Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

Note 1. It is certain that theological hope, even as to act, is not found in God on account of the defect of the object, because God possesses all intrinsic goods most steadfastly, and enjoys himself most fully. As to extrinsic goods, namely glory and veneration, which he exacts from us, since they are not arduous for him, and since moreover they are not future with respect to him, because all things are from eternity intimately present to him, therefore he cannot hope for them: whence whenever in Scripture God is said to hope for something from us, these things must be understood tropologically; so that God speaks after the human manner, signifying doubtless those affections which we ordinarily have concerning a good absent and convenient to us. Therefore speech can be had only of creatures, whether indeed theological hope can exist in them in whatever state they are considered.

Note 2. Here chiefly is the difficulty concerning men according to their twofold state, namely of the way, and of the term. I call the state of the way that by which we tend toward eternity, which embraces not only faithful men dwelling in this world, but also souls loosed from the body languishing in Purgatory. I say the state of the term is that of all those who are already consigned to eternity, either blessed in heaven, or to miserable eternity in hell; concerning all of whom this present difficulty can be raised: first, whether hope exists in all faithful wayfarers: second, whether in souls dwelling in Purgatory: third, whether in the comprehensors and the Blessed: fourth, whether in the damned and reprobate.

Note 3. Hope, like the other theological virtues, can be lost in three ways: first indeed through the cessation of the divine influx conserving it; for just as infused virtues specially depend on God, that they be created and infused, so also do they depend on his special concurrence, that they be conserved in their being. For the conservation of a thing is nothing else than a certain continued production of that thing. Wherefore, the divine conserving influx ceasing, it is necessary that that virtue perish. Second, charity and hope can cease through the subtraction of faith, which is their foundation: for the foundation removed, it is necessary that every building fall. Third, the theological virtues can cease through vices contrary to them: whence as divine faith is lost at least demeritoriously through infidelity, and charity through any mortal sin whatsoever; so also Christian hope is lost through an act of presumption or despair.

First Conclusion. — THEOLOGICAL HOPE SUBSISTS IN WAYFARERS, BOTH IN THOSE DWELLING IN THIS WORLD AND IN PURGATORY. This conclusion consists of two parts, of which the first is proven: first indeed from the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter i., where it teaches: In justification itself, together with the remission of sins, man receives all these things infused at once through Jesus Christ, to whom is ingrafted faith, hope, and charity; for unless hope and charity be added, neither is he united perfectly with Christ, nor made any member of his body. — Nor does it obstruct that very many of the faithful are defiled by most grave sins, for they do not on that account lose hope, so long as they preserve divine faith, nor admit any sin of presumption or despair; since with sanctifying grace not all the gifts infused from heaven depart through some mortal sin committed; but faith and hope remain in us, like a divine seed of spiritual life, according to that of Isaiah: Unless the Lord of hosts had left us a seed, we had been as Sodom, and we should have been like to Gomorra. Yet hope does not remain in those who have lost faith; since faith is the foundation of supernatural hope, it is manifest that, that foundation removed, no infused hope remains. Hence heretics have only acquired and natural hope, which is a certain natural love of concupiscence with respect to beatitude, and the expectation of it, which is wholly human.

The second part, namely that hope is present in the souls existing in Purgatory, is easily gathered from what has been said of faith; since faith is the foundation and support of hope, and it remains in those same souls, hope can also be in them. Moreover, since beatitude with respect to them is still absent, and to be attained through grievous torments and punishments which they are held to expiate, beatitude is set before them under the ratio of an absent and arduous good, and consequently under the ratio of the object of hope. Finally, the souls of Purgatory have an efficacious desire of obtaining supernatural beatitude, as an absent arduous good, and possible of acquisition to themselves: therefore they have the act of Christian and theological hope. The consequence is clear from what was said in the first Notable of the preceding Question. The antecedent is proven; for the souls there are as in prison, until they shall have paid even to the last farthing, which payment, since it is laborious and most penal, is to them an arduous means of obtaining the desired good; and consequently they can elicit acts of hope.

You will say 1. Those souls are certain of their beatitude, from which they cannot fail or fall away: therefore they cannot have hope. — I deny the consequence: for certainty, as we said above, does not stand in the way of the act of hope, because it does not take from it the ratio of a highest supernatural good, arduous, and absent, nor does it impede the burning and efficacious desire of it as one's own good, or redounding to the benefit of the one desiring it; which suffices for the proper and precise ratio of the act of hope: therefore even if the souls existing in Purgatory are certain of their salvation and attainment of eternal beatitude, and on that account are at peace, yet because they do not yet enjoy that beatitude, they can rightly hope for it with a perfect act of theological hope: just as the wayfarer existing in this world, who would be certain of his salvation, such as the thief hanging on the cross was, when he heard from Christ the Lord: this day thou shalt be with me in Paradise, could truly hope for eternal salvation, which he did not yet have.

You will say 2. Those cannot have acts of hope who cannot elicit acts contrary to it: but the souls existing in Purgatory cannot elicit acts opposite to hope, namely an act of despair: therefore neither acts of hope. The major is plain: for the same power is of contraries, according to the Philosophers. — I deny the major: for it is not necessary for exercising the act of hope that an act opposed to it can be elicited, because it is not absolutely necessary that he who can exercise one act can also elicit the act opposed to it; for the Blessed can love God out of charity, whom nevertheless they cannot hate. In proof of which, when it is said that the power is of contraries, this ought not to be taken universally, but by accommodation to the state and condition of the one whose is the power. Hence, although the souls existing in Purgatory are confirmed in grace, and on that account cannot despair, yet they can elicit the act of hope with respect to beatitude promised to them, toward which they aspire.

You will say 3. The act of hope conjoined with charity is meritorious: but the souls existing in Purgatory can merit no longer: therefore neither hope. Confirmation, because hope rests upon present merits: but the souls in Purgatory cannot have present merits: therefore neither hope. — I distinguish the major: the act of hope is thus meritorious when elicited by a wayfarer simply, and before death, I concede: otherwise, I deny. But it is certain that the souls in Purgatory are no longer simply in the state of life, which is terminated in death itself, but are only in a state of life secundum quid, and consequently they can merit no longer: for every merit closes with life, as will be said in the following Tractate. To the confirmation I say, that hope rests upon merits not elicited in the present, but which were elicited and acquired while they lived on earth: just as the wayfarer existing in the state of mortal sin can have the act of hope resting upon good works, which he will be able to exercise when he shall have attained sanctifying grace by virtue of the Sacrament of Penance. Add that although the souls existing in Purgatory are outside the state of merit, nevertheless hope in them is not idle: for it instills into them divine consolation, and infuses heavenly strength, that they may bear with constant mind their unconquered punishments and bitter torments.

Second conclusion. — HOPE IN NO WISE REMAINS EITHER IN THE BLESSED OR IN THE DAMNED. This conclusion has already been sufficiently proved from what was said concerning faith, where we said that infused faith does not remain either in the Blessed or in the damned, and consequently neither does hope: for the reason of each is alike, especially since faith is the foundation and rule of hope.

The case of the damned is evident: both because in Prov. 11 it is said: When the wicked man is dead, there shall be no hope any more: and the expectation of the solicitous shall perish: and therefore the damned, being in the last term of impiety, can have no hope. Then because they are certain of their perpetual damnation, and that eternal beatitude is in no wise possible for them, according to that of Job. 15: He believeth not that he may be able to return from darkness to light, looking round about on every side for a sword. Finally, because they have no supernatural aid whereby they might merit their salvation, and therefore there inhere in them no hope of attaining it.

You will say. The damned desire eternal beatitude: for none is so miserable that he does not desire to be happy: therefore they can hope for it. — I distinguish the antecedent: they desire it with a natural and altogether inefficacious appetite, I concede; with a supernatural and efficacious appetite, I deny. Now hope is an act or desire, both efficacious and altogether supernatural, concerning beatitude as possible to the one hoping, and to be attained by the aid of God and good works: and therefore the damned cannot have it.

The second part also holds: for hope tends toward a good not possessed, whereas the blessed enjoy God by vision and love, and consequently can no longer have an act of hope. The major holds: for, as we said, from the Apostle to Rom. 8. Hope that is seen is not hope: for what a man seeth, why doth he hope for?

You will say. The blessed await the resumption of their exile and the beatitude which they do not yet possess: therefore with respect to the beatitude of their body they can have hope. — I distinguish the consequent: they can have hope whereby it is a theological virtue tending toward God to be possessed, I deny; whereby it is a natural desire, by which one part naturally desires union with the other, so as to make with it one whole, and likewise an elicited desire, by which the soul longs that the body, which was to it the instrument and medium of salvation, be also a sharer in the reward and recompense, I concede. Wherefore in the souls of the Saints there can indeed be a desire with respect to the glory of the body, yet not properly speaking hope, which is a theological virtue, and whose object is God himself as to be possessed, not however any created good.

You ask 1. Whether at least the habit of hope remains in the Blessed? — I answer that it does not, with the Doctor in 3. dist. 31. num. 2. because, he says, no habit is to be posited as remaining there in vain: but a habit would be there in vain whose inclination would then be impossible: now faith by its reason inclines only toward truth hidden, according to the gloss upon that of Heb. 11. Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not; and hope inclines only toward an absent fitting good, according to that of Rom. 8. Hope that is seen is not hope; taking hope for the thing hoped, namely the object: but these inclinations cannot be had in the fatherland, where truth will be manifest and the good possessed: therefore those habits will not remain, because they would be superfluous. By which words the Doctor signifies therefore that hope does not remain in the fatherland, because hope cannot tend except toward an absent good; but in the fatherland the good is not absent, but present and possessed, and consequently concerning it there can be no act of hope, nor consequently a habit, because it would be altogether superfluous.

You ask 2. How does the habit of hope cease, both in the Blessed and in the damned? — I answer that it ceases through the cessation of the influx of God preserving it: for since the infused virtues of themselves require in a special manner to be produced and infused by God, they must also in a special manner be preserved by him; for the preservation of a thing is nothing else than its continued production. God, moreover, ceases to preserve the habit of hope in the Blessed, because in them it would be altogether idle, since it could not in that state incline the will to produce that act of hope; but God undertakes and preserves nothing vainly, especially in the most perfect state, such as that of beatitude. In the damned indeed, besides the negation of the conserving influx, the habit of hope also ceases through the act opposed to it, namely through the act of despair; for as by the act of infidelity divine faith perishes, at least meritoriously, so also Christian hope is lost through the act of despair: but the damned are in continual despair; for they know eternal beatitude to be impossible of acquisition for them, while nevertheless they know from elsewhere that they were created by God for it: therefore, etc.

You ask 3. Whether, and when, does the precept concerning eliciting an act of hope urge? — I answer first, that truly a precept is given concerning sometimes eliciting an act of hope. Which indeed is proved from the Apostle to Timoth. chap. 6. where he says: Charge the rich of this world not to be highminded, nor to trust in the uncertainty of riches, but in the living God. Likewise Psal. 4. Sacrifice ye the sacrifice of justice, and hope in the Lord, which the Psalmist often repeats and inculcates. Reason also favors it; for every act is reckoned to be in precept whose omission is a special sin: for the sin of omission is always against some positive precept, as the sin of commission against a negative one: but the omission of the act of supernatural hope is imputed to many as sin; thus in 1. Paralip. chap. 10. Saul is said to have been condemned for his iniquities, in that he transgressed the commandment of the Lord, which he had commanded... and hoped not in the Lord. And Wisd. 2. the impious are condemned, because they knew not the sacraments of God, nor hoped for the reward of justice, nor judged the honor of holy souls. — I answer secondly, as regards the time of obligation, that this precept obliges indirectly whenever without an act of hope penance cannot be exercised, nor prayer be heard, nor the victory over temptation be carried off, because a precept obliging to some end obliges at the same time to the means necessary for the attainment of the end. But this obligation is only indirect, because it arises not so much from the precept of hope as from the precept of penance, of prayer, and of temptation to be overcome, and consequently its omission fights not so much against hope as against the virtue with which the sin to be avoided through hope conflicts. — Hence, as regards the direct obligation of hope, omitting the opinions of others, I judge that the precept of hope obliges when the object to be hoped for is sufficiently proposed to us, and we have as yet elicited no act of hope concerning it, for supernatural habits are not granted us by God that they may be perpetually idle, and therefore we ought sometimes to elicit their acts. Secondly, the precept of hope obli...