Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

WHETHER CHARITY IS A VIRTUE, AND OF WHAT KIND.

Note 1. The name of charity, according to the etymology of the word, is deduced either from the Greek word χάρις, which signifies grace, or, as is more probable, from the adjective charus, whose substantive is charitas; signifying the excellence of some thing which, since it is of great price, is also held in special affection; whence it has been transferred to express that very love. And although it sometimes happens that this name is usurped to designate illicit love, in which sense Judith, praying to God, chap. 9. said of Holofernes: Let him be caught in the snare of his own eyes with me, and let him be struck by the lips of my charity, that is, by things which could allure him to love and forbidden embrace, nevertheless the usage of common holy Scripture and of the Holy Fathers has now prevailed, that the word charitas designates only that habit or supernatural act whereby we love God for himself, and other things for God himself. And although St. August., lib. 4. De Civit. Dei* chap. 7. said that these three, amor, dilectio, charitas, mostly signify one and the same thing in holy Scripture; nevertheless he observes there that a diverse signification inheres in them; amor indeed extends more widely, and signifies every affection of the will, whether natural and necessary, or supernatural and gratuitous: dilectio precisely denotes not a mutual affection of two or several among themselves, but only a good will, which we have out of choice and weighed counsel toward someone rather than toward others: charitas truly signifies the mutual gratuitous and supernatural affection which we have toward God or neighbor: whence charity obtains the name and dignity of friendship. That this may appear more evidently,

Note 2. Friendship, according to Aristotle, lib. 8. Ethic., chap. 2. is thus defined: Friendship is the mutual benevolence of certain persons, which does not lie hidden from their very souls, but ⟦illegible: alis? ipsis?⟧ is known to each other. It is called benevolence, that it may be distinguished from the love of concupiscence, whereby one wishes a good to himself. Mutual is added, because it is as it were a bond, whereby two are bound to one another out of the choice of both, and therefore out of the judgment of reason. The remaining words of the definition signify the exercise of friendship itself, which stimulates friends not only to mutual affection, but also to rendering one another mutual services; for indeed if a friend should not know that he is loved by the other, he will not be stimulated to bestow love upon him and to succor him in necessities. Hence four conditions especially are assigned by the same Aristotle there as desirable for true and perfect friendship: first, that there be benevolence, or volition of the good, which we wish: but since the goods which we can wish a friend are in a twofold difference; for some are those which he already possesses, and others those of which he is destitute: the former goods we wish him with the love of complacency: the latter truly with the love of desire: namely by desiring and wishing them for him. The second condition is, that this love be mutual; for if this be wanting, love indeed can exist, but not friendship. Third, that this mutual benevolence be known on both sides. Fourth finally, that among friends there be a mutual communication of goods, that is, that friends communicate their goods to one another, and cherish their love by mutual offices toward each other.

Note 3. It is certain, as appears from what we have said concerning sanctifying grace, that charity is not the Holy Spirit himself, or the substantial, or personal love of God formally joined to us, as the Master of the Sentences seems to have taught in 1. dist. 17. although the Subtle Doctor there q. 3. num. 20. strives to reconcile him with the common opinion; but truly a quality infused by God, as the Council of Trent teaches, Sess. 6. chap. 7. where, laying down that our justification takes place through an inherent form, it concludes thus:

This however takes place in this justification of the impious, when, by the merit of the most holy passion of the same, through the Holy Spirit the charity of God is infused into the hearts of those who are justified, and inheres in them: whence in justification itself man, together with the remission of sins, receives all these things at once through Jesus Christ, into whom he is ingrafted, faith, hope, and charity.

In which words the Council teaches three things: first, that charity is diffused through the Holy Spirit, whereby it signifies that God is the efficient cause of charity, and consequently that it is really distinct from God, and consequently from the Holy Spirit. Second, that charity is infused; but the Holy Spirit cannot be said to be infused. Third, that charity inheres in the justified: which certainly cannot belong to the Holy Spirit, but only to some created form inherently adhering. Wherefore most nobly St. Augustine, lib. De Spiritu et littera, chap. 32. says: The charity of God is said to be poured forth in our hearts, not whereby he himself loves us, but whereby he makes us his beloved; as the justice of God, whereby by his gift we are made just; and the salvation of the Lord, whereby he makes us safe. It also stands that charity, inasmuch as it is really indistinct from sanctifying grace, is a supernatural quality, and that either habitual or actual; whence there remains here only to determine whether charity is a virtue, and that special properly so called, and likewise the perfect friendship of man with God.

First conclusion. — THE HABIT OF CHARITY, HOWEVER REMISS, IS A THEOLOGICAL VIRTUE. This consists of two parts: the first, that it is a virtue: the second, that it claims this dignity for itself even in a remiss degree. But the parts of this Conclusion the Subtle Doctor delivers and proves dist. 27. num. 2.

The first indeed he may thus prove: Virtue, according to St. Augustine, is a good quality of the mind, whereby one lives rightly, whereby no one uses ill. According to Aristotle truly it is a quality which makes its possessor good, and his work honorable and conformable to right reason: but theological charity makes him whom it informs good, and exhibits even his act as good, as St. Paul proves 1. ad Cor. 13. Showing especially that without charity the works of the other virtues, however good from their object, profit nothing, especially toward eternal beatitude: therefore, etc.

The Doctor proves secondly: Every habit whose individual acts are properly moral, right, and conformed to right reason, is also a moral virtue properly so called: but such are the acts of charity: therefore, etc. He proves the minor: because to love God above all things, he says, is an act conformed to natural right reason, whereby it dictates that the best is to be loved: therefore it is right; nay rather its certainty is per se nota, as the rectitude of the first principle in operables: for by the innate light of nature itself it appears that of all things lovable the highest good is to be loved above all, as the highest truth is to be believed above all: therefore since God is the highest good, he is also necessarily to be loved supremely. — He confirms it, namely that the act of loving God above all things is a good act, and conformed to right reason; because the things which are of the law of nature are conformed to right reason, otherwise they would not be of the law of nature; for it would be absurd that nature should command anything fighting against right reason itself, since nature itself is the law, the light innate to us, and the dictamen of right reason: but that precept, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, is of the law of nature: therefore it is naturally known that this act is right; and consequently the habit inclining to this act is truly theological: Because, says the Doctor, it is concerned with a theological object, namely God immediately: and moreover it rests immediately upon the first rule of human acts, and it can be infused by God, and because it is apt to perfect the supreme portion of the soul, which is not most perfectly perfected except immediately by God. By which words he signifies that the act of charity has four conditions necessary for a theological virtue: of which the first is, that it have God for its object: the second, that it rest upon the first rule of human acts, namely the eternal law known to us through the light of faith: the third, that it ought to be divinely infused, not acquired by our own acts: fourth finally, that it be apt to perfect the superior portion. But all these things belong to charity: therefore it is a theological virtue.

The second part is proved, because all those characters of theological virtue belong to charity however remiss, as is evident per se; and consequently this too has the ratio of virtue. He adds that every operative habit which conduces to the unitive act of man with God is truly a theological virtue: but charity however remiss is of such a kind, since, says St. John, Epist. 1. chap. 4. if we love one another, God abideth in us, and his charity in us is perfect. There he speaks simply and absolutely of supernatural love, abstracting from whether it be remiss or intense; for these words, is perfect, are not understood of the perfection of charity with regard to degrees most intense, which we may call the perfection of excellence, but are understood only of sufficient perfection, inasmuch as whosoever loves his neighbor out of theological charity has charity complete in the ratio of virtue, because by loving his neighbor for God, upon God himself as upon the object ⟦illegible: qnl teratur; leg. qualificetur? terminetur?⟧. — It is confirmed from this, that there chap. 1. St. John expressly pronounces: Who keepeth his word, in him truly is the charity of God perfected: but this perfection cannot be understood with respect to the most perfect intensification of degrees; for there the Apostle treats of the works of precepts, for the observance of which a most perfect charity is not required, as is gathered from Matth. 19. where Christ the Lord, when the young man asking ⟦quid faciendo vitam aeternam possidebo?⟧ had been answered: If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments, and the answer had been given by the youth himself: ⟦omnia⟧ these have I kept from my youth, what is yet wanting to me? Christ the Lord exhorts him to a further excellence of charity, namely to pursuing the works of counsel and supererogation, saying: If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell whatsoever thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven, and come follow me: therefore charity also in a remiss degree, which suffices for the observance of the precepts, according to the mind of St. John, is perfect charity; and consequently has the true ratio of theological virtue.

You will say: Every virtue properly so called is concerned with the arduous and difficult: but the theological habit of charity is not concerned with the arduous, nor does its act have any difficulty; for nothing is more delightful, nor easier, than to love God: therefore that habit has not the ratio of virtue. —

I answer, that the greater virtue is concerned with the arduous, either by reason of the object, which transcends the natural power of the faculty; or by reason of the impediment, which it removes from eliciting an act of virtue: now in both these ways the act of charity can be reckoned difficult. First indeed, that act transcends the powers of a natural faculty considered within the line and order of nature. Moreover it has also the adjunct of impediment, inasmuch namely as it seems difficult to love God above all things: partly because all earthly things, and whatsoever created objects fall under sense, recall from that love: partly because the supreme goodness of God, since it does not yet lie open so perspicuously and in prospect to us mortals, thence allures less efficaciously to the supernatural love of itself. Hence St. Peter, Epist. 1. chap. 1. commends the faithful, because whom not having seen you love, in whom now also, not seeing, you believe. Add that this is not common to all virtues, nor is it of the formal ratio of virtue, inasmuch as precisely it is virtue, which is occupied with the difficult, for this belongs especially to the moral virtues, which are occupied with curbing and moderating the passions.

You will say 2: Virtue only begun, or in a remiss degree, is not properly to be called virtue, as Aristotle teaches, lib. 2. Magnorum Moralium, chap. 7. where he says that temperance in a remiss degree has not the ratio of virtue: but every charity which we have in this mortal state is only begun and imperfect, for it alone will be consummated in the Fatherland: therefore it has not now the ratio of perfect virtue, which is most true of charity in a remiss degree. —

I answer, that the major is true of acquired virtues, which are occupied with moderating the passions; for since those are acquired through acts, which are for the most part weak, thence it comes that unless they are often repeated, they do not promote the habit to the perfect state of virtue: But the theological habit of charity, since it is of itself infused by God, at that same instant in which it is infused, has the perfection sufficient for the ratio of virtue.

Second conclusion. — THEOLOGICAL CHARITY IS A SPECIAL VIRTUE DISTINCT FROM THE OTHER VIRTUES. This also is common. The Subtle Doctor proves in the place cited above: This virtue, he says, is distinct from faith, because its act is not to believe: likewise from hope, because its act is not to covet the good of the beloved, inasmuch as it is a fitting good for the lover; but to tend toward the object in itself, even if per impossibile its fittingness were circumscribed from flowing into the lover. This truth also appears in the Apostle 1. ad Cor. 13. where he enumerates faith, hope, and charity, as three distinct virtues not only from one another, but also from the other moral virtues, whose acts he there celebrates.

Reason also urges: because wherever there is a special honesty according to which a virtue tends toward its object, there also there ought to be a special virtue distinct from others: but the formal ratio under which theological charity tends toward God is a special honesty distinct from every other ratio according to which certain other virtues tend toward God: therefore charity ought to be a special virtue. The major holds. But the minor is proved: for the honesty of loving God as the highest good for himself is one thing, and the honesty of believing in him as supremely true, and of hoping in him as the highest good fitting and promised to us, is another, as is evident per se. For although the divine goodness, inasmuch as it is apprehended by charity, embraces the special perfection and goodness of whatsoever essence, person, or divine property, which can be objects of certain other virtues: nevertheless it considers that divine goodness, even particular, whether of essence, of person, or of divine property, in another manner than the other virtues; indeed it considers it, as to be loved for itself, and by reason of that supreme excellence: therefore it has a special honesty. —

Now Seraph. Doctor dist. 27. art. 1. quaest. 1. gathers this diversity of charity from the other virtues out of the sixfold comparison of the same virtue: First indeed, from comparison to the object, which is distinguished from others by reason of moving: for the formal ratio under which theological charity tends, and according to which it attains each and all of its objects, is the very uncreated goodness of God containing in itself every perfection in every genus of excellence, goodness and perfection, which ratio is special and distinct from that goodness and perfection under which the other virtues tend toward God, or toward any other object: for this taken formally is nothing else than one formal ratio, by which all the divine perfections as it were integrate and compose one supreme goodness and integrity of God, on account of which God is in himself supremely to be loved: under which special ratio no other virtue tends toward God himself, and consequently on the part of the object it is a special virtue. Second, the same diversity is gathered by comparison to the act, because the love of God, on account of his excellence in himself and to be loved for himself, differs from the acts of the other virtues. Third, by comparison to the proper subject, because this is in the will, not as concupiscible simply, nor even as irascible, but as it takes complacency in the object toward which it tends through the love of friendship, or as Seraph. Doctor says, just as faith is in the rational, hope in the irascible, so charity in the concupiscible. Fourth, by comparison to opposites: for the other virtues have certain vices opposed to them: but charity conflicts with all altogether. Fifth, by comparison to the reward: for the habit of faith and hope is evacuated in the fatherland: but charity remains. Sixth finally, by comparison to its principle, which it represents: for the image of re-creation, he says, consists in the three theological virtues, and the unity of grace: as the image of creation in the three potencies, and the unity of substance: therefore as the natural potencies, intellect, will, and memory, inasmuch as they retain the image of God the creator, are really distinguished from one another, because they do not represent the divine persons except inasmuch as they are under acts, or actually operating; so faith, hope, and charity, which represent God as restorer and savior, ought by equal reason to be really distinguished.

You will say 1. From the Apostle 1. Cor. 13. Charity has the effect of all the virtues: since, he says, charity is patient, and kind, etc. where he enumerates fifteen works of the virtues which belong to charity: but a virtue which has the acts of all the virtues is not special, but common: therefore charity is not a virtue distinct from the others. — Seraph. Doctor distinguishes the major: Charity has the acts of all the virtues as elicitive principle, he denies: as imperative principle, he concedes. Therefore the acts of the other virtues are attributed to charity itself not as eliciting, but as commanding, or as first mover, not as immediate mover; by which reason the Apostle admonished 1. ad Cor. 16. Let all your things be done in charity.

You will say 2. The Holy Fathers call charity a general virtue; for St. Jerome, praised by Seraph. Doctor, says: I shall briefly embrace the whole definition of virtue, virtue is charity, whereby everything to be loved is loved. Likewise St. Augustine, lib. 15. De Civitate, chap. 22. and St. Bernard, lib. De Amore Dei, chap. 6. say that virtue is nothing else than the order of love, or ordered love: but ordered love is nothing else than charity: therefore since every virtue is ordered love, also every virtue is charity, and consequently this is not distinct from the other virtues. — Seraph. Doctor answers, that all virtues can be called charity causally; because, he says, charity with respect to the others in moving has in some manner the ratio of efficient cause, in some manner formal, in some manner final: but the love of charity commands the other virtues, that they go forth into its acts, and by commanding informs them, and makes them meritorious, and by informing joins them to the end, and in it gives them rest, while it makes us adhere to God and enjoy him; and therefore deservedly gratuitous virtue is to be defined through the love of charity. It could also be said otherwise, that that love which falls into the definition of virtue is generally not the love of charity, which is one of the theological virtues, but is the love common and general to all the other virtues; and therefore the consequence is to be denied.

You will say 3. As the precept of charity is related to other precepts, so is the habit of charity related to the other habits of virtues: but the precept of charity comprehends all other precepts: for, says the Apostle to Rom. 18. he who loveth his neighbor hath fulfilled the law: therefore the habit of charity contains in itself the habits of all the other virtues. — Seraphicus Doctor answers by distinguishing the minor:

The precept of charity comprehends all precepts not by omnimodal entity, but by a certain reduction: for all precepts are reduced to it, and in it are consummated; and therefore from this it cannot be concluded that the habit of charity is common to the others, except only through radiation, according to which St. Gregory says, that the precepts are many through the diversity of work, and one in the root of love, who whatsoever is commanded, is rooted in charity alone: but this is not id> true concerning the truth, as if it belonged to charity alone to execute the precepts enjoined, but because the other virtues without charity do not execute the divine precepts according to the divine acceptation.

You will say 1. As the object of charity is related to the objects of the other virtues, so is the habit of charity related to the other habits: but the object of charity is common to all the objects of the other virtues; since its object is good under the ratio of good simply: therefore, etc. — The same Seraphicus Doctor answers by denying the minor: for the object of charity is distinguished in substance from the objects of the cardinal virtues, which are concerned only with a created object: but from the objects of the theological virtues according to a diverse ratio of moving, because as faith regards God under the ratio of the true, and hope under the ratio of the arduous, so charity under the ratio of the good. If therefore good under the ratio of good, and true under the ratio of true, signify diverse ratios of moving, because according to the diversity of the ratio of moving is the distinction in acts and habits, hence it is that charity differs from the other theological virtues.

Third Conclusion. — Charity has the true nature of friendship. Thus the Theologians commonly hold against Durandus, in 1. dist. 19. qu. 1., who denies that there is a proper friendship of man toward God. This assertion the Subtle Doctor hands down and declares, dist. 27. num. 20., where he says:

I concede that charity can properly be called friendship, though not by taking friendship strictly, as the Philosopher takes it there, but by extending it somewhat: just as according to his intention friendship toward God is something more excellent than friendship. For that excellence of the object does not take away what is of perfection in the object, but what is of imperfection. For honesty in the lovable, and being loved in return in the beloved, are conditions per se in the lovable, not indeed of imperfection — nay, it would not be more perfect if it were not loved in return; but equality in these is an accompanying condition. God, however, has honesty and being-loving-in-return, just as loving, and friendship toward Him can be more excellent, so that it may be called superfriendship. And thus it is argued that equality is the ground of friendship. This is true supposing honesty, which is the first ground of lovability: but equality is the ground of friendship taken strictly: while excellence is the ground of a habit more akin to perfection than friendship is. Such, in our case, I call charity.

So far the Doctor. In these words he chiefly makes three things clear: first, that charity is truly and properly called friendship; so that if this ground of man's friendship toward God belongs to any virtue, it must be attributed most of all to charity, which is the habitual principle of loving God for Himself, and indeed above all things. Second, that on account of its excellence it can be called superfriendship, that is, the most preeminent among all friendships, or a love that utterly surpasses every love that could be called friendship. Third, that it is not friendship strictly speaking as the Philosopher defines it, since it does not have all the conditions he assigned for true friendship.

The conclusion is therefore proved: First indeed from Sacred Scripture, for in Wisdom 7., concerning divine Wisdom, it is said: She transferreth herself into holy souls, and maketh them friends of God. And Ps. 138.: They thy friends, O God, are exceedingly honoured. And Sacred Scripture everywhere calls the just friends of God, especially in the New Testament, for Christ the Lord says to His Apostles in John, chap. 15.: You are my friends. And in the same place, I will not now call you servants, for the servant knoweth not what his lord doth: but I have called you friends, because all things whatsoever I have heard of my Father, I have made known to you. Finally, throughout the whole book of Canticles this divine friendship is sufficiently and abundantly signified and commended.

The same assertion is proved by the Holy Fathers, as many as expounded and illustrated such oracles of Scripture in their interpretations, especially St. Basil on Ps. ⟦illegible: num.⟧; Ambrose, lib. 3. Officiorum, cap. 26, and August., Serm. ⟦illegible: num.⟧ De Sanctis, who likewise in lib. 8. Confess., cap. 6. relates that famous conversion of Pontitianus, an official of the imperial court, who by chance entering a Monk's cell, having found therein and read the life of St. Anthony, Prince of Monks, addressed his companion thus:

Tell me, I pray, with all these labours of ours, whither do we strive to arrive! What do we seek? For whose sake do we serve! Can our hope at court be greater than to be friends of the Emperor? And through so many perils one arrives at a greater peril! And how long shall that be! But if I will to be a friend of God, behold, now I become one.

It is proved also by reason: That truly and properly is supernatural friendship which is mutual supernatural love of benevolence on account of supernatural honesty, not hidden from the lovers themselves, founded upon some communication of supernatural goods: but mutual supernatural charity between God and just men is a reciprocal love of supernatural benevolence on account of supernatural honesty: and the love is reciprocal known to God Himself and to the just man, and is founded upon the communication of certain supernatural goods: therefore that mutual supernatural charity between God and just men is true and properly called supernatural friendship. The major is clear from what was said in the 3. Notable. The minor is proved as to each part. As to the first, namely that this charity is a reciprocal love: First, for God with uncreated love loves just men, who in turn love Him: for He Himself says in Proverbs: I love them that love me. And Christ in John 14.: If any one love me, he will be loved by my Father. — Second, this mutual love is not hidden from the lovers, for although we are not certain by divine faith that we truly love God as we ought, and are loved by Him in turn; yet this is known to the just from probable conjectures and morally certain ones; which certainly suffices for true friendship; especially since even among men the mutual love of friends becomes known in no other way. Add that sometimes through the internal motion of the Holy Spirit we may become certain that we are truly loved by God, and are pleasing to Him, as the Apostle testifies in Rom. 8., saying: The same Spirit rendereth testimony to our spirit, that we are the sons of God. — Third, there also intervenes between the lovers some communication of goods, for God gives Himself to us, or communicates Himself, here through grace in various ways, but in the fatherland through glory; whence St. Peter, Epist. 2. cap. 1.: He hath given us most great and precious promises, by which we are made partakers of the divine nature. Nor does He communicate goods only, but also secrets, as appears from Christ's aforementioned words to the Disciples: All things whatsoever I have heard from my Father I have made known to you. We in turn offer to God worship, reverence, and honour in the observance of the commandments, in acts of religion, such as adoration, sacrifices, etc. Similarly we ought to reveal to Him our way, Psal. 36.: Pour out before Him our hearts, Psal. 61.; nay, to offer Him our heart, Proverb. 23.; not that anything is hidden from Him, but that we may exercise the office of friendship, and thus implore help from Him, from whom alone we can be helped. — Finally, there is an intimate union, at least moral, of friend with friend, which union consists chiefly in the conformity of wills, by reason of which a friend reckons his friend as another self, and his goods and losses as his own: but this union exists in charity, for it makes us one spirit with God, 1. ad Cor. 6.: He who cleaveth to the Lord, is one spirit. And Christ the Lord in S. John, cap. 17., praying for believers, says: That they all may be one, as we also are one. Hence St. Bernard, Serm. 17. in Cantica, says thus:

The Son says: I in the Father, and the Father in me; and we are one Spirit. And in the same place shortly before: Plainly no one, unless demented, whether from earth or from heaven, will usurp to himself that word of the Only-begotten: I and the Father are one: and yet I, though dust and ashes, trusting indeed in the authority of Scripture, would not ⟦illegible: "ixtuul"; fortasse "tantum"⟧ fear to say, that I am one spirit with God, if ever however I should be persuaded by certain experiences that I cleave to God like one of those who remain in charity, and thereby remain in God, and God in them.

The same is clear from that saying of the Apostle to Galat. 2.: I live, now not I, but Christ liveth in me.

You will say 1. True and proper friendship is between equals, whence St. Jerome on cap. 7. Micheae: Friendship accepts equals, or makes them: where there is inequality, there is no friendship. — It is confirmed: between servant and lord friendship cannot intervene: but every just man is a servant of God, according to that Psal. 115.: I am thy servant, and the son of thy handmaid. — The Doctor answers in the place cited above, that equality is required indeed for friendship taken strictly, but not for friendship of excellence, to which a certain proportion between the lovers themselves suffices. Add that a certain equality is also established by charity between God and men; since charity is not a virtue of man inasmuch as he is man, but inasmuch as through participation in grace he becomes a son of God, and in a manner equal to God, according to that 1. Ioan. 3.: Behold what manner of charity the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called, and should be the sons of God. Whence the Doctor says in the same place:

I say that two conditions concur in the lovable object, namely unity, and goodness, and although goodness at times surpasses goodness, nevertheless unity on the other side compensates: that is, the infinite goodness of God, by so depressing its own excellence, as it were, and ennobling our lowliness, establishes a certain equality with itself, although there be not unity, that is, similitude, because the divine goodness compensates what is lacking on our part toward that divine similitude.

For confirmation I say that, although servants, qua servants, cannot truly have friendship with a lord, qua Lord, and thus men, inasmuch as they are first creatures depending upon God, cannot have toward Him a love of friendship; nevertheless truly inasmuch as they are elevated to be sons of God, they can love Him not only as Lord, but as God infinitely perfect in Himself, and God can at the same time love creatures on account of the perfections and gifts He has bestowed upon them, by which those creatures, the more they subject themselves to God, are moved the more sublimely; whence St. Antony said most excellently: To serve God is to reign.

You will say 2. That love which tends only to the vision and fruition of the friend is not a love of friendship, nor of benevolence, but of concupiscence: whereas the end of the love of charity is the vision and fruition of God: therefore charity is a love of benevolence, not indeed of friendship. — I distinguish the major: that love which tends to the vision and fruition of the beloved on account of the proper good of the lover, or its particular delectation, I concede: on account of the good of the beloved himself, namely that honour and glory be bestowed upon him, I deny. And similarly, the minor being distinguished, the consequence must be denied. Hope indeed desires the vision and fruition of God, inasmuch as it is good and delectable to the one hoping, and therefore it is not a love of friendship, but of concupiscence; whereas charity, as the Apostle says, seeketh not her own, nor does she desire the vision and fruition of God on account of her own delectation, but on account of God Himself, with whom she desires to be joined as far as she can: whence she must be reckoned a love not of concupiscence, but of friendship; for although the friend perceives delectation from the presence of the friend, he does not therefore seek the friend's presence that he may delight in him, but on account of the friend himself, with whom he desires to be joined.

You will say 3. Friendship is a mutual love of benevolence: but God does not love men with a love of benevolence: therefore neither with a love of friendship; and consequently, since friendship requires mutual benevolent affection, there can be no true friendship between God and men. The major stands from what was said. But the minor is proved: that is a love of benevolence by which someone is loved for his own sake: but God cannot love creatures for their own sakes; since, as is said Prov. 16.: The Lord hath made all things for Himself: therefore, etc. — I answer, conceding the major, denying the minor, and in its proof distinguishing the major: that a love of benevolence must be borne toward the good of the beloved on account of himself alone, such that the particle on account excludes the utility and pleasantness which the lover thereby perceives or expects, I deny: that it signifies that the affection tends per se and directly to the good of the beloved himself, from whose love, as it were by concomitance or resultance, flows the delectation of lover or beloved, I concede. In this latter sense charity tends to God only, to be loved for Himself, and the love itself, by which God also loves the rational creature, although it tends to God Himself as to its proper and adequate object, can nonetheless terminate in the creature herself, though not ultimately; which certainly suffices for God to will some good to the creature as a proper good of the creature herself, though to be ordered to God Himself as to the ultimate end. Or otherwise I answer: that a love of benevolence must terminate in the good of the friend in such a way that order to the ultimate end is excluded, I deny: that this order excludes all other particular ends to which that love could terminate, I concede. And similarly, the minor being distinguished, I deny the consequence: for every friendship, if it is to be honest, in willing the good to the friend ought not to exclude but to include order to the ultimate end; for if anyone loved another to the exclusion of the love of God, that love would not be friendship, but base complacency. That therefore God may be said to love the rational creature with a love of friendship, it is not necessary that He not refer the creature herself to Himself; but it suffices that the good willed by Him to the creature not be ordered by Him to other ends.

You ask. Whether charity is more excellent than all other virtues? — I affirm; First, because the other theological virtues are done away in the fatherland: but this one most steadfastly perseveres: whence Christ the Lord in Matth. 22., concerning the precept of charity, says: This is the greatest and first commandment: certainly because it proceeds from the act of the most preeminent virtue: wherefore the Apostle, 1. ad Cor. 12., speaking of charity, says: I show unto you yet a more excellent way, which the pious Idiota thus expounds, cap. 17.:

It is the straightest way without deviation, the short way without tedium, the level way without encumbrance, the secure way without peril, the delightful way with a good companion, namely with Thee, O Lord, a most loving guide.

Second, this virtue commands all the others as prince and queen: whence St. Augustine admonishes most excellently, Serm. 31. De Temporibus:

Follow after charity, the sweet and salutary bond of minds, without which the rich man is poor, and with which the poor man is rich. This bears adversities, tempers prosperities, is strong in hard sufferings, cheerful in good works, most safe in temptations, most wide in hospitality, most joyful among true brothers, most patient among false ones. Grateful in Abel through sacrifice, secure in Noe through the flood, most faithful in Abraham through wanderings, mildest in Moses amid injuries, gentlest in tribulations: in the three children it awaits harmlessly the flattering fires, in the Machabees it bravely endures the savage fires, chaste in Susanna toward a husband, in Anna after a husband, in Mary besides a husband. Free in Paul for reproving, humble in Peter for obeying, human in Christ for confessing, divine in Christ for forgiving.

Third finally, charity is the end and as it were the crown of absolutely all the commandments, according to that saying of the Apostle: The end of the commandment is charity from a pure heart, and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith. Which text indeed St. Ambrose thus expounds, in cap. 13. ad Rom.:

Of all virtues charity is the greatest: this he said to be the end, that is, the perfection, consummation of all the commandments, if however it be from a pure heart, and a good conscience. For true charity cannot have an evil life, nor have a feigned form, in which are fulfilled the law and the Prophets.

But Chrysostom, Hom. 2. in 1. ad Timoth., drawing these words to the mutual charity between brothers, from whose defect he judges heresies to arise, inculcates the same point in another manner, saying:

Moreover from that ambition heresies were born; wherefore also Paul, when he had spoken, as denouncing to certain ones that it would not be otherwise, suggests also the manner in which this could come about. What then is this? Charity. Just as finally he said: The end of the law is Christ, that is, the fulfilment: so too this commandment is joined to charity, and depends upon it. For the end of medicine is health: and so when health is present much treatment is unnecessary: even so if charity be present, there is no need of precepts: but of what kind he says charity must be, sincere, and that which proceeds not from words only, but from knowledge, and from the innermost affection of the heart and compassion for one's neighbours.