Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

Having explained Divine Faith as to its object and its habit, from which, as from principles, the act of faith proceeds, consideration and discussion of the act of such faith presents itself in due order. Now since this act is twofold — namely the internal one, which is that firm assent itself founded upon the authority of God obscurely revealing; and the external one, which is the sensible exhibition and declaration of the interior act of faith, or its profession by some external and apparent sign, whereby the internal act of faith is made manifest and declared — hence both of these acts must be treated in the present Article, inquiring and resolving: First, what the internal act of faith is, and of how many kinds: Second, wherein lies its certitude: Third, how and when it is necessary: Fourth, in what manner the will concurs toward it: Fifth and last, how and when it is necessary to profess the faith by an external sign.

NOTE 1. That this definition of faith is brought forward by certain Theologians from St. Augustine, who in the book De Praedestinatione Sanctorum, chapter 2, says: to believe is nothing else than to think with assent: which definition St. Thomas explains thus in question 2, article 1, as wishing by those words to comprehend the genus and the difference of faith itself; for thought holds the place of the genus; but assent denotes the difference of the very act of faith from evident cognition, insofar as it signifies some liberty in that adherence of the intellect whereby it offers firm assent to some proposition on account of the divine authority alone. Which indeed seems to be explained from St. Augustine himself, who in the book De Spiritu et Littera, chapter 34, says:

What is it to believe, unless to consent that what is said is true?

Therefore that assent, although it be not an act of the will, which rather is called consent, is nevertheless elicited dependently upon the consent of the will; wherefore Suarez, disp. 6, sect. 1, n. 9, and de Lugo, disp. 8, sect. 3, n. 30, note most especially that although that explanation of St. Thomas may seem acute, it is not according to the mind of St. Augustine; inasmuch as St. Augustine there did not intend to define divine faith, but only to explain some generic predicate, from which he would prove against the Semipelagians that not only the progress or increase, but also the very beginning of faith must be in us from the grace of God. To this end he uses pious thought, which seems to be the genus of divine faith: for by it faith seems to agree with human faith; but from it he infers that faith pertaining to salvation is only from the grace of God; since, as St. Paul says to the Philippians 3, we are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves, namely in those things that pertain to piety, as St. Augustine explains there: wherefore another definition of faith must be sought.

NOTE 2. The definition of faith which Theologians commonly receive is handed down by the Apostle to the Hebrews 11, where he says:

Now faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not.

In which definition the discourse is concerning actual faith, whatever Erasmus may cry out to the contrary, who in his Annotations upon that passage wishes that by the name of faith there is meant there not the evidence of things that appear not: and concerning the same he subjoins: Without faith it is impossible to please God; for he that cometh to God must believe that he is. Which indeed pertains to the understanding, and afterwards concerning the same faith he adds: By faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God, etc., and he brings forward other examples, which altogether signify intellectual assent. It must also be observed that the Apostle does not there institute a discourse concerning objective faith, or the object of faith, but concerning faith itself formal, or our internal assent; for objective faith consists of the things that are hoped for and do not appear: but the faith which is here defined is the substance of things to be hoped for, and the evidence of things that appear not; and straightway it is distinguished from the object of faith; for the object is not the substance, or foundation of itself, nor is an argument the proof of itself. Whether, however, the aforesaid definition of faith be accurate, or whether it be only an encomium of the same faith, as Erasmus will have it, or merely a description of it through its effects, as certain Theologians wish, must be determined.

NOTE 3. All the internal acts of infused faith are of the same species, inasmuch as they have the same formal object, namely the divine veracity, and the same motive, that is, the same divine revelation, which is not varied in species, although it manifests objects distinct in species. Nor does it stand in the way that some acts of faith seem affirmative, others negative, as when we believe that that is not, nor shall be, which is so denied by God, for example when we believe the pains of hell are nowhere to end, since God asserts them to be eternal; for this assent, although it seem negative, is nevertheless truly affirmative; for we do not believe these things for any other reason than because God, who is truthful in speaking, has revealed them. Whence that act is rather assent than dissent. Add that we do not believe the pains of hell are nowhere to end for any other reason than because we believe they will be eternal: but to believe something to be eternal is not assent and dissent: therefore acts of faith do not seem to be distinguished in species by this reason: wherefore there remains here to be investigated how the internal act of divine faith is divided, according to the diverse manner of tending to God proposing the objects to be believed.

FIRST CONCLUSION. — FAITH IS RIGHTLY DEFINED BY THE APOSTLE: THE SUBSTANCE OF THINGS TO BE HOPED FOR, THE EVIDENCE OF THINGS THAT APPEAR NOT.

So the Seraphic Doctor, dist. 23, art. 1, qu. 5, together with the other Princes of Theology. Which Conclusion he proves most excellently thus:

Then a definition, or notification, is rightly assigned when it contains nothing superfluous, and nothing diminished. And this is when by that notification the essence of the thing defined is plainly indicated, and openly manifested, and separated from all others: but this is found in the matter at hand, if anyone attends. For faith itself according to its essence regards something on the part of the intellect, and something on the part of the affection. For it has to stabilize the affection, and illuminate the intellect. And inasmuch as it stabilizes the affection, it is called substance, or foundation; inasmuch however as it illuminates the intellect, it is called argument: therefore in order that the essence of faith might be fully explicated, it was fitting that it be defined, or notified, so that it might be called at once substance and argument; for a definition ought to enclose within itself the whole essence of the thing defined: > it ought also nevertheless to notify it openly. Since therefore the habit of virtue is to be notified in two ways, namely through its ultimate end, and through its object: but the end of faith itself consists in eternal beatitude, which we hope for, and thus in things to be hoped for: while the object consists in truth not seen, and thus in things that appear not: therefore it was opportune that faith be defined through things to be hoped for and things that appear not, so that thus the notification of faith might not only explicate the essence of the thing defined fully through intellect and affection, but also manifest it openly through end and object. A definition also ought to separate the thing defined from all others. And since formed faith is to be distinguished from unformed faith, it is also to be distinguished from the habit of any other virtue; from unformed faith, I say, it is distinguished, inasmuch as it sustains the whole spiritual fabric: from the other virtues, however, inasmuch as it makes one adhere to truth not seen. Therefore with respect to these two things, it is called the substance of things to be hoped for, that it may be distinguished from unformed faith; and the evidence of things that appear not, that it may be distinguished from the habits of other virtues. And thus it is clear that the aforesaid notification contains nothing superfluous, nothing diminished, nor is there in it any clause, or word, no nor even an idle syllable. It must therefore be granted that it is conveniently, and artfully assigned, such that it has in itself truth, convertibility, evidence, and sufficiency so perfectly and completely, that even the most expert of Philosophers could not assign it more artfully and more completely.

You will say 1: Faith is a quality, as we have said: therefore it is not rightly called substance. — The Seraphic Doctor answers that substance is taken in two ways, namely properly, and transumptively, or by appropriation. Properly indeed when it signifies matter, or substantial form, or the composite, or the essence of anything. But by appropriation, when some property of substance befits it. Now in this latter mode faith is called substance, namely because it is the foundation of the spiritual fabric which it sustains; just as substance is the foundation of accidents, and matter the foundation of forms. Hence St. Damascene, book 1, chapter 11, writes hypostasis in place of substance, saying: Faith is the hypostasis of things to be hoped for, the rebuttal of those things that are not seen.

You will say 2: No virtue is an argument, nor is any argument a virtue: but faith is a virtue: therefore it is not rightly called an argument. — The same Seraphic Doctor answers that argument also is taken either properly, or by appropriation. Properly indeed argument is said in four ways: first, for ratiocination: secondly, for the brief collection of a longer discourse: thirdly, for the mean, in which consists the whole force of argumentation: finally fourthly, for the major proposition itself, in which consists the firmness of the whole inference: all of which are called argument for this reason, that they argue the mind and illumine it, inasmuch as it apprehends something and firmly adheres to it. According to which acceptation faith can be called the argument of things that appear not, because it argues and illumines the mind, that it give assent to a thing obscurely proposed on account of the divine authority; just as argumentation moves the intellect to adhere to a proposition manifested and proved.

You will say 3: Through faith we believe eternal punishments are to come: but that belief is not the substance of things to be hoped for, but rather of things to be feared and fled: therefore the aforesaid definition does not befit every act of faith. — The same Seraphic Doctor answers the minor, that the belief concerning punishments can be considered either after the manner of an object, or after the manner of an end; but it is, he says, of things to be hoped for not after the manner of an object, but after the manner of an end; for we believe eternal punishments precisely that we may thereby be spurred to attain eternal beatitude.

You will say finally: Faith is the substance of the whole spiritual edifice: but charity contributes to that edifice no less, nay far more than hope, and consequently faith must no less be called the substance of things to be loved than of things to be hoped for: therefore the aforesaid definition is not sufficient. — The same Seraphic Doctor answers that faith is more fittingly called the substance of things to be hoped for than of things to be believed or loved: for, he says, by being called of things to be hoped for, the end of the virtue is more given to be understood, which is beatitude itself awaited, than by being called of things to be believed, or loved, or feared. For these acts are directed not only to the end, but also to those things that are toward the end.

Truly, if anyone inspect the matter more deeply, he will easily discover with the Subtle Doctor, dist. 23, that the aforesaid definition of the Apostle is rather a description of faith through its effects than an accurate definition. Whence internal actual faith can more rightly be defined by saying, that faith is the actual assent, firm and certain, of the created intellect, founded upon the authority of God obscurely revealing. It is called assent, whereby it agrees quasi-generically with very many acts of the intellect, e. g. science, opinion, and human faith. It is called actual, that it may be distinguished from habitual faith. Supernatural is added, that its distinction from all natural acts of the intellect may appear. Firm and certain is added, that it may be distinguished from opinion, which moves not to a certain and firm assent, but to a probable and doubtful one. Finally, on account of the authority of God is added, that it may be distinguished from human faith, which moves to assent only on account of the authority of the man proposing.

SECOND CONCLUSION. — IN THREE WAYS CAN THE INTERNAL ACT OF DIVINE FAITH BE ELICITED, NAMELY EITHER BY BELIEVING THAT GOD IS, OR BY BELIEVING GOD, OR BY BELIEVING IN GOD. This is common among Theologians. Proof: An act can be exercised in as many ways as it can have diverse tendencies toward its principal object: but faith can tend toward God, who is its principal object, in three ways. First indeed it tends toward Him as toward its material object, and object of attribution, and thus we have the first act, which is to believe God, that is, to believe God to be, or to exist. Secondly faith can tend toward its formal object, which is the divine revelation itself, or the authority of God revealing; and thus arises the second act of faith, namely to believe God, that is, some one revealing, or proposing as true, because He Himself can neither be deceived nor deceive. Thirdly finally, one can tend toward God through the pious affection of the will inclining the intellect, that it assent to the propositions of faith, and thus the third act is admitted, namely to believe in God, that is, by believing to tend toward Him as toward the ultimate end through the affection of the will, or as St. Augustine speaks, Serm. 18 de tempore, etc. de verbis Domini, to believe in God is to love by believing, to go to Him by believing, to adhere to Him by believing, and to be incorporated into His members. — Yet I would not have you think that those three modes of tending toward God import so many really distinct acts of faith: for truly in every act of divine faith these three are included, namely to believe God, to believe God, and to believe in God: since every true act of divine faith has for its material object God Himself at least as object of attribution, for its formal object the authority of God revealing, and proceeds from the intellect as stimulated and excited by the will: but these three are nothing else than to believe God, to believe God, and to believe in God: and consequently those three modes of believing do not import diverse acts of faith. — It is confirmed: for if anything stood in the way of these three belonging to one and the same act, especially since sinners can believe God and believe God, but cannot believe in God; because they are not borne toward Him by pious affection of the will: yet this does not appear true: since while they are sinners they profess that they believe in God: not indeed only in the person of the Church, as St. Thomas signifies, but also in their own person; whence St. Bernard, Serm. 21 on the Canticles, attributes faith in God to a sinner; which certainly is taken from Scripture John 12, where it is said: Many of the rulers believed in him: but because of the Pharisees they did not confess him, that they might not be cast out of the synagogue: for they loved the glory of men more than the glory of God: those therefore who are said to have believed in Christ were truly sinners, since they feared to offend men more than God. Whence St. Chrysostom, Hom. 52 on Matthew: It profits nothing, he says, that you believe in the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, unless you live rightly.

NOTE 1. Certitude is the firmness and constancy of some thing. Which is threefold, namely objective certitude, subjective, and formal. Objective certitude is the necessity and immobility of a thing in itself. And this is twofold: namely the necessity and invariability of essence and existence, which befits God alone; and the necessity of essence, or of a proposition, which is the necessary connection of the predicate with the subject. Which again is threefold: first metaphysical, whereby not even divinely can a thing be otherwise, e. g. man is rational. Second physical, when at least naturally the proposition cannot be false, e. g. every fire burns. Third moral, when the proposition is true according to the accustomed order of nature: but since this does not remove contingency, it does not even suffice for science. Formal certitude is the necessary determination of cognition to truth. Which can be considered either on the part of its cause, or on the part of its object. In the first sense that is called more certain which has a more certain cause, or motive: and thus the act of faith is more certain than the act of science, because it leans upon divine truth. In the second sense that is called more certain which more fully attains the intellect, and perceives more evidently; by which reason the act of science is called more certain than the act of faith, because we perceive the objects of science, being proportioned to us, more easily. Subjective certitude is the firm adherence of the intellect to some object on account of an infallible motive.

But this arises either from experience, such as the certitude we have concerning the heat of fire; or from the evidence of natural light, such as is the certitude concerning first principles; or from due inference, such as is the certitude concerning a conclusion deduced from premises in legitimate form and matter. Thence four conditions of certitude are gathered from the Doctor in the Proemium of book 1 of the Posterior Analytics: the first is, that the intellect firmly adhere. The second, that that to which it adheres be certain. The third, that the motive for which it adheres be infallible. The fourth, that the motive be duly applied.

NOTE 3. That the opinion of Theologians is various in assigning the precise reason why faith is more certain than any other cognition. For certain ones with Cajetan contend that the assent of faith is more certain than science in itself, but not in regard to us: others indeed wish that greater certitude is to be sought on the part of the object, not of the subject, such that faith indeed is more certain than any science on the part of God, because it is impossible for Him to be deceived or to deceive; but science on the part of the subject is more certain than faith, because faith suffers doubt along with itself, but science does not. Some seek that greater certitude from the firmer radication of faith itself in the subject; such that faith adheres far more tenaciously and immovably to the intellect than any scientific habit. There are also those who philosophize ingeniously and acutely, saying that faith indeed is appretiatively more certain than science, but not otherwise. For just as, they say, he is judged to love God more who is prepared to abandon all things on His account; so he must be called appretiatively more certain who is prepared to abandon all natural assents on account of the assent of faith. Finally certain ones will that therefore the assent of faith be more certain than any scientific assent, and also than that which proceeds from understanding, or the habit of first principles, because namely it is elicited from a principle effectively far more certain than any natural knowledge innate or acquired.

Two things therefore are here to be determined: First, whether faith be truly more certain than any other cognition: Secondly, whence that greater certitude proceeds.

FIRST CONCLUSION. — THE ASSENT OF FAITH IS TRULY MORE CERTAIN THAN THE ASSENT OF ANY NATURAL SCIENCE WHATSOEVER. So the Doctor in many places, but especially in t. dist. 11, qu. 3, n. 5, where he says: Those truths however are more excellent, insofar as the natural light of the wayfarer does not attain them: both because those truths are more certain than many others to which the natural light of the wayfarer does attain, because they are true from that truth which can neither deceive nor be deceived. Whence to one having faith, that God inspired all of Sacred Scripture, and that He Himself is the infallible truth, whatever is revealed by Him in Scripture must be more certain than that to which any intellect whatsoever can attain by natural light. Thus likewise teach the Alexandrian, part 3, qu. 68, the Seraphic Doctor in 3 dist. 23, qu. 4, and the Angelic Doctor 2. 2, qu. 1, art. 8, as well as nearly all Theologians against Durandus in 3 dist. 23, qu. 7, n. 10.

It is proved first from Sacred Scripture, which teaches in many places that the assent of faith is far more certain than any assent elicited through the natural sciences. For Christ the Lord willed to signify this very thing Luke 21, as some interpret, when He said: Heaven and earth shall pass away; but my words shall not pass away, that is, Philosophy shall fail in the speculation of the heavens and the investigation of their motions, influences, and incorruption; but my words shall not fail. Wherefore St. Peter, comparing the certitude of Prophecy and faith with the vision of the eyes, says Epist. 2, ch. 2: We have the more firm prophetical word, etc. The same St. John signifies 1 Epist. ch. 5: If we receive the testimony of men, he says, the testimony of God is greater. But most clearly of all St. Paul teaches this truth 1 ad Cor., ch. 2, verse 10, where speaking of the doctrine of our faith, and comparing it with human wisdom, he writes thus: That which is foolish of God is wiser than men, and that which is weak of God is stronger than men: and in order to show more this strength and certitude of the doctrine of our faith above every strength and certitude of human science, he subjoins thus: The foolish things of the world hath God chosen, that he may confound the wise, and the weak things of the world hath God chosen, that he may confound the strong. That is, God, that He might show the power, efficacy, and certitude of the doctrine of our faith, chose those to preach it who according to human judgment were unapt to teach others. Likewise 2 ad Cor., ch. 10, he says thus: The arms of our warfare are not carnal, but powerful of God unto the destruction of fortifications, destroying counsels, and every height that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God, and bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of Christ: by which words the Apostle signifies that the doctrine of faith, which he preached, is more powerful, and consequently more certain, than human sciences, with which the Pseudo-Apostles opposed him.

The same truth the holy Fathers openly teach, especially St. Basil in his Homily upon Psalm 115, where he says: Faith draws the soul to assent above rational methods. Chrysostom, Hom. 12 on the Epistle to the Hebrews: Faith, he says, cannot be spoken of, unless one have more certitude concerning those things that are not seen than concerning those things that are seen. To these concurs St. Augustine, lib. 15 Confess., ch. 10, writing: More easily would I doubt that I am, than that truth is, which I heard in my heart. And also St. Bernard Epist. 190, ch. 1, where he teaches that faith is not doubtful estimation, as Abailard wished, but certitude, and that far greater than Philosophy.

It is proved also by reason; for that assent is simply more certain than all others which is more determined to truth: but the assent of faith is more determined to truth with respect to its object than is any natural assent whatsoever: therefore it is more certain. The minor is proved: that assent is more determined to truth which leans upon a motive more immutable as regards truth: but the assent of divine faith leans upon a motive more immutable as regards truth than are the motives of the assent of all natural habits of the intellect; since it leans upon the divine revelation and truth, which is far more certain and more immutable than all created motives, upon which all natural cognitions lean: therefore the assent of divine faith is far more certain than is the assent of all natural habits. — Then, the certitude of divine faith depends upon infused and divine light, which indicates truth far more excellent and perspicacious than the natural light of the intellect: and consequently that assent is far more certain. — Finally, that assent must be called more certain wherein men adhere far more firmly and tenaciously to the truth proposed, than they adhere through any other assents whatsoever of the intellect: but such is the case with the assent of faith by comparison with the assents of any natural cognition whatever; which certainly follows from this, that none of the Philosophers, even the most expert, ever willed to defend unto the shedding of blood and death those truths to which they assented, and which they upheld under the guidance of natural light: but innumerable faithful poured out all their blood, and judged it wiser to undergo whatever heavier punishments rather than depart ever so little from the truth known to them through faith; and consequently the faithful adhere more tenaciously to the propositions of faith than each expert could adhere to the truth known to him through natural light.

You will say. That is called more certain about which no one can be in doubt, than that about which one can doubt: but there can be doubt concerning truth known through faith: otherwise it is with truth known through science, which excludes all doubt: therefore the assent of faith is not more certain than the assent which can be had through science. The major stands: since that certitude is judged greater which excludes all doubt. The Doctor admits the minor in 3 dist. 23, n. 16, where he objects that infused faith does not exclude all doubt more than acquired faith: therefore, he says, infused faith is not more certain as regards not being deceived than acquired faith. Which objection indeed he leaves unsolved, for he says: If on account of some greater certitude you wish to say (namely that infused faith is necessary, but not acquired) you are wont to make an argument made, which it is not. But dist. 21, n. 17, speaking of the Prophets and Apostles, who had a habit inclining to firm assent regarding all things revealed, says it was not a habit of science, because it was not from the evidence of the thing; it was nevertheless a greater certitude of faith, because faith does not exclude all doubt, and some doubt can stand together with faith. The minor also is evident; for the cognition of science and of first principles exclude all doubt altogether, and consequently their assent is more certain than the assent of faith. — I deny the minor. For faith does not admit all doubt utterly, at least free, or voluntary and deliberate: for although undue deliberation can be found together with habitual faith, yet it can nowhere exist together with actual faith, whence certain indeliberate doubts do not detract from the greater certitude of faith. But to the Doctor I say that in that objection of his he spoke those words only while doubting, not confirming: whence Quodlib. 14 and 17 he openly teaches the contrary, affirming that the assent of faith excludes all doubt utterly.

You will say 2. Assent given on account of evidence is more certain than that which is given only on account of adherence: but the assent of science is on account of evidence: while that of faith is only on account of adherence, and the command of the will: therefore, etc. The major stands, for assent on account of evidence is necessary and natural, and consequently immutable: but assent on account of adherence is voluntary, and consequently is not of the same certitude and necessity. — I distinguish the major. If that evidence of the object allure the assent of the intellect by a more efficacious and firmer motive than that motive on account of which the intellect adheres to some proposition on account of the testimony of the speaker, I concede: otherwise, I deny. It is certain however that the evidence of any natural object whatsoever is not of equal virtue and efficacy with the divine veracity, with which it utterly conflicts to deceive or be deceived; and consequently it impels the assent of the intellect less efficaciously: whence the consequence must be denied.

You will say 3. The certitude of an assent is the greater by how much the assent itself is more intense: but it often happens that a natural evident assent is far greater and more intense than the assent of divine faith: therefore it is also more certain. — I distinguish the major. If that intensio be attended according to certitude, I concede: if according to the entity of the act, I deny. For here a greater or lesser intensity of assent is altogether indifferent to certitude: whence however much the most evident assent of natural science might grow as regards its intension, it would nowhere arrive at the certitude of the assent of divine faith: for a thing of interior order and species, however much it grows within its own order and species, nowhere attains that perfection in which it is found in some individual, even the lowest, of a superior order and species; however much a body be perfected in bodily perfection, it would nowhere attain the perfection of a spiritual substance, even the least.

You will say 4. Sight is more certain than hearing: whence intuitive knowledge is more excellent than that which is acquired by discipline: but science is a kind of intellectual vision, and moreover its principles can at times be resolved into intuitive cognition, as is clear in Mathematics: but Faith cometh by hearing, says the Apostle to the Romans 10. Nor can any of its principles be resolved up to intuitive cognition: therefore the assent of science seems more certain than the assent of faith. — I distinguish the major. If sight and hearing are equally perfect, I concede: otherwise, I deny; for someone having very weak sight may see a column distant from himself, which he will judge to be wooden: but hearing from men worthy of trust that it is of marble, in that case he will believe what he has heard more firmly than what he has seen with his own eyes. The same, says Isambert, dist. 22. art. 3., occurs in the present difficulty: our intellectual sight, or our power of understanding considered in itself, is very weak with respect to supernatural objects, and although it is rendered proportionate to them through the intuition of divine faith, yet because divine faith always has an obscurity joined to it, it happens that the intellect instructed thereby cannot determine its will to give assent to it; but our spiritual hearing has divine authority, namely the first truth speaking, than which nothing can be more certain; and therefore our intellect must defer more to it, and believe it rather than its own spiritual vision, or its natural cognition.

Second Conclusion. — That greater certainty of faith above all natural knowledges arises especially from this, that it proceeds from a habit, or assistance, wholly and infallibly determining to the truth. So the Doctor, in 3. dist. 23. n. 18., where he says:

Although acquired faith suffices for the assent and certainty of the act, insofar as to believe is opposed to opining, nevertheless it is not so perfectly certain as with infused faith; nor would the act be so intense, nor does it suffice in first being: because acquired faith does not perfect the soul so perfectly as infused faith.

By these words the Doctor signifies that the reason for the greater certainty of the act of faith must be sought from the same habit infallibly inclining to and determining to the true; which indeed he declares and explains more clearly in Quodlibet II. q. 1., where he proves that falsehood can in no way underlie faith, because it is a participation of the divine light; and consequently, just as the divine light itself cannot incline except to the true, so also the infused habit of faith, since it is a special participation of the same, cannot elicit an act which is not wholly certain.

The Conclusion therefore is proved: That act is for this reason altogether more certain than all others with which it agrees generically, because it proceeds from a principle more infallibly and efficaciously determining to the true: but the act of faith proceeds from the habit of the same, which determines to the true more infallibly and efficaciously than any natural habit: therefore for this reason it must be judged more certain than the others. The major stands, for on no other account is the act of science or of understanding judged certain than because those principles from which it proceeds incline infallibly to the true, as far as lies in themselves. The minor also is clear: because the habit of faith, since it is a nobler and more intimate participation of the divine light than are all the natural sciences, which participate the divine light only according to natural being, while faith participates it according to supernatural being, and hence in a nobler and loftier manner, thence it is that, just as in its entity it is a more excellent light, so also in its operation it determines to the true more efficaciously. — It is confirmed: if that greater certainty were not to be sought precisely from the side of the habit of faith itself, it would have to be drawn from some other principle, especially from those assigned in the last Notable: but it is not so. For the first manner of speaking among them, namely that faith is indeed more certain in itself, but not with respect to us, or as it is in us, cannot stand: both because from Sacred Scripture it is openly evident that the act of faith, even as it is in us, is more certain than all the acts of the natural sciences: which indeed the Apostle indicates to the Galatians: Though we, says the Apostle, or an Angel from heaven preach a gospel to you besides that which we have preached to you, let him be anathema. And to impress this more strongly, as most true and most certain, he immediately repeats: As we said before, so now I say again: if any one preach to you a gospel, besides that which you have received, let him be anathema. By which words he signifies that we ought to believe the articles and truths of divine faith more firmly than any human cognition, or even Angelic persuasion. Then also because that manner of speaking does not explain how the assent of faith could be judged more certain than every assent of the natural sciences; for if faith does not make us more certain than natural habits do, we can assert it to be more certain on no account. Finally then because every form actualizing and informing some subject necessarily communicates to it its formal and immediate effect according to the degree of its perfection; for such an effect is nothing else than the very actual communication of its own form: but the assent of divine faith is a kind of form actualizing and informing the intellect of every believer, and its primary effect (whose proper note is that it is more certain than any natural assent): therefore it confers the same degree of certainty upon the intellect in which it inheres, and hence faith is not only more certain in itself, but also with respect to us.

Nor does it avail to reply that the same holds of the light of faith, proportion being preserved, as of the light of the Sun, which although in itself and of itself it is far greater than the light of a candle, yet at times it can happen that the eye is better illuminated by the light of a candle than by the light of the Sun, on account of some dark cloud standing between the Sun itself and the seeing eye. This, I say, does not help; since that example is not to the purpose; for the candle illuminates more clearly than the light of the Sun precisely because there is a disproportion on the part of the medium for receiving the light of the Sun; but there is no similar disproportion between the habit of faith and the intellect, in which that habit immediately inheres.

Nor can the second opinion be admitted, namely that faith is indeed more certain on the part of the object, but not of the subject: for this almost coincides with the former, and is impugned by the same considerations.

Nor yet the third, namely that the greater certainty of faith consists in its deeper rooting in the subject; for greater or lesser rootedness in the subject contributes nothing to the intensification of a quality, as has been proved in the Physics; since some quality can be divinely intensified to the highest degree, in which it will have a far deeper rooting in the subject than that which is produced successively by a natural cause; and yet it will not be more excellent by reason of that rootedness: therefore the same must be said of the habit and assent of faith.

Nor yet the fourth, namely that science is indeed more certain by evidential certainty, but faith by the certainty of science; for although faith depends upon the will, nevertheless the will does not confer that certainty upon it, otherwise faith would not have intellectual certainty, but would only be certain affectively, nor would we be certain about the proposition of faith otherwise than because we so will, the contrary of which is apparent; for therefore we will to assent to God through faith because we know that he has revealed it, and cannot deceive or be deceived.

Finally the last opinion cannot be proved, namely that faith is indeed more certain appreciatively than science, but not otherwise: for the greater certainty appreciatively is only affective, not intellectual; and hence it is not intrinsic to faith itself, which is a habit, or an assent of the intellect. Moreover faith and science can be about one object, suppose that God is one, good, omnipotent, etc.; in which case the will cannot be prepared to defer to the light of science, so that it assents to the proposed object solely by the light and guidance of faith: therefore, etc.

Note 1. With respect to the present undertaking there is a twofold necessity, one of precept, the other of means: the former is an obligation proceeding from a precept and a law enacted by a Superior; the latter is the necessity of that without which something cannot be obtained, whether meanwhile it be from the nature of the things themselves, which are so connected with one another, as food is said to be necessary for preserving animal life; or from the ordination of a superior decreeing that one thing cannot be obtained without another. Moreover, between each necessity this distinction intervenes, that the necessity of means admits no excuse: but the necessity of precept sometimes admits an excuse, because it does not bind unless the precept be known by him who is bound to obey, and it is within his power to carry it out.

Note 2. Again, a twofold necessity of means is distinguished; one indeed simple and absolute, when namely the means destined for obtaining some end is such that without it really and in fact had, the end cannot be obtained: the other, on the other hand, secundum quid, when namely it suffices that the means be either in reality or in desire. In the former way sanctifying grace is absolutely necessary for obtaining salvation: for no one can be saved who has truly not possessed sanctifying grace: but in the latter way baptism, or the sacrament of penance, is said to be necessary for adults, because it suffices that they be held in desire, when truly they cannot be obtained; since contrition together with the desire of receiving baptism or the sacrament of penance can suffice for salvation where the faculty of receiving those sacraments is not present. It is asked therefore which of those necessities belongs to the internal act of faith as necessary for obtaining salvation.

Note 3. Besides the twofold necessity, of means and of precept, two others can again be subdivided with respect to some act to be exercised; one indeed per se and direct: the other per accidens and indirect. Direct necessity, or per se, of exercising some act is judged to exist then, when by reason of its own goodness we are obliged to exercise it, and not only by reason of some other thing to which we are obligated and for attaining which it is necessary: but then the necessity of exercising some act is only indirect and per accidens, when this arises from the occasion of some other thing which we are bound to do, and to which such an act is necessary.

These points premised, it must be determined: first, whether the act of divine faith is necessary by a necessity of means for salvation to all absolutely all adults; secondly, whether and by what precept this same is necessary.

First Conclusion. — The internal act of divine faith is necessary by a necessity of means for attaining salvation. So almost all Theologians, with whom the Doctor agrees, in 3. dist. 25. q. 1. n. 2., where he says:

I say, that infused faith is necessary for man unto salvation in every state, because just as the soul is not accepted by God unless it be adorned and perfected through charity with respect to the will, so it is not accepted by God unless it be perfected with respect to the intellect by a supernatural habit: and just as those powers are naturally ordered in their acts, because understanding precedes willing, so in perfections, because by nature the intellect is supernaturally perfected before the will, though simultaneously in duration: now that supernatural perfection, whereby the soul assents determinately to the true and believes the true, is infused faith.

Where although he treats only of habitual faith, nevertheless in n. 6. he openly says that even the explicit act of faith is necessary; for he says:

I say, that it was necessary in every state to have an implicit act about all things: for an act is had implicitly when the habit is had. But to have only such an act does not suffice, but in one having the use of reason a more distinct and explicit act is required.

Thus the Doctor.

The Conclusion therefore is proved: First from Sacred Scripture, for in Habakkuk, chapter 2., it is said: The just liveth by faith: therefore, says St. Chrysostom, Homily On Faith: No one without faith has had life: similarly St. Paul to the Hebrews 11.: But without faith it is impossible to please God: for he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and is a rewarder to them that seek him. In which place the Apostle treats of faith, not habitual, but actual. And there the Apostle treats of actual faith, or of the act of faith, as he indicates by he that cometh, which signifies one actually hastening and tending toward God. Hence to the Galatians 3., and to the Ephesians 2., and elsewhere frequently, he attributes justification to faith, as to the foundation and root of all salvation.

The same truth the Council of Trent clearly hands down, Session 6. chapter 7., where it says, that the instrumental cause of our justification is the sacrament of baptism, which is the sacrament of faith, without which no one was ever justified. Hence in chapter 8. it says, that faith is the beginning, the foundation, and the root of human salvation: wherefore in Canon 1. it thus defines: If anyone shall say that without the preventional inspiration and assistance of the Holy Spirit man can believe, hope, love, or repent, as he ought, so that the grace of justification may be conferred upon him, let him be anathema. Since therefore according to the mind of the Council faith is the foundation, root, and beginning of salvation, or of justification, there is no doubt that it itself is necessary by a necessity of means for salvation.

It is proved also by the authority of the Holy Fathers, above all indeed of St. Augustine, who inculcates this supreme necessity of faith for attaining salvation in many places, especially in the preface to Psalm 31., where he teaches that faith is the foundation of piety not only in individual men but also in individual works, so that without it no one can be judged pious or just. Which indeed he also explains most excellently in Sermon 38. De Tempore, where he says: Faith is the beginning of human salvation, without which no one can arrive at the fellowship of the sons of God, because without it neither in this age does anyone obtain the grace of justification, nor in the future possesses eternal life. To him accords St. Fulgentius, book On Faith to Peter, at the beginning, saying: without faith conversion can profit nothing, nay, cannot even be.

And again: Without this faith no one can be reckoned among the number of the sons, as the same is taught by St. Leo, Sermon 4. On the Nativity, and St. Bernard, Epistle 77. Hence most excellently the Doctor, in 3. dist. 23. nu. 14., says that the necessity of faith must be admitted on account of the authority of Scripture and of the Fathers.

This truth can also be persuaded by reason: Both because faith, as has been said, is the foundation and root of justice: but without a foundation a building cannot be constructed, nor can a tree without a root bear fruit: therefore no one without faith can truly be justified, nor attain beatitude, which is the fruit of justification. Then because outside the Church no salvation is to be hoped for: but faith is the bond by which the members of the Church are joined together with one another: therefore without faith no one can be numbered among the members of the Church, nor consequently be saved. Finally then because there must be a proportion between the means and the end: but beatitude, which consists in the vision and love of God, is supernatural: therefore the means by which we ought to attain it ought likewise to be supernatural: but those means are the knowledge and love of God: therefore just as the love of God is supernatural, namely charity, so also the knowledge of God, insofar as it is a means unto salvation, ought to be supernatural, such as is the knowledge which is had through faith.

You will say 1. For instituting salvation and obtaining beatitude it suffices to observe the commandments of God, according to that of Matthew 19.: If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments: but the observance of those commandments can be had by the powers of nature; since the Apostle testifies to the Romans 2.: The Gentiles, who have not the law, do naturally the things contained in the law: therefore by the mere knowledge of nature and its innate powers all things necessary for salvation can be supplied; and hence infused faith does not seem absolutely necessary for it.

I answer by denying the minor, and to the authority of the Apostle I say, first, that the particle naturally, as St. Augustine explains, book 1. De Spiritu et Littera, chapter 21., does not exclude divinely infused cognition, which even certain Gentiles possessed, or those who were not counted among the Israelites, suppose ⟦Petro⟧, Job, and very many others: but only by that particle is the Mosaic and Evangelic law excluded; so that the sense is, that the Gentiles, who have not the law written by Moses, or published by Christ and his Apostles, naturally, that is, by the guidance ⟦ductu⟧ of nature and by that light itself implanted by God as Author of nature, do the things contained in the law; which exposition also St. Thomas admits, ibid., section 3. Reason also favors this; for just as there are sins which are called against nature, so also grace and supernatural knowledge can be called natural, that is, fitting and consonant to nature.

Or I say, that by the particle naturally the Apostle signifies that the Gentiles observed some natural precepts; namely those which either natural reason or conscience itself dictates to be kept and carried out: for indeed since natural reason sufficiently discloses that there is one God, who is supreme over all beings, and the principle and end of the rest, and likewise indicates him to be the center and secret of all perfections, it tacitly also signifies that he is to be worshipped; which indeed is prescribed in the precepts of the first tablet of the Decalogue. Similarly conscience dictates that one should not do to another what he would not have done to himself; and accordingly, since no one wills injury to be done to himself, neither in his own person through violence, nor in the person joined to him through concupiscence, nor in his own goods through force or fraud. Hence conscience itself likewise persuades that these things are not to be done to another; and hence neither is death to be inflicted upon another, nor his goods plundered, nor his wife abused, etc., which are the very precepts of the Mosaic law. Yet the Apostle does not say that they observed all the precepts.

You will say 2. Faith seems no more necessary for salvation than baptism: but the latter is not so necessary in fact and in reality but that it can be supplied: therefore someone can also be saved without the act of supernatural faith. The major stands: for just as it is said to the Hebrews 11.: Without faith it is impossible to please God: so also it is written John 3.: Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God. The minor also the Theologians admit ⟦unaniter⟧, teaching that baptism can suffice in explicit or implicit desire, namely when neither the faculty of receiving baptism in fact is present, or when there is neither abundance nor knowledge of it.

I deny the major; for baptism truly can be supplied in desire, because the desire of receiving it is contained virtually in faith itself: but the act of supernatural faith can be contained virtually in nothing; for if it could be contained in something, especially in natural cognition both of God and of his precepts: but since this is of an inferior order, it can on no account contain in desire and virtually a supernatural faith embracing it.

You will say 3. Every adult in this life has within himself sufficient assistance for attaining salvation: but it can happen that faith is impossible for some man; and hence without faith he could be saved. The major is clear: for since God wills all men to be saved, he gives to all sufficient means for salvation. The minor also stands: both because most mortals have an invincible ignorance of the mysteries of faith; for as St. Paul says to the Romans 10.: How shall they believe in him, whom they have not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher? Namely there are very many nations to which the Gospel has not yet been preached, and before the advent of Christ the Lord God was known only in Judea: and hence faith is impossible for very many.

The Theologians commonly answer the minor, that if man in that state does what is in him, that is, if he keeps those things which the light of reason and conscience dictate to him to be done, God by his providence brings it about, that such a man either by an internal inspiration or by the ministry of some exterior preaching be enlightened concerning the mysteries of faith, which must necessarily be believed for attaining justification and salvation: as happened to the Eunuch of Queen Candace, Acts 8., to whom holy Philip was sent, that he might baptize him; and to Cornelius, who was sent by a special apparition of an Angel to be taught by holy Peter, Acts 10.; just as also in chapter 16. Paul was sent to certain ones in Macedonia by a special revelation of God. Hence likewise St. Dionysius, in the chapter On the Celestial Hierarchy, reports very many from among the Gentiles who, learning the mysteries of the faith through the ministry of Angels, attained eternal salvation, as we saw more fully in the Treatise On Grace.

Second Conclusion. — TO MEN IS GIVEN THE PRECEPT OF ELICITING THE INTERNAL ACT OF FAITH. It is gathered from the Doctor, dist. 25., cited above. And

It can be proved first from Sacred Scripture: for it is expressly had in 1.

John 3.: And this is his commandment, that we believe in the name of his Son. Moreover the same truth is gathered from that general maxim, that all things which are proposed in Sacred Scripture under the threat of eternal damnation presuppose a divine precept; for thus rightly is gathered the precept concerning receiving the Sacrament of the Eucharist from the fact that in John 6. Christ the Lord said: Except you eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink his blood, you shall not have life in you: but faith is commanded in Sacred Scripture under the intermination of divine damnation; for at the end of Matthew it is said: He that believeth not shall be condemned. And to the Hebrews 2.: How shall we escape, if we neglect so great salvation? And chapter 10.: The just liveth by faith; but if he withdraw himself, he shall not please my soul: therefore, etc. It is confirmed: because no one is damned except on account of sin: but as we proved when treating of sins in the fifth volume, every sin is a transgression of some commandment, and hence since faith is exacted under the threat of eternal damnation, its omission is a sin, and consequently a transgression of some commandment. Hence Theologians are wont to inquire how, and concerning what matters, explicit faith was necessary in any state whatsoever of men; but we have already sufficiently explained that when treating of habitual faith.

NOTE 1. That this is not a discourse about habitual faith is already clear; for we have already proved that, in order that the habit of faith be infused into us, it is not necessary that there be infused simultaneously in the will some supernatural habit inclining the will to wish the intellect to assent to objects obscurely proposed and revealed by God, as is best proved by the Doctor d. 25. qu. 2. num. 2. against St. Thomas; but the difficulty concerns actual faith, namely whether some imperative act of the will must necessarily be pre-required in order that the intellect elicit an act of believing; or whether for believing there is necessary a pious affection of the will commanding the act of faith, or rather whether the intellect can have an act of faith without the will's having any positive act concurring toward eliciting that act of faith. But on the hypothesis that such an act is required on the part of the will, there is likewise the difficulty whether such an act must be supernatural.

NOTE 2. The question can be raised about a twofold act of the will: First indeed, concerning the pious affection and motion of the will itself toward the Revealer, and the object proposed by the Revealer; which motion is a certain propensity and inclination of the soul toward believing the things of faith that are proposed; such as the inclination which disciples have toward their preceptor and teacher: thus Thomists are moved by such a pious affection toward the Angelic Doctor, and Scotists toward the Subtle one, from which pious affection it comes about that each investigates reasons not only whereby he may defend the dogmas of his own Doctor, but also whereby he is moved to grant assent to them. Second, the question can be raised concerning the act of the will which is called imperium, and which is a certain efficacious volition, by which the will directly commands the intellect to grant assent to some revealed proposition, even though it be obscure and unevident: which imperium is commonly accustomed to be called the pious affection of credulity, because it regards not so much God revealing, and the objects revealed, as credulity itself, or the assent of faith. Here, however, there is no discourse about the prior act of the will, because it does not determine the intellect directly to believe, but only indirectly, and inasmuch as it moves the intellect to investigate the motives of credibility; but the difficulty concerns only the latter act: namely whether an act of faith can be elicited without the will commanding it.

NOTE 3. Concerning the present question there are chiefly three opinions of Authors, the first of which denies that the imperium of the will is pre-required for determining the intellect with regard to the exercise of the act of faith; which opinion Alanus in 3. disp. 21. qu. 1. attributes to Holcot, and which some Recentiores attribute to the Subtle Doctor, subscribing thereto Gonetus, but erroneously, as will appear below. The second opinion affirms that a direct act of the will is pre-required in order that the intellect elicit the assent of divine faith. The third, however, as it were midway between both contends that a direct act of the will is required for the assent of acquired divine faith, but not for the assent that is elicited through the habit of infused faith: which opinion Castillo d. 6. q. 3. num. 12. contends to be the genuine opinion of the Subtle Doctor. Which, then, of all these opinions is the truer, and more consonant to the mind of the Subtle Doctor, must now be determined, resolving first, whether the act of faith is free with the freedom of exercise, and also of specification: second, whether for the act of faith the imperium, or immediate concurrence of the will, is necessarily required: third, whether that act of the will is in some way supernatural.

First Conclusion. — THE ACT OF DIVINE FAITH IS ALWAYS FREE AS TO EXERCISE, BUT NOT SO AS TO SPECIFICATION. This on both points is the doctrine of the Doctor, disp. 25. qu. 1. near the end, where, after the objection had been made: Someone can believe unwillingly, because the things in the intellect precede willing, he answers: I say that it does not follow, because the act of believing depends on two things, namely the inclining habit, and the credible presented, not in any manner whatever, yet the credible being presented, and thus it is commonly not presented except through doctrine, and further, even if it be presented, the intellect does not necessarily believe: for so to believe would precede willing, because the one proposing the credible to the intellect does not demonstrate it, so as to compel the intellect to assent: therefore it does not believe unless willingly: although however the will has imperium over the act of believing, nevertheless it has no imperium over the opposite act, faith standing, so that the intellect should dissent from the credible proposed by the imperium of the will, but it can only impede the intellect, lest it go forth into its own elicited act of believing about the credibles proposed. By which the Doctor signifies two things: first indeed, that the act of faith as to exercise is always free, because however much the objects credible may be proposed together with the motives of credibility, nevertheless the will can command the intellect not to elicit an act of faith: second, that when the object of faith has been proposed together with the motives of credibility, the will cannot command the intellect to elicit an act of dissent about that object, and immediately thereafter that the act of faith is not free as to specification; because the intellect cannot, about a revealed object duly proposed, elicit an act either of assent or of dissent.

The first part seems to be a matter of faith, since it is plainly sufficiently handed down in Sacred Scripture, especially at the end of Luke, where two Disciples, whom Christ ⟦had not appeared to⟧ after the resurrection, are rebuked because they were slow to believe. O foolish ones, and slow of heart to believe! etc. And at the end of Mark it is said of all the Disciples that Christ the Lord upbraided their unbelief and hardness of heart, because they did not believe those who had seen him risen: but they would be reproved wrongly unless it had been free for them to believe or not to believe. Therefore the act of faith is free as to exercise. It is confirmed from this, that faith itself in Sacred Scripture is marked with the name of obedience: thus Acts 6. A great multitude of priests obeyed the faith. To the Romans 10. But all do not obey the Gospel. And chapter 16. Your obedience, that is your faith, is published in every place. Whence 2. to the Corinthians 10. it is said: Casting down every understanding into the obedience of Christ: but the understanding is taken captive by the will, whose chief prerogative it is to render obedience to Christ.

Proof is given secondly, from the Councils, but most especially from the Arausican, cap. 5.

If anyone says that the augmentation of faith as well as also its beginning, and the very affect of credulity whereby we believe in him who justifies the ungodly, is naturally inherent in us, and not through the gift of grace, that is, through the inspiration of the Holy Spirit correcting our will from infidelity to faith, he contradicts the Apostolic dogmas.

And from the Tridentine, Sess. 6. cap. 6. where it says: They are disposed unto that very justification, when, excited and assisted by divine grace, conceiving faith from hearing, they are freely moved toward God, believing those things to be true which divinely have been revealed and promised.

Proof is given also from the Holy Fathers, but most especially from St. Irenaeus, lib. 1. cap. 62. Not only, he says, in works, but also in faith, God preserved to man free judgment and of his own power. Similarly St. Ambrose, on cap. 1. ad Rom. says: To believe or not to believe is a matter of the will. But best of all St. Augustine, Tract. 26. upon John, says: Into the church anyone can enter unwillingly, he can approach the altar unwillingly, but he cannot believe unless willing. Wherefore St. Bernard, lib. 5. De Consideratione, cap. 6. defines faith thus: Faith is a voluntary and certain foretaste of a truth not yet manifest.

This truth is evident also by reason: First, because faith is a theological and supernatural virtue, ordered to salvation, and consequently ought to be meritorious: but every meritorious act is free: therefore, etc. Second, because the intellect is a faculty subordinate to the will as regards all its acts: so that the will can impede it either directly, forbidding it to exercise any act: or indirectly, recalling it from consideration of the object proposed, and provoking it to consider another object: and accordingly it can hinder the intellect itself from exercising any act of faith, even while the objects to be believed, and the motives of credibility, are being proposed. Nor does it matter that it is a natural faculty acting naturally, since other faculties acting naturally are subordinate to the will: therefore also the intellect. Nor does it stand in the way that it is a faculty operating before the will, because not every act of the intellect precedes the will; but many acts it can elicit at the imperium of the will. Finally, there is nothing that would determine the intellect necessarily, and drive it to assenting to the objects of faith notwithstanding the imperium of the will, and hence, while the will resists, the intellect cannot break forth into its act. The antecedent is evident, for if anything should move the intellect necessarily and ineluctably to assent to revealed objects proposed to it, especially moral evidence of motives having a necessary connection with the attestation of infallible divine truth, and with the truth of the proposition to be believed: but that moral evidence cannot so necessarily determine the intellect, the will resisting: otherwise it would not be moral evidence, but metaphysical or physical: for moral evidence is distinguished from physical in this, that the latter is said to move the intellect to assent necessarily and ineluctably, whereas the former only morally. Add to these that experience shows that if we were unwilling to believe the objects proposed, that would certainly be within our freedom, and hence while we believe, we believe most freely, and consequently the act of faith is free.

You will object 1. The Subtle Doctor in the praised second question, num. 1. Or I see no contradiction why the intellect, if it acted merely per se, and had an object present, could not understand, or believe what is presented to it. Therefore according to his mind the intellect, notwithstanding the reluctance of the will, can believe a proposed object; and consequently the act of faith is not properly free.

I deny the consequence., and to the antecedent I say that the Doctor by the aforesaid words signifies nothing other than that the intellect considered in itself, even if no imperium of the will be present, can be sufficiently allured by a present and moving object so as to grant assent to it: although if the will should resist, notwithstanding that presence and motion of the object, it could by no means break forth into such an act. Or I say he must be so understood as to mean that the intellect can assent to revealed objects proposed, even though the will not directly move it thereto, stimulated and assisted through some supernatural habit inhering in it, as St. Thomas teaches, whom he there impugns. Or finally, that the reasons adduced by the Angelic Doctor in support of his opinion were not so efficacious that one could not sustain the contradictory of that assertion.

You will object 2. If the imperium of the will were pre-required for the act of faith, it would follow that faith would not be the beginning of justification: but the consequent is false: therefore also that from which it follows.

I deny the sequel of the major; for faith is not therefore called the beginning of justification because it presupposes no other act; indeed, for the assent of faith are pre-required the apprehension of the credible object, of divine revelation, and very often a judgment about credibility, or about the motives of that credibility; but it is called the beginning of justification because it is the first supernatural act in substance: and consequently the first act among the dispositions pre-required for justification: since the imperium, or the act of the will moving to the assent of faith, is not always supernatural in substance, but only in mode, as we shall say below.

Proof is given also of the second part, namely that the act of faith is not free with the freedom of contrariety, nor as to specification, about objects of faith proposed together with moral evidence of credibility: since in that case there is nothing that could move the intellect to elicit an act of dissent, and hence it cannot elicit it. The consequence is evident, because the intellect cannot have any judgment unless it be moved to it by something. But the antecedent is proved: if in that case the intellect were moved to dissent, especially either by the object, or by the will: but neither can be said. Not indeed by the object, because the revealed object, when proposed as encompassed with motives of credibility, cannot at all move toward dissent. Nor yet by the will, because, as the Doctor best proves ibid. num. 2., the will cannot move the intellect to an act except supposing some motion on the part of the object: therefore since in the proposed case there cannot be any motive on the part of the object toward dissent, the will will not be able to move toward dissent.

Proof is given secondly: no one can believe unless a credible object is proposed: therefore neither can one disbelieve, or dissent, unless the thing be proposed as incredible, or as not credible: but the objects proposed through motives of credibility evidently known, whether with moral or physical evidence, are in no way incredible, or not credible: therefore the intellect, even with the will commanding, cannot dissent from them.

It is confirmed, because, as the Doctor best proves ibi num. 2., if the will could move the intellect to dissent from some object that appears without any motive for dissent, it would follow that at the imperium of the will the intellect could judge the stars to be equal, and likewise that the stick, which placed in water had appeared broken or curved, while drawn out from it is perceived whole and straight by sight and touch, nevertheless to be truly broken: but experience plainly teaches the contrary: therefore, etc.

Finally, the intellect is no more determined or necessitated to assent to a scientific conclusion proposed than it would be necessitated to assend by faith to a credible object proposed; for the same reason appears on both sides, seeing that the object of faith thus proposed is evident with extrinsic evidence, whether moral or physical, as those motives of credibility are evident: but, as all confess, the intellect is determined with the necessity of specification to render scientific assent regarding a scientific conclusion proposed: therefore by parity of reason it is necessitated to render the assent of faith to the object proposed with motives of credibility evidently known.

You will say. To most infidels and heretics the aforesaid motives of credibility can be proposed, who nevertheless do not believe, but even disbelieve and dissent: therefore the intellect is not determined with determination as to specification, so as to render assent to the objects of faith proposed with the motive of credibility.

I distinguish the antecedent. They dissent from the articles of faith when they apprehend the motives of credibility in such a way as to be determined by them morally or physically to assent, I deny: otherwise, I concede. That therefore they disbelieve comes from this, that whether through defect of understanding, or defect of attention and consideration, or on account of contrary motives which they possess by reason of their infidelity and heresy, they do not judge the mysteries thus proposed to be evidently credible. Indeed it can happen that, although they are interiorly convinced of the credibility of the mysteries, while they weigh and ponder the matter exactly, yet wholly devoting themselves to the motives of their errors, they easily turn the intellect away from such motives of the credibility of faith, that with obstinate will they may persist in their errors.

I confess nevertheless that very often the assent of faith is free as to specification, even while the proposal of the motives stands, for of course the evidence of credibility does not always appear perspicuously, whether through defect of a proposal of such motives insufficiently set forth, or through defect of capacity or attention on the part of the hearer. Wherefore experience shows, that although the articles of faith be sufficiently proposed to heretics, so that they sin in not believing, nevertheless they pertinaciously persist in their errors: as befell the Jews, of whom Christ the Lord John 15. said:

If I had not come, and spoken to them, they would not have sin: but now they have no excuse for their sin. And further on: If I had not done among them the works that no other man hath done, they would not have sin: but now they have both seen, and hated me, and my Father: but that the word may be fulfilled which is written in their law, that they have hated me gratuitously.

By which Christ the Lord plainly signifies that the Jews, through the miracles wrought by himself, such as no one ever had wrought, had sufficient motive to believe him truly to be the Messiah; but notwithstanding these, they were unwilling to believe, although they had no motive why they should disbelieve.

Second Conclusion. — IT IS MORE PROBABLE THAT FOR EVERY ACT OF FAITH TO BE ELICITED ON ACCOUNT OF AN OBSCURE REVELATION, THE IMMEDIATE CONCOURSE OF THE WILL COMMANDING SUCH AN ACT IS REQUIRED. This is the doctrine of the Doctor dist. 27. qu. 2. where although in num. 1. he signified that the contrary assertion is not improbable: yet he adds num. 2. And suppose that a positive motion of the will be required, still the will suffices for thus moving even in the state of pure nature, because, a supernatural object being posited present to the intellect, the will could move the intellect to understand it, provided there were in the intellect a habit inclining the intellect toward it.

The Conclusion is proved by all those authorities both of Scripture and of the Councils, together with those of the Holy Fathers, by which above it was proved that the act of faith is free: for by this reason it appears much more easily how the act of faith is most free. Then also experience favors it, since we experience that we are not accustomed to believe unless positively willing: for when two men of equal authority and truthfulness with us, one of whom would say something was revealed by God, while the other would deny it, we can bend the intellect at our pleasure toward one side, leaving the other: which certainly does not happen except through the direct imperium of the will, determining the intellect rather to believe the man affirming that thing to have been revealed by God than the one denying it. Finally, the intellect must be sufficiently determined to believe, either by the object proposed, or by the will: but it cannot be sufficiently determined immediately by the object: therefore the intellect must be determined by the will. The major stands, for nothing appears that can be determinative of the intellect besides the object and the will. But the minor is proved: the object cannot sufficiently determine the intellect, unless either it be seen in itself immediately, as holds both in those things which fall under experience and in first principles, which are apprehended through the ingenerate light: or it be inferred through necessary consequence from principles clearly known, as appears in conclusions: but the object of faith is in none of those ways evidently known to us, since such an object is a truth obscurely revealed: therefore the intellect cannot

You will object 1. The Subtle Doctor in num. 2. praised above, says:

With acquired faith posited, the credible being present, the intellect can believe through the infused habit, provided the will do not move against, nor is anything more required; that is, no other concourse of the will is desired beyond non-contrary motion, or on the hypothesis that it not turn the intellect away from the object so as to move and convert it to the consideration of another.

It is confirmed, because according to the doctrine of the Doctor, a power not impeded can of itself be directed directly into an object sufficiently proposed to it without the help of another faculty, especially when it acts naturally and necessarily, which it is certain the intellect does; seeing that it belongs to the will alone, all things pre-required for acting being posited, to be able to act or not act: therefore when the intellect has the object of faith sufficiently proposed, with the motives of credibility evidently apprehended, it needs no imperium of the will. — I answer, the Doctor said this only probabiliter, whence he immediately subjoins: And suppose that a passive motion of the will be required, etc. By which it appears that he did not put forward the prior opinion assertively. To the confirmation I say that a power not impeded is indeed borne of itself into an object sufficiently proposed, when it is determined by it directly and per se, I concede: otherwise, I deny. But the intellect, as we just now said, cannot be sufficiently determined by the object of faith: because however sufficiently it be proposed, it always remains obscure and unevident, and hence it is necessary that it be moved to it by the imperium of the will.

You will say 2. Demons believe without the imperium of the will: therefore for believing that motion and imperium of the will is not required. — I distinguish the antecedent: they believe with natural faith, pass on: with supernatural, I deny: for it is certain, as we said, that demons do not possess supernatural faith. Or otherwise, the antecedent conceded, I distinguish the consequent: demons so believe when the motives of credibility are physically evident to them, I concede: otherwise, I deny. But it holds that some objects of faith are apprehended by the demons with evident motives of credibility: for from the oracles of the Prophets designating the time of the Incarnation, and likewise from Christ's miracles and the perfect sanctity of his life, the demons were able to know him to be the Messiah, etc.

You will object 3. The will cannot move the intellect to assent rather than to dissent concerning the things of faith: therefore for rendering such assent the intellect has no need of the motion and imperium of the will. The consequence is evident. But the antecedent is proved: the will cannot move the intellect merely to the specification of an act, but only to its exercise: therefore it can only move to assent, but not to dissent. — I deny the antecedent, and likewise its proof; seeing that, as we said, when the intellect is left indifferent to the species of the act, that is, to assent or dissent, as happens while two men of equal authority, one of whom asserts something to have been revealed, while the other denies it: for then in that case the will determines the intellect indifferent of itself to assent or

The third Conclusion. — That internal act of the will is supernatural in some respect, but not according to its substance and in entity. This is the teaching of the Doctor at dist. 25. qu. 2. n. 2, where he says:

For the will to move the intellect to believing the credible, it suffices that the intellect be disposed, nor is it necessary that a disposition proportional to that be posited in the will; nor, in order that it work unevenly through an instrument, is such a proportional disposition required in the will as exists in a more perfect act of believing and in a less perfect one, but a proportional disposition in the differing intellect suffices, according as differing degrees of perfection exist in the acts.

By which words the Doctor unravels the argument of St. Thomas, by which he contended that a supernatural habit must be admitted in the will, in order that it move the intellect to eliciting the act of faith; just as a supernatural habit is required in the intellect, in order that it elicit such an act of faith in supernatural entity. And this argument of St. Thomas was of this sort:

When two agents concur toward the same effect, one by way of principal cause, the other by way of instrumental cause, a perfection as great, or at least as great as is required, is demanded in the instrumental cause as in the principal: but the will is the principal cause of the act of faith, while the intellect is the instrumental cause, or at least the less principal one: therefore if a supernatural habit be admitted in the intellect for eliciting the act of faith, much more must it be admitted in the will, so that the will may move itself to eliciting such an act.

That this argument is of no force whatsoever the Doctor demonstrates there by denying the major; for he says,

as a matter of fact certain dispositions are required in the instruments of the arts for the perfection of their effects, for instance sharpness, solidity, and hardness in an axe, whereas such perfection is not required in the locomotive power: therefore, gratuitously granting that the intellect be only the instrumental cause with respect to the act of faith, it does not follow that, if a supernatural habit is to be posited in it for eliciting the act of faith, a supernatural habit must by parity of reason also be admitted in the will, so that through it the will may move the intellect to the production of such an act; but it suffices that the will be stimulated and aided to commanding it by some actual supernatural help.

Behold the genuine opinion of the Subtle Doctor.

Proof of the first part of the Conclusion, namely that the act of the will, whereby it moves the intellect to believe, is in some manner supernatural. First indeed from all those oracles of Scripture by which it is proved that every work conducing to eternal life is from grace. Thus in Ioan. 15 Christ the Lord says: without me you can do nothing. And Rom. 9: What hast thou that thou hast not received? And ad Philip. 2: It is he who worketh in us both to will and to accomplish, etc. But that act of the will moving the intellect to faith conduces to eternal life: therefore it is from grace, and consequently in some manner supernatural: for, as Pontius says in his commentary on the above-mentioned question of the Doctor, n. ⟦251?⟧, that an act be supernatural in some manner is nothing else than that it proceed from supernatural grace conducing to eternal life.

Nor indeed, as regards this part of the Conclusion, does any difficulty appear, unless perhaps from certain words of the Subtle Doctor, who seems to judge that even that actual supernatural aid need not be posited in the will, in order that it move the intellect to believe. Whence:

You will object. He who says that the will suffices in the state of pure nature for moving the intellect does not seem to require an actual supernatural help for that: but thus the Doctor judges, for he says at n. 3: Even granted that a positive motion of the will be required, the will suffices for believing thus in the state of pure nature: therefore, etc.

I distinguish the major. He who says this by excluding every supernatural help, both habitual and actual, I grant; by excluding only the habitual, I deny. To the minor I say that by the will in the state of pure nature the Doctor understands a will not informed by a supernatural habit, concerning which alone the controversy there with St. Thomas was being waged; and not a will without the aids of actual preventing, exciting, and assisting grace in forming that command, which was indeed altogether foreign to the scope of the proposed difficulty. Hence Suarez fell into serious error, when at disp. 6. De Fide. sect. i. he says that Scotus does not seem to differ from the opinion of the Semipelagians; for from that opinion, if the Doctor be rightly understood, he differs no less than any other Catholic Doctor whatsoever.

Proof of the second part, namely that that act of the will is not supernatural in entity: First indeed: that volition, as regards its entity, must be proportioned and be of the same order as is the cognition of the intellect directing it: but the cognition directing this volition is not supernatural in entity: therefore neither is that volition in entity; for there must be proportion between the cognition proposing and the prosecution of the will, as regards naturalness and supernaturalness; whence in fact the necessary connection of supernatural faith with charity and hope is admitted by all: since these two virtues residing in the will are of the supernatural order, they also presuppose in the intellect a virtue of the same order. The minor, however, is proved: for that cognition antecedent to the command of the will consists in a judgment both speculative and practical of the intellect concerning the evidence of credibility: but that judgment is only of the natural order. It is proved: if that judgment of the intellect were of the supernatural order, faith would not rightly be called the foundation and beginning of all salvation: but the consequent appears false from what has been said: therefore, etc. Proof of the consequence of the major, because to that extent habitual faith is called the beginning of habitual justification, inasmuch as it does not presuppose any supernatural habit in substance: therefore similarly to that extent actual faith is the beginning of actual justification, inasmuch as it is the first supernatural act in substance that can be had: but if the judgment preceding and directing the command of the will were supernatural in substance, actual faith would not be the primary supernatural act, but rather that judgment; and then that judgment rather than the act of faith would have to be called the beginning of actual justification.

It is confirmed. Not every act of the intellect, supernatural in entity, universally requires a preceding similar act of the will: therefore neither does the primary act of faith necessarily require an act of faith supernatural in entity. The antecedent is plain: for the judgment of the intellect preceding the affection of believing in the will does not suppose any act of the will supernatural in entity, otherwise one would have to proceed to infinity: therefore, etc. The consequence also stands by parity of reason.

You will say. From Sacred Scripture, the Councils, and the Holy Fathers, the will to believe requires special grace, and consequently it ought to be supernatural in entity.

I deny the consequence, since grace is required for many things which are not supernatural in entity: for through acts of acquired moral virtues, which are not supernatural in substance, we very often at least observe the precepts and overcome the gravest temptations: but particular grace of Christ is required for the acts whereby these are done, as I suppose from the Treatise on Actual Grace. Moreover, because it is certain that this is a very great gift of God, that here and now, when someone would not give alms unless such species were excited or such circumstances applied, those species are excited and those circumstances applied so that the largesse of alms should follow, even on account of natural honesty; and consequently actual grace is sometimes required for acts which are not supernatural in entity.

You will urge. Therefore it is gathered that the acts of faith, hope, and charity are supernatural in substance, because Sacred Scripture and the Councils signify that they cannot be elicited without grace: therefore, since the same is said of the volition of believing, that too ought to be called supernatural in entity.

I answer to the antecedent, that it is not from precisely this reason ⟦intus?⟧ that those virtues are supernatural, but especially from other heads, and truly above all because those habits are infused in justification and baptism: but habits infused per se are per se supernatural as regards substance, as we said above: therefore, etc.

You will press. Therefore God infuses habits, which are said to be infused per se, in order that there be some proportion between our merits and the reward of beatitude, which, being supernatural, requires also merit of the same order: but the merit of faith also depends upon that volition of believing; for precisely for this reason does the assent of faith have the ratio of merit, because it is commanded by the will, through the mediation of that volition itself: therefore the volition itself ought to be supernatural in entity no less than the habit of faith.

I answer by distinguishing the major. That those infused habits are granted in order that there be a proportion between their acts and the reward of beatitude precisely, I deny: for the reason of the infusion of those habits is rightly referred back to the divine will, whose motives are often hidden from us: that they are granted on account of other ends, I grant. To the minor likewise I say that supernatural faith is not precisely infused in order that a supernatural object be proposed to the will, and that there be a certain proportion between the act of the proposing intellect and the prosecuting will. Add that the merit of faith could have a proportion in supernaturalness with the reward of beatitude, even though it depended upon a volition which was not supernatural; since besides that volition the supernatural habit of faith concurs toward eliciting such an act.

Note 1. That the external confession of faith can be taken in two ways: First indeed commonly and broadly for all good works, which are exercised by means of faith or for its illustration; of which confession St. James says, chapter 2: Shew me thy faith without works, and I will shew thee, by works, my faith. Second, strictly and properly for the very manifestation of faith through some sensible sign, whether of voice, of writing, or of act, whereby we bear witness that we have internal faith and believe the articles of faith; which manifestation is properly called the confession of faith, and is, according to all Theologians, an external act of faith: just as, conversely, the external denial of faith is an external act of infidelity. Now this profession of faith can have an extrinsic goodness proceeding from the intrinsic ordination of some interior virtue. But the difficulty is whether it proceeds from the very internal habit of faith itself, just as the honesty of the external act of almsgiving is proper to the act of mercy; or whether it proceeds from some other virtue, for instance charity toward God, truthfulness, fortitude, etc. For the unfolding of which difficulty the opinion of Authors is chiefly threefold: The first is that of those who contend that the external confession is a true act of faith, because it proceeds from the very internal faith, inasmuch as it is connatural to man to disclose his internal conception outwardly, and faith itself urges this. The second denies that it is an act of the virtue of faith, or that it has the proper honesty thereof, since it can exist without an interior act of faith itself; indeed even the external denial of faith can exist without an interior act: for one can externally confess faith through simulation and without having an internal assent concerning the articles of faith; and one can also deny the faith externally without denying it internally, as must be believed to have happened to blessed Peter, while he protested that he had not known Christ. The third opinion finally contends that the external confession of faith is not properly an act of faith, just as the exterior act of temperance is an act of the virtue of temperance; but that it stands related as a sign manifestative of the interior act, and as it were a secondary and indirect act of the virtue of faith.

NOTANDA 2. As regards the precept of the confession of faith¹ that it is generically twofold, namely Ecclesiastical and divine. The Ecclesiastical is grounded especially in the constitutions or Canons of the Church, whereby universally, or for a certain class of persons, the issuing of a profession of faith is prescribed; as in the Council of Trent, Sess. 21. cap. 12. De reformatione, it is ordained that those provided with benefices of whatever kind having the care of souls are bound

on the day of taking possession, at least within two months, to make in the hands of the Bishop himself, or, should he be hindered, before his general Vicar or Official, a public profession of their orthodox faith, and to promise and swear that they will persevere in obedience to the Roman Church. Those, moreover, provided with Canonries and Dignities in Cathedral Churches are bound to do the same not only before the Bishop or his Official, but also before the Chapter: otherwise all the aforesaid provisi as above shall not take their fruits, nor shall possession stand them in stead.

And Sess. 25. cap. 2. De reformatione:

The holy Synod commands the Patriarchs, Primates, Archbishops, Bishops, and all others who ought by law or custom to be present in a Provincial Council, that in the very first Provincial Synod, to be held after the end of the present Council, they openly receive all and singular the things defined and decreed by this holy Synod: as also that they promise and profess true obedience to the Roman Pontiff, etc.

The divine precept of making confession is expressed in most many oracles of Sacred Scripture to be adduced below. That precept, however, is twofold, one indeed affirmative, the other negative. The former commands that faith at some time be manifested through some external and sensible sign: the latter forbids that faith be denied, or anything contrary to the confession of faith be done. The latter obliges not indeed for every single moment of life, but only at some time, and for some time alone or circumstances; the former, however, obliges always and forever, or for any difference of time whatsoever, because nowhere is it lawful to deny the faith, as we shall say below.

NOTANDA 3. That certain heretics at some time, and indeed especially ⟦illegible: sect name lost in faded print⟧ asserted that it was licit to deny the faith under torments, provided it be retained in heart, as Eusebius relates, book 6. Historiae, chapter 28, and Epiphanius, heresy 19.; to whom may be reckoned the Priscillianists, who, as St. Augustine hands down, heresy 70, asserted that one could conceal his error even by perjury; which error the Anabaptists and others revived, as Valentia relates, tom. 1. disp. 1. quast. 3. Against all which errors the Church pronounces expressly that the faith is nowhere to be denied, although it agrees that it can at times be licitly concealed. It must be known, however, that it is one thing to conceal or dissimulate the true faith, another to simulate falsely by acts or words: for the dissimulation of the true faith takes place when something is done from which it is not positively gathered that he who employs such dissimulation is a Christian or Catholic, yet so that nothing contrary is thereby signified; whereas the simulation of false faith consists in acts signifying here and now that the one simulating professes another faith directly opposed to the Christian or Catholic faith.

These things premised, four points remain to be determined in this Question: first, that the external confession of faith is not properly an act of faith, elicited or commanded: second, that in certain circumstances or occasions we are bound to profess the faith by divine mandate: third, that nowhere is it licit to deny it: fourth and last, that it is sometimes licit to conceal the true faith, but nowhere to profess a false one.

Conclusio prima. — THE EXTERNAL CONFESSION OF FAITH IS NOT AN ACT ELICITED OR COMMANDED BY THE HABIT OF FAITH.

It is proved: the external confession consists in some action which as regards its substance is produced by the natural locomotive power, from which is elicited or produced speech, writing, gesture, or some other protestative work of internal faith: but none of these have internal faith as their elicitive principle; and consequently that external confession is not elicited by the internal habit of faith residing in the intellect. That, however, the external confession is also not commanded by the habit of faith is plain, because the habit or assent of faith, inasmuch as it is in the intellect, cannot command external acts, for this pertains solely to the will, which through volition can command the other powers. Therefore the external act of faith is not properly an act elicited or commanded by the habit of faith. Hence it must be established that the external confession pertains to faith to that extent wherein it is properly commanded by the will through the volition of confessing the faith outwardly; which volition indeed has a special honesty, namely that which the volition of believing has: for as it is honest to will to believe, so also to will to confess what we believe; and consequently there is in believing itself and confessing a similar objective honesty founded upon the excellence of divine veracity. For the excellence of divine veracity is that same thing whose cult the will intends by commanding the assent of faith and captivating the intellect into its service, in order to avoid the irreverence which would be offered to divine veracity by not assenting to its words. But an irreverence would be inflicted upon divine veracity if anyone should deny outwardly the faith regarding the things revealed by God: as conversely to profess openly the truth of such revealed objects redounds to the cult and reverence of the same: to the same habit of the will, therefore, both pertain: to command the act and to love it; whence the Apostle, 2. ad Corinth. 4, says: Having the same spirit of faith, as it is written: I believed, for which cause I have spoken; we also believe, for which cause we speak also. I judge, therefore, that the confession of faith can be called its act: first, on account of the similar honesty inherent in both the interior and the exterior act of faith, since each tends toward the divine veracity to be honored. Second, because each is commanded by the same pious motion of the will, which commands not only the interior act but also the exterior act of confession. Third, because the external confession is a sign of internal faith, just as the pulse of the arteries is called healthy because it is a sign of internal health. Fourth, because the external confession and the internal assent of faith rest upon the same formal reason, namely the revelation of God. By this reasoning, therefore, all the aforesaid opinions can be reconciled, namely that the external confession of faith is indeed commanded through the pious volition of believing, is directed by the internal habit and assent of faith, and is elicited truly by the locomotive power, which exhibits such a sign manifestative of faith.

Conclusio secunda. — THE DIVINE PRECEPT IS THAT THE FAITH BE AT TIMES CONFESSED OUTWARDLY, BUT NOWHERE DENIED.

Proof first from very many oracles of Sacred Scripture: thus Matth. 10. Every one therefore that shall confess me before men, I will also confess him before my Father who is in heaven. But he that shall deny me before men, I will also deny him before my Father who is in heaven. The same is repeated Luke 12. Every one whosoever shall confess me before men, him the Son of man shall confess before the Angels of God: but he that shall deny me before men, shall be denied before the Angels of God. And Luke 9. it is said: For he that shall be ashamed of me and of my words, of him the Son of man shall be ashamed, when he shall come in his majesty, and that of his Father, and of the holy Angels. It is signified, Rom. 10. That if thou confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and believe in thy heart that God hath raised him up from the dead, thou shalt be saved; for with the heart we believe unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation. Hence St. August., lib. De Fide, et Symbolo, cap. 1. rightly said: Faith exacts from us a duty both of heart and tongue: under the duty of the tongue understanding every external confession as by a principal expressive sign. In which words a twofold precept is expressed, one affirmative, by which we are bound at times to profess the faith outwardly; the other negative, by which we may nowhere deny it. But that we are at times bound to profess the faith outwardly, it can be gathered first, because, says de Lugo d. 11. sect. 1. God did not in fact will the Church to be only invisible and mental, but visible through a sensible union and conjunction, so that indeed it should become one visible mystical body animated by one and the same visible internal spirit. But this visible conjunction cannot come about unless the members be sensibly conjoined with one another, which happens while each manifests by some sensible sign that they are members of this mystical body, by professing the same faith and religion common to the other members. Second, because this redounds most to the glory of God and the celebration of His divine majesty: for just as he would be judged unworthy who, enrolled in the household of a Prince, and receiving so ample a stipend from him, nevertheless would not wish to profess himself one of that Prince's servants, nor wish to show the Prince any sign of his service except secretly, since by acting thus he would seem to disdain his Lord and to be ashamed of the profession of his servitude: so the irreverence would become so much the greater toward God on the part of him who, signed through baptism among His servants, would not wish publicly to profess himself the servant and worshipper of the true God, since the dignity and majesty of God are infinitely greater, and His innumerable benefits and merits toward His servants demand from them an assiduous profession of their servitude and of their faith toward a Lord infinitely excellent, to whom they know themselves bound by so many titles. — Moreover, the faithful ordinarily satisfy this precept whenever they perform the works of the other precepts of the Christian law, namely when they receive the sacraments, are present at the sacrifice of the Mass, devoutly frequent the temples, and they satisfy all the commandments prescribed by the Catholic Church to each individual faithful. Nor is it required that those works be done out of a special motive of manifesting and confessing the faith; for it is not necessary, in order that one satisfy a precept, that he fulfill the work commanded out of the motive of that precept; for he who is accustomed to fast out of pious custom on each Friday truly satisfies the precept of the Church when on that Friday there occurs an Ember Wednesday, or the vigil of some feast, on which fasting is prescribed by Ecclesiastical precept, even though he does not think of the precept of fasting.

Beyond the ordinary cases various circumstances can occur, in which the external profession of faith ought to be made from the very force of faith itself: first indeed we are bound to profess the faith publicly as often as, if questioned about the faith we were silent, that silence would give occasion either for thinking that the faith was not true, or it would be an occasion for others to be turned away from the faith. Second, when an adult receives baptism: for at that time the very reverence toward divine veracity and authority obliges to exhibiting an external sign of faith, and to professing ourselves worshippers of the same faith. Third, as often as the omission of the confession of faith would be the occasion and cause why others should be drawn away from the faith: or from thence there would be a moral danger of the faithful man himself being drawn away from the faith, unless by that contrary act and external protestation he should drive out fear and shame, professing himself publicly a Christian and Catholic. — There are also many other cases, in which the obligation of professing the faith seems to press from the precepts of other virtues. Thus e. g. we ought to profess the faith at least implicitly, when we ought to receive some sacrament, hear Mass, recite the Office, go to Temples, adore the Eucharist, venerate images of the Saints or their relics, observe fasts or feast days, and similar things. But this obligation in those cases does not arise from the force of faith, but from other precepts, which cannot be kept without an explicit or implicit confession of faith.

As regards the second part, namely that the faith must nowhere be denied, the matter is well known, namely that such denial could not take place without sin, because whoever denies the faith opposes himself to the divine authority, denying some revealed truth: but offense against God becomes grave by denying His veracity; since implicitly by that denial it is signified that God is a liar, and thereupon that denial cannot take place without sin. From these things it follows as a consequence that it is nowhere lawful to deny the faith.

This is proved by most abundant testimonies of the Fathers and ecclesiastical authors, who relate that Christians were asked by tyrants for this one thing, that they deny Christ, and openly disclaim being Christians. Which the faithful execrated as impious, choosing rather to die than to deny the faith, or feign a false religion. Wherefore Tertullian, Apologet., cap. 2. writes excellently:

And so you do not even act toward us in the manner of judging evils in that case, since to others denying you apply torments to make them confess, to Christians alone to make them deny; whereas, if it were an evil, we certainly would deny it, but you would compel yourselves by torments to confess it. The man cries out: I am a Christian. He declares what he is; you wish to hear what he is not. Presidents charged with extorting truth, from us alone do you labor to hear a lie. This am I, says he, what you ask whether I am; why do you torture me into perversity? I confess, and you torture; what would you do if I denied? Plainly to others denying you do not easily give credence; to us, if we denied, you believe at once. That perversity should be suspect to you, lest some force lie hidden in secret, which ministers against the manner, against nature of judging, even against the laws themselves. For unless I mistake, the laws command that the wicked be dug out, not concealed; they prescribe that the confessed be condemned, not absolved. The decrees of the Senate define this, the mandates of Princes, the imperium whose ministers you are. Your dominion is civil, not tyrannical. Among tyrants torments are applied also as punishments; among you they are tempered only for interrogation. Preserve to them your law only up to confession; and if they be anticipated by confession, they shall go free. Sentence is needed; the guilty by due right must be expunged, not exempted. Finally no one is eager to absolve him, it is not permitted to will this; therefore neither is anyone compelled to deny. You judge the Christian, a man guilty of all crimes, an enemy of the gods, of the emperors, of the laws, of morals, of the whole of nature, and you compel him to deny, that you may absolve him whom you cannot absolve unless he has denied. You betray the laws. Do you therefore wish him to deny himself guilty, that you may make him innocent, and indeed unwilling already, nor he guilty of the past? Whence that perversity? that you do not even reflect that more credence is to be given to one spontaneously confessing than to one denying under compulsion; or lest, having been forced to deny, he did not deny out of faith; and absolved there after your tribunal may laugh at your emulation, again a Christian.

And lib. De Idololatria, cap. 14. says that not even the festivals of the heathen can be observed by Christians without impiety. Where speaking of the institution and doctrine of the Apostle he has this:

But although he does not prohibit us from conversing with idolaters and adulterers and the other criminal sorts, saying (1. Cor., V. 10.): otherwise you would have to leave this world: yet certainly not to change those reins of conversation, such that because it is necessary both to live together and mingle with sinners, therefore we could also sin with them. There is the commerce of life, which the Apostle concedes; here to sin, which no one permits. It is permitted to dine with the heathen, it is not permitted to sojourn with them. Let us dine with all: let us rejoice in the communion of nature, not of superstition. We are equals in soul, not in discipline: co-possessors of the world, not of error.

And lib. De Paenitentia, cap. ⟦illegible: chapter numeral lost⟧:

But certain ones say > that it is enough for God if He be regarded in heart and mind, though less be done in act. And so they sin with fear and faith preserved: that is, chastity preserved, they violate marriages; piety preserved, they temper the resisting parent. And so likewise they themselves will be hurled into gehenna with pardon reserved, while they sin with fear preserved.

— The error of the heretics is confuted by St. Augustine, lib. De Fide et Symbolo, cap. 1. saying: We cannot be saved unless, striving for the salvation of our neighbors, we profess with the mouth the faith which we bear also in heart. — The same error is refuted by the most holy discipline of the Church, by which she condemned to most severe penance those slothful Christians who had obtained libelli from heathen judges for money counted out, lest they be called into judgment on account of the profession of the Christian faith. Of whom St. Cyprian in the Treatise De Lapsis says:

Nor let those flatter themselves that they need not do penance, who although they did not contaminate their hands with slaughtering sacrifices, nevertheless polluted their conscience with libelli, and that protestation of denial is the contestation of a Christian, that he had been an apostate; he said he had been silent, whatever another committed by doing. Christ in His precepts says: he who has not been ashamed shall be confounded with the Son of man. And does he think himself a Christian, who is ashamed or fears to be a Christian? How can he be with Christ who either blushes or fears to belong to Christ? He will plainly have sinned less by not seeing the idols, nor profaning the sanctity of the faith beneath the eyes of the surrounding and insulting people, not polluting his hands with tainted sacrifices nor staining his mouth with criminal foods. By this he advances so far that the fault is lesser, not that his conscience is innocent. More easily can he arrive at pardon of the crime; nevertheless he is not immune from the crime. Nor would there be any doing of penance nor imploring the mercy of the Lord; nor does it seem that, because he is less in the quality of the delict, it is multiplied in neglected satisfaction.

— But against this error nothing is more illustrious than the testimony of Tertullian, Apologet., cap. 21:

Therefore, when summoned to sacrifice, we bar the step for the sake of faith by our conscience, whereby we are certain to whom those offices arrive under the prostitution of images and the consecration of human names. But some judge it madness, that while we could both sacrifice in the present and go away unharmed, with the purpose remaining in our mind, we offer obstinacy to our salvation. Giving us counsel of course, which we abuse toward you; but we acknowledge whence such things are suggested, who agitates this whole matter, and how now with astuteness of persuading, now with hardness of raging he works to cast down our conscience. Those spirits namely of demons and angels doomed to perdition, who are our rival because of his divorce and envious because of God's grace, battles against us from your minds.

By which words is overthrown the error of the Heretics usurped in these latter times by some, if one truly genuflects before an idol, and offers incense, provided the intention be directed to the Crucified One whom they secretly venerated. Which error, through the agency of the most illustrious and most religious bishop of Ingolstadt, John de Palatox, was condemned by Innocent XI the Supreme Pontiff. — Finally St. Augustine refuted as revived in the Priscillianists the error of those ancient heretics, lib. contra mendacium ad Consentium, cap. 2. The Priscillianists contended that even in the profession of religion truth was to be retained in heart, but that falsehood could be brought forth with the mouth toward strangers without sin, and that this was the sense of this verse,

Psalm 11: He that speaketh truth in his heart; that it would pertain to justice not to lie before neighbors, but before strangers this would be lawful. These men also twisted the words of the Apostle into so depraved a sense, Eph. 4: Detesting lies, speak ye the truth, every one with his neighbor, because we are members one of another. But this heresy St. Augustine thus refutes:

Which sentence dishonors the holy martyrs, or rather takes away holy martyrdom altogether; for according to these men they would act more justly and more wisely, if they did not confess to their persecutors that they were Christians, nor by their confession make them homicides: but rather by lying and denying what they were, they themselves would have kept safe the advantage of the flesh, and the purpose of the heart; and would not allow them to fulfill in act the crime conceived in mind. For their neighbors were not in the Christian faith, so that with them they ought to speak the truth in their mouth which they spoke in their heart, but were moreover enemies of the very truth. For if Jehu, whom prudently they seem to contemplate among others as an example of lying, lied that he was a servant of Baal, that he might kill his servants: how much more justly, according to the perversity of these men, in time of persecution should the servants of Christ lie that they were servants of demons, lest the servants of demons kill the servants of Christ; and sacrifice to idols lest men be slain, since he sacrificed to Baal that he might slay men? For what would it harm them, according to the excellent doctrine of liars, if they feigned the worship of the devil in body, when the worship of God was preserved in heart? But not so understood the true martyrs of the Apostles, the holy martyrs. For they saw and held what is written: With the heart we believe unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation; and: In their mouth there was no lie found.

You will object in favor of the Heretics: Jehu king of Israel feigned himself a worshipper of Baal, saying: Achab worshipped Baal little. but I will worship him more. Now therefore call to me all the prophets of Baal, and all his servants, and all his priests: let none be wanting, for I have a great sacrifice for Baal: whosoever shall be wanting shall not live. Moreover Jehu did this deceitfully that he might destroy the worshippers of Baal, says Scripture, IV Reg., cap. 10. Yet Jehu on account of this work was rewarded by God, who established the throne of Israel to his sons unto the fourth generation (as is had in the same place): therefore it was lawful outwardly to feign religion, or deny the faith, provided it be retained in heart. — I answer distinguishing the minor: Jehu on account of this work was rewarded by God, that is on account of the exterminated house of Achab according to the mandate of God, I concede; that is on account of the lie and simulation of false religion, I deny. Scripture signifies this, when it relates that the Lord addressed Jehu thus: Because thou hast diligently done what was right and pleasing in my eyes, and hast done all things that were in my heart against the house of Achab: thy sons shall sit upon the throne of Israel unto the fourth generation. Moreover the simulation of Jehu is so far from being approved by Sacred Scripture, that rather it brands him there with the note of impiety. Therefore Jehu destroyed Baal out of Israel: yet from the sins of Jeroboam son of Nabat, who made Israel sin, he departed not, nor did he abandon the golden calves that were in Bethel and in Dan. And further: But Jehu walked not that he should walk in the law of the Lord God of Israel with his whole heart: for he departed not from the sins of Jeroboam, who had made Israel sin. This response is that of St. Augustine, lib. Contra Mendacium, cap. 2. who says:

They should not imitate that Jehu, seeking with an impious lie and sacrilegious sacrifice the impious and sacrilegious to be killed, nor even if Scripture concerning what sort he was had been silent. Whereas it has been written that he had not an upright heart with God; what did it profit him, that for some obedience which he exhibited concerning the house of Achab being utterly destroyed, for the greed of his domination, he received some transitory reward of temporal kingdom?

You will object 2. Eliseus conceded to Naaman prince of the army of the king of Syria, that when the king adored in the temple of Remmon, he himself also adore with him in the same place: yet this was an open simulation of false religion: therefore simulation of religion is lawful. — The major is proved from the words of Naaman to Eliseus, and from the response of the prophet: but in this only, pardon thy servant my lord: when my lord goeth into the temple of Remmon to adore there, and he leaneth upon my hand, if I bow down in the temple of Remmon, he adoring in the same place, that the Lord forgive thy servant for this thing. Who said to him: Go in peace.

I answer: I distinguish the major: and there the name of adoration is taken improperly for the bending of the body, I concede: and there the word adoration is taken for worship exhibited to the one true God alone, I deny. Naaman therefore did not ask from Eliseus the faculty of adoring the idol Remmon, but only the duty of performing his office in the temple of Remmon, as he discharged it elsewhere, namely supporting Benadad prostrate before the idol, and bending his body or prostrating when the king had prostrated himself. But this service was not a simulation of false religion, since no worship at all was given to the idol, but to the king. It would however have been a simulation, or open profession of the cult of Remmon, if Naaman had done anything proximately pertaining to a sacrifice offered to a false deity, or to the impious rites of a false religion, as if he had handed wine to the sacrificing king, had uttered some word necessary to the sacrilegious sacrifices, or had rendered some similar assistance, as is gathered from Tertullian, lib. De Idololatria, cap. 11. who says:

Moreover why do we keep silent about servants, or free faithful? likewise officials attending sacrificing lords, or patrons or presidents? But if anyone hand over pure wine to one sacrificing, or rather assist with any word whatsoever necessary to the sacrifice, he will be held a minister of idolatry. Mindful of this rule, we can render duty also to magistrates and powers after the manner of the patriarchs and other elders, who attended idolatrous kings up to the limit of idolatry itself.

Moreover there could be no suspicion concerning Naaman that he adored the idol Remmon, even if he genuflected with Benadad in the temple of Remmon, because he openly professed the religion of the Jews, as he had previously testified to Eliseus, taking away the burden of two asses from the land of Israel, that he might build an altar to the true God, and worship Him alone. Grant to thy servant, he says, that I take away a burden of two asses out of the land: for thy servant will not henceforth make holocaust or victim to strange gods, but to the Lord.

You will urge: Naaman would not have asked Eliseus that he beg pardon from God for a work which he could have exercised without any sin whatsoever: yet if that adoration in the temple of Remmon had been mere service exhibited to the king of Syria, he could have exercised it without any sin whatsoever: therefore Naaman would not have asked Eliseus that he beg pardon from God for that adoration in the temple of Remmon. — I answer, that this argument concludes that Naaman sinned, and so does not favor the Heretics. But because we vindicate him from sacrilegious simulation, it must be said to the major, that he, not yet sufficiently instructed in morals, and agitated by scruples, as easily happens to neophytes, begged pardon for a deed concerning which he feared lest it displease God. Moreover Eliseus showed that the aforesaid work could be done without sin, when he removed the scruple from him with these words: Go in peace; and certainly Eliseus, holy, learned, and studious of the divine law, if ever any one was such, the director persuades that this was lawful for Naaman; but also Tertullian, when he laid down this rule of Christian moral discipline lib. De Idololatria, cap. 16.

Wicked idolatry has beguiled the world; it will be permitted to be present in some things, wherein we are dutiful to man, not to an idol. Plainly called to the priesthood and sacrifice I will not go (for that is the proper office of an idol): but neither by counsel, nor expense, nor other work will I serve in such matters. If called on account of the sacrifice I attend, I shall be a partaker of idolatry: if another cause joins me to one sacrificing, I shall be only a spectator of the sacrifice.

Since therefore another cause joined Naaman to the king of Syria his lord sacrificing to the idol Remmon, and adoring him, he was not a partaker of idolatry, but only a spectator.

But whether it is at times lawful to dissimulate or conceal the faith is a grave difficulty, and manifold contention among Theologians. But what seems truer to us in this matter, will disclose

Third Conclusion. — IT IS LAWFUL AT TIMES TO CONCEAL THE FAITH, NOT ONLY NEGATIVELY, BY NOT MANIFESTING IT THROUGH SOME POSITIVE ACT, BUT EVEN POSITIVELY AND AFFIRMATIVELY, WHEN ELSEWHERE THERE IS NO OBLIGATION OF CONFESSING THE FAITH PRESENT. This is common as regards both parts among Theologians, especially as regards the first part, because it is permitted to flee or hide oneself in time of persecution, as Christ the Lord teaches, Matth. 10. where foretelling to the Apostles the persecutions they were to undergo, He says: But when they shall persecute you in this city, flee into another.

By flight persecution can be avoided. It is proved by the example of Christ while yet an infant when He fled into Egypt, a holy Angel admonishing Joseph in dreams: Arise and take the child and his mother, and fly into Egypt. He Himself also taught when grown up, John 8. chap.: The Jews therefore took stones to cast at him: but Jesus hid himself and went out of the temple. — He taught also by oracle, Matth. 10. chap.: But when they shall persecute you in this city, flee into another. The Apostles also taught following the doctrine and examples of Christ: whence it is marvelous that Tertullian was blinded in so great a light of Sacred Scriptures, especially since he himself, not yet a Montanist, unravels that error of the Montanists, lib. De Patientia, cap. 13.

Our Conclusion the Fathers teach openly, and first indeed St. Cyprian, who during the persecution himself fled, and wrote several letters in retirement, and among them the 56th, in which he writes thus to the people of Thibaris: Perhaps each one, most beloved brethren, when he sees our people fleeing through fear of persecution and scattered, is disturbed, because he does not see the brotherhood gathered together, nor hear the bishops treating. All cannot then be together at once who are not permitted to kill, but must be killed. Whoever in those days shall have been each one of the brothers separated for a time from the flock, by necessity of the time in body, not in spirit, let him not die from the horror of that flight, nor departing, nor hiding, let him be terrified by the solitude of the place chosen; he is not alone to whom Christ is a companion in flight. He is not alone who keeping the temple of God, wherever he may be, without God is not: and if a robber oppress him fleeing in solitude and mountains, a wild beast leap upon him, hunger or thirst or cold afflict him, or storms and gales submerge him hastening over seas in swift navigation, Christ beholds His soldier fighting wherever he fights, and renders to him dying on account of persecution for the honor of His name the reward which He promised He would give in persecution. And lib. De Lapsis: The first, he says, title of victory, to confess the Lord seized by the hands of the gentiles. The second step toward glory, to be reserved for the Lord, withdrawn from the fold by secession. That is public confession, this private. That one conquers the judge of the world, this one content with God his judge keeps a pure conscience with integrity of heart. Here promptitude of fortitude, here security of solicitude. That one, his own hour approaching, has already been found ripe: this one perhaps has been deferred, who having abandoned his patrimony withdrew for this reason, because he was not going to deny, he would certainly confess if he himself also had been detained. To this tends what Pontius the Deacon wrote in the Life of St. Cyprian, concerning his flight. Well, he says, well then and truly spiritually did it come about that a man so necessary, with so many and so good things, was deferred from the consummation of martyrdom. Do you wish to know that that withdrawal was not cowardice? lest I offer anything else as excuse, he himself afterwards suffered: which passion certainly he would have cited according to custom, if he had lived before. Truly that fear existed, but just fear, fear which feared to offend the Lord, fear by which he preferred to obey the precepts of God rather than thus to be crowned. For his mind consecrated to God in all things, and faith enslaved to divine admonitions, believed that unless he had obeyed the Lord then secretly commanding, he sinned even by the very passion itself.

Second, St. Athanasius in the Apologia pro fuga sua, where the Arians objecting to himself the crime of cowardice because he fled their persecution and snares, he opposes the examples of Christ and the saints. The saints, he says, as issued forth from the Lord, both in former ancient times and in subsequent times in the contest which they had with persecutors, snatched themselves away from those pressing upon them by flight, and withdrew themselves through hiding places from those seeking them; since, as men, they were ignorant of the time constituted for them by divine Providence, and therefore by no means threw themselves upon their ambushers, since they were not ignorant of what is written, that the lots of men are in the hands of God, and that the Lord kills and makes alive: and they preferred to await the same even unto the course of their time, observing meanwhile through solitude being deflected and afflicted, and lurking in caves and holes of the earth, until either the appointed time of death should supervene, or until the determiner of time, God, should Himself indicate this very thing to them, either restraining the persecutors, or delivering them to the persecutors, as seemed to Him more opportune. And further: Wherefore the saints fleeing concealed themselves, and by dispensation were reserved like physicians for the uses of the needy. But to the rest and universally to all, the law has been proposed that they flee while they are pursued in persecutions, and conceal themselves while sought, neither be headlong and rash in tempting the Lord, but await until the appointed time of dying arrive, or until that judge constitute concerning these what seems right to himself. Yet He willed us always ready, so that either the time calling, or apprehended for the Church we fight even unto death. These things the blessed martyrs observed in times of persecutions... But if certain ones of them surrendered themselves to persecutors, they were not carried thither by temerity; but everywhere before all they professed; this readiness proceeded from the Holy Spirit upon oblation. — Third: Before St. Athanasius St. Peter of Alexandria bishop had treated of this matter, Can. 9. in these words: They also who as if out of sleep rush forth to a contest which is to be brought forth by deliberation, and to be deferred by mature counsel, attract the temptation of naval battle and of many inundations of waves, or rather kindle coals of sins for the brethren; communion is also to be given to them, so that they who come to it in the name of Christ: and if they hear not his words, who teaches not to enter into temptation. And the illustrious canon proves by many arguments flight in persecution to be lawful and often necessary. To the same tends the sixtieth canon of the Council of Illiberis, which forbids martyrs to be held in place and number those who were slain breaking idols, on account of the temerity by which they offered themselves to martyrdom, and stirred up a greater persecution against the Church. If anyone, he says, shall have broken an idol, and been slain there, whereas it is not written in the Gospel, nor is found ever to have been done by the Apostles, it has pleased that he be not received into the number of martyrs. —

Fourth, St. Augustine, Epist. 180. ad Honoratum asserts our dogma expressly. Therefore whoever, he says, flees in such a way that the necessary ministry of the Church does not fail in him fleeing, does what the Lord commanded. I permitted seeing it. Read the same tract. 18. on John. — Fifth, St. Peter Chrysologus, Serm. 15. says: The martyr apprehended ought to keep constancy, not apprehended ought to flee the pursuer: that he may indulge to the persecutor time of repenting, and not take away from himself time for supplicating: he makes the persecutor who provokes: he corrects, who declines. We must pray, we must flee, that he who rages through ignorance may be healed: and that he who is thought to hold the palm of patience may not have peril from temerity. Brethren, if they had not slain Paul the martyrs, they would not have borne Paul.

You will object 1. With Tertullian, lib. De fuga in persecutione, that it is not permitted to flee what is good and sent from God: but persecution is good and sent from God: therefore it is a crime to flee persecution. Persecution, I say, is good: for then also faith is more solicitous and more disciplined in expeditions, in fasts and stations and prayers, humility in affection diligence and love, in sanctity and sobriety. Nor is it prepared except for fear or hope, and even from this very thing it is shown to us that it cannot be attributed to the devil, which makes the servants of God better, says Tertullian, cap. 2. Moreover if we deservedly define persecution good, what is good ought not to be avoided, because it is a delict to refuse what is good: still more because it has seemed good to God: indeed now neither can it be avoided, because it comes from God, whose will cannot be evaded. Therefore they who think flight necessary either reproach evil against God if they flee persecution as an evil; for no one doubts it is good: or they think themselves stronger than God who think they can escape if God should will such a thing to come, says the same Tertullian, cap. 1.

I answer: I distinguish the major: if it be good per se and absolutely, I concede. If only per accidens, I deny. For God by it proves, exercises, crowns His faithful; and aided by divine grace they endure persecutions with unshaken faith and love. But that in the same place it is good in this manner only, it is lawful to flee. Certainly temptation is good in this manner, as persecution, and happens only by God willing and permitting: nevertheless it is not illicit to flee temptation and to pray against it itself. Otherwise Christ taught us in vain to pray thus: And lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil. But also pestilence and famine are good in this manner, yet we are not prohibited from fleeing them, nay he will be rash who will not flee these evils, when he can avoid them, the duties of Christian virtues remaining safe.

I make a second distinction within the same proposition: it is not lawful to flee what has been sent by God, unless flight itself He has forbidden; this I concede; if He has not forbidden it, I deny. But Christ taught flight in persecution both by word and by example.

You will urge: Those who invite to martyrdom do not command flight: but Christ and the Apostles exhort Christians to endure persecutions: therefore they do not command flight. What an inequality of sentiments, says Tertullian, chapter 1, between Him who commands flight and Him who invites to passion, which is contrary to flight? Whoever shall confess in me, and I also will confess in him before my Father — how shall he confess while fleeing, how shall he flee while confessing? — I answer: I distinguish the major: they do not command flight when the time appointed by God is at hand for enduring martyrdom, I concede: when it is not yet at hand, I deny. For since the crown descends from the bounty of God, says St. Cyprian in his book De Lapsis, and cannot be received unless the hour for receiving it has come, whoever meanwhile falls while remaining in Christ does not deny the faith, but awaits the time. But he who fell when he did not fall, remained intending to deny.

You will object 2. At least for prelates of the Church it is not lawful to flee in persecution: For the good shepherd giveth his life for his sheep. But the hireling seeth the wolf coming, and leaveth the sheep and flieth: therefore neither is it lawful for the other Christians to flee, for if the flock ought to flee, the shepherd of the flock ought not to stand, being about to stand without cause for the protection of a flock which would not desire it, namely by license of flight, says Tertullian, chapter 11.

I answer: I distinguish the antecedent: it is not lawful for prelates of the Church to flee if the persecution rages equally against all, and no one remains who could discharge the ministry necessary to the Church, I concede: if the persecution lingers only against some, and there remain as many as are necessary to the Church, I deny. This is the distinction of St. Augustine, Epistle 180, which is to Honoratus. But who would believe, he says, that the Lord willed this to be done, so that the flocks which He purchased with His own blood should be abandoned of the ministry without which they cannot live? Did He Himself do this, when as a little child He fled into Egypt carried by His parents, who had not yet gathered churches which we might say were left desolate by His departure? Or did He do so when the Apostle Paul, lest the enemy should seize him, was let down through a window in a basket, and escaped — was the Church there left desolate, when the necessary ministry was fulfilled, as was fitting, by other brethren established in the same place? For this the Apostle had done with those willing, that he might preserve himself for the Church, whom that persecutor properly sought: Therefore the servants of Christ, the ministers of His word and sacraments, do what He commanded or permitted. Let them flee altogether from city to city, when each of them is specially sought by the persecutors: lest by others who are not so required the

Church be deserted, but let them furnish food to their fellow servants, whom they know cannot otherwise live. But when the peril is common to all, that is, to bishops and clerics, those who have need must not be deserted by those of whom they have need. And further below: Why do they think that the precept is to be obeyed indifferently on their part, where they read that one must flee from city to city, and yet do not shrink from the hireling who seeth the wolf coming and fleeth, because he hath no care for the sheep? Why do they not strive to understand these two sayings of the Lord, and both true, one namely where flight is allowed or commanded, the other where it is reproved and blamed, in such wise that they are found not to be contrary to one another, as indeed they are not? And this is found to be the case then, when under the pressure of persecution Christ's ministers must flee from places where we are, either when there is no Christian people there to be ministered to, or even if there is, the necessary ministry can be fulfilled by others who have not the same cause for fleeing. By these examples of Saints Paul and Athanasius he proves it, and then subjoins: But when the people remain and the ministers flee, and the ministry is withdrawn, what will it be but that damnable flight of the hirelings, who have no care for the sheep? — Therefore Tertullian reasoned badly in concluding that the Christian people ought not to flee in persecution because bishops and priests ought not to flee, since they alone ought to remain on account of the people, though elsewhere they would lawfully take to flight if the people as a whole changed its seat, or their ministry were not necessary to it, because other ministers are at hand, and they reserve themselves for another time, being about to profit the Church equally by their flight as others by their presence. Certainly how necessary is the work of the ministers of the Church, and how shameful and impious the flight when the Christian people cannot flee the persecution, St. Augustine elegantly expounds in the same place: Do we not consider, he says, when the extreme of these perils is reached, and there is no power of fleeing, how great a concourse is wont to arise in the Church of both sexes and every age, some demanding baptism, others reconciliation,

rightly is this done by some, when others are not lacking through whom the ecclesiastical ministry may be supplied, lest it be deserted by all, as we said above Athanasius had done. For how necessary he was to the Church, and how profitable it was that that man ⟦illegible: "munsit"; fortasse "defunctus"⟧ in the flesh, the Catholic faith knew, which by his mouth and love was defended against the Arian heretics. But when the peril is common, it is rather to be feared lest anyone be believed to do this, not with the will of providing counsel but with the fear of dying, and rather let the example of fleeing be absent than the office of going about profit; it must by no means be done.

But the difficulty concerns the second part of the Conclusion, namely by what means it is sometimes lawful to conceal the faith, whether it is lawful to use the garments and rites of infidels in order to conceal one's faith.

As for garments, by which infidels can be distinguished from the faithful, it can be said that these are of fourfold difference: First, there are garments by which infidels are wont to be distinguished materially from the faithful, not indeed formally, or precisely as they are infidels, but only inasmuch as they belong to such a nation, such are the garments of the Turks, which pertain more to the nation or province than to the sect of Religion; whence it comes about that, even if all were converted to the Christian faith, they would not on that account lay aside the ancient custom of using garments of this kind. Moreover the Catholic Doctors agree that a believer may use garments of this kind when some necessity compels him to pass through the region of those infidels: for that garment contains neither explicitly nor implicitly a denial of the faith or a profession of another sect. Nor does it stand in the way that others, judging him to be of the infidel nation, be deceived, thinking him to be of the same sect of the nation; for that deception occurs per accidens, and from the ignorance of the deceived, which he who uses garments of this kind does not intend per se. I said, while necessity urges; for since without sufficient cause we cannot intend our neighbor's deception, especially in a grave matter, such as it would be were he judged a worshipper of a false sect, it is certain that it would not be lawful even without necessity to use garments of this kind, nor to supply such a foundation for deception.

The second kind of garments is that which are worn for discerning infidels formally, as they are infidels, as the Jews at Rome by ordination of the Supreme Pontiff must wear a hat of red color; and their women must cover the head with a red veil. The third kind of garments is that which are assumed for professing and signifying a false religion, such as would be the garments which the Priests of a false religion are wont to use in common use. Finally the fourth kind of garments is that which not only in any way contain and signify the profession of a false sect, but moreover denote the actual worship of such false religion, such as those which either the Mahometan Priests or the petty sacrificers use in their sacrifices and superstitious rites. But whether the use of this triple kind of garments be lawful for believers, the Doctors do not agree, as may be seen in Lugo, d. 14. sect. ⟦illegible: "ă"; fortasse "2"⟧ who reports their opinions, and partly approves, partly disapproves them, and confesses ib., num. 42, that from the opinions of so many different Authors this general rule can be formed, in which perhaps all would agree, or differ but little; namely, that the use of the aforesaid garments is not lawful, when by institution or circumstances it is determined to the signification of a false worship, that is, of a perverse religion. But it does not conflict, he says, that the circumstances be such in which the garment can have a signification as determinate as words have; suppose, for instance, that an infidel prince should command a Christian subject to deny the faith, and, as a sign of the faith denied, to wear the image of an idol, or something of the sort. For in this case it is not doubtful that the wearing of that garment would be a sign of the faith denied, and therefore that it would be altogether illicit.

Since, however, not every use of such garments is always thus determined, it is inferred that then, for a most grave cause, it would be lawful to use garments of the first and second kind, namely when he who sees a Christian man using them is not thereby determined to judge that he has deserted the faith, but can doubt or judge that he uses such a garment for some other purpose. Whoever desires the fuller controversy on this matter, let him consult Lugo himself in the cited section, Suares, d. 11. sect. ⟦illegible: "»"; fortasse "2"⟧, and other Authors of moral or practical Theology: for the matter amassed in this volume, now hastening to its end, does not admit of a fuller discussion of this question. Wherefore, setting these aside, some things concerning Christian Hope are to be tasted.