Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

That CHARITY is the most excellent of all the virtues, both moral and theological, and as it were the crown of them, the Apostle luminously signified when he said: Fides, Spes, Charitas tria haec, maior autem horum est charitas. Whence to the Colossians 3. he admonished: Super omnia autem haec charitatem habete, quod est vinculum perfectionis. But the encomium of this most perfect virtue 2. ad Cor. last chapter celebrates outstandingly, writing: Gratia Domini nostri Iesu Christi, et charitas Dei, et communicatio sancti Spiritus sit cum omnibus vobis. By which words he commends the three principal offices and encomia of divine charity. For that excellent virtue truly is grace. First, because by the gratuitous goodness of God it is bestowed upon us as His surpassing gift: secondly, because it makes us grateful and acceptable to God: third finally, because it spurs on and allures that with a grateful and rejoicing mind we devote all our works to the glory and honor of God. Moreover it is called the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, since that Savior, who is to be adored, commended this virtue above the others to His Disciples, saying Ioan. 15. Hoc est praeceptum meum, ut diligatis invicem, sicut et ego dilexi vos. He willed furthermore that it be the genuine character by which His most loving Disciples would be distinguished from outsiders; whence He said Ioan. 13. In hoc cognoscent omnes, quia Discipuli mei estis, si dilectionem habueritis ad invicem. Finally, by this divine virtue Christ Himself was sealed from eternity by the Father to us as Savior and Redeemer, whence He said Ioan. 16. Sic Deus dilexit mundum, ut Filium suum unigenitum daret, ut omnis, qui credit in eum, non pereat, sed habeat vitam aeternam. To which the Apostle concurs ad Ephes. 2. Deus, qui dives est in misericordia, propter nimiam charitatem suam, qua dilexit nos, et cum essemus mortui peccatis, convivificavit nos in Christo, etc. — The Apostle adds, for the more illustrious commendation of this divine virtue, that it be named the charity of God: for, says St. Augustine, tract. 9. on the Epistle of John:

I know not whether charity can be commended to us more magnificently than by saying, Deus charitas est: a brief praise, and a great praise: brief in speech, great in understanding. How quickly it is said. Deus charitas est: et qui manet in charitate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo! Let God be your dwelling, be a house of God, remain in God, that God may remain in you: let God remain in you, that He may contain you; remain in God, lest you fall; Who as the Apostle says of charity, Charitas numquam cadit.

— Finally it is called the communication of the Holy Spirit, inasmuch as through the Holy Spirit this surpassing virtue is infused into us, the Apostle saying ad Rom. 5. Charitas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum sanctum. It is, I say, a communication: for all the goods of the Holy Spirit ought to be common among the faithful, so that each of them can say with the Psalmist 118.: Particeps ego sum omnium timentium te: hence the children of the nascent Church burned with the highest ardor of divine charity (as St. Luke notes Actorum 4.): Multitudinis credentium erat cor unum, et anima una, nec quisquam eorum, quae possidebat, aliquid suum esse dicebat, sed erant illis omnia communia. In sum, it institutes an intimate fellowship between God and men, as St. John explains most excellently, Epist. 1. cap. 1. Et ut nos societatem habeamus nobiscum, et societas nostra sit cum Patre, et cum Filio eius Iesu Christo. — It would be long to go through each of the encomia of this divine virtue, which requires rather an Orator than a Theological Disputant; wherefore abstaining from its fuller commendation, certain things concerning its nature and properties must be disputed. And since the chief questions pertaining to it have already been weighed in the preceding Treatise, where there was treated of sanctifying Grace, which

is really identified with Charity; hence only three capital questions remain to be examined here: of which the first will disclose the nature of this surpassing virtue: the second its object: the third will declare the order of man to God, neighbor, and himself.

WHETHER CHARITY IS A VIRTUE, AND OF WHAT KIND.

Note 1. The name of charity, according to the etymology of the word, is deduced either from the Greek word χάρις, which signifies grace, or, as is more probable, from the adjective charus, whose substantive is charitas; signifying the excellence of some thing which, since it is of great price, is also held in special affection; whence it has been transferred to express that very love. And although it sometimes happens that this name is usurped to designate illicit love, in which sense Judith, praying to God, chap. 9. said of Holofernes: Let him be caught in the snare of his own eyes with me, and let him be struck by the lips of my charity, that is, by things which could allure him to love and forbidden embrace, nevertheless the usage of common holy Scripture and of the Holy Fathers has now prevailed, that the word charitas designates only that habit or supernatural act whereby we love God for himself, and other things for God himself. And although St. August., lib. 4. De Civit. Dei* chap. 7. said that these three, amor, dilectio, charitas, mostly signify one and the same thing in holy Scripture; nevertheless he observes there that a diverse signification inheres in them; amor indeed extends more widely, and signifies every affection of the will, whether natural and necessary, or supernatural and gratuitous: dilectio precisely denotes not a mutual affection of two or several among themselves, but only a good will, which we have out of choice and weighed counsel toward someone rather than toward others: charitas truly signifies the mutual gratuitous and supernatural affection which we have toward God or neighbor: whence charity obtains the name and dignity of friendship. That this may appear more evidently,

Note 2. Friendship, according to Aristotle, lib. 8. Ethic., chap. 2. is thus defined: Friendship is the mutual benevolence of certain persons, which does not lie hidden from their very souls, but ⟦illegible: alis? ipsis?⟧ is known to each other. It is called benevolence, that it may be distinguished from the love of concupiscence, whereby one wishes a good to himself. Mutual is added, because it is as it were a bond, whereby two are bound to one another out of the choice of both, and therefore out of the judgment of reason. The remaining words of the definition signify the exercise of friendship itself, which stimulates friends not only to mutual affection, but also to rendering one another mutual services; for indeed if a friend should not know that he is loved by the other, he will not be stimulated to bestow love upon him and to succor him in necessities. Hence four conditions especially are assigned by the same Aristotle there as desirable for true and perfect friendship: first, that there be benevolence, or volition of the good, which we wish: but since the goods which we can wish a friend are in a twofold difference; for some are those which he already possesses, and others those of which he is destitute: the former goods we wish him with the love of complacency: the latter truly with the love of desire: namely by desiring and wishing them for him. The second condition is, that this love be mutual; for if this be wanting, love indeed can exist, but not friendship. Third, that this mutual benevolence be known on both sides. Fourth finally, that among friends there be a mutual communication of goods, that is, that friends communicate their goods to one another, and cherish their love by mutual offices toward each other.

Note 3. It is certain, as appears from what we have said concerning sanctifying grace, that charity is not the Holy Spirit himself, or the substantial, or personal love of God formally joined to us, as the Master of the Sentences seems to have taught in 1. dist. 17. although the Subtle Doctor there q. 3. num. 20. strives to reconcile him with the common opinion; but truly a quality infused by God, as the Council of Trent teaches, Sess. 6. chap. 7. where, laying down that our justification takes place through an inherent form, it concludes thus:

This however takes place in this justification of the impious, when, by the merit of the most holy passion of the same, through the Holy Spirit the charity of God is infused into the hearts of those who are justified, and inheres in them: whence in justification itself man, together with the remission of sins, receives all these things at once through Jesus Christ, into whom he is ingrafted, faith, hope, and charity.

In which words the Council teaches three things: first, that charity is diffused through the Holy Spirit, whereby it signifies that God is the efficient cause of charity, and consequently that it is really distinct from God, and consequently from the Holy Spirit. Second, that charity is infused; but the Holy Spirit cannot be said to be infused. Third, that charity inheres in the justified: which certainly cannot belong to the Holy Spirit, but only to some created form inherently adhering. Wherefore most nobly St. Augustine, lib. De Spiritu et littera, chap. 32. says: The charity of God is said to be poured forth in our hearts, not whereby he himself loves us, but whereby he makes us his beloved; as the justice of God, whereby by his gift we are made just; and the salvation of the Lord, whereby he makes us safe. It also stands that charity, inasmuch as it is really indistinct from sanctifying grace, is a supernatural quality, and that either habitual or actual; whence there remains here only to determine whether charity is a virtue, and that special properly so called, and likewise the perfect friendship of man with God.

First conclusion. — THE HABIT OF CHARITY, HOWEVER REMISS, IS A THEOLOGICAL VIRTUE. This consists of two parts: the first, that it is a virtue: the second, that it claims this dignity for itself even in a remiss degree. But the parts of this Conclusion the Subtle Doctor delivers and proves dist. 27. num. 2.

The first indeed he may thus prove: Virtue, according to St. Augustine, is a good quality of the mind, whereby one lives rightly, whereby no one uses ill. According to Aristotle truly it is a quality which makes its possessor good, and his work honorable and conformable to right reason: but theological charity makes him whom it informs good, and exhibits even his act as good, as St. Paul proves 1. ad Cor. 13. Showing especially that without charity the works of the other virtues, however good from their object, profit nothing, especially toward eternal beatitude: therefore, etc.

The Doctor proves secondly: Every habit whose individual acts are properly moral, right, and conformed to right reason, is also a moral virtue properly so called: but such are the acts of charity: therefore, etc. He proves the minor: because to love God above all things, he says, is an act conformed to natural right reason, whereby it dictates that the best is to be loved: therefore it is right; nay rather its certainty is per se nota, as the rectitude of the first principle in operables: for by the innate light of nature itself it appears that of all things lovable the highest good is to be loved above all, as the highest truth is to be believed above all: therefore since God is the highest good, he is also necessarily to be loved supremely. — He confirms it, namely that the act of loving God above all things is a good act, and conformed to right reason; because the things which are of the law of nature are conformed to right reason, otherwise they would not be of the law of nature; for it would be absurd that nature should command anything fighting against right reason itself, since nature itself is the law, the light innate to us, and the dictamen of right reason: but that precept, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, is of the law of nature: therefore it is naturally known that this act is right; and consequently the habit inclining to this act is truly theological: Because, says the Doctor, it is concerned with a theological object, namely God immediately: and moreover it rests immediately upon the first rule of human acts, and it can be infused by God, and because it is apt to perfect the supreme portion of the soul, which is not most perfectly perfected except immediately by God. By which words he signifies that the act of charity has four conditions necessary for a theological virtue: of which the first is, that it have God for its object: the second, that it rest upon the first rule of human acts, namely the eternal law known to us through the light of faith: the third, that it ought to be divinely infused, not acquired by our own acts: fourth finally, that it be apt to perfect the superior portion. But all these things belong to charity: therefore it is a theological virtue.

The second part is proved, because all those characters of theological virtue belong to charity however remiss, as is evident per se; and consequently this too has the ratio of virtue. He adds that every operative habit which conduces to the unitive act of man with God is truly a theological virtue: but charity however remiss is of such a kind, since, says St. John, Epist. 1. chap. 4. if we love one another, God abideth in us, and his charity in us is perfect. There he speaks simply and absolutely of supernatural love, abstracting from whether it be remiss or intense; for these words, is perfect, are not understood of the perfection of charity with regard to degrees most intense, which we may call the perfection of excellence, but are understood only of sufficient perfection, inasmuch as whosoever loves his neighbor out of theological charity has charity complete in the ratio of virtue, because by loving his neighbor for God, upon God himself as upon the object ⟦illegible: qnl teratur; leg. qualificetur? terminetur?⟧. — It is confirmed from this, that there chap. 1. St. John expressly pronounces: Who keepeth his word, in him truly is the charity of God perfected: but this perfection cannot be understood with respect to the most perfect intensification of degrees; for there the Apostle treats of the works of precepts, for the observance of which a most perfect charity is not required, as is gathered from Matth. 19. where Christ the Lord, when the young man asking ⟦quid faciendo vitam aeternam possidebo?⟧ had been answered: If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments, and the answer had been given by the youth himself: ⟦omnia⟧ these have I kept from my youth, what is yet wanting to me? Christ the Lord exhorts him to a further excellence of charity, namely to pursuing the works of counsel and supererogation, saying: If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell whatsoever thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven, and come follow me: therefore charity also in a remiss degree, which suffices for the observance of the precepts, according to the mind of St. John, is perfect charity; and consequently has the true ratio of theological virtue.

You will say: Every virtue properly so called is concerned with the arduous and difficult: but the theological habit of charity is not concerned with the arduous, nor does its act have any difficulty; for nothing is more delightful, nor easier, than to love God: therefore that habit has not the ratio of virtue. —

I answer, that the greater virtue is concerned with the arduous, either by reason of the object, which transcends the natural power of the faculty; or by reason of the impediment, which it removes from eliciting an act of virtue: now in both these ways the act of charity can be reckoned difficult. First indeed, that act transcends the powers of a natural faculty considered within the line and order of nature. Moreover it has also the adjunct of impediment, inasmuch namely as it seems difficult to love God above all things: partly because all earthly things, and whatsoever created objects fall under sense, recall from that love: partly because the supreme goodness of God, since it does not yet lie open so perspicuously and in prospect to us mortals, thence allures less efficaciously to the supernatural love of itself. Hence St. Peter, Epist. 1. chap. 1. commends the faithful, because whom not having seen you love, in whom now also, not seeing, you believe. Add that this is not common to all virtues, nor is it of the formal ratio of virtue, inasmuch as precisely it is virtue, which is occupied with the difficult, for this belongs especially to the moral virtues, which are occupied with curbing and moderating the passions.

You will say 2: Virtue only begun, or in a remiss degree, is not properly to be called virtue, as Aristotle teaches, lib. 2. Magnorum Moralium, chap. 7. where he says that temperance in a remiss degree has not the ratio of virtue: but every charity which we have in this mortal state is only begun and imperfect, for it alone will be consummated in the Fatherland: therefore it has not now the ratio of perfect virtue, which is most true of charity in a remiss degree. —

I answer, that the major is true of acquired virtues, which are occupied with moderating the passions; for since those are acquired through acts, which are for the most part weak, thence it comes that unless they are often repeated, they do not promote the habit to the perfect state of virtue: But the theological habit of charity, since it is of itself infused by God, at that same instant in which it is infused, has the perfection sufficient for the ratio of virtue.

Second conclusion. — THEOLOGICAL CHARITY IS A SPECIAL VIRTUE DISTINCT FROM THE OTHER VIRTUES. This also is common. The Subtle Doctor proves in the place cited above: This virtue, he says, is distinct from faith, because its act is not to believe: likewise from hope, because its act is not to covet the good of the beloved, inasmuch as it is a fitting good for the lover; but to tend toward the object in itself, even if per impossibile its fittingness were circumscribed from flowing into the lover. This truth also appears in the Apostle 1. ad Cor. 13. where he enumerates faith, hope, and charity, as three distinct virtues not only from one another, but also from the other moral virtues, whose acts he there celebrates.

Reason also urges: because wherever there is a special honesty according to which a virtue tends toward its object, there also there ought to be a special virtue distinct from others: but the formal ratio under which theological charity tends toward God is a special honesty distinct from every other ratio according to which certain other virtues tend toward God: therefore charity ought to be a special virtue. The major holds. But the minor is proved: for the honesty of loving God as the highest good for himself is one thing, and the honesty of believing in him as supremely true, and of hoping in him as the highest good fitting and promised to us, is another, as is evident per se. For although the divine goodness, inasmuch as it is apprehended by charity, embraces the special perfection and goodness of whatsoever essence, person, or divine property, which can be objects of certain other virtues: nevertheless it considers that divine goodness, even particular, whether of essence, of person, or of divine property, in another manner than the other virtues; indeed it considers it, as to be loved for itself, and by reason of that supreme excellence: therefore it has a special honesty. —

Now Seraph. Doctor dist. 27. art. 1. quaest. 1. gathers this diversity of charity from the other virtues out of the sixfold comparison of the same virtue: First indeed, from comparison to the object, which is distinguished from others by reason of moving: for the formal ratio under which theological charity tends, and according to which it attains each and all of its objects, is the very uncreated goodness of God containing in itself every perfection in every genus of excellence, goodness and perfection, which ratio is special and distinct from that goodness and perfection under which the other virtues tend toward God, or toward any other object: for this taken formally is nothing else than one formal ratio, by which all the divine perfections as it were integrate and compose one supreme goodness and integrity of God, on account of which God is in himself supremely to be loved: under which special ratio no other virtue tends toward God himself, and consequently on the part of the object it is a special virtue. Second, the same diversity is gathered by comparison to the act, because the love of God, on account of his excellence in himself and to be loved for himself, differs from the acts of the other virtues. Third, by comparison to the proper subject, because this is in the will, not as concupiscible simply, nor even as irascible, but as it takes complacency in the object toward which it tends through the love of friendship, or as Seraph. Doctor says, just as faith is in the rational, hope in the irascible, so charity in the concupiscible. Fourth, by comparison to opposites: for the other virtues have certain vices opposed to them: but charity conflicts with all altogether. Fifth, by comparison to the reward: for the habit of faith and hope is evacuated in the fatherland: but charity remains. Sixth finally, by comparison to its principle, which it represents: for the image of re-creation, he says, consists in the three theological virtues, and the unity of grace: as the image of creation in the three potencies, and the unity of substance: therefore as the natural potencies, intellect, will, and memory, inasmuch as they retain the image of God the creator, are really distinguished from one another, because they do not represent the divine persons except inasmuch as they are under acts, or actually operating; so faith, hope, and charity, which represent God as restorer and savior, ought by equal reason to be really distinguished.

You will say 1. From the Apostle 1. Cor. 13. Charity has the effect of all the virtues: since, he says, charity is patient, and kind, etc. where he enumerates fifteen works of the virtues which belong to charity: but a virtue which has the acts of all the virtues is not special, but common: therefore charity is not a virtue distinct from the others. — Seraph. Doctor distinguishes the major: Charity has the acts of all the virtues as elicitive principle, he denies: as imperative principle, he concedes. Therefore the acts of the other virtues are attributed to charity itself not as eliciting, but as commanding, or as first mover, not as immediate mover; by which reason the Apostle admonished 1. ad Cor. 16. Let all your things be done in charity.

You will say 2. The Holy Fathers call charity a general virtue; for St. Jerome, praised by Seraph. Doctor, says: I shall briefly embrace the whole definition of virtue, virtue is charity, whereby everything to be loved is loved. Likewise St. Augustine, lib. 15. De Civitate, chap. 22. and St. Bernard, lib. De Amore Dei, chap. 6. say that virtue is nothing else than the order of love, or ordered love: but ordered love is nothing else than charity: therefore since every virtue is ordered love, also every virtue is charity, and consequently this is not distinct from the other virtues. — Seraph. Doctor answers, that all virtues can be called charity causally; because, he says, charity with respect to the others in moving has in some manner the ratio of efficient cause, in some manner formal, in some manner final: but the love of charity commands the other virtues, that they go forth into its acts, and by commanding informs them, and makes them meritorious, and by informing joins them to the end, and in it gives them rest, while it makes us adhere to God and enjoy him; and therefore deservedly gratuitous virtue is to be defined through the love of charity. It could also be said otherwise, that that love which falls into the definition of virtue is generally not the love of charity, which is one of the theological virtues, but is the love common and general to all the other virtues; and therefore the consequence is to be denied.

You will say 3. As the precept of charity is related to other precepts, so is the habit of charity related to the other habits of virtues: but the precept of charity comprehends all other precepts: for, says the Apostle to Rom. 18. he who loveth his neighbor hath fulfilled the law: therefore the habit of charity contains in itself the habits of all the other virtues. — Seraphicus Doctor answers by distinguishing the minor:

The precept of charity comprehends all precepts not by omnimodal entity, but by a certain reduction: for all precepts are reduced to it, and in it are consummated; and therefore from this it cannot be concluded that the habit of charity is common to the others, except only through radiation, according to which St. Gregory says, that the precepts are many through the diversity of work, and one in the root of love, who whatsoever is commanded, is rooted in charity alone: but this is not id> true concerning the truth, as if it belonged to charity alone to execute the precepts enjoined, but because the other virtues without charity do not execute the divine precepts according to the divine acceptation.

You will say 1. As the object of charity is related to the objects of the other virtues, so is the habit of charity related to the other habits: but the object of charity is common to all the objects of the other virtues; since its object is good under the ratio of good simply: therefore, etc. — The same Seraphicus Doctor answers by denying the minor: for the object of charity is distinguished in substance from the objects of the cardinal virtues, which are concerned only with a created object: but from the objects of the theological virtues according to a diverse ratio of moving, because as faith regards God under the ratio of the true, and hope under the ratio of the arduous, so charity under the ratio of the good. If therefore good under the ratio of good, and true under the ratio of true, signify diverse ratios of moving, because according to the diversity of the ratio of moving is the distinction in acts and habits, hence it is that charity differs from the other theological virtues.

Third Conclusion. — Charity has the true nature of friendship. Thus the Theologians commonly hold against Durandus, in 1. dist. 19. qu. 1., who denies that there is a proper friendship of man toward God. This assertion the Subtle Doctor hands down and declares, dist. 27. num. 20., where he says:

I concede that charity can properly be called friendship, though not by taking friendship strictly, as the Philosopher takes it there, but by extending it somewhat: just as according to his intention friendship toward God is something more excellent than friendship. For that excellence of the object does not take away what is of perfection in the object, but what is of imperfection. For honesty in the lovable, and being loved in return in the beloved, are conditions per se in the lovable, not indeed of imperfection — nay, it would not be more perfect if it were not loved in return; but equality in these is an accompanying condition. God, however, has honesty and being-loving-in-return, just as loving, and friendship toward Him can be more excellent, so that it may be called superfriendship. And thus it is argued that equality is the ground of friendship. This is true supposing honesty, which is the first ground of lovability: but equality is the ground of friendship taken strictly: while excellence is the ground of a habit more akin to perfection than friendship is. Such, in our case, I call charity.

So far the Doctor. In these words he chiefly makes three things clear: first, that charity is truly and properly called friendship; so that if this ground of man's friendship toward God belongs to any virtue, it must be attributed most of all to charity, which is the habitual principle of loving God for Himself, and indeed above all things. Second, that on account of its excellence it can be called superfriendship, that is, the most preeminent among all friendships, or a love that utterly surpasses every love that could be called friendship. Third, that it is not friendship strictly speaking as the Philosopher defines it, since it does not have all the conditions he assigned for true friendship.

The conclusion is therefore proved: First indeed from Sacred Scripture, for in Wisdom 7., concerning divine Wisdom, it is said: She transferreth herself into holy souls, and maketh them friends of God. And Ps. 138.: They thy friends, O God, are exceedingly honoured. And Sacred Scripture everywhere calls the just friends of God, especially in the New Testament, for Christ the Lord says to His Apostles in John, chap. 15.: You are my friends. And in the same place, I will not now call you servants, for the servant knoweth not what his lord doth: but I have called you friends, because all things whatsoever I have heard of my Father, I have made known to you. Finally, throughout the whole book of Canticles this divine friendship is sufficiently and abundantly signified and commended.

The same assertion is proved by the Holy Fathers, as many as expounded and illustrated such oracles of Scripture in their interpretations, especially St. Basil on Ps. ⟦illegible: num.⟧; Ambrose, lib. 3. Officiorum, cap. 26, and August., Serm. ⟦illegible: num.⟧ De Sanctis, who likewise in lib. 8. Confess., cap. 6. relates that famous conversion of Pontitianus, an official of the imperial court, who by chance entering a Monk's cell, having found therein and read the life of St. Anthony, Prince of Monks, addressed his companion thus:

Tell me, I pray, with all these labours of ours, whither do we strive to arrive! What do we seek? For whose sake do we serve! Can our hope at court be greater than to be friends of the Emperor? And through so many perils one arrives at a greater peril! And how long shall that be! But if I will to be a friend of God, behold, now I become one.

It is proved also by reason: That truly and properly is supernatural friendship which is mutual supernatural love of benevolence on account of supernatural honesty, not hidden from the lovers themselves, founded upon some communication of supernatural goods: but mutual supernatural charity between God and just men is a reciprocal love of supernatural benevolence on account of supernatural honesty: and the love is reciprocal known to God Himself and to the just man, and is founded upon the communication of certain supernatural goods: therefore that mutual supernatural charity between God and just men is true and properly called supernatural friendship. The major is clear from what was said in the 3. Notable. The minor is proved as to each part. As to the first, namely that this charity is a reciprocal love: First, for God with uncreated love loves just men, who in turn love Him: for He Himself says in Proverbs: I love them that love me. And Christ in John 14.: If any one love me, he will be loved by my Father. — Second, this mutual love is not hidden from the lovers, for although we are not certain by divine faith that we truly love God as we ought, and are loved by Him in turn; yet this is known to the just from probable conjectures and morally certain ones; which certainly suffices for true friendship; especially since even among men the mutual love of friends becomes known in no other way. Add that sometimes through the internal motion of the Holy Spirit we may become certain that we are truly loved by God, and are pleasing to Him, as the Apostle testifies in Rom. 8., saying: The same Spirit rendereth testimony to our spirit, that we are the sons of God. — Third, there also intervenes between the lovers some communication of goods, for God gives Himself to us, or communicates Himself, here through grace in various ways, but in the fatherland through glory; whence St. Peter, Epist. 2. cap. 1.: He hath given us most great and precious promises, by which we are made partakers of the divine nature. Nor does He communicate goods only, but also secrets, as appears from Christ's aforementioned words to the Disciples: All things whatsoever I have heard from my Father I have made known to you. We in turn offer to God worship, reverence, and honour in the observance of the commandments, in acts of religion, such as adoration, sacrifices, etc. Similarly we ought to reveal to Him our way, Psal. 36.: Pour out before Him our hearts, Psal. 61.; nay, to offer Him our heart, Proverb. 23.; not that anything is hidden from Him, but that we may exercise the office of friendship, and thus implore help from Him, from whom alone we can be helped. — Finally, there is an intimate union, at least moral, of friend with friend, which union consists chiefly in the conformity of wills, by reason of which a friend reckons his friend as another self, and his goods and losses as his own: but this union exists in charity, for it makes us one spirit with God, 1. ad Cor. 6.: He who cleaveth to the Lord, is one spirit. And Christ the Lord in S. John, cap. 17., praying for believers, says: That they all may be one, as we also are one. Hence St. Bernard, Serm. 17. in Cantica, says thus:

The Son says: I in the Father, and the Father in me; and we are one Spirit. And in the same place shortly before: Plainly no one, unless demented, whether from earth or from heaven, will usurp to himself that word of the Only-begotten: I and the Father are one: and yet I, though dust and ashes, trusting indeed in the authority of Scripture, would not ⟦illegible: "ixtuul"; fortasse "tantum"⟧ fear to say, that I am one spirit with God, if ever however I should be persuaded by certain experiences that I cleave to God like one of those who remain in charity, and thereby remain in God, and God in them.

The same is clear from that saying of the Apostle to Galat. 2.: I live, now not I, but Christ liveth in me.

You will say 1. True and proper friendship is between equals, whence St. Jerome on cap. 7. Micheae: Friendship accepts equals, or makes them: where there is inequality, there is no friendship. — It is confirmed: between servant and lord friendship cannot intervene: but every just man is a servant of God, according to that Psal. 115.: I am thy servant, and the son of thy handmaid. — The Doctor answers in the place cited above, that equality is required indeed for friendship taken strictly, but not for friendship of excellence, to which a certain proportion between the lovers themselves suffices. Add that a certain equality is also established by charity between God and men; since charity is not a virtue of man inasmuch as he is man, but inasmuch as through participation in grace he becomes a son of God, and in a manner equal to God, according to that 1. Ioan. 3.: Behold what manner of charity the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called, and should be the sons of God. Whence the Doctor says in the same place:

I say that two conditions concur in the lovable object, namely unity, and goodness, and although goodness at times surpasses goodness, nevertheless unity on the other side compensates: that is, the infinite goodness of God, by so depressing its own excellence, as it were, and ennobling our lowliness, establishes a certain equality with itself, although there be not unity, that is, similitude, because the divine goodness compensates what is lacking on our part toward that divine similitude.

For confirmation I say that, although servants, qua servants, cannot truly have friendship with a lord, qua Lord, and thus men, inasmuch as they are first creatures depending upon God, cannot have toward Him a love of friendship; nevertheless truly inasmuch as they are elevated to be sons of God, they can love Him not only as Lord, but as God infinitely perfect in Himself, and God can at the same time love creatures on account of the perfections and gifts He has bestowed upon them, by which those creatures, the more they subject themselves to God, are moved the more sublimely; whence St. Antony said most excellently: To serve God is to reign.

You will say 2. That love which tends only to the vision and fruition of the friend is not a love of friendship, nor of benevolence, but of concupiscence: whereas the end of the love of charity is the vision and fruition of God: therefore charity is a love of benevolence, not indeed of friendship. — I distinguish the major: that love which tends to the vision and fruition of the beloved on account of the proper good of the lover, or its particular delectation, I concede: on account of the good of the beloved himself, namely that honour and glory be bestowed upon him, I deny. And similarly, the minor being distinguished, the consequence must be denied. Hope indeed desires the vision and fruition of God, inasmuch as it is good and delectable to the one hoping, and therefore it is not a love of friendship, but of concupiscence; whereas charity, as the Apostle says, seeketh not her own, nor does she desire the vision and fruition of God on account of her own delectation, but on account of God Himself, with whom she desires to be joined as far as she can: whence she must be reckoned a love not of concupiscence, but of friendship; for although the friend perceives delectation from the presence of the friend, he does not therefore seek the friend's presence that he may delight in him, but on account of the friend himself, with whom he desires to be joined.

You will say 3. Friendship is a mutual love of benevolence: but God does not love men with a love of benevolence: therefore neither with a love of friendship; and consequently, since friendship requires mutual benevolent affection, there can be no true friendship between God and men. The major stands from what was said. But the minor is proved: that is a love of benevolence by which someone is loved for his own sake: but God cannot love creatures for their own sakes; since, as is said Prov. 16.: The Lord hath made all things for Himself: therefore, etc. — I answer, conceding the major, denying the minor, and in its proof distinguishing the major: that a love of benevolence must be borne toward the good of the beloved on account of himself alone, such that the particle on account excludes the utility and pleasantness which the lover thereby perceives or expects, I deny: that it signifies that the affection tends per se and directly to the good of the beloved himself, from whose love, as it were by concomitance or resultance, flows the delectation of lover or beloved, I concede. In this latter sense charity tends to God only, to be loved for Himself, and the love itself, by which God also loves the rational creature, although it tends to God Himself as to its proper and adequate object, can nonetheless terminate in the creature herself, though not ultimately; which certainly suffices for God to will some good to the creature as a proper good of the creature herself, though to be ordered to God Himself as to the ultimate end. Or otherwise I answer: that a love of benevolence must terminate in the good of the friend in such a way that order to the ultimate end is excluded, I deny: that this order excludes all other particular ends to which that love could terminate, I concede. And similarly, the minor being distinguished, I deny the consequence: for every friendship, if it is to be honest, in willing the good to the friend ought not to exclude but to include order to the ultimate end; for if anyone loved another to the exclusion of the love of God, that love would not be friendship, but base complacency. That therefore God may be said to love the rational creature with a love of friendship, it is not necessary that He not refer the creature herself to Himself; but it suffices that the good willed by Him to the creature not be ordered by Him to other ends.

You ask. Whether charity is more excellent than all other virtues? — I affirm; First, because the other theological virtues are done away in the fatherland: but this one most steadfastly perseveres: whence Christ the Lord in Matth. 22., concerning the precept of charity, says: This is the greatest and first commandment: certainly because it proceeds from the act of the most preeminent virtue: wherefore the Apostle, 1. ad Cor. 12., speaking of charity, says: I show unto you yet a more excellent way, which the pious Idiota thus expounds, cap. 17.:

It is the straightest way without deviation, the short way without tedium, the level way without encumbrance, the secure way without peril, the delightful way with a good companion, namely with Thee, O Lord, a most loving guide.

Second, this virtue commands all the others as prince and queen: whence St. Augustine admonishes most excellently, Serm. 31. De Temporibus:

Follow after charity, the sweet and salutary bond of minds, without which the rich man is poor, and with which the poor man is rich. This bears adversities, tempers prosperities, is strong in hard sufferings, cheerful in good works, most safe in temptations, most wide in hospitality, most joyful among true brothers, most patient among false ones. Grateful in Abel through sacrifice, secure in Noe through the flood, most faithful in Abraham through wanderings, mildest in Moses amid injuries, gentlest in tribulations: in the three children it awaits harmlessly the flattering fires, in the Machabees it bravely endures the savage fires, chaste in Susanna toward a husband, in Anna after a husband, in Mary besides a husband. Free in Paul for reproving, humble in Peter for obeying, human in Christ for confessing, divine in Christ for forgiving.

Third finally, charity is the end and as it were the crown of absolutely all the commandments, according to that saying of the Apostle: The end of the commandment is charity from a pure heart, and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith. Which text indeed St. Ambrose thus expounds, in cap. 13. ad Rom.:

Of all virtues charity is the greatest: this he said to be the end, that is, the perfection, consummation of all the commandments, if however it be from a pure heart, and a good conscience. For true charity cannot have an evil life, nor have a feigned form, in which are fulfilled the law and the Prophets.

But Chrysostom, Hom. 2. in 1. ad Timoth., drawing these words to the mutual charity between brothers, from whose defect he judges heresies to arise, inculcates the same point in another manner, saying:

Moreover from that ambition heresies were born; wherefore also Paul, when he had spoken, as denouncing to certain ones that it would not be otherwise, suggests also the manner in which this could come about. What then is this? Charity. Just as finally he said: The end of the law is Christ, that is, the fulfilment: so too this commandment is joined to charity, and depends upon it. For the end of medicine is health: and so when health is present much treatment is unnecessary: even so if charity be present, there is no need of precepts: but of what kind he says charity must be, sincere, and that which proceeds not from words only, but from knowledge, and from the innermost affection of the heart and compassion for one's neighbours.

WHAT THE OBJECT OF CHARITY IS.

NOTE 1. All Theologians agree that the primary object of charity is God Himself: since charity is a theological virtue: but every theological virtue has God for its object; and consequently charity tends to God as to its proper object. Since, however, charity is love, whose object is good, therefore beyond controversy it is that this theological virtue tends to good, quatenus good; so that the divine goodness is the formal reason under which the virtue of charity attains God, as its proper object. The difficulty, however, as the Subtle Doctor notes, dist. 27. num. 3., is by what reason the virtue of charity is borne toward the goodness of God: whether namely toward His absolute goodness, or quatenus God is good in Himself; or toward His respective goodness, or quatenus He is good to the lover; or finally quatenus His goodness embraces both, namely the absolute goodness, whereby God is good in Himself, and the respective, whereby He is good to creatures, or as convenient and beneficial to us.

NOTE 2. The absolute goodness of God can be distinguished as threefold, or considered in three ways: first indeed, for the supreme goodness of the divine nature alone, quatenus this belongs to the divine essence prout it is formally distinguished from its divine attributes: or for attributal goodness, that which is one among the attributes of the divine essence itself, formally distinct from it, as also from the other attributes: or finally for transcendent goodness, quatenus it is common to the divine goodness per essentiam, which is found in God alone, and to the divine goodness per participationem, which shines forth in creatures. The prior goodness is nothing else than that highest perfection of the divine essence taken adequately, prout namely it embraces all and singular the perfections belonging to God, by which reason it is the same to be good as to be absolutely and simply and in every way perfect; according to which signification Christ the Lord said Lucae 18. No one is good, but God alone: for to God alone does it belong to be good and perfect per essentiam, quatenus He has in Himself all the perfections due to His nature in such wise that He alone has them in act and de facto by nature and essential necessity. The second goodness is nothing else than that positive perfection, whereby God is moved from Himself and inclined to communicate Himself, and to produce something outside Himself, and thus it is the beneficence of God itself, benignity, and as it were His habitual love toward creatures. Finally, the third goodness is the very concept of divine goodness abstracting and prescinding from that goodness itself, quatenus it is in God by necessity of being; but in creatures through the communication and participation of the same divine goodness. It is asked, then, under which reason of goodness God is reckoned the object of the virtue of charity.

NOTE 3. From the Doctor, dist. 27. n. 7., a threefold reason can be considered in the object lovable by charity: the first is that at which the very act of charity terminates, as that which: namely such that the beloved person is constituted in the esse of God through Deity: the second is some reason preceding the act of love, and without which perhaps an act of such love would not here and now be elicited, as if someone, considering that God has bestowed many benefits upon him, were stimulated by this consideration to love Him. Finally, the third is some reason necessarily concomitant with, or following, the act of love; as, he says, if it were said that God loves, quatenus He is supremely loved, for this does not arise from the formal reason of the object, but follows a reason concomitant in the object with the act of love; for indeed God loves those who love Him. This threefold reason the Doctor illustrates by the example of a thing which would be, first, most beautifully visible by its own nature; secondly, which would give visual power to the eye, whereby it would be seen; thirdly, which would quiet and satiate sight inasmuch as it is attained by the eye through the act of seeing, which would be the formal reason of terminating visual love on hypothesis, supposing that sight could love such an object. The first reason, whereby God would tend into His object, is the very reason of the nature of the visible thing, whereby in such a nature there is perfectly the reason of the adequate object of such a power. The second is a certain reason eliciting to love by reason of the benefit conferred, namely by reason of the power of seeing granted by that visible thing. The third truly would be a reason concomitant with the act, wherein sight would be perfectly quieted. It is asked, therefore, which of these reasons is the formal objective reason of charity; and consequently three things chiefly must here be determined: first, whether God is the object of charity quatenus He is good in Himself, or quatenus He is good to us, or a good convenient to us: secondly, whether the terminating reason of the act of charity is His essential, or attributal goodness, or the divine goodness quatenus it prescinds from the reason of essential good, both as it is in God, and from the reason of good per participationem, quatenus it is in creatures: thirdly, whether that terminating reason of the act of charity is something concomitant with or subsequent to such an act.

First Conclusion. — The formal and primarily terminating object of charity is not the divine goodness quatenus convenient to us, nor the divine goodness analogically common to God and creatures per participationem, but it is the absolute goodness of God. This is the Doctor's teaching, num. 3. and following.

He proves the first part thus: the formal object of the most perfect virtue, such as charity is, ought to be the most perfect reason on account of which God is supremely lovable; otherwise another virtue would be given which would tend to God under that more perfect reason: but more perfect is the reason of divine goodness prout considered in itself, than prout considered in order to creatures: therefore the primary formal object of charity is not the divine goodness, as convenient to a creature.

Secondly, if God, as convenient to us, and as our good, were the principal formal object of charity, this would belong to Him most of all, quatenus He is beatifying of us: but that cannot be said. Proof: if God quatenus beatific had the formal reason of the object of charity, then either quatenus beatific aptitudinaliter, or quatenus beatific actualiter, that is quatenus aptus is, and can make blessed, or has de facto bestowed beatitude; but neither can be said. Not indeed the first, because one cannot love any object on account of the aptitudinal respect it has, except quatenus one loved it on account of its absolute perfection, by reason of which such respect belongs to it; and accordingly God cannot be loved, quatenus He is beatific aptitudinaliter, except on account of His absolute goodness, on account of which the virtue of beatifying belongs to Him; for the perfection and virtue of beatifying do not consist formally in the respect itself, but in the absolute perfection to which it follows. Nor yet the second, because it belongs to Him to be the beatific object prior to actually beatifying, inasmuch as the act of beatifying signifies an actual respect to that act of beatitude whereby one tends to the object.

The Doctor confirms this: because to be beatific, both actualiter and aptitudinaliter, signifies only a respect of reason; for if it signified a real respect, actual and aptitudinal, it would depend upon a creature: for every respect depends upon its term; such that if the term were impossible, such a respect too would be impossible: but it seems absurd that God in Himself have anything really depending upon a creature: such that if a creature were impossible, that likewise would be impossible. And consequently that respect, or reason of beatific, cannot be in God anything real: but charity, which is a real virtue, cannot have as formal object any ens rationis; and consequently it has for object God not ut beatificum formally; nor consequently, as our good.

Thirdly finally, to desire a good as convenient to us pertains to the affection of the useful, not indeed of justice: but charity perfects the will, inasmuch as it signifies the affection of justice, not however of the useful, for under this reason it is distinguished from hope, which is borne to God through the affection of the useful: therefore, etc.

The second part is proved, namely that the formal and primary object of charity is not the divine goodness itself, as convenient analogically to the divine goodness per essentiam, and to human goodness per participationem: first indeed, because charity is related to God, ut bonum, just as faith is related to God, ut verum: but faith does not tend to the divine truth quatenus it abstracts from the divine truth itself per essentiam, and per participationem: therefore neither does charity tend to the divine goodness quatenus it prescinds from goodness per essentiam, and from goodness per participationem. Further, our charity is a formal participation of that charity whereby God loves Himself: but the charity of God has for formal object no good in common, but only the absolute goodness of God: therefore, etc. Moreover, a theological virtue has God for its formal and primary object, not indeed something common to God and creatures: but charity is a theological virtue, and consequently it has nothing common to God and creatures for object. Finally, as the Doctor says ibid. num. 6., every act and habit ought to have a single specificative formal reason: but that goodness prout it belongs analogically to God per se, and to creatures per participationem, is not one specificative formal reason: since it has not one and the same reason of goodness, neither specific, nor individual; not indeed specific, because created and uncreated goodness are not of the same species; nor yet individual, because those two goods, since they are specifically distinct, are also much more numerically diverse.

You will say. Divine goodness quatenus convenient to God per se, and to creatures per participationem, can have the reason of formal object of some theological habit, or of one tending to divine things: but of no other than charity: therefore the specificative object of charity is that goodness itself, quatenus convenient to God and creatures.

I answer first, that the major may be denied: both because no real concept of goodness can truly exist which is analogous and common to God and to a creature, as has been said; and because goodness common to God and to a creature cannot have a unity sufficient for specifying one and the same habit: for a single habit in species, such as charity, requires an object one in species, which that goodness common to God per se and to creatures by participation cannot be.

I answer secondly, that even the minor may be denied; indeed, if some habit were granted tending toward the divine goodness insofar as it is common to God and creatures, that habit would be entirely distinct from charity, since it would have an object entirely distinct in species.

You will say. Charity tends equally toward God and neighbor: therefore it has at once God and creature for its formal and specifying object; and consequently it tends toward the divine goodness insofar as it is common to God and creatures.

I deny the consequence: for just as the uncreated charity of God tends not only toward God, but also toward men and Angels, whom God loves with charitable friendship, yet does not on that account have for its formal object a charity common to God and creatures: so, proportion being kept, our charity, which is a certain participation in divine charity, can tend toward God and neighbor as to be loved out of friendship, even if it have only the divine goodness, insofar as it belongs to God alone, for its formal object.

Second Conclusion. — The formal terminating object of divine charity is the essential divine goodness, not indeed the attributal, nor anything concomitant, or consequent upon the act of such charity. This is the teaching of the Doctor ibid. num. 7. And he proves it thus: That is the formal ratio principally terminating the most perfect virtue, such as charity, by which its material object, namely God, can most perfectly quiet and satiate the will, and also have the most perfect ratio of object: but God has this only through His essential goodness: therefore that essential goodness has the ratio of formal object of charity. The major stands per se. The minor however is proved: whenever a power regards the whole of being as its adequate terminative object, it cannot be perfectly quieted by that object unless it have the most perfect ratio of entity: but the will has being, or good in common, as its adequate object: therefore it cannot be perfectly quieted by any other ratio than by that which has the primary and principal ratio of goodness: but only the essential goodness claims this for itself; for attributal goodness flows from it as from a root: therefore only the essential goodness has the ratio of formal terminating object of divine charity.

Moreover, that essential divine goodness or perfection of God, taken absolutely, embraces infinite wisdom, omnipotence, eternity, immensity, and all other formally infinite perfections, from which there results an infinite being in every genus of being: nevertheless, when that essential goodness of God is viewed in itself, it is the most simple ratio sufficiently moving to the act of supernatural charity and love.

Furthermore, ibidem the Doctor grants in num. 5. that the divine goodness, as bestowing benefits upon us, can have the ratio of motivating object of charity; for this S. John teaches in his first Epistle, chap. 1., saying: Let us therefore love God, because God first hath loved us. Hence daily experience shows that from the consideration of benefits received from someone we are moved and spurred to love him more effectively than he would be loved on account of his own perfections. The Doctor however calls this ratio secondary; because if anyone were to love

God only on account of the benefits bestowed on him by God, without attending to His divine perfections, from which He has that He is supremely amiable on account of Himself; such an act of love would not properly be accounted theological, nor supernatural, but only natural; since it is natural to return love for love, and affection for one who confers benefits upon us. Yet that consideration of divine benefits can be a secondary motive ratio, which may provoke and allure to the act of charity, inasmuch as God is loved not so much on account of the benefits received from God, as on account of the divine goodness, by which He is provoked to confer those benefits upon us.

Nor would I deny that God can be loved by us, in this mortal state, with an love of charity on account of some special attribute of His, namely, the providence by which He governs us, the power by which He protects us, the goodness by which He cherishes us, the mercy by which He indulges us, etc.; even as supernatural faith has for the motive object of its assent some attribute, namely, the veracity of God. Nor does anything hinder that love from being a true act of charity; for although God so considered might seem the object of the love of concupiscence, whereby we covet divine benefits to be conferred upon us by God; nevertheless it can be an act of charity and of the love of friendship, inasmuch as providence, power, and the other attributal perfections are considered as infinite perfections, and concurring toward that infinite goodness, by which God is said to be infinitely good and perfect. For it often happens that lovers of God are sometimes stirred to the consideration and admiration of the singular perfections of God, and thence are enkindled to a ⟦illegible: viviticum?⟧, and most ardent love of their beloved God; even as we read of the celestial Spouse, Cant. 2., who, upon the daughters of Jerusalem asking what manner of beloved hers was, recounted His various perfections, and finally concluded: He is wholly desirable. So that the consideration of all the perfections of her beloved was like a fire and a spur, whereby that celestial spouse was provoked to love her beloved on account of His absolute and supreme perfection. But that a concomitant or subsequent ratio of the termination of the act of love is not properly speaking the objective and terminating ratio, the Doctor proves ibid. num. 9.: Because, he says, the objective ratio, properly speaking, must presuppose the act which is terminated; whereas this ratio accompanies or follows the act; whence he infers that God, as the good actually beatifying, is not properly said to be the object of charity, because as such He actually terminates charity: for He has actually to beatify insofar as He terminates beatific love; whence He does not begin to be actually beatifying before the very act of beatific love itself is proposed and possessed. He confesses nevertheless that that third ratio can in some way be called the object of charity, or of its object, inasmuch as it holds itself concomitantly on the side of the object toward actual charity, so that actual charity about God can never be had without God's terminating it; whether it should terminate it by some respect, which is the less probable view, or by itself, the act being posited, or by extrinsic denomination taken from the act, as seems more probable.

Third Conclusion. — ONE AND THE SAME AND INDIVISIBLE IS THE HABITUAL VIRTUE OF CHARITY INCLINING TO THE LOVING OF GOD AS

PRIMARY OBJECT, AND OF NEIGHBOR AS SECONDARY. This is the more common opinion among the followers of both Schools, the Subtle and the Angelic.

It is proved first from the Holy Fathers, by Augustine, lib. 8. De Trinitate, chap. 5., who says: By one and the same charity we love God and our neighbor, but God for God's sake, while ourselves and our neighbor for God's sake. Moreover, in Serm. II., which is On the Ascension: I think, he says, that therefore the Holy Spirit was given twice, once on earth and again in heaven, that the two precepts of charity might be commended to us, namely, of God and of neighbor. There is one charity, and two precepts; one Spirit, and two givings, because no other charity loves the neighbor than that which loves God; therefore with the same charity with which we love our neighbor we love God, etc. Similarly S. Gregory, book 7. of the Moral., chap. 10., speaking of the Love of God and of Neighbor, says: These two loves are two certain parts, but one whole is composed of both: two rings, but one chain; two actions, but one virtue: two works, but one charity: two merits before God, but it is impossible for one to be found without the other.

The same truth the Seraphic Doctor teaches in dist. 27. art. 2. qu. 2.; first, because the motion toward the end is the same as that toward that which is for the end; for a motion does not become different on account of a difference of means, but of the extremity: whereas the motion of charity tends toward God as toward the end, but toward the neighbor as toward a means: therefore one and the same motion, or habit of charity, can incline to an act which tends toward the neighbor and toward God. Secondly, the same is the honor whereby the image of some Saint is honored together with that whereby the Saint himself is honored, because the honor of the image is referred to the prototype, as S. Damascene teaches, lib. 1. De Fide, chap. 17.; but love of neighbor is referred to God: therefore similarly there is one motion, or one principle inclining to the loving of God and neighbor. Thirdly, three adorable persons of the Trinity are loved by one and the same love, because in them there is one ratio of love, namely the supreme divine goodness: so also there is one motive ratio for loving God and neighbor: therefore there is one and the same ratio.

It is confirmed by a similar case: although faith attains several things credible, and hope extends itself in hoping toward several things; yet because all are attained under the same formal ratio under which, namely, the veracity of God, and His omnipotence, as assisting, those virtues are not multiplied in species: so likewise charity, even though it extend itself to loving several things, nevertheless attains all under the one formal ratio of divine and uncreated goodness; therefore it is one virtue in species, simple.

You will say: A diverse habit is required where a diverse difficulty occurs in eliciting the act: yet one difficulty occurs about the love of neighbor, and another about the love of God: for he who loves God with the greatest sweetness and delight of his soul suffers no less grave a difficulty in loving his enemies for God's sake: therefore the acts of the love of God and of neighbor require diverse habits.

I distinguish the major: a diverse acquired habit is required, I concede: infused, I deny: for infused habits are not granted that anyone may act easily, but only that he simply have the power of acting. To the minor I say, that difficulty of loving enemies is removed by the very virtue of charity, inasmuch as it applies the motive of that love, namely, the very person to be loved for the sake of the infinite goodness of God, who commands and ordains this.

You will say, secondly: Charity moves only to loving that which is lovable on account of the infinite goodness of God: yet the neighbor does not present himself as thus to be loved. Proof: no one is to be loved on account of the infinite goodness of God unless in whom that infinite goodness exists: but it does not exist in the neighbor: therefore, etc.

I deny the minor, and to its proof I say, it is not necessary that the divine goodness be inherent in someone in order that he be loved through charity, but it suffices that he have an extrinsic relation to that goodness of God. For just as a medicine, however unpleasant and bitter, and thus not lovable, is nevertheless loved on account of the health to which it is ordered, so also the neighbor, however odious otherwise, can be loved on account of the divine goodness, to which he is ordered.

Now this ordering of the neighbor to the divine goodness can be considered in diverse ways. First indeed, inasmuch as he who loves God desires that He be loved by all; hence that he be loved by the neighbor; but in desiring this very thing he wishes for the neighbor the greatest good on account of that divine goodness itself, which he judges most worthy to be loved by the neighbor. Secondly, he who loves someone desires every good of which he is capable; hence he who loves God desires that all things tend to His glory; but it pertains to the glory of God that He be loved by the neighbor: therefore, etc. Finally, he who loves someone also loves those things which pertain to him: whence S. John in the first Epistle, chap. 5.: Every one that loveth him who begot, loveth him also who is born of him: whence he infers: In this we know that we love the children of God, when we love God and keep his commandments. As if he said: we who love God ought also to love for God's sake all men, who are born of God and bear forth His divine image.

Hence it follows, that if the neighbor be loved precisely on account of his own intrinsic and natural goodness, it will not be theological charity, since a theological virtue necessarily tends toward God, at least as formal object. The act of these will be moral friendship, whether acquired or infused, if it be given. Although even here it could be imperated reflexively by a distinct act elicited from the motive of divine charity, as is evident.

NOTE 1. That it is certain that there is given a precept of loving God; for this is expressed in Deuteronomy 6., and Christ the Lord repeats and inculcates it anew in Matthew 22. in these words: He that hath my commandments, and keepeth them; he it is that loveth me, he that loveth me not, keepeth not my words. Hence in chap. 15., addressing the Apostles, He says: You are my friends, if you do the things that I command you. Wherefore here there is no difficulty about the effective love of God, which consists in the observance of the divine precepts; for this is prescribed generically by each of these divine precepts; but the controversy concerns affective love, namely whether there be a special affirmative precept whereby we are bound to elicit an act of love toward God on account of Himself, as to be loved above all things. About which there is a twofold opinion among Theologians. For some, with Maldonatus chap. 22. on Matthew, Jansenius in the harmony of the Gospels, chap. 18., think there is no special precept about loving God: since indeed the love of God and neighbor contains all the precepts entirely, and as it were is closed up and comprehended in them. But other Theologians object.

NOTE 2. That the controversy is no light one among Theologians in assigning the time at which the precept concerning eliciting an act of divine love ought to be fulfilled. For there are those who think it must be fulfilled as soon as man obtains the use of reason; others once each year: some in the time at which one approaches the sacraments, especially those of Baptism and the Eucharist: several for an indeterminate time of the whole life, provided it be elicited before death, but especially about the very instant of death: others however on feast days, especially Sundays, as the Doctor holds probable in num. 7. What however is to be held as truer will be determined in what follows.

NOTE 3. That some object can be loved more than another in three ways: first indeed, objectively, when we will and wish greater goods for it than we would for another. Secondly, intensively, when it is loved with greater effort and more ardent fervor than any other: so that the act of love toward it has more degrees of intensity than any other act of love toward another object. Finally thirdly, appretiatively, when it is esteemed of more worth than another, so that for attaining or conserving the beloved object whatever else may be lost, whether meanwhile that beloved object is loved more intensely and with greater effort, or not. Now these three modes of loving are so distinct that they can be separated from one another: for he who sins mortally on account of earthly delight, e. g. loves himself and that delight more, both intensively and appretiatively, than God: since with greater effort and a more fervent ardor of love he tends toward that delight than toward the love of God: similarly he loves it more appretiatively, inasmuch as by sinning mortally he prefers that delightful good to God Himself, the supreme good and last end: nevertheless he loves God objectively more than anything else which he viciously pursues in act, namely speaking of an absolute and efficacious, or deliberate act of the will: since he wills for God all the divine perfections fitting to Him, which are certainly far better than any good which he could wish for himself. Similarly someone can love another thing more objectively and intensively, which nevertheless he loves less appretiatively, as is clear from the example of a Father, who usually esteems his firstborn son more highly than a little child, whom however he loves more intensely and tenderly.

These things premised, three things remain to be determined: first, what is the special precept concerning eliciting an internal act of love toward God: second, when this ought to be done: third, whether God is by precept to be loved more, not only intensively and objectively, but also appretiatively.

First Conclusion. — The affirmative precept of loving God obliges to eliciting an internal act of love toward God. So the Doctor, d. 27. n. 18., where he says:

I say that that affirmative precept, Deuteron. 6. and Matth. 22. Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, etc., does not only oblige always to fleeing the opposite, namely lest there be an act of hatred; but it obliges at some time to an elicited act. > because that act is about the end, from whose goodness every moral goodness descends in the acts which are for the end. Therefore just as man is bound to have some virtuous act, so is he bound to have some act of that precept about the end to be loved gratuitously.

It is proved first, from that passage of Deuteronomy 6., where the first of the ten commandments given by God is thus expressed: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole strength. Which precept also Christ the Lord inculcates in Matt. 22., where He calls this precept the first and greatest, not because it is written in the first place, but because it is first and principally per se a precept, so that all the rest ought to be observed precisely in order that this may be perfectly fulfilled in every respect; and thus the fulfillment of that precept seems the end of all the rest, as is said

1. Timoth. 1.: For the end of the commandment is charity from a pure heart, or it is called first by comparison with the other, namely the love of neighbor, which it calls second, and it enumerates that as two distinct precepts, and forthwith sufficiently indicates the love of God to be specially commanded. Which is indeed confirmed; for where there is a true number, there is a special distinction between the things numbered; for every number is founded upon some distinction of those things which make up the number: but the precept of the love of God, compared with the other precepts of the Decalogue, makes a true number: therefore this precept is special.

It is proved secondly from the Holy Fathers, especially Augustine, lib. 1. of the Questions on the Gospels, qu. 33.; Jerome, Anselm, and other Fathers, who, expounding the words of Matth. 22., On these two commandments dependeth the whole law and the prophets, interpret that dependence thus, as wishing it to be like that of branches from a root, members from a head, rays from the sun, rivulets from a fountain, effects from a principle: but root from branches, rivulet from fountain, head from members, etc. are specially distinct: therefore the same Holy Fathers judge the precept of the love of God to be specially distinct from the other precepts.

Thirdly, love concerning the divine goodness and the supreme perfection of God seems no less to be commanded than the assent of faith concerning divine truth: but not only is effective faith commanded, which is exhibited through prayer, adoration, and confession of the mysteries of faith, but affective and actual faith is also commanded, whereby one firmly assents to the articles on account of the divine truth: therefore not only is effective charity commanded, but also affective, and forthwith there is given a special precept concerning the very interior act of the love of God. Which is indeed confirmed, because it does not seem congruous that God should have inculcated the love of neighbor by so many precepts, forbidding that any evil be inflicted upon him, yet should have prescribed no precept concerning the love of Himself.

You will say: The end of a precept does not fall under the precept: but charity is the end of the precept, as we said just now from the Apostle: therefore it does not fall under the precept; and forthwith its act is not commanded.

I distinguish the major: the end extrinsic, I concede: intrinsic, I deny. For there is a twofold end of every precept: one indeed extrinsic to the precept itself, and to the thing commanded, e. g. in the precept of fasting, the extrinsic end is the taming of the flesh, and its subjection to the spirit, and other things of that kind for which fasting was instituted: but the other end is intrinsic to the precept, as abstinence from food, which is the matter about which fasting is occupied.

I distinguish the minor in like manner: that the love of God is the end of the commandments extrinsically, I concede; intrinsically, I deny; for the other commandments can be kept without it, namely that an act of the love of God be elicited.

You will say 2. Christ the Lord testifies with the aforesaid words of Matth. 22. that upon these two commandments the whole law hangs, and the Prophets: therefore He signifies that the love of God and of neighbor, which are the two commandments, include all the precepts of the law, as well as the oracles of the Prophets, which intimate precepts of this kind.

Moreover, Ioan. 14., the same Christ the Lord explaining what it is to love God, says: He that hath my commandments, and keepeth them; he it is that loveth me. Similarly ad Rom. 14., The fulfilling of the law is charity.

I answer to the first, that therefore Christ says that upon the love of God and of neighbor the whole law depends, insofar as all other commandments are kept so that God may be loved most perfectly; whence he who loves God seems to have fulfilled the law, because he obtains the end to which the law is ordered. By the same reasoning the other two testimonies are resolved.

You will say 3. St. Bernard, Serm. 50. in Cantica, explaining those words: he set in me charity, says: Charity is in act, and in effect, and concerning that charity indeed which belongs to work, the law was first given to men, and the commandment formed; for who has it thus in affection, as it is commanded?

I answer first, that St. Bernard there denies that a precept was given concerning the internal act of charity, which he calls charity in affection; nay, he expressly confesses this; for he says there: If it please you more that the commandment was given concerning affective charity (of course), I do not contend on that account: provided you also acquiesce with me, that in no wise can it be fulfilled, or ever could be fulfilled, by any man in this life.

I answer second, that St. Bernard there distinguishes a twofold internal act of charity: one, indeed, whereby God is loved so perfectly, and the loving soul adheres to Him with such sweetness, that the soul, as though wholly forgetful of itself and of all other things, is borne with supreme sweetness into God. The other, whereby we are impelled to external works, that we may succor our neighbor; for, as he writes there, How often thence (that is, from praying to God, for this he brings forward as an example) are we withdrawn by charity bidding, and turned away on behalf of those who need our work or speech; this charity he calls actual, because it impels to acting, and affective, because it rests wholly in internal affection. The second, he teaches, has the reason of merit, and therefore properly pertains to the Fatherland, and there alone is perfectly found, although here it is sometimes given to be foretasted in contemplation. Whence, when he had distinguished within a threefold affection of love, namely that which flesh begets, and that which reason rules, and that which wisdom seasons, he adds: The first indeed is sweet, but base: the second dry, but strong: the last rich, and sweet. Therefore through the second works are done (or commanded), and in that charity sits, not that effective charity which, seasoned with the salt of wisdom, growing rich imports into the mind a great abundance of the sweetness of the Lord, but rather a certain actual charity, which, although it does not yet refresh sweetly with its pleasant moisture, nevertheless vehemently enkindles toward that same love (namely wholly perfect, whereby the soul would be rapt wholly into God). And below: Let us love in work, and in truth, while namely we are moved to command well more by a certain impulse of rigid virtue than by that sweet affection of charity: where he openly distinguishes that twofold internal act, as I said above.

Conclusion second. — GOD IS TO BE LOVED BY PRECEPT ABOVE ALL THINGS, NOT ONLY OBJECTIVELY, BUT ALSO APPRETIATIVELY, YET NOT INTENSIVELY. This likewise is the doctrine of the Doctor in the place cited above n. 17.

The first and second parts easily stand; for indeed God is the object of infinite perfection, to which the will, by the inclining habit of charity, not only desires all good things in preference, when inclined to will for Him all its own divine attributes and divine excellencies, but also to love Him Himself with estimation and appretiation above every lovable thing. Which indeed is proved first from the habit of charity; because for that for which anything is such, that thing is the more so: but the habit of theological charity inclines our will, and stirs it and powerfully affects it to love one created object more appretiatively than another, on account of God the sovereign good; for any created object is esteemed worthy to be loved out of charity insofar as it participates in some of the divine excellencies, and is something of God: and accordingly, the nobler something participates in the divine perfections, the more it also appears to be loved out of charity: therefore since charity inclines the will to love one created object more than another on account of its greater affinity with God, it likewise inclines equally to loving God above all things, lovable appretiatively.

The same truth stands from actual charity; for Christ the Lord plainly signifies this when He says Matth. 10. He that loveth father or mother more than me, is not worthy of me, and he that loves son or daughter above me, is not worthy of me: and with St. Luke, ch. 14. If anyone come to me, and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and moreover his own soul also, he cannot be my disciple; in which places this particle (more) signifies excess according to appretiation, as sufficiently indicates that other particle with St. Luke (hate); for it sounds there the same as postpones, despises before another, esteems less than another, just as ad Rom., ch. 13. when it is said, Jacob I have loved, Esau have I hated, that is, I have postponed him; and with St. Matth. ch. 6. For either he will hate the one, that is, he will love the one less appretiatively, and will love the other, that is, he makes it of more worth: therefore from an act of charity God is loved appretiatively above all things.

You will say. The just love God above all things: but while they sin venially, they will rather to please themselves, or others, on whose account they sin, than God: therefore the love of God above all things is not always made appretiatively.

I distinguish the minor: they desire to please themselves or others more in a light matter, I concede; in a grave matter, I deny. Whence the consequence must be denied: for that anyone love God appretiatively, it is not necessary that he will to please Him more than others in all things, even in the lightest matters, but it suffices that he will to please Him more simpliciter with respect to all things which He has commanded, nor is it necessary that he will to please Him also secundum quid, and with respect to all things which He has not commanded. It can indeed happen that charity's love be so perfect that it would determine to pleasing God more than any other: but that perfection is not precepted for this or such a state, in which the body, which is corrupted, weighs down the soul; otherwise very few would be just, seeing that very few are they who would keep this precept, loving God above all things, even in the lightest matters. But that this matter may be made known, it must be known that God can be loved appretiatively above all things in three ways: first indeed, while God is expressly preferred in particular to dearer things, as parents, brothers, friends: secondly, if He is preferred explicitly to other things conceived confusedly and in general, as when the intellect proposes that God be pleased in all things rather than any creature, the will should will to do so: thirdly, if He is preferred implicitly to all things, as if anyone conceive the proposal of always pleasing God in all things, or of fleeing or detesting all sins inasmuch as they are offenses of God, or if anyone simply loves God with that affection of benevolence from which there would follow the proposal of pleasing Him in all things, or of fleeing sins, if he thought upon it.

The third part also stands, namely that God is not to be loved by precept above all things intensively; because for the observance of this precept the efficacious love of charity suffices, whereby anyone will efficaciously rather to please God than any creature, and which excludes every affect of sinning mortally, and spurs on to the observance of all the commandments: but a love less intense according to degrees can claim all these things for itself: therefore that there be made sufficient satisfaction to the precept of loving God, there is no need that He be loved intensively above all things. The major stands because from the observance of the commandments it is best gathered a posteriori that someone loves God above all things, as is required for fulfilling that precept: whence also Christ the Lord proposed only that observance of the commandments as the sign of love out of the affection of charity: He that loveth me, keepeth my word. But the minor is proved: for fulfilling the precept of the love of God there is not required the highest intensity of love: therefore love in whatever degree can suffice for that. The consequence is evident: for if love supremely intense is not desired, neither will there be a determined number of necessary degrees, that this precept be fulfilled. But the antecedent is proved, because otherwise one just man could not love God more intensely than another, nor could even the love required for fulfilling the precept of loving God be increased at all: which plainly appears absurd: therefore such a love is not necessarily required. It is confirmed: if God were necessarily to be loved intensively above all things, it would follow that he who had never elicited an act of the love of God unless he thereby sinned in loving his own salvation, or that of a parent, as seven, out of the love of hope, or of piety toward a parent: but this seems absurd, for those acts of love, as seven, have an honorable object, and are true acts of virtue: therefore, etc.

You will say 1. As natural reason dictates that God is to be loved extensively above all things, so also it dictates that He is to be loved with a love of greater intensity than any other object: but from such a dictation it follows that God is to be loved extensively above all things: therefore equally from it there follows that He ought to be loved intensively thus.

I deny the minor; for that anyone make sufficient satisfaction to the dictation of reason concerning loving God, it suffices that he have an act of love which includes the affect of pleasing God and of observing His commandments, but excludes the affect of sinning; however it is not required that that act of love have the greatest intensity of degrees.

You insist. Not only by the dictation of natural reason is God to be loved, but also to be loved with the whole heart, with the whole soul, and with the whole strength, as the precept of Deuteronomy bears, which belongs to the natural law; but thus He cannot be loved unless it have the highest intensity of degrees; therefore, etc.

I deny the minor: for unto this, that God be so loved, it suffices that there be a will of pleasing God more in all things than any other: yet this can be obtained without that highest intensity of degrees. Hence St. Augustine explains the aforesaid words thus in book 1. De Doctrina Christiana, ch. 22.

When He says, thou shalt love with the whole heart, with the whole soul, with the whole mind, He left no part of our life which ought to be vacant, and as it were to give place, that we might will to enjoy something else: but whatever else shall enter into the mind, let it be borne thither whither the impulse of total charity runs: For so he who loves his neighbor as himself refers all the love of himself and of him into that love of God, which suffers no rivulet to be drawn from itself outside itself, by whose derivation it would be diminished.

But St. Bernard, Ser. 20. in Cantica, expounds thus: To me, he says, love seems to pertain to the zeal of the affection of the heart; but soul-love to industry, or the judgment of reason; but virtuous love to be referred to the constancy or vigor of the mind.

You say. 2° The same St. Bernard, in the book De diligendo Deo, says: The cause of loving God is God: but the mode is to love without mode: but He who is to be loved without mode, is to be loved with the supreme intensity of an act of love: therefore, etc.

I answer. First, that God is indeed to be loved without mode, that is, insofar as the affections of our heart can extend themselves; but this is counseled, not indeed precepted: but this discourse is concerning eliciting the love of God from precept, not indeed from counsel. I answer secondly with the Seraphic Doctor dist. 27. art. 2. q. 5. that an act can be said to have a mode in three ways; in one way by limitation with respect to itself: in another way by aggregation of circumstances: in the third way from mediation between the superfluous and the diminished. In the first way it is to be said that every act of created virtue has a mode. For every created virtue is finite and limited; and therefore every act of it has finiteness and mode, speaking of limitation and finition not according to possibility, but according to act. But in the second way it is to be said that mode concerns an act of moral and meritorious virtue; because no act is laudable unless due circumstances concur to it. In the third way it is to be said that the act of every cardinal, or political, virtue has a mode. For all consist in the mean between the superfluous and the diminished, and from this very fact have a created and finite object. Since therefore charity is a created virtue, and a gratuitous virtue, and a theological virtue: hence it is that its act has a mode from the limitation of the virtue. It also has a mode from the addition of due circumstances, as is evident, because the mode which concerns an act of charity is that one love God above all things, and for Himself with the whole heart, with the whole soul, and with the whole mind: but it does not have that mode which is from the mean between the superfluous and the diminished, because its object is immense and infinite.

Conclusion third. — IT IS PROBABLE THAT GOD IS TO BE LOVED BY PRECEPT IN A THREEFOLD CIRCUMSTANCE OF TIME: NAMELY FIRST AS SOON AS ANYONE SUFFICIENTLY HAS THE USE OF REASON, AND CAN SIN MORTALLY; SECONDLY ON SUNDAYS AND MORE SOLEMN DAYS: THIRDLY AT THE ARTICLE OF DEATH.

St. Thomas hands down the first part in 1. 2. q. 89. art. 6., and his Disciples follow him, who prove this assertion first from the fact that as soon as a man possesses the use of reason he is bound to convert himself to his last end, and to direct all his acts to Him: but this is done through the love of God above all things: therefore he is then bound to elicit that love. They prove the major because that gravity which is in a stone and necessitates it to tend toward its end, namely toward the center of the earth, corresponds in man to the obligation toward his own end: but a stone, as soon as it is formed, all impediment removed, tends toward the center of the earth: therefore by equal reason man, as soon as he has been formed and has obtained the use of reason, is bound to convert himself to God. Truly, this argument is nothing; for the major is plainly false, since if the obligation of man to love God were the same as the necessity inherent in a stone to seek the center, it would follow that just as a stone, whenever it is not impeded, continually tends as much as it can toward the center of the earth until it arrives there, so man would whenever he could be bound by precept to elicit an act of the love of God, and not only as soon as he possesses the use of reason, as the Thomists will have it. — Secondly they prove it thus: if one were not bound to love God in the first instant of the use of reason, he could then sin only venially; because he could not then sin mortally except insofar as he omitted that conversion of himself to God, which omission would be a mortal sin: but it is false that man for that instant can sin merely venially; because from this it would follow that someone could have original sin together with venial alone: but this is false. Which indeed is proved first: because, as Innocent III teaches in the chapter Maiores on Baptism, original sin cannot be remitted by baptism to adults who are asleep, because it cannot be remitted without the mortal: therefore the Pontiff judges that original sin cannot be found in adults without the mortal. Secondly, the Council of Florence says: The souls of those who depart in actual mortal sin, or in original sin alone, descend forthwith into hell, to be tormented however with unequal punishments. There he makes no mention of those who depart with original sin alone and venial: therefore he judges there are no such persons. Thirdly, because no place could be assigned for them: for neither the limbo of children, since actual sins are not punished there; nor yet the place of the damned on account of mortal sins, since they would not have committed a mortal sin; and no third place of the damned is given. — Truly I answer by denying the minor, and against its first proof I deny the reasoning of those following Pontius in his Commentaries on dist. 27. n. 55. For, he says, original sin is not unable to be remitted by baptism to a sleeping adult because he must necessarily have a mortal sin, nor is that asserted in that passage, since it is certain that an adult, even if that obligation of converting himself to God were laid upon him, could convert himself to God, and consequently not have a mortal sin, because original cannot be remitted unless whatever mortal was held together with it is remitted; and a sleeping adult does not have the disposition required that the mortal sin distinct from original be remitted in him. Therefore the Pontiff means nothing else in that chapter than that original sin cannot be taken away by baptism from a sleeping adult who has a mortal sin, and that therefore, since it is uncertain whether he has a mortal sin, baptism ought not be applied to him. Against the second proof, I deny that the Council thought that some do not depart with original and venial: for although he made no mention of them, still it does not follow from that that he did not think such persons exist; but because it was neither necessary nor useful for his intention to make mention of them, just as he also made no mention of those who die with original and personal mortal sin. Against the third proof finally, some respond that the case is impossible by supposition of the providence already established by God; but such a providence is asserted utterly gratuitously, and has no semblance of likelihood. Therefore it is better and more easily answered that the place in which they would remain if they died with original and venial alone is that very place in which they would remain if they died with original alone, whether that place be limbo or hell; and it is said quite gratuitously that in limbo actual sins committed in life are not punished, satisfaction for which has not been made. Therefore I judge that the assertion is better proved by this argument: the precept of loving God binds at some time: but it does not seem that it binds at a more fitting time than when man possesses the use of reason: then because since God is our Creator and Former, who created us precisely that we might render to Him the love and homage owed, as St. Leo aptly teaches, sermon 1. De ieiunio decimi mensis, where he says:

If we understand healthily and wisely the beginning of our creation, we shall find that man was created after the image of God precisely that he might be an imitator of his guide, and that this is the natural dignity of our race, if in us, as in a kind of mirror, the form of divine benignity resplends; since, I say, God made us for that purpose, it is fitting that we bestow love as proof of our gratitude and homage for so great a benefit.

You will say. That precept of loving God cannot bind for that time in which there seems a moral impossibility of observing it: but such is the case for the first instant of the use of reason: then because no one can know when he first has the use of reason: then because it does not seem likely that in that first instant God is so perfectly proposed as to be loved that anyone could think himself bound for that instant to His love: but without this prior knowledge that precept cannot be kept: therefore, etc.

I deny the minor; for I do not judge absolutely that the precept urges for the first instant of reason simply, but only for that in which man would have sufficient use of reason so as to be able to sin.

The Doctor hands down and proves the second part in num. 18. where he writes thus:

Perhaps that divine precept determined this: Sanctify the Sabbath; and let everyone remain with himself, that is, recollecting and ascending to God his own. And the Church specified as regards hearing Mass on Sunday De Consecr., dist. 2. cap. Missas. But it is not similar concerning the precept of loving one's neighbor, as will appear in the following distinction.

It is confirmed.: both because the innumerable benefits of God bestowed upon us require this love in a mind of gratitude; and it cannot be rendered at a more suitable time than on those days sacred to God, and accordingly that precept seems to urge on those very days. It is confirmed, because those days designated as sacred to God are chiefly set apart for eliciting acts of religion and observance toward God: but no act seems to conduce more to the glory of God than the act of charity, as being more excellent than all other acts: therefore it is especially on those days to be elicited. To these add, that the act of charity is not burdensome to the will but delightful, unless perhaps insofar as affections opposed toward some creature have rendered it somewhat difficult: but by virtue of the negative precept we are bound not to burst forth into an act of disordered love toward creatures, nor is it harder for anyone having such a habitual affection to put it off so as to have the opposite affection than to have the omission of the act of charity; and consequently there is no difficulty to be overcome in eliciting the act of love which ought not be removed by the negative precept, by which we are bound not to love a creature above God or equally with God.

You will say. If we are all bound by precept to elicit an act of love toward God: then whoever does not elicit even such an act sins: but this seems false: both because the faithful are not accustomed to confess that they have not fulfilled this precept on Sundays, and hence it is a sign that they do not think themselves bound to it by precept: but it is not likely that in a matter of such moment the ignorance of the faithful would be so common and perilous: therefore, etc. Then also because if all were bound to elicit the act of charity on Sundays, it would follow that a faithful person existing in the state of mortal sin would be bound to gird himself to recover the state of grace through sacramental confession; for it does not appear how anyone could love God above all things without having the will to reconcile himself with God and to possess His grace: but no one asserts that sinners are bound to sacramental confession every Sunday: therefore, etc.

I deny the minor, and against its first proof I say that it is not required that one expressly and distinctly confess that he has not observed that precept; indeed the Confessor can sufficiently know this from hearing that the penitent was in the state of mortal sin with a continuous affection of sinning; and by the very fact that he confesses he was for such a time in such a disposition, he signifies sufficiently that he has not observed that precept; but if he were immune from every mortal sin, one can also judge tacitly that he fulfilled that precept; indeed since he had no impediment to observing it, and elsewhere the act can be elicited tacitly. Against the second proof I distinguish the major: that the sinner would be bound to recover divine grace through the elicition of the act of the love of God above all things, which perhaps exists nowhere without the state of grace, I concede: that he would be bound to it by the actual application of all ordinary means conducing to such recovery of grace, I deny.

The third part is also evident, namely that we are bound to elicit an act of charity about the article of death; indeed since then the gravest combats press in, and therefore man is bound in every way to prepare himself against them, nor is any medium safer than this act, if one wishes to extricate himself from the danger of damnation, and this I likewise concede. The reason is, because although it is certain that attrition suffices for the effect of the Sacrament of Penance, still we are not always sufficiently certain that we have true attrition: whence it follows that in that case we are also exposed to danger of salvation. To these add, that it can also often happen that a man in other occasions is bound to elicit an act of the love of God above all things, especially as often as God is proposed with motives sufficiently persuasive that He ought thus to be loved: first, because otherwise by silence He would seem to be contemned: second, because wherever there is the same obligation of natural law to love God for some time, the same obligation also occurs as often as the motive reason is the same: but where God is proposed sufficiently as to be loved, the same reason for loving God occurs as on Sundays: therefore, etc. —

The same must be said as often as anyone judges the act of the love of God necessary for overcoming some grave temptation, or that the mind may be sufficiently prepared to undertake some heroic work which he is already bound to fulfill. For although perhaps that act of the love of God would not be on the part of the thing here and now a medium necessary for obtaining those ends; nevertheless by the very fact that he thinks it to be thus necessary, he is bound to it as long as he remains in that opinion, lest otherwise he sin against conscience. Then, because it can often happen that it truly is a medium necessary for obtaining the said ends, either on account of his disposition, that by other ways he would perhaps not be sufficiently aroused to overcome the temptation, or undertake that work constantly, or even because by another way he would not obtain from God those graces by which he needs to obtain those ends de facto. For although God does not fail us in necessity by ministering His grace, nevertheless He often requires, that He may give us greater graces, and those which He sees will have effect, that we strive to impetrate them for certain reasons: which if we omit through negligence, He gives us lesser ones, by which although we could absolutely accomplish this or that, still we could do so only with the greatest difficulty, and therefore we shall not in fact perfect it.

You ask. Should some order be observed in the exercise of charity toward ourselves and toward our neighbor, and what should that order be?

I answer, that truly some order must be observed, as the holy Fathers commonly teach when expounding that verse of Canticles 2: He ordered charity in me. And likewise that saying of the Apostle to the Galatians 5: Let us work good toward all, but most especially toward the household of the faith; that is, toward those gathered by one faith in the same house of the Church. Nor does it matter that St. Augustine says in book 1, De Doctrina Christiana, chapter 28, that all men are to be loved equally, namely as regards affection; for in the same place he assigns that a disparity must be observed as regards the offices of charity; which he also teaches in the book De Vera Religione, chapter 47: Since, he says, he cannot benefit all those whom he loves equally unless he prefers to benefit those more closely joined to him, he would be unjust.

For it is only by those words that St. Augustine wishes all men to be loved equally, as regards the generality and substance of love, inasmuch as no one is to be excluded from general affection; not as regards the manner of the act, or its intensity, or estimation. I answer secondly, that the order of charity requires first that one love his own salvation more than that of his neighbor. This the Seraphic Doctor proves, dist. 29, art. 1, qu. 3.

Because, he says, each thing desires perfection more in itself than in its like, and any weight draws the body in which it is more strongly toward the place due to it than it draws another body attached to it: hence it is that charity first desires God to be united to us, and to dwell in us, and us to tend toward God Himself and to rest in Him, before it seeks this in any other thing that has some likeness to us.

Therefore the arguments must be conceded which show that in the order of charity the love of self is passed over in favor of love of neighbor. And a sign of this is that those are reprehended and reckoned foolish who neglect their own salvation in order to procure that of another. A sign of this also is that if a man out of charity were bound to love his neighbor as much as himself, in such a way that there were therein an equality of every kind, then he would be bound to love two neighbors twice as much as himself, and three three times as much, and so on ascending further: which is found to happen in no one possessing charity, however perfect. It is proved secondly: because grace gratum faciens pertains to charity, and is given for one's own salvation, not for that of others, as grace freely given. From which it follows that it is not licit, neglecting one's own salvation, or sinning venially, on account of another's salvation. And it is confirmed by that saying of the Wise Man: He who is wicked to himself, to whom will he be good? And by that of David: He who loves iniquity hates his own soul. Nor is it excused by the fact that good comes to another; because, as the Apostle says to the Romans 3: Evils must not be done that goods may come: which to assert, he says, is blasphemous; whence elsewhere Scripture says: What does it profit a man, if he gain the whole world and suffer the loss of his own soul? For what exchange shall a man give for his soul? And accordingly it is not licit even to wish to be deprived of God forever on account of the salvation of very many.

But you will say. Micheas wished to have sinned venially for the sake of others; and Moses and Paul seem to have wished mortally, desiring the loss of everlasting beatitude, as appears, and that for the sake of the salvation of others. For Micheas, chapter 2, spoke these words: Would that I were not a man having spirit, and that I might rather speak lies. Moses, Exodus 32, said to God: This people has sinned a most grievous sin, they have made to themselves gods of gold: either forgive them this wrong, or if thou dost not, blot me out of the book which thou hast written. Paul, moreover, Romans 9, says: I wished myself to be an anathema from Christ for my brethren, who are my kinsmen according to the flesh, that is, eternal and ultimate destruction.

I answer, that Micheas did not wish this formally, but only materially. And that you may understand the matter: the Prophet had recounted the oppressions of the poor and other injuries inflicted upon his neighbors and upon the Israelites, and had therefore threatened them with captivity; and so that they might understand that he did these things not out of hatred, but out of love and compassion for them, he says: would that the things I prophesy concerning the ruin and destruction of Israel were not prophecies revealed by God, but lies suggested to me by a vain spirit of fear and faint-heartedness and dread! Thus we commonly say: would that I be deceived! would that I be a false prophet! And accordingly he does not wish formally to lie, but materially only, that is, that in reality it may not come to pass, or that he may not speak from the Spirit of God but from his own spirit, or the human spirit of vain fear: and this in order to show that he wishes his citizens to endure and not to be cut off or destroyed by the Assyrians, which he threatened to them from God. I add that even if Micheas had wished this formally, he would not therefore have been excused from sin, since he too was a man, and every man can be a liar. — As to the words of Moses and Paul, I answer that neither of them simply wished to be cut off from beatitude: but first, Moses used a certain confidence toward God, and in a certain way mingled himself in the cause of the people whom God wished to destroy, so that God would either destroy him together with the people, which he knew would not happen, or save both. Just as if the son of a king, seeing his father angry at a rebelling multitude and ready to send against them soldiers who would kill them, were to mingle himself with that same multitude and cry out to his father that he should either spare them or kill him along with them, knowing that his father would in no wise do this. Thus St. Augustine explains it, qu. 117 on Exodus, writing thus:

He said this indeed without anxiety, so that the reasoning may be concluded in what follows, namely, that because God did not blot Moses out of his book, He would remit that sin of the people. As if he were to say: just as he did not fear that he himself would be blotted out of the book of life, so too he trusted without hesitation that he would obtain from God what he asked. As regards holy Paul, however, I answer that his desire was only conditional, namely that if it could be done without sin, he would wish it. This indeed St. Chrysostom weighs most excellently, Homil. 16. ad Rom., writing thus:

For he did not, he says, say these things simply; but because all were saying, and blaming God, that those who had been deemed worthy to be called sons of God, to receive the law, to know Him before all others, to enjoy such and so great glory, to worship Him before the whole world, and then to receive the promises, and to be the fathers of those same tribes, and — greatest of all — to be the ancestors of Christ Himself, for this is what it means to be of those from whom Christ is, as far as concerns the flesh, had been cast out and dishonored, while those were brought in who had never known Him, men namely who had sprung from the Gentiles: therefore, since what they said affronted God with reproaches, Paul hearing these things and bearing them grievously and grieving for the glory of God, prayed that he might be an anathema, if only it could be, so that they might be saved and such reproach cease, lest God should seem to have deceived their forefathers, to whom He promised gifts.

You will insist. Holy Paul himself, in Philip. 1., wishes not conditionally but absolutely, for some time to lack beatitude for the sake of the salvation of others; for he says: I am straitened between two: having a desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ, being much better: but to abide still in the flesh, is needful for you. And confident of this: I know that I shall remain, and shall continue with you all for your profit and the joy of faith.

I answer. The Apostle there does not wish to remain in the flesh on account of others, but because of the necessity of others, freedom of choice being posited, he does not know what he would choose, namely life or death. And this is not against charity toward himself, since it contributed to a greater increase of that same charity, and to the accumulating of ever greater merits and rewards, which are not acquired in the same way through a brief life as through a long one.

Very many matters concerning the order of charity of man toward parents, children, relatives, and strangers are wont to be disputed by doctors of moral theology. But since these do not belong to our present undertaking, therefore I merely admonish, first, that parents are to be loved more than children; for although children are as it were a part of their parents, and consequently their love, which is said to descend rather than to ascend, inclines more toward children, nevertheless in extreme necessity provision ought rather to be made for parents than for children; since from them we have obtained from God the greatest benefit, namely life: whence also the precept of honoring parents and of coming to their aid is placed immediately after the three precepts pertaining to God. Hence St. Ambrose, expounding that verse Cant. 2. He ordered charity in me, says: The charity of many is disordered, because they place in first place what belongs in third or fourth. First God is to be loved, secondly parents, then children, after them the household, who, if they are good, are to be preferred to wicked children, etc.

But after children, aid is rather to be brought to relatives, according to the order of closer affinity and greater natural conjunction which they have with us, as St. Augustine teaches, book De vera religione, chapter 42. Since you cannot benefit all whom you love equally, unless you prefer to benefit those more closely joined to you, you are unjust. And book De Doctrina Christiana, chapter 28.

All men are to be loved equally: but since you cannot benefit all, counsel must above all be given to those who, by the opportunities of their times or of any circumstances whatsoever, are more closely joined to you as if by a certain lot. Nevertheless those who are illustrious by greater piety are also to be loved by us with a dearer and more excellent love out of the motive of charity; for since the object of this most excellent virtue is God Himself, it also spurs us with a keener inclination to love those who preserve a closer and more perfect conjunction with God: although I do not doubt that if some just man and one of our own relatives, endowed with less piety, were pressed by equal necessity, aid would be owed by a better title to the relative than to the stranger: for the order of love of neighbor in this life is chiefly determined by his conjunction, or nearness, to us; but the nearness and natural conjunction of relatives is greater than that of outsiders, and accordingly aid would be owed to them upon a stronger reason. If you desire more, consult the doctors of moral theology, who dispute most abundantly about observing order in the acts of charity.

Moreover this one thing is necessary for us to know, that we may have perfect charity; for perfect charity brings with it, as far as it can be had in this mortal life, the crown of all holiness. For, as St. Augustine most excellently says, book De Natura et Gratia, chapter 10: Charity begun is justice begun: charity advanced is justice advanced: charity great is justice great: charity perfect is justice perfect: but charity from a pure heart, and faith unfeigned.

This is that precious Evangelical pearl, which when a man has found he sells all that he has and buys it, as the same St. Augustine teaches, Tract. 5. on the Epistle of John. > This, he says, is that precious pearl, charity; without which nothing you may have profits you: whereas if you have it alone, it suffices you. This, he says in the same place, is what discerns between the sons of God and the sons of the devil: let all sign themselves with the sign of the cross of Christ: let all answer, Amen: let all sing, Alleluia: let all be baptized: let all enter the churches: let the walls of basilicas be raised: the sons of God are not discerned from the sons of the devil except by charity.

It alone is, as he adds in the Tract. De Laud. Charit., that which its own felicity does not exalt, because it is not inflated: it alone is that which an evil conscience does not punish, because it does nothing amiss. Amid reproaches it is secure: amid hatreds beneficent; amid angers tranquil; amid snares innocent: amid iniquities groaning; breathing in truth. What is stronger than she, not to repay injuries but to heal them? What more faithful than she, not to charity but to eternity? For she endures all things in the present life because she believes all things concerning the future life: and he suffers all things inflicted here who hopes for all things promised here. Deservedly she never falls. Therefore pursue charity: and thinking on it holily, bring forth the fruit of justice: and whatever you find more abundant than I was able to say in her praises, let it appear in your morals. Amen.

IMPRIMATUR:

Fr. ALBERTUS LEPIDI O. P. S. P. A. Magister.

IMPRIMATUR:

IOSEPH CEPPETELLI, Archbishop of Myra, Vicegerent.