Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

NOTE 1. That this is not a discourse about habitual faith is already clear; for we have already proved that, in order that the habit of faith be infused into us, it is not necessary that there be infused simultaneously in the will some supernatural habit inclining the will to wish the intellect to assent to objects obscurely proposed and revealed by God, as is best proved by the Doctor d. 25. qu. 2. num. 2. against St. Thomas; but the difficulty concerns actual faith, namely whether some imperative act of the will must necessarily be pre-required in order that the intellect elicit an act of believing; or whether for believing there is necessary a pious affection of the will commanding the act of faith, or rather whether the intellect can have an act of faith without the will's having any positive act concurring toward eliciting that act of faith. But on the hypothesis that such an act is required on the part of the will, there is likewise the difficulty whether such an act must be supernatural.

NOTE 2. The question can be raised about a twofold act of the will: First indeed, concerning the pious affection and motion of the will itself toward the Revealer, and the object proposed by the Revealer; which motion is a certain propensity and inclination of the soul toward believing the things of faith that are proposed; such as the inclination which disciples have toward their preceptor and teacher: thus Thomists are moved by such a pious affection toward the Angelic Doctor, and Scotists toward the Subtle one, from which pious affection it comes about that each investigates reasons not only whereby he may defend the dogmas of his own Doctor, but also whereby he is moved to grant assent to them. Second, the question can be raised concerning the act of the will which is called imperium, and which is a certain efficacious volition, by which the will directly commands the intellect to grant assent to some revealed proposition, even though it be obscure and unevident: which imperium is commonly accustomed to be called the pious affection of credulity, because it regards not so much God revealing, and the objects revealed, as credulity itself, or the assent of faith. Here, however, there is no discourse about the prior act of the will, because it does not determine the intellect directly to believe, but only indirectly, and inasmuch as it moves the intellect to investigate the motives of credibility; but the difficulty concerns only the latter act: namely whether an act of faith can be elicited without the will commanding it.

NOTE 3. Concerning the present question there are chiefly three opinions of Authors, the first of which denies that the imperium of the will is pre-required for determining the intellect with regard to the exercise of the act of faith; which opinion Alanus in 3. disp. 21. qu. 1. attributes to Holcot, and which some Recentiores attribute to the Subtle Doctor, subscribing thereto Gonetus, but erroneously, as will appear below. The second opinion affirms that a direct act of the will is pre-required in order that the intellect elicit the assent of divine faith. The third, however, as it were midway between both contends that a direct act of the will is required for the assent of acquired divine faith, but not for the assent that is elicited through the habit of infused faith: which opinion Castillo d. 6. q. 3. num. 12. contends to be the genuine opinion of the Subtle Doctor. Which, then, of all these opinions is the truer, and more consonant to the mind of the Subtle Doctor, must now be determined, resolving first, whether the act of faith is free with the freedom of exercise, and also of specification: second, whether for the act of faith the imperium, or immediate concurrence of the will, is necessarily required: third, whether that act of the will is in some way supernatural.

First Conclusion. — THE ACT OF DIVINE FAITH IS ALWAYS FREE AS TO EXERCISE, BUT NOT SO AS TO SPECIFICATION. This on both points is the doctrine of the Doctor, disp. 25. qu. 1. near the end, where, after the objection had been made: Someone can believe unwillingly, because the things in the intellect precede willing, he answers: I say that it does not follow, because the act of believing depends on two things, namely the inclining habit, and the credible presented, not in any manner whatever, yet the credible being presented, and thus it is commonly not presented except through doctrine, and further, even if it be presented, the intellect does not necessarily believe: for so to believe would precede willing, because the one proposing the credible to the intellect does not demonstrate it, so as to compel the intellect to assent: therefore it does not believe unless willingly: although however the will has imperium over the act of believing, nevertheless it has no imperium over the opposite act, faith standing, so that the intellect should dissent from the credible proposed by the imperium of the will, but it can only impede the intellect, lest it go forth into its own elicited act of believing about the credibles proposed. By which the Doctor signifies two things: first indeed, that the act of faith as to exercise is always free, because however much the objects credible may be proposed together with the motives of credibility, nevertheless the will can command the intellect not to elicit an act of faith: second, that when the object of faith has been proposed together with the motives of credibility, the will cannot command the intellect to elicit an act of dissent about that object, and immediately thereafter that the act of faith is not free as to specification; because the intellect cannot, about a revealed object duly proposed, elicit an act either of assent or of dissent.

The first part seems to be a matter of faith, since it is plainly sufficiently handed down in Sacred Scripture, especially at the end of Luke, where two Disciples, whom Christ ⟦had not appeared to⟧ after the resurrection, are rebuked because they were slow to believe. O foolish ones, and slow of heart to believe! etc. And at the end of Mark it is said of all the Disciples that Christ the Lord upbraided their unbelief and hardness of heart, because they did not believe those who had seen him risen: but they would be reproved wrongly unless it had been free for them to believe or not to believe. Therefore the act of faith is free as to exercise. It is confirmed from this, that faith itself in Sacred Scripture is marked with the name of obedience: thus Acts 6. A great multitude of priests obeyed the faith. To the Romans 10. But all do not obey the Gospel. And chapter 16. Your obedience, that is your faith, is published in every place. Whence 2. to the Corinthians 10. it is said: Casting down every understanding into the obedience of Christ: but the understanding is taken captive by the will, whose chief prerogative it is to render obedience to Christ.

Proof is given secondly, from the Councils, but most especially from the Arausican, cap. 5.

If anyone says that the augmentation of faith as well as also its beginning, and the very affect of credulity whereby we believe in him who justifies the ungodly, is naturally inherent in us, and not through the gift of grace, that is, through the inspiration of the Holy Spirit correcting our will from infidelity to faith, he contradicts the Apostolic dogmas.

And from the Tridentine, Sess. 6. cap. 6. where it says: They are disposed unto that very justification, when, excited and assisted by divine grace, conceiving faith from hearing, they are freely moved toward God, believing those things to be true which divinely have been revealed and promised.

Proof is given also from the Holy Fathers, but most especially from St. Irenaeus, lib. 1. cap. 62. Not only, he says, in works, but also in faith, God preserved to man free judgment and of his own power. Similarly St. Ambrose, on cap. 1. ad Rom. says: To believe or not to believe is a matter of the will. But best of all St. Augustine, Tract. 26. upon John, says: Into the church anyone can enter unwillingly, he can approach the altar unwillingly, but he cannot believe unless willing. Wherefore St. Bernard, lib. 5. De Consideratione, cap. 6. defines faith thus: Faith is a voluntary and certain foretaste of a truth not yet manifest.

This truth is evident also by reason: First, because faith is a theological and supernatural virtue, ordered to salvation, and consequently ought to be meritorious: but every meritorious act is free: therefore, etc. Second, because the intellect is a faculty subordinate to the will as regards all its acts: so that the will can impede it either directly, forbidding it to exercise any act: or indirectly, recalling it from consideration of the object proposed, and provoking it to consider another object: and accordingly it can hinder the intellect itself from exercising any act of faith, even while the objects to be believed, and the motives of credibility, are being proposed. Nor does it matter that it is a natural faculty acting naturally, since other faculties acting naturally are subordinate to the will: therefore also the intellect. Nor does it stand in the way that it is a faculty operating before the will, because not every act of the intellect precedes the will; but many acts it can elicit at the imperium of the will. Finally, there is nothing that would determine the intellect necessarily, and drive it to assenting to the objects of faith notwithstanding the imperium of the will, and hence, while the will resists, the intellect cannot break forth into its act. The antecedent is evident, for if anything should move the intellect necessarily and ineluctably to assent to revealed objects proposed to it, especially moral evidence of motives having a necessary connection with the attestation of infallible divine truth, and with the truth of the proposition to be believed: but that moral evidence cannot so necessarily determine the intellect, the will resisting: otherwise it would not be moral evidence, but metaphysical or physical: for moral evidence is distinguished from physical in this, that the latter is said to move the intellect to assent necessarily and ineluctably, whereas the former only morally. Add to these that experience shows that if we were unwilling to believe the objects proposed, that would certainly be within our freedom, and hence while we believe, we believe most freely, and consequently the act of faith is free.

You will object 1. The Subtle Doctor in the praised second question, num. 1. Or I see no contradiction why the intellect, if it acted merely per se, and had an object present, could not understand, or believe what is presented to it. Therefore according to his mind the intellect, notwithstanding the reluctance of the will, can believe a proposed object; and consequently the act of faith is not properly free.

I deny the consequence., and to the antecedent I say that the Doctor by the aforesaid words signifies nothing other than that the intellect considered in itself, even if no imperium of the will be present, can be sufficiently allured by a present and moving object so as to grant assent to it: although if the will should resist, notwithstanding that presence and motion of the object, it could by no means break forth into such an act. Or I say he must be so understood as to mean that the intellect can assent to revealed objects proposed, even though the will not directly move it thereto, stimulated and assisted through some supernatural habit inhering in it, as St. Thomas teaches, whom he there impugns. Or finally, that the reasons adduced by the Angelic Doctor in support of his opinion were not so efficacious that one could not sustain the contradictory of that assertion.

You will object 2. If the imperium of the will were pre-required for the act of faith, it would follow that faith would not be the beginning of justification: but the consequent is false: therefore also that from which it follows.

I deny the sequel of the major; for faith is not therefore called the beginning of justification because it presupposes no other act; indeed, for the assent of faith are pre-required the apprehension of the credible object, of divine revelation, and very often a judgment about credibility, or about the motives of that credibility; but it is called the beginning of justification because it is the first supernatural act in substance: and consequently the first act among the dispositions pre-required for justification: since the imperium, or the act of the will moving to the assent of faith, is not always supernatural in substance, but only in mode, as we shall say below.

Proof is given also of the second part, namely that the act of faith is not free with the freedom of contrariety, nor as to specification, about objects of faith proposed together with moral evidence of credibility: since in that case there is nothing that could move the intellect to elicit an act of dissent, and hence it cannot elicit it. The consequence is evident, because the intellect cannot have any judgment unless it be moved to it by something. But the antecedent is proved: if in that case the intellect were moved to dissent, especially either by the object, or by the will: but neither can be said. Not indeed by the object, because the revealed object, when proposed as encompassed with motives of credibility, cannot at all move toward dissent. Nor yet by the will, because, as the Doctor best proves ibid. num. 2., the will cannot move the intellect to an act except supposing some motion on the part of the object: therefore since in the proposed case there cannot be any motive on the part of the object toward dissent, the will will not be able to move toward dissent.

Proof is given secondly: no one can believe unless a credible object is proposed: therefore neither can one disbelieve, or dissent, unless the thing be proposed as incredible, or as not credible: but the objects proposed through motives of credibility evidently known, whether with moral or physical evidence, are in no way incredible, or not credible: therefore the intellect, even with the will commanding, cannot dissent from them.

It is confirmed, because, as the Doctor best proves ibi num. 2., if the will could move the intellect to dissent from some object that appears without any motive for dissent, it would follow that at the imperium of the will the intellect could judge the stars to be equal, and likewise that the stick, which placed in water had appeared broken or curved, while drawn out from it is perceived whole and straight by sight and touch, nevertheless to be truly broken: but experience plainly teaches the contrary: therefore, etc.

Finally, the intellect is no more determined or necessitated to assent to a scientific conclusion proposed than it would be necessitated to assend by faith to a credible object proposed; for the same reason appears on both sides, seeing that the object of faith thus proposed is evident with extrinsic evidence, whether moral or physical, as those motives of credibility are evident: but, as all confess, the intellect is determined with the necessity of specification to render scientific assent regarding a scientific conclusion proposed: therefore by parity of reason it is necessitated to render the assent of faith to the object proposed with motives of credibility evidently known.

You will say. To most infidels and heretics the aforesaid motives of credibility can be proposed, who nevertheless do not believe, but even disbelieve and dissent: therefore the intellect is not determined with determination as to specification, so as to render assent to the objects of faith proposed with the motive of credibility.

I distinguish the antecedent. They dissent from the articles of faith when they apprehend the motives of credibility in such a way as to be determined by them morally or physically to assent, I deny: otherwise, I concede. That therefore they disbelieve comes from this, that whether through defect of understanding, or defect of attention and consideration, or on account of contrary motives which they possess by reason of their infidelity and heresy, they do not judge the mysteries thus proposed to be evidently credible. Indeed it can happen that, although they are interiorly convinced of the credibility of the mysteries, while they weigh and ponder the matter exactly, yet wholly devoting themselves to the motives of their errors, they easily turn the intellect away from such motives of the credibility of faith, that with obstinate will they may persist in their errors.

I confess nevertheless that very often the assent of faith is free as to specification, even while the proposal of the motives stands, for of course the evidence of credibility does not always appear perspicuously, whether through defect of a proposal of such motives insufficiently set forth, or through defect of capacity or attention on the part of the hearer. Wherefore experience shows, that although the articles of faith be sufficiently proposed to heretics, so that they sin in not believing, nevertheless they pertinaciously persist in their errors: as befell the Jews, of whom Christ the Lord John 15. said:

If I had not come, and spoken to them, they would not have sin: but now they have no excuse for their sin. And further on: If I had not done among them the works that no other man hath done, they would not have sin: but now they have both seen, and hated me, and my Father: but that the word may be fulfilled which is written in their law, that they have hated me gratuitously.

By which Christ the Lord plainly signifies that the Jews, through the miracles wrought by himself, such as no one ever had wrought, had sufficient motive to believe him truly to be the Messiah; but notwithstanding these, they were unwilling to believe, although they had no motive why they should disbelieve.

Second Conclusion. — IT IS MORE PROBABLE THAT FOR EVERY ACT OF FAITH TO BE ELICITED ON ACCOUNT OF AN OBSCURE REVELATION, THE IMMEDIATE CONCOURSE OF THE WILL COMMANDING SUCH AN ACT IS REQUIRED. This is the doctrine of the Doctor dist. 27. qu. 2. where although in num. 1. he signified that the contrary assertion is not improbable: yet he adds num. 2. And suppose that a positive motion of the will be required, still the will suffices for thus moving even in the state of pure nature, because, a supernatural object being posited present to the intellect, the will could move the intellect to understand it, provided there were in the intellect a habit inclining the intellect toward it.

The Conclusion is proved by all those authorities both of Scripture and of the Councils, together with those of the Holy Fathers, by which above it was proved that the act of faith is free: for by this reason it appears much more easily how the act of faith is most free. Then also experience favors it, since we experience that we are not accustomed to believe unless positively willing: for when two men of equal authority and truthfulness with us, one of whom would say something was revealed by God, while the other would deny it, we can bend the intellect at our pleasure toward one side, leaving the other: which certainly does not happen except through the direct imperium of the will, determining the intellect rather to believe the man affirming that thing to have been revealed by God than the one denying it. Finally, the intellect must be sufficiently determined to believe, either by the object proposed, or by the will: but it cannot be sufficiently determined immediately by the object: therefore the intellect must be determined by the will. The major stands, for nothing appears that can be determinative of the intellect besides the object and the will. But the minor is proved: the object cannot sufficiently determine the intellect, unless either it be seen in itself immediately, as holds both in those things which fall under experience and in first principles, which are apprehended through the ingenerate light: or it be inferred through necessary consequence from principles clearly known, as appears in conclusions: but the object of faith is in none of those ways evidently known to us, since such an object is a truth obscurely revealed: therefore the intellect cannot

You will object 1. The Subtle Doctor in num. 2. praised above, says:

With acquired faith posited, the credible being present, the intellect can believe through the infused habit, provided the will do not move against, nor is anything more required; that is, no other concourse of the will is desired beyond non-contrary motion, or on the hypothesis that it not turn the intellect away from the object so as to move and convert it to the consideration of another.

It is confirmed, because according to the doctrine of the Doctor, a power not impeded can of itself be directed directly into an object sufficiently proposed to it without the help of another faculty, especially when it acts naturally and necessarily, which it is certain the intellect does; seeing that it belongs to the will alone, all things pre-required for acting being posited, to be able to act or not act: therefore when the intellect has the object of faith sufficiently proposed, with the motives of credibility evidently apprehended, it needs no imperium of the will. — I answer, the Doctor said this only probabiliter, whence he immediately subjoins: And suppose that a passive motion of the will be required, etc. By which it appears that he did not put forward the prior opinion assertively. To the confirmation I say that a power not impeded is indeed borne of itself into an object sufficiently proposed, when it is determined by it directly and per se, I concede: otherwise, I deny. But the intellect, as we just now said, cannot be sufficiently determined by the object of faith: because however sufficiently it be proposed, it always remains obscure and unevident, and hence it is necessary that it be moved to it by the imperium of the will.

You will say 2. Demons believe without the imperium of the will: therefore for believing that motion and imperium of the will is not required. — I distinguish the antecedent: they believe with natural faith, pass on: with supernatural, I deny: for it is certain, as we said, that demons do not possess supernatural faith. Or otherwise, the antecedent conceded, I distinguish the consequent: demons so believe when the motives of credibility are physically evident to them, I concede: otherwise, I deny. But it holds that some objects of faith are apprehended by the demons with evident motives of credibility: for from the oracles of the Prophets designating the time of the Incarnation, and likewise from Christ's miracles and the perfect sanctity of his life, the demons were able to know him to be the Messiah, etc.

You will object 3. The will cannot move the intellect to assent rather than to dissent concerning the things of faith: therefore for rendering such assent the intellect has no need of the motion and imperium of the will. The consequence is evident. But the antecedent is proved: the will cannot move the intellect merely to the specification of an act, but only to its exercise: therefore it can only move to assent, but not to dissent. — I deny the antecedent, and likewise its proof; seeing that, as we said, when the intellect is left indifferent to the species of the act, that is, to assent or dissent, as happens while two men of equal authority, one of whom asserts something to have been revealed, while the other denies it: for then in that case the will determines the intellect indifferent of itself to assent or

The third Conclusion. — That internal act of the will is supernatural in some respect, but not according to its substance and in entity. This is the teaching of the Doctor at dist. 25. qu. 2. n. 2, where he says:

For the will to move the intellect to believing the credible, it suffices that the intellect be disposed, nor is it necessary that a disposition proportional to that be posited in the will; nor, in order that it work unevenly through an instrument, is such a proportional disposition required in the will as exists in a more perfect act of believing and in a less perfect one, but a proportional disposition in the differing intellect suffices, according as differing degrees of perfection exist in the acts.

By which words the Doctor unravels the argument of St. Thomas, by which he contended that a supernatural habit must be admitted in the will, in order that it move the intellect to eliciting the act of faith; just as a supernatural habit is required in the intellect, in order that it elicit such an act of faith in supernatural entity. And this argument of St. Thomas was of this sort:

When two agents concur toward the same effect, one by way of principal cause, the other by way of instrumental cause, a perfection as great, or at least as great as is required, is demanded in the instrumental cause as in the principal: but the will is the principal cause of the act of faith, while the intellect is the instrumental cause, or at least the less principal one: therefore if a supernatural habit be admitted in the intellect for eliciting the act of faith, much more must it be admitted in the will, so that the will may move itself to eliciting such an act.

That this argument is of no force whatsoever the Doctor demonstrates there by denying the major; for he says,

as a matter of fact certain dispositions are required in the instruments of the arts for the perfection of their effects, for instance sharpness, solidity, and hardness in an axe, whereas such perfection is not required in the locomotive power: therefore, gratuitously granting that the intellect be only the instrumental cause with respect to the act of faith, it does not follow that, if a supernatural habit is to be posited in it for eliciting the act of faith, a supernatural habit must by parity of reason also be admitted in the will, so that through it the will may move the intellect to the production of such an act; but it suffices that the will be stimulated and aided to commanding it by some actual supernatural help.

Behold the genuine opinion of the Subtle Doctor.

Proof of the first part of the Conclusion, namely that the act of the will, whereby it moves the intellect to believe, is in some manner supernatural. First indeed from all those oracles of Scripture by which it is proved that every work conducing to eternal life is from grace. Thus in Ioan. 15 Christ the Lord says: without me you can do nothing. And Rom. 9: What hast thou that thou hast not received? And ad Philip. 2: It is he who worketh in us both to will and to accomplish, etc. But that act of the will moving the intellect to faith conduces to eternal life: therefore it is from grace, and consequently in some manner supernatural: for, as Pontius says in his commentary on the above-mentioned question of the Doctor, n. ⟦251?⟧, that an act be supernatural in some manner is nothing else than that it proceed from supernatural grace conducing to eternal life.

Nor indeed, as regards this part of the Conclusion, does any difficulty appear, unless perhaps from certain words of the Subtle Doctor, who seems to judge that even that actual supernatural aid need not be posited in the will, in order that it move the intellect to believe. Whence:

You will object. He who says that the will suffices in the state of pure nature for moving the intellect does not seem to require an actual supernatural help for that: but thus the Doctor judges, for he says at n. 3: Even granted that a positive motion of the will be required, the will suffices for believing thus in the state of pure nature: therefore, etc.

I distinguish the major. He who says this by excluding every supernatural help, both habitual and actual, I grant; by excluding only the habitual, I deny. To the minor I say that by the will in the state of pure nature the Doctor understands a will not informed by a supernatural habit, concerning which alone the controversy there with St. Thomas was being waged; and not a will without the aids of actual preventing, exciting, and assisting grace in forming that command, which was indeed altogether foreign to the scope of the proposed difficulty. Hence Suarez fell into serious error, when at disp. 6. De Fide. sect. i. he says that Scotus does not seem to differ from the opinion of the Semipelagians; for from that opinion, if the Doctor be rightly understood, he differs no less than any other Catholic Doctor whatsoever.

Proof of the second part, namely that that act of the will is not supernatural in entity: First indeed: that volition, as regards its entity, must be proportioned and be of the same order as is the cognition of the intellect directing it: but the cognition directing this volition is not supernatural in entity: therefore neither is that volition in entity; for there must be proportion between the cognition proposing and the prosecution of the will, as regards naturalness and supernaturalness; whence in fact the necessary connection of supernatural faith with charity and hope is admitted by all: since these two virtues residing in the will are of the supernatural order, they also presuppose in the intellect a virtue of the same order. The minor, however, is proved: for that cognition antecedent to the command of the will consists in a judgment both speculative and practical of the intellect concerning the evidence of credibility: but that judgment is only of the natural order. It is proved: if that judgment of the intellect were of the supernatural order, faith would not rightly be called the foundation and beginning of all salvation: but the consequent appears false from what has been said: therefore, etc. Proof of the consequence of the major, because to that extent habitual faith is called the beginning of habitual justification, inasmuch as it does not presuppose any supernatural habit in substance: therefore similarly to that extent actual faith is the beginning of actual justification, inasmuch as it is the first supernatural act in substance that can be had: but if the judgment preceding and directing the command of the will were supernatural in substance, actual faith would not be the primary supernatural act, but rather that judgment; and then that judgment rather than the act of faith would have to be called the beginning of actual justification.

It is confirmed. Not every act of the intellect, supernatural in entity, universally requires a preceding similar act of the will: therefore neither does the primary act of faith necessarily require an act of faith supernatural in entity. The antecedent is plain: for the judgment of the intellect preceding the affection of believing in the will does not suppose any act of the will supernatural in entity, otherwise one would have to proceed to infinity: therefore, etc. The consequence also stands by parity of reason.

You will say. From Sacred Scripture, the Councils, and the Holy Fathers, the will to believe requires special grace, and consequently it ought to be supernatural in entity.

I deny the consequence, since grace is required for many things which are not supernatural in entity: for through acts of acquired moral virtues, which are not supernatural in substance, we very often at least observe the precepts and overcome the gravest temptations: but particular grace of Christ is required for the acts whereby these are done, as I suppose from the Treatise on Actual Grace. Moreover, because it is certain that this is a very great gift of God, that here and now, when someone would not give alms unless such species were excited or such circumstances applied, those species are excited and those circumstances applied so that the largesse of alms should follow, even on account of natural honesty; and consequently actual grace is sometimes required for acts which are not supernatural in entity.

You will urge. Therefore it is gathered that the acts of faith, hope, and charity are supernatural in substance, because Sacred Scripture and the Councils signify that they cannot be elicited without grace: therefore, since the same is said of the volition of believing, that too ought to be called supernatural in entity.

I answer to the antecedent, that it is not from precisely this reason ⟦intus?⟧ that those virtues are supernatural, but especially from other heads, and truly above all because those habits are infused in justification and baptism: but habits infused per se are per se supernatural as regards substance, as we said above: therefore, etc.

You will press. Therefore God infuses habits, which are said to be infused per se, in order that there be some proportion between our merits and the reward of beatitude, which, being supernatural, requires also merit of the same order: but the merit of faith also depends upon that volition of believing; for precisely for this reason does the assent of faith have the ratio of merit, because it is commanded by the will, through the mediation of that volition itself: therefore the volition itself ought to be supernatural in entity no less than the habit of faith.

I answer by distinguishing the major. That those infused habits are granted in order that there be a proportion between their acts and the reward of beatitude precisely, I deny: for the reason of the infusion of those habits is rightly referred back to the divine will, whose motives are often hidden from us: that they are granted on account of other ends, I grant. To the minor likewise I say that supernatural faith is not precisely infused in order that a supernatural object be proposed to the will, and that there be a certain proportion between the act of the proposing intellect and the prosecuting will. Add that the merit of faith could have a proportion in supernaturalness with the reward of beatitude, even though it depended upon a volition which was not supernatural; since besides that volition the supernatural habit of faith concurs toward eliciting such an act.