Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

THREE things above all come here to be determined: First indeed, whether the infused habit of faith has the true and perfect ratio of virtue: Second, whether that habit is to be called speculative or practical: Third finally, whether it is discursive or merely assentive. That these may be perceived more evidently,

Note 1. Virtue is distributed generically into moral and intellectual. Moral is that which is ordered to a work or act good of itself morally: intellectual truly, that which tends to the true, insofar as it perfects the intellect, as Aristotle himself hands down in 6 Ethics., chapters 1, 2, etc. Moreover, intellectual virtue can be regarded in two ways; for one is simply intellectual, and is per se ordered only to the perfection of the intellect itself, and consists solely in the cognition and apprehension of truth; but another is partly intellectual and partly moral; intellectual indeed, insofar as it tends to knowing the truth by which the intellect is perfected; moral truly, inasmuch as that cognition and apprehension of truth is ordered to informing the will and directing it in eliciting morally good acts. Again, this moral intellectual virtue can be considered either insofar as it is true virtue, or insofar as it is perfect virtue: for it is one thing that some habit be a virtue, and another that it be a perfect virtue: for the first requires only that it have the essence and definition of virtue; for the second however it is required that it have the mode and perfection of virtue, or that it order man to his ultimate end simpliciter: For, says Arist., lib. I Physic., virtue is the disposition of the perfect to the best: whence elsewhere he teaches virtue to be that which makes its possessor good simpliciter, and renders its work perfect. It is asked therefore whether faith in itself, and insofar as it is distinguished from charity and hope, is true virtue and perfect.

NOTA 2. Besides the infused habit of faith residing in the intellect, by which it is inclined to assenting to truths proposed although not evident, another is commonly admitted in the will, namely by which the will is inclined to commanding the intellect that it give assent to the proposition revealed, however obscure and non-evident; which habit indeed certain men wish to be a special virtue of obedience, as Medina teaches, lib. ⟦illegible: 1?⟧ De recta in Deum fide, chapter 2. Since, he says, no one can believe unless he captivates the intellect into the service of faith, as the Apostle teaches in chapter 6 of Acts, and 2 ad Corinthians chapter 10; yet no one can captivate the intellect except by subjecting it to the command of the will, which is certainly rendered through the obediential virtue. Some together with Lessius, Tract. De praedestinatione Angelorum et hominum, disp. 1. sect. ⟦b?⟧ assertion 2, judge it to be a habit of religion. Others truly together with Valentia, Tract. De fide, qu. 1. punct. ⟦t?⟧ dub. 1, contend it to be a habit of studiousness, inasmuch as its office is to apply the intellect, not only to eliciting its own act, but also to eliciting it thus or otherwise about this or that object. There are also those who judge the habit residing in the will, by which it inclines to moving the intellect that it assent to a non-evident proposition, to be the very habit of faith residing in the will; not that one and the same habit physically inheres in the intellect and the will at once, but that that habit is indeed double physically, but uniting morally, because they are ordered to the same act, namely to giving assent to the proposition revealed. Thus Alensis seems to teach, 3 part. q. 78. memb. 3. But none of these opinions is proved to me. Not indeed the first, because obedience per se has only the precept of a superior for its motive; but the honesty of believing is not the precept of a superior, although it be the matter upon which a precept can fall: whence it must first be honest before it be precepted: and consequently that integrity regards the habit of another virtue than obedience. Nor the second, because studiousness is ordered to regulating the appetite for knowing, and to blunting the vices opposed to it, namely curiosity and sloth, or excess and negligence: but willing to believe is not ordered to that, both because it presupposes science and knowledge of that which is to be believed, and because a studious man after he knows what is to be believed can not will to believe it, and consequently studiousness does not move toward that assent. Not finally the fourth, both because the habit of faith is properly intellectual, and consequently regards only the intellect, and because willing to believe, and believing de facto, pertain to diverse faculties, and consequently also pertain to diverse habits; for if the same habit sufficed for the diverse acts of diverse powers, it would follow that one habit would suffice for the diverse acts of the will and the intellect, which is altogether false. — I judge therefore, more probably, that the habit by which the will is inclined to commanding the intellect that it assent to the proposition revealed is a certain special habit, which can be called the habit of pious affection. Thus teach Suarez in 3. part. qu. 7. and dist. 3. De Fide, qu. 2. and many others more Recent, even among our own, especially Castillo d. 6. qu. 8. n. 19. for habits, like powers, ought to be specified by order to special objects: but the honesty found in the will of believing is specially distinct from the objects of other virtues, as we said just now, and consequently regards a special virtue, which can rightly be called the pious motion of the will, inasmuch as through that habit the will is piously moved to commanding the intellect that it assent to the proposition revealed. The difficulty therefore is, whether the habit of faith residing in the intellect, and insofar as it is distinguished from this habit of pious motion, is true virtue and perfect.

NOTANDUM 3. From Aristotle, lib. 3. De Anima, discourse is twofold: one indeed objective, and another formal. Objective is every that object, or those objects, which have such connexion and dependence among themselves that by their nature they demand terminating the acts of the intellect, which concur to formal discourse. Formal truly discourse is argumentation, which is an oration, in which a less known proposition is inferred from a more known one, whether meanwhile that proposition be known by natural light, or be evident, or only certain. Hence it is necessarily required that in discourse several cognitions intervene, and that the last be caused from the prior ones, either in the genus of efficient cause, as Saint Thomas teaches, 1. part. qu. 11. art. 7. or in the genus of material cause or dispositive and having itself after the manner of an antecedent condition, as Durandus wills in 2. disp. 24. qu. 2. Moreover it must be adverted to that the sense of faith can be thought to rely on discourse in two ways: first indeed, so that from premises containing divine testimony the assent to the truth testified would be deduced, e.g. whatever God says is true: but He says Himself to be trine in persons, and one in essence: therefore it is true; second, so that from premises believed the assent to another truth be elicited, v.gr. every man is risible: but Christ is man: therefore He is risible. Hence it is controverted among Theologians, whether faith relies on discourse from a proposition revealed, as much toward a revealed as toward a non-revealed one.

These things thus prenoted, three things above all remain to be determined: First, whether faith is true and perfect virtue: Second, whether it is discursive: Third, whether it is speculative or practical.

First Conclusion. — INTELLECTUAL FAITH SEPARATELY FROM HOPE AND CHARITY IS INDEED TRUE VIRTUE, BUT NOT SIMPLICITER PERFECT. Thus commonly all Theologians with the Doctor in 3. dist. 36. n. 30, where he supposes the common doctrine, Faith, Hope, and Charity to be Theological virtues.

It is proved also by reason: Of the ratio of virtue is, first, that it perfect a power in order to some good and honest act: second, that that act be in some way arduous and difficult: third, that of itself it signify order to the ultimate end, and be by its nature apt to be referred to it: but these three are found in the habit and act of faith, even separately from charity: first namque this inclines and determines the intellective power to right operation, for to believe the Revealer is a notable good: likewise it perfects the intellective power, since it instils into it knowledge far more excellent than any natural science and cognition whatsoever. Second, it inclines to the arduous and difficult: since indeed it is difficult to assent to non-evident truths, and often against, or at least beyond, the common judgment of reason. Finally, of its nature it is ordered to the ultimate end, namely God: for it uncovers and declares the mysteries so that the will be kindled more easily to divine love.

The Doctor teaches the second part at n. 31 where he says:

if it is asked whether Faith and Hope without Charity would be virtues: It can be said, as was said before of the moral virtues, that in their species they can be perfect, namely insofar as they are principles of their own acts respecting their own objects; but that ultimate perfection, which they have in attaining the end to which they are ordered by charity, they cannot have without it. And this perfection indeed, both in morals and in these, although it is commonly said to consist in attaining the end through some elicited operation, or through some order of these, or their acts, to the end, can nevertheless be said principally to consist in this, that one be accepted by God, ordered to beatitude; for thus no virtue, nor its act, is accepted without charity, which alone divides between the children of the kingdom and of perdition.

You will say. Virtue is that which places the power in the ultimate degree of perfection due to its act: but faith, since it is obscure, does not communicate to the intellect the ultimate degree of perfection due to its act; for it communicates to it neither clarity nor evidence: therefore it is only a virtue improperly and broadly taken, namely insofar as it signifies a laudable habit inclining to good. — I distinguish the major: so it constitutes it either in genus or in species, I concede: in species only, I deny. True indeed it is that every virtue ought to constitute the power in its best, if best be taken in genus and universally: for every virtue of the will disposes it to honesty, which is the best of the will; and every virtue of the intellect disposes it to the cognition of truth, which is the best of the intellect. But if the speech is about the best in species, it is false: for not every virtue of the will brings to it the supreme degree of honesty; for this competes to charity alone: yet other virtues also are in the will. Nor does every virtue of the intellect bring to it the supreme degree of evidence: for physical science is not in that degree of evidence in which Mathematics is. Therefore to the ratio of virtue it suffices that it infallibly attain the good of its power, which is gathered from Aristotle 6. Ethic., chapters 2 and 3, who demanded no other condition. But this most of all competes to faith; for although it be exceeded by science in evidence, nevertheless it is the more excellent science, both in supernaturalness and in certitude and infallibility; on account of which with better right it merits the appellation of virtue.

You will say 2. Faith is not numbered by Aristotle among the virtues of the intellect: therefore it is a sign that he did not acknowledge it as a virtue of the intellect. — I deny the consequence: for it is not wonderful that he did not reckon faith among intellectual virtues; since he himself did not acknowledge divine supernatural faith with the excellence of infallibility which Theologians acknowledge in it. Human faith however he rightly did not number among virtues, since it lies open to error, into which, as far as it is of itself, it can lead the intellect, which chiefly stands against the definition of virtue, as is clear.

Second Conclusion. — CHRISTIAN FAITH IS NOT DISCURSIVE, BUT ASSENTS IMMEDIATELY TO THINGS REVEALED, INASMUCH AS THEY ARE REVEALED. This is the opinion of the Subtle Doctor in 3. dist. 24. n. 14, and he proves it by the authority of Saint Augustine, lib. 18. De Civit., chapter 11. where speaking of those things contained in Sacred Scripture, he says that they are commended to us by divine utterances, although through men, not instilled by contentions of arguments, lest he who knew them, namely as they were handed down in Scripture, should fear to contemn not the genius of man but the eloquence of God: whence the Doctor concludes,

that he who assents to them has a habit, not indeed of science, but a habit whereby he assents immediately to all and each, and not to one on account of another, of those things which are handed down in Scripture; nay more, if some things handed down there were proved from others, he would not assent to them because so proved: but to every saying in the Canon he assents, not because it is proved in the said manner, but solely on account of the authority of God, by reason of which he assents immediately to all things handed down in Scripture, not to one on account of another by syllogistic discourse.

The same Saint Damascene teaches, lib. 1. De Fide, chapter 12. he proves likewise that it is not inquisitive, nor consequently discursive. Hence Saint Ambrose, lib. 1. De Fide, says: Take away hence arguments, where faith is sought, as if to say there must be no ratiocination. Wherefore Tertullian, lib. De praescriptionibus, chapter 7. says: We have no need of curiosity after Christ, nor of inquiry after the Gospel: when we believe, we desire to believe nothing beyond.

It is proved similarly by reason: First namque in every discourse the assent given to the premise or principle is distinguished really from that which is exercised about the conclusion: but the assent of Faith concerning divine revelation is not distinguished really from the assent which is of the thing revealed: therefore that assent itself is not properly discursive. The major is evident, for discourse is an oration in which one thing is inferred from another: but one would not be inferred from another, if by the same act anyone gave assent to principle and conclusion: for then that assent would be simple, not truly illative. The minor also is evident; for the formal object of the assent of faith is the thing revealed, considered indeed not materially and according to its entity, but formally, or reduplicatively as revealed: and consequently when anyone assents to a thing revealed, he also assents to the revelation. — It is confirmed from this, that the habit of faith is distinguished from the theological habit, as all Theologians agree: but it is distinguished from it from no other source than because Theology is formally discursive, supposing divine revelation, or the proposition revealed, as true, that from it it may elicit another: but faith by a single intuition attains immediately divine revelation and the thing revealed. — Next, divine revelation is believed immediately and without discourse as such; therefore also the article revealed by it. The antecedent is evident: for in that argument something can be proved to be truly revealed by God. The consequence is proved by the example of vision; for just as a colored and illuminated thing is seen immediately, because color and light inexisting in the thing itself are seen immediately, color indeed as the material object of sight, light truly as its formal object; whereas the thing revealed by God is only the material object of the act of faith: but divine revelation the formal object: therefore by one and simple act of faith believes the thing revealed and worthy of revelation: and consequently faith is not discursive. — Finally, that assent is properly discursive only when through some antecedent judgment two things are judged to be either the same or conjoined, so that from one conceded the other also seems ought to be conceded; whereas the internal assent of faith does not require that antecedent judgment concerning the connexion of the revelation with the thing revealed: therefore that act is not a discourse, nor consequently is the habit inclining to it discursive. The major is plain from the common doctrine of the Dialecticians, who teach that two judgments are required for argumentation, namely judgment must be made of the goodness of the consequence, and accordingly judgment must also be made of the connexion of the extremes with the middle, and by force of that judgment of such a consequence, assent must be given to the thing enunciated through the conclusion. But the minor is proved: both because when anyone believes God to be trine, e.g., he does not precisely and formally believe the thing to be so on account of the connexion which the extremes of this proposition have among themselves, and with the motive itself or medium, namely divine revelation; nor does he therefore assent from this, that he see such a connexion, and judge of the goodness of that consequence inferred from the antecedent, as is especially evident in idiot and rude men, who although they know not how to judge of the goodness of a consequence from the antecedent, nevertheless elicit preeminent acts of faith, and sometimes far more excellent than those who are most expert Theologians. — It is confirmed, if that judgment were required for faith, it would follow that whoever apprehended better that connexion of the extremes, namely of the truth to be believed and of divine revelation, and penetrated more acutely the goodness of that consequence from the antecedent, would elicit thereby more perfect acts of divine faith, just as whoever penetrates better the connexion of some scientific truth with the scientific medium has a more perfect act of science: but experience shows this to be false: therefore, &c.

You will say 1. Every argument comes about with discourse: but from the Apostle to the Hebrews 11. Faith is the argument of things that appear not: therefore it is discursive.

I distinguish the major: argument properly so called, insofar as it signifies the inference of one thing from another, comes about with discourse, I concede: argument improperly so called, and insofar as it signifies only the certitude or manifestation and conviction of those things which are comprehended neither by sense nor by reason, comes about with discourse, I deny. But in this latter manner the Apostle calls faith an argument, so that just as by discursive argument we arrive at the cognition of a thing inferred from another, and by the very force of the argument we are convinced to assent with certitude to the truth of it, so also through divine faith we have cognition of the things revealed by God, no less certain than that cognition is which is acquired through argumentations and most certain demonstrations.

You will say 2. In the same manner, proportion being preserved, one must philosophize about the assent of divine faith and about the assent of human faith: but the latter is elicited through discourse: therefore also the former. — I deny the major as regards the present undertaking, and the reason of disparity is that human faith is not borne toward human authority itself as immediate and per se certain, but as certain and known through something else, namely through experience of the probity of life and perfect knowledge of the speaker; by which human authority ought above all to stand firm, so that it move toward assent: whence the intellect can infer from the cognition of such principles a conclusion containing assent: but divine faith is borne immediately toward the very authority or truth of God; and thus the intellect, leaning upon that alone as formal motive, can be determined by the will so that without any discourse it tend toward whatever material object of divine faith, just as on account of the certitude of the first principles it tends immediately toward assent to such principles.

You will say 3. If it were not necessary for the assent of faith to be made with a discourse, one proposition of faith ought not to be inferred from another: yet this is done frequently; for in 1. Corinth. 15. the Apostle reasons thus: If the dead rise not: then Christ is not risen: but Christ is risen: therefore the dead shall rise. Likewise S. John, chapter 4. of his First Epistle, runs thus: Let us love one another, because he first loved us: therefore faith is discursive.

I distinguish the minor: such an inference ought not to be made with respect to the inferrer himself, as if he needed such a discourse, so that by the assent given to one proposition he were moved to assent to another proposition deduced from it, I concede: with respect to those who would not know that the deduced proposition had been revealed unless such an inference were made, I deny the minor. But to its proof the Doctor answers at n. 15. that those texts of Scripture are not true argumentations:

Because an argument makes faith about some matter which was otherwise doubtful: therefore in an argument properly so called the conclusion is believed and consented to on account of the argument and its evidence. But if Paul had said this, the dead shall rise, I would have believed him then just as now: nor is that conclusion of greater formality than if he had simply narrated it: likewise just as I believe the conclusion or consequent, so also the antecedent, and conversely: for as I believe that the dead shall rise, so I believe Christ rose again, because we have no certainty of the resurrection of Christ except from the testimony of others, as is clear from the Apostle, where above, who says: if Christ be not risen, we are found false > witnesses, and therefore all the certainty which is had concerning the resurrection of Christ and of the dead is nothing other than the certainty of faith, and not beyond. Likewise what John said, Let us love one another, etc., he said to move our souls to the love of Christ. That however Christ loved us with that love of which he speaks, this has been believed by us, and thus it holds certainty concerning the conclusion, yet not greater than concerning the principle; and therefore since the principle is not known from the evidence of the thing, it cannot have science of the conclusion. But if anyone has a habit beyond faith, that man assents to all and each of the things said in the Canon, and not to any one on account of another; because although one thing might follow from another, he nevertheless has no greater certainty about that which follows than about that from which it follows.

These words of the Doctor. By which he clearly signifies that all propositions which are elicited from others in Scripture, whether one be of faith or both, are by no means to be judged of faith as thus deduced, because the assent given to them so does not rest upon immediate revelation or testimony of God.

You will say 4. It happens often that from propositions believed through faith others are inferred which likewise pertain to faith: thus from this proposition of faith believed, Christ is truly God and man, the Fathers of the Council of Constantinople rightly gathered that in him there is a twofold will, namely divine and human, in this syllogism: where there is a twofold intellectual nature, there is a twofold will: but in Christ there are two intellectual natures, divine and human: therefore also a twofold will; whereby indeed that last proposition is of faith, and elicited from that prior one, which is equally of faith, namely, in Christ there are two intellectual natures. — I answer, those inferences are not made through the habit of faith, but by Theology, which draws forth those conclusions from revealed principles; whence the truths expressed in those deduced propositions are not of faith, but are Theological conclusions, insofar as they are considered as inferred through a discourse, although the same are of faith, inasmuch as they fall under immediate divine revelation.

You will say finally: Whenever any assent regards two things, such that it attains one only through mediation of the other, by which it is caused, so often is it a legitimate and true discourse: but the interior assent of divine faith regards first and per se the divine revelation, and through it the very thing revealed, to which therefore it faithfully assents, because it offers assent to the divine revelation: therefore the interior assent of divine faith is discursive. — I distinguish the major: if it attains one thing through another by way of inducing knowledge of the other, I concede: if by way of formal object affecting and determining the material object, I deny. For an assent can be understood to regard two things in such a way that it attains one through the other in two ways: first indeed, if it is occupied about one as about the formal, and through it attains the material object insofar as it is informed by such a formal object; secondly, if it attains one as primarily known, in order that through it knowledge of the second be deduced. Now the first manner by no means imports the formal reason of a discourse, otherwise the operations of the senses, e.g. the vision by which the eye terminates in the colored as luminous, would be discursive, because it perceives color only through the mediation of light. The second manner indeed is discursive; but the assent of our divine faith attains the revealed thing only as material object, and revelation indeed as formal object, and thus it is by no reason to be called discursive.

Third Conclusion. — DIVINE FAITH IS TO BE CALLED ABSOLUTELY PRACTICAL, NOT HOWEVER SPECULATIVE. This is the Doctor's, question 1. of the Prologue, num. 31. where he resolves therefore that Theology is practical, because it rests upon divine faith, which is practical. And num. 41. answering the arguments he says:

To the first I answer, that faith is not a speculative habit; nor is believing a speculative act; nor is the vision following believing a speculative vision, but practical: for the nature of that vision is to be conformed to fruition, and to be had prior in the created intellect, so that fruition may be elicited conformably to it.

By these words the Doctor signifies that faith is absolutely practical, and that there is no force in the argument of those who contended that therefore faith is speculative, because the beatific vision succeeded to it, which is speculative: for the Doctor denies that the beatific vision is speculative, and contends that it is truly practical, because therefore the beatific vision precedes in the intellect, that fruition may follow in the will. Now this Conclusion, sufficiently proved, remains from art. 1. question 1. of the Proemial Disputation concerning Theology in common; for it rests upon the same reasons by which we proved there that Theology is practical, and we solved all the difficulties and arguments by which the contrary opinion is usually attacked by Thomists holding otherwise. Therefore, lest we retrace courses already worn, we have refrained from repeating them.