Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

NOTE 1. Certitude is the firmness and constancy of some thing. Which is threefold, namely objective certitude, subjective, and formal. Objective certitude is the necessity and immobility of a thing in itself. And this is twofold: namely the necessity and invariability of essence and existence, which befits God alone; and the necessity of essence, or of a proposition, which is the necessary connection of the predicate with the subject. Which again is threefold: first metaphysical, whereby not even divinely can a thing be otherwise, e. g. man is rational. Second physical, when at least naturally the proposition cannot be false, e. g. every fire burns. Third moral, when the proposition is true according to the accustomed order of nature: but since this does not remove contingency, it does not even suffice for science. Formal certitude is the necessary determination of cognition to truth. Which can be considered either on the part of its cause, or on the part of its object. In the first sense that is called more certain which has a more certain cause, or motive: and thus the act of faith is more certain than the act of science, because it leans upon divine truth. In the second sense that is called more certain which more fully attains the intellect, and perceives more evidently; by which reason the act of science is called more certain than the act of faith, because we perceive the objects of science, being proportioned to us, more easily. Subjective certitude is the firm adherence of the intellect to some object on account of an infallible motive.

But this arises either from experience, such as the certitude we have concerning the heat of fire; or from the evidence of natural light, such as is the certitude concerning first principles; or from due inference, such as is the certitude concerning a conclusion deduced from premises in legitimate form and matter. Thence four conditions of certitude are gathered from the Doctor in the Proemium of book 1 of the Posterior Analytics: the first is, that the intellect firmly adhere. The second, that that to which it adheres be certain. The third, that the motive for which it adheres be infallible. The fourth, that the motive be duly applied.

NOTE 3. That the opinion of Theologians is various in assigning the precise reason why faith is more certain than any other cognition. For certain ones with Cajetan contend that the assent of faith is more certain than science in itself, but not in regard to us: others indeed wish that greater certitude is to be sought on the part of the object, not of the subject, such that faith indeed is more certain than any science on the part of God, because it is impossible for Him to be deceived or to deceive; but science on the part of the subject is more certain than faith, because faith suffers doubt along with itself, but science does not. Some seek that greater certitude from the firmer radication of faith itself in the subject; such that faith adheres far more tenaciously and immovably to the intellect than any scientific habit. There are also those who philosophize ingeniously and acutely, saying that faith indeed is appretiatively more certain than science, but not otherwise. For just as, they say, he is judged to love God more who is prepared to abandon all things on His account; so he must be called appretiatively more certain who is prepared to abandon all natural assents on account of the assent of faith. Finally certain ones will that therefore the assent of faith be more certain than any scientific assent, and also than that which proceeds from understanding, or the habit of first principles, because namely it is elicited from a principle effectively far more certain than any natural knowledge innate or acquired.

Two things therefore are here to be determined: First, whether faith be truly more certain than any other cognition: Secondly, whence that greater certitude proceeds.

FIRST CONCLUSION. — THE ASSENT OF FAITH IS TRULY MORE CERTAIN THAN THE ASSENT OF ANY NATURAL SCIENCE WHATSOEVER. So the Doctor in many places, but especially in t. dist. 11, qu. 3, n. 5, where he says: Those truths however are more excellent, insofar as the natural light of the wayfarer does not attain them: both because those truths are more certain than many others to which the natural light of the wayfarer does attain, because they are true from that truth which can neither deceive nor be deceived. Whence to one having faith, that God inspired all of Sacred Scripture, and that He Himself is the infallible truth, whatever is revealed by Him in Scripture must be more certain than that to which any intellect whatsoever can attain by natural light. Thus likewise teach the Alexandrian, part 3, qu. 68, the Seraphic Doctor in 3 dist. 23, qu. 4, and the Angelic Doctor 2. 2, qu. 1, art. 8, as well as nearly all Theologians against Durandus in 3 dist. 23, qu. 7, n. 10.

It is proved first from Sacred Scripture, which teaches in many places that the assent of faith is far more certain than any assent elicited through the natural sciences. For Christ the Lord willed to signify this very thing Luke 21, as some interpret, when He said: Heaven and earth shall pass away; but my words shall not pass away, that is, Philosophy shall fail in the speculation of the heavens and the investigation of their motions, influences, and incorruption; but my words shall not fail. Wherefore St. Peter, comparing the certitude of Prophecy and faith with the vision of the eyes, says Epist. 2, ch. 2: We have the more firm prophetical word, etc. The same St. John signifies 1 Epist. ch. 5: If we receive the testimony of men, he says, the testimony of God is greater. But most clearly of all St. Paul teaches this truth 1 ad Cor., ch. 2, verse 10, where speaking of the doctrine of our faith, and comparing it with human wisdom, he writes thus: That which is foolish of God is wiser than men, and that which is weak of God is stronger than men: and in order to show more this strength and certitude of the doctrine of our faith above every strength and certitude of human science, he subjoins thus: The foolish things of the world hath God chosen, that he may confound the wise, and the weak things of the world hath God chosen, that he may confound the strong. That is, God, that He might show the power, efficacy, and certitude of the doctrine of our faith, chose those to preach it who according to human judgment were unapt to teach others. Likewise 2 ad Cor., ch. 10, he says thus: The arms of our warfare are not carnal, but powerful of God unto the destruction of fortifications, destroying counsels, and every height that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God, and bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of Christ: by which words the Apostle signifies that the doctrine of faith, which he preached, is more powerful, and consequently more certain, than human sciences, with which the Pseudo-Apostles opposed him.

The same truth the holy Fathers openly teach, especially St. Basil in his Homily upon Psalm 115, where he says: Faith draws the soul to assent above rational methods. Chrysostom, Hom. 12 on the Epistle to the Hebrews: Faith, he says, cannot be spoken of, unless one have more certitude concerning those things that are not seen than concerning those things that are seen. To these concurs St. Augustine, lib. 15 Confess., ch. 10, writing: More easily would I doubt that I am, than that truth is, which I heard in my heart. And also St. Bernard Epist. 190, ch. 1, where he teaches that faith is not doubtful estimation, as Abailard wished, but certitude, and that far greater than Philosophy.

It is proved also by reason; for that assent is simply more certain than all others which is more determined to truth: but the assent of faith is more determined to truth with respect to its object than is any natural assent whatsoever: therefore it is more certain. The minor is proved: that assent is more determined to truth which leans upon a motive more immutable as regards truth: but the assent of divine faith leans upon a motive more immutable as regards truth than are the motives of the assent of all natural habits of the intellect; since it leans upon the divine revelation and truth, which is far more certain and more immutable than all created motives, upon which all natural cognitions lean: therefore the assent of divine faith is far more certain than is the assent of all natural habits. — Then, the certitude of divine faith depends upon infused and divine light, which indicates truth far more excellent and perspicacious than the natural light of the intellect: and consequently that assent is far more certain. — Finally, that assent must be called more certain wherein men adhere far more firmly and tenaciously to the truth proposed, than they adhere through any other assents whatsoever of the intellect: but such is the case with the assent of faith by comparison with the assents of any natural cognition whatever; which certainly follows from this, that none of the Philosophers, even the most expert, ever willed to defend unto the shedding of blood and death those truths to which they assented, and which they upheld under the guidance of natural light: but innumerable faithful poured out all their blood, and judged it wiser to undergo whatever heavier punishments rather than depart ever so little from the truth known to them through faith; and consequently the faithful adhere more tenaciously to the propositions of faith than each expert could adhere to the truth known to him through natural light.

You will say. That is called more certain about which no one can be in doubt, than that about which one can doubt: but there can be doubt concerning truth known through faith: otherwise it is with truth known through science, which excludes all doubt: therefore the assent of faith is not more certain than the assent which can be had through science. The major stands: since that certitude is judged greater which excludes all doubt. The Doctor admits the minor in 3 dist. 23, n. 16, where he objects that infused faith does not exclude all doubt more than acquired faith: therefore, he says, infused faith is not more certain as regards not being deceived than acquired faith. Which objection indeed he leaves unsolved, for he says: If on account of some greater certitude you wish to say (namely that infused faith is necessary, but not acquired) you are wont to make an argument made, which it is not. But dist. 21, n. 17, speaking of the Prophets and Apostles, who had a habit inclining to firm assent regarding all things revealed, says it was not a habit of science, because it was not from the evidence of the thing; it was nevertheless a greater certitude of faith, because faith does not exclude all doubt, and some doubt can stand together with faith. The minor also is evident; for the cognition of science and of first principles exclude all doubt altogether, and consequently their assent is more certain than the assent of faith. — I deny the minor. For faith does not admit all doubt utterly, at least free, or voluntary and deliberate: for although undue deliberation can be found together with habitual faith, yet it can nowhere exist together with actual faith, whence certain indeliberate doubts do not detract from the greater certitude of faith. But to the Doctor I say that in that objection of his he spoke those words only while doubting, not confirming: whence Quodlib. 14 and 17 he openly teaches the contrary, affirming that the assent of faith excludes all doubt utterly.

You will say 2. Assent given on account of evidence is more certain than that which is given only on account of adherence: but the assent of science is on account of evidence: while that of faith is only on account of adherence, and the command of the will: therefore, etc. The major stands, for assent on account of evidence is necessary and natural, and consequently immutable: but assent on account of adherence is voluntary, and consequently is not of the same certitude and necessity. — I distinguish the major. If that evidence of the object allure the assent of the intellect by a more efficacious and firmer motive than that motive on account of which the intellect adheres to some proposition on account of the testimony of the speaker, I concede: otherwise, I deny. It is certain however that the evidence of any natural object whatsoever is not of equal virtue and efficacy with the divine veracity, with which it utterly conflicts to deceive or be deceived; and consequently it impels the assent of the intellect less efficaciously: whence the consequence must be denied.

You will say 3. The certitude of an assent is the greater by how much the assent itself is more intense: but it often happens that a natural evident assent is far greater and more intense than the assent of divine faith: therefore it is also more certain. — I distinguish the major. If that intensio be attended according to certitude, I concede: if according to the entity of the act, I deny. For here a greater or lesser intensity of assent is altogether indifferent to certitude: whence however much the most evident assent of natural science might grow as regards its intension, it would nowhere arrive at the certitude of the assent of divine faith: for a thing of interior order and species, however much it grows within its own order and species, nowhere attains that perfection in which it is found in some individual, even the lowest, of a superior order and species; however much a body be perfected in bodily perfection, it would nowhere attain the perfection of a spiritual substance, even the least.

You will say 4. Sight is more certain than hearing: whence intuitive knowledge is more excellent than that which is acquired by discipline: but science is a kind of intellectual vision, and moreover its principles can at times be resolved into intuitive cognition, as is clear in Mathematics: but Faith cometh by hearing, says the Apostle to the Romans 10. Nor can any of its principles be resolved up to intuitive cognition: therefore the assent of science seems more certain than the assent of faith. — I distinguish the major. If sight and hearing are equally perfect, I concede: otherwise, I deny; for someone having very weak sight may see a column distant from himself, which he will judge to be wooden: but hearing from men worthy of trust that it is of marble, in that case he will believe what he has heard more firmly than what he has seen with his own eyes. The same, says Isambert, dist. 22. art. 3., occurs in the present difficulty: our intellectual sight, or our power of understanding considered in itself, is very weak with respect to supernatural objects, and although it is rendered proportionate to them through the intuition of divine faith, yet because divine faith always has an obscurity joined to it, it happens that the intellect instructed thereby cannot determine its will to give assent to it; but our spiritual hearing has divine authority, namely the first truth speaking, than which nothing can be more certain; and therefore our intellect must defer more to it, and believe it rather than its own spiritual vision, or its natural cognition.

Second Conclusion. — That greater certainty of faith above all natural knowledges arises especially from this, that it proceeds from a habit, or assistance, wholly and infallibly determining to the truth. So the Doctor, in 3. dist. 23. n. 18., where he says:

Although acquired faith suffices for the assent and certainty of the act, insofar as to believe is opposed to opining, nevertheless it is not so perfectly certain as with infused faith; nor would the act be so intense, nor does it suffice in first being: because acquired faith does not perfect the soul so perfectly as infused faith.

By these words the Doctor signifies that the reason for the greater certainty of the act of faith must be sought from the same habit infallibly inclining to and determining to the true; which indeed he declares and explains more clearly in Quodlibet II. q. 1., where he proves that falsehood can in no way underlie faith, because it is a participation of the divine light; and consequently, just as the divine light itself cannot incline except to the true, so also the infused habit of faith, since it is a special participation of the same, cannot elicit an act which is not wholly certain.

The Conclusion therefore is proved: That act is for this reason altogether more certain than all others with which it agrees generically, because it proceeds from a principle more infallibly and efficaciously determining to the true: but the act of faith proceeds from the habit of the same, which determines to the true more infallibly and efficaciously than any natural habit: therefore for this reason it must be judged more certain than the others. The major stands, for on no other account is the act of science or of understanding judged certain than because those principles from which it proceeds incline infallibly to the true, as far as lies in themselves. The minor also is clear: because the habit of faith, since it is a nobler and more intimate participation of the divine light than are all the natural sciences, which participate the divine light only according to natural being, while faith participates it according to supernatural being, and hence in a nobler and loftier manner, thence it is that, just as in its entity it is a more excellent light, so also in its operation it determines to the true more efficaciously. — It is confirmed: if that greater certainty were not to be sought precisely from the side of the habit of faith itself, it would have to be drawn from some other principle, especially from those assigned in the last Notable: but it is not so. For the first manner of speaking among them, namely that faith is indeed more certain in itself, but not with respect to us, or as it is in us, cannot stand: both because from Sacred Scripture it is openly evident that the act of faith, even as it is in us, is more certain than all the acts of the natural sciences: which indeed the Apostle indicates to the Galatians: Though we, says the Apostle, or an Angel from heaven preach a gospel to you besides that which we have preached to you, let him be anathema. And to impress this more strongly, as most true and most certain, he immediately repeats: As we said before, so now I say again: if any one preach to you a gospel, besides that which you have received, let him be anathema. By which words he signifies that we ought to believe the articles and truths of divine faith more firmly than any human cognition, or even Angelic persuasion. Then also because that manner of speaking does not explain how the assent of faith could be judged more certain than every assent of the natural sciences; for if faith does not make us more certain than natural habits do, we can assert it to be more certain on no account. Finally then because every form actualizing and informing some subject necessarily communicates to it its formal and immediate effect according to the degree of its perfection; for such an effect is nothing else than the very actual communication of its own form: but the assent of divine faith is a kind of form actualizing and informing the intellect of every believer, and its primary effect (whose proper note is that it is more certain than any natural assent): therefore it confers the same degree of certainty upon the intellect in which it inheres, and hence faith is not only more certain in itself, but also with respect to us.

Nor does it avail to reply that the same holds of the light of faith, proportion being preserved, as of the light of the Sun, which although in itself and of itself it is far greater than the light of a candle, yet at times it can happen that the eye is better illuminated by the light of a candle than by the light of the Sun, on account of some dark cloud standing between the Sun itself and the seeing eye. This, I say, does not help; since that example is not to the purpose; for the candle illuminates more clearly than the light of the Sun precisely because there is a disproportion on the part of the medium for receiving the light of the Sun; but there is no similar disproportion between the habit of faith and the intellect, in which that habit immediately inheres.

Nor can the second opinion be admitted, namely that faith is indeed more certain on the part of the object, but not of the subject: for this almost coincides with the former, and is impugned by the same considerations.

Nor yet the third, namely that the greater certainty of faith consists in its deeper rooting in the subject; for greater or lesser rootedness in the subject contributes nothing to the intensification of a quality, as has been proved in the Physics; since some quality can be divinely intensified to the highest degree, in which it will have a far deeper rooting in the subject than that which is produced successively by a natural cause; and yet it will not be more excellent by reason of that rootedness: therefore the same must be said of the habit and assent of faith.

Nor yet the fourth, namely that science is indeed more certain by evidential certainty, but faith by the certainty of science; for although faith depends upon the will, nevertheless the will does not confer that certainty upon it, otherwise faith would not have intellectual certainty, but would only be certain affectively, nor would we be certain about the proposition of faith otherwise than because we so will, the contrary of which is apparent; for therefore we will to assent to God through faith because we know that he has revealed it, and cannot deceive or be deceived.

Finally the last opinion cannot be proved, namely that faith is indeed more certain appreciatively than science, but not otherwise: for the greater certainty appreciatively is only affective, not intellectual; and hence it is not intrinsic to faith itself, which is a habit, or an assent of the intellect. Moreover faith and science can be about one object, suppose that God is one, good, omnipotent, etc.; in which case the will cannot be prepared to defer to the light of science, so that it assents to the proposed object solely by the light and guidance of faith: therefore, etc.