Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

NOTE 1. That it is certain that there is given a precept of loving God; for this is expressed in Deuteronomy 6., and Christ the Lord repeats and inculcates it anew in Matthew 22. in these words: He that hath my commandments, and keepeth them; he it is that loveth me, he that loveth me not, keepeth not my words. Hence in chap. 15., addressing the Apostles, He says: You are my friends, if you do the things that I command you. Wherefore here there is no difficulty about the effective love of God, which consists in the observance of the divine precepts; for this is prescribed generically by each of these divine precepts; but the controversy concerns affective love, namely whether there be a special affirmative precept whereby we are bound to elicit an act of love toward God on account of Himself, as to be loved above all things. About which there is a twofold opinion among Theologians. For some, with Maldonatus chap. 22. on Matthew, Jansenius in the harmony of the Gospels, chap. 18., think there is no special precept about loving God: since indeed the love of God and neighbor contains all the precepts entirely, and as it were is closed up and comprehended in them. But other Theologians object.

NOTE 2. That the controversy is no light one among Theologians in assigning the time at which the precept concerning eliciting an act of divine love ought to be fulfilled. For there are those who think it must be fulfilled as soon as man obtains the use of reason; others once each year: some in the time at which one approaches the sacraments, especially those of Baptism and the Eucharist: several for an indeterminate time of the whole life, provided it be elicited before death, but especially about the very instant of death: others however on feast days, especially Sundays, as the Doctor holds probable in num. 7. What however is to be held as truer will be determined in what follows.

NOTE 3. That some object can be loved more than another in three ways: first indeed, objectively, when we will and wish greater goods for it than we would for another. Secondly, intensively, when it is loved with greater effort and more ardent fervor than any other: so that the act of love toward it has more degrees of intensity than any other act of love toward another object. Finally thirdly, appretiatively, when it is esteemed of more worth than another, so that for attaining or conserving the beloved object whatever else may be lost, whether meanwhile that beloved object is loved more intensely and with greater effort, or not. Now these three modes of loving are so distinct that they can be separated from one another: for he who sins mortally on account of earthly delight, e. g. loves himself and that delight more, both intensively and appretiatively, than God: since with greater effort and a more fervent ardor of love he tends toward that delight than toward the love of God: similarly he loves it more appretiatively, inasmuch as by sinning mortally he prefers that delightful good to God Himself, the supreme good and last end: nevertheless he loves God objectively more than anything else which he viciously pursues in act, namely speaking of an absolute and efficacious, or deliberate act of the will: since he wills for God all the divine perfections fitting to Him, which are certainly far better than any good which he could wish for himself. Similarly someone can love another thing more objectively and intensively, which nevertheless he loves less appretiatively, as is clear from the example of a Father, who usually esteems his firstborn son more highly than a little child, whom however he loves more intensely and tenderly.

These things premised, three things remain to be determined: first, what is the special precept concerning eliciting an internal act of love toward God: second, when this ought to be done: third, whether God is by precept to be loved more, not only intensively and objectively, but also appretiatively.

First Conclusion. — The affirmative precept of loving God obliges to eliciting an internal act of love toward God. So the Doctor, d. 27. n. 18., where he says:

I say that that affirmative precept, Deuteron. 6. and Matth. 22. Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, etc., does not only oblige always to fleeing the opposite, namely lest there be an act of hatred; but it obliges at some time to an elicited act. > because that act is about the end, from whose goodness every moral goodness descends in the acts which are for the end. Therefore just as man is bound to have some virtuous act, so is he bound to have some act of that precept about the end to be loved gratuitously.

It is proved first, from that passage of Deuteronomy 6., where the first of the ten commandments given by God is thus expressed: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole strength. Which precept also Christ the Lord inculcates in Matt. 22., where He calls this precept the first and greatest, not because it is written in the first place, but because it is first and principally per se a precept, so that all the rest ought to be observed precisely in order that this may be perfectly fulfilled in every respect; and thus the fulfillment of that precept seems the end of all the rest, as is said

1. Timoth. 1.: For the end of the commandment is charity from a pure heart, or it is called first by comparison with the other, namely the love of neighbor, which it calls second, and it enumerates that as two distinct precepts, and forthwith sufficiently indicates the love of God to be specially commanded. Which is indeed confirmed; for where there is a true number, there is a special distinction between the things numbered; for every number is founded upon some distinction of those things which make up the number: but the precept of the love of God, compared with the other precepts of the Decalogue, makes a true number: therefore this precept is special.

It is proved secondly from the Holy Fathers, especially Augustine, lib. 1. of the Questions on the Gospels, qu. 33.; Jerome, Anselm, and other Fathers, who, expounding the words of Matth. 22., On these two commandments dependeth the whole law and the prophets, interpret that dependence thus, as wishing it to be like that of branches from a root, members from a head, rays from the sun, rivulets from a fountain, effects from a principle: but root from branches, rivulet from fountain, head from members, etc. are specially distinct: therefore the same Holy Fathers judge the precept of the love of God to be specially distinct from the other precepts.

Thirdly, love concerning the divine goodness and the supreme perfection of God seems no less to be commanded than the assent of faith concerning divine truth: but not only is effective faith commanded, which is exhibited through prayer, adoration, and confession of the mysteries of faith, but affective and actual faith is also commanded, whereby one firmly assents to the articles on account of the divine truth: therefore not only is effective charity commanded, but also affective, and forthwith there is given a special precept concerning the very interior act of the love of God. Which is indeed confirmed, because it does not seem congruous that God should have inculcated the love of neighbor by so many precepts, forbidding that any evil be inflicted upon him, yet should have prescribed no precept concerning the love of Himself.

You will say: The end of a precept does not fall under the precept: but charity is the end of the precept, as we said just now from the Apostle: therefore it does not fall under the precept; and forthwith its act is not commanded.

I distinguish the major: the end extrinsic, I concede: intrinsic, I deny. For there is a twofold end of every precept: one indeed extrinsic to the precept itself, and to the thing commanded, e. g. in the precept of fasting, the extrinsic end is the taming of the flesh, and its subjection to the spirit, and other things of that kind for which fasting was instituted: but the other end is intrinsic to the precept, as abstinence from food, which is the matter about which fasting is occupied.

I distinguish the minor in like manner: that the love of God is the end of the commandments extrinsically, I concede; intrinsically, I deny; for the other commandments can be kept without it, namely that an act of the love of God be elicited.

You will say 2. Christ the Lord testifies with the aforesaid words of Matth. 22. that upon these two commandments the whole law hangs, and the Prophets: therefore He signifies that the love of God and of neighbor, which are the two commandments, include all the precepts of the law, as well as the oracles of the Prophets, which intimate precepts of this kind.

Moreover, Ioan. 14., the same Christ the Lord explaining what it is to love God, says: He that hath my commandments, and keepeth them; he it is that loveth me. Similarly ad Rom. 14., The fulfilling of the law is charity.

I answer to the first, that therefore Christ says that upon the love of God and of neighbor the whole law depends, insofar as all other commandments are kept so that God may be loved most perfectly; whence he who loves God seems to have fulfilled the law, because he obtains the end to which the law is ordered. By the same reasoning the other two testimonies are resolved.

You will say 3. St. Bernard, Serm. 50. in Cantica, explaining those words: he set in me charity, says: Charity is in act, and in effect, and concerning that charity indeed which belongs to work, the law was first given to men, and the commandment formed; for who has it thus in affection, as it is commanded?

I answer first, that St. Bernard there denies that a precept was given concerning the internal act of charity, which he calls charity in affection; nay, he expressly confesses this; for he says there: If it please you more that the commandment was given concerning affective charity (of course), I do not contend on that account: provided you also acquiesce with me, that in no wise can it be fulfilled, or ever could be fulfilled, by any man in this life.

I answer second, that St. Bernard there distinguishes a twofold internal act of charity: one, indeed, whereby God is loved so perfectly, and the loving soul adheres to Him with such sweetness, that the soul, as though wholly forgetful of itself and of all other things, is borne with supreme sweetness into God. The other, whereby we are impelled to external works, that we may succor our neighbor; for, as he writes there, How often thence (that is, from praying to God, for this he brings forward as an example) are we withdrawn by charity bidding, and turned away on behalf of those who need our work or speech; this charity he calls actual, because it impels to acting, and affective, because it rests wholly in internal affection. The second, he teaches, has the reason of merit, and therefore properly pertains to the Fatherland, and there alone is perfectly found, although here it is sometimes given to be foretasted in contemplation. Whence, when he had distinguished within a threefold affection of love, namely that which flesh begets, and that which reason rules, and that which wisdom seasons, he adds: The first indeed is sweet, but base: the second dry, but strong: the last rich, and sweet. Therefore through the second works are done (or commanded), and in that charity sits, not that effective charity which, seasoned with the salt of wisdom, growing rich imports into the mind a great abundance of the sweetness of the Lord, but rather a certain actual charity, which, although it does not yet refresh sweetly with its pleasant moisture, nevertheless vehemently enkindles toward that same love (namely wholly perfect, whereby the soul would be rapt wholly into God). And below: Let us love in work, and in truth, while namely we are moved to command well more by a certain impulse of rigid virtue than by that sweet affection of charity: where he openly distinguishes that twofold internal act, as I said above.

Conclusion second. — GOD IS TO BE LOVED BY PRECEPT ABOVE ALL THINGS, NOT ONLY OBJECTIVELY, BUT ALSO APPRETIATIVELY, YET NOT INTENSIVELY. This likewise is the doctrine of the Doctor in the place cited above n. 17.

The first and second parts easily stand; for indeed God is the object of infinite perfection, to which the will, by the inclining habit of charity, not only desires all good things in preference, when inclined to will for Him all its own divine attributes and divine excellencies, but also to love Him Himself with estimation and appretiation above every lovable thing. Which indeed is proved first from the habit of charity; because for that for which anything is such, that thing is the more so: but the habit of theological charity inclines our will, and stirs it and powerfully affects it to love one created object more appretiatively than another, on account of God the sovereign good; for any created object is esteemed worthy to be loved out of charity insofar as it participates in some of the divine excellencies, and is something of God: and accordingly, the nobler something participates in the divine perfections, the more it also appears to be loved out of charity: therefore since charity inclines the will to love one created object more than another on account of its greater affinity with God, it likewise inclines equally to loving God above all things, lovable appretiatively.

The same truth stands from actual charity; for Christ the Lord plainly signifies this when He says Matth. 10. He that loveth father or mother more than me, is not worthy of me, and he that loves son or daughter above me, is not worthy of me: and with St. Luke, ch. 14. If anyone come to me, and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and moreover his own soul also, he cannot be my disciple; in which places this particle (more) signifies excess according to appretiation, as sufficiently indicates that other particle with St. Luke (hate); for it sounds there the same as postpones, despises before another, esteems less than another, just as ad Rom., ch. 13. when it is said, Jacob I have loved, Esau have I hated, that is, I have postponed him; and with St. Matth. ch. 6. For either he will hate the one, that is, he will love the one less appretiatively, and will love the other, that is, he makes it of more worth: therefore from an act of charity God is loved appretiatively above all things.

You will say. The just love God above all things: but while they sin venially, they will rather to please themselves, or others, on whose account they sin, than God: therefore the love of God above all things is not always made appretiatively.

I distinguish the minor: they desire to please themselves or others more in a light matter, I concede; in a grave matter, I deny. Whence the consequence must be denied: for that anyone love God appretiatively, it is not necessary that he will to please Him more than others in all things, even in the lightest matters, but it suffices that he will to please Him more simpliciter with respect to all things which He has commanded, nor is it necessary that he will to please Him also secundum quid, and with respect to all things which He has not commanded. It can indeed happen that charity's love be so perfect that it would determine to pleasing God more than any other: but that perfection is not precepted for this or such a state, in which the body, which is corrupted, weighs down the soul; otherwise very few would be just, seeing that very few are they who would keep this precept, loving God above all things, even in the lightest matters. But that this matter may be made known, it must be known that God can be loved appretiatively above all things in three ways: first indeed, while God is expressly preferred in particular to dearer things, as parents, brothers, friends: secondly, if He is preferred explicitly to other things conceived confusedly and in general, as when the intellect proposes that God be pleased in all things rather than any creature, the will should will to do so: thirdly, if He is preferred implicitly to all things, as if anyone conceive the proposal of always pleasing God in all things, or of fleeing or detesting all sins inasmuch as they are offenses of God, or if anyone simply loves God with that affection of benevolence from which there would follow the proposal of pleasing Him in all things, or of fleeing sins, if he thought upon it.

The third part also stands, namely that God is not to be loved by precept above all things intensively; because for the observance of this precept the efficacious love of charity suffices, whereby anyone will efficaciously rather to please God than any creature, and which excludes every affect of sinning mortally, and spurs on to the observance of all the commandments: but a love less intense according to degrees can claim all these things for itself: therefore that there be made sufficient satisfaction to the precept of loving God, there is no need that He be loved intensively above all things. The major stands because from the observance of the commandments it is best gathered a posteriori that someone loves God above all things, as is required for fulfilling that precept: whence also Christ the Lord proposed only that observance of the commandments as the sign of love out of the affection of charity: He that loveth me, keepeth my word. But the minor is proved: for fulfilling the precept of the love of God there is not required the highest intensity of love: therefore love in whatever degree can suffice for that. The consequence is evident: for if love supremely intense is not desired, neither will there be a determined number of necessary degrees, that this precept be fulfilled. But the antecedent is proved, because otherwise one just man could not love God more intensely than another, nor could even the love required for fulfilling the precept of loving God be increased at all: which plainly appears absurd: therefore such a love is not necessarily required. It is confirmed: if God were necessarily to be loved intensively above all things, it would follow that he who had never elicited an act of the love of God unless he thereby sinned in loving his own salvation, or that of a parent, as seven, out of the love of hope, or of piety toward a parent: but this seems absurd, for those acts of love, as seven, have an honorable object, and are true acts of virtue: therefore, etc.

You will say 1. As natural reason dictates that God is to be loved extensively above all things, so also it dictates that He is to be loved with a love of greater intensity than any other object: but from such a dictation it follows that God is to be loved extensively above all things: therefore equally from it there follows that He ought to be loved intensively thus.

I deny the minor; for that anyone make sufficient satisfaction to the dictation of reason concerning loving God, it suffices that he have an act of love which includes the affect of pleasing God and of observing His commandments, but excludes the affect of sinning; however it is not required that that act of love have the greatest intensity of degrees.

You insist. Not only by the dictation of natural reason is God to be loved, but also to be loved with the whole heart, with the whole soul, and with the whole strength, as the precept of Deuteronomy bears, which belongs to the natural law; but thus He cannot be loved unless it have the highest intensity of degrees; therefore, etc.

I deny the minor: for unto this, that God be so loved, it suffices that there be a will of pleasing God more in all things than any other: yet this can be obtained without that highest intensity of degrees. Hence St. Augustine explains the aforesaid words thus in book 1. De Doctrina Christiana, ch. 22.

When He says, thou shalt love with the whole heart, with the whole soul, with the whole mind, He left no part of our life which ought to be vacant, and as it were to give place, that we might will to enjoy something else: but whatever else shall enter into the mind, let it be borne thither whither the impulse of total charity runs: For so he who loves his neighbor as himself refers all the love of himself and of him into that love of God, which suffers no rivulet to be drawn from itself outside itself, by whose derivation it would be diminished.

But St. Bernard, Ser. 20. in Cantica, expounds thus: To me, he says, love seems to pertain to the zeal of the affection of the heart; but soul-love to industry, or the judgment of reason; but virtuous love to be referred to the constancy or vigor of the mind.

You say. 2° The same St. Bernard, in the book De diligendo Deo, says: The cause of loving God is God: but the mode is to love without mode: but He who is to be loved without mode, is to be loved with the supreme intensity of an act of love: therefore, etc.

I answer. First, that God is indeed to be loved without mode, that is, insofar as the affections of our heart can extend themselves; but this is counseled, not indeed precepted: but this discourse is concerning eliciting the love of God from precept, not indeed from counsel. I answer secondly with the Seraphic Doctor dist. 27. art. 2. q. 5. that an act can be said to have a mode in three ways; in one way by limitation with respect to itself: in another way by aggregation of circumstances: in the third way from mediation between the superfluous and the diminished. In the first way it is to be said that every act of created virtue has a mode. For every created virtue is finite and limited; and therefore every act of it has finiteness and mode, speaking of limitation and finition not according to possibility, but according to act. But in the second way it is to be said that mode concerns an act of moral and meritorious virtue; because no act is laudable unless due circumstances concur to it. In the third way it is to be said that the act of every cardinal, or political, virtue has a mode. For all consist in the mean between the superfluous and the diminished, and from this very fact have a created and finite object. Since therefore charity is a created virtue, and a gratuitous virtue, and a theological virtue: hence it is that its act has a mode from the limitation of the virtue. It also has a mode from the addition of due circumstances, as is evident, because the mode which concerns an act of charity is that one love God above all things, and for Himself with the whole heart, with the whole soul, and with the whole mind: but it does not have that mode which is from the mean between the superfluous and the diminished, because its object is immense and infinite.

Conclusion third. — IT IS PROBABLE THAT GOD IS TO BE LOVED BY PRECEPT IN A THREEFOLD CIRCUMSTANCE OF TIME: NAMELY FIRST AS SOON AS ANYONE SUFFICIENTLY HAS THE USE OF REASON, AND CAN SIN MORTALLY; SECONDLY ON SUNDAYS AND MORE SOLEMN DAYS: THIRDLY AT THE ARTICLE OF DEATH.

St. Thomas hands down the first part in 1. 2. q. 89. art. 6., and his Disciples follow him, who prove this assertion first from the fact that as soon as a man possesses the use of reason he is bound to convert himself to his last end, and to direct all his acts to Him: but this is done through the love of God above all things: therefore he is then bound to elicit that love. They prove the major because that gravity which is in a stone and necessitates it to tend toward its end, namely toward the center of the earth, corresponds in man to the obligation toward his own end: but a stone, as soon as it is formed, all impediment removed, tends toward the center of the earth: therefore by equal reason man, as soon as he has been formed and has obtained the use of reason, is bound to convert himself to God. Truly, this argument is nothing; for the major is plainly false, since if the obligation of man to love God were the same as the necessity inherent in a stone to seek the center, it would follow that just as a stone, whenever it is not impeded, continually tends as much as it can toward the center of the earth until it arrives there, so man would whenever he could be bound by precept to elicit an act of the love of God, and not only as soon as he possesses the use of reason, as the Thomists will have it. — Secondly they prove it thus: if one were not bound to love God in the first instant of the use of reason, he could then sin only venially; because he could not then sin mortally except insofar as he omitted that conversion of himself to God, which omission would be a mortal sin: but it is false that man for that instant can sin merely venially; because from this it would follow that someone could have original sin together with venial alone: but this is false. Which indeed is proved first: because, as Innocent III teaches in the chapter Maiores on Baptism, original sin cannot be remitted by baptism to adults who are asleep, because it cannot be remitted without the mortal: therefore the Pontiff judges that original sin cannot be found in adults without the mortal. Secondly, the Council of Florence says: The souls of those who depart in actual mortal sin, or in original sin alone, descend forthwith into hell, to be tormented however with unequal punishments. There he makes no mention of those who depart with original sin alone and venial: therefore he judges there are no such persons. Thirdly, because no place could be assigned for them: for neither the limbo of children, since actual sins are not punished there; nor yet the place of the damned on account of mortal sins, since they would not have committed a mortal sin; and no third place of the damned is given. — Truly I answer by denying the minor, and against its first proof I deny the reasoning of those following Pontius in his Commentaries on dist. 27. n. 55. For, he says, original sin is not unable to be remitted by baptism to a sleeping adult because he must necessarily have a mortal sin, nor is that asserted in that passage, since it is certain that an adult, even if that obligation of converting himself to God were laid upon him, could convert himself to God, and consequently not have a mortal sin, because original cannot be remitted unless whatever mortal was held together with it is remitted; and a sleeping adult does not have the disposition required that the mortal sin distinct from original be remitted in him. Therefore the Pontiff means nothing else in that chapter than that original sin cannot be taken away by baptism from a sleeping adult who has a mortal sin, and that therefore, since it is uncertain whether he has a mortal sin, baptism ought not be applied to him. Against the second proof, I deny that the Council thought that some do not depart with original and venial: for although he made no mention of them, still it does not follow from that that he did not think such persons exist; but because it was neither necessary nor useful for his intention to make mention of them, just as he also made no mention of those who die with original and personal mortal sin. Against the third proof finally, some respond that the case is impossible by supposition of the providence already established by God; but such a providence is asserted utterly gratuitously, and has no semblance of likelihood. Therefore it is better and more easily answered that the place in which they would remain if they died with original and venial alone is that very place in which they would remain if they died with original alone, whether that place be limbo or hell; and it is said quite gratuitously that in limbo actual sins committed in life are not punished, satisfaction for which has not been made. Therefore I judge that the assertion is better proved by this argument: the precept of loving God binds at some time: but it does not seem that it binds at a more fitting time than when man possesses the use of reason: then because since God is our Creator and Former, who created us precisely that we might render to Him the love and homage owed, as St. Leo aptly teaches, sermon 1. De ieiunio decimi mensis, where he says:

If we understand healthily and wisely the beginning of our creation, we shall find that man was created after the image of God precisely that he might be an imitator of his guide, and that this is the natural dignity of our race, if in us, as in a kind of mirror, the form of divine benignity resplends; since, I say, God made us for that purpose, it is fitting that we bestow love as proof of our gratitude and homage for so great a benefit.

You will say. That precept of loving God cannot bind for that time in which there seems a moral impossibility of observing it: but such is the case for the first instant of the use of reason: then because no one can know when he first has the use of reason: then because it does not seem likely that in that first instant God is so perfectly proposed as to be loved that anyone could think himself bound for that instant to His love: but without this prior knowledge that precept cannot be kept: therefore, etc.

I deny the minor; for I do not judge absolutely that the precept urges for the first instant of reason simply, but only for that in which man would have sufficient use of reason so as to be able to sin.

The Doctor hands down and proves the second part in num. 18. where he writes thus:

Perhaps that divine precept determined this: Sanctify the Sabbath; and let everyone remain with himself, that is, recollecting and ascending to God his own. And the Church specified as regards hearing Mass on Sunday De Consecr., dist. 2. cap. Missas. But it is not similar concerning the precept of loving one's neighbor, as will appear in the following distinction.

It is confirmed.: both because the innumerable benefits of God bestowed upon us require this love in a mind of gratitude; and it cannot be rendered at a more suitable time than on those days sacred to God, and accordingly that precept seems to urge on those very days. It is confirmed, because those days designated as sacred to God are chiefly set apart for eliciting acts of religion and observance toward God: but no act seems to conduce more to the glory of God than the act of charity, as being more excellent than all other acts: therefore it is especially on those days to be elicited. To these add, that the act of charity is not burdensome to the will but delightful, unless perhaps insofar as affections opposed toward some creature have rendered it somewhat difficult: but by virtue of the negative precept we are bound not to burst forth into an act of disordered love toward creatures, nor is it harder for anyone having such a habitual affection to put it off so as to have the opposite affection than to have the omission of the act of charity; and consequently there is no difficulty to be overcome in eliciting the act of love which ought not be removed by the negative precept, by which we are bound not to love a creature above God or equally with God.

You will say. If we are all bound by precept to elicit an act of love toward God: then whoever does not elicit even such an act sins: but this seems false: both because the faithful are not accustomed to confess that they have not fulfilled this precept on Sundays, and hence it is a sign that they do not think themselves bound to it by precept: but it is not likely that in a matter of such moment the ignorance of the faithful would be so common and perilous: therefore, etc. Then also because if all were bound to elicit the act of charity on Sundays, it would follow that a faithful person existing in the state of mortal sin would be bound to gird himself to recover the state of grace through sacramental confession; for it does not appear how anyone could love God above all things without having the will to reconcile himself with God and to possess His grace: but no one asserts that sinners are bound to sacramental confession every Sunday: therefore, etc.

I deny the minor, and against its first proof I say that it is not required that one expressly and distinctly confess that he has not observed that precept; indeed the Confessor can sufficiently know this from hearing that the penitent was in the state of mortal sin with a continuous affection of sinning; and by the very fact that he confesses he was for such a time in such a disposition, he signifies sufficiently that he has not observed that precept; but if he were immune from every mortal sin, one can also judge tacitly that he fulfilled that precept; indeed since he had no impediment to observing it, and elsewhere the act can be elicited tacitly. Against the second proof I distinguish the major: that the sinner would be bound to recover divine grace through the elicition of the act of the love of God above all things, which perhaps exists nowhere without the state of grace, I concede: that he would be bound to it by the actual application of all ordinary means conducing to such recovery of grace, I deny.

The third part is also evident, namely that we are bound to elicit an act of charity about the article of death; indeed since then the gravest combats press in, and therefore man is bound in every way to prepare himself against them, nor is any medium safer than this act, if one wishes to extricate himself from the danger of damnation, and this I likewise concede. The reason is, because although it is certain that attrition suffices for the effect of the Sacrament of Penance, still we are not always sufficiently certain that we have true attrition: whence it follows that in that case we are also exposed to danger of salvation. To these add, that it can also often happen that a man in other occasions is bound to elicit an act of the love of God above all things, especially as often as God is proposed with motives sufficiently persuasive that He ought thus to be loved: first, because otherwise by silence He would seem to be contemned: second, because wherever there is the same obligation of natural law to love God for some time, the same obligation also occurs as often as the motive reason is the same: but where God is proposed sufficiently as to be loved, the same reason for loving God occurs as on Sundays: therefore, etc. —

The same must be said as often as anyone judges the act of the love of God necessary for overcoming some grave temptation, or that the mind may be sufficiently prepared to undertake some heroic work which he is already bound to fulfill. For although perhaps that act of the love of God would not be on the part of the thing here and now a medium necessary for obtaining those ends; nevertheless by the very fact that he thinks it to be thus necessary, he is bound to it as long as he remains in that opinion, lest otherwise he sin against conscience. Then, because it can often happen that it truly is a medium necessary for obtaining the said ends, either on account of his disposition, that by other ways he would perhaps not be sufficiently aroused to overcome the temptation, or undertake that work constantly, or even because by another way he would not obtain from God those graces by which he needs to obtain those ends de facto. For although God does not fail us in necessity by ministering His grace, nevertheless He often requires, that He may give us greater graces, and those which He sees will have effect, that we strive to impetrate them for certain reasons: which if we omit through negligence, He gives us lesser ones, by which although we could absolutely accomplish this or that, still we could do so only with the greatest difficulty, and therefore we shall not in fact perfect it.

You ask. Should some order be observed in the exercise of charity toward ourselves and toward our neighbor, and what should that order be?

I answer, that truly some order must be observed, as the holy Fathers commonly teach when expounding that verse of Canticles 2: He ordered charity in me. And likewise that saying of the Apostle to the Galatians 5: Let us work good toward all, but most especially toward the household of the faith; that is, toward those gathered by one faith in the same house of the Church. Nor does it matter that St. Augustine says in book 1, De Doctrina Christiana, chapter 28, that all men are to be loved equally, namely as regards affection; for in the same place he assigns that a disparity must be observed as regards the offices of charity; which he also teaches in the book De Vera Religione, chapter 47: Since, he says, he cannot benefit all those whom he loves equally unless he prefers to benefit those more closely joined to him, he would be unjust.

For it is only by those words that St. Augustine wishes all men to be loved equally, as regards the generality and substance of love, inasmuch as no one is to be excluded from general affection; not as regards the manner of the act, or its intensity, or estimation. I answer secondly, that the order of charity requires first that one love his own salvation more than that of his neighbor. This the Seraphic Doctor proves, dist. 29, art. 1, qu. 3.

Because, he says, each thing desires perfection more in itself than in its like, and any weight draws the body in which it is more strongly toward the place due to it than it draws another body attached to it: hence it is that charity first desires God to be united to us, and to dwell in us, and us to tend toward God Himself and to rest in Him, before it seeks this in any other thing that has some likeness to us.

Therefore the arguments must be conceded which show that in the order of charity the love of self is passed over in favor of love of neighbor. And a sign of this is that those are reprehended and reckoned foolish who neglect their own salvation in order to procure that of another. A sign of this also is that if a man out of charity were bound to love his neighbor as much as himself, in such a way that there were therein an equality of every kind, then he would be bound to love two neighbors twice as much as himself, and three three times as much, and so on ascending further: which is found to happen in no one possessing charity, however perfect. It is proved secondly: because grace gratum faciens pertains to charity, and is given for one's own salvation, not for that of others, as grace freely given. From which it follows that it is not licit, neglecting one's own salvation, or sinning venially, on account of another's salvation. And it is confirmed by that saying of the Wise Man: He who is wicked to himself, to whom will he be good? And by that of David: He who loves iniquity hates his own soul. Nor is it excused by the fact that good comes to another; because, as the Apostle says to the Romans 3: Evils must not be done that goods may come: which to assert, he says, is blasphemous; whence elsewhere Scripture says: What does it profit a man, if he gain the whole world and suffer the loss of his own soul? For what exchange shall a man give for his soul? And accordingly it is not licit even to wish to be deprived of God forever on account of the salvation of very many.

But you will say. Micheas wished to have sinned venially for the sake of others; and Moses and Paul seem to have wished mortally, desiring the loss of everlasting beatitude, as appears, and that for the sake of the salvation of others. For Micheas, chapter 2, spoke these words: Would that I were not a man having spirit, and that I might rather speak lies. Moses, Exodus 32, said to God: This people has sinned a most grievous sin, they have made to themselves gods of gold: either forgive them this wrong, or if thou dost not, blot me out of the book which thou hast written. Paul, moreover, Romans 9, says: I wished myself to be an anathema from Christ for my brethren, who are my kinsmen according to the flesh, that is, eternal and ultimate destruction.

I answer, that Micheas did not wish this formally, but only materially. And that you may understand the matter: the Prophet had recounted the oppressions of the poor and other injuries inflicted upon his neighbors and upon the Israelites, and had therefore threatened them with captivity; and so that they might understand that he did these things not out of hatred, but out of love and compassion for them, he says: would that the things I prophesy concerning the ruin and destruction of Israel were not prophecies revealed by God, but lies suggested to me by a vain spirit of fear and faint-heartedness and dread! Thus we commonly say: would that I be deceived! would that I be a false prophet! And accordingly he does not wish formally to lie, but materially only, that is, that in reality it may not come to pass, or that he may not speak from the Spirit of God but from his own spirit, or the human spirit of vain fear: and this in order to show that he wishes his citizens to endure and not to be cut off or destroyed by the Assyrians, which he threatened to them from God. I add that even if Micheas had wished this formally, he would not therefore have been excused from sin, since he too was a man, and every man can be a liar. — As to the words of Moses and Paul, I answer that neither of them simply wished to be cut off from beatitude: but first, Moses used a certain confidence toward God, and in a certain way mingled himself in the cause of the people whom God wished to destroy, so that God would either destroy him together with the people, which he knew would not happen, or save both. Just as if the son of a king, seeing his father angry at a rebelling multitude and ready to send against them soldiers who would kill them, were to mingle himself with that same multitude and cry out to his father that he should either spare them or kill him along with them, knowing that his father would in no wise do this. Thus St. Augustine explains it, qu. 117 on Exodus, writing thus:

He said this indeed without anxiety, so that the reasoning may be concluded in what follows, namely, that because God did not blot Moses out of his book, He would remit that sin of the people. As if he were to say: just as he did not fear that he himself would be blotted out of the book of life, so too he trusted without hesitation that he would obtain from God what he asked. As regards holy Paul, however, I answer that his desire was only conditional, namely that if it could be done without sin, he would wish it. This indeed St. Chrysostom weighs most excellently, Homil. 16. ad Rom., writing thus:

For he did not, he says, say these things simply; but because all were saying, and blaming God, that those who had been deemed worthy to be called sons of God, to receive the law, to know Him before all others, to enjoy such and so great glory, to worship Him before the whole world, and then to receive the promises, and to be the fathers of those same tribes, and — greatest of all — to be the ancestors of Christ Himself, for this is what it means to be of those from whom Christ is, as far as concerns the flesh, had been cast out and dishonored, while those were brought in who had never known Him, men namely who had sprung from the Gentiles: therefore, since what they said affronted God with reproaches, Paul hearing these things and bearing them grievously and grieving for the glory of God, prayed that he might be an anathema, if only it could be, so that they might be saved and such reproach cease, lest God should seem to have deceived their forefathers, to whom He promised gifts.

You will insist. Holy Paul himself, in Philip. 1., wishes not conditionally but absolutely, for some time to lack beatitude for the sake of the salvation of others; for he says: I am straitened between two: having a desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ, being much better: but to abide still in the flesh, is needful for you. And confident of this: I know that I shall remain, and shall continue with you all for your profit and the joy of faith.

I answer. The Apostle there does not wish to remain in the flesh on account of others, but because of the necessity of others, freedom of choice being posited, he does not know what he would choose, namely life or death. And this is not against charity toward himself, since it contributed to a greater increase of that same charity, and to the accumulating of ever greater merits and rewards, which are not acquired in the same way through a brief life as through a long one.

Very many matters concerning the order of charity of man toward parents, children, relatives, and strangers are wont to be disputed by doctors of moral theology. But since these do not belong to our present undertaking, therefore I merely admonish, first, that parents are to be loved more than children; for although children are as it were a part of their parents, and consequently their love, which is said to descend rather than to ascend, inclines more toward children, nevertheless in extreme necessity provision ought rather to be made for parents than for children; since from them we have obtained from God the greatest benefit, namely life: whence also the precept of honoring parents and of coming to their aid is placed immediately after the three precepts pertaining to God. Hence St. Ambrose, expounding that verse Cant. 2. He ordered charity in me, says: The charity of many is disordered, because they place in first place what belongs in third or fourth. First God is to be loved, secondly parents, then children, after them the household, who, if they are good, are to be preferred to wicked children, etc.

But after children, aid is rather to be brought to relatives, according to the order of closer affinity and greater natural conjunction which they have with us, as St. Augustine teaches, book De vera religione, chapter 42. Since you cannot benefit all whom you love equally, unless you prefer to benefit those more closely joined to you, you are unjust. And book De Doctrina Christiana, chapter 28.

All men are to be loved equally: but since you cannot benefit all, counsel must above all be given to those who, by the opportunities of their times or of any circumstances whatsoever, are more closely joined to you as if by a certain lot. Nevertheless those who are illustrious by greater piety are also to be loved by us with a dearer and more excellent love out of the motive of charity; for since the object of this most excellent virtue is God Himself, it also spurs us with a keener inclination to love those who preserve a closer and more perfect conjunction with God: although I do not doubt that if some just man and one of our own relatives, endowed with less piety, were pressed by equal necessity, aid would be owed by a better title to the relative than to the stranger: for the order of love of neighbor in this life is chiefly determined by his conjunction, or nearness, to us; but the nearness and natural conjunction of relatives is greater than that of outsiders, and accordingly aid would be owed to them upon a stronger reason. If you desire more, consult the doctors of moral theology, who dispute most abundantly about observing order in the acts of charity.

Moreover this one thing is necessary for us to know, that we may have perfect charity; for perfect charity brings with it, as far as it can be had in this mortal life, the crown of all holiness. For, as St. Augustine most excellently says, book De Natura et Gratia, chapter 10: Charity begun is justice begun: charity advanced is justice advanced: charity great is justice great: charity perfect is justice perfect: but charity from a pure heart, and faith unfeigned.

This is that precious Evangelical pearl, which when a man has found he sells all that he has and buys it, as the same St. Augustine teaches, Tract. 5. on the Epistle of John. > This, he says, is that precious pearl, charity; without which nothing you may have profits you: whereas if you have it alone, it suffices you. This, he says in the same place, is what discerns between the sons of God and the sons of the devil: let all sign themselves with the sign of the cross of Christ: let all answer, Amen: let all sing, Alleluia: let all be baptized: let all enter the churches: let the walls of basilicas be raised: the sons of God are not discerned from the sons of the devil except by charity.

It alone is, as he adds in the Tract. De Laud. Charit., that which its own felicity does not exalt, because it is not inflated: it alone is that which an evil conscience does not punish, because it does nothing amiss. Amid reproaches it is secure: amid hatreds beneficent; amid angers tranquil; amid snares innocent: amid iniquities groaning; breathing in truth. What is stronger than she, not to repay injuries but to heal them? What more faithful than she, not to charity but to eternity? For she endures all things in the present life because she believes all things concerning the future life: and he suffers all things inflicted here who hopes for all things promised here. Deservedly she never falls. Therefore pursue charity: and thinking on it holily, bring forth the fruit of justice: and whatever you find more abundant than I was able to say in her praises, let it appear in your morals. Amen.

IMPRIMATUR:

Fr. ALBERTUS LEPIDI O. P. S. P. A. Magister.

IMPRIMATUR:

IOSEPH CEPPETELLI, Archbishop of Myra, Vicegerent.