Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

WHAT AND OF WHAT SORT DIVINE HOPE IS.

NOTE 1. The signification of this word Hope is manifold; for it sometimes signifies the affection and passion of the sensitive appetite, whereby it tends toward an arduous good, on which account it is reckoned among the passions: at other times also it has acceptations of the same kind. But omitting all these, inasmuch as they are not theological, it is customarily used by Theologians in a threefold manner: first, indeed, for the object or good that is hoped for. Thus Rom. 8. Hope that is seen is not hope. And Titus 3. Expecting blessed hope, and the advent of the glory of the great God. Second, it is sometimes used for Him toward whom hope is directed: thus Sacred Scripture very often calls God our hope, as Psal. 13. The Lord is his hope; and Psal. 21. Thou art he who hast brought me out of the womb, my hope from the breasts of my mother. But those acceptations are less proper. And so hope, of which we speak here, is properly taken for the act of hope, whereby we hope for supernatural goods from God: thus Rom. 8. By hope we are saved. Now since a habit is denominated from its acts, that habit supernaturally bestowed, which inclines and stimulates toward eliciting that act, is also called hope, of which Job chap. 19. This my hope is laid up in my bosom. And the Apostle, 1. Cor. 3. These three remain, faith, hope, and charity: which assuredly can be understood not of acts, which pass away, but only of habits, which remain. Of this last acceptation of hope, however, there will be question hereafter.

NOTE 2. That no light controversy has been raised among Authors both ancient and modern, as to which faculty hope belongs to — namely whether it regards the intellect or the will. For there were some, as the Doctor relates, d. 25. n. ⟦illegible⟧, who judged that hope is not distinct from faith and charity, because, he says, n. 1. it could be said that hope aggregates in itself in a certain manner two virtues, namely faith and charity: for the act of hope, which is to expect, includes certitude, and this certitude pertains to the intellect and to faith: it includes also desire, which pertains to the will; and if it be meritorious desire, it pertains to charity, which perfects the will: just, therefore, as perfect and meritorious expectation includes the certitude of the intellect and the ordered desire of the will, so hope as a perfect virtue would be said to include faith and charity by a certain aggregation; and on this account a third virtue would be posited, not formally, nor simply, but according as it aggregates into itself formally two virtues. So the Doctor. The second opinion is that of those who judge hope to be an act of the intellect indistinct from faith, namely because we hope for something precisely because we believe God to be faithful in His promises. The third opinion contends indeed that hope pertains to the intellect, although it is not elicited from the habit of faith; but is an act of judgment, whereby the intellect judges that God will give him beatitude, from the fact that He promised He would grant it to those observing the commandment, and since He is most faithful in His promises, thence he hopes that he will attain that beatitude if he keep the precepts. The fourth opinion is that of those who judge hope to be indeed an act of the will, but altogether indistinct from the act of charity, because by the same virtue of charity, such as it is posited in willing the ordered good, the will by the same is disposed to refuse the disordered, for according to Aristotle, book 1. De anima, text 85. the rectum is judge of itself and of the oblique; therefore by equal reason the same virtue of charity, which disposes to loving the good present, equally disposes to desiring the good absent: just as the heavy, by the same gravity by which it tends toward a terminus not possessed, rests in that terminus itself, where it has been placed; and consequently, since the will is determined to loving God present to itself by charity, by the same it is disposed to desire, or hope for Him.

NOTE 3. That even though the more numerous and celebrated company of Theologians agrees that hope is an act of the will, nevertheless among themselves they dispute what that act may be formally. For generally the act of the will is twofold: one indeed of flight and aversion from evil; the other truly of pursuit and access to a good. It is certain, moreover, that hope is not an act of flight, because it has not evil for its object; inasmuch as evil, qua evil, is neither desired nor hoped for, but rather feared: nor does it busy itself with the object by receding from it, but rather by embracing it, and approaching it by affection: therefore it is necessary that hope be an act of pursuit. Now since the act of pursuit is twofold, one namely which is called the act of pursuit of friendship, which tends toward the object on account of its sole excellence; the other truly the pursuit of concupiscence, whereby someone tends toward a good, not on account of its sole excellence, but inasmuch as it is fitting to us, or to others whom we love; the question arises of what kind of act of pursuit hope is.

There are therefore four things to be determined here: first, whether hope is a Theological virtue; second, whether it is really distinct from faith and charity; third, whether it is an act of the will, and altogether identical with desire, or the pursuit of concupiscence, whereby someone desires a good for himself, inasmuch as it is his own proper good; fourth, what are the species of hope.

First Conclusion. — In truth hope is a virtue, and that a theological one. This is common among Theologians against Durandus, in 3. disp. 26. qu. 1. who says hope is not a virtue except improperly and broadly taken; because, he says, virtue, according to the Philosopher, is a disposition of the perfect to the best; but hope, since it is concerned with an arduous good, absent, and not yet possessed, is not a disposition of the perfect to the best, any more than faith, which is exercised about God known only in an obscure manner.

The Doctor proves the first part, n. 10. Every habit inclining to an act good, and affected with good circumstances, is in truth a virtue: but such is hope: therefore, etc. He proves the antecedent: to hope in God as the supreme good is something honest, and conformed to the rules of the eternal law, inasmuch as it is commanded by God, and elsewhere there is no good perfectly satiating a rational creature, because only this infinite good is: therefore the appetite of that good is an honest act. Then, that act is also affected with good circumstances; inasmuch as it is made through means ordained by God Himself: whence although the appetite of the infinite good can be illicit, as it was in Lucifer, nevertheless to desire the infinite good through means ordained by that same One cannot be otherwise than good.

You will say 1: By hope someone desires and expects something as a good proper to himself: and forthwith he is borne toward the good, not qua honest, but qua useful: but every virtue ought to tend toward the good not qua useful, but qua honest: therefore hope is not a virtue. — The Doctor denies the second part of the major, n. 12. For that someone should desire a good for himself does not detract from the honesty of that act, when he desires it through proportionate means, and dictated by reason; for that circumstance of the person for whom the good is desired does not vary the formal reason of the good, since when the will desires the good for itself, the good itself is not varied intrinsically on that account, but only extrinsically, inasmuch as from the fact that the will thus appetites it, this good receives the denomination of willed and desired from the will, which denomination can give occasion to the intellect for conceiving the relation of reason between that good and the will.

You will insist: Everything which we use by enjoying cannot be deemed an act of virtue: but the act of hope is such: inasmuch as by it the will loves the infinite good on account of itself, and not on account of the excellence of that good. — The Doctor denies the minor: for the will, by thus hoping for the infinite good, does not use it by enjoying, because we do not use by enjoying when we will a good, which is to be loved on account of itself, as the perfection of ourselves, when in truth that good is perfective of us, nor do we will it as something less good, which would serve us for the acquisition of some good, but we wish for it alone as a most excellent good, which would perfect us, and make us blessed.

You will say 2: No passion is a virtue: but hope is one of the eleven passions: therefore it is not a virtue. — The Doctor answers, n. 23. That the name of hope is equivocal, used to signify that movement of the sensitive appetite concerning a sensible good, easily acquirable, on which account it is not a virtue, but a passion: but otherwise the name of hope is used to signify a habit inclining to an act concerning a spiritual good, future, inasmuch as perfective of the soul, and in this manner it is a virtue.

The Doctor proves the second part, namely, that it is a theological virtue, num. 11. For that virtue is theological, whereby one regards God as the object which, and something divine as the object whereby: but such is hope, as we shall say in the following Question: therefore it is a theological virtue. Then, he says, n. 15. three conditions are commonly required for a theological virtue, by which it is distinguished not only from moral virtues, but also from those acquired through the acts of supernatural virtues: the first, that it regard God as its primary object: the second, that it have as its rule the first rule of human acts, and not some acquired rule: third, that it be infused immediately by God, as by an efficient cause: indeed the two prior conditions can belong to acquired faith, hope, and charity, which tend toward God as toward an object, and have something divine as their first rule: faith indeed divine truth, hope divine fidelity, and charity divine goodness; but they fail in the third, because namely they are not infused by God, nor consequently are they supernatural in substance, such as truly theological virtues ought to be.

You will say 1: No theological virtue is between two vicious extremes through excess or defect: but hope has two vicious extremes, namely presumption and despair: therefore it ought not to be deemed a theological virtue.

The minor stands: since indeed despair and presumption are opposed to hope, the former through defect, the latter truly through excess. The major also seems evident; for excess cannot be committed in faith, because it is impossible that anything be believed too firmly; nor in hope, because God cannot be desired too much, nor longed for with more urgent inquiry and search; nor lastly in charity, because God cannot be loved more than He is lovable, or than He ought to be loved: therefore hope is not to be called a theological virtue. — The Doctor answers, n. 21. denying the major: for it can be conceded, he says, that a theological virtue is properly a mean, not on the part of the object, but on the part of the excess, which can exist in the act; nor does it thence follow that it is distinguished from a moral virtue; for a moral virtue has excess and defect not only by reason of the mode of the act, but also by reason of the object into which that act tends; but it is otherwise with the theological virtue, which cannot have excess by reason of the object, because since that is infinite, it cannot be exceeded by the act of virtue which is borne toward it, and therefore God cannot be believed in more firmly, nor hoped in more constantly, nor loved more ardently than He merits. Yet sin can be committed against that infinite object by reason of the mode of tending toward it, namely by an immoderate act, which would tend toward that object more, or less, than is fitting. On which account faith can be a mean between levity, whereby someone would assent firmly to what is not so to be believed: whence that Eccles. 19. He that believeth quickly is light of heart: and between pertinacity, whereby someone resists too much the things to be believed, unwilling to assent to anyone unless it be shown by natural reason that it is true: so also with too much love someone can tend toward some thing lovable, just as too remissly: although he cannot tend too much toward the infinite good by loving, nor believe in it too firmly. By similar reason hope is between despair and presumption, inasmuch as the one despairing does not will to desire God, nor to hope in Him; the one presuming truly wills and desires Him, but through disproportionate means; while the one hoping desires God through proportionate and rational means, and thus excludes each vice; nor is it necessary that every virtue have two extremes, by one of which the object of that virtue is loved excessively, and by the other less intensely.

You will say 2: A theological virtue is exercised only about God: but hope has not only for its object God Himself to be possessed, but also the means, namely grace, and the gifts, by which His possession can be obtained: therefore it is not to be called a theological virtue. — I distinguish the major: that a theological virtue ought to be exercised about God and the uncreated good, as about its primary and specificative object, I concede: as about its sole object, altogether simple, I deny. For just as faith is exercised not only about those things which are altogether divine, but also about those things which have been made, as all the mysteries of Christ, and all propositions revealed: and as charity tends not only toward God, but also toward neighbor; so also hope is ordered to God as to its primary and adequate object, but to grace and the means conducing to the possession of God, as to a secondary object.

Second Conclusion. — Hope is really distinct from faith and charity. So the Doctor, n. 17. where he proves the conclusion thus: first, that it is distinct from faith, because no desiring is believing: but every act of faith is believing: therefore hope is not the same as faith. — Then, to hope is the same as to desire: but to desire is an act of the will; whereas to believe is an act of the intellect: therefore faith and hope are not one and the same. — Lastly, if to hope that we shall attain eternal life were the same as to believe that we shall attain it, it would follow that it would be certain that whoever hoped for the attainment of eternal life would without doubt attain it; for the object of faith is infallible concerning things: but this is manifestly false: for very many of the faithful hope for beatitude, whom nevertheless on account of the wickedness of their morals and final impenitence they will not attain. — It is confirmed also against Luther, who in Sermon 2. of Quadragesima teaches that hope is the same as faith, which he takes for confidence; which assuredly is erroneous: for if faith and confidence were the same, the Apostle would talk nonsense, when he says Ephes. 3. In whom, namely Christ, we have confidence through His faith. For it would follow that we should have confidence through confidence, which would be open nonsense: whence 1. Cor. 13. he numbers the three theological virtues as three distinct things, when he says: Faith, hope, charity, these three, etc. The same the Holy Fathers teach, especially Chrysost., Hom. De Fide, Spe, et Charitate. And Aug., Hom. 22. De Verbis Apostoli: Domus Dei credendo fundatur, sperando erigitur, diligendo probatur. Hence in the Enchiridion, chap. 8. he says: Distinguenda est fides a spe.

He proves similarly that it is distinct from charity: First, because charity is love of friendship, whereby God is loved on account of Himself, in such wise that He would not be loved less with the love of charity even if He were nowhere to be possessed by a rational creature; but hope is love of concupiscence, because it is the love whereby someone concupiscences a good, inasmuch as it is his own proper good; whence if someone did not consider that from the possession of God he would have beatitude, he would not desire that possession with the desire of hope: therefore hope is distinguished from charity. — Then, according to St. Anselm, book De Concordia, chap. 11., the will has two affections and inclinations; namely one of justice, whereby it pursues the good on account of itself; and another of commodity, whereby it pursues the good inasmuch as fitting to itself; but the first of these affections is nobler than the second: therefore distinct habits are to be posited in the will in order to the acts, which belong to it according to those diverse inclinations; and consequently the desire of hope belonging to it inasmuch as it has the affection of commodity does not arise from the will inasmuch as it has the affection of justice. Whence hope and charity are distinguished not only by the acts which they can have, but also by the diverse affections according to which they perfect the will. Then, says the Seraphic Doctor, dist. 26. art. 1. qu. 3.

Just as in the fatherland there will be three dowers according to the three powers of the soul, whereof one will reform and consummate the rational, namely vision itself; another the concupiscible, namely dilection; the third the irascible, namely the holding itself, or possession, so also in the way it is necessary to posit three theological virtues, faith, to which vision corresponds, charity, to which dilection, and hope, to which possession.

You will say. Man has only two faculties perfectible by infused habits in order to God, namely intellect, and will: therefore two infused habits suffice, namely faith, which perfects the intellect, and charity, which perfects the will. — The Doctor denies the consequence, num. 26. because, he says, the will has two affections, and two genera of acts, to which two infused habits must correspond; but the intellect has no other acts on account of which it must have two habits infused per se; and forthwith three distinct habits are to be admitted.

Third Conclusion. — HOPE IS AN ACT OF THE WILL IDENTICAL WITH DESIRE. So the Doctor, num. 19. where he solves the arguments which he had formed against this assertion.

Proof. Hope is borne toward the good absent as to be possessed: but that act, whereby the good absent is appetited as to be possessed, is desire; and forthwith hope is an act of the concupiscible appetite, whereby the will tends toward God, inasmuch as commodious and fitting to itself.

You will say 1: One who despairs desires beatitude: but he has no hope: therefore desire is not an act of hope. The major is proven, because he grieves over lost beatitude; but no one grieves over the loss of a thing he does not covet: therefore, etc. — The Doctor distinguishes the major at n. 20. He desires with an ineffectual and conditional desire, this is granted: with an effectual and absolute desire, denied. To the proof I say that indeed no one grieves over the loss of a thing he does not covet; yet in order to have grief over its loss, it is not necessary that he covet it absolutely and effectually, as appears from the example of one who throws his merchandise into the sea, who grieves over their loss because he would ineffectually and conditionally wish to keep them were no danger of life at hand.

You will say 2: By the same habit one can love another with the love of friendship, and covet for him a good, and by the same habit one can love a good present and absent: but by charity one loves a good present: therefore by charity one covets and desires a present good, and also by the same loves and desires an absent good: therefore desire for a good even absent is an act of charity. — The Doctor distinguishes the consequent at n. 21. He desires with a desire and concupiscence proportioned to the love of friendship, and arising from that very love, this is granted: he desires with a desire and concupiscence of distinct reason, denied. Thus one can covet an absent good in two ways: first indeed, by an affection of charity and friendship, whereby he loves his neighbor, and covets for him a good on account of himself: second, insofar as he considers that good to be advantageous to himself without any regard for the love of another, and thus that desire is not an act of charity, but of hope, which is constituted in that very desire, not however in the former.

You will say 3. We desire beatitude naturally: therefore it does not seem necessary to admit some supernatural habit for desiring it, and consequently the virtue of hope does not consist in desire. — The Doctor distinguishes the antecedent: naturally we desire beatitude in the universal, and whatever sort it be, whether natural or supernatural, let it pass: in the particular, and inasmuch as it is supernatural beatitude, denied. Whence the consequence must be denied. For just as notwithstanding the natural love of God there is given the habit of charity, that God may be loved with a supernatural love; so notwithstanding the natural desire of beatitude, there ought to be given the habit of infused hope, whereby we hope for supernatural beatitude on account of the very goodness of God, and His infallibility in His promises.

You will say 4. If desiring were an act of a theological virtue, it would likewise be meritorious: but it cannot be meritorious unless it be either elicited or commanded by the will: but it cannot be commanded by it, otherwise the will would simultaneously have two acts concerning God, one act whereby it desired, and another whereby it commanded such a desire, which act also would regard God, since it would proceed from charity: if it be elicited by charity, it will not be an act distinct from it: therefore, etc. — The Doctor answers that nothing stands in the way of the will being able to have two acts concerning the same object, especially when one is commanded and the other commands; nor does one impede the production of the other, since they are not of the same reason: Nor is it unfitting, he says, that in subordinate acts many should be present in one, indeed perhaps it is necessary for one scientifically knowing a conclusion, while the act scientifically contemplates, to understand simultaneously the principle, and, as loving in due order that which is ordered to the end, using, simultaneously to enjoy the end.

You will say 5. If hope and desire were one and the same, whenever we use the name of hope, we could likewise use the name of desire, and vice versa: but this is false: for I cannot properly say, I desire to attain beatitude on account of the divine goodness, just as I can say, I hope on account of the divine goodness and mercy that I shall attain beatitude: therefore they are not one and the same. — I deny the minor, and to its proof I say that both these names could in reality be employed to signify the same thing, when it signifies the movement of the appetitive faculty concerning the attainment of a good; but desire is not properly taken for hope, because the verb to hope is imposed to signify a desire presupposing and connoting an opinion conceived about the attainment of the desired good; whereas the verb I desire does not involve that connotation: whence they are not assumed indiscriminately to signify the same thing properly.

Fourth conclusion. — There are seven species or distinct acts of hope, to which the others can be recalled with little difficulty.

This Conclusion William of Paris weighs most excellently, book On Morals, where he relates those seven species of hope, which he calls daughters, the first of which is confidence; the second security, or the strengthening of divine vallation and protection: the third constancy, and erection against the movements and onsets of those rising up: the fourth consolation; the fifth respiration, comfort, and recovery of strength from the presence of God: the sixth expectation of the promised goods without hesitation; the seventh joyousness, which accompanies hope of this kind like an inseparable companion.

Confidence is the firm adherence of the mind in God, who is not confounded, as David says: In thee, O Lord, have I hoped: let me never be confounded. Whoever trusts in man is confounded, because he withdraws himself from him, whether on account of malice and aversion, or on account of impotence, or on account of a change of will and friendship: but these are not to be feared on the part of God. — Security is that of which Solomon speaks: The secure mind is as a continual feast. Proverbs 15, where Gregory says: Hope of eternal fellowship is the continuation of eternal refreshment. Security is twofold: the first, concerning obtaining eternal felicity: the second, against fears of the present life. And indeed it holds itself secure through the pledge of the Holy Spirit: who hath sealed us, and given the pledge of the Spirit in our hearts, 2 Corinthians 1, to Ephesians Who is the pledge of our inheritance. Whence St. Augustine: He Himself is the pledge of our inheritance and redemption given to me through the open letters of the Gospel, in which there is no other seal than the very Son of God, the image of the invisible God, and the figure or character of the substance of the Father, who for the confirmation and attestation of Gospel truth was fastened to the wood of the cross. The Incarnation, Passion, Death, Resurrection of the Lord uphold me on every side and strengthen me, so that concerning pardon, grace, and glory no hesitation may remain; for he who spared not his own son, shall he not with him give us all things? etc. Whence in the logic of God no argument is more valid for reasoning well by syllogism, and proving, than the death of His only-begotten Son, none for destroying hesitation or an objection raised against me so efficacious or strong, since not only is confidence inferred concerning the benefits of God through such a means, but it is even crushed. In the theology of God no pledge is more precious, more assuring, or more certain than the very Son of God, and the Holy Spirit: but both are given to us in pledge: therefore, those who through such great safeguards are not secure hold God to be of worse condition than any liar or perjurer: it is evident therefore how great an insult they do to God who hesitate.

The second security against the calamities of this world; for our God is refuge and strength, etc. The Lord is my illumination, etc. If God be for us, who is against us?

Erection, or strengthening, whereby strength is recovered through hope, that we may fight more keenly and resist temptations. A veteran, or crafty serpent assails the soul of the spirit with countless temptations: Shall he who sleeps not add, that he may rise? Rise, thou that sleepest, and Christ shall illuminate thee, Ephesians. It raises slack hands and loosened knees. — Consolation, which is not a gladdening of the mind, but rather a soothing and mitigation of fear and sorrow: for he consoles who lays aside sadness, though he receive no joy: but hope, as David says: This comforted me in my humility, that is, in my depression. In conversion the Lord brought back the captivity of Sion, etc. From this arises joy; whence then was our mouth filled with joy, etc. There are some who on account of various mischances grieve so much that they think no salvation remains to them: these God consoles with graces shining forth and celestial sweetnesses, that they may take courage, Isaiah 15. Thy light shall arise in darkness, and thy darkness shall be as noonday. And Job 4: As the morning light arising toward evening, and when you thought yourself consumed, you shall rise like the daystar. Hence is born Consolation, which is a strength of mind animating and firming constancy against temptations: He set my feet upon a rock; if I fall, I shall not be shattered, because the Lord sustains his hand beneath me. And I was pushed and overturned that I might fall, and the Lord received me, etc. Expectation of goods is a firm constancy of mind, whereby, attending to the promised goods, one overcomes all bitternesses; These things I remembered, and poured out my soul within me. From this is begotten joyousness: Rejoicing in hope. Joy moreover, that is, from the indwelling presence of God; whence that joy is as the earnest of an eternal reward, and as a foretaste of future sweetness: O taste, and see that the Lord is sweet.