Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

WHAT THE OBJECT OF CHARITY IS.

NOTE 1. All Theologians agree that the primary object of charity is God Himself: since charity is a theological virtue: but every theological virtue has God for its object; and consequently charity tends to God as to its proper object. Since, however, charity is love, whose object is good, therefore beyond controversy it is that this theological virtue tends to good, quatenus good; so that the divine goodness is the formal reason under which the virtue of charity attains God, as its proper object. The difficulty, however, as the Subtle Doctor notes, dist. 27. num. 3., is by what reason the virtue of charity is borne toward the goodness of God: whether namely toward His absolute goodness, or quatenus God is good in Himself; or toward His respective goodness, or quatenus He is good to the lover; or finally quatenus His goodness embraces both, namely the absolute goodness, whereby God is good in Himself, and the respective, whereby He is good to creatures, or as convenient and beneficial to us.

NOTE 2. The absolute goodness of God can be distinguished as threefold, or considered in three ways: first indeed, for the supreme goodness of the divine nature alone, quatenus this belongs to the divine essence prout it is formally distinguished from its divine attributes: or for attributal goodness, that which is one among the attributes of the divine essence itself, formally distinct from it, as also from the other attributes: or finally for transcendent goodness, quatenus it is common to the divine goodness per essentiam, which is found in God alone, and to the divine goodness per participationem, which shines forth in creatures. The prior goodness is nothing else than that highest perfection of the divine essence taken adequately, prout namely it embraces all and singular the perfections belonging to God, by which reason it is the same to be good as to be absolutely and simply and in every way perfect; according to which signification Christ the Lord said Lucae 18. No one is good, but God alone: for to God alone does it belong to be good and perfect per essentiam, quatenus He has in Himself all the perfections due to His nature in such wise that He alone has them in act and de facto by nature and essential necessity. The second goodness is nothing else than that positive perfection, whereby God is moved from Himself and inclined to communicate Himself, and to produce something outside Himself, and thus it is the beneficence of God itself, benignity, and as it were His habitual love toward creatures. Finally, the third goodness is the very concept of divine goodness abstracting and prescinding from that goodness itself, quatenus it is in God by necessity of being; but in creatures through the communication and participation of the same divine goodness. It is asked, then, under which reason of goodness God is reckoned the object of the virtue of charity.

NOTE 3. From the Doctor, dist. 27. n. 7., a threefold reason can be considered in the object lovable by charity: the first is that at which the very act of charity terminates, as that which: namely such that the beloved person is constituted in the esse of God through Deity: the second is some reason preceding the act of love, and without which perhaps an act of such love would not here and now be elicited, as if someone, considering that God has bestowed many benefits upon him, were stimulated by this consideration to love Him. Finally, the third is some reason necessarily concomitant with, or following, the act of love; as, he says, if it were said that God loves, quatenus He is supremely loved, for this does not arise from the formal reason of the object, but follows a reason concomitant in the object with the act of love; for indeed God loves those who love Him. This threefold reason the Doctor illustrates by the example of a thing which would be, first, most beautifully visible by its own nature; secondly, which would give visual power to the eye, whereby it would be seen; thirdly, which would quiet and satiate sight inasmuch as it is attained by the eye through the act of seeing, which would be the formal reason of terminating visual love on hypothesis, supposing that sight could love such an object. The first reason, whereby God would tend into His object, is the very reason of the nature of the visible thing, whereby in such a nature there is perfectly the reason of the adequate object of such a power. The second is a certain reason eliciting to love by reason of the benefit conferred, namely by reason of the power of seeing granted by that visible thing. The third truly would be a reason concomitant with the act, wherein sight would be perfectly quieted. It is asked, therefore, which of these reasons is the formal objective reason of charity; and consequently three things chiefly must here be determined: first, whether God is the object of charity quatenus He is good in Himself, or quatenus He is good to us, or a good convenient to us: secondly, whether the terminating reason of the act of charity is His essential, or attributal goodness, or the divine goodness quatenus it prescinds from the reason of essential good, both as it is in God, and from the reason of good per participationem, quatenus it is in creatures: thirdly, whether that terminating reason of the act of charity is something concomitant with or subsequent to such an act.

First Conclusion. — The formal and primarily terminating object of charity is not the divine goodness quatenus convenient to us, nor the divine goodness analogically common to God and creatures per participationem, but it is the absolute goodness of God. This is the Doctor's teaching, num. 3. and following.

He proves the first part thus: the formal object of the most perfect virtue, such as charity is, ought to be the most perfect reason on account of which God is supremely lovable; otherwise another virtue would be given which would tend to God under that more perfect reason: but more perfect is the reason of divine goodness prout considered in itself, than prout considered in order to creatures: therefore the primary formal object of charity is not the divine goodness, as convenient to a creature.

Secondly, if God, as convenient to us, and as our good, were the principal formal object of charity, this would belong to Him most of all, quatenus He is beatifying of us: but that cannot be said. Proof: if God quatenus beatific had the formal reason of the object of charity, then either quatenus beatific aptitudinaliter, or quatenus beatific actualiter, that is quatenus aptus is, and can make blessed, or has de facto bestowed beatitude; but neither can be said. Not indeed the first, because one cannot love any object on account of the aptitudinal respect it has, except quatenus one loved it on account of its absolute perfection, by reason of which such respect belongs to it; and accordingly God cannot be loved, quatenus He is beatific aptitudinaliter, except on account of His absolute goodness, on account of which the virtue of beatifying belongs to Him; for the perfection and virtue of beatifying do not consist formally in the respect itself, but in the absolute perfection to which it follows. Nor yet the second, because it belongs to Him to be the beatific object prior to actually beatifying, inasmuch as the act of beatifying signifies an actual respect to that act of beatitude whereby one tends to the object.

The Doctor confirms this: because to be beatific, both actualiter and aptitudinaliter, signifies only a respect of reason; for if it signified a real respect, actual and aptitudinal, it would depend upon a creature: for every respect depends upon its term; such that if the term were impossible, such a respect too would be impossible: but it seems absurd that God in Himself have anything really depending upon a creature: such that if a creature were impossible, that likewise would be impossible. And consequently that respect, or reason of beatific, cannot be in God anything real: but charity, which is a real virtue, cannot have as formal object any ens rationis; and consequently it has for object God not ut beatificum formally; nor consequently, as our good.

Thirdly finally, to desire a good as convenient to us pertains to the affection of the useful, not indeed of justice: but charity perfects the will, inasmuch as it signifies the affection of justice, not however of the useful, for under this reason it is distinguished from hope, which is borne to God through the affection of the useful: therefore, etc.

The second part is proved, namely that the formal and primary object of charity is not the divine goodness itself, as convenient analogically to the divine goodness per essentiam, and to human goodness per participationem: first indeed, because charity is related to God, ut bonum, just as faith is related to God, ut verum: but faith does not tend to the divine truth quatenus it abstracts from the divine truth itself per essentiam, and per participationem: therefore neither does charity tend to the divine goodness quatenus it prescinds from goodness per essentiam, and from goodness per participationem. Further, our charity is a formal participation of that charity whereby God loves Himself: but the charity of God has for formal object no good in common, but only the absolute goodness of God: therefore, etc. Moreover, a theological virtue has God for its formal and primary object, not indeed something common to God and creatures: but charity is a theological virtue, and consequently it has nothing common to God and creatures for object. Finally, as the Doctor says ibid. num. 6., every act and habit ought to have a single specificative formal reason: but that goodness prout it belongs analogically to God per se, and to creatures per participationem, is not one specificative formal reason: since it has not one and the same reason of goodness, neither specific, nor individual; not indeed specific, because created and uncreated goodness are not of the same species; nor yet individual, because those two goods, since they are specifically distinct, are also much more numerically diverse.

You will say. Divine goodness quatenus convenient to God per se, and to creatures per participationem, can have the reason of formal object of some theological habit, or of one tending to divine things: but of no other than charity: therefore the specificative object of charity is that goodness itself, quatenus convenient to God and creatures.

I answer first, that the major may be denied: both because no real concept of goodness can truly exist which is analogous and common to God and to a creature, as has been said; and because goodness common to God and to a creature cannot have a unity sufficient for specifying one and the same habit: for a single habit in species, such as charity, requires an object one in species, which that goodness common to God per se and to creatures by participation cannot be.

I answer secondly, that even the minor may be denied; indeed, if some habit were granted tending toward the divine goodness insofar as it is common to God and creatures, that habit would be entirely distinct from charity, since it would have an object entirely distinct in species.

You will say. Charity tends equally toward God and neighbor: therefore it has at once God and creature for its formal and specifying object; and consequently it tends toward the divine goodness insofar as it is common to God and creatures.

I deny the consequence: for just as the uncreated charity of God tends not only toward God, but also toward men and Angels, whom God loves with charitable friendship, yet does not on that account have for its formal object a charity common to God and creatures: so, proportion being kept, our charity, which is a certain participation in divine charity, can tend toward God and neighbor as to be loved out of friendship, even if it have only the divine goodness, insofar as it belongs to God alone, for its formal object.

Second Conclusion. — The formal terminating object of divine charity is the essential divine goodness, not indeed the attributal, nor anything concomitant, or consequent upon the act of such charity. This is the teaching of the Doctor ibid. num. 7. And he proves it thus: That is the formal ratio principally terminating the most perfect virtue, such as charity, by which its material object, namely God, can most perfectly quiet and satiate the will, and also have the most perfect ratio of object: but God has this only through His essential goodness: therefore that essential goodness has the ratio of formal object of charity. The major stands per se. The minor however is proved: whenever a power regards the whole of being as its adequate terminative object, it cannot be perfectly quieted by that object unless it have the most perfect ratio of entity: but the will has being, or good in common, as its adequate object: therefore it cannot be perfectly quieted by any other ratio than by that which has the primary and principal ratio of goodness: but only the essential goodness claims this for itself; for attributal goodness flows from it as from a root: therefore only the essential goodness has the ratio of formal terminating object of divine charity.

Moreover, that essential divine goodness or perfection of God, taken absolutely, embraces infinite wisdom, omnipotence, eternity, immensity, and all other formally infinite perfections, from which there results an infinite being in every genus of being: nevertheless, when that essential goodness of God is viewed in itself, it is the most simple ratio sufficiently moving to the act of supernatural charity and love.

Furthermore, ibidem the Doctor grants in num. 5. that the divine goodness, as bestowing benefits upon us, can have the ratio of motivating object of charity; for this S. John teaches in his first Epistle, chap. 1., saying: Let us therefore love God, because God first hath loved us. Hence daily experience shows that from the consideration of benefits received from someone we are moved and spurred to love him more effectively than he would be loved on account of his own perfections. The Doctor however calls this ratio secondary; because if anyone were to love

God only on account of the benefits bestowed on him by God, without attending to His divine perfections, from which He has that He is supremely amiable on account of Himself; such an act of love would not properly be accounted theological, nor supernatural, but only natural; since it is natural to return love for love, and affection for one who confers benefits upon us. Yet that consideration of divine benefits can be a secondary motive ratio, which may provoke and allure to the act of charity, inasmuch as God is loved not so much on account of the benefits received from God, as on account of the divine goodness, by which He is provoked to confer those benefits upon us.

Nor would I deny that God can be loved by us, in this mortal state, with an love of charity on account of some special attribute of His, namely, the providence by which He governs us, the power by which He protects us, the goodness by which He cherishes us, the mercy by which He indulges us, etc.; even as supernatural faith has for the motive object of its assent some attribute, namely, the veracity of God. Nor does anything hinder that love from being a true act of charity; for although God so considered might seem the object of the love of concupiscence, whereby we covet divine benefits to be conferred upon us by God; nevertheless it can be an act of charity and of the love of friendship, inasmuch as providence, power, and the other attributal perfections are considered as infinite perfections, and concurring toward that infinite goodness, by which God is said to be infinitely good and perfect. For it often happens that lovers of God are sometimes stirred to the consideration and admiration of the singular perfections of God, and thence are enkindled to a ⟦illegible: viviticum?⟧, and most ardent love of their beloved God; even as we read of the celestial Spouse, Cant. 2., who, upon the daughters of Jerusalem asking what manner of beloved hers was, recounted His various perfections, and finally concluded: He is wholly desirable. So that the consideration of all the perfections of her beloved was like a fire and a spur, whereby that celestial spouse was provoked to love her beloved on account of His absolute and supreme perfection. But that a concomitant or subsequent ratio of the termination of the act of love is not properly speaking the objective and terminating ratio, the Doctor proves ibid. num. 9.: Because, he says, the objective ratio, properly speaking, must presuppose the act which is terminated; whereas this ratio accompanies or follows the act; whence he infers that God, as the good actually beatifying, is not properly said to be the object of charity, because as such He actually terminates charity: for He has actually to beatify insofar as He terminates beatific love; whence He does not begin to be actually beatifying before the very act of beatific love itself is proposed and possessed. He confesses nevertheless that that third ratio can in some way be called the object of charity, or of its object, inasmuch as it holds itself concomitantly on the side of the object toward actual charity, so that actual charity about God can never be had without God's terminating it; whether it should terminate it by some respect, which is the less probable view, or by itself, the act being posited, or by extrinsic denomination taken from the act, as seems more probable.

Third Conclusion. — ONE AND THE SAME AND INDIVISIBLE IS THE HABITUAL VIRTUE OF CHARITY INCLINING TO THE LOVING OF GOD AS

PRIMARY OBJECT, AND OF NEIGHBOR AS SECONDARY. This is the more common opinion among the followers of both Schools, the Subtle and the Angelic.

It is proved first from the Holy Fathers, by Augustine, lib. 8. De Trinitate, chap. 5., who says: By one and the same charity we love God and our neighbor, but God for God's sake, while ourselves and our neighbor for God's sake. Moreover, in Serm. II., which is On the Ascension: I think, he says, that therefore the Holy Spirit was given twice, once on earth and again in heaven, that the two precepts of charity might be commended to us, namely, of God and of neighbor. There is one charity, and two precepts; one Spirit, and two givings, because no other charity loves the neighbor than that which loves God; therefore with the same charity with which we love our neighbor we love God, etc. Similarly S. Gregory, book 7. of the Moral., chap. 10., speaking of the Love of God and of Neighbor, says: These two loves are two certain parts, but one whole is composed of both: two rings, but one chain; two actions, but one virtue: two works, but one charity: two merits before God, but it is impossible for one to be found without the other.

The same truth the Seraphic Doctor teaches in dist. 27. art. 2. qu. 2.; first, because the motion toward the end is the same as that toward that which is for the end; for a motion does not become different on account of a difference of means, but of the extremity: whereas the motion of charity tends toward God as toward the end, but toward the neighbor as toward a means: therefore one and the same motion, or habit of charity, can incline to an act which tends toward the neighbor and toward God. Secondly, the same is the honor whereby the image of some Saint is honored together with that whereby the Saint himself is honored, because the honor of the image is referred to the prototype, as S. Damascene teaches, lib. 1. De Fide, chap. 17.; but love of neighbor is referred to God: therefore similarly there is one motion, or one principle inclining to the loving of God and neighbor. Thirdly, three adorable persons of the Trinity are loved by one and the same love, because in them there is one ratio of love, namely the supreme divine goodness: so also there is one motive ratio for loving God and neighbor: therefore there is one and the same ratio.

It is confirmed by a similar case: although faith attains several things credible, and hope extends itself in hoping toward several things; yet because all are attained under the same formal ratio under which, namely, the veracity of God, and His omnipotence, as assisting, those virtues are not multiplied in species: so likewise charity, even though it extend itself to loving several things, nevertheless attains all under the one formal ratio of divine and uncreated goodness; therefore it is one virtue in species, simple.

You will say: A diverse habit is required where a diverse difficulty occurs in eliciting the act: yet one difficulty occurs about the love of neighbor, and another about the love of God: for he who loves God with the greatest sweetness and delight of his soul suffers no less grave a difficulty in loving his enemies for God's sake: therefore the acts of the love of God and of neighbor require diverse habits.

I distinguish the major: a diverse acquired habit is required, I concede: infused, I deny: for infused habits are not granted that anyone may act easily, but only that he simply have the power of acting. To the minor I say, that difficulty of loving enemies is removed by the very virtue of charity, inasmuch as it applies the motive of that love, namely, the very person to be loved for the sake of the infinite goodness of God, who commands and ordains this.

You will say, secondly: Charity moves only to loving that which is lovable on account of the infinite goodness of God: yet the neighbor does not present himself as thus to be loved. Proof: no one is to be loved on account of the infinite goodness of God unless in whom that infinite goodness exists: but it does not exist in the neighbor: therefore, etc.

I deny the minor, and to its proof I say, it is not necessary that the divine goodness be inherent in someone in order that he be loved through charity, but it suffices that he have an extrinsic relation to that goodness of God. For just as a medicine, however unpleasant and bitter, and thus not lovable, is nevertheless loved on account of the health to which it is ordered, so also the neighbor, however odious otherwise, can be loved on account of the divine goodness, to which he is ordered.

Now this ordering of the neighbor to the divine goodness can be considered in diverse ways. First indeed, inasmuch as he who loves God desires that He be loved by all; hence that he be loved by the neighbor; but in desiring this very thing he wishes for the neighbor the greatest good on account of that divine goodness itself, which he judges most worthy to be loved by the neighbor. Secondly, he who loves someone desires every good of which he is capable; hence he who loves God desires that all things tend to His glory; but it pertains to the glory of God that He be loved by the neighbor: therefore, etc. Finally, he who loves someone also loves those things which pertain to him: whence S. John in the first Epistle, chap. 5.: Every one that loveth him who begot, loveth him also who is born of him: whence he infers: In this we know that we love the children of God, when we love God and keep his commandments. As if he said: we who love God ought also to love for God's sake all men, who are born of God and bear forth His divine image.

Hence it follows, that if the neighbor be loved precisely on account of his own intrinsic and natural goodness, it will not be theological charity, since a theological virtue necessarily tends toward God, at least as formal object. The act of these will be moral friendship, whether acquired or infused, if it be given. Although even here it could be imperated reflexively by a distinct act elicited from the motive of divine charity, as is evident.