Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

NOTE 1. That this definition of faith is brought forward by certain Theologians from St. Augustine, who in the book De Praedestinatione Sanctorum, chapter 2, says: to believe is nothing else than to think with assent: which definition St. Thomas explains thus in question 2, article 1, as wishing by those words to comprehend the genus and the difference of faith itself; for thought holds the place of the genus; but assent denotes the difference of the very act of faith from evident cognition, insofar as it signifies some liberty in that adherence of the intellect whereby it offers firm assent to some proposition on account of the divine authority alone. Which indeed seems to be explained from St. Augustine himself, who in the book De Spiritu et Littera, chapter 34, says:

What is it to believe, unless to consent that what is said is true?

Therefore that assent, although it be not an act of the will, which rather is called consent, is nevertheless elicited dependently upon the consent of the will; wherefore Suarez, disp. 6, sect. 1, n. 9, and de Lugo, disp. 8, sect. 3, n. 30, note most especially that although that explanation of St. Thomas may seem acute, it is not according to the mind of St. Augustine; inasmuch as St. Augustine there did not intend to define divine faith, but only to explain some generic predicate, from which he would prove against the Semipelagians that not only the progress or increase, but also the very beginning of faith must be in us from the grace of God. To this end he uses pious thought, which seems to be the genus of divine faith: for by it faith seems to agree with human faith; but from it he infers that faith pertaining to salvation is only from the grace of God; since, as St. Paul says to the Philippians 3, we are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves, namely in those things that pertain to piety, as St. Augustine explains there: wherefore another definition of faith must be sought.

NOTE 2. The definition of faith which Theologians commonly receive is handed down by the Apostle to the Hebrews 11, where he says:

Now faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not.

In which definition the discourse is concerning actual faith, whatever Erasmus may cry out to the contrary, who in his Annotations upon that passage wishes that by the name of faith there is meant there not the evidence of things that appear not: and concerning the same he subjoins: Without faith it is impossible to please God; for he that cometh to God must believe that he is. Which indeed pertains to the understanding, and afterwards concerning the same faith he adds: By faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God, etc., and he brings forward other examples, which altogether signify intellectual assent. It must also be observed that the Apostle does not there institute a discourse concerning objective faith, or the object of faith, but concerning faith itself formal, or our internal assent; for objective faith consists of the things that are hoped for and do not appear: but the faith which is here defined is the substance of things to be hoped for, and the evidence of things that appear not; and straightway it is distinguished from the object of faith; for the object is not the substance, or foundation of itself, nor is an argument the proof of itself. Whether, however, the aforesaid definition of faith be accurate, or whether it be only an encomium of the same faith, as Erasmus will have it, or merely a description of it through its effects, as certain Theologians wish, must be determined.

NOTE 3. All the internal acts of infused faith are of the same species, inasmuch as they have the same formal object, namely the divine veracity, and the same motive, that is, the same divine revelation, which is not varied in species, although it manifests objects distinct in species. Nor does it stand in the way that some acts of faith seem affirmative, others negative, as when we believe that that is not, nor shall be, which is so denied by God, for example when we believe the pains of hell are nowhere to end, since God asserts them to be eternal; for this assent, although it seem negative, is nevertheless truly affirmative; for we do not believe these things for any other reason than because God, who is truthful in speaking, has revealed them. Whence that act is rather assent than dissent. Add that we do not believe the pains of hell are nowhere to end for any other reason than because we believe they will be eternal: but to believe something to be eternal is not assent and dissent: therefore acts of faith do not seem to be distinguished in species by this reason: wherefore there remains here to be investigated how the internal act of divine faith is divided, according to the diverse manner of tending to God proposing the objects to be believed.

FIRST CONCLUSION. — FAITH IS RIGHTLY DEFINED BY THE APOSTLE: THE SUBSTANCE OF THINGS TO BE HOPED FOR, THE EVIDENCE OF THINGS THAT APPEAR NOT.

So the Seraphic Doctor, dist. 23, art. 1, qu. 5, together with the other Princes of Theology. Which Conclusion he proves most excellently thus:

Then a definition, or notification, is rightly assigned when it contains nothing superfluous, and nothing diminished. And this is when by that notification the essence of the thing defined is plainly indicated, and openly manifested, and separated from all others: but this is found in the matter at hand, if anyone attends. For faith itself according to its essence regards something on the part of the intellect, and something on the part of the affection. For it has to stabilize the affection, and illuminate the intellect. And inasmuch as it stabilizes the affection, it is called substance, or foundation; inasmuch however as it illuminates the intellect, it is called argument: therefore in order that the essence of faith might be fully explicated, it was fitting that it be defined, or notified, so that it might be called at once substance and argument; for a definition ought to enclose within itself the whole essence of the thing defined: > it ought also nevertheless to notify it openly. Since therefore the habit of virtue is to be notified in two ways, namely through its ultimate end, and through its object: but the end of faith itself consists in eternal beatitude, which we hope for, and thus in things to be hoped for: while the object consists in truth not seen, and thus in things that appear not: therefore it was opportune that faith be defined through things to be hoped for and things that appear not, so that thus the notification of faith might not only explicate the essence of the thing defined fully through intellect and affection, but also manifest it openly through end and object. A definition also ought to separate the thing defined from all others. And since formed faith is to be distinguished from unformed faith, it is also to be distinguished from the habit of any other virtue; from unformed faith, I say, it is distinguished, inasmuch as it sustains the whole spiritual fabric: from the other virtues, however, inasmuch as it makes one adhere to truth not seen. Therefore with respect to these two things, it is called the substance of things to be hoped for, that it may be distinguished from unformed faith; and the evidence of things that appear not, that it may be distinguished from the habits of other virtues. And thus it is clear that the aforesaid notification contains nothing superfluous, nothing diminished, nor is there in it any clause, or word, no nor even an idle syllable. It must therefore be granted that it is conveniently, and artfully assigned, such that it has in itself truth, convertibility, evidence, and sufficiency so perfectly and completely, that even the most expert of Philosophers could not assign it more artfully and more completely.

You will say 1: Faith is a quality, as we have said: therefore it is not rightly called substance. — The Seraphic Doctor answers that substance is taken in two ways, namely properly, and transumptively, or by appropriation. Properly indeed when it signifies matter, or substantial form, or the composite, or the essence of anything. But by appropriation, when some property of substance befits it. Now in this latter mode faith is called substance, namely because it is the foundation of the spiritual fabric which it sustains; just as substance is the foundation of accidents, and matter the foundation of forms. Hence St. Damascene, book 1, chapter 11, writes hypostasis in place of substance, saying: Faith is the hypostasis of things to be hoped for, the rebuttal of those things that are not seen.

You will say 2: No virtue is an argument, nor is any argument a virtue: but faith is a virtue: therefore it is not rightly called an argument. — The same Seraphic Doctor answers that argument also is taken either properly, or by appropriation. Properly indeed argument is said in four ways: first, for ratiocination: secondly, for the brief collection of a longer discourse: thirdly, for the mean, in which consists the whole force of argumentation: finally fourthly, for the major proposition itself, in which consists the firmness of the whole inference: all of which are called argument for this reason, that they argue the mind and illumine it, inasmuch as it apprehends something and firmly adheres to it. According to which acceptation faith can be called the argument of things that appear not, because it argues and illumines the mind, that it give assent to a thing obscurely proposed on account of the divine authority; just as argumentation moves the intellect to adhere to a proposition manifested and proved.

You will say 3: Through faith we believe eternal punishments are to come: but that belief is not the substance of things to be hoped for, but rather of things to be feared and fled: therefore the aforesaid definition does not befit every act of faith. — The same Seraphic Doctor answers the minor, that the belief concerning punishments can be considered either after the manner of an object, or after the manner of an end; but it is, he says, of things to be hoped for not after the manner of an object, but after the manner of an end; for we believe eternal punishments precisely that we may thereby be spurred to attain eternal beatitude.

You will say finally: Faith is the substance of the whole spiritual edifice: but charity contributes to that edifice no less, nay far more than hope, and consequently faith must no less be called the substance of things to be loved than of things to be hoped for: therefore the aforesaid definition is not sufficient. — The same Seraphic Doctor answers that faith is more fittingly called the substance of things to be hoped for than of things to be believed or loved: for, he says, by being called of things to be hoped for, the end of the virtue is more given to be understood, which is beatitude itself awaited, than by being called of things to be believed, or loved, or feared. For these acts are directed not only to the end, but also to those things that are toward the end.

Truly, if anyone inspect the matter more deeply, he will easily discover with the Subtle Doctor, dist. 23, that the aforesaid definition of the Apostle is rather a description of faith through its effects than an accurate definition. Whence internal actual faith can more rightly be defined by saying, that faith is the actual assent, firm and certain, of the created intellect, founded upon the authority of God obscurely revealing. It is called assent, whereby it agrees quasi-generically with very many acts of the intellect, e. g. science, opinion, and human faith. It is called actual, that it may be distinguished from habitual faith. Supernatural is added, that its distinction from all natural acts of the intellect may appear. Firm and certain is added, that it may be distinguished from opinion, which moves not to a certain and firm assent, but to a probable and doubtful one. Finally, on account of the authority of God is added, that it may be distinguished from human faith, which moves to assent only on account of the authority of the man proposing.

SECOND CONCLUSION. — IN THREE WAYS CAN THE INTERNAL ACT OF DIVINE FAITH BE ELICITED, NAMELY EITHER BY BELIEVING THAT GOD IS, OR BY BELIEVING GOD, OR BY BELIEVING IN GOD. This is common among Theologians. Proof: An act can be exercised in as many ways as it can have diverse tendencies toward its principal object: but faith can tend toward God, who is its principal object, in three ways. First indeed it tends toward Him as toward its material object, and object of attribution, and thus we have the first act, which is to believe God, that is, to believe God to be, or to exist. Secondly faith can tend toward its formal object, which is the divine revelation itself, or the authority of God revealing; and thus arises the second act of faith, namely to believe God, that is, some one revealing, or proposing as true, because He Himself can neither be deceived nor deceive. Thirdly finally, one can tend toward God through the pious affection of the will inclining the intellect, that it assent to the propositions of faith, and thus the third act is admitted, namely to believe in God, that is, by believing to tend toward Him as toward the ultimate end through the affection of the will, or as St. Augustine speaks, Serm. 18 de tempore, etc. de verbis Domini, to believe in God is to love by believing, to go to Him by believing, to adhere to Him by believing, and to be incorporated into His members. — Yet I would not have you think that those three modes of tending toward God import so many really distinct acts of faith: for truly in every act of divine faith these three are included, namely to believe God, to believe God, and to believe in God: since every true act of divine faith has for its material object God Himself at least as object of attribution, for its formal object the authority of God revealing, and proceeds from the intellect as stimulated and excited by the will: but these three are nothing else than to believe God, to believe God, and to believe in God: and consequently those three modes of believing do not import diverse acts of faith. — It is confirmed: for if anything stood in the way of these three belonging to one and the same act, especially since sinners can believe God and believe God, but cannot believe in God; because they are not borne toward Him by pious affection of the will: yet this does not appear true: since while they are sinners they profess that they believe in God: not indeed only in the person of the Church, as St. Thomas signifies, but also in their own person; whence St. Bernard, Serm. 21 on the Canticles, attributes faith in God to a sinner; which certainly is taken from Scripture John 12, where it is said: Many of the rulers believed in him: but because of the Pharisees they did not confess him, that they might not be cast out of the synagogue: for they loved the glory of men more than the glory of God: those therefore who are said to have believed in Christ were truly sinners, since they feared to offend men more than God. Whence St. Chrysostom, Hom. 52 on Matthew: It profits nothing, he says, that you believe in the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, unless you live rightly.