Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

WHAT THE OBJECT OF DIVINE HOPE IS.

NOTE 1. It is certain that the object of hope must be first some honest good; for we hope for or pursue nothing but a good, at least apprehended as such: just as we fear and flee only an evil: but since hope is a virtue, and every virtue tends to the good under the aspect of the honest, no one should doubt that the object of hope ought to be some honest good. Second, it must be possible, for impossible things, once known as such, can neither be hoped for nor desired, with a desire at least effectual and stimulating to the pursuit of the good apprehended; although indeed, according to the doctrine of the Doctor, they may be coveted by an ineffectual appetite and from complacency. Third, it ought to be an arduous good, or not of so easy acquisition: yet that difficulty ought not to be other than what arises from this, that the hoped-for object is not obtained by us without labor or trouble, or from this, that we cannot in any way attain it of ourselves, but it must be granted to us out of the liberality of one who gives or rewards. Fourth, some add that this good should be only probably, and not certainly, future. But this condition does not seem necessary, since even a certainly future good can be hoped for; hence those confirmed in grace, although secure about their beatitude, can no less hope for it. Next, the object of hope is said to be an absent good. For, says the Apostle to the Romans 8: Hope that is seen is not hope; for what doth any man see, what doth he hope for? But if we hope for that which we see not, we wait for it through patience. Yet the Doctor at d. 26 n. 12 contends that this condition is not absolutely necessary: because, he says, the same thing is the object of hope and of tending: but tending does not regard the absence of the object: therefore neither does hope. Which indeed is confirmed, because that is the object quod of hope which is desired, and that is the formal object cuius of it, which moves toward that desire: but it is certain that the will desires not the absence of the object, but rather its presence; nor is that absence the reason moving the will to desire, or to hope, though it may seem a condition sine qua non, without which it would neither hope nor desire: because if the good were perfectly possessed, it would no longer be desired, but loved. Whence the Doctor concludes: As in effects those things do not vary the reason of effecting which do not pertain per se to the reason of effecting; so in ends that thing does not vary the reason of end which does not exceed the reason of terminating: such is to be absent or present in the aforesaid manner: therefore it does not vary the formality of the object, or its formal reason. From these things it shines forth in mutual interrelation that absence, possibility, and futurity of the object are not of the formal reason of the object of hope.

NOTE 2. That the reason of the arduous good, or comparable with some difficulty, pertains to the object of hope, all Theologians agree: but there is controversy as to wherein consists that arduousness desired in the very object of hope; for there are those who judge, with Vasquez on book 2 of the third part, chapter 2, that the arduousness of the object of hope consists in this, that the thing hoped for must be obtained dependently upon another, because an arduous object from being obtained by one's own labors is the object of daring, not of hope. Some teach that the arduousness consists in the difficulty of attaining the thing hoped for, whether this difficulty proceeds from the magnitude of the thing itself, which exceeds our own powers, or arises from other circumstances, namely from distance, contingency, length of time, labor, expenses. But the truer opinion appears to be that of those who judge that the arduousness of the object of theological hope consists in this, that it should not only be contingent on the part of God bestowing liberally upon us the hoped-for good, and on our part, because it is conferred on account of merits, which necessarily must be contingent, since they are free. This reason indeed the Doctor intimates at d. 26 nn. 20 and 22, where he says: that something is not effectually and absolutely desired or hoped for unless it be possible to be attained or obtained, and therefore the despairing are persuaded to believe, not to love, because the first root of desperation is not in the will, but in the intellect: as if he said, that only that is the object of hope whose attainment is possible to us, though contingent, and that therefore certainty concerning the possibility of its attainment is to be urged, lest the despondent fall in spirit, but rather be raised up, and hope for that which, though contingently, is nevertheless possible to come to pass.

NOTE 3. The Theologians commonly agree that supernatural beatitude is the material object, more principal and adequate, of our hope; but since supernatural beatitude embraces two things, namely the vision or fruition of God, and God Himself to be seen and enjoyed, or objective and formal beatitude; there is difficulty as to which of these is the material object of theological hope. For Durandus in book 3 d. 26 q. 2 holds that formal beatitude is the immediate material object of theological hope; but objective beatitude to be only an indirect and mediate object. There are also those who judge, with Gregory of Rimini, that God is the immediate material object of hope, while fruition and vision are only a condition sine qua non. Finally a third opinion teaches that hope directly and immediately touches both beatitudes, namely the objective and the formal, the objective indeed as the end which, the formal however, as the end whereby. But as regards the formal object of the same hope there is a fourfold diversity of opinion among Authors. The first contends that the formal object is God under the aspect of omnipotent and faithful in executing His promises. Thus St. Thomas q. 1 On the Virtues art. 1. The second contends that God is the object of hope under the absolute aspect of Deity, without any order of Him speaking to us by which He could be possessed. Thus most of ours with Pitigianus in book 3 d. 26 art. 6. A third champions that the formal object of hope is God as fitting us and to be possessed by us. A fourth finally says that God as fitting us is indeed the motivating formal object of hope, but His goodness the terminative object.

First conclusion. — Both beatitudes, the objective as well as the formal, that is, God, thus to be possessed by us through vision and love, is the object both material and formal-terminative of our hope. This is the more common and truer. And the Doctor plainly hands it down sufficiently at d. 25 n. 11, where he says that hope is a theological virtue:

Because, he says, it respects God for the immediate object; for through all other things which are added to the object itself, the reason of the object as object is not taken away: for because I desire it for myself, or for such a one, it is not taken away that I desire it as object: therefore that around which the act of hope is, is an infinite good, and thus eternal.

The same has n. 16.

It is proven first from Sacred Scripture, and that from the second chapter of Tobias, where it is said: We are the sons of Saints, and we also await that life which God will give to those who never change their faith in him; and therefore Christ the Lord admonishes Matthew 6: Seek ye first the kingdom of God… and all these things shall be added unto you. By which He signifies that the kingdom of God, that is, eternal beatitude, is to be sought as the principal object; but the rest are not to be sought principally, but only secondarily, nor continually. This very thing St. Apostle teaches to the Romans chapter 5 when he says: We glory in the hope of the glory of the sons of God: as if he said: we hope for the glory and eternal beatitude of the Son of God, as a promised inheritance. And to Titus 1: In hope of life everlasting, which God, who lieth not, hath promised, etc. By which he signifies that hope tends to eternal life, as to the more principal object. This also indicates Hebrews 11 when he says: Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, that is, the thing known through faith is the thing to be hoped for: but God alone, who is our objective beatitude, is the material and formal object of faith; the others however are only material and secondary objects: therefore also of hope. To these accords that saying of St. Augustine lib. 2. De Civit. Dei last chapter: The reward of virtue, he says, will be He Himself who gave the virtue, who promised Himself, when nothing greater can be. And book 1 Confessions, chapter 23.: For blessed life is joy concerning truth, that is, concerning thee who art truth, my God. And upon Psalm 11.: Raise thy hope toward the good fruit of all things, by whom all things have been made good in their kind.

It is proven also by reason: hope inasmuch as it is a theological virtue tends to God: but it does not tend to God except as to be possessed: moreover God cannot be possessed by creatures except through vision and love, in which formal beatitude consists: therefore, etc. The major stands. The minor is proven: the act of desire, whereby hope tends to God, is distinguished from the desire, whereby charity tends to Him, wishing for Him the good itself, namely glory on account of Himself: but it cannot otherwise be distinguished than because hope tends to God as fitting us: therefore, etc. It is confirmed from this, that it is one thing to hope for God, and another to hope in God: for to hope for God is to have an effectual desire of having God as the object of beatific vision and fruition, or to desire the infinite good inasmuch as it fits us: but to hope in God is to have an effectual desire that God be our helper, and according to His promises confer upon us the necessary helps, whereby we could merit the beatitude which we hope for; for these two acts can sometimes exist apart from one another, especially the first without the second, for instance while someone presumptuously hopes; otherwise when the act of theological hope is honest both from itself and from its circumstances. This the Doctor signifies at n. 23 when he says that the act of theological hope is to desire the infinite good, as a good for me from God conferring liberally on account of the merits which I have, or which I hope for myself: by which words the two aforesaid acts are designated, as Castillo rightly notes quaest. i. n. 6, the first indeed by these words, to desire the infinite good: the second however by these words, liberally from God on account of the merits which I have, or which I hope for myself. — It is confirmed again: God is the object of hope as the highest good making us blessed: but as such He includes not only objective beatitude but also formal; and consequently under the aspect of either beatitude He is the adequate object of hope. Next, God as to-be-possessed formally includes the possession of Himself, which is made only through vision and love; but as to-be-possessed He is the object of hope: therefore as object of hope He includes the possession of Himself; and consequently formal beatitude. Finally, the formal object of hope is the last end of the rational creature: but formal beatitude, which is vision, and objective beatitude, which is God clearly seen, are not two ends, but a single one: therefore from them is constituted the formal object, which is that of hope in the wayfarer, and of delight or fruition in the Fatherland.

You will say. God cannot be desired by us, nor consequently hoped for, inasmuch as He is our good: therefore as such He is not the object of hope. The antecedent is evident, because thus to desire God is to use things to be enjoyed, which is perverse. —

I deny the antecedent: for to desire our good, inasmuch as it truly fits us, is not to use things to be enjoyed, because as such we do not order that good as a means to the attainment of another good: and consequently as such we do not use things to be enjoyed.

You will insist. A good which is entirely distinct from us, nor can perfect us, cannot be desired by us, nor hoped for as a good fitting us: but God is a good entirely distinct from us, which cannot be in us, nor perfect us: therefore it cannot be the object of our hope. —

I distinguish the major: that is not a good fitting us which cannot perfect us neither formally nor objectively, this I grant; formally only, I deny. To the minor I say that God does not indeed perfect us formally, or by the mode of the inexistence of a form, but objectively, or by the mode of an object alluring to its own joyous fruition and vision.

You will urge. God through Himself is not the immediate object of the sadness of the damned, but the evil inflicted on them by Him: therefore likewise He is not the immediate object of the joy of the Blessed, but the good granted by Him, namely His vision or fruition. Moreover, the object of hope ought to be future: but God cannot be apprehended as future, since ⟦illegible: "ihique"; fortasse "iam"⟧ He exists present: therefore per se He cannot be the object of hope. Again, hope and desperation, as contrary movements, are exercised about the same material object by way of pursuit and flight: but no one despairs of God, but of His attainment: therefore no one hopes for God, but for His attainment: therefore He is not the material object of hope. Fourth finally, because God is not referable to creatures, since He Himself is the last end of all: therefore He cannot be regarded by love of concupiscence, which always refers the object to the lover: therefore neither can He be the material object of hope, because hope is a love of concupiscence whereby the object is desired as the good of one hoping. —

I answer to the first, that the reason of God is not the same in order to the Blessed one and the damned: since with respect to the Blessed one He is considered as good: but since He is good in Himself and of Himself, He can also of Himself be the object of that hope, just as of love and vision: but in order to the damned He is apprehended after the manner of an evil disagreeing: but since in Himself and of Himself He has not the reason of evil, thus also He cannot be the object of the sadness of the damned, but only through something else, namely by reason of the punishment inflicted. —

To the second I say that even if God in Himself be not a future object, nevertheless as He terminates vision and fruition, He can be called future and arduous, because His vision and fruition are future. —

To the third I grant indeed that no one despairs of God considered in Himself, yet well as a future object of termination or fruition. —

To the fourth the Doctor answers that God is indeed not referable to us as a greater good to a lesser, but as an abundant good to the lesser good, to whom it is liberally granted from the very munificence of God communicating Himself to the rational creature, that He may perfect it by His possession.

You will say. The object of a virtue, as of a science, ought to be one: but from objective and formal beatitude one thing cannot be made, since objective beatitude is an uncreated thing, namely God: formal however is a created thing, namely the act of beatific vision and love: therefore the total and adequate object of hope cannot be simultaneously objective and formal beatitude. —

I distinguish the major: it ought to be one by the unity of being, I deny: by the unity of the terminating object, I grant. And similarly distinguishing the minor, I deny the consequence: for objective and formal beatitude are truly a thing distinct according to entity: but since they agree in the reason of perfect and adequate beatitude, they also agree in the reason of the object of hope.

You will urge. From objective and formal beatitude something one cannot be made: therefore there is no solution. Proof of the antecedent: either formal beatitude pertains equally first to this object of Christian hope as God does, that is, as objective beatitude, or it does not pertain equally first, but God principally, directly, and in a straight line, while formal beatitude only obliquely, and as it were by connotation. The first cannot be said, because these two joined together would either make one only per accidens, and thus the total primary object of hope would not be one in the genus of object, or they would make some one such that God would stand in this object as material, and the beatific vision as formal, which cannot be said, because then hope would not be properly theological: for each thing must be denominated from its formal ratio, which on this hypothesis would not be God, but the beatific vision: therefore the beatific vision does not enter into the ratio of the primary object of Christian hope as a part of it, but only as some condition, without which posited beforehand, the will could not exercise an act of hope. —

I answer, granting indeed that formal and objective beatitude do not pertain equally to the ratio of the principal object of beatitude: for objective beatitude concurs more principally to integrating and constituting it: but formal beatitude less principally: for that is judged to concur more principally to integrating the object of hope which most of all satisfies the appetite of the Christian soul hoping, and from which the ratio of goodness and appetibility, which is in beatitude, is derived and proceeds: but God himself is he who most principally satisfies the appetite of the hoping soul, inasmuch as that soul obtains the good hoped for, and the whole ratio of appetibility found in formal beatitude is derived from him; for thus we desire the beatific vision as the highest good, because we desire God, the fount of all goods; so that if God were not our objective beatitude, the vision of God would not have the ratio of beatitude; and consequently formal beatitude looks less principally to the ratio of the object of hope.

Second Conclusion. — The objective motive, or formal ratio under which of theological hope, is not divine omnipotence, nor God under the absolute ratio of Deity, but inasmuch as he is the highest good. This Conclusion consists of three parts, of which

The first is proven: God is the object of theological hope, inasmuch as he is the last end of rational creature to be possessed by it: but such he is not under the ratio of the omnipotent or of one who aids, for thus he bears the ratio of efficient cause: therefore under this ratio he is not the objective motive of theological hope. — Then, the ratio under which of theological hope must be some ratio of good: but divine omnipotence, even under the ratio of aiding, does not formally bear the ratio of good, because as such it pertains to the ratio of being and of efficient cause: therefore it cannot be the ratio under which, nor the objective motive of hope. — Finally, that alone is the formal object of Christian hope which is the ratio of desiring the good hoped for: yet the power of God, and the other things enumerated above, are not ratios of desiring the good hoped for, because as such they are either something prerequisite to the act of hope, and thus bear the ratio of efficient cause, or they are only means to the good hoped for: but means as means cannot be the motive ratio of desiring the end, for no one prudently desires the end on account of the means, but on the contrary desires the means on account of the end: therefore divine omnipotence, or the aid and fidelity of God in fulfilling promises, cannot bear the formal ratio under which of theological hope.

You will say. Sacred Scripture exhorts us to hope in God on account of his omnipotence, liberality, and fidelity in fulfilling promises: thus 2 Kings, ch. 22.: My strong God, I will hope in him. Isaiah 23.: You have trusted in the Lord God mighty forever. Ps. 17.: My God, my helper, and I will hope in him. Likewise the Council of Trent, Session vi. chapter 13., exhorts the faithful disposing themselves to justification, inasmuch as all ought to place and repose their most firm hope in the aid of God: therefore, etc. —

I answer, these things are indeed required not as motive reasons for hoping, but only as certain means, or several prerequisite conditions, that the act of divine hope be elicited with easier labor.

The second part is proven: the formal ratio under which of hope must be distinct from any other habit tending toward God: but other habits besides hope tend toward God under the ratio of Deity, namely Theology, which is concerned about God under the ratio of Deity: therefore under this ratio God cannot be the formal object of hope.

The third part is proven: that is the objective motive of hope which is the formal motive ratio of love, whereby God is loved with the love of concupiscence: but the objective motive of that love of concupiscence is uncreated goodness, inasmuch as it is the highest good comprehending both formal and objective beatitude: therefore it is the precise ratio under which of hope. — Then, that is the formal objective motive which properly moves to the appetite and desire of itself: but the aforesaid goodness moves to thus desiring God as an end to be possessed: therefore, etc. — Finally, it is probable that there is some virtue which considers God inasmuch as he is a good for us, just as charity honors him, inasmuch as he is the highest good in order to himself: but no other virtue appears to which this consideration more fittingly belongs than hope: therefore such a motive ratio is to be assigned to it.

You will say 1. The objective motive of theological hope must be something uncreated: but divine goodness as convenient to us is not something uncreated: therefore God, inasmuch as he is our good, or insofar as he redounds to our benefit, is not the formal objective motive of theological hope. The major stands by a similar argument concerning faith, whose motive ratio is the truth of God in speaking, and concerning charity, whose motive ratio is the supreme goodness of God as in himself and according to himself. The minor also is evident, for the goodness of God as convenient to us formally signifies nothing else than our benefit. —

I deny the minor: for the reason moving us to hope in God is not precisely our benefit, but our uncreated good, which is the very uncreated goodness of God, as to be possessed by us. Nor does it obstruct that this uncreated good, inasmuch as it is the object of hope, denotes an order toward us: for this does not hinder a theological virtue, which is not so called from the subject to which its object is referred, as if the good of that subject, but from both its objects, namely material and formal: but both objects of hope are something uncreated, namely God, and his divine goodness.

You will say 2. The objective motive of theological hope must be distinct from the motive of charity: but to will God as our good, and insofar as he redounds as it were to our benefit, pertains to charity, which tends not only toward God for his own sake, to be loved, but also toward everything that is divine: therefore, etc. —

I deny the minor: for charity is borne toward the divine goodness, inasmuch as it is the perfection of God himself, but not inasmuch as it is the good of a creature: but Christian hope is borne toward the goodness of God as its own good, or inasmuch as it is the good and benefit of the very person hoping.

You ask: whether the beatitude of another can be the object of theological hope, or whether we can hope beatitude for others? —

I affirm with the Doctor in 3. dist. 26. num. 11., where speaking of the object of hope he says: Because I desire it for myself, or for such a one, is not taken away so that I do not desire it as an object. Nor does it matter that in n. 2., objecting, Therefore, he says, to desire for another neighbor a good of the same ratio, is an act of hope: indeed, what is more, to will a present good of the same ratio for St. Peter, will be an act of hope, which is absurd: for I say that the Doctor does not infer this as an inconvenience, but only on account of the inference, which followed from what was said by him, namely that just as faith in the universal, and faith in the particular, do not make diverse faiths: so hope about me, and about another, do not make diverse virtues of hope. Nor is that absurdity about this, that the beatitude hoped for belongs to another, but that a present good can be the object of hope, which is indeed truly absurd.

Therefore our assertion is proven. First from the Apostle, 2 Cor. 1., who, having premised of himself, as a member having spiritual conjunction with them, that he had suffered many tribulations, subjoins: That our hope may be firm for you, knowing that as you are partakers of the sufferings, so shall you be also of the consolation: for the Apostle sets down this consolation, which God bestows upon the afflicted in this mortal life, as it were a certain pledge of that future eternal glory or beatitude. Likewise chapter 1. of the Epistle to the Philippians: Being confident, he says, of this very thing, that he who hath begun a good work in you will perfect it unto the day of Christ Jesus: that he may signify this his confidence, or hope concerning that good of the Philippians, to be concerning something as pertaining to himself by reason of the spiritual conjunction which he had with them, and thus subjoins: As it is just for me to think this for you all, because I have you in my heart, and in my bonds, and in the defense and confirmation of the gospel, you all being partakers of my joy.

Our proposition is proven also by reason: all things required in the act of Christian hope, both on the part of the act and on the part of the object, are found in this present act: therefore such an act is properly said to be of Christian hope. Proof of the antecedent: for on the part of the act there is required that it be some efficacious supernatural desire of the love of concupiscence; on the part of the object there is required that it be the desire of the highest good, inasmuch as that is convenient to us: but these two can truly fall upon the act of hope, whereby I hope and long for beatitude for another; for that act is supernatural, since it tends toward a supernatural object, and it is also from the love of concupiscence; for in this act I tend toward eternal beatitude not inasmuch as it is a good in itself, but inasmuch as it is some highest good convenient to another, as his supreme perfection: therefore, etc.

You will say. St. Augustine in the Enchiridion, chapter 8. says: Hope is of good things only, nor except future ones, and belonging to him who is said to hope for them: therefore it is concerned only about a good convenient to us, but not to another. Then, the act of hope is an act of the love of concupiscence: but the love of concupiscence is concerned only about one's own good, but not the good of another: therefore we cannot hope beatitude for another. —

I answer to St. Augustine, that he is to be understood only of hope conceived according to the affection of advantage, but not according to the affection of justice, of which he speaks in Serm. 11. De Verbis Domini, when he says: Of the salvation of no one must we despair, while he lives. Or I say he wishes only that we cannot hope goods for others except those which it befits us to hope for ourselves. To the second I say, that the love of concupiscence, inasmuch as it connotes only the affection of advantage, is concerned only about ourselves; but inasmuch as it connotes the affection of justice, it can be concerned as much about ourselves as about others.