Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

Since the appetite and pursuit of a thing follow upon the knowledge of an object most good and most excellent, hence it is that, when the light of divine faith shines upon us, whereby we discover and behold, though with darkened eyes, God as supremely good and all His divine excellences, there is straightway kindled within us the desire of possessing and enjoying Him, wherewith we are spurred to attain Him; which stimulus hope, divinely implanted, arouses; for hope is as it were the foot of the soul, not only by which it subsists, but by which it also walks as it were, and is carried and sighs toward the sweetest possession of God.

This divine hope St. Bernard commends so excellently, as the treasure of a pious man, serm. 9. in Psal. Qui habitat:

This one thing, he says, is to me the cause of all the promises, this the whole reason of my expectation. Let another put forward his merit; let him boast that he can bear the burden of the day and the heat; let him say he fasts twice in the sabbath; finally let him glory that he is not as other men: but for me it is good to adhere to God, to put my hope in the Lord my God; let others hope in others, perhaps this one in learning, this one in the cunning of the world, that one in nobility, that one in dignity, that one in whatever other vanity let him trust: for thee I have suffered the loss of all things, and count them as dung, because thou art the Lord my hope: let him hope who will in the uncertainty of riches: but I do not even hope for the necessaries of life except from thee, trusting assuredly in thy word, in which I have abandoned all things: Seek ye first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things shall be added unto you; namely, to thee the poor man is forsaken, thou wilt be a helper to the orphan. If rewards are promised me, through thee shall I hope to obtain them. If battles rise against me, if the world rages, if the malignant one trembles, if the flesh itself lust against the spirit, in thee shall I hope. Brethren, to be thus minded is to live by faith, nor can any other pronounce the sentence: Because thou art the Lord my hope: unless he be inwardly persuaded by the Spirit, so that, as the Prophet counsels, he cast his thought upon the Lord, knowing that he must be nourished by Him, according also to that saying of Peter the Apostle, cap. 5., Casting all your care upon him: for he hath care of us.

Wherefore the holy Apostle celebrates her with a splendid encomium in Heb. 6., when he said she is the anchor of the soul, firm: We have fled, he says, to hold fast the hope set before us, which we have as an anchor of the soul, sure and firm, and entering even within the veil. For hope is the most firm support of our soul, and as it were a sacred anchor, which steadies the tottering mind, tossed amid the storms and tempests of this life, lest it swerve from the desired course and suffer shipwreck on the stormy sea of this world. — Wherefore St. Augustine says excellently: This hope we have promised to ourselves as an anchor in the holy land, lest in this sea we be shaken and suffer shipwreck: for just as concerning a ship that is at anchor we rightly say that it is already on land, although it still tosses upon the waves, so conversely our hope is founded upon that city of Jerusalem against the temptations of this our pilgrimage. — Moreover the matters which theologians are wont to dispute concerning divine hope are not very many; wherefore, lest we wear away time fruitlessly in unfolding its nature and excellence, we reduce all the controversies commonly raised in fact to three principal heads, inquiring namely what and of what sort that divine virtue is; what its object and subject; who and when ought to elicit its act by precept; which things we shall explain in the three following Questions.

WHAT AND OF WHAT SORT DIVINE HOPE IS.

NOTE 1. The signification of this word Hope is manifold; for it sometimes signifies the affection and passion of the sensitive appetite, whereby it tends toward an arduous good, on which account it is reckoned among the passions: at other times also it has acceptations of the same kind. But omitting all these, inasmuch as they are not theological, it is customarily used by Theologians in a threefold manner: first, indeed, for the object or good that is hoped for. Thus Rom. 8. Hope that is seen is not hope. And Titus 3. Expecting blessed hope, and the advent of the glory of the great God. Second, it is sometimes used for Him toward whom hope is directed: thus Sacred Scripture very often calls God our hope, as Psal. 13. The Lord is his hope; and Psal. 21. Thou art he who hast brought me out of the womb, my hope from the breasts of my mother. But those acceptations are less proper. And so hope, of which we speak here, is properly taken for the act of hope, whereby we hope for supernatural goods from God: thus Rom. 8. By hope we are saved. Now since a habit is denominated from its acts, that habit supernaturally bestowed, which inclines and stimulates toward eliciting that act, is also called hope, of which Job chap. 19. This my hope is laid up in my bosom. And the Apostle, 1. Cor. 3. These three remain, faith, hope, and charity: which assuredly can be understood not of acts, which pass away, but only of habits, which remain. Of this last acceptation of hope, however, there will be question hereafter.

NOTE 2. That no light controversy has been raised among Authors both ancient and modern, as to which faculty hope belongs to — namely whether it regards the intellect or the will. For there were some, as the Doctor relates, d. 25. n. ⟦illegible⟧, who judged that hope is not distinct from faith and charity, because, he says, n. 1. it could be said that hope aggregates in itself in a certain manner two virtues, namely faith and charity: for the act of hope, which is to expect, includes certitude, and this certitude pertains to the intellect and to faith: it includes also desire, which pertains to the will; and if it be meritorious desire, it pertains to charity, which perfects the will: just, therefore, as perfect and meritorious expectation includes the certitude of the intellect and the ordered desire of the will, so hope as a perfect virtue would be said to include faith and charity by a certain aggregation; and on this account a third virtue would be posited, not formally, nor simply, but according as it aggregates into itself formally two virtues. So the Doctor. The second opinion is that of those who judge hope to be an act of the intellect indistinct from faith, namely because we hope for something precisely because we believe God to be faithful in His promises. The third opinion contends indeed that hope pertains to the intellect, although it is not elicited from the habit of faith; but is an act of judgment, whereby the intellect judges that God will give him beatitude, from the fact that He promised He would grant it to those observing the commandment, and since He is most faithful in His promises, thence he hopes that he will attain that beatitude if he keep the precepts. The fourth opinion is that of those who judge hope to be indeed an act of the will, but altogether indistinct from the act of charity, because by the same virtue of charity, such as it is posited in willing the ordered good, the will by the same is disposed to refuse the disordered, for according to Aristotle, book 1. De anima, text 85. the rectum is judge of itself and of the oblique; therefore by equal reason the same virtue of charity, which disposes to loving the good present, equally disposes to desiring the good absent: just as the heavy, by the same gravity by which it tends toward a terminus not possessed, rests in that terminus itself, where it has been placed; and consequently, since the will is determined to loving God present to itself by charity, by the same it is disposed to desire, or hope for Him.

NOTE 3. That even though the more numerous and celebrated company of Theologians agrees that hope is an act of the will, nevertheless among themselves they dispute what that act may be formally. For generally the act of the will is twofold: one indeed of flight and aversion from evil; the other truly of pursuit and access to a good. It is certain, moreover, that hope is not an act of flight, because it has not evil for its object; inasmuch as evil, qua evil, is neither desired nor hoped for, but rather feared: nor does it busy itself with the object by receding from it, but rather by embracing it, and approaching it by affection: therefore it is necessary that hope be an act of pursuit. Now since the act of pursuit is twofold, one namely which is called the act of pursuit of friendship, which tends toward the object on account of its sole excellence; the other truly the pursuit of concupiscence, whereby someone tends toward a good, not on account of its sole excellence, but inasmuch as it is fitting to us, or to others whom we love; the question arises of what kind of act of pursuit hope is.

There are therefore four things to be determined here: first, whether hope is a Theological virtue; second, whether it is really distinct from faith and charity; third, whether it is an act of the will, and altogether identical with desire, or the pursuit of concupiscence, whereby someone desires a good for himself, inasmuch as it is his own proper good; fourth, what are the species of hope.

First Conclusion. — In truth hope is a virtue, and that a theological one. This is common among Theologians against Durandus, in 3. disp. 26. qu. 1. who says hope is not a virtue except improperly and broadly taken; because, he says, virtue, according to the Philosopher, is a disposition of the perfect to the best; but hope, since it is concerned with an arduous good, absent, and not yet possessed, is not a disposition of the perfect to the best, any more than faith, which is exercised about God known only in an obscure manner.

The Doctor proves the first part, n. 10. Every habit inclining to an act good, and affected with good circumstances, is in truth a virtue: but such is hope: therefore, etc. He proves the antecedent: to hope in God as the supreme good is something honest, and conformed to the rules of the eternal law, inasmuch as it is commanded by God, and elsewhere there is no good perfectly satiating a rational creature, because only this infinite good is: therefore the appetite of that good is an honest act. Then, that act is also affected with good circumstances; inasmuch as it is made through means ordained by God Himself: whence although the appetite of the infinite good can be illicit, as it was in Lucifer, nevertheless to desire the infinite good through means ordained by that same One cannot be otherwise than good.

You will say 1: By hope someone desires and expects something as a good proper to himself: and forthwith he is borne toward the good, not qua honest, but qua useful: but every virtue ought to tend toward the good not qua useful, but qua honest: therefore hope is not a virtue. — The Doctor denies the second part of the major, n. 12. For that someone should desire a good for himself does not detract from the honesty of that act, when he desires it through proportionate means, and dictated by reason; for that circumstance of the person for whom the good is desired does not vary the formal reason of the good, since when the will desires the good for itself, the good itself is not varied intrinsically on that account, but only extrinsically, inasmuch as from the fact that the will thus appetites it, this good receives the denomination of willed and desired from the will, which denomination can give occasion to the intellect for conceiving the relation of reason between that good and the will.

You will insist: Everything which we use by enjoying cannot be deemed an act of virtue: but the act of hope is such: inasmuch as by it the will loves the infinite good on account of itself, and not on account of the excellence of that good. — The Doctor denies the minor: for the will, by thus hoping for the infinite good, does not use it by enjoying, because we do not use by enjoying when we will a good, which is to be loved on account of itself, as the perfection of ourselves, when in truth that good is perfective of us, nor do we will it as something less good, which would serve us for the acquisition of some good, but we wish for it alone as a most excellent good, which would perfect us, and make us blessed.

You will say 2: No passion is a virtue: but hope is one of the eleven passions: therefore it is not a virtue. — The Doctor answers, n. 23. That the name of hope is equivocal, used to signify that movement of the sensitive appetite concerning a sensible good, easily acquirable, on which account it is not a virtue, but a passion: but otherwise the name of hope is used to signify a habit inclining to an act concerning a spiritual good, future, inasmuch as perfective of the soul, and in this manner it is a virtue.

The Doctor proves the second part, namely, that it is a theological virtue, num. 11. For that virtue is theological, whereby one regards God as the object which, and something divine as the object whereby: but such is hope, as we shall say in the following Question: therefore it is a theological virtue. Then, he says, n. 15. three conditions are commonly required for a theological virtue, by which it is distinguished not only from moral virtues, but also from those acquired through the acts of supernatural virtues: the first, that it regard God as its primary object: the second, that it have as its rule the first rule of human acts, and not some acquired rule: third, that it be infused immediately by God, as by an efficient cause: indeed the two prior conditions can belong to acquired faith, hope, and charity, which tend toward God as toward an object, and have something divine as their first rule: faith indeed divine truth, hope divine fidelity, and charity divine goodness; but they fail in the third, because namely they are not infused by God, nor consequently are they supernatural in substance, such as truly theological virtues ought to be.

You will say 1: No theological virtue is between two vicious extremes through excess or defect: but hope has two vicious extremes, namely presumption and despair: therefore it ought not to be deemed a theological virtue.

The minor stands: since indeed despair and presumption are opposed to hope, the former through defect, the latter truly through excess. The major also seems evident; for excess cannot be committed in faith, because it is impossible that anything be believed too firmly; nor in hope, because God cannot be desired too much, nor longed for with more urgent inquiry and search; nor lastly in charity, because God cannot be loved more than He is lovable, or than He ought to be loved: therefore hope is not to be called a theological virtue. — The Doctor answers, n. 21. denying the major: for it can be conceded, he says, that a theological virtue is properly a mean, not on the part of the object, but on the part of the excess, which can exist in the act; nor does it thence follow that it is distinguished from a moral virtue; for a moral virtue has excess and defect not only by reason of the mode of the act, but also by reason of the object into which that act tends; but it is otherwise with the theological virtue, which cannot have excess by reason of the object, because since that is infinite, it cannot be exceeded by the act of virtue which is borne toward it, and therefore God cannot be believed in more firmly, nor hoped in more constantly, nor loved more ardently than He merits. Yet sin can be committed against that infinite object by reason of the mode of tending toward it, namely by an immoderate act, which would tend toward that object more, or less, than is fitting. On which account faith can be a mean between levity, whereby someone would assent firmly to what is not so to be believed: whence that Eccles. 19. He that believeth quickly is light of heart: and between pertinacity, whereby someone resists too much the things to be believed, unwilling to assent to anyone unless it be shown by natural reason that it is true: so also with too much love someone can tend toward some thing lovable, just as too remissly: although he cannot tend too much toward the infinite good by loving, nor believe in it too firmly. By similar reason hope is between despair and presumption, inasmuch as the one despairing does not will to desire God, nor to hope in Him; the one presuming truly wills and desires Him, but through disproportionate means; while the one hoping desires God through proportionate and rational means, and thus excludes each vice; nor is it necessary that every virtue have two extremes, by one of which the object of that virtue is loved excessively, and by the other less intensely.

You will say 2: A theological virtue is exercised only about God: but hope has not only for its object God Himself to be possessed, but also the means, namely grace, and the gifts, by which His possession can be obtained: therefore it is not to be called a theological virtue. — I distinguish the major: that a theological virtue ought to be exercised about God and the uncreated good, as about its primary and specificative object, I concede: as about its sole object, altogether simple, I deny. For just as faith is exercised not only about those things which are altogether divine, but also about those things which have been made, as all the mysteries of Christ, and all propositions revealed: and as charity tends not only toward God, but also toward neighbor; so also hope is ordered to God as to its primary and adequate object, but to grace and the means conducing to the possession of God, as to a secondary object.

Second Conclusion. — Hope is really distinct from faith and charity. So the Doctor, n. 17. where he proves the conclusion thus: first, that it is distinct from faith, because no desiring is believing: but every act of faith is believing: therefore hope is not the same as faith. — Then, to hope is the same as to desire: but to desire is an act of the will; whereas to believe is an act of the intellect: therefore faith and hope are not one and the same. — Lastly, if to hope that we shall attain eternal life were the same as to believe that we shall attain it, it would follow that it would be certain that whoever hoped for the attainment of eternal life would without doubt attain it; for the object of faith is infallible concerning things: but this is manifestly false: for very many of the faithful hope for beatitude, whom nevertheless on account of the wickedness of their morals and final impenitence they will not attain. — It is confirmed also against Luther, who in Sermon 2. of Quadragesima teaches that hope is the same as faith, which he takes for confidence; which assuredly is erroneous: for if faith and confidence were the same, the Apostle would talk nonsense, when he says Ephes. 3. In whom, namely Christ, we have confidence through His faith. For it would follow that we should have confidence through confidence, which would be open nonsense: whence 1. Cor. 13. he numbers the three theological virtues as three distinct things, when he says: Faith, hope, charity, these three, etc. The same the Holy Fathers teach, especially Chrysost., Hom. De Fide, Spe, et Charitate. And Aug., Hom. 22. De Verbis Apostoli: Domus Dei credendo fundatur, sperando erigitur, diligendo probatur. Hence in the Enchiridion, chap. 8. he says: Distinguenda est fides a spe.

He proves similarly that it is distinct from charity: First, because charity is love of friendship, whereby God is loved on account of Himself, in such wise that He would not be loved less with the love of charity even if He were nowhere to be possessed by a rational creature; but hope is love of concupiscence, because it is the love whereby someone concupiscences a good, inasmuch as it is his own proper good; whence if someone did not consider that from the possession of God he would have beatitude, he would not desire that possession with the desire of hope: therefore hope is distinguished from charity. — Then, according to St. Anselm, book De Concordia, chap. 11., the will has two affections and inclinations; namely one of justice, whereby it pursues the good on account of itself; and another of commodity, whereby it pursues the good inasmuch as fitting to itself; but the first of these affections is nobler than the second: therefore distinct habits are to be posited in the will in order to the acts, which belong to it according to those diverse inclinations; and consequently the desire of hope belonging to it inasmuch as it has the affection of commodity does not arise from the will inasmuch as it has the affection of justice. Whence hope and charity are distinguished not only by the acts which they can have, but also by the diverse affections according to which they perfect the will. Then, says the Seraphic Doctor, dist. 26. art. 1. qu. 3.

Just as in the fatherland there will be three dowers according to the three powers of the soul, whereof one will reform and consummate the rational, namely vision itself; another the concupiscible, namely dilection; the third the irascible, namely the holding itself, or possession, so also in the way it is necessary to posit three theological virtues, faith, to which vision corresponds, charity, to which dilection, and hope, to which possession.

You will say. Man has only two faculties perfectible by infused habits in order to God, namely intellect, and will: therefore two infused habits suffice, namely faith, which perfects the intellect, and charity, which perfects the will. — The Doctor denies the consequence, num. 26. because, he says, the will has two affections, and two genera of acts, to which two infused habits must correspond; but the intellect has no other acts on account of which it must have two habits infused per se; and forthwith three distinct habits are to be admitted.

Third Conclusion. — HOPE IS AN ACT OF THE WILL IDENTICAL WITH DESIRE. So the Doctor, num. 19. where he solves the arguments which he had formed against this assertion.

Proof. Hope is borne toward the good absent as to be possessed: but that act, whereby the good absent is appetited as to be possessed, is desire; and forthwith hope is an act of the concupiscible appetite, whereby the will tends toward God, inasmuch as commodious and fitting to itself.

You will say 1: One who despairs desires beatitude: but he has no hope: therefore desire is not an act of hope. The major is proven, because he grieves over lost beatitude; but no one grieves over the loss of a thing he does not covet: therefore, etc. — The Doctor distinguishes the major at n. 20. He desires with an ineffectual and conditional desire, this is granted: with an effectual and absolute desire, denied. To the proof I say that indeed no one grieves over the loss of a thing he does not covet; yet in order to have grief over its loss, it is not necessary that he covet it absolutely and effectually, as appears from the example of one who throws his merchandise into the sea, who grieves over their loss because he would ineffectually and conditionally wish to keep them were no danger of life at hand.

You will say 2: By the same habit one can love another with the love of friendship, and covet for him a good, and by the same habit one can love a good present and absent: but by charity one loves a good present: therefore by charity one covets and desires a present good, and also by the same loves and desires an absent good: therefore desire for a good even absent is an act of charity. — The Doctor distinguishes the consequent at n. 21. He desires with a desire and concupiscence proportioned to the love of friendship, and arising from that very love, this is granted: he desires with a desire and concupiscence of distinct reason, denied. Thus one can covet an absent good in two ways: first indeed, by an affection of charity and friendship, whereby he loves his neighbor, and covets for him a good on account of himself: second, insofar as he considers that good to be advantageous to himself without any regard for the love of another, and thus that desire is not an act of charity, but of hope, which is constituted in that very desire, not however in the former.

You will say 3. We desire beatitude naturally: therefore it does not seem necessary to admit some supernatural habit for desiring it, and consequently the virtue of hope does not consist in desire. — The Doctor distinguishes the antecedent: naturally we desire beatitude in the universal, and whatever sort it be, whether natural or supernatural, let it pass: in the particular, and inasmuch as it is supernatural beatitude, denied. Whence the consequence must be denied. For just as notwithstanding the natural love of God there is given the habit of charity, that God may be loved with a supernatural love; so notwithstanding the natural desire of beatitude, there ought to be given the habit of infused hope, whereby we hope for supernatural beatitude on account of the very goodness of God, and His infallibility in His promises.

You will say 4. If desiring were an act of a theological virtue, it would likewise be meritorious: but it cannot be meritorious unless it be either elicited or commanded by the will: but it cannot be commanded by it, otherwise the will would simultaneously have two acts concerning God, one act whereby it desired, and another whereby it commanded such a desire, which act also would regard God, since it would proceed from charity: if it be elicited by charity, it will not be an act distinct from it: therefore, etc. — The Doctor answers that nothing stands in the way of the will being able to have two acts concerning the same object, especially when one is commanded and the other commands; nor does one impede the production of the other, since they are not of the same reason: Nor is it unfitting, he says, that in subordinate acts many should be present in one, indeed perhaps it is necessary for one scientifically knowing a conclusion, while the act scientifically contemplates, to understand simultaneously the principle, and, as loving in due order that which is ordered to the end, using, simultaneously to enjoy the end.

You will say 5. If hope and desire were one and the same, whenever we use the name of hope, we could likewise use the name of desire, and vice versa: but this is false: for I cannot properly say, I desire to attain beatitude on account of the divine goodness, just as I can say, I hope on account of the divine goodness and mercy that I shall attain beatitude: therefore they are not one and the same. — I deny the minor, and to its proof I say that both these names could in reality be employed to signify the same thing, when it signifies the movement of the appetitive faculty concerning the attainment of a good; but desire is not properly taken for hope, because the verb to hope is imposed to signify a desire presupposing and connoting an opinion conceived about the attainment of the desired good; whereas the verb I desire does not involve that connotation: whence they are not assumed indiscriminately to signify the same thing properly.

Fourth conclusion. — There are seven species or distinct acts of hope, to which the others can be recalled with little difficulty.

This Conclusion William of Paris weighs most excellently, book On Morals, where he relates those seven species of hope, which he calls daughters, the first of which is confidence; the second security, or the strengthening of divine vallation and protection: the third constancy, and erection against the movements and onsets of those rising up: the fourth consolation; the fifth respiration, comfort, and recovery of strength from the presence of God: the sixth expectation of the promised goods without hesitation; the seventh joyousness, which accompanies hope of this kind like an inseparable companion.

Confidence is the firm adherence of the mind in God, who is not confounded, as David says: In thee, O Lord, have I hoped: let me never be confounded. Whoever trusts in man is confounded, because he withdraws himself from him, whether on account of malice and aversion, or on account of impotence, or on account of a change of will and friendship: but these are not to be feared on the part of God. — Security is that of which Solomon speaks: The secure mind is as a continual feast. Proverbs 15, where Gregory says: Hope of eternal fellowship is the continuation of eternal refreshment. Security is twofold: the first, concerning obtaining eternal felicity: the second, against fears of the present life. And indeed it holds itself secure through the pledge of the Holy Spirit: who hath sealed us, and given the pledge of the Spirit in our hearts, 2 Corinthians 1, to Ephesians Who is the pledge of our inheritance. Whence St. Augustine: He Himself is the pledge of our inheritance and redemption given to me through the open letters of the Gospel, in which there is no other seal than the very Son of God, the image of the invisible God, and the figure or character of the substance of the Father, who for the confirmation and attestation of Gospel truth was fastened to the wood of the cross. The Incarnation, Passion, Death, Resurrection of the Lord uphold me on every side and strengthen me, so that concerning pardon, grace, and glory no hesitation may remain; for he who spared not his own son, shall he not with him give us all things? etc. Whence in the logic of God no argument is more valid for reasoning well by syllogism, and proving, than the death of His only-begotten Son, none for destroying hesitation or an objection raised against me so efficacious or strong, since not only is confidence inferred concerning the benefits of God through such a means, but it is even crushed. In the theology of God no pledge is more precious, more assuring, or more certain than the very Son of God, and the Holy Spirit: but both are given to us in pledge: therefore, those who through such great safeguards are not secure hold God to be of worse condition than any liar or perjurer: it is evident therefore how great an insult they do to God who hesitate.

The second security against the calamities of this world; for our God is refuge and strength, etc. The Lord is my illumination, etc. If God be for us, who is against us?

Erection, or strengthening, whereby strength is recovered through hope, that we may fight more keenly and resist temptations. A veteran, or crafty serpent assails the soul of the spirit with countless temptations: Shall he who sleeps not add, that he may rise? Rise, thou that sleepest, and Christ shall illuminate thee, Ephesians. It raises slack hands and loosened knees. — Consolation, which is not a gladdening of the mind, but rather a soothing and mitigation of fear and sorrow: for he consoles who lays aside sadness, though he receive no joy: but hope, as David says: This comforted me in my humility, that is, in my depression. In conversion the Lord brought back the captivity of Sion, etc. From this arises joy; whence then was our mouth filled with joy, etc. There are some who on account of various mischances grieve so much that they think no salvation remains to them: these God consoles with graces shining forth and celestial sweetnesses, that they may take courage, Isaiah 15. Thy light shall arise in darkness, and thy darkness shall be as noonday. And Job 4: As the morning light arising toward evening, and when you thought yourself consumed, you shall rise like the daystar. Hence is born Consolation, which is a strength of mind animating and firming constancy against temptations: He set my feet upon a rock; if I fall, I shall not be shattered, because the Lord sustains his hand beneath me. And I was pushed and overturned that I might fall, and the Lord received me, etc. Expectation of goods is a firm constancy of mind, whereby, attending to the promised goods, one overcomes all bitternesses; These things I remembered, and poured out my soul within me. From this is begotten joyousness: Rejoicing in hope. Joy moreover, that is, from the indwelling presence of God; whence that joy is as the earnest of an eternal reward, and as a foretaste of future sweetness: O taste, and see that the Lord is sweet.

WHAT THE OBJECT OF DIVINE HOPE IS.

NOTE 1. It is certain that the object of hope must be first some honest good; for we hope for or pursue nothing but a good, at least apprehended as such: just as we fear and flee only an evil: but since hope is a virtue, and every virtue tends to the good under the aspect of the honest, no one should doubt that the object of hope ought to be some honest good. Second, it must be possible, for impossible things, once known as such, can neither be hoped for nor desired, with a desire at least effectual and stimulating to the pursuit of the good apprehended; although indeed, according to the doctrine of the Doctor, they may be coveted by an ineffectual appetite and from complacency. Third, it ought to be an arduous good, or not of so easy acquisition: yet that difficulty ought not to be other than what arises from this, that the hoped-for object is not obtained by us without labor or trouble, or from this, that we cannot in any way attain it of ourselves, but it must be granted to us out of the liberality of one who gives or rewards. Fourth, some add that this good should be only probably, and not certainly, future. But this condition does not seem necessary, since even a certainly future good can be hoped for; hence those confirmed in grace, although secure about their beatitude, can no less hope for it. Next, the object of hope is said to be an absent good. For, says the Apostle to the Romans 8: Hope that is seen is not hope; for what doth any man see, what doth he hope for? But if we hope for that which we see not, we wait for it through patience. Yet the Doctor at d. 26 n. 12 contends that this condition is not absolutely necessary: because, he says, the same thing is the object of hope and of tending: but tending does not regard the absence of the object: therefore neither does hope. Which indeed is confirmed, because that is the object quod of hope which is desired, and that is the formal object cuius of it, which moves toward that desire: but it is certain that the will desires not the absence of the object, but rather its presence; nor is that absence the reason moving the will to desire, or to hope, though it may seem a condition sine qua non, without which it would neither hope nor desire: because if the good were perfectly possessed, it would no longer be desired, but loved. Whence the Doctor concludes: As in effects those things do not vary the reason of effecting which do not pertain per se to the reason of effecting; so in ends that thing does not vary the reason of end which does not exceed the reason of terminating: such is to be absent or present in the aforesaid manner: therefore it does not vary the formality of the object, or its formal reason. From these things it shines forth in mutual interrelation that absence, possibility, and futurity of the object are not of the formal reason of the object of hope.

NOTE 2. That the reason of the arduous good, or comparable with some difficulty, pertains to the object of hope, all Theologians agree: but there is controversy as to wherein consists that arduousness desired in the very object of hope; for there are those who judge, with Vasquez on book 2 of the third part, chapter 2, that the arduousness of the object of hope consists in this, that the thing hoped for must be obtained dependently upon another, because an arduous object from being obtained by one's own labors is the object of daring, not of hope. Some teach that the arduousness consists in the difficulty of attaining the thing hoped for, whether this difficulty proceeds from the magnitude of the thing itself, which exceeds our own powers, or arises from other circumstances, namely from distance, contingency, length of time, labor, expenses. But the truer opinion appears to be that of those who judge that the arduousness of the object of theological hope consists in this, that it should not only be contingent on the part of God bestowing liberally upon us the hoped-for good, and on our part, because it is conferred on account of merits, which necessarily must be contingent, since they are free. This reason indeed the Doctor intimates at d. 26 nn. 20 and 22, where he says: that something is not effectually and absolutely desired or hoped for unless it be possible to be attained or obtained, and therefore the despairing are persuaded to believe, not to love, because the first root of desperation is not in the will, but in the intellect: as if he said, that only that is the object of hope whose attainment is possible to us, though contingent, and that therefore certainty concerning the possibility of its attainment is to be urged, lest the despondent fall in spirit, but rather be raised up, and hope for that which, though contingently, is nevertheless possible to come to pass.

NOTE 3. The Theologians commonly agree that supernatural beatitude is the material object, more principal and adequate, of our hope; but since supernatural beatitude embraces two things, namely the vision or fruition of God, and God Himself to be seen and enjoyed, or objective and formal beatitude; there is difficulty as to which of these is the material object of theological hope. For Durandus in book 3 d. 26 q. 2 holds that formal beatitude is the immediate material object of theological hope; but objective beatitude to be only an indirect and mediate object. There are also those who judge, with Gregory of Rimini, that God is the immediate material object of hope, while fruition and vision are only a condition sine qua non. Finally a third opinion teaches that hope directly and immediately touches both beatitudes, namely the objective and the formal, the objective indeed as the end which, the formal however, as the end whereby. But as regards the formal object of the same hope there is a fourfold diversity of opinion among Authors. The first contends that the formal object is God under the aspect of omnipotent and faithful in executing His promises. Thus St. Thomas q. 1 On the Virtues art. 1. The second contends that God is the object of hope under the absolute aspect of Deity, without any order of Him speaking to us by which He could be possessed. Thus most of ours with Pitigianus in book 3 d. 26 art. 6. A third champions that the formal object of hope is God as fitting us and to be possessed by us. A fourth finally says that God as fitting us is indeed the motivating formal object of hope, but His goodness the terminative object.

First conclusion. — Both beatitudes, the objective as well as the formal, that is, God, thus to be possessed by us through vision and love, is the object both material and formal-terminative of our hope. This is the more common and truer. And the Doctor plainly hands it down sufficiently at d. 25 n. 11, where he says that hope is a theological virtue:

Because, he says, it respects God for the immediate object; for through all other things which are added to the object itself, the reason of the object as object is not taken away: for because I desire it for myself, or for such a one, it is not taken away that I desire it as object: therefore that around which the act of hope is, is an infinite good, and thus eternal.

The same has n. 16.

It is proven first from Sacred Scripture, and that from the second chapter of Tobias, where it is said: We are the sons of Saints, and we also await that life which God will give to those who never change their faith in him; and therefore Christ the Lord admonishes Matthew 6: Seek ye first the kingdom of God… and all these things shall be added unto you. By which He signifies that the kingdom of God, that is, eternal beatitude, is to be sought as the principal object; but the rest are not to be sought principally, but only secondarily, nor continually. This very thing St. Apostle teaches to the Romans chapter 5 when he says: We glory in the hope of the glory of the sons of God: as if he said: we hope for the glory and eternal beatitude of the Son of God, as a promised inheritance. And to Titus 1: In hope of life everlasting, which God, who lieth not, hath promised, etc. By which he signifies that hope tends to eternal life, as to the more principal object. This also indicates Hebrews 11 when he says: Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, that is, the thing known through faith is the thing to be hoped for: but God alone, who is our objective beatitude, is the material and formal object of faith; the others however are only material and secondary objects: therefore also of hope. To these accords that saying of St. Augustine lib. 2. De Civit. Dei last chapter: The reward of virtue, he says, will be He Himself who gave the virtue, who promised Himself, when nothing greater can be. And book 1 Confessions, chapter 23.: For blessed life is joy concerning truth, that is, concerning thee who art truth, my God. And upon Psalm 11.: Raise thy hope toward the good fruit of all things, by whom all things have been made good in their kind.

It is proven also by reason: hope inasmuch as it is a theological virtue tends to God: but it does not tend to God except as to be possessed: moreover God cannot be possessed by creatures except through vision and love, in which formal beatitude consists: therefore, etc. The major stands. The minor is proven: the act of desire, whereby hope tends to God, is distinguished from the desire, whereby charity tends to Him, wishing for Him the good itself, namely glory on account of Himself: but it cannot otherwise be distinguished than because hope tends to God as fitting us: therefore, etc. It is confirmed from this, that it is one thing to hope for God, and another to hope in God: for to hope for God is to have an effectual desire of having God as the object of beatific vision and fruition, or to desire the infinite good inasmuch as it fits us: but to hope in God is to have an effectual desire that God be our helper, and according to His promises confer upon us the necessary helps, whereby we could merit the beatitude which we hope for; for these two acts can sometimes exist apart from one another, especially the first without the second, for instance while someone presumptuously hopes; otherwise when the act of theological hope is honest both from itself and from its circumstances. This the Doctor signifies at n. 23 when he says that the act of theological hope is to desire the infinite good, as a good for me from God conferring liberally on account of the merits which I have, or which I hope for myself: by which words the two aforesaid acts are designated, as Castillo rightly notes quaest. i. n. 6, the first indeed by these words, to desire the infinite good: the second however by these words, liberally from God on account of the merits which I have, or which I hope for myself. — It is confirmed again: God is the object of hope as the highest good making us blessed: but as such He includes not only objective beatitude but also formal; and consequently under the aspect of either beatitude He is the adequate object of hope. Next, God as to-be-possessed formally includes the possession of Himself, which is made only through vision and love; but as to-be-possessed He is the object of hope: therefore as object of hope He includes the possession of Himself; and consequently formal beatitude. Finally, the formal object of hope is the last end of the rational creature: but formal beatitude, which is vision, and objective beatitude, which is God clearly seen, are not two ends, but a single one: therefore from them is constituted the formal object, which is that of hope in the wayfarer, and of delight or fruition in the Fatherland.

You will say. God cannot be desired by us, nor consequently hoped for, inasmuch as He is our good: therefore as such He is not the object of hope. The antecedent is evident, because thus to desire God is to use things to be enjoyed, which is perverse. —

I deny the antecedent: for to desire our good, inasmuch as it truly fits us, is not to use things to be enjoyed, because as such we do not order that good as a means to the attainment of another good: and consequently as such we do not use things to be enjoyed.

You will insist. A good which is entirely distinct from us, nor can perfect us, cannot be desired by us, nor hoped for as a good fitting us: but God is a good entirely distinct from us, which cannot be in us, nor perfect us: therefore it cannot be the object of our hope. —

I distinguish the major: that is not a good fitting us which cannot perfect us neither formally nor objectively, this I grant; formally only, I deny. To the minor I say that God does not indeed perfect us formally, or by the mode of the inexistence of a form, but objectively, or by the mode of an object alluring to its own joyous fruition and vision.

You will urge. God through Himself is not the immediate object of the sadness of the damned, but the evil inflicted on them by Him: therefore likewise He is not the immediate object of the joy of the Blessed, but the good granted by Him, namely His vision or fruition. Moreover, the object of hope ought to be future: but God cannot be apprehended as future, since ⟦illegible: "ihique"; fortasse "iam"⟧ He exists present: therefore per se He cannot be the object of hope. Again, hope and desperation, as contrary movements, are exercised about the same material object by way of pursuit and flight: but no one despairs of God, but of His attainment: therefore no one hopes for God, but for His attainment: therefore He is not the material object of hope. Fourth finally, because God is not referable to creatures, since He Himself is the last end of all: therefore He cannot be regarded by love of concupiscence, which always refers the object to the lover: therefore neither can He be the material object of hope, because hope is a love of concupiscence whereby the object is desired as the good of one hoping. —

I answer to the first, that the reason of God is not the same in order to the Blessed one and the damned: since with respect to the Blessed one He is considered as good: but since He is good in Himself and of Himself, He can also of Himself be the object of that hope, just as of love and vision: but in order to the damned He is apprehended after the manner of an evil disagreeing: but since in Himself and of Himself He has not the reason of evil, thus also He cannot be the object of the sadness of the damned, but only through something else, namely by reason of the punishment inflicted. —

To the second I say that even if God in Himself be not a future object, nevertheless as He terminates vision and fruition, He can be called future and arduous, because His vision and fruition are future. —

To the third I grant indeed that no one despairs of God considered in Himself, yet well as a future object of termination or fruition. —

To the fourth the Doctor answers that God is indeed not referable to us as a greater good to a lesser, but as an abundant good to the lesser good, to whom it is liberally granted from the very munificence of God communicating Himself to the rational creature, that He may perfect it by His possession.

You will say. The object of a virtue, as of a science, ought to be one: but from objective and formal beatitude one thing cannot be made, since objective beatitude is an uncreated thing, namely God: formal however is a created thing, namely the act of beatific vision and love: therefore the total and adequate object of hope cannot be simultaneously objective and formal beatitude. —

I distinguish the major: it ought to be one by the unity of being, I deny: by the unity of the terminating object, I grant. And similarly distinguishing the minor, I deny the consequence: for objective and formal beatitude are truly a thing distinct according to entity: but since they agree in the reason of perfect and adequate beatitude, they also agree in the reason of the object of hope.

You will urge. From objective and formal beatitude something one cannot be made: therefore there is no solution. Proof of the antecedent: either formal beatitude pertains equally first to this object of Christian hope as God does, that is, as objective beatitude, or it does not pertain equally first, but God principally, directly, and in a straight line, while formal beatitude only obliquely, and as it were by connotation. The first cannot be said, because these two joined together would either make one only per accidens, and thus the total primary object of hope would not be one in the genus of object, or they would make some one such that God would stand in this object as material, and the beatific vision as formal, which cannot be said, because then hope would not be properly theological: for each thing must be denominated from its formal ratio, which on this hypothesis would not be God, but the beatific vision: therefore the beatific vision does not enter into the ratio of the primary object of Christian hope as a part of it, but only as some condition, without which posited beforehand, the will could not exercise an act of hope. —

I answer, granting indeed that formal and objective beatitude do not pertain equally to the ratio of the principal object of beatitude: for objective beatitude concurs more principally to integrating and constituting it: but formal beatitude less principally: for that is judged to concur more principally to integrating the object of hope which most of all satisfies the appetite of the Christian soul hoping, and from which the ratio of goodness and appetibility, which is in beatitude, is derived and proceeds: but God himself is he who most principally satisfies the appetite of the hoping soul, inasmuch as that soul obtains the good hoped for, and the whole ratio of appetibility found in formal beatitude is derived from him; for thus we desire the beatific vision as the highest good, because we desire God, the fount of all goods; so that if God were not our objective beatitude, the vision of God would not have the ratio of beatitude; and consequently formal beatitude looks less principally to the ratio of the object of hope.

Second Conclusion. — The objective motive, or formal ratio under which of theological hope, is not divine omnipotence, nor God under the absolute ratio of Deity, but inasmuch as he is the highest good. This Conclusion consists of three parts, of which

The first is proven: God is the object of theological hope, inasmuch as he is the last end of rational creature to be possessed by it: but such he is not under the ratio of the omnipotent or of one who aids, for thus he bears the ratio of efficient cause: therefore under this ratio he is not the objective motive of theological hope. — Then, the ratio under which of theological hope must be some ratio of good: but divine omnipotence, even under the ratio of aiding, does not formally bear the ratio of good, because as such it pertains to the ratio of being and of efficient cause: therefore it cannot be the ratio under which, nor the objective motive of hope. — Finally, that alone is the formal object of Christian hope which is the ratio of desiring the good hoped for: yet the power of God, and the other things enumerated above, are not ratios of desiring the good hoped for, because as such they are either something prerequisite to the act of hope, and thus bear the ratio of efficient cause, or they are only means to the good hoped for: but means as means cannot be the motive ratio of desiring the end, for no one prudently desires the end on account of the means, but on the contrary desires the means on account of the end: therefore divine omnipotence, or the aid and fidelity of God in fulfilling promises, cannot bear the formal ratio under which of theological hope.

You will say. Sacred Scripture exhorts us to hope in God on account of his omnipotence, liberality, and fidelity in fulfilling promises: thus 2 Kings, ch. 22.: My strong God, I will hope in him. Isaiah 23.: You have trusted in the Lord God mighty forever. Ps. 17.: My God, my helper, and I will hope in him. Likewise the Council of Trent, Session vi. chapter 13., exhorts the faithful disposing themselves to justification, inasmuch as all ought to place and repose their most firm hope in the aid of God: therefore, etc. —

I answer, these things are indeed required not as motive reasons for hoping, but only as certain means, or several prerequisite conditions, that the act of divine hope be elicited with easier labor.

The second part is proven: the formal ratio under which of hope must be distinct from any other habit tending toward God: but other habits besides hope tend toward God under the ratio of Deity, namely Theology, which is concerned about God under the ratio of Deity: therefore under this ratio God cannot be the formal object of hope.

The third part is proven: that is the objective motive of hope which is the formal motive ratio of love, whereby God is loved with the love of concupiscence: but the objective motive of that love of concupiscence is uncreated goodness, inasmuch as it is the highest good comprehending both formal and objective beatitude: therefore it is the precise ratio under which of hope. — Then, that is the formal objective motive which properly moves to the appetite and desire of itself: but the aforesaid goodness moves to thus desiring God as an end to be possessed: therefore, etc. — Finally, it is probable that there is some virtue which considers God inasmuch as he is a good for us, just as charity honors him, inasmuch as he is the highest good in order to himself: but no other virtue appears to which this consideration more fittingly belongs than hope: therefore such a motive ratio is to be assigned to it.

You will say 1. The objective motive of theological hope must be something uncreated: but divine goodness as convenient to us is not something uncreated: therefore God, inasmuch as he is our good, or insofar as he redounds to our benefit, is not the formal objective motive of theological hope. The major stands by a similar argument concerning faith, whose motive ratio is the truth of God in speaking, and concerning charity, whose motive ratio is the supreme goodness of God as in himself and according to himself. The minor also is evident, for the goodness of God as convenient to us formally signifies nothing else than our benefit. —

I deny the minor: for the reason moving us to hope in God is not precisely our benefit, but our uncreated good, which is the very uncreated goodness of God, as to be possessed by us. Nor does it obstruct that this uncreated good, inasmuch as it is the object of hope, denotes an order toward us: for this does not hinder a theological virtue, which is not so called from the subject to which its object is referred, as if the good of that subject, but from both its objects, namely material and formal: but both objects of hope are something uncreated, namely God, and his divine goodness.

You will say 2. The objective motive of theological hope must be distinct from the motive of charity: but to will God as our good, and insofar as he redounds as it were to our benefit, pertains to charity, which tends not only toward God for his own sake, to be loved, but also toward everything that is divine: therefore, etc. —

I deny the minor: for charity is borne toward the divine goodness, inasmuch as it is the perfection of God himself, but not inasmuch as it is the good of a creature: but Christian hope is borne toward the goodness of God as its own good, or inasmuch as it is the good and benefit of the very person hoping.

You ask: whether the beatitude of another can be the object of theological hope, or whether we can hope beatitude for others? —

I affirm with the Doctor in 3. dist. 26. num. 11., where speaking of the object of hope he says: Because I desire it for myself, or for such a one, is not taken away so that I do not desire it as an object. Nor does it matter that in n. 2., objecting, Therefore, he says, to desire for another neighbor a good of the same ratio, is an act of hope: indeed, what is more, to will a present good of the same ratio for St. Peter, will be an act of hope, which is absurd: for I say that the Doctor does not infer this as an inconvenience, but only on account of the inference, which followed from what was said by him, namely that just as faith in the universal, and faith in the particular, do not make diverse faiths: so hope about me, and about another, do not make diverse virtues of hope. Nor is that absurdity about this, that the beatitude hoped for belongs to another, but that a present good can be the object of hope, which is indeed truly absurd.

Therefore our assertion is proven. First from the Apostle, 2 Cor. 1., who, having premised of himself, as a member having spiritual conjunction with them, that he had suffered many tribulations, subjoins: That our hope may be firm for you, knowing that as you are partakers of the sufferings, so shall you be also of the consolation: for the Apostle sets down this consolation, which God bestows upon the afflicted in this mortal life, as it were a certain pledge of that future eternal glory or beatitude. Likewise chapter 1. of the Epistle to the Philippians: Being confident, he says, of this very thing, that he who hath begun a good work in you will perfect it unto the day of Christ Jesus: that he may signify this his confidence, or hope concerning that good of the Philippians, to be concerning something as pertaining to himself by reason of the spiritual conjunction which he had with them, and thus subjoins: As it is just for me to think this for you all, because I have you in my heart, and in my bonds, and in the defense and confirmation of the gospel, you all being partakers of my joy.

Our proposition is proven also by reason: all things required in the act of Christian hope, both on the part of the act and on the part of the object, are found in this present act: therefore such an act is properly said to be of Christian hope. Proof of the antecedent: for on the part of the act there is required that it be some efficacious supernatural desire of the love of concupiscence; on the part of the object there is required that it be the desire of the highest good, inasmuch as that is convenient to us: but these two can truly fall upon the act of hope, whereby I hope and long for beatitude for another; for that act is supernatural, since it tends toward a supernatural object, and it is also from the love of concupiscence; for in this act I tend toward eternal beatitude not inasmuch as it is a good in itself, but inasmuch as it is some highest good convenient to another, as his supreme perfection: therefore, etc.

You will say. St. Augustine in the Enchiridion, chapter 8. says: Hope is of good things only, nor except future ones, and belonging to him who is said to hope for them: therefore it is concerned only about a good convenient to us, but not to another. Then, the act of hope is an act of the love of concupiscence: but the love of concupiscence is concerned only about one's own good, but not the good of another: therefore we cannot hope beatitude for another. —

I answer to St. Augustine, that he is to be understood only of hope conceived according to the affection of advantage, but not according to the affection of justice, of which he speaks in Serm. 11. De Verbis Domini, when he says: Of the salvation of no one must we despair, while he lives. Or I say he wishes only that we cannot hope goods for others except those which it befits us to hope for ourselves. To the second I say, that the love of concupiscence, inasmuch as it connotes only the affection of advantage, is concerned only about ourselves; but inasmuch as it connotes the affection of justice, it can be concerned as much about ourselves as about others.

Note 1. It is certain that theological hope, even as to act, is not found in God on account of the defect of the object, because God possesses all intrinsic goods most steadfastly, and enjoys himself most fully. As to extrinsic goods, namely glory and veneration, which he exacts from us, since they are not arduous for him, and since moreover they are not future with respect to him, because all things are from eternity intimately present to him, therefore he cannot hope for them: whence whenever in Scripture God is said to hope for something from us, these things must be understood tropologically; so that God speaks after the human manner, signifying doubtless those affections which we ordinarily have concerning a good absent and convenient to us. Therefore speech can be had only of creatures, whether indeed theological hope can exist in them in whatever state they are considered.

Note 2. Here chiefly is the difficulty concerning men according to their twofold state, namely of the way, and of the term. I call the state of the way that by which we tend toward eternity, which embraces not only faithful men dwelling in this world, but also souls loosed from the body languishing in Purgatory. I say the state of the term is that of all those who are already consigned to eternity, either blessed in heaven, or to miserable eternity in hell; concerning all of whom this present difficulty can be raised: first, whether hope exists in all faithful wayfarers: second, whether in souls dwelling in Purgatory: third, whether in the comprehensors and the Blessed: fourth, whether in the damned and reprobate.

Note 3. Hope, like the other theological virtues, can be lost in three ways: first indeed through the cessation of the divine influx conserving it; for just as infused virtues specially depend on God, that they be created and infused, so also do they depend on his special concurrence, that they be conserved in their being. For the conservation of a thing is nothing else than a certain continued production of that thing. Wherefore, the divine conserving influx ceasing, it is necessary that that virtue perish. Second, charity and hope can cease through the subtraction of faith, which is their foundation: for the foundation removed, it is necessary that every building fall. Third, the theological virtues can cease through vices contrary to them: whence as divine faith is lost at least demeritoriously through infidelity, and charity through any mortal sin whatsoever; so also Christian hope is lost through an act of presumption or despair.

First Conclusion. — THEOLOGICAL HOPE SUBSISTS IN WAYFARERS, BOTH IN THOSE DWELLING IN THIS WORLD AND IN PURGATORY. This conclusion consists of two parts, of which the first is proven: first indeed from the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter i., where it teaches: In justification itself, together with the remission of sins, man receives all these things infused at once through Jesus Christ, to whom is ingrafted faith, hope, and charity; for unless hope and charity be added, neither is he united perfectly with Christ, nor made any member of his body. — Nor does it obstruct that very many of the faithful are defiled by most grave sins, for they do not on that account lose hope, so long as they preserve divine faith, nor admit any sin of presumption or despair; since with sanctifying grace not all the gifts infused from heaven depart through some mortal sin committed; but faith and hope remain in us, like a divine seed of spiritual life, according to that of Isaiah: Unless the Lord of hosts had left us a seed, we had been as Sodom, and we should have been like to Gomorra. Yet hope does not remain in those who have lost faith; since faith is the foundation of supernatural hope, it is manifest that, that foundation removed, no infused hope remains. Hence heretics have only acquired and natural hope, which is a certain natural love of concupiscence with respect to beatitude, and the expectation of it, which is wholly human.

The second part, namely that hope is present in the souls existing in Purgatory, is easily gathered from what has been said of faith; since faith is the foundation and support of hope, and it remains in those same souls, hope can also be in them. Moreover, since beatitude with respect to them is still absent, and to be attained through grievous torments and punishments which they are held to expiate, beatitude is set before them under the ratio of an absent and arduous good, and consequently under the ratio of the object of hope. Finally, the souls of Purgatory have an efficacious desire of obtaining supernatural beatitude, as an absent arduous good, and possible of acquisition to themselves: therefore they have the act of Christian and theological hope. The consequence is clear from what was said in the first Notable of the preceding Question. The antecedent is proven; for the souls there are as in prison, until they shall have paid even to the last farthing, which payment, since it is laborious and most penal, is to them an arduous means of obtaining the desired good; and consequently they can elicit acts of hope.

You will say 1. Those souls are certain of their beatitude, from which they cannot fail or fall away: therefore they cannot have hope. — I deny the consequence: for certainty, as we said above, does not stand in the way of the act of hope, because it does not take from it the ratio of a highest supernatural good, arduous, and absent, nor does it impede the burning and efficacious desire of it as one's own good, or redounding to the benefit of the one desiring it; which suffices for the proper and precise ratio of the act of hope: therefore even if the souls existing in Purgatory are certain of their salvation and attainment of eternal beatitude, and on that account are at peace, yet because they do not yet enjoy that beatitude, they can rightly hope for it with a perfect act of theological hope: just as the wayfarer existing in this world, who would be certain of his salvation, such as the thief hanging on the cross was, when he heard from Christ the Lord: this day thou shalt be with me in Paradise, could truly hope for eternal salvation, which he did not yet have.

You will say 2. Those cannot have acts of hope who cannot elicit acts contrary to it: but the souls existing in Purgatory cannot elicit acts opposite to hope, namely an act of despair: therefore neither acts of hope. The major is plain: for the same power is of contraries, according to the Philosophers. — I deny the major: for it is not necessary for exercising the act of hope that an act opposed to it can be elicited, because it is not absolutely necessary that he who can exercise one act can also elicit the act opposed to it; for the Blessed can love God out of charity, whom nevertheless they cannot hate. In proof of which, when it is said that the power is of contraries, this ought not to be taken universally, but by accommodation to the state and condition of the one whose is the power. Hence, although the souls existing in Purgatory are confirmed in grace, and on that account cannot despair, yet they can elicit the act of hope with respect to beatitude promised to them, toward which they aspire.

You will say 3. The act of hope conjoined with charity is meritorious: but the souls existing in Purgatory can merit no longer: therefore neither hope. Confirmation, because hope rests upon present merits: but the souls in Purgatory cannot have present merits: therefore neither hope. — I distinguish the major: the act of hope is thus meritorious when elicited by a wayfarer simply, and before death, I concede: otherwise, I deny. But it is certain that the souls in Purgatory are no longer simply in the state of life, which is terminated in death itself, but are only in a state of life secundum quid, and consequently they can merit no longer: for every merit closes with life, as will be said in the following Tractate. To the confirmation I say, that hope rests upon merits not elicited in the present, but which were elicited and acquired while they lived on earth: just as the wayfarer existing in the state of mortal sin can have the act of hope resting upon good works, which he will be able to exercise when he shall have attained sanctifying grace by virtue of the Sacrament of Penance. Add that although the souls existing in Purgatory are outside the state of merit, nevertheless hope in them is not idle: for it instills into them divine consolation, and infuses heavenly strength, that they may bear with constant mind their unconquered punishments and bitter torments.

Second conclusion. — HOPE IN NO WISE REMAINS EITHER IN THE BLESSED OR IN THE DAMNED. This conclusion has already been sufficiently proved from what was said concerning faith, where we said that infused faith does not remain either in the Blessed or in the damned, and consequently neither does hope: for the reason of each is alike, especially since faith is the foundation and rule of hope.

The case of the damned is evident: both because in Prov. 11 it is said: When the wicked man is dead, there shall be no hope any more: and the expectation of the solicitous shall perish: and therefore the damned, being in the last term of impiety, can have no hope. Then because they are certain of their perpetual damnation, and that eternal beatitude is in no wise possible for them, according to that of Job. 15: He believeth not that he may be able to return from darkness to light, looking round about on every side for a sword. Finally, because they have no supernatural aid whereby they might merit their salvation, and therefore there inhere in them no hope of attaining it.

You will say. The damned desire eternal beatitude: for none is so miserable that he does not desire to be happy: therefore they can hope for it. — I distinguish the antecedent: they desire it with a natural and altogether inefficacious appetite, I concede; with a supernatural and efficacious appetite, I deny. Now hope is an act or desire, both efficacious and altogether supernatural, concerning beatitude as possible to the one hoping, and to be attained by the aid of God and good works: and therefore the damned cannot have it.

The second part also holds: for hope tends toward a good not possessed, whereas the blessed enjoy God by vision and love, and consequently can no longer have an act of hope. The major holds: for, as we said, from the Apostle to Rom. 8. Hope that is seen is not hope: for what a man seeth, why doth he hope for?

You will say. The blessed await the resumption of their exile and the beatitude which they do not yet possess: therefore with respect to the beatitude of their body they can have hope. — I distinguish the consequent: they can have hope whereby it is a theological virtue tending toward God to be possessed, I deny; whereby it is a natural desire, by which one part naturally desires union with the other, so as to make with it one whole, and likewise an elicited desire, by which the soul longs that the body, which was to it the instrument and medium of salvation, be also a sharer in the reward and recompense, I concede. Wherefore in the souls of the Saints there can indeed be a desire with respect to the glory of the body, yet not properly speaking hope, which is a theological virtue, and whose object is God himself as to be possessed, not however any created good.

You ask 1. Whether at least the habit of hope remains in the Blessed? — I answer that it does not, with the Doctor in 3. dist. 31. num. 2. because, he says, no habit is to be posited as remaining there in vain: but a habit would be there in vain whose inclination would then be impossible: now faith by its reason inclines only toward truth hidden, according to the gloss upon that of Heb. 11. Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not; and hope inclines only toward an absent fitting good, according to that of Rom. 8. Hope that is seen is not hope; taking hope for the thing hoped, namely the object: but these inclinations cannot be had in the fatherland, where truth will be manifest and the good possessed: therefore those habits will not remain, because they would be superfluous. By which words the Doctor signifies therefore that hope does not remain in the fatherland, because hope cannot tend except toward an absent good; but in the fatherland the good is not absent, but present and possessed, and consequently concerning it there can be no act of hope, nor consequently a habit, because it would be altogether superfluous.

You ask 2. How does the habit of hope cease, both in the Blessed and in the damned? — I answer that it ceases through the cessation of the influx of God preserving it: for since the infused virtues of themselves require in a special manner to be produced and infused by God, they must also in a special manner be preserved by him; for the preservation of a thing is nothing else than its continued production. God, moreover, ceases to preserve the habit of hope in the Blessed, because in them it would be altogether idle, since it could not in that state incline the will to produce that act of hope; but God undertakes and preserves nothing vainly, especially in the most perfect state, such as that of beatitude. In the damned indeed, besides the negation of the conserving influx, the habit of hope also ceases through the act opposed to it, namely through the act of despair; for as by the act of infidelity divine faith perishes, at least meritoriously, so also Christian hope is lost through the act of despair: but the damned are in continual despair; for they know eternal beatitude to be impossible of acquisition for them, while nevertheless they know from elsewhere that they were created by God for it: therefore, etc.

You ask 3. Whether, and when, does the precept concerning eliciting an act of hope urge? — I answer first, that truly a precept is given concerning sometimes eliciting an act of hope. Which indeed is proved from the Apostle to Timoth. chap. 6. where he says: Charge the rich of this world not to be highminded, nor to trust in the uncertainty of riches, but in the living God. Likewise Psal. 4. Sacrifice ye the sacrifice of justice, and hope in the Lord, which the Psalmist often repeats and inculcates. Reason also favors it; for every act is reckoned to be in precept whose omission is a special sin: for the sin of omission is always against some positive precept, as the sin of commission against a negative one: but the omission of the act of supernatural hope is imputed to many as sin; thus in 1. Paralip. chap. 10. Saul is said to have been condemned for his iniquities, in that he transgressed the commandment of the Lord, which he had commanded... and hoped not in the Lord. And Wisd. 2. the impious are condemned, because they knew not the sacraments of God, nor hoped for the reward of justice, nor judged the honor of holy souls. — I answer secondly, as regards the time of obligation, that this precept obliges indirectly whenever without an act of hope penance cannot be exercised, nor prayer be heard, nor the victory over temptation be carried off, because a precept obliging to some end obliges at the same time to the means necessary for the attainment of the end. But this obligation is only indirect, because it arises not so much from the precept of hope as from the precept of penance, of prayer, and of temptation to be overcome, and consequently its omission fights not so much against hope as against the virtue with which the sin to be avoided through hope conflicts. — Hence, as regards the direct obligation of hope, omitting the opinions of others, I judge that the precept of hope obliges when the object to be hoped for is sufficiently proposed to us, and we have as yet elicited no act of hope concerning it, for supernatural habits are not granted us by God that they may be perpetually idle, and therefore we ought sometimes to elicit their acts. Secondly, the precept of hope obli...