Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

NOTE 1. The present question involves various and manifold difficulties, which several Theologians set forth and explain at greater length; but we, striving after brevity and clarity, will reduce them all chiefly to three heads, investigating and resolving: First, whether the habit of faith existed in wayfarers who were innocent: second, whether it perseveres in all wayfarers who are defiled by mortal sin: third, whether it exists in those who are at the term of beatitude or of damnation. Now it is certain that the Angels were for some time wayfarers, and were not established in the state of beatitude from the beginning of their creation, as we taught in the Treatise on the Angels, disputation 8; which Saint Augustine also clearly teaches in his commentary on Genesis, book 4, chapter 3, where he says:

The angelic nature was first created uniform, and called heaven, according to that text: In the beginning God created heaven, etc.; and second it was formed, and called light, when it was turned to the Creator, and adhering to Him was perfected by direction, according to that text: And God said: Be light made, and light was made.

In that state, moreover, the Angels were provided with the means necessary for meriting beatitude: but whether they also had infused faith is disputed among Theologians: for very many, with Alvarez 3. part. question 68. member 8. article 2., contend that in the Angels as wayfarers there was not faith properly so called, but that they had some more excellent scientific knowledge, namely either a supernatural knowledge of infused science, or evidence in the attesting witness, which, properly speaking, is not faith but science; while the other Theologians defend the affirmative part, with whom we also subscribed ourselves, in volume 1, Treatise 1, disputation 3, article 2, question 3, conclusion ⟦illegible: n.⟧ whence here only the first Parents must be treated of.

NOTE 2. That the Blessed have every perfection whatsoever which most befits their state of beatitude: since beatitude is a state perfect by the aggregation of all goods: and therefore it is certain that they are endowed and illumined with every virtue whatever, which has no repugnance nor incompossibility with that state of beatitude. But because three things above all fill out and perfect that lot of the Blessed, namely the intuitive vision of God, eternal and intimate fruition, and ineffable delight and divine pleasure, which from the vision of God by the intellect, and the fruition of Him by the will, overflows into the very substance of the soul and all its faculties; hence those things are said to be repugnant to that beatific state which are opposed either to that perspicuous vision of God, or to intimate fruition, or to delight; but whether faith directly or indirectly conflicts with any one of these three, by reason of which it could not subsist together with the beatific state, must be determined in the present place.

NOTE 3. Sinful wayfarers can be considered chiefly in a twofold state; for they are either heretics, or only defiled by mortal sin. I call a heretic one who, although initiated into Christian Doctrine and by the sacrament of baptism enrolled among Christians and the Faithful, nevertheless professes and maintains some error pertinaciously against the object and rules of faith, and the definition of the Church. Hence three things chiefly concur to make heresy: First, that such an error be pertinacious; for he who, merely because divine revelation, or the definition of the Church concerning some proposition commonly received and believed by all other faithful, has not been ascertained by him, should waver in doubt, and, his mind not being fixed, should incline to neither assenting part, affirming or denying, would not be judged a heretic. Second, that he who pertinaciously maintains it shall have been initiated not only by the sacrament of baptism, but also in that he professes the Christian faith as to the other articles; for by this a heretic is distinguished from an infidel; inasmuch as an infidel is he who was neither initiated by baptism nor professes the Christian faith in any way. Third and lastly, it is necessary, in order that anyone be judged a heretic, that he profess the faith according to some part at least of the New Testament, at least by human faith. For if he abjures it on every side, whether baptized or not, he is not to be called a heretic, but either a Jew or a Pagan, although by reason of the baptism received he be subject to the Church, and consequently liable to the same punishments as heretics. It is asked, therefore, whether sinners defiled by mortal sin, as well as those infected with heresy alone, preserve infused faith.

Four things, therefore, remain to be resolved in this Question: First, whether the first Parents had faith in the state of innocence, and lost it by sinning. Second, whether the souls of the faithful departing from this life, whether received into heaven or languishing in purgatory, preserve the habit of faith. Third, whether the damned, both men and demons, have infused faith. Fourth, whether that infused habit of faith perseveres in heretics.

First Conclusion. — IT IS PROBABLE THAT THE FIRST PARENTS IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE HAD INFUSED FAITH, AND LOST IT BY THEIR SIN. This is the more common opinion among Theologians, especially as to the first part, which indeed ⟦illegible: …⟧. Proof: first, because the first Parents in the state of innocence were acceptable and pleasing to God, as all confess: but by the Apostle, Hebrews 11.: Without faith it is impossible to please God. For he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and is a rewarder to them that seek him. Therefore, etc. Second, the same truth is confirmed by the authority of the supreme Pontiffs, who condemned the proposition of Baius: Absurd is the opinion of those who say that man was raised from the beginning by a supernatural and gratuitous gift, above the condition of nature, so that he might worship God supernaturally by Faith, Hope, and Charity: therefore the proposition contrary to this condemned one is approved. Third and lastly, in that state the first Parents were able to merit: but nothing is more congruent for merit than knowledge: therefore it must be granted that the first Parents had it.

You will say: Faith is imperfect knowledge: but in the state of innocence nothing was imperfect: therefore neither faith. — I distinguish the major: it is imperfect knowledge by order to intuitive and beatific knowledge, I concede: by order to all other knowledges which a wayfarer can have of the ordinary way, I deny. The minor likewise I distinguish: the state of innocence admitted nothing imperfect that pertained to the state of the wayfarer, I concede: that would be called imperfect by order to the beatific state, I deny.

The second part is also proved, and the foregoing is confirmed: first indeed by the authority of the ancient Theologians and holy Fathers, for above all Tertullian, book 1. Against Marcion, chapter 12., says:

Who will doubt that that very fault of Adam is to be pronounced heresy, because he admitted it by the choice of his own rather than of the divine sentence; except that Adam never said to his Potter: you did not define me prudently: he confessed his seduction, he did not conceal her who seduced: he was a heretic exceedingly rude, etc.

The same is taught by Saint Ambrose, Epistle 33., which is to Marcellina his sister, where he introduces God speaking thus to Adam: You acknowledge yourself naked, because you have lost the good garments of faith.

But this truth Saint Prosper defends most openly in many places, especially in the response to the excerpts of the Genoese, doubt 3., where, speaking of Adam, and of human nature, which had fallen through his sin, he says:

What, then, is the reason that he wills faith alone to be commanded to that same nature, which unless it had first lost it, would lack none of the other goods? For Adam, in believing the devil, did not believe God. And shortly after: How could faith, once lost in Adam, be found in any of his sons, unless the same Spirit, who works all things in all, were to infuse it?

And a little below he concludes thus: All men therefore lost what Adam lost: but he first lost faith, which we all, because we were able to lose it first, ought to receive first. By these words he clearly signifies that Adam truly lost faith. He teaches the same in book against the Collator, chapter 19. This also S. Fulgentius teaches in the book On the Incarnation and Grace of Christ, saying: The first man, deceived by diabolical persuasion, fell from humility, because he lost faith: but in losing faith he lost divine protection.

You will say 1. If Adam and Eve had lost infused faith, they would truly have been heretics: but it is not so; for he is not to be judged an infidel and heretic who does not oppose with obstinate mind the truth divinely revealed to him by sinning: but neither Adam nor Eve, by sinning, pertinaciously opposed the truth divinely revealed to them: therefore, &c. The major is evident: for heresy is an error of faith contrary together with obstinacy. Whence S. Augustine, Epistle 162, says: Those who defend such a perverse opinion with no obstinate spirit, and are ready to be corrected, and seek the truth with all diligence, are not to be reckoned among heretics. And in book 1, On Baptism against the Donatists, c. 16, assigning the difference between two men believing the same error, but with this distinction, that one is within the Church and the other outside the Church, and baptized by heretics, he speaks thus: Let me set up two persons in this manner, that is, one of these holding concerning Christ what Photinus altogether opined, and being baptized in his heresy outside the communion of the Catholic Church; but the other holding this same thing, yet being baptized in the Catholic Church, thinking it itself to be the Catholic faith: the latter I say is not yet a heretic, unless he should prefer to resist the doctrine of the Catholic faith manifested to him. But neither Adam nor Eve were obstinate in sin, nor rebels against the divine reproach; indeed each excused his own sin, the one accusing his wife his companion, the other accusing the serpent as the instigator of the crime committed: therefore, &c. — I distinguish the major: he who does not oppose truth with obstinacy, when the truth which he opposes is not evident to him, nor is he certain that it was revealed by God, is not to be reckoned a heretic, I concede: otherwise, I deny. But to the first Parents of mankind it was most evidently clear that God had threatened them with death if they should eat of the fruit of the forbidden tree: therefore, giving faith to the devil who said: You shall not die the death, &c., it follows that they denied it to him who had said: Of the tree of knowledge of good and evil thou shalt not eat: for in what day soever thou shalt eat of it, thou shalt die the death.

You will urge: Even if the first Parents had known that God had forbidden the use of that forbidden fruit under threat of death, it was not therefore clear to them whether that divine sentence would be merely comminatory, or whether it would truly have to be carried into execution. For since they had attained supreme dominion over all creatures, they could without difficulty suspect that God did not wish to bind their liberty to the fruit of one little tree; and consequently it is clear either that they did not attend sufficiently to the divine words, or that their sense and understanding in no way gave assent. It is confirmed from this, that the devil, masked in the image of the serpent, accomplished nothing else by tempting than with lying words simulating himself a friend of God and vindicator of the divine glory, that the divine words were to be understood not in that sense which they supposed, but in one far different: Why hath he commanded, &c.; as if he said: do not think that this was prohibited in words: for why would God have commanded you to abstain your hand from the fruit of some tree, when all are good and healthful? Thus almost interprets S. Epiphanius concerning the heresy of the Caians, question 3, and it is deduced from the Apostle, 2. ad Cor. 11, where he compares their seduction through the Pseudo-Apostles to the seduction of Eve through the serpent, saying: I fear lest as the serpent seduced Eve by his subtilty, so your minds should be corrupted. For just as the Pseudo-Apostles do not openly calumniate God, nor pronounce that he has spoken falsely: for if they said this, they would deservedly have no hearer, but would be expelled by all; but transforming themselves into Apostles, they simulate zeal for the honor of God and the salvation of souls, affirming that this or that divine oracle is to be understood not as others understand it. For neither do the Calvinists say that Christ lied when he said: This is my Body: but they affirm that those words are not rightly received by Catholics according as they sound, since they are to be interpreted by trope. Therefore it is to be inferred that the first parents fell rather through error and doubt, than through infidelity and heresy. — I deny the consequence. For they could not twist the words of the divine prohibition into another sense without open loss of faith, since it had been sufficiently intimated to them, both by the light of natural reason and of the indited sciences, and by the light of faith, that by this precept their obedience was to be proven; nor were they urged by any passion, nor labored under any error or ignorance, and the divine words had been intimated without any ambiguity; there is no doubt that only hesitating and failing in faith could they suspect something other than our signification of the words, nor believe the tempter intimating something else. For what else does the mind of heretics accomplish than to interpret the divine words signifying Christian truths beyond their native sense and that of the Church? Nor did the Apostle will anything else: for just as the Corinthians, giving faith to the Pseudo-Apostles, had fallen from the faith of Christ; so Eve, thinking with the devil against the divine commandment, fell away from the divine faith together with her husband.

You will say 2. Whoever sins only, either from rash presumption, or from inordinate love of creatures, does not fall from faith; but either from hope, or from charity, or from both at once: but Adam sinned thus; first indeed from rash presumption of pursuing pardon: for as S. Augustine says, book 4, Of the City of God, chapter 11, Adam, since he was inexperienced in the divine severity, could be deceived in this, that he believed what was committed to be venial. Chapter 13. And he thought he transgressed the precept venially if he did not abandon the companion of his life even in the fellowship of sinning. Secondly from inordinate love of his spouse; for, as the same S. Augustine speaks, book 11, On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 12, or whoever else may be the author of that book, Adam did not wish to sadden Eve, whom he believed able to pine away without his solace if he were alienated from her in mind, and that discord wholly perish; not indeed from concupiscence of the flesh's embrace, since he had not yet felt in the resisting law of his members a law against the law of his mind, but from a certain friendly benevolence, whereby it happens that God is offended lest man become an enemy from a friend. — I distinguish: whoever sins from presumption or from inordinate love having no antecedent or consequent infidelity, I concede: otherwise, I deny. But if anyone's motion were presumption or inordinate love in Adam, there is no doubt he had antecedent or consequent infidelity: for since he was driven by no enticement to sin of the flesh and passion, how could it have come about that he should slip into it, if he had believed the loss of death of body and soul, of all heavenly charisms, and of supreme dominion over all creatures to be instantly incurred, as God had threatened? I confess that men for the most part conquered by concupiscence, or chained by an ineluctable habit of sinning, are not summoned even to threatened and expected punishments: but nothing of the sort may be suspected in Adam; especially since, as the praised Augustine says, no law of members opposed the law of the mind in him; and consequently it is necessary that the divine faith first extinguished, either by not believing the words of God, or by twisting them into another sense, before he lapsed into presumption or inordinate affection.

Second Conclusion. — It is more probable that the blessed do not have faith, but otherwise concerning the souls mourning in purgatory. This is the more common opinion among Theologians regarding each part; although Alensis contradicts it, 3. par. qu. 61. memb. 1, and Durandus in 3. d. 32. q. 3, whom the Master of the Sentences seems to favor in 3. dist. 23.

The first part the Doctor proves, dist. 31. nu. 2, where he clearly signifies that the habit of faith or hope does not remain in the Blessed:

No habit, he says, is to be posited as remaining there in vain: but a habit would be there in vain whose inclination would then be impossible: but faith from its reason inclines only into latent truth, according to the gloss upon that Hebrews 11. Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not: and hope inclines only into an absent commodious good, according to Romans 8. Hope that is seen, is not hope, taking hope for the thing hoped for, namely for the object: but these inclinations cannot be had in the fatherland, where truth will be manifest, and the good possessed: therefore those habits will not remain, because they would be superfluous.

By these words the Doctor not only affirms that the habit of faith and hope does not remain in the Blessed, but also proves it by this argument: the most perfect state, such as is the beatific, suffers nothing idle and useless: but the habits of faith and of hope in that state would be idle; since in it they could never elicit their act, for the act of faith involves the imperfection of obscurity; but the act of hope connotes the absence of the object; but obscure cognition and actual possession of the object cannot subsist with the clear and intuitive vision of the same object, and its actual possession: therefore in the state of beatitude the habits of faith and hope would be in vain.

The same truth is confirmed from the Apostle, 1. ad Cor. 13, where he teaches every imperfect cognition is to be banished from the beatific state: for he says: We know in part, and we prophesy in part: but when that which is perfect shall come, that which is in part shall be done away. That is, that which is imperfect, and infuses only incomplete perfection, such as we at least have through faith, which indeed confers on us certain cognition of the divine mysteries, but inevident and obscure: whence that cognition is indeed perfect on the part of certitude, but imperfect on the part of obscurity: whence the same Apostle adds: Now I know in part; but then I shall know even as I am known. And now there remain faith, hope, and charity. Where by that adversative but, he seems to intimate the diversity of the way, in which these three remain, from the state of the fatherland, where charity alone remains, of which he had premised; charity never falls away, according to which sense Jerome received the words of S. Paul there, saying: Charity never falleth away, that is, it alone remains in the future. Chrysostom, Homily 31 on that place, saying charity is greater, because faith and hope pass away, but charity endures always. August. Sermon 53, De Tempore. Anselm upon that place of Paul, and others.

You will object 1. S. Irenaeus, book 4, chapter 25, where he teaches the three theological virtues remain in the state of beatitude; for he says: Paul, he says, all things being done away, faith, hope, and love remain. To him subscribes Tertullian, book On Patience, near the end, saying: Deservedly charity shall never fall away, the rest shall be done away, consummated, exhausted: tongue, knowledge, prophecy: faith, hope, love remain.

I answer. That S. Irenaeus and Tertullian wish not that faith and hope remain in the Blessed according to their specific formal reasons, namely the inevident cognition of the revealed object, and the firm tending into the absent object; but only according to some common reason of attaining the first truth and highest good; inasmuch namely that through the beatific vision succeeding faith, there is had firm and most certain cognition of God, just as it was had through faith, though in a more imperfect mode: similarly through fruition succeeding hope God is most perfectly possessed as present, who before through hope only was possessed as absent.

You will object 2. If the habits of faith and hope did not remain in the Blessed, chiefly because they would be useless in them: but it is not so: therefore, etc. The major is clear from what was just said. But the minor is proved; for since objects of a threefold kind can underlie the cognition of the Blessed, whereof some pertain per se to beatitude, such as the vision of the divine essence illumined by its attributes, and subsisting in the three divine persons: others are those which pertain to it only concomitantly, such as all the mysteries of the Incarnate Word and of our Redemption: others indeed are wholly outside the state and lot of beatitude, such as may be judged the knowledge of all those things which have been done in the world, or are being done, or are brought about, even unto the consummation of the age; although perhaps faith does not remain in the Blessed as to the objects of the first and second kind, unto which the beatific vision is terminated per se, nevertheless it can remain as to the objects of the third kind; for indeed nothing stands in the way why one of the Blessed cannot, by God specially revealing, know the things which have been done, or are being done, or will be done hereafter, and believe them on account of the divine revelation: for no contradiction can be conceived that God should render His essence manifest to someone by intuitive vision, and yet conceal from him the things that are being done in the world, or are to be done, which He may manifest afterwards, either per se, or through Angels: therefore as to these objects there can be an act of faith; and hence the habit in the Blessed will not be wholly useless.

I answer. Indeed that it is so; yet that assent will not be an act of theological faith, but either angelic or human, if what is revealed be made known through an Angel or another blessed soul; for those acts do not tend to God as to the object included directly or indirectly in those objects unto which they are terminated. In the case certainly he will give assent to the objects proposed to him by God, and that on account of the testimony of God, not obscurely known indeed, but clearly: and hence that assent will not be faith proper and strict, but evident knowledge through a demonstrative medium a posteriori; which evident knowledge does not conflict with the beatific state, at least concerning those objects which are not seen in the Word, nor possessed elsewhere by most perfect immediate cognition.

You will object 3. If the habits of faith and hope did not remain in the fatherland, chiefly because in that state habit and act are incompossible: but it is not so; for if there were some opposition of faith with beatitude, especially either on the side of act, or on the side of habit, or on the side of the act of beatitude with the habit of faith, for a threefold comparison can be made: first indeed, between the act of vision and the act of faith: second, between the habit of faith and the light of glory: third, between the act of vision together with the habit of faith, or between the act of faith with the habit of the light of glory: yet on neither side is it repugnant that faith be able to subsist with the beatific vision: therefore, etc.

I deny the minor: for first it is clear that the act of faith conflicts with the act of vision; both because one and the same object cannot be seen at once clearly and obscurely, as has already been proven several times; and because beatitude, since it is a status bringing the aggregation of all goods, and also the exclusion of all evil, consequently ought to exclude dread of every evil; for he who fears some evil of his own is not blessed on every side: but an obscure assent, such as is the assent of faith, always has annexed a dread of error, and hence infers a power of dreading, which per se is an evil; for to be able to fear evil itself is no slight evil; but if the act of faith could stand together with the act of vision, it would follow that in the same instant the evil of obscurity would stand together with the vision of God, and in consequence in that instant man would not be plainly and on every side blessed. — The habit of faith also conflicts with the habit of the light of glory: because it inclines to opposite acts, namely the unevident and the evident, whence it is necessary that one or other habit be perpetually useless: but such will not be the habit of the light of glory, which by its nature exacts permanence or perpetuity, and the state of beatitude completed in the blessed subject, and in consequence exacts perpetual privation of all obscurity, and of actual faith; and hence it infers the uselessness of the habit of faith, since it can now serve for no act. — Third and lastly, it is repugnant that the habit of faith subsist with the act of the light of glory, because the clear vision of God cannot be given connaturally except to one having the light of glory: therefore since this light of glory exacts of itself the negation of the habit of faith, it equally infers its act. Nor does it matter that Saint Paul perhaps had the beatific vision in his rapture; for I answer that although Saint Paul had truly had the beatific vision, the contrary of which we taught when treating of the beatific vision, still it would not be consequent that the act of the beatific vision could subsist connaturally with the habit of faith: for that conjunction of vision with the habit of faith in Saint Paul would not have been connatural, but against the connatural laws of each. Whence from it one may not infer that that act of vision could subsist connaturally with the habit, as it truly ought to subsist in the Blessed, otherwise a perpetual miracle would be required, that the habit of faith might be preserved together with the actual beatific vision, even as a miracle was needed that the moderate coolness might be preserved in the three children cast into the Babylonian furnace.

The second part is also commonly admitted by Theologians: both because those souls are still in the state of the way, and hence have everything that per se conduces to the sanctity of such a status, such as the theological virtues; and because there is nothing in those souls that conflicts with the habit or act of faith; for although (as de Lugo says) they can know God their Creator evidently from creatures, yet this knowledge is not incompossible with faith concerning the same object, as is clear in the Angels, who in the state of the way knew God more perfectly, and could still have had faith. — Then, many things about God are credible which are not known by natural power from creatures, such as the Trinity, and likewise many other things about creatures are believed through faith which could not be discovered by natural reason, such as the hypostatic union, the future resurrection, the universal judgment, and countless others. — Finally, an obscure revelation, upon which strict faith can be founded, is not repugnant to the state of those souls, since that is not the beatific state excluding all pains and anguish, but rather a darksome state, full of solicitude and anxiety, though with certitude of one's own salvation. And although concerning certain objects perhaps they have revelation evident to themselves, and not obscure, it suffices nevertheless if they do not have so clear a revelation of such a kind concerning all objects that the habit of faith must be retained, which will not there be wholly idle.

Third Conclusion. — Demons and the damned do not have infused faith. This is the more common opinion among Theologians against Durandus, in 3. dist. 23. question 9., where he says that faith remains in the damned; and

It is proved first by the authority of Saint Dionysius, book On the Divine Names, chapter 1., where he says that the damned lack all divine gifts; as also of Saint Augustine, book 9. Of the City of God, chapter 21., saying that the demons know Christ, not, he says, by the light of faith, but by the efficacy of signs.

It is also proved by reason: First, because habitual infused faith is granted for this purpose, both that one may become a member of Christ implanted in His mystical body, which is the Church; and that it may be the root of justification, and the foundation of things hoped for: but the damned, whether men or demons, are neither in act nor in potency members of Christ and of the Church, seeing that they are as branches cut off, withered, and cast into the fire; nor are they capable either of justification, or of the beatitude and salvation to be hoped for: therefore they are equally incapable of faith. — Second, the gifts and aids of grace are not communicated to the damned: but the habit of faith is an excellent gift: therefore it does not remain in the damned. The major is clear from that text Matthew 7., where Christ said: Give not that which is holy to dogs; neither cast ye your pearls before swine. Moreover, the state of the damned is a state of supreme misery: but if they had any supernatural gift, their state would not be one of supreme misery. For a greater misery could befall those who did not have that supernatural gift itself; therefore that state of the damned must be judged not to be illumined by the habit of faith. — Third and lastly, God grants nothing in vain: but that infused habit of faith would be altogether in vain in demons and the damned, since it would concur efficaciously toward no act of faith; for the act of faith cannot be elicited without gratuitous supernatural aid: but this aid is deservedly denied to the damned, for whom there is now no place for grace and mercy. Add that such aid would be given to them in vain: for since supernatural acts are ordered to justification and beatitude, that end ceasing, as it ceases in the damned, all supernatural means ordered to both ought also to cease. Nor does it stand in the way that there remains in the damned the character of Baptism, or of Confirmation, or of Priesthood: since that character is not per se an operative quality, but only an indelible sign of power, or of grace received, which sign assuredly perseveres in them deservedly unto their greater torment and bruising: but the habit of infused faith is a quality per se operative, which where it can no longer elicit its act, it is necessary that it perish.

You will say 1. Saint James chapter 2. teaches that actual faith is in the demons: therefore also habitual. The consequence is evident. But the antecedent is proved, for he says: The devils believe, and tremble: where he certainly speaks of the act of infused faith, otherwise he would not rightly use that example, to prove that faith alone, even infused, does not suffice for salvation, which he surely intends there, as Salvian observes and admonishes most excellently, book 4. On Providence, not far from the beginning, where he weighs the aforesaid oracle of the Apostle thus:

This very fruit of faith the Apostle testifies to be unfruitful without good works, saying: Faith without good works is dead. And again: For as the body without the spirit is dead, so faith without works is dead. He adds also certain harsher things for crushing those who flatter themselves with presumption of Christian faith; but someone will say: You have faith, and I have works. Show me thy faith without works, and I will show thee my faith by my works. Whereby he indeed indicates that the good acts of Christian faith are as it were witnesses; because unless a Christian do good works, he can in no way prove his faith, and by this, that he cannot prove it, that it is, it must be altogether held as if it were not. For since he thought it to be held in no wise by this, he at once demonstrates it himself in what follows, saying to the Christian: Thou believest that there is one God: thou dost well: the devils believe, and tremble. Let us consider what the Apostle willed to say in this place; let us not be angry at the divine testimonies, but acquiesce: and let us not contradict, but profit. Thou believest, says the divine discourse to the Christian, that God is one, thou dost well: the devils also believe, and tremble: did the Apostle err, that he compared the faith of a Christian man to a demon? Not at all: but wishing to show that which was said above, that without good works he ought to usurp nothing to himself by the arrogance of faith. And therefore he says that God is believed by demons, namely that as the demons, while they believe God to be, nevertheless persevere in perversity, so also certain men have as it were a demoniacal credulity, who, while they assert themselves to believe God, nevertheless do not cease from evil work. But he subjoins, to the shame and condemnation of sinful men, that the demons not only believe the name of God, but also fear, and tremble. That is to say: wherefore, he says, dost thou flatter thyself, O man whosoever thou art, about a credulity which without fear and obedience of God is nothing? The demons have something more. For thou hast only one thing, they two: thou hast credulity, thou hast not fear: they have credulity equally, and fear.

— Some answer, first, that the Apostle uses the verb believe in the present for the past; so that the sense is: the demons, when they were wayfarers, also believed, and yet because they had not works they were damned: therefore thou too, Christian, having a sterile faith without works, shalt be no less subject to eternal damnation: for it is most familiar among the Hebrews to write one tense for another, as is clear from that text Luke 7. To whom less is forgiven, he loveth less, that is, he loved less, as the holy Fathers expound, Ambrose,

Chrysostom, etc. Others answer that the Apostle does not equate the faith of demons with the faith of wayfaring man in all respects, but only in this, that both are sterile and useless for salvation as long as they exist without charity and good works. But this solution supposes faith to be in the damned in the manner in which it is in a sinner, and hence that the very habit of faith subsists also in the damned and in demons, which is against the Conclusion. Therefore I judge, with others, that it must be said otherwise and more correctly, that the Apostle there proves only from defect of works that faith is dead, even as by defect of fruits a tree is shown to be dead; and to prove this he brings forward the faith of the demon, which faith (whatever it be, whether acquired or infused) we gather to be dead because it lacks works: equally therefore the faith of the sinful man, which is sterile, will be proven dead. To these add that the demons and the damned can believe by acquired faith, which they procured for themselves through repeated acts of infused faith while they were wayfarers, as will appear from what is to be said below.

⟦Illegible: opening words of the following obiection lost in faded print; text resumes:⟧ …by the sole sin of infidelity it is lost: but there are many damned who nowhere admitted the sin of infidelity, and who died with the habit of faith: therefore they retain the same habit of infused faith.

I answer. That infused faith is destroyed not only by the sin of infidelity opposed to it absolutely speaking, but also from defect of pious affection toward believing as one ought, and on account of the unworthiness of the state. For although in wayfarers the habit of faith is not wont to perish except on account of infidelity, nevertheless it is not wonderful that it perishes in the damned, who elicited no act of infidelity: partly because they no longer have a pious affection toward believing; partly because their state is one of supreme misery, and consequently has no supernatural benefit, such as is the habit of faith; finally because, as we said, they are no longer ordained to justification and beatitude, and consequently faith in them would be useless. Hence it comes about that although the damned know within the same supernatural truths which they knew in the way, yet they do not know them in the same manner, namely by the habit of infused faith, but only by the habit of acquired faith, or perhaps also by a special manifestation of God, whereby God sets before them those mysteries which they had believed in the way, but especially those which regard eternal felicity, which through their own fault they lost, namely that at its sight they may be tormented more bitterly.

You will insist. Nothing hinders that a pious affection toward believing remain in the damned: therefore equally nothing can hinder that the habit of faith remain in them. The consequence is evident from what was said just above. But the antecedent is proved; for since synderesis and inclination to good remain in the damned, it does not conflict that some pious affection be found also in them, as is evident from the rich man feasting, who though buried ⟦in hell⟧ and tortured by flames, wished salvation to his brethren, and besought Abraham to send Lazarus to them, so that he might exhort them to penance.

I deny the antecedent. For although the damned always have synderesis unto more bitter torment, yet since they always act from a perverse intention of the end, and all their acts, however much they may have a good object, are ordinarily evil, it conflicts that any pious affection toward the first truth revealing and expounding the mysteries be in them. Nor did the rich man beseech from a pious affection — nay, altogether perverse — that Lazarus should labour for the conversion of his brethren; for he demanded this lest, namely, he be tortured more harshly on account of their damnation, and the most wicked example and occasion of sinning which he had given them.

Fourth Conclusion. — THE HABIT OF INFUSED FAITH PERSISTS IN A SINNER STRIPPED OF SANCTIFYING GRACE AND CHARITY. This is determined in the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 15, where it is defined that it must be asserted that not only through infidelity, by which faith itself also is lost, but also through any other mortal sin, even if faith be not lost, the grace of justification once received is lost. And Canon 23:

If anyone shall say that grace being lost through sin, faith also is at the same time always lost with it; or that the faith which remains is not true faith, although it be not living; or that he who has faith without charity is not a Christian: let him be anathema.

It is proved: first indeed from sacred Scripture, for the Apostle, 1. ad Cor. 13, clearly supposes faith to be able to exist without charity, and consequently it to subsist in a sinful man; for he says: If I should have all faith… but have not charity, it profiteth me nothing: and S. James demonstrates this openly chapter 2, where he says: Faith without works is dead: there is therefore a living faith and a dead faith; living faith indeed, namely that faith which works through charity, says the Apostle to the Galatians 5; but dead faith, whereby it is sundered from charity; for since the life of the soul consists in grace and charity, that will be called living faith which is formed by charity; but that dead which exists without charity; whence S. Augustine book On the Trinity, chapter 18, says excellently that faith can exist without charity, but not profit. And S. Bernard, Sermon 2, On the Resurrection:

Just as, he says, we discern the life of this body from its motion, so also the life of faith from good works. Wherefore the life indeed of the body is the soul, whereby it moves and senses: but the life of faith is charity, because through it it works, as the Apostle says: faith, which worketh by love: whence, charity growing cold, faith dies, as the body when the soul withdraws. Therefore just as the body through the withdrawal of the soul does not cease to be, so neither does faith altogether perish on account of its separation from charity and grace ⟦illegible: one or more words lost in faded print⟧.

It is proved also by reason: Faith is not destroyed by that which is not opposed to it, neither physically nor morally: but not every sin is opposed to faith, nor destroys its formal reason of object, and presently man existing in mortal sin can believe all things that are proposed as revealed by God: therefore he can in that state have both ⟦illegible: passage lost in faded print; marginal citation legible: inquit Suarez disp. 5. sect. 3. num. 3.⟧ … man can hope, and repent imperfectly through supernatural attrition, and pray to God as supernatural Author, adore him, and serve him, as regards certain precepts that occur to be kept: but these he cannot accomplish without infused faith: therefore man in sin⟦?⟧ can conserve faith. — Finally, faith is judged to perish through sin because it would have necessary connexion with sanctifying grace, such as charity has: but it is not so, for neither is it a property of it, nor ⟦word uncertain in print: “compars”⟧, but only its foundation as of the whole spiritual edifice, which certainly can remain, that edifice destroyed, just as the house demolished, the foundation subsists no less entire. Advert however that faith subsisting in a sinner is called formless and dead, but that which remains in a just man is called living and formed: for charity is as it were the form perfecting faith, not indeed physically, as some wish; because it is false that the habit of charity concurs immediately with the habit of faith toward its assent, since the latter precedes every act of charity: therefore such information of charity is not necessary for this effect: but only morally: and that under a twofold title, first indeed inasmuch as from the fellowship of charity the acts of faith are made meritorious of eternal life, which without charity have no reward. Secondly, because formless faith behaves after the manner of a root, or tree bearing no fruit, in which state it is judged dead, that is, deprived of spiritual life, and all comeliness and beauty, whereby it may become grateful and acceptable to God.

Yet I would not have you think with certain older Theologians that formless and formed faith are distinct habits in entity, whereof one subsists in the sinner, and perishes upon the advent of grace; and conversely here it recedes, grace succeeding, with another habit of formless faith; nor, as others wished, that both those habits remain in the just man, while in the sinner only the habit of formless faith subsists. Which variety of opinions indeed perhaps took its origin from this, that they thought living and dead faith to differ no less than a living man and a dead one, whom they judged to differ not only in number but in species; but now the concordant opinion of Theologians teaches that the same faith in number, which before was formless on account of the lack of grace, becomes formed through its increase: for just as the same body, which had been living, not only remains the same dead, but truly is the same, when it is raised anew and recalled to life, so also the habit of faith, which was alive with charity present, dies through its absence, and again receives life through its advent. Which certainly, says de Lugo disp. 16. sect. 3. n. 5., the parables and similitudes indicate to be true, by which Scripture and the Fathers are wont to signify this. For faith without charity is likened to a lamp without oil, such as the foolish virgins had. Which same lamp, that it might revive, they prepared to adorn with oil added, not another lamp, but the same. So also S. Jerome, tom. 1, on chapter 26 of Isaiah near the beginning, compares good works or charity to a wall. ⟦illegible: one line badly garbled by faded print (“Haem a benurali fit poredtr, tnqiuit, inecat e tuei, et tntemesale”); sense from context: the wall of faith is furnished with an outer rampart⟧ sit munimento, for it does not suffice for faith to have a wall, unless faith itself be confirmed by works. Where you see that the very same faith, which without works does not suffice, must be confirmed by good works: for neither does the wall being posited change the rampart, but the same altogether perseveres. So also says S. Bernard, Sermon 24, on the Canticles: The death of faith, he says, is the separation of charity: dost thou believe in Christ? do the works of Christ, that thy faith may live: let thy love animate thy faith, prove it by acts, it shall not incur ⟦tergiversatione⟧ work, whom faith of heavenly things raises up. The same therefore is faith, which charity withdrawing dies, and returning is vivified and animated. In his own sense also Bede on chapter 2 of James said, that dead faith revives and is animated through works of charity. But it is certain that nothing can revive and rise again unless that very same thing which had fallen and been dead. The reason of this assertion is clear: because the same faith which is formless, since it suffices for supernatural assent concerning things revealed on account of divine authority, suffices upon the advent of charity for believing the same objects, which assent in man already just will be grateful to God, and meritorious de condigno: why then should another habit of faith be added? Add that it is not credible that man sinning there be given him then another new habit of faith, which would certainly be a supernatural gift of God given anew to man without any disposition on his part, nay with indisposition and actual demerit, on account of which he would deserve to be stripped of all gifts, not indeed to receive new ones.

Fifth Conclusion. — THE HABIT OF INFUSED FAITH DOES NOT REMAIN IN HERETICS. This is determined in the Council of Trent in the places praised in the preceding Conclusion, where it says faith is lost through the sin of infidelity. Which is also Proved from sacred Scripture, for Luke 8 it is said there are some who believe for a time, and in time of temptation fall away: and the Apostle, 1. ad Timoth. 1, speaking of Alexander, and Hymeneus, exhorts Timothy that he hold faith, and a good conscience, which some rejecting, have made shipwreck concerning the faith. But they are said to have made shipwreck who lost the ship, that is, the Church, as S. Chrysostom expounds, Homily 5, saying:

As he who suffers shipwreck, having lost all things, remains naked, so he who falls away from faith retains nothing further to himself of the gifts and virtues of God.

Whence in the same place chapter 6. concerning the heretical man, saying, he says: He is proud, knowing nothing, that is, believing nothing with certainty and firmness: whence in the same place he exhorts Timothy: Keep the deposit, avoiding profane novelties of words, and oppositions of knowledge falsely so called, which some promising have erred concerning the faith: by which words the Apostle signifies that truly the infidel man and heretic falls away from faith. — The same is gathered from the First Epistle of S. John, chapter 2. where the Apostle, speaking of heretics, whom he calls Antichrists, says: They went out from us, but they were not of us: for if they had been of us, they would certainly have continued with us. From which words the holy Fathers gather that a heretical man is severed from the Church, nor is he any longer joined at all to the mystical body of Christ.

It is proved moreover by reason; First indeed: he loses faith who cannot be judged faithful: but a heretic cannot be judged faithful: therefore faith does not persevere in him. The minor stands: for heresy is formal infidelity, and consequently a heretic cannot be esteemed faithful. The major also is clear, for as long as anyone has the habit of faith, however doubtful he may be concerning certain articles, he can truly be called faithful, just as he who knows many philosophical conclusions, although he err concerning one or another, is nevertheless called absolutely a philosopher. — Then, he has not the habit of infused faith who cannot be moved by the formal reason of the object of such a habit: but a heretic cannot be moved by the formal reason of the object of infused faith; for this formal reason is revelation itself, as notified through the altogether infallible Church: therefore since a heretic does not believe the Church to be infallible in proposing all things revealed by God, otherwise he would believe one article no more than another, it follows that he has lost faith. — Finally, if anyone before receiving the habit of faith would refuse to believe some article, for instance the presence of the body of Christ in the Eucharist, although he were prepared to believe all the articles expressed in the three Symbols, of the Apostles, of S. Athanasius, and of the Council of Nicaea, he could not receive faith: therefore if he be so perversely disposed after it has been received, he will not be able to keep it. The consequence is clear by a similar case: for just as one pursuing one man with hatred, although he love all others, cannot receive nor preserve the habit of charity, so in like manner he who is perversely disposed toward one article to be believed cannot receive the habit of faith: for as charity moves to loving all men absolutely without exception, so also faith to believing all objects whatsoever revealed by God.

You will say. A heretic who denies one article of faith, for instance purgatory, or some Sacrament, still experiences the same facility and promptitude concerning other articles: therefore he still has the same habit of faith.

I distinguish the antecedent: he experiences the same facility by reason of infused faith, I deny: by reason of faith acquired through various acts, which he exercised before the heresy, I concede. The consequent similarly I distinguish; he has the same habit of faith divinely infused, I deny: acquired I concede. That man therefore, says the Doctor dist. 23. n. 1. without infused faith believes other articles, because infused faith is corrupted when heresy is generated; otherwise faith and heresy would stand together: therefore by acquired faith he believes other articles; which namely was together with the preceding infused faith, if any such there was; for not in that instant in which infused faith is corrupted through heresy is acquired faith first generated, for that error does not dispose to faith for the time being, nay rather it is an indisposition that it be not then generated: therefore it preceded before that error, and thus it is certain that there is in us acquired faith. Thus the Doctor.

You will say 2: If through the sin of infidelity the habit of faith were destroyed, that destruction would occur either physically, or morally: but it can occur in neither manner. Not indeed morally, or demeritoriously; for indeed if through the sin of infidelity the habit of faith were destroyed, especially because on account of its unworthiness and enormity it would move God to take away from man every supernatural gift: yet this cannot be said; because there are other graver sins, for instance hatred of God, which nevertheless does not move God to take away the habit of faith from him who has such hatred. Nor even physically, for if the sin of heresy destroyed physically the habit of faith, either it would effect this in the reason of formal cause, or after the manner of a form, which by its present and formal efficacy would fight against faith and destroy it, as heat fights against cold, and whiteness against blackness, or after the manner of an efficient cause and mediately, producing namely something which would be altogether incompossible with faith: but neither can be said. Not indeed the first: both because an act is not opposed formally and immediately to a habit, but only to another act elicited from an opposite habit: and because the act of heresy which is not voluntary but undeliberate has every physical entity of the act of heresy which is deliberate, and nevertheless by its presence the habit of faith does not perish. Nor even in the genus of efficient cause; since the first act of heresy, however intense, cannot produce a habit contrary to the habit of faith, except perhaps according to entity, and the first degree of that habit of infidelity: but that habit thus produced according to the first degree would not suffice that the acquired habit be expelled: therefore much less that the infused habit be destroyed by it physically and efficiently, especially since no acquired habit conflicts by its nature with an infused habit; for the sinner however much he has vicious infused habits can nevertheless be justified no less, even if those vicious habits remain in him when justified.

I answer. The act of infidelity or heresy expels the habit of faith morally only, not only demeritoriously, but also dispositively: a twofold genus of destruction, as regards the present institution, can be distinguished; namely demerit and indisposition; but the act of infidelity not only fights against faith demeritoriously, inasmuch as namely it moves God to withdraw faith from the infidel, but also dispositively, for he who wills not to assent to one proposition of faith on account of the authority and divine revelation proposed by the Church, by that very fact has an impediment lest he offer assent to infused faith concerning other propositions; since the authority and divine revelation proposed through the Church is the unique and indivisible motive by which we assent through infused faith to all mysteries revealed: therefore where this motive is judged insufficient to excite the intellect to assent with respect to one, it ought by equal reason to be judged insufficient for assenting to others which are to be believed on account of the same motive.

You will say 3: One can lose an acquired habit, e.g. science concerning one object, and preserve it perfect and entire concerning another particular object of the same science; for the physician can with ease lose the habit of Physic with respect to the principles and properties of the natural body, and retain it with respect to Anatomy and the properties of the human body: therefore by equal reason the heretic will be able to lose the habit of faith with respect to one article, and preserve the same with respect to other articles to be believed by divine faith.

I deny the parity, and the reason of the disparity is, that the habit of total science is not simple and indivisible, but multiple and gathered from distinct habits, which are occupied about diverse parts of the same general and common object; but the habit of faith is altogether simple and indivisible; and consequently it ought not be wondered at that where it is lost, it perishes entirely.