Spirit, which will not be forgiven in this age or in the age to come. This impenitence, for we may use a single name for it, and call it both blasphemy and a word against the Holy Spirit, has no remission forever.… This impenitence has no remission in this age or in the age to come, because Penance obtains remission in this age that avails in the next. But this impenitence, or impenitent heart, cannot be judged in anyone as long as he lives in this flesh. For we must despair of no one as long as God’s patience leads him to Penance.” After much more he concludes: “There is therefore one refuge to keep blasphemy from being irremissible: let the impenitent heart be guarded against, and let no one think Penance useful except by holding fast to the Church; remission of sins is given, and fellowship in the Spirit is kept in the bond of peace.” — The Fathers cited in the objection are to be understood in this way. They all mean that those who sin against the Holy Spirit have no excuse for sin, such as ignorance or weakness in most other crimes. “I obtained mercy,” says the Apostle, “because I acted ignorantly in unbelief.” And the Royal Psalmist says, “God knows our nature; He remembers that we are dust.” That this was St. Athanasius’s opinion is clear from his book On the Common Essence of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, fol. 392, where he plainly says that no sin, not even blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, is wholly irremissible: “There are others who stumble against the Holy Spirit and thus speak blasphemies against the divinity of Christ, namely, that He cast out demons by Beelzebub, the prince of demons. Of these it must be understood that He said, ‘It will not be forgiven in this age or the next.’ Yet one must also observe that Christ did not say that forgiveness would not be given to one who blasphemes and does Penance, but to one who blasphemes and remains in blasphemy, since no sin is irremissible before God for those who truly, sincerely, and as they ought, do Penance.” — As for St. Pacian, I say that he does not absolutely deny that blasphemy against the Holy Spirit can be remitted. In the preceding words of the same passage, he presses the Novatian to whom he writes: “After this,” he says, “you propose that the Lord wrote: ‘Every sin and blasphemy will be forgiven men; but whoever sins against the Holy Spirit will not be forgiven, either here or in the next age.’ Either I am mistaken, or this example is against you. For if every sin and blasphemy is forgiven, you see that pardon is not denied to penitents. Therefore every sin, and therefore blasphemy itself too. Luke adds: ‘Whoever sins against the Son of Man will be forgiven.’ What could be more than this in the clemency of the Judge?” — As for St. Ambrose, the reading of the whole context alone makes his meaning plain. The words cited against us are these: “It has been reported to us,” he says, “that you also customarily object that it is written: ‘Every sin and blasphemy will be forgiven men, but the blasphemy of the Spirit will not be forgiven,’ etc. By this example your whole claim is destroyed and undone, for it is written, ‘Every sin and blasphemy will be forgiven men.’ Why then do you not forgive? Why do you bind bonds you do not loose? Why do you tie knots you do not untie? Forgive the others, and let us discuss those whom you think are eternally bound by Gospel authority as sinners against the Holy Spirit; let us consider whom it binds.… ” Finally, Peter said to Simon, who, corrupted by the practice of magic, thought that he could buy Christ’s grace through the laying on of hands and the infusion of the Holy Spirit: “‘You have no part or share in this faith, because your heart is not right before God. Do Penance, therefore, for this wickedness of yours, and pray to the Lord, if perhaps this thought of your heart may be forgiven you.’ You see that apostolic authority condemns this man, who blasphemed against the Holy Spirit through magical delusion, all the more because he did not have a pure conscience of faith; yet it did not cut off his hope of pardon, since it invited him to Penance.” After the words cited in the objection, where he seems to declare two crimes irremissible—those of the Pharisees who likened the devil to Christ, and of schismatics who tear apart Christ’s Church—he adds, lest anyone think he was taking away hope of pardon from such people: “Therefore return to the Church, you who have impiously separated yourselves. For He promises pardon to all who convert, since it is written: ‘Everyone who calls on the name of the Lord will be saved.’ Finally, even the Jewish people who said of the Lord Jesus, ‘He has a demon; He casts out demons by Beelzebub,’ and who crucified the Lord Jesus, were called by Peter’s preaching to Baptism, so that they might lay aside the guilt of so great a crime.” — St. Hilary’s words are to be taken in the same sense. Though they seem harsher at first, they do not mean that the sin of blasphemy against the Holy Spirit is never forgiven or is absolutely irremissible, since he says in the same place that pardon, by which every sin is to be remitted, is stored in the secret of God’s indulgence. Rather, they only indicate that Jews who blasphemed in this way were more unworthy of pardon than Gentiles to whom Christ had preached neither His Gospel nor performed miracles. St. Hilary shows this by the comparison with the divinities and the Queen of Sheba which Christ presses in the same chapter of Matthew 12: “The comparison heaps up the accusation,” he says, “and leaves the Jews without excuse through the faith of the Gentiles: though they believed those prophets, Jonah and Solomon, they do not believe Christ, who is greater than Jonah and Solomon. And therefore they will judge them at the resurrection, because fear of God was found in those to whom the Law had not been preached; the Jews are more unworthy of pardon because they are faithless though they have the Law, whereas greater faith was found in those who did not know the Law.”

YOU WILL PRESS: Blasphemy by which God’s works are attributed to the devil is blasphemy against the Holy Spirit; but this is absolutely irremissible; therefore final impenitence alone is not the irremissible blasphemy. The minor premise is proved from St. Jerome’s ep. 149 to Marcella, in which he explains what sin Christ called irremissible and proves against the Novatians that denying Christ out of fear of torture is not an inexpiable sin. “Hence,” he says, “he must be convicted from the whole order of Scripture: the blasphemy was not called irremissible for those who, compelled by tortures and racked by various torments, denied the Lord, but for those who, seeing God’s works in miracles, slander them and cry out that they are the devil’s power, and say that all the signs performed belong not to divine majesty but to the devil.… Let the Novatian prove that anyone who was compelled to sacrifice before a judge’s tribunal replied that all the things written in the Gospel were performed not by the Son of God but by Beelzebub, the prince of demons; then he will be able to establish that blasphemy against the Holy Spirit is irremissible.” And below: “It is clear that sin against the Holy Spirit cannot be forgiven because it contains blasphemy: when you see God in miracles, you slander His deeds as Beelzebub. Let him prove, then, that any denier called Christ Beelzebub, and I will gladly concede that a denier cannot obtain pardon after his fall; for it is one thing to yield to torments and deny oneself to be a Christian, another to call Christ the devil, as Scripture itself and its context, read more attentively, could show you.” From this I infer that St. Jerome held the blasphemy against the Holy Spirit he explained to be inexpiable in the same sense in which the Novatian claimed that denying Christ under force or fear of torture was irremissible. But the Novatian claimed that denial of Christ was wholly irremissible, not merely difficult to expiate. Therefore St. Jerome thought that blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, as he explained it, is absolutely irremissible. — I ANSWER: I distinguish the major: St. Jerome uses a figure of concession to show that Christ’s words about irremissible blasphemy against the Holy Spirit do not favor the Novatians, I grant; that he granted this absolutely, I deny. The Novatians contended that any sins committed by Christians after Baptism were inexpiable, especially denial of Christ and the Christian name, on this argument: the sin of blasphemy against the Holy Spirit is irremissible; but denial of Christ and the Christian name, and idolatry, are sins against the Holy Spirit; therefore they are irremissible. This argument troubled Marcella, a most devout, learned, and illustrious woman, and she could not answer it. So she consulted St. Jerome. What does he say? First, he denies that idolatry and denial of Christ and the Christian name are blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, since otherwise there would be no distinction between blasphemy said to be against the Son of Man and blasphemy against the Holy Spirit. Second, he proves that the blasphemy of those who deny Christ can be remitted by the example of St. Peter, whose sin of denial was forgiven. Finally, setting aside the question which he says he cannot then examine because he is occupied with other studies and concerns—whether blasphemy against the Holy Spirit is absolutely irremissible—he says that even if he granted this to the Novatians, they would not have proved their claim: granting, I say, but not conceding, that blasphemy against the Holy Spirit were absolutely and by its nature irremissible, it would not follow that all mortal sins of the baptized are irremissible, since they are not blasphemies against the Holy Spirit. For blasphemy against the Holy Spirit is said to occur only when someone sees Christ in His powers, that is, His miracles, and slanders Him as Beelzebub in His deeds, that is, attributes God’s works to the devil, as the Jews did when they said, “He casts out demons by Beelzebub, the prince of demons.” This is clear from the context of the whole epistle. That St. Jerome did not write everything needed to resolve that question, but only what sufficed to dissolve the Novatians’ argument, is clear from the end of the epistle: “I should indeed have discussed the matter at greater length,” he says, “but I cannot deny my presence to friends who have gathered at our lodging, and it seemed arrogant not to answer you at once; so I have compressed a broad discussion into a brief reply.”

YOU WILL PRESS: Blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, which will not be forgiven in this age or the next, is any mortal sin committed by the baptized; therefore no crime of the baptized can be expiated by Penance. The antecedent is proved by the authority of Origen and Theognostus, whom St. Athanasius praises in his book On That Gospel Passage: “‘Whoever speaks a word against the Son of Man,’ etc. By these words, then, the men of old, among them Origen, a man of extensive learning and great diligence, and that admirable and most studious Theognostus, teach us that this is blasphemy against the Holy Spirit: when those who have been deemed worthy of the gifts of the Holy Spirit through Baptism return to sins, and hence do not obtain remission.”

I ANSWER: Origen and Theognostus called the crimes of the baptized irremissible not absolutely, but in comparison with the sins of pagans. Perhaps this is the more hidden sense which St. Athanasius says should be sought in their words: “I think both opinions require further inquiry and examination, to see whether there is some more hidden and profound meaning in their words.” Certainly Origen did not hold that sins committed after Baptism were irremissible, as is clear from the countless passages in which he exhorts the faithful to Penance and confession of sins. A notable passage proving this is in bk. 3 of Against Celsus: “How severe,” he says, “is our discipline toward sinners, especially those stained by lust, whom our community expels, even though Celsus makes them out to be like worthless charlatans. The venerable school of the Pythagoreans set up cenotaphs for deserters from its discipline, evidently considering them dead; our people, however, mourn as lost and dead to God those overcome by lust or some similar vice, but again receive those who come to their senses as if they had returned from the dead, finally after a longer proof of a better disposition than when they were first admitted to learn the religion, yet on this condition: since they have fallen, they are henceforth excluded from all ecclesiastical honors and offices.” Later, when Celsus objects that Christians think an unjust man is received by God if he humbles himself because of his misery, Origen answers that they do not teach it is enough for the unjust man to acknowledge his misery to be received by God; rather, God receives the man who condemns his former life and turns to a better way. Finally, in the same book he teaches that God raises no evil man unless he turns to virtue: “But those who condemn their sins with their whole heart,” he says, “and bewail and mourn for themselves as rightly lost because of their misdeeds, and then choose the change befitting those who come to their senses—these, at last, He pardons their past errors because their mind has changed for the better, while the virtue that has succeeded to the vices driven from the soul obtains forgetfulness of past things.” All this plainly shows that Origen thought sins committed after Baptism are remitted by God and the Church. — But whatever Origen and Theognostus thought about this, though they spoke more harshly before the rise of the Novatian heresy, the opinion attributed to them is false: it is false, I say, that the unremitted blasphemy against the Holy Spirit is any sin committed by the baptized, as St. Athanasius proves by many arguments in the book cited above. First, the Holy Trinity is undivided, and therefore whoever sins against the Son and blasphemes necessarily sins against the Father and the Holy Spirit. Second, Baptism is given in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; hence those who transgress after Baptism would again have to blaspheme against the holy and undivided Trinity. Third, Christ’s words, “Whoever speaks against the Holy Spirit will not be forgiven, either in this age or the next,” were spoken not of the baptized but of the Pharisees; hence this saying cannot apply to those who transgress after Baptism, especially since He rebuked them not for sins in general but for blasphemy. The difference is that one who sins transgresses the Law, while one who blasphemes acts impiously against the very Godhead, says St. Athanasius. Fourth, if this was said of those who sin after Baptism, why did Paul restore the repentant man at Corinth to communion, asks Athanasius? Why did he travail over the Galatians who turned back until Christ was formed in them again, since in the word again one may discern even their first initiation in the Holy Spirit? Or why should we be angry with Novatus for abolishing Penance and saying that those who sin after the washing obtain no pardon?

THEY OBJECT 6. From the Epistle of St. John, ch. 5: “Whoever knows his brother to sin a sin not unto death, let him ask, and life will be given him for a sin not unto death. There is a sin unto death; I do not say that anyone should ask for it.” Therefore that sin cannot be remitted. — I DENY the consequence: that sin unto death admits various interpretations. First, many sacred interpreters understand by it final impenitence and final persistence in evil, as St. Augustine also interprets it, bk. On Correction and Grace, ch. 12. After prefacing the Apostle’s words, he adds: “Since that sin is not specified, many different things may be thought of it; but I say that it is the sin of abandoning until death the faith that works through love.” This impenitence is rightly called irremissible, because it is a rejection of Penance and the sin of a man already outside the state of a wayfarer; consequently, praying for him would be no less futile than praying for the sin of demons, as the same St. Augustine teaches, bk. 21, City of God, ch. 24. He writes: “If the Church were so certain about certain people that it knew who they were, and knew that although still living this life they were predestined to go into eternal fire with the devil, it would no more pray for them than for the devil himself; but since it is certain of no one, it prays for all men, even its enemies living in this body, though it is not heard for all of them.” But if the sin unto death is understood as some particular sin distinct from final impenitence itself, St. John says that it is not fitting for anyone to pray for it, because no ordinary petitioner suffices to obtain pardon for such a sin unto death; an intercessor of outstanding holiness is required to obtain its pardon. For Scripture mentions two kinds of sin: some may be called not unto death because they are easily cured, such as those which extinguish neither faith nor the desire for salvation, for which the Apostle advises prayer and promises pardon. Other sins are cured with great difficulty, such as positive unbelief, especially among heresiarchs. Although the Apostle does not forbid prayer for such sins, he does not dare advise that anyone pray for them, because unless such prayer is exceedingly effective, it will fail of its purpose. — St. Ambrose, bk. 1, On Penance, ch. 9, clearly shows that this was indeed St. John’s meaning. In answer to the Novatians’ objection just cited, he says: “John was not speaking to Moses and Jeremiah, but to the people, who should appoint another sinner for their own sins, one who would consider it enough to pray to God for lighter offenses and reserve pardon for graver ones to the prayers of the just. For how could John say that one should not pray for a graver offense, when he had read that Moses prayed and obtained what he asked where there was willful transgression, and knew that Jeremiah had also prayed? How could John say that one should not pray for a sin unto death, when he himself wrote in the Apocalypse the command to the angel of the Church at Pergamum: ‘You have there those who hold the teaching of Balaam, who taught Balak to place a stumbling block before the children of Israel, to eat and commit fornication; so you also have those who hold the teaching of the Nicolaitans. Repent in like manner, or I will come to you quickly’? Do you see that God, who demands Penance, promises pardon? Finally, there too He says: ‘He who has an ear, let him hear what the Spirit says to the churches: To the victor I will give the hidden manna.’ Had not John himself known that Stephen had prayed for his persecutors, who could not bear to hear the name of Christ, when he said of those stoning him, ‘Lord, do not hold this sin against them’? We see the effect of his prayer in the Apostle: Paul, who guarded the garments of those stoning Stephen, soon afterward by Christ’s grace became an Apostle, though he had been a persecutor.” These are St. Ambrose’s words, by which he plainly teaches that there is no sin so grave that we cannot obtain pardon for it through saving Penance.

YOU WILL PRESS: St. Augustine, bk. 1, On the Lord’s Sermon on the Mount, ch. 22, says: “I think a sin unto death occurs when, after knowing God through Christ’s grace, someone attacks the brotherhood and is driven into the jaws of envy against that very grace. So great is the stain of that sin that he cannot submit to the humility of entreaty, even if the sinner is compelled by much reflection of conscience and admonition”; therefore he thinks there is some sin that can in no way be removed by Penance. — I ANSWER: St. Augustine means nothing other than that this sin cannot easily be cured or washed away by human powers with God’s ordinary help, not that it cannot be cured absolutely by God’s extraordinary power. For St. Augustine himself teaches that even the most abandoned sinners can be converted by God, explaining the words of Psalm 76, “In the depth of the sea”: “He converts,” he says, “those who lie submerged in the depths of this world under the weight of sins, in order to free those who are most desperate sinners.”

YOU WILL OBJECT 7: From Clement of Rome, bk. 2, Apostolic Constitutions, ch. 23, who says: “If anyone deserts the battle line, tempting God as if the wicked man were not pursued by punishments, he will not obtain pardon, even if he says to himself, ‘May God make this turn out well for me, for I will walk in the integrity of my heart,’” etc. Therefore some sin is irremissible.

I ANSWER: As was proved in vol. I, the Apostolic Constitutions are neither by the Apostles nor by Clement of Rome. But whoever their author may be, I deny that he recognized any sin as absolutely and by its nature irremissible. The words cited in the argument do not prove this; they only say that a man so wickedly disposed to the end of his life that he can see God’s judgment will not obtain pardon. This is clear from the same author’s teaching in ch. 24 of the same book, where he is very angry with those who deny Penance to sinners. “Let the bishop,” he says, “preserve his people as far as he can, so that those who have not sinned remain outside sin; and let him receive those who have sinned when they turn back from their sins, applying medicine. But if he cruelly refuses Penance, he will sin against the Lord his God, justifying himself above His justice and not receiving the man whom God receives through Christ.… Those who do not receive penitents provoke Him to anger.”

YOU WILL OBJECT 8: From St. Cyprian, in On the Lapsed, who says that Moses, Daniel, and Job prayed for sinners but did not obtain their request, citing the Lord’s words: “Even if these three men, Noah, Job, and Daniel, were in their midst, they would not deliver sons or daughters, but they alone would be saved.” Therefore the prayers of the saints do not obtain pardon for sinners, and consequently their sins are irremissible.

I ANSWER: The Novatians abused this testimony of St. Cyprian and twisted his words to a perverse meaning, as St. Pacian shows in ep. 5, To Sympronian. “For when he compelled the lapsed to do Penance, they did not wish to repent, saying that they had received peace from confessors or martyrs. He taught and showed that not even those patriarchs obtained it for the unrepentant. For who can free one unwilling? Who can humble himself for the proud, or obtain pardon for the unrepentant? In saying this, he was compelling them to the remedies of Penance. That man of such gravity and merit did not say anything contrary to himself; rather, he taught sinners to pour forth prayers and to cherish public confession.” Pacian proves this from the very examples Cyprian used: “Do you not see for whom Moses did not obtain what he asked? When he returned to the people, what did he hear in the camp? The voices of drunkards and the songs of idol worship rang out. The people still persisted in wickedness, still remained in the very crime, and did not know how to repent. Yet who among us told you that Moses did not obtain his request? God had indeed said to him, ‘He has sinned before Me; I will erase him from the book.’ He had said this with the authority of a judge and the power of the Lord; but see how quickly He reversed the sentence pronounced against the people’s wickedness. Hear the Prophet there at once: ‘Moses prayed in the sight of the Lord his God: Why, Lord, are You so angry with Your people?’… ‘And the Lord was moved to mercy concerning the evil He had said He would do to His people.’ Do you see God’s anger softened? Do you see the offense appeased? But you say Noah, Daniel, and Job could not deliver sons and daughters. This is the same case: if they pray for those who do not pray, if they intercede for those persisting in crime, if they defend not individuals or a few but many thousands. Besides, Noah saved his household from public ruin; Job received all that he had lost; and Daniel by prayer turned aside the sword that threatened Babylon’s wise men. Certainly Lot prayed for the safety of the town, and Paul for the ship’s officers. Thus the just obtain acquittal for those who know how to repent. Finally, I also consider the written words, ‘They alone will be saved.’ Who are they? Surely those who intercede for sinners; they may safely plead for such people. Why then do you condemn the Church? Why do you forbid intercession for penitents, if it is lawful to ask even for those for whom one cannot obtain pardon? Read my Cyprian more carefully, then. Read the whole letter On the Lapsed; read the other one he wrote to Antonianus, where the Novatian is challenged by all the examples, and you will know what he declares about the healing of penitents.” These are St. Pacian’s words.

Second conclusion. — ONE MORTAL SIN CANNOT BE REMITTED THROUGH PENANCE IN THE ORDINARY COURSE WITHOUT ANOTHER, THOUGH IT COULD BE THROUGH GOD’S EXTRAORDINARY WILL AND POWER. This conclusion consists of two parts, of which

The first is common among theologians and is gathered from sacred Scripture, which repeatedly insists that remission of all mortal sins occurs through Penance. Thus Ezekiel 18: “When the wicked man turns away from the wickedness he has committed, and does judgment and justice, he will give life to his soul. For if he considers and turns away from all his iniquities which he has committed, he will live and not die.” But he could not live, that is, have full and perfect life, if he were partly in the state of death and partly in the state of grace, with one sin present and another expiated. For St. James 2 warns: “Whoever keeps the whole Law but stumbles in one point has become guilty of all; for He who said, ‘You shall not commit adultery,’ also said, ‘You shall not kill.’ If you do not commit adultery but do kill, you have become a transgressor of the Law.” Each mortal sin brings death to the soul itself, according to Ezekiel 18: “The soul that sins shall itself die.” Hence the Council of Trent rightly says, sess. V, in its decree on original sin: “If anyone denies that through the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, which is conferred in Baptism, the debt of original sin is remitted, or even asserts that not all that has the true and proper character of sin is taken away, but says that it is only scraped off or not imputed, let him be anathema”; for “in those reborn God hates nothing, because there is no condemnation for those who have truly been buried with Christ through Baptism into death,” etc. Therefore all mortal sins are remitted and pardoned together.

Innocent III thus explains and proves this truth, as is reported in ch. Maiores, On Baptism. Asking why original sin is not remitted in Baptism to the insane and sleeping, at least as it is to infants, he says: “The answer must be given in this way: the Lord, who made the whole man well on the Sabbath, does not know an imperfect work, and remits this sin not in part but entirely.” He adds another reason: “Moreover, the punishment for original sin is deprivation of the vision of God, while the actual punishment of sin is the torments of everlasting hell. Thus, if the first were remitted to someone while the other was not, he would not be deprived of the vision of God on account of original sin, which was remitted, and yet would be tormented forever in hell on account of the debt of actual sin. But these things, as incompatible, do not tolerate one another at all; rather, they are mutually opposed.” These are Innocent’s words, which most clearly support our assertion, especially because remission of sin does not occur without infusion of justifying grace. In fact, justifying grace is altogether incompatible in the present order with any mortal sin, since through it a man is formally constituted a friend and son of God and heir of eternal life, as the Council of Trent teaches, sess. VI, ch. 7: “Justification itself follows this disposition or preparation; it is not merely remission of sins, but also sanctification and renewal of the inner man through the voluntary reception of grace and gifts. Thus a man from unjust becomes just, and from an enemy a friend, so that he may be an heir according to the hope of eternal life.” But every mortal sin makes a man an enemy of God and a child of hell, and therefore cannot coexist with the infusion of sanctifying grace by which a man is constituted a son and friend of God.

The same assertion is admirably explained and proved by whoever the author of bk. 9 of On True and False Penance may be. Having said that Christ never healed anyone without freeing him completely from every infirmity, he concludes: “For it is a kind of impiety of unbelief to hope for half a salvation from Him who is just and is justice.”

YOU WILL SAY 1: In fact, God sometimes remits one sin without another, as He indicates through the Prophet Amos, ch. 1, saying: “I rained upon one city and did not rain upon another; one part was rained upon, and the part on which it did not rain withered.” St. Gregory explains these words in hom. 16 on Ezekiel: “When the man who hates his neighbor corrects himself of other vices, one and the same city is watered in part and remains dry in part, because there are those who cut away certain vices while persisting grievously in others.” Therefore, according to St. Gregory’s meaning and the sense of Scripture, one sin is remitted without another. — I DENY the consequence. Regarding St. Gregory, I say that some people do indeed cut away one vice in the sense that they cease the act, but not in the remission of guilt: a man who was accustomed to commit several sins may abandon one but not another, and thus does not attain remission of guilt.

YOU WILL SAY 2: Sins are remitted in people chiefly through charity; but some penitents have a more excellent act of love of God than others; therefore they obtain remission of more sins than others, as Christ the Lord indicates in Luke 7, saying: “To whom less is forgiven, he loves less.” Consequently, according to the intensity or remission of love, more or fewer sins are remitted. — I DISTINGUISH the major: sins are remitted through charity that is more or less intense as regards the intensity or remission of punishment, I grant; as regards guilt, I deny. Thus, the more fervent the act of love with which the penitent loves God, the greater the remission of the punishment due for sins he obtains. The debt of guilt is otherwise: it can be wiped away by any act of perfect contrition or of love of God for His own sake and above all things.

The second part—namely, that by His absolute power and extraordinary disposition God can remit one sin without another—has already been amply proved in the treatise On Grace, disp. 3, art. 2, q. 4, where from the Subtle Doctor we proved that God can remit sin by a merely extrinsic and gratuitous pardon, without any infusion of sanctifying grace. We also proved in the preceding conclusion that by absolute power sanctifying grace can coexist with sin. From these points one may reason as follows: whoever can remit a sin by extrinsic pardon alone and preserve grace together with sin can remit one sin without remitting another; but God can do both; therefore, etc. Thomists readily admit the major, and rightly so: that extrinsic pardon is wholly discretionary and may, at the pardoner’s pleasure, extend either to every offense altogether or only to part of it. Even if matters were not as we have shown them to be—which we have proved to be entirely true—and even if, as the Thomists maintain, remission of sin could not occur without infusion of grace, nevertheless, since God, as we proved, can in the extraordinary course preserve grace together with sin, it is clear that He can infuse the grace necessary for remitting one sin, say adultery, while preserving, or not remitting, another sin, for example murder, committed by the same adulterer. Since all this has already been proved most fully in the places cited above, there is no need to dwell on it further here.

NOTE 1. It is certain that every sin, even the slightest, must necessarily be cleansed before the attainment of eternal happiness, for nothing defiled shall enter the kingdom of heaven, nor shall anyone ascend the Lord’s mountain or rest upon his holy mountain unless innocent in hands and pure in heart; hence, “Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God.” But theologians dispute by what means and remedies lesser sins, called venial, can be cleansed and forgiven. For the Council of Trent most plainly teaches that they can be expiated in many ways, sess. XIV, ch. 5, where it says: “Venial sins, by which we are not excluded from grace and into which we fall more frequently, although they are rightly and usefully confessed without any presumption, as the practice of devout persons shows, may nevertheless be omitted without fault and expiated by many other remedies.” Since the Council does not specify what those remedies are, theologians have taken occasion to put forward various ways by which they think such sins can be blotted out and forgiven.

NOTE 2. There are three principal and chief remedies by which venial sin is held especially capable of expiation: namely, the virtue of penance; frequent reception of the sacraments, especially penance and the Eucharist; and certain sacred actions which theologians call sacramentals, ten in number according to the older theologians: namely, the common confession usually made at the beginning of Mass and at the end of Compline; striking the breast as a sign of sorrow and penance; sprinkling with holy water; an act of interior sorrow for sins; prayer, especially the Lord’s Prayer; making the sign of the cross; eating blessed bread; giving alms; extreme unction; patiently enduring punishment; and works of mercy. All these are included in the following verses:

I confess, I strike, I sprinkle, I grieve, I pray,
I am washed, I eat, I give; by these I remove venial sins:
Unction, light punishment, compassion shown to the needy.

Other theologians, especially more recent ones, count only six such sacred actions that remit venial sin, which are contained in the following verse:

Praying, sprinkled, eating, confessing, giving, blessing.

These signify, first, the Lord’s Prayer, in which we pray that our daily faults be forgiven; second, holy water, which, as we said in the first Disputation, has various effects, especially the efficacy of remitting venial sins by the work of the one acting; third, blessed bread; fourth, general confession; fifth, the giving of alms; sixth, the blessing of a bishop or a consecrated abbot. The question, then, is whether venial sin is remitted not only through the virtue of penance, whether specifically or generally understood, and through reception of the sacraments, but also through such sacramentals.

NOTE 3. According to the Doctor, In IV Sent., d. 21, q. 1, n. 8, venial sin, besides an obligation to punishment, leaves in the soul some stain, or debt of guilt. For after saying at n. 6 that there are two opinions about the remission of venial sin, the first being “that the remission of venial guilt is nothing other than payment of the temporal punishment due for it—for after the passing act, the guilt that remains is nothing other than a debt to the punishment due; and this venial debt is only to temporal punishment,” he adds at n. 8: “But this account does not please, because the Saints seem to distinguish between the remission of the guilt of any sin and of its punishment, and especially between remission of guilt and payment of the punishment due for that guilt.” This truth is plainly gathered a posteriori from the universal practice of the Church, which imposes sacramental penance for venial sins alone when confessed and remitted as to guilt through absolution. The a priori reason is that venial sin is a true and real offense against God, in keeping with the Apostle James, ch. 3: “In many things we all offend.” Therefore, just as mortal sin, because it is a grave offense, leaves behind a grave habitual stain, so by the same reasoning venial sin, because it is a slight offense, leaves behind a slight habitual stain. Both, then, displease God, since by either God’s law is violated and hence there is a certain virtual contempt of God, which cannot but truly and really displease him, though unequally. The question is how this debt of venial guilt can be cleansed both in this life and after death.

First conclusion. — VENIAL SIN IS REMITTED IN THIS LIFE AS TO THE DEBT OF GUILT AND OF PUNISHMENT, NOT ONLY THROUGH AN ACT OF FORMAL OR VIRTUAL PENANCE, BUT ALSO THROUGH RECEPTION OF THE SACRAMENTS AND EVERY MERITORIOUS WORK, AND THEREFORE ALSO THROUGH SACRAMENTALS. This conclusion has four parts, of which

The first is proved: namely, that venial sin is remitted through an act of formal or virtual penance. For venial sin can be remitted by that by which mortal sin can be blotted out; but an act of penance suffices to blot out mortal sin, not only formal but also virtual, as was said in the preceding Question. Therefore an act of either kind of penance will suffice all the more for this. Furthermore, that suffices for remitting venial sin which is opposed to it; but virtual penance is sufficiently opposed to virtual sin. For in venial sin there is a turning away, not from friendship—which only mortal sin dissolves—but from familiarity with God, because this sin is some disordered turning toward a creature. In virtual penance, however, such as an act of charity, there is a turning away from the creature and an approach to familiarity with God. Therefore virtual penance suffices to expiate this kind of sin.

YOU WILL SAY: Venial sin is removed only by what is opposed to it; but virtual penance is not opposed to it. For if any act is an act of virtual penance, it is most of all an act of fervent charity; but this is not opposed to venial sin, both because it can coexist with it, and because devotion toward divine things and a joking lie have no opposition: for truth, not devotion, is opposed to a lie. Therefore, etc. — I DENY the minor premise. In answer to its proof I say that, although an act of most fervent charity or devotion is not formally opposed to venial sin, it is opposed to it virtually and according to its generic character. For both of those virtues tend readily toward God, and with alacrity of spirit; consequently they are opposed to the delay, or languor, in the movement’s tendency toward God which venial sin brings about.

The second part is proved: namely, that venial sin can be remitted through reception of the sacraments of the New Law. First, all the sacraments of the New Law, by the primary intention of Christ the Lord who instituted them, are directed as remedies for mortal sin. For the removal of that sin, two are instituted above all: baptism and penance; the rest are directed toward preventing it, as we said at the beginning of this Treatise. Since venial sins are far more easily remitted than mortal sins, it follows that venial sins can be remitted through reception of these sacraments. Second, all the sacraments apply to us the fruit of Christ’s Passion and were instituted to sanctify souls and dispose them perfectly for attaining eternal glory; therefore they also remove every impediment that can delay that attainment. Since venial sins delay it, it follows that they can be remitted through the sacraments. Furthermore, each sacrament has a special power and efficacy concerning remission of venial sin. For baptism, being spiritual rebirth, completely transforms a person from the state of sin to the state of grace. Hence the Council of Florence says that the effect of this sacrament is remission of every guilt, both original and actual; venial sin is included under actual guilt. The same is clear of the sacrament of penance, which is directed above all to blotting out mortal sins; therefore, with stronger reason, it is directed to remitting venial sins. Hence the Council of Trent teaches that venial sins are sufficient matter for sacramental absolution, as we shall explain below when treating confession. The same is evident of confirmation, whose proper power is directed especially to conferring an increase of spiritual life and consequently to removing what is opposed to such increase and perfection, as venial sins are. The same is also clear of the Eucharist, instituted as spiritual food and nourishment, whose proper power is to restore what is lost through the heat of concupiscence and thus to cleanse venial sins, which assail this spiritual life. Add that the proper effect of this sacrament is to stir up the fervor of charity, and hence to remove venial sins, which diminish that fervor. Thus the Council of Trent, sess. XIII, ch. 2, calls this sacrament “an antidote by which we are freed from daily faults and preserved from mortal sins.” Finally, the same is evident of the other sacraments, which confer a special holiness of soul and spiritual vigor, not only for avoiding but also for cleansing lesser offenses opposed to the perfection and preservation of such life.

The third part, namely that venial sin can be remitted through every meritorious work, is taught by the Doctor at n. 8, cited above, where he says: “It can be said in another way that venial sin can be remitted in this life not only through interior or exterior punishment, since that is not necessary for this, but through some act more acceptable to God than venial sin is displeasing to him; and this act may either be directed by the one acting toward remitting this venial sin or not directed by that person, but accepted by God in relation to it.” By these words the Doctor means that venial sin can be forgiven not only through an act of penance, whether interior or exterior, but also through any good and meritorious act more acceptable to God than the act of venial sin was hateful to him. This opinion of the Doctor is proved, first, because if any good work did not suffice for this, it would be especially because an actual or virtual act of penance would be required for it. But that is not so. It is proved: if actual or virtual penance were necessarily required beforehand for the remission of venial sin, it would follow that venial sin was remitted no more easily than mortal sin. For mortal sin can be removed and forgiven through an act of charity, and also through martyrdom, without any prior formal detestation. Why, then, can it not likewise be expiated through any meritorious work proceeding from outstanding charity? Furthermore, venial sin is not blotted out by actual or habitual contrition; therefore formal or virtual penance is not required for its expiation. The consequence is clear. The antecedent is proved: a sin is not remitted by contrition if it can coexist with contrition; but venial sin can coexist with an act of contrition. Therefore, etc. The major premise is established: sin is removed by penance precisely insofar as the act of penance is opposed to it and cannot coexist with it. The minor premise is proved: sin is not removed so long as the sinner takes pleasure in it; but one who elicits an act of contrition by which he obtains remission of mortal sin can call to mind some venial sin without a purpose of amendment; consequently venial sin can coexist with an act of contrition. Therefore, etc. Finally, whatever contrition confers outside the sacrament, attrition joined to the sacrament of penance can confer; but not all venial sins are always blotted out through attrition, as the Council of Trent teaches, sess. XIV, ch. 5, in the words cited by us in the first Note, where it indicates that venial sins may be omitted in confession without fault, “and expiated by many other remedies.” These remedies, distinct from confession and penance, must have the efficacy of blotting out those sins, and this can only be through satisfaction and, consequently, the offering of some work equivalent toward their remission. But an equivalent work can belong to the matter of any virtue, for example faith, almsgiving, prayer, or fasting, since these works are satisfactory, as is clear from Scripture; and the Fathers and Doctors count fasting, almsgiving, and prayer among the parts of satisfaction. Indeed, any good work can have this effect. Therefore it can do so especially for slight sins. To make any meritorious act effective for blotting out venial sins, it must be elicited and offered as satisfaction and compensation for that end. For if an act of penance and contrition, and also of love of God, is insufficient to blot out venial sin when it is not directed implicitly or explicitly toward that end, as was just said, then any other good act of lesser rank and worth will have that efficacy all the less. Add that if, in order to offer satisfaction for a person’s own sin through fasting, it is necessary that the fast—which could be undertaken for various ends—be directed toward intending such satisfaction, so too, for a satisfactory work to be effective for remitting venial sins, it must be performed with that intention. This intention does not give the good work its value, but applies it.

Finally, the fourth part is proved: namely, that sacramentals have the power to remit venial sin. For not only theologians but also supreme pontiffs and the holy Fathers say that these sanctify and cleanse through the Church’s blessing; but they do not cleanse from mortal sins. Therefore they must cleanse from venial sins. The minor premise is established: if they cleansed from mortal sins, they would confer first grace and so would possess the true and complete character of a sacrament. The minor premise has already been proved regarding holy water and blessed bread in the final question, article 1, of the preceding Treatise. — Their power is proved for the rest, first of all for the Lord’s Prayer. For St. Augustine in the Enchiridion, ch. 71, and the Fourth Council of Toledo following him, ch. 9, say: “Daily prayer of the faithful makes satisfaction for the daily, brief, and slight sins without which this life is not lived; for it belongs to them to say, ‘Our Father, who art in heaven,’ etc. This very prayer entirely blots out the smallest and daily sins.” It is no answer to say with Vazquez that this should be understood of a prayer accompanied by a movement of contrition and penance; that answer is wholly contrived. Otherwise such remission of slight sins would be attributed to the Lord’s Prayer no more than to other prayers by which contrition can be stirred up, for example the Psalm Have mercy on me, O God, and the other penitential Psalms. Add that this remission is attributed not to contrition but to this petition: “Forgive us our debts.” St. Augustine makes this especially clear in On Correction and Grace, ch. 5, where from those words of the Lord’s Prayer he proves that no one is without sin, and confirms this by the authority of St. Cyprian, who, explaining this passage of the Lord’s Prayer, says: “How necessarily, prudently, and salutarily we are admonished that we are sinners, since we are compelled to pray for our sins, so that, while forgiveness is sought from God, the mind may recall its own conscience. Lest anyone please himself as though innocent and perish more through exalting himself, he is instructed and taught that he sins daily, since he is commanded to pray daily for his sins. Thus, too, John says in his epistle: ‘If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us.’” — The same is clear of general confession, which is customarily made at the beginning of Mass and Compline. For this public and general accusation of sins has the efficacy, when made with sincere devotion and religious feeling, of remitting not only venial sin but also of making satisfaction for forgiven mortal sins, as St. Augustine teaches in bk. 50, Homilies, final homily, ch. 9, and ep. 108. — The giving of alms also contributes greatly to this, as St. Jerome teaches admirably on Daniel ch. 4, where among other things he says: “We should know that if pardon is promised to Nebuchadnezzar for doing good works, it is promised much more to those who have committed lesser sins.” — Finally, episcopal blessing contributes to this, as theologians commonly teach. — It should be known, however, that such sacramentals do not have this efficacy of remitting venial sin unless they are preceded or accompanied by a movement of the soul on the part of the person to whom they are applied. For they must be applied to us through our faith and religious worship, since they are sacred ceremonies whose use must be religious and performed in a human manner. Thus, perhaps, they do not have this effect in the insane or those asleep, although they have other effects in infants, such as driving away demons and the like.

YOU WILL ASK: Whether sacramentals remit venial sin by the work performed or by the work of the one acting? — I ANSWER that if remitting sin by the work performed means effecting it not only in view of the dignity and merit of the act elicited by the one acting but also through the merit of another that lends its aid, sacramentals can in this sense be said to bring about that remission by the work performed. For they have this efficacy insofar as the holiness of the Church is morally applied to them through prayers by which she obtains this effect for them from Christ the Lord. — But if it is said that an effect is brought about by the work performed when it is given or produced from another’s merits as a matter of condign merit and infallibly, then these sacramentals cannot be said to act by the work performed. For then the Church obtains this efficacy for them only through her prayers, insofar as she beseeches God to confer certain supernatural helps for eliciting supernatural acts by which a person formally or virtually takes displeasure in venial sins and retracts them. For they are held to remit venial sins insofar as they are sacred ceremonies whose religious use stirs in us either attrition or devotion, that is, the fervor of charity, by which the sins themselves are remitted. For since venial sins are opposed to the fervor of charity and diminish its ardor, and since no privation can be removed except by the presence of the opposed form, sacramentals seem to remit venial sin in no other way than by obtaining, through Christ’s merits and the Church’s prayers, certain supernatural helps by which a person is stirred and assisted to elicit fervent acts of charity or penance, through which such sins are formally or virtually repudiated. Hence their application perhaps would not have this efficacy of remitting venial sins in adults who are insane or asleep, although in infants they have other effects, such as driving away demons and preventing demonic infestations.

YOU WILL SAY: If sacramentals remitted venial sin only by stirring up the fervor of charity, it would follow that there is no difference between them and sacred images, since those images too stir pious movements and the fervor of charity in us. But this seems absurd; therefore the former point from which it follows is absurd as well. — I DENY the consequence of the major premise. In answer to its proof, I say that this is the difference between sacramentals and sacred images: the latter stir up the fervor of charity in us only objectively, insofar as seeing them calls to mind the merits and virtues of those whom they represent; sacramentals, however, also bring this about effectively, insofar as through Christ’s merits and the Church’s prayers they obtain from God supernatural helps by which a person elicits fervent acts of charity.

Second conclusion. — HABITUAL GRACE IS REQUIRED BEFOREHAND, BUT NOT FORMALLY, FOR THE REMISSION OF VENIAL SIN; ACTUAL GRACE, HOWEVER, IS REQUIRED CONCOMITANTLY. This conclusion has three parts, of which

The Subtle Doctor indicates the first when he says, d. 15, q. 1, n. 7: “By his ordained power God has not decreed to give first grace to any sinner except through the merit of the one who was without sin, namely Christ. For, as was touched on above, he did not decree to reconcile an enemy except through a service more pleasing than the offense was displeasing to him; and such a service is Christ’s Passion or his merit. And just as he did not decree to give grace to a sinner without the Passion, without which grace no satisfaction can exist at all that reconciles, since it is in no way equivalent, nor so in itself or in divine acceptance, so much more is it impossible by God’s ordained power to make satisfaction to God for sin except through the power of Christ’s Passion.” By these words the Doctor means that satisfaction cannot be made and reconciliation with God cannot occur except through the benefit and application of the blood of Jesus Christ. Although he speaks only of reconciliation and satisfaction made on account of mortal sin, the same can be said, with due proportion, of venial sin. For it accords with piety and religion to believe that venial sins are remitted only by grace and in view of Christ’s merits. St. John indicates this clearly enough in his First Epistle, ch. 1: “If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us.” Immediately afterward he adds the means of remission for these sins, saying: “If we confess our sins, he is faithful and just to forgive us our sins and cleanse us from all iniquity.” That this remission occurs on account of Christ he indicates in the following chapter, saying: “We have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the just, and he is the propitiation for our sins.”

The Apostle indicates this truth when he says, 1 Corinthians 13: “If I deliver up my body so that I burn, but have not charity, it profits me nothing.” From this one may infer that a person cannot make satisfaction for the debt of venial guilt, which suffices to impede and delay the attainment of eternal life. Otherwise he could profit greatly by being able to offer that satisfaction outside charity.

NOR IS IT AN OBJECTION that, as we shall say below, a person can make satisfaction for temporal punishment without charity; from this it seems to follow that something can be profitable without charity. — I ANSWER that the one who pays what the law has established for temporal punishment does not profit much. For just as release from punishment is a good, an equivalent payment is an evil; it does not profit a thief much to be hanged, even though by hanging he makes satisfaction for temporal punishment, or rather suffers enough. Although, therefore, the state of mortal sin does not remove the ability to make satisfaction for temporal punishment, it does remove reconciling satisfaction for guilt, because this is grace and mercy through Christ, which ought not to be granted except to one who through sanctifying grace is a living member of Christ.

St. Bonaventure explicitly teaches this assertion, In IV Sent., d. 21, p. 1, a. q. 1: “It should be said that some have held that venial sins can be blotted out without sanctifying grace, through freely given grace. They wished to show this on the ground that venial sin is not opposed to sanctifying grace but to freely given grace, and does not offend the divine Majesty, because in that sin nothing is loved above God, but something is loved somewhat disorderly beneath God. Therefore, just as mortal sin can be blotted out through grace, because it is opposed to grace, and because grace reconciles one who has offended God, and because it makes one love above all the God whom one had scorned, so venial sin can be blotted out through freely given grace, which removes that slight disorder and takes from the soul that occasion for loving God less; and there need not be grace elevating the soul to love God above all, since through venial sin nothing is loved above God. But this position, although it may seem probable, nevertheless deviates from the truth upon examination. For every sin, by the very fact that it is sin, defiles the soul in some way and disorders it in some way; and it must therefore displease God in some way. Since, then, even the slightest mark of displeasure that can exist without a habit restoring complacency and friendship cannot be removed, it must be held absolutely of every sin in general that none can be blotted out without sanctifying grace. For divine mercy has thus decreed to heal us. The Saints say this, and Scripture teaches the same, since it especially presents grace as necessary for blotting out sins.” Thus far the Seraphic Doctor. He confirms his opinion by the authority of St. Augustine, The City of God, bk. 21, ch. 27, where he says: “Yet not even grave sins, from which one must wholly depart by changing one’s conduct for the better, are forgiven those who pray unless what is said there is done: ‘As we also forgive our debtors.’ For if even the smallest sins, without which even the life of the just is not lived, are not otherwise remitted, how much more do those entangled in many and grave crimes, even if they have now ceased to commit them, obtain no pardon if they are inexcusable in forgiving others whatever anyone has sinned against them, since the Lord says: ‘If you do not forgive men their sins, neither will your Father forgive you.’” From this the Seraphic Doctor infers that one who does not forgive an offense received from a brother cannot hope for God’s pardon of the offense inflicted upon him for no other reason than that one unwilling to forgive is in a state of mortal sin, in which he merits no remission so long as he takes pleasure in it.

The second part is proved: namely, that a new infusion of habitual and sanctifying grace is not formally required for the remission of venial sin. For that is formally required which is required as the form removing a privation that was previously present; but sanctifying grace is not the form that removes the stain of venial sin, since venial sin can coexist with it in a wayfarer. Consequently, an infusion of sanctifying grace is not necessary for remission of venial sin.

YOU WILL ASK: Whether, at least concomitantly or consequently, that remission of venial sins requires a special infusion of sanctifying grace? — I ANSWER that this is not necessary, since the person whose venial sin is remitted already possesses sanctifying grace; consequently it need not be newly infused into him.

YOU WILL SAY: Venial sin diminishes the fervor of charity; therefore, for it to be remitted, that fervor must be restored. But it cannot be restored except through habitual grace; therefore some degree of that grace must be infused for the remission of this sin. — I DENY the minor premise. For the grace sufficient to restore that ardor of charity is actual grace, which recalls a person who clings in a disordered way to temporal things away from them and turns him toward God through an act of love.

The third part is proved: namely, that actual grace is necessary for the remission of venial sin, because 1 John 1 says: “The blood of Christ cleanses us from all sin.” Therefore it cleanses from venial as well as mortal sin. But the blood of Christ does not act without grace. 1 John 2: “If anyone sins, we have an advocate with the Father.” And the Second Council of Orange, can. 4: “We are cleansed from sin through the operation of the Holy Spirit,” because, according to Solomon, “The will is prepared by the Lord,” and according to the Apostle: “God is the one who works in us both to will and to accomplish according to his good will.” And canon 7: “Whoever says that by the vigor of nature we can think or choose, as is fitting, any good pertaining to the salvation of eternal life without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit does not understand the voice of the Lord saying in the Gospel, John 15, ‘Without me you can do nothing,’ nor that of the Apostle: ‘We are not capable of thinking anything of ourselves, as of ourselves,’ 2 Corinthians 3.” Canon 14: “No wretched person is freed from any misery unless he is anticipated by God’s mercy,” as it is said in Psalm 78: “May your mercies, O Lord, quickly go before us,” and in Psalm 52¹: “My God, his mercy shall go before me.” Canon 22: “No one has anything of his own except falsehood and sin. If any man has truth and justice, it is from that fountain for which we must thirst in this wilderness, lest we fail on the way.”

YOU WILL OBJECT AGAINST THE FIRST PART: Venial sin does not include deprivation of grace and coexists with grace; therefore habitual grace is not required for its remission. — I DISTINGUISH the consequent: habitual grace is not required as a formal, physical, or moral cause, I grant; as a disposition required beforehand, I deny. For, as we said, to be worthy of obtaining remission of venial sin as to the debt of guilt, a person must be acceptable to God and therefore must be in the state of sanctifying grace.

YOU WILL OBJECT 2. Venial sins are remitted through sacramentals; but these are applied equally to the just and to sinners, as is clear of holy water and blessed bread, which are given to both the just and sinners. Therefore habitual grace is not required beforehand for the remission of venial sin. — I DISTINGUISH the minor premise: sacramentals are applied to both the just and sinners, by the Church’s intention, for remission of venial sin as though they belonged equally to both, I deny; for other benefits that sinners can receive from the application of such sacramentals, I grant. For, for example, sprinkling with holy water can benefit them by driving away and removing the assaults of demons and sorcerers.

YOU WILL OBJECT 3. Venial sin is remitted in hell, since the punishment due for venial sins is relaxed for the damned; but the damned have no habitual grace. Therefore this is not required beforehand for remission of venial sin. — I DISTINGUISH the major premise: it is remitted as to the debt of guilt, I deny; as to the debt of punishment, for the reasons to be set out in the following question, I grant.

YOU WILL OBJECT 4. Remission of venial sins that occurs together with remission of mortal sins does not presuppose habitual grace, since the latter does not precede that remission of mortal sins. Therefore remission of venial sins does not necessarily require habitual grace. — I DISTINGUISH the consequent: it does not require it with priority of time and duration, since habitual grace need not be in the sinner before his sins are forgiven, I grant; it does not require it by necessity and simultaneous existence, I deny. For in the ordinary course a sin cannot be remitted unless habitual grace is present, through which we are restored to friendship with God and to the right to the eternal inheritance.

YOU WILL OBJECT 5. Against the final part: one contrary is removed by another; venial sin is a natural act often contrary to some natural virtue, as a joking lie is contrary to truthfulness, and excess in food and drink to temperance. — I DENY the minor premise. In the state in which we live, being advanced toward the supernatural order of grace and glory, venial sin is opposed not only to natural perfection but also to supernatural perfection, for example the fervor of charity and familiarity with God. Therefore it cannot be removed except through the fervor of divine charity and a supernatural act by which that familiarity with God is restored.

YOU WILL OBJECT FINALLY: Venial sin is merely an excessive attachment to creatures; but a person can naturally and without helps of grace remove this excessive attachment, namely by an act of love for God as Creator. Therefore a person can naturally, without the help of divine grace, obtain remission of venial sins. The major premise is established: venial sin does not overturn the order toward the ultimate end; through it the sinner only clings too much to a creature while preserving that end. The minor premise is also clear: in the state of pure nature, which we said in volume V, p. 69, was possible, there could have been venial sins; in that state, however, they could have been cleansed in no other way than through an act of love of God as Creator. — I DENY the minor premise. For that excessive attachment to creatures and delay in attaining the ultimate end is opposed not only to natural virtue but also to some supernatural perfection, namely the fervor of charity and a person’s familiarity with God. Consequently it cannot be removed except through some fervor of charity or another supernatural act that in some way turns a person away from creatures and toward God; and this turning cannot occur except through some supernatural help. In answer to its proof, I say, first, that it is doubtful whether there could truly have been any venial sins in the state of pure nature, for that state is called such especially because it is free from all sin and from the help of grace. Second, I say that if venial sins were perhaps committed in that state, they would have been of a different character from ours, since they would not then have been opposed to the fervor of charity and familiarity with God, as those committed now in the state of nature elevated to the supernatural order are. Therefore they could have been remitted through natural love of God as Creator or through an act of any natural virtue.

Third conclusion. — VENIAL SIN IS REMITTED EITHER AFTER DEATH OR AT THE INSTANT OF DEATH, IN VIEW OF PREVIOUS MERITS, BUT NOT BY REASON OF A MERITORIOUS ACT ELICITED ANEW.

This conclusion has three parts. The first is that venial sin can truly be remitted as to the debt of guilt in purgatory, after death, or at the instant of death; the second, that this remission occurs by reason of a preceding meritorious work; the third, that it does not occur in view of a meritorious act newly elicited.

The first part is taught not only by all theologians but also by the holy Fathers, and the Doctor expressly teaches it in the Reportata, d. 21, q. 1, n. 2: “In this question,” he says, “the conclusion is certain: some sin can be forgiven after death, not only as to punishment, because the punishment due for that sin was not paid here, but also as to the guilt itself. This is proved as follows: no one will be saved with any sin; but a person who remains with some venial sin can fall asleep and die while asleep, and likewise someone can sin venially up to the final instant in which the soul leaves the body. It is clear that this venial sin was never forgiven for a person dying in this way. Therefore either he would enter glory without remission of the guilt of such venial sin, or it will be remitted for him there. But he will not enter glory without remission of such venial sin, for ‘nothing defiled shall enter it,’ Revelation 21. Therefore it will be remitted for him there.”

The Master of the Sentences gathers the same opinion in bk. 1, d. 21, from Christ’s words in Matthew 12: “Whoever speaks” (a word) “against the Holy Spirit, it will not be forgiven him, either in this world or in the world to come.” From this, he says, it is understood, as the holy Doctors teach, that some sins will be forgiven in the world to come: some faults are remitted in this world, and some lesser ones in the future, which indeed burden people after death but are forgiven if they are worthy and have merited through good acts in this life that they be forgiven. Those Doctors are chiefly the holy Fathers, especially St. Augustine, The City of God, ch. 24, where he says: “For it would not truly be said of certain sins that they are not forgiven either in this world or in the world to come, unless there were some sins which, although not in this world, are nevertheless forgiven in the world to come.” St. Gregory the Great gathers the same in bk. 1 of the Dialogues, ch. 39, where, considering the aforesaid words of St. Matthew, he says: “In this statement it is understood that some faults can be loosed in this world, and others in the world to come. For from the denial concerning one kind, the consequent understanding is clear: it is granted concerning some.” St. Isidore teaches the same in Ecclesiastical Offices, ch. 18, as does St. Bernard, Sermon 16 on the Song of Songs, etc.

YOU WILL SAY 1: No just person can sin after death; therefore neither can he rise from the debt of sin. The antecedent is clear. The consequence is proved: both because the reason is the same for the power to sin and to rise from sin; both because it is easier to fall than to rise; and finally because rising from sin does not seem to belong to one who cannot merit, while one who cannot fall in any state cannot merit either. Therefore, etc. — The Doctor denies the consequence, In IV Sent., d. 21, q. 1, n. 11: “Understanding ‘rise’ to mean ‘be freed from sin.’” As to the first proof, he says that there is no likeness between being able to sin and rising from sin, because sinning is acting freely and pertains to the state of the way (understand this of sin that incurs demerit). For the Doctor teaches, In IV Sent., d. 2, q. 1, that “the damned will to sin, although through that sin they incur no new demerit; but rising, that is, becoming free from sin, does not require free action even in the state of the way, because according to the first opinion it is nothing other than paying a punishment, which is to suffer it; or, according to the second, it is nothing other than guilt now being forgiven through merits previously acquired in the state of the way and then accepted for this purpose.” Regarding the second proof of the consequence, he says: “I grant that it is easier to fall than to rise, insofar as rising denotes an act properly within the power of one who rises; but ‘rising’ is not understood in this way in this remission of venial sin.” Regarding the third proof, he says it falsely assumes that rising then occurs through a meritorious act of the will that is present at that time, whereas it occurs through a meritorious act that was previously present in life, according to the second opinion, or through no meritorious act at all, but only by suffering a punishment proportionate to that sin, according to the first opinion.

YOU WILL SAY 2: No mortal sin can be remitted after this life; therefore neither can venial sin. The consequence is clear: the reason for mortal and venial sin seems to be the same, since they differ only in degree, more or less. — The Doctor denies the consequence, n. 12: “Because merits acquired in life cannot be accepted at the instant of death so as to blot out mortal sin through them, since God ordained that mortal sin not be blotted out except through voluntary reception of a sacrament or through some disposition, as a merit of congruity, inhering at the time or up to the time when the sin is blotted out. It is otherwise for one who departs in mortal sin.” In answer to the proof of the consequence he responds that, although mortal and venial sin are sometimes opposed to the same virtue and deprive one of the same goodness in the order of nature or custom—physical or moral goodness—they do not deprive one of the same theological moral goodness. For by divine ordinance mortal sin is opposed to justifying grace and deprives one of divine friendship; venial sin is otherwise. Therefore it is no wonder if one is remitted after death but not the other.

YOU WILL SAY 3: Venial sin can be remitted through any punishment, and especially through the punishment of death; therefore none remains to be forgiven after death. — The Doctor responds, n. 13, that one may well grant that death voluntarily accepted is a sufficient punishment in place of the punishment for any venial sin, and perhaps in place of a large part of the punishment due for forgiven mortal sins. Nor is it an objection that death is a necessary punishment, since one can voluntarily accept what is necessary. This accords with what was said in the second opinion, that venial sin is blotted out at the instant of death. Hence he adds in the Reportata, final number, that death could be imposed on a thief as sacramental satisfaction: “And I believe,” he says, “that if the thief endured it willingly, his contrition and sorrow could be so great that he would fly up to heaven at once.”

The Doctor proves the second part, n. 8: “For,” he says, “one who dies in charity, although after death his meritorious works are not referred to the venial sin in which he dies, so that it may be remitted, and although he himself has no new meritorious act by which that venial sin is blotted out, nevertheless those works done earlier can be referred by God to the remission of this venial sin after death.” He proves this as follows: “An impedible cause, while impeded, does not produce its effect, but when it is not impeded, it does; but the merits of this person dying in charity would be a sufficient cause for blotting out his venial sins, either as referred to this by him or as accepted by God for this end. Yet they are impeded while he lives, if he continually remains in the act of venial sin; after death they are no longer impeded, because then he does not contract an act of venial sin. Therefore through those merits venial sins will be blotted out after this life, that is, at the instant of the soul’s separation.” From this he infers two things: “First, that venial sins are remitted at the instant of death, because then the act of venial sin no longer remains and consequently the impediment ceases. Second, that every venial sin of one dying in charity is remitted in this life unless he continues the act of venial sin up to death or to the instant of death.” By all this the Doctor means that, just as a just person merits glory through good works if he dies in grace, so too, if he departs in grace, he merits pardon for his slight offenses, without which he cannot attain the glory he merits. Therefore, by the merits acquired earlier in this life, he has a right to have his venial sins remitted after death or at the instant of death, provided that while he lives he does not take pleasure in them.

Finally, the third part is proved from Ecclesiastes, ch. 11: “If a tree falls to the south or to the north, wherever it falls, there it will be.” This signifies that after death there is no further place for merit or demerit, as all theologians who affirm that the state of this life alone is set apart for merit or demerit readily acknowledge. Hence the opinion of St. Thomas is refuted: in question 7 of On Evil, a. 11, he asserts that venial sins are remitted in purgatory through acts of contrition or charity by which the soul detests and retracts those sins. For it would follow that souls suffering in purgatory could still merit, the contrary of which theologians commonly teach.