Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

Note 1. It is certain and indubitable among all Catholics that the infused virtues are to be admitted, which are bestowed divinely upon men both adult and infant in baptism. As to adults, this is most clearly taught by Innocent II cap. Maiores, for he says: That indeed which the objectors bring forward, that faith, or charity, and other virtues are not infused into infants as being non-consenting, is not absolutely granted by most, since on this account a question is debated among Theological Doctors, some asserting that through the power of baptism fault indeed is remitted to infants, but grace is not conferred: others saying that sin is forgiven and virtues are infused, having them as to habit, not as to use, until they come to adult age. Where he plainly supposes it to be held by all as certain and indubitable that those habits are infused into adults, as consenting by their baptism and divine vocation, while they are being baptized, and that it is only doubtful whether the same happens in infants. Similarly the Council of Vienna, related in the Clementine De summa Trinitate, after teaching that baptism profits unto salvation both infants and adults; yet that it is disputed among Theologians whether in baptism virtues and informing grace are also infused into infants beyond the remission of fault, adds: But we, attending to the general efficacy of the death of Christ, which through baptism is applied equally to all the baptized, have deemed the second opinion, which says that informing grace and virtues are conferred in baptism upon infants as well as adults, as the more probable, and more consonant and harmonious with the sayings of the Saints and Doctors of modern Theology, to be chosen with the approval of the sacred Council. Where he plainly supposes as indubitable that said virtues are infused; but since the efficacy of the death of Christ generically is applied in baptism both to infants and to adults, from the fact that those virtues are infused into adults, meanwhile these also are infused into infants (for those words signify this: We attending, &c., by which the reason of the ensuing decision is rendered), and that this is to be chosen as more consonant with the Fathers and Theologians. Now the difficulty is whether those virtues truly are habits, and those supernaturally permanently abiding in us; which that it may appear the more evident,

Note 2. This distinction is found between supernatural habits divinely infused per se, and natural ones acquired by one's own labor and repeated and reiterated acts: First, that the latter confer merely facility upon the faculty in which they inhere, that it may break forth more promptly and expeditiously into its operations and elicit acts; but the former bestow not so much that facility as virtue upon the potency in which they inhere for eliciting their acts, so that the faculty without acquired habits could indeed operate absolutely, though with some difficulty: but without supernatural habits could not in any way elicit the acts toward which those habits incline. Second, those habits differ in this, that acquired ones do not promote the potency beyond its lot and natural state, but stimulate and aid it toward eliciting the acts naturally due to it; but the supernatural promote the faculty and soul to a state naturally undue, and confer upon it force for eliciting acts above the powers of nature, so that the faculty without habits of this kind could not in any way exercise such acts, even though it expended all its force and activity thereon. Nevertheless they agree in this, that both those habits inexist in the faculty by way of co-principle, and concur with it partially in the production of the act to which they are ordered.

Note 3. Something can be called supernatural by either of these two ways, namely either as to substance, or as to mode. That is called supernatural as to substance which in its entity is such that it could not be produced by any secondary cause of the natural order, however duly applied and prepared for acting, unless some principle were implanted in that secondary cause, already naturally complete and indeed sufficiently disposed for eliciting natural acts, but not for producing those acts or effects which are called supernatural. I said already naturally complete and disposed for acting: for it is certain that a secondary cause, however prepared and expedite of itself for acting, cannot elicit its acts nor produce effects without the special concurrence of God, which is necessary for producing any effect whatsoever; and therefore that faculty has not of itself, without such concurrence, an adequate physical virtue unto that effect: but this concurrence is required on account of the essential subordination of the secondary cause to the first, and also on account of the essential dependence of every effect upon the same first cause; nor is that exigency made on account of the special perfection and dignity of one effect rather than another: for that concurrence is required alike for eliciting acts and producing effects imperfect and perfect; whence this concurrence does not suppose a potency sufficiently complete, but completes and perfects it by way of co-principle in the elicition of acts connatural to it. But when an act is of such entity and dignity that it cannot be produced by a potency thus complete and expedite for acting, unless that faculty be aided, and be rendered powerful for that production through some form to be produced and infused by God alone, then that act is judged supernatural as to substance; because its production altogether exceeds the capacity and activity of the faculty otherwise sufficiently disposed for eliciting acts which would be purely natural. Supernatural according to mode is called that which, although it could be done and produced by the forces of nature by secondary causes without any divinely implanted form, is nevertheless here and now done by God beyond the exigency of nature, as sight restored to a blind man, a rose brought forth in winter, water turned into wine by miracle, as was done at Cana of Galilee.

These things premised, there remain only two points to be determined: First indeed, whether the virtues of Faith, Hope, and Charity are habits or qualities permanently abiding in us: Second, whether they are supernatural as to substance, or as to mode.

First Conclusion. — INDEED THE VIRTUES OF FAITH, HOPE, AND CHARITY ARE QUALITIES PERMANENTLY ABIDING IN US BY WAY OF HABIT. This is common among Theologians. And

Proof from the authority of the Council of Vienna, and of Clement V in the first Notable cited above: for from the sentence of the same Council it stands that supernatural virtues, as well as justifying grace, are infused divinely into infants in baptism: but they are not infused by way of act, of which those infants are altogether incapable: therefore they must be infused by way of habit. Nor does it matter that Clement V with the Council of Vienna approving does not define it to be altogether certain that the virtues are infused in baptism even into infants: for it suffices that he assert this to be the more probable, and more consonant with the sayings of the Holy Fathers and Doctors of Theology, and consequently against that definition, which Clement V made with the Council of Vienna approving

Whoever should teach the contrary to be more probable would sin. He adds that Clement V asserts in an equal degree of certitude that informing grace and virtues are conferred in baptism upon infants as well as adults. By which he insinuates that each is equally certain, nor can one be denied without the other: but it is altogether certain that informing, or justifying, grace is infused into infants in baptism: therefore according to the mind both of the Council of Vienna and of Clement V it ought equally to be certain that the virtues of Faith, Hope, and Charity are infused by way of habit into those same infants, seeing that they are altogether incapable of acts.

Proof second, and the preceding argument is confirmed by the authority of the Council of Trent, Sess. 6. cap. 7., where after enumerating the dispositions which precede justification, and recounting within them the act of faith and hope, it subjoins: This disposition and preparation is followed by justification itself, which is not mere remission of sins, but sanctification also and renovation of the interior man through the grace received and gifts. Wherein the reception of grace and gifts in justification is co-distinguished from the preparation which it follows, and in which actual faith was already supposed: therefore by the name of gifts, which are afterward infused, something permanent and co-distinct from acts must be understood. — It is confirmed from the fact that there the same Council, after saying that the formal cause of justification is inherent justice divinely infused, according to each one's disposition, straightway infers: Whence in justification itself, together with the remission of sins, man receives all these things at once infused through Jesus Christ, into whom he is ingrafted: Faith, Hope, and Charity. By which words the Council declares what those gifts are whose reception it had said above is included in justification. It is confirmed also by the following words, where the Council teaches that this faith, of which it speaks, is that which, it says, Catechumens before the sacrament of baptism seek from the Church by the tradition of the Apostles, when they seek the faith that proffers life eternal: but this faith is neither sought from the Church nor given save through baptism, unto which the very Catechumens come: but through baptism actual faith is not given, seeing that infants are incapable thereof; nor do the Catechumens even ask for the act of faith, because they come to baptism with actual faith, or act of faith: therefore the mind of the Council is that those virtues of which it speaks are qualities by way of habit permanently abiding in us. Finally it is confirmed from Vega, lib. I. on Trent, cap. 21., where he teaches that after Trent the virtue of faith distinct from the act of believing is to be said to be infused concerning faith: for after he had recounted the words of the Council of Vienna cited above in the first Notable, thus does that famous Interpreter of the doctrine of the Council of Trent speak, seeing that he was eyewitness and earwitness thereof: It seemed good to this holy Synod (namely the Tridentine) to approve that opinion and to pronounce anathema against him who asserts the contrary: for it understood this to be the common faith of the Church, although not under the name of habits. The same Sotus, lib. De natura et gratia, cap. 18., who himself also was present at the Tridentine Council.

From which it is legitimately inferred, after the Council of Trent, to seem certain that the virtues of Faith, Hope, and Charity are infused into us by way of habit: Both because the Council expressly defines Faith, Hope, and Charity to be infused into us: but according to the common manner of speaking these necessarily signify some act, or habit: therefore the Council defines some act, or habit, to be infused into us: but it cannot be said that an act is infused into us; because acts are given to us not only by God, but are also elicited by us: therefore the Council defines a habit to be infused into us: And because, there the same Council cap. 15. and Can. 28. defines that faith, when justifying grace has been lost through mortal sin, is not lost save through infidelity, and is verily of faith: but these cannot belong to an act: for the latter is neither lost through sin, nor does it remain the same before and after sin, and straightway the Council speaks of habitual and permanently abiding faith.

You will say 1: The Council does not expressly define that habits of Faith, Hope, and Charity are infused into us: but it is inferred only from certain of its sayings: but a proposition which is not expressly defined in Councils, but is only inferred from some of their sayings, is not altogether certain, but is only a theological proposition: therefore, etc. — I distinguish the minor: if it be inferred only by reason of some connection which that proposition would have with the thing defined in the Council, it would not be altogether certain, let that pass: but if it be inferred from the force of the signification of the words, and the identity of what is signified, or because the thing signified by both words is the same, I deny the major. For, as we said, if the words of the Council are taken properly, they signify not an act, but the habit of faith: therefore, etc.

You will say 2: The Council of Trent intends only to condemn heretics asserting that our justification is not wrought through any form inherently adhering in us, but only through an extrinsic acceptance of God: therefore it defines only that we are formally just through some intrinsic form, whether meanwhile this be act or habit. — I deny the consequence: both because the Lutheran heretics, against whom chiefly that definition of the Tridentine Council militates, not only taught these things, but also perversely denied that we are just through intrinsic habits; and condemned the opinion which teaches that habits of Faith, Hope, and Charity are infused into us; and consequently as the Council intends to condemn them, so it intends also to define this opinion. And because Councils often in their definitions not only condemn the opinions of heretics, but at the same time also explain what is to be thought concerning the proposed matter, as even appears from the very words of the Council itself.

You will say 3: God labors nothing in vain, nor does He concede anything useless: but supernatural virtues by way of habit would be useless and vain in most of their subjects, especially in infants; which indeed is proved, because habits are given for the eliciting of acts: but infants are incapable of acts to be elicited: therefore also of habits to be received. — I answer first, that if the argument concluded anything, it would even follow that infants through baptism do not receive Faith, Hope, and Charity, because they are incapable of the acts of those virtues: but this directly militates against the definition of the Council of Trent: therefore, etc. — I answer second with the Seraphic Doctor in II. d. 4. qu. 2., that the incapacity of infants for eliciting acts does not make them incapable of receiving habits:

For it must be noted, he says, that the powers of the soul are impeded in two ways by an evil habit, and by concupiscence, or by fault: and on the contrary this impediment is removed by grace, or the virtues, whereby they are expedited for operating. Therefore the virtues render the powers facile, perfecting them, and this by removing fault: but they do not effect another expedition. Hence since an infant has both impediments, one is removed by the virtues, not both: and therefore he is not altogether facile for operating. Now a habit of this expeditive kind has a multiple origin. For one is innate, one acquired, one infused. The first begins with nature, and takes its origin from its principles: and therefore it is imperfect in imperfect nature, and grows as nature grows, and is perfected when nature is perfected, as appears in natural judgment. But the second, namely the acquired, takes its origin from free will, which has no use until nature is somehow perfected: and therefore it follows perfected nature. But the third takes its origin from God, not from nature, nor from free will, and can be in an infant before the use of free will: but because it has not its origin from nature, it can be perfect while nature is imperfect.

Second Conclusion. — THE THREE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES, NAMELY FAITH, HOPE, AND CHARITY ARE INFUSED PER SE AND SUPERNATURAL IN ENTITY.

Proof first from Sacred Scripture: for Ioan. 6.: This is the work of God, that you believe in him whom he hath sent. To the Philippians 1.: For unto you it is given for Christ, not only to believe in him, etc. And to the Romans 5.: The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, etc. Then, says the Doctor in 3. d. 28. n. 3., the Apostle to the Hebrews 11. says: Without faith it is impossible to please God: but it is certain that many do please, and many have pleased God; therefore it is necessary to posit faith with respect to the credibles revealed to us. And that he speaks of infused faith, appears through the same I. to the Corinthians 12., where he says: And I shew unto you yet a more excellent way, and after cap. 13. he subjoins concerning those theological virtues, which are ways more excellent than all acquired habits: for there he speaks of infused faith, just as of infused charity. Finally, it belongs to Him to grant faith whose it is to increase faith: but it belongs to God alone to increase faith;

and therefore, says the Doctor n. 16., the Apostles prayed. Luke 17.: Lord, increase our faith. And the Church in the Collect for the faithful beseeches the same increase of faith in these words: Almighty everlasting God, give us the increase of Faith, Hope, and Charity: yet this would not need to be asked, if the whole assent were from the will.

The same truth is proved from the definition of the Council of Milevis, Can. I., Arausican. II. Can. 25., and of Trent, Sess. 6. Can. 3. and cap. 1., as was said in the preceding Conclusion. Which truth indeed the Council of Voguntinum celebrated two years after the said sixth Session of the Council of Trent defined lucidly; whence cap. 8. it has a certain periphrasis of that seventh chapter of the sixth Session of Trent, in these words:

Justification together with the remission of sins confers also sanctification and interior renovation, inasmuch as, through the merit of Christ, who now communicates himself to the believer, having received with all sins forgiven the grace of God, and through the Holy Spirit together with faith at once hope and charity poured forth in the heart: and these gifts abiding in him, he is not only reputed, but truly exists just.

From these words it is clear that the Fathers of that Council asserted that Faith, Hope, and Charity, which the Council of Trent had defined to be divinely infused in justification, are not acts but habitual gifts abiding in the very person justified, and that this pertains to Catholic doctrine. The same Saint Ambrose teaches most excellently in the book De Vocatione Gentium, last chapter, and Saint Augustine in the book De Natura et Gratia, chapters 2, 3, and 4, and often elsewhere. Whence the Doctor concludes admirably at n. 11: That one must posit infused faith on account of the authority of Scripture and of the Saints.

Various arguments too are brought forward by Theologians persuading this truth; yet since that truth depends upon divine revelation alone. Hence it comes about, says the Doctor just praised at n. 14, that it cannot be demonstrated that infused faith is present in anyone unless faith is presupposed, namely that he wishes to believe Scripture and the Saints; but it would never be shown to an infidel: but just as I believe God to be three and one, so I believe myself to have infused faith, by which I believe this, and this from God, that He may perfect the soul in first act: because it belongs to God to perfect perfectly when He perfects. Just as when He heals someone according to the body, He heals perfectly for the state in which he is: so also according to the soul; and because in the soul there is the image of God according to three powers, which were deformed by sin, Christ Himself reforming them, perfects the will through charity, and thus the intellect through faith. — Nevertheless we can affirm that God wished to give supernatural habits precisely so that the acts of those virtues might be elicited more connaturally; for since, speaking generically, an effect is compared to its cause as a branch to its root, it is more connatural that, as far as possible, an effect arise from a cause proportioned to itself, and which contains the effect in its power, either totally or at least partially. Hence, since the acts of faith, hope, and charity are of supernatural order, as we shall say in the following Article, it was fitting that they be elicited by a faculty elevated to that order and proportioned in first act to operations of that kind: but this elevation and proportion is brought about especially through a supernatural habit, permanently persevering in the faculty, and having the character of a co-principle with the faculty eliciting such supernatural acts. For when some cause in itself has no proportion to its effect, it is necessary that it receive at least something within itself by which it be proportioned in first act to producing the effect and contain it within itself; therefore the intellect, that it may produce a supernatural act, to which of itself it has no intrinsic proportion, is intrinsically proportioned through the intrinsic infused habit, by which it is already a cause proportioned to such an effect and contains it within itself.

You will say: To elicit an act supernatural in entity, it is enough that the power be elevated by some transient and intrinsic virtue, and by an aid merely actual: therefore for this an infused habit does not seem to be necessarily required. — I answer, that this indeed could be done, but not so connaturally; inasmuch as a habit, or quality permanently persevering in the soul, has the character of a co-principle, hence it constitutes the soul in that degree and supernatural state in a more fitting order, so that it may truly be proportioned and commensurate to the dignity of eliciting a supernatural act: for although this proportion and commensuration could also come about through an actual and transitory aid, nevertheless since that aid would not be persevering in the soul, neither would it seem to be so in its power that it could use it at will for eliciting an act, in the way it can use a habit infused into it and long persevering in it. Add to these things that by those three supernatural virtues man is held to be constituted in the supernatural order; whence just as there follow upon the rational soul, which constituted man in the rank of rational nature, the powers or faculties intrinsic by which man operates as rational, so to the state of justifying grace, by which man is constituted quasi in a higher nature and supernatural state, there are owed also faculties congruent to the nature placed in that state, by which he may operate conformably to the end to which he is ordained in that state: but those faculties or powers cannot be others than those habitual supernatural virtues: therefore man elicits supernatural acts more fitly and connaturally through the concourse of these habits than through the concourse of any natural and transitory aid.

You will seek 1. Whether those infused habits are so subject to the will in operating that it can use them or not use them at will? — I answer that a habit, whether acquired or infused, is not first and per se and immediately in the power of the will in the way an act to be elicited is, which the will can produce per se, or through powers subjected to it, either elicitively or imperatively: but only indirectly, and insofar as it is in the power of the will itself to use that habit by acting or not acting. For if the habit were a cause wholly necessitated and naturally determined of itself to act, hence it would incline of itself the faculty in which it resides to operate at the very moment all things required for operation are posited, nor could the will restrain the natural activity of that habit except by taking from it something necessary for operation, e.g., either ceasing to propose to it the object about which it is to tend and diverting thought elsewhere, or determining itself to non-action. For just as, since the visual power is an agent wholly necessary of itself, the will cannot directly impede its action, but only indirectly, namely either by closing the eyes or turning them to another object, so, since habits, whether acquired or infused, do not necessitate the power to act, but leave it to its natural liberty, if it is free; hence it follows that the habit is indirectly subject to the will in operating, and thus it is in the power of the will whether the habit operate or not operate, and produce an act or not produce it.

You will seek 2. Whether supernatural habits confer upon the faculty not only virtue but also activity? — I answer, that it seems more probable that supernatural habits confer only the faculty of acting and activity, but not facility. This indeed is proved first by experience: for a baptized child, although he has the habit of faith, does not for that reason experience greater facility for believing when he becomes an adult than if he had not been baptized: indeed an adult heretic who receives himself to the Catholic faith, although he receives the habit of faith in his justification, afterwards experiences no less inclination and propensity toward heresy; and consequently the infused habit of faith does not remove the contrary facility which had been induced by the habit of heresy: therefore it confers no facility, but only activity and virtue for eliciting the act of faith. Next, if infused habits conferred facility, it would follow that those who have such habits more intense ought also, other things being equal, to experience greater facility in operating than those who have them less intense; but this openly conflicts with experience: both because those who live lukewarmly for a long time without mortal sin, and frequently frequent the sacraments, augment within themselves sanctifying grace and the infused habits through their reception and good works, though elicited remissly, and yet after long exercise do not feel greater facility in the exercise of the virtues than at the beginning: therefore it is a sign that those habits confer no facility. Finally, if such habits conferred facility in eliciting virtuous acts, they would do so either per se and immediately by inclining the power to elicit such acts, as acquired habits confer facility by inclining the power so that it exercise its acts more promptly and readily; or indirectly and mediately, namely by bringing it about that the goodness of the object, insofar as fitting, be apprehended and sought more efficaciously: just as efficacious speech often stimulates and inclines the minds of hearers to performing some work: but neither can be said. Not indeed the first, because otherwise we would be able to sense such inclination in ourselves, and thus detect that we have infused habits, especially when we know from elsewhere that we do not have compared and acquired habits; yet experience shows this to be false. Nor the second, for it is known from experience itself that habits of the will never excite in us such apprehension unless they first incline the will per se and immediately toward love of the object, and thereby bring it about that the object pleases, and consequently that the intellect apprehend it as desirable, and finally that the affection also blaze forth more into its love and pursuit: therefore it does not appear how such habits could confer facility.

You will seek ⟦denote?⟧: Whether the habit of faith is single and simple, or composed from the aggregation of several habits corresponding to several articles, just as we said that every total science is not one simple quality, but an ordered collection of distinct particular sciences inclining toward assent to diverse conclusions? — I answer, that the common opinion of Theologians is that the habit of faith is single: for Saint Thomas teaches this, question I, article 6, and the Subtle Doctor, distinction 23, n. 6, where he says:

It can be held that there is one faith of all things credible, because it does not regard credible things under their proper reasons, but as revealed by God, and it believes all things revealed by Him as true by the same habit by which it believes the Revealer to be truthful. For if I have a habit by which I believe you to be truthful, by the same habit I believe these things which you assert to be true, however much they may be of diverse reasons; because I assent to them only accidentally, namely by this, that I assent to your truthfulness, and thus I assent to them as asserted by you. So here, for I assent to things credible revealed by God because I assent to the truthfulness of God; and thus faith regards all things credible as revealed by God, not under their proper reasons; and therefore one faith could be about all things credible, even if geometrical and physical things, however diverse and of another order, were introduced here as things credible: for in all of them there would be one reason for believing them to be true: because they are revealed by God.

— The answer can be proved from that text to the Ephesians I: One Lord, one faith, one baptism, where the Apostle compares the unity of faith with the unity of God and of baptism: but it is certain that God is one in number, as also baptism: therefore by equal reason it is a sign that faith has the same unity. — It is also proved by reason that there is one habit where there is one formal motive: but there is one formal motive of faith, namely divine truth revealing, which informs all things credible in the same manner, although those revelations are made in diverse ways: therefore faith also is one in species. — Yet I do not judge it to be one simple quality wholly indivisible, as if it could in no way be composed of intensive parts of the same species; for it is certain that faith, like the other supernatural habits, can receive degrees of intensity, whether through frequenting the sacraments, or through meritorious acts, or through the supreme liberality of God; therefore, as we said, the Church prays for her children: Grant us the increase of faith, hope, and charity