Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

Not slight is the controversy among Catholics and Heretics, the Lutherans and Calvinists, concerning the habits of Faith, Hope, and Charity: for since these plainly deny that anything real is infused into us divinely in justification, and affirm that we are justified by the sole non-imputation of sin, and by the extrinsic favor and acceptance of God, as we demonstrated from their writings in the preceding Treatise when treating of sanctifying grace, hence they likewise deny and reject every habit, or quality and virtue infused by God, which not only aids us in eliciting supernatural acts, but also confers upon us the faculty and power for doing so. That we may assuredly assail this heretical dogma, and establish the Catholic truth and sentiment concerning supernatural habits upon an impregnable and most firm foundation, four points above all must be discussed in this article: First, whether a habit of faith is given: Second, what it is, and of what kind: Third, in what subjects it is found and perseveres: Fourth, what causes it has.

Note 1. It is certain and indubitable among all Catholics that the infused virtues are to be admitted, which are bestowed divinely upon men both adult and infant in baptism. As to adults, this is most clearly taught by Innocent II cap. Maiores, for he says: That indeed which the objectors bring forward, that faith, or charity, and other virtues are not infused into infants as being non-consenting, is not absolutely granted by most, since on this account a question is debated among Theological Doctors, some asserting that through the power of baptism fault indeed is remitted to infants, but grace is not conferred: others saying that sin is forgiven and virtues are infused, having them as to habit, not as to use, until they come to adult age. Where he plainly supposes it to be held by all as certain and indubitable that those habits are infused into adults, as consenting by their baptism and divine vocation, while they are being baptized, and that it is only doubtful whether the same happens in infants. Similarly the Council of Vienna, related in the Clementine De summa Trinitate, after teaching that baptism profits unto salvation both infants and adults; yet that it is disputed among Theologians whether in baptism virtues and informing grace are also infused into infants beyond the remission of fault, adds: But we, attending to the general efficacy of the death of Christ, which through baptism is applied equally to all the baptized, have deemed the second opinion, which says that informing grace and virtues are conferred in baptism upon infants as well as adults, as the more probable, and more consonant and harmonious with the sayings of the Saints and Doctors of modern Theology, to be chosen with the approval of the sacred Council. Where he plainly supposes as indubitable that said virtues are infused; but since the efficacy of the death of Christ generically is applied in baptism both to infants and to adults, from the fact that those virtues are infused into adults, meanwhile these also are infused into infants (for those words signify this: We attending, &c., by which the reason of the ensuing decision is rendered), and that this is to be chosen as more consonant with the Fathers and Theologians. Now the difficulty is whether those virtues truly are habits, and those supernaturally permanently abiding in us; which that it may appear the more evident,

Note 2. This distinction is found between supernatural habits divinely infused per se, and natural ones acquired by one's own labor and repeated and reiterated acts: First, that the latter confer merely facility upon the faculty in which they inhere, that it may break forth more promptly and expeditiously into its operations and elicit acts; but the former bestow not so much that facility as virtue upon the potency in which they inhere for eliciting their acts, so that the faculty without acquired habits could indeed operate absolutely, though with some difficulty: but without supernatural habits could not in any way elicit the acts toward which those habits incline. Second, those habits differ in this, that acquired ones do not promote the potency beyond its lot and natural state, but stimulate and aid it toward eliciting the acts naturally due to it; but the supernatural promote the faculty and soul to a state naturally undue, and confer upon it force for eliciting acts above the powers of nature, so that the faculty without habits of this kind could not in any way exercise such acts, even though it expended all its force and activity thereon. Nevertheless they agree in this, that both those habits inexist in the faculty by way of co-principle, and concur with it partially in the production of the act to which they are ordered.

Note 3. Something can be called supernatural by either of these two ways, namely either as to substance, or as to mode. That is called supernatural as to substance which in its entity is such that it could not be produced by any secondary cause of the natural order, however duly applied and prepared for acting, unless some principle were implanted in that secondary cause, already naturally complete and indeed sufficiently disposed for eliciting natural acts, but not for producing those acts or effects which are called supernatural. I said already naturally complete and disposed for acting: for it is certain that a secondary cause, however prepared and expedite of itself for acting, cannot elicit its acts nor produce effects without the special concurrence of God, which is necessary for producing any effect whatsoever; and therefore that faculty has not of itself, without such concurrence, an adequate physical virtue unto that effect: but this concurrence is required on account of the essential subordination of the secondary cause to the first, and also on account of the essential dependence of every effect upon the same first cause; nor is that exigency made on account of the special perfection and dignity of one effect rather than another: for that concurrence is required alike for eliciting acts and producing effects imperfect and perfect; whence this concurrence does not suppose a potency sufficiently complete, but completes and perfects it by way of co-principle in the elicition of acts connatural to it. But when an act is of such entity and dignity that it cannot be produced by a potency thus complete and expedite for acting, unless that faculty be aided, and be rendered powerful for that production through some form to be produced and infused by God alone, then that act is judged supernatural as to substance; because its production altogether exceeds the capacity and activity of the faculty otherwise sufficiently disposed for eliciting acts which would be purely natural. Supernatural according to mode is called that which, although it could be done and produced by the forces of nature by secondary causes without any divinely implanted form, is nevertheless here and now done by God beyond the exigency of nature, as sight restored to a blind man, a rose brought forth in winter, water turned into wine by miracle, as was done at Cana of Galilee.

These things premised, there remain only two points to be determined: First indeed, whether the virtues of Faith, Hope, and Charity are habits or qualities permanently abiding in us: Second, whether they are supernatural as to substance, or as to mode.

First Conclusion. — INDEED THE VIRTUES OF FAITH, HOPE, AND CHARITY ARE QUALITIES PERMANENTLY ABIDING IN US BY WAY OF HABIT. This is common among Theologians. And

Proof from the authority of the Council of Vienna, and of Clement V in the first Notable cited above: for from the sentence of the same Council it stands that supernatural virtues, as well as justifying grace, are infused divinely into infants in baptism: but they are not infused by way of act, of which those infants are altogether incapable: therefore they must be infused by way of habit. Nor does it matter that Clement V with the Council of Vienna approving does not define it to be altogether certain that the virtues are infused in baptism even into infants: for it suffices that he assert this to be the more probable, and more consonant with the sayings of the Holy Fathers and Doctors of Theology, and consequently against that definition, which Clement V made with the Council of Vienna approving

Whoever should teach the contrary to be more probable would sin. He adds that Clement V asserts in an equal degree of certitude that informing grace and virtues are conferred in baptism upon infants as well as adults. By which he insinuates that each is equally certain, nor can one be denied without the other: but it is altogether certain that informing, or justifying, grace is infused into infants in baptism: therefore according to the mind both of the Council of Vienna and of Clement V it ought equally to be certain that the virtues of Faith, Hope, and Charity are infused by way of habit into those same infants, seeing that they are altogether incapable of acts.

Proof second, and the preceding argument is confirmed by the authority of the Council of Trent, Sess. 6. cap. 7., where after enumerating the dispositions which precede justification, and recounting within them the act of faith and hope, it subjoins: This disposition and preparation is followed by justification itself, which is not mere remission of sins, but sanctification also and renovation of the interior man through the grace received and gifts. Wherein the reception of grace and gifts in justification is co-distinguished from the preparation which it follows, and in which actual faith was already supposed: therefore by the name of gifts, which are afterward infused, something permanent and co-distinct from acts must be understood. — It is confirmed from the fact that there the same Council, after saying that the formal cause of justification is inherent justice divinely infused, according to each one's disposition, straightway infers: Whence in justification itself, together with the remission of sins, man receives all these things at once infused through Jesus Christ, into whom he is ingrafted: Faith, Hope, and Charity. By which words the Council declares what those gifts are whose reception it had said above is included in justification. It is confirmed also by the following words, where the Council teaches that this faith, of which it speaks, is that which, it says, Catechumens before the sacrament of baptism seek from the Church by the tradition of the Apostles, when they seek the faith that proffers life eternal: but this faith is neither sought from the Church nor given save through baptism, unto which the very Catechumens come: but through baptism actual faith is not given, seeing that infants are incapable thereof; nor do the Catechumens even ask for the act of faith, because they come to baptism with actual faith, or act of faith: therefore the mind of the Council is that those virtues of which it speaks are qualities by way of habit permanently abiding in us. Finally it is confirmed from Vega, lib. I. on Trent, cap. 21., where he teaches that after Trent the virtue of faith distinct from the act of believing is to be said to be infused concerning faith: for after he had recounted the words of the Council of Vienna cited above in the first Notable, thus does that famous Interpreter of the doctrine of the Council of Trent speak, seeing that he was eyewitness and earwitness thereof: It seemed good to this holy Synod (namely the Tridentine) to approve that opinion and to pronounce anathema against him who asserts the contrary: for it understood this to be the common faith of the Church, although not under the name of habits. The same Sotus, lib. De natura et gratia, cap. 18., who himself also was present at the Tridentine Council.

From which it is legitimately inferred, after the Council of Trent, to seem certain that the virtues of Faith, Hope, and Charity are infused into us by way of habit: Both because the Council expressly defines Faith, Hope, and Charity to be infused into us: but according to the common manner of speaking these necessarily signify some act, or habit: therefore the Council defines some act, or habit, to be infused into us: but it cannot be said that an act is infused into us; because acts are given to us not only by God, but are also elicited by us: therefore the Council defines a habit to be infused into us: And because, there the same Council cap. 15. and Can. 28. defines that faith, when justifying grace has been lost through mortal sin, is not lost save through infidelity, and is verily of faith: but these cannot belong to an act: for the latter is neither lost through sin, nor does it remain the same before and after sin, and straightway the Council speaks of habitual and permanently abiding faith.

You will say 1: The Council does not expressly define that habits of Faith, Hope, and Charity are infused into us: but it is inferred only from certain of its sayings: but a proposition which is not expressly defined in Councils, but is only inferred from some of their sayings, is not altogether certain, but is only a theological proposition: therefore, etc. — I distinguish the minor: if it be inferred only by reason of some connection which that proposition would have with the thing defined in the Council, it would not be altogether certain, let that pass: but if it be inferred from the force of the signification of the words, and the identity of what is signified, or because the thing signified by both words is the same, I deny the major. For, as we said, if the words of the Council are taken properly, they signify not an act, but the habit of faith: therefore, etc.

You will say 2: The Council of Trent intends only to condemn heretics asserting that our justification is not wrought through any form inherently adhering in us, but only through an extrinsic acceptance of God: therefore it defines only that we are formally just through some intrinsic form, whether meanwhile this be act or habit. — I deny the consequence: both because the Lutheran heretics, against whom chiefly that definition of the Tridentine Council militates, not only taught these things, but also perversely denied that we are just through intrinsic habits; and condemned the opinion which teaches that habits of Faith, Hope, and Charity are infused into us; and consequently as the Council intends to condemn them, so it intends also to define this opinion. And because Councils often in their definitions not only condemn the opinions of heretics, but at the same time also explain what is to be thought concerning the proposed matter, as even appears from the very words of the Council itself.

You will say 3: God labors nothing in vain, nor does He concede anything useless: but supernatural virtues by way of habit would be useless and vain in most of their subjects, especially in infants; which indeed is proved, because habits are given for the eliciting of acts: but infants are incapable of acts to be elicited: therefore also of habits to be received. — I answer first, that if the argument concluded anything, it would even follow that infants through baptism do not receive Faith, Hope, and Charity, because they are incapable of the acts of those virtues: but this directly militates against the definition of the Council of Trent: therefore, etc. — I answer second with the Seraphic Doctor in II. d. 4. qu. 2., that the incapacity of infants for eliciting acts does not make them incapable of receiving habits:

For it must be noted, he says, that the powers of the soul are impeded in two ways by an evil habit, and by concupiscence, or by fault: and on the contrary this impediment is removed by grace, or the virtues, whereby they are expedited for operating. Therefore the virtues render the powers facile, perfecting them, and this by removing fault: but they do not effect another expedition. Hence since an infant has both impediments, one is removed by the virtues, not both: and therefore he is not altogether facile for operating. Now a habit of this expeditive kind has a multiple origin. For one is innate, one acquired, one infused. The first begins with nature, and takes its origin from its principles: and therefore it is imperfect in imperfect nature, and grows as nature grows, and is perfected when nature is perfected, as appears in natural judgment. But the second, namely the acquired, takes its origin from free will, which has no use until nature is somehow perfected: and therefore it follows perfected nature. But the third takes its origin from God, not from nature, nor from free will, and can be in an infant before the use of free will: but because it has not its origin from nature, it can be perfect while nature is imperfect.

Second Conclusion. — THE THREE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES, NAMELY FAITH, HOPE, AND CHARITY ARE INFUSED PER SE AND SUPERNATURAL IN ENTITY.

Proof first from Sacred Scripture: for Ioan. 6.: This is the work of God, that you believe in him whom he hath sent. To the Philippians 1.: For unto you it is given for Christ, not only to believe in him, etc. And to the Romans 5.: The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, etc. Then, says the Doctor in 3. d. 28. n. 3., the Apostle to the Hebrews 11. says: Without faith it is impossible to please God: but it is certain that many do please, and many have pleased God; therefore it is necessary to posit faith with respect to the credibles revealed to us. And that he speaks of infused faith, appears through the same I. to the Corinthians 12., where he says: And I shew unto you yet a more excellent way, and after cap. 13. he subjoins concerning those theological virtues, which are ways more excellent than all acquired habits: for there he speaks of infused faith, just as of infused charity. Finally, it belongs to Him to grant faith whose it is to increase faith: but it belongs to God alone to increase faith;

and therefore, says the Doctor n. 16., the Apostles prayed. Luke 17.: Lord, increase our faith. And the Church in the Collect for the faithful beseeches the same increase of faith in these words: Almighty everlasting God, give us the increase of Faith, Hope, and Charity: yet this would not need to be asked, if the whole assent were from the will.

The same truth is proved from the definition of the Council of Milevis, Can. I., Arausican. II. Can. 25., and of Trent, Sess. 6. Can. 3. and cap. 1., as was said in the preceding Conclusion. Which truth indeed the Council of Voguntinum celebrated two years after the said sixth Session of the Council of Trent defined lucidly; whence cap. 8. it has a certain periphrasis of that seventh chapter of the sixth Session of Trent, in these words:

Justification together with the remission of sins confers also sanctification and interior renovation, inasmuch as, through the merit of Christ, who now communicates himself to the believer, having received with all sins forgiven the grace of God, and through the Holy Spirit together with faith at once hope and charity poured forth in the heart: and these gifts abiding in him, he is not only reputed, but truly exists just.

From these words it is clear that the Fathers of that Council asserted that Faith, Hope, and Charity, which the Council of Trent had defined to be divinely infused in justification, are not acts but habitual gifts abiding in the very person justified, and that this pertains to Catholic doctrine. The same Saint Ambrose teaches most excellently in the book De Vocatione Gentium, last chapter, and Saint Augustine in the book De Natura et Gratia, chapters 2, 3, and 4, and often elsewhere. Whence the Doctor concludes admirably at n. 11: That one must posit infused faith on account of the authority of Scripture and of the Saints.

Various arguments too are brought forward by Theologians persuading this truth; yet since that truth depends upon divine revelation alone. Hence it comes about, says the Doctor just praised at n. 14, that it cannot be demonstrated that infused faith is present in anyone unless faith is presupposed, namely that he wishes to believe Scripture and the Saints; but it would never be shown to an infidel: but just as I believe God to be three and one, so I believe myself to have infused faith, by which I believe this, and this from God, that He may perfect the soul in first act: because it belongs to God to perfect perfectly when He perfects. Just as when He heals someone according to the body, He heals perfectly for the state in which he is: so also according to the soul; and because in the soul there is the image of God according to three powers, which were deformed by sin, Christ Himself reforming them, perfects the will through charity, and thus the intellect through faith. — Nevertheless we can affirm that God wished to give supernatural habits precisely so that the acts of those virtues might be elicited more connaturally; for since, speaking generically, an effect is compared to its cause as a branch to its root, it is more connatural that, as far as possible, an effect arise from a cause proportioned to itself, and which contains the effect in its power, either totally or at least partially. Hence, since the acts of faith, hope, and charity are of supernatural order, as we shall say in the following Article, it was fitting that they be elicited by a faculty elevated to that order and proportioned in first act to operations of that kind: but this elevation and proportion is brought about especially through a supernatural habit, permanently persevering in the faculty, and having the character of a co-principle with the faculty eliciting such supernatural acts. For when some cause in itself has no proportion to its effect, it is necessary that it receive at least something within itself by which it be proportioned in first act to producing the effect and contain it within itself; therefore the intellect, that it may produce a supernatural act, to which of itself it has no intrinsic proportion, is intrinsically proportioned through the intrinsic infused habit, by which it is already a cause proportioned to such an effect and contains it within itself.

You will say: To elicit an act supernatural in entity, it is enough that the power be elevated by some transient and intrinsic virtue, and by an aid merely actual: therefore for this an infused habit does not seem to be necessarily required. — I answer, that this indeed could be done, but not so connaturally; inasmuch as a habit, or quality permanently persevering in the soul, has the character of a co-principle, hence it constitutes the soul in that degree and supernatural state in a more fitting order, so that it may truly be proportioned and commensurate to the dignity of eliciting a supernatural act: for although this proportion and commensuration could also come about through an actual and transitory aid, nevertheless since that aid would not be persevering in the soul, neither would it seem to be so in its power that it could use it at will for eliciting an act, in the way it can use a habit infused into it and long persevering in it. Add to these things that by those three supernatural virtues man is held to be constituted in the supernatural order; whence just as there follow upon the rational soul, which constituted man in the rank of rational nature, the powers or faculties intrinsic by which man operates as rational, so to the state of justifying grace, by which man is constituted quasi in a higher nature and supernatural state, there are owed also faculties congruent to the nature placed in that state, by which he may operate conformably to the end to which he is ordained in that state: but those faculties or powers cannot be others than those habitual supernatural virtues: therefore man elicits supernatural acts more fitly and connaturally through the concourse of these habits than through the concourse of any natural and transitory aid.

You will seek 1. Whether those infused habits are so subject to the will in operating that it can use them or not use them at will? — I answer that a habit, whether acquired or infused, is not first and per se and immediately in the power of the will in the way an act to be elicited is, which the will can produce per se, or through powers subjected to it, either elicitively or imperatively: but only indirectly, and insofar as it is in the power of the will itself to use that habit by acting or not acting. For if the habit were a cause wholly necessitated and naturally determined of itself to act, hence it would incline of itself the faculty in which it resides to operate at the very moment all things required for operation are posited, nor could the will restrain the natural activity of that habit except by taking from it something necessary for operation, e.g., either ceasing to propose to it the object about which it is to tend and diverting thought elsewhere, or determining itself to non-action. For just as, since the visual power is an agent wholly necessary of itself, the will cannot directly impede its action, but only indirectly, namely either by closing the eyes or turning them to another object, so, since habits, whether acquired or infused, do not necessitate the power to act, but leave it to its natural liberty, if it is free; hence it follows that the habit is indirectly subject to the will in operating, and thus it is in the power of the will whether the habit operate or not operate, and produce an act or not produce it.

You will seek 2. Whether supernatural habits confer upon the faculty not only virtue but also activity? — I answer, that it seems more probable that supernatural habits confer only the faculty of acting and activity, but not facility. This indeed is proved first by experience: for a baptized child, although he has the habit of faith, does not for that reason experience greater facility for believing when he becomes an adult than if he had not been baptized: indeed an adult heretic who receives himself to the Catholic faith, although he receives the habit of faith in his justification, afterwards experiences no less inclination and propensity toward heresy; and consequently the infused habit of faith does not remove the contrary facility which had been induced by the habit of heresy: therefore it confers no facility, but only activity and virtue for eliciting the act of faith. Next, if infused habits conferred facility, it would follow that those who have such habits more intense ought also, other things being equal, to experience greater facility in operating than those who have them less intense; but this openly conflicts with experience: both because those who live lukewarmly for a long time without mortal sin, and frequently frequent the sacraments, augment within themselves sanctifying grace and the infused habits through their reception and good works, though elicited remissly, and yet after long exercise do not feel greater facility in the exercise of the virtues than at the beginning: therefore it is a sign that those habits confer no facility. Finally, if such habits conferred facility in eliciting virtuous acts, they would do so either per se and immediately by inclining the power to elicit such acts, as acquired habits confer facility by inclining the power so that it exercise its acts more promptly and readily; or indirectly and mediately, namely by bringing it about that the goodness of the object, insofar as fitting, be apprehended and sought more efficaciously: just as efficacious speech often stimulates and inclines the minds of hearers to performing some work: but neither can be said. Not indeed the first, because otherwise we would be able to sense such inclination in ourselves, and thus detect that we have infused habits, especially when we know from elsewhere that we do not have compared and acquired habits; yet experience shows this to be false. Nor the second, for it is known from experience itself that habits of the will never excite in us such apprehension unless they first incline the will per se and immediately toward love of the object, and thereby bring it about that the object pleases, and consequently that the intellect apprehend it as desirable, and finally that the affection also blaze forth more into its love and pursuit: therefore it does not appear how such habits could confer facility.

You will seek ⟦denote?⟧: Whether the habit of faith is single and simple, or composed from the aggregation of several habits corresponding to several articles, just as we said that every total science is not one simple quality, but an ordered collection of distinct particular sciences inclining toward assent to diverse conclusions? — I answer, that the common opinion of Theologians is that the habit of faith is single: for Saint Thomas teaches this, question I, article 6, and the Subtle Doctor, distinction 23, n. 6, where he says:

It can be held that there is one faith of all things credible, because it does not regard credible things under their proper reasons, but as revealed by God, and it believes all things revealed by Him as true by the same habit by which it believes the Revealer to be truthful. For if I have a habit by which I believe you to be truthful, by the same habit I believe these things which you assert to be true, however much they may be of diverse reasons; because I assent to them only accidentally, namely by this, that I assent to your truthfulness, and thus I assent to them as asserted by you. So here, for I assent to things credible revealed by God because I assent to the truthfulness of God; and thus faith regards all things credible as revealed by God, not under their proper reasons; and therefore one faith could be about all things credible, even if geometrical and physical things, however diverse and of another order, were introduced here as things credible: for in all of them there would be one reason for believing them to be true: because they are revealed by God.

— The answer can be proved from that text to the Ephesians I: One Lord, one faith, one baptism, where the Apostle compares the unity of faith with the unity of God and of baptism: but it is certain that God is one in number, as also baptism: therefore by equal reason it is a sign that faith has the same unity. — It is also proved by reason that there is one habit where there is one formal motive: but there is one formal motive of faith, namely divine truth revealing, which informs all things credible in the same manner, although those revelations are made in diverse ways: therefore faith also is one in species. — Yet I do not judge it to be one simple quality wholly indivisible, as if it could in no way be composed of intensive parts of the same species; for it is certain that faith, like the other supernatural habits, can receive degrees of intensity, whether through frequenting the sacraments, or through meritorious acts, or through the supreme liberality of God; therefore, as we said, the Church prays for her children: Grant us the increase of faith, hope, and charity

THREE things above all come here to be determined: First indeed, whether the infused habit of faith has the true and perfect ratio of virtue: Second, whether that habit is to be called speculative or practical: Third finally, whether it is discursive or merely assentive. That these may be perceived more evidently,

Note 1. Virtue is distributed generically into moral and intellectual. Moral is that which is ordered to a work or act good of itself morally: intellectual truly, that which tends to the true, insofar as it perfects the intellect, as Aristotle himself hands down in 6 Ethics., chapters 1, 2, etc. Moreover, intellectual virtue can be regarded in two ways; for one is simply intellectual, and is per se ordered only to the perfection of the intellect itself, and consists solely in the cognition and apprehension of truth; but another is partly intellectual and partly moral; intellectual indeed, insofar as it tends to knowing the truth by which the intellect is perfected; moral truly, inasmuch as that cognition and apprehension of truth is ordered to informing the will and directing it in eliciting morally good acts. Again, this moral intellectual virtue can be considered either insofar as it is true virtue, or insofar as it is perfect virtue: for it is one thing that some habit be a virtue, and another that it be a perfect virtue: for the first requires only that it have the essence and definition of virtue; for the second however it is required that it have the mode and perfection of virtue, or that it order man to his ultimate end simpliciter: For, says Arist., lib. I Physic., virtue is the disposition of the perfect to the best: whence elsewhere he teaches virtue to be that which makes its possessor good simpliciter, and renders its work perfect. It is asked therefore whether faith in itself, and insofar as it is distinguished from charity and hope, is true virtue and perfect.

NOTA 2. Besides the infused habit of faith residing in the intellect, by which it is inclined to assenting to truths proposed although not evident, another is commonly admitted in the will, namely by which the will is inclined to commanding the intellect that it give assent to the proposition revealed, however obscure and non-evident; which habit indeed certain men wish to be a special virtue of obedience, as Medina teaches, lib. ⟦illegible: 1?⟧ De recta in Deum fide, chapter 2. Since, he says, no one can believe unless he captivates the intellect into the service of faith, as the Apostle teaches in chapter 6 of Acts, and 2 ad Corinthians chapter 10; yet no one can captivate the intellect except by subjecting it to the command of the will, which is certainly rendered through the obediential virtue. Some together with Lessius, Tract. De praedestinatione Angelorum et hominum, disp. 1. sect. ⟦b?⟧ assertion 2, judge it to be a habit of religion. Others truly together with Valentia, Tract. De fide, qu. 1. punct. ⟦t?⟧ dub. 1, contend it to be a habit of studiousness, inasmuch as its office is to apply the intellect, not only to eliciting its own act, but also to eliciting it thus or otherwise about this or that object. There are also those who judge the habit residing in the will, by which it inclines to moving the intellect that it assent to a non-evident proposition, to be the very habit of faith residing in the will; not that one and the same habit physically inheres in the intellect and the will at once, but that that habit is indeed double physically, but uniting morally, because they are ordered to the same act, namely to giving assent to the proposition revealed. Thus Alensis seems to teach, 3 part. q. 78. memb. 3. But none of these opinions is proved to me. Not indeed the first, because obedience per se has only the precept of a superior for its motive; but the honesty of believing is not the precept of a superior, although it be the matter upon which a precept can fall: whence it must first be honest before it be precepted: and consequently that integrity regards the habit of another virtue than obedience. Nor the second, because studiousness is ordered to regulating the appetite for knowing, and to blunting the vices opposed to it, namely curiosity and sloth, or excess and negligence: but willing to believe is not ordered to that, both because it presupposes science and knowledge of that which is to be believed, and because a studious man after he knows what is to be believed can not will to believe it, and consequently studiousness does not move toward that assent. Not finally the fourth, both because the habit of faith is properly intellectual, and consequently regards only the intellect, and because willing to believe, and believing de facto, pertain to diverse faculties, and consequently also pertain to diverse habits; for if the same habit sufficed for the diverse acts of diverse powers, it would follow that one habit would suffice for the diverse acts of the will and the intellect, which is altogether false. — I judge therefore, more probably, that the habit by which the will is inclined to commanding the intellect that it assent to the proposition revealed is a certain special habit, which can be called the habit of pious affection. Thus teach Suarez in 3. part. qu. 7. and dist. 3. De Fide, qu. 2. and many others more Recent, even among our own, especially Castillo d. 6. qu. 8. n. 19. for habits, like powers, ought to be specified by order to special objects: but the honesty found in the will of believing is specially distinct from the objects of other virtues, as we said just now, and consequently regards a special virtue, which can rightly be called the pious motion of the will, inasmuch as through that habit the will is piously moved to commanding the intellect that it assent to the proposition revealed. The difficulty therefore is, whether the habit of faith residing in the intellect, and insofar as it is distinguished from this habit of pious motion, is true virtue and perfect.

NOTANDUM 3. From Aristotle, lib. 3. De Anima, discourse is twofold: one indeed objective, and another formal. Objective is every that object, or those objects, which have such connexion and dependence among themselves that by their nature they demand terminating the acts of the intellect, which concur to formal discourse. Formal truly discourse is argumentation, which is an oration, in which a less known proposition is inferred from a more known one, whether meanwhile that proposition be known by natural light, or be evident, or only certain. Hence it is necessarily required that in discourse several cognitions intervene, and that the last be caused from the prior ones, either in the genus of efficient cause, as Saint Thomas teaches, 1. part. qu. 11. art. 7. or in the genus of material cause or dispositive and having itself after the manner of an antecedent condition, as Durandus wills in 2. disp. 24. qu. 2. Moreover it must be adverted to that the sense of faith can be thought to rely on discourse in two ways: first indeed, so that from premises containing divine testimony the assent to the truth testified would be deduced, e.g. whatever God says is true: but He says Himself to be trine in persons, and one in essence: therefore it is true; second, so that from premises believed the assent to another truth be elicited, v.gr. every man is risible: but Christ is man: therefore He is risible. Hence it is controverted among Theologians, whether faith relies on discourse from a proposition revealed, as much toward a revealed as toward a non-revealed one.

These things thus prenoted, three things above all remain to be determined: First, whether faith is true and perfect virtue: Second, whether it is discursive: Third, whether it is speculative or practical.

First Conclusion. — INTELLECTUAL FAITH SEPARATELY FROM HOPE AND CHARITY IS INDEED TRUE VIRTUE, BUT NOT SIMPLICITER PERFECT. Thus commonly all Theologians with the Doctor in 3. dist. 36. n. 30, where he supposes the common doctrine, Faith, Hope, and Charity to be Theological virtues.

It is proved also by reason: Of the ratio of virtue is, first, that it perfect a power in order to some good and honest act: second, that that act be in some way arduous and difficult: third, that of itself it signify order to the ultimate end, and be by its nature apt to be referred to it: but these three are found in the habit and act of faith, even separately from charity: first namque this inclines and determines the intellective power to right operation, for to believe the Revealer is a notable good: likewise it perfects the intellective power, since it instils into it knowledge far more excellent than any natural science and cognition whatsoever. Second, it inclines to the arduous and difficult: since indeed it is difficult to assent to non-evident truths, and often against, or at least beyond, the common judgment of reason. Finally, of its nature it is ordered to the ultimate end, namely God: for it uncovers and declares the mysteries so that the will be kindled more easily to divine love.

The Doctor teaches the second part at n. 31 where he says:

if it is asked whether Faith and Hope without Charity would be virtues: It can be said, as was said before of the moral virtues, that in their species they can be perfect, namely insofar as they are principles of their own acts respecting their own objects; but that ultimate perfection, which they have in attaining the end to which they are ordered by charity, they cannot have without it. And this perfection indeed, both in morals and in these, although it is commonly said to consist in attaining the end through some elicited operation, or through some order of these, or their acts, to the end, can nevertheless be said principally to consist in this, that one be accepted by God, ordered to beatitude; for thus no virtue, nor its act, is accepted without charity, which alone divides between the children of the kingdom and of perdition.

You will say. Virtue is that which places the power in the ultimate degree of perfection due to its act: but faith, since it is obscure, does not communicate to the intellect the ultimate degree of perfection due to its act; for it communicates to it neither clarity nor evidence: therefore it is only a virtue improperly and broadly taken, namely insofar as it signifies a laudable habit inclining to good. — I distinguish the major: so it constitutes it either in genus or in species, I concede: in species only, I deny. True indeed it is that every virtue ought to constitute the power in its best, if best be taken in genus and universally: for every virtue of the will disposes it to honesty, which is the best of the will; and every virtue of the intellect disposes it to the cognition of truth, which is the best of the intellect. But if the speech is about the best in species, it is false: for not every virtue of the will brings to it the supreme degree of honesty; for this competes to charity alone: yet other virtues also are in the will. Nor does every virtue of the intellect bring to it the supreme degree of evidence: for physical science is not in that degree of evidence in which Mathematics is. Therefore to the ratio of virtue it suffices that it infallibly attain the good of its power, which is gathered from Aristotle 6. Ethic., chapters 2 and 3, who demanded no other condition. But this most of all competes to faith; for although it be exceeded by science in evidence, nevertheless it is the more excellent science, both in supernaturalness and in certitude and infallibility; on account of which with better right it merits the appellation of virtue.

You will say 2. Faith is not numbered by Aristotle among the virtues of the intellect: therefore it is a sign that he did not acknowledge it as a virtue of the intellect. — I deny the consequence: for it is not wonderful that he did not reckon faith among intellectual virtues; since he himself did not acknowledge divine supernatural faith with the excellence of infallibility which Theologians acknowledge in it. Human faith however he rightly did not number among virtues, since it lies open to error, into which, as far as it is of itself, it can lead the intellect, which chiefly stands against the definition of virtue, as is clear.

Second Conclusion. — CHRISTIAN FAITH IS NOT DISCURSIVE, BUT ASSENTS IMMEDIATELY TO THINGS REVEALED, INASMUCH AS THEY ARE REVEALED. This is the opinion of the Subtle Doctor in 3. dist. 24. n. 14, and he proves it by the authority of Saint Augustine, lib. 18. De Civit., chapter 11. where speaking of those things contained in Sacred Scripture, he says that they are commended to us by divine utterances, although through men, not instilled by contentions of arguments, lest he who knew them, namely as they were handed down in Scripture, should fear to contemn not the genius of man but the eloquence of God: whence the Doctor concludes,

that he who assents to them has a habit, not indeed of science, but a habit whereby he assents immediately to all and each, and not to one on account of another, of those things which are handed down in Scripture; nay more, if some things handed down there were proved from others, he would not assent to them because so proved: but to every saying in the Canon he assents, not because it is proved in the said manner, but solely on account of the authority of God, by reason of which he assents immediately to all things handed down in Scripture, not to one on account of another by syllogistic discourse.

The same Saint Damascene teaches, lib. 1. De Fide, chapter 12. he proves likewise that it is not inquisitive, nor consequently discursive. Hence Saint Ambrose, lib. 1. De Fide, says: Take away hence arguments, where faith is sought, as if to say there must be no ratiocination. Wherefore Tertullian, lib. De praescriptionibus, chapter 7. says: We have no need of curiosity after Christ, nor of inquiry after the Gospel: when we believe, we desire to believe nothing beyond.

It is proved similarly by reason: First namque in every discourse the assent given to the premise or principle is distinguished really from that which is exercised about the conclusion: but the assent of Faith concerning divine revelation is not distinguished really from the assent which is of the thing revealed: therefore that assent itself is not properly discursive. The major is evident, for discourse is an oration in which one thing is inferred from another: but one would not be inferred from another, if by the same act anyone gave assent to principle and conclusion: for then that assent would be simple, not truly illative. The minor also is evident; for the formal object of the assent of faith is the thing revealed, considered indeed not materially and according to its entity, but formally, or reduplicatively as revealed: and consequently when anyone assents to a thing revealed, he also assents to the revelation. — It is confirmed from this, that the habit of faith is distinguished from the theological habit, as all Theologians agree: but it is distinguished from it from no other source than because Theology is formally discursive, supposing divine revelation, or the proposition revealed, as true, that from it it may elicit another: but faith by a single intuition attains immediately divine revelation and the thing revealed. — Next, divine revelation is believed immediately and without discourse as such; therefore also the article revealed by it. The antecedent is evident: for in that argument something can be proved to be truly revealed by God. The consequence is proved by the example of vision; for just as a colored and illuminated thing is seen immediately, because color and light inexisting in the thing itself are seen immediately, color indeed as the material object of sight, light truly as its formal object; whereas the thing revealed by God is only the material object of the act of faith: but divine revelation the formal object: therefore by one and simple act of faith believes the thing revealed and worthy of revelation: and consequently faith is not discursive. — Finally, that assent is properly discursive only when through some antecedent judgment two things are judged to be either the same or conjoined, so that from one conceded the other also seems ought to be conceded; whereas the internal assent of faith does not require that antecedent judgment concerning the connexion of the revelation with the thing revealed: therefore that act is not a discourse, nor consequently is the habit inclining to it discursive. The major is plain from the common doctrine of the Dialecticians, who teach that two judgments are required for argumentation, namely judgment must be made of the goodness of the consequence, and accordingly judgment must also be made of the connexion of the extremes with the middle, and by force of that judgment of such a consequence, assent must be given to the thing enunciated through the conclusion. But the minor is proved: both because when anyone believes God to be trine, e.g., he does not precisely and formally believe the thing to be so on account of the connexion which the extremes of this proposition have among themselves, and with the motive itself or medium, namely divine revelation; nor does he therefore assent from this, that he see such a connexion, and judge of the goodness of that consequence inferred from the antecedent, as is especially evident in idiot and rude men, who although they know not how to judge of the goodness of a consequence from the antecedent, nevertheless elicit preeminent acts of faith, and sometimes far more excellent than those who are most expert Theologians. — It is confirmed, if that judgment were required for faith, it would follow that whoever apprehended better that connexion of the extremes, namely of the truth to be believed and of divine revelation, and penetrated more acutely the goodness of that consequence from the antecedent, would elicit thereby more perfect acts of divine faith, just as whoever penetrates better the connexion of some scientific truth with the scientific medium has a more perfect act of science: but experience shows this to be false: therefore, &c.

You will say 1. Every argument comes about with discourse: but from the Apostle to the Hebrews 11. Faith is the argument of things that appear not: therefore it is discursive.

I distinguish the major: argument properly so called, insofar as it signifies the inference of one thing from another, comes about with discourse, I concede: argument improperly so called, and insofar as it signifies only the certitude or manifestation and conviction of those things which are comprehended neither by sense nor by reason, comes about with discourse, I deny. But in this latter manner the Apostle calls faith an argument, so that just as by discursive argument we arrive at the cognition of a thing inferred from another, and by the very force of the argument we are convinced to assent with certitude to the truth of it, so also through divine faith we have cognition of the things revealed by God, no less certain than that cognition is which is acquired through argumentations and most certain demonstrations.

You will say 2. In the same manner, proportion being preserved, one must philosophize about the assent of divine faith and about the assent of human faith: but the latter is elicited through discourse: therefore also the former. — I deny the major as regards the present undertaking, and the reason of disparity is that human faith is not borne toward human authority itself as immediate and per se certain, but as certain and known through something else, namely through experience of the probity of life and perfect knowledge of the speaker; by which human authority ought above all to stand firm, so that it move toward assent: whence the intellect can infer from the cognition of such principles a conclusion containing assent: but divine faith is borne immediately toward the very authority or truth of God; and thus the intellect, leaning upon that alone as formal motive, can be determined by the will so that without any discourse it tend toward whatever material object of divine faith, just as on account of the certitude of the first principles it tends immediately toward assent to such principles.

You will say 3. If it were not necessary for the assent of faith to be made with a discourse, one proposition of faith ought not to be inferred from another: yet this is done frequently; for in 1. Corinth. 15. the Apostle reasons thus: If the dead rise not: then Christ is not risen: but Christ is risen: therefore the dead shall rise. Likewise S. John, chapter 4. of his First Epistle, runs thus: Let us love one another, because he first loved us: therefore faith is discursive.

I distinguish the minor: such an inference ought not to be made with respect to the inferrer himself, as if he needed such a discourse, so that by the assent given to one proposition he were moved to assent to another proposition deduced from it, I concede: with respect to those who would not know that the deduced proposition had been revealed unless such an inference were made, I deny the minor. But to its proof the Doctor answers at n. 15. that those texts of Scripture are not true argumentations:

Because an argument makes faith about some matter which was otherwise doubtful: therefore in an argument properly so called the conclusion is believed and consented to on account of the argument and its evidence. But if Paul had said this, the dead shall rise, I would have believed him then just as now: nor is that conclusion of greater formality than if he had simply narrated it: likewise just as I believe the conclusion or consequent, so also the antecedent, and conversely: for as I believe that the dead shall rise, so I believe Christ rose again, because we have no certainty of the resurrection of Christ except from the testimony of others, as is clear from the Apostle, where above, who says: if Christ be not risen, we are found false > witnesses, and therefore all the certainty which is had concerning the resurrection of Christ and of the dead is nothing other than the certainty of faith, and not beyond. Likewise what John said, Let us love one another, etc., he said to move our souls to the love of Christ. That however Christ loved us with that love of which he speaks, this has been believed by us, and thus it holds certainty concerning the conclusion, yet not greater than concerning the principle; and therefore since the principle is not known from the evidence of the thing, it cannot have science of the conclusion. But if anyone has a habit beyond faith, that man assents to all and each of the things said in the Canon, and not to any one on account of another; because although one thing might follow from another, he nevertheless has no greater certainty about that which follows than about that from which it follows.

These words of the Doctor. By which he clearly signifies that all propositions which are elicited from others in Scripture, whether one be of faith or both, are by no means to be judged of faith as thus deduced, because the assent given to them so does not rest upon immediate revelation or testimony of God.

You will say 4. It happens often that from propositions believed through faith others are inferred which likewise pertain to faith: thus from this proposition of faith believed, Christ is truly God and man, the Fathers of the Council of Constantinople rightly gathered that in him there is a twofold will, namely divine and human, in this syllogism: where there is a twofold intellectual nature, there is a twofold will: but in Christ there are two intellectual natures, divine and human: therefore also a twofold will; whereby indeed that last proposition is of faith, and elicited from that prior one, which is equally of faith, namely, in Christ there are two intellectual natures. — I answer, those inferences are not made through the habit of faith, but by Theology, which draws forth those conclusions from revealed principles; whence the truths expressed in those deduced propositions are not of faith, but are Theological conclusions, insofar as they are considered as inferred through a discourse, although the same are of faith, inasmuch as they fall under immediate divine revelation.

You will say finally: Whenever any assent regards two things, such that it attains one only through mediation of the other, by which it is caused, so often is it a legitimate and true discourse: but the interior assent of divine faith regards first and per se the divine revelation, and through it the very thing revealed, to which therefore it faithfully assents, because it offers assent to the divine revelation: therefore the interior assent of divine faith is discursive. — I distinguish the major: if it attains one thing through another by way of inducing knowledge of the other, I concede: if by way of formal object affecting and determining the material object, I deny. For an assent can be understood to regard two things in such a way that it attains one through the other in two ways: first indeed, if it is occupied about one as about the formal, and through it attains the material object insofar as it is informed by such a formal object; secondly, if it attains one as primarily known, in order that through it knowledge of the second be deduced. Now the first manner by no means imports the formal reason of a discourse, otherwise the operations of the senses, e.g. the vision by which the eye terminates in the colored as luminous, would be discursive, because it perceives color only through the mediation of light. The second manner indeed is discursive; but the assent of our divine faith attains the revealed thing only as material object, and revelation indeed as formal object, and thus it is by no reason to be called discursive.

Third Conclusion. — DIVINE FAITH IS TO BE CALLED ABSOLUTELY PRACTICAL, NOT HOWEVER SPECULATIVE. This is the Doctor's, question 1. of the Prologue, num. 31. where he resolves therefore that Theology is practical, because it rests upon divine faith, which is practical. And num. 41. answering the arguments he says:

To the first I answer, that faith is not a speculative habit; nor is believing a speculative act; nor is the vision following believing a speculative vision, but practical: for the nature of that vision is to be conformed to fruition, and to be had prior in the created intellect, so that fruition may be elicited conformably to it.

By these words the Doctor signifies that faith is absolutely practical, and that there is no force in the argument of those who contended that therefore faith is speculative, because the beatific vision succeeded to it, which is speculative: for the Doctor denies that the beatific vision is speculative, and contends that it is truly practical, because therefore the beatific vision precedes in the intellect, that fruition may follow in the will. Now this Conclusion, sufficiently proved, remains from art. 1. question 1. of the Proemial Disputation concerning Theology in common; for it rests upon the same reasons by which we proved there that Theology is practical, and we solved all the difficulties and arguments by which the contrary opinion is usually attacked by Thomists holding otherwise. Therefore, lest we retrace courses already worn, we have refrained from repeating them.

NOTE 1. The present question involves various and manifold difficulties, which several Theologians set forth and explain at greater length; but we, striving after brevity and clarity, will reduce them all chiefly to three heads, investigating and resolving: First, whether the habit of faith existed in wayfarers who were innocent: second, whether it perseveres in all wayfarers who are defiled by mortal sin: third, whether it exists in those who are at the term of beatitude or of damnation. Now it is certain that the Angels were for some time wayfarers, and were not established in the state of beatitude from the beginning of their creation, as we taught in the Treatise on the Angels, disputation 8; which Saint Augustine also clearly teaches in his commentary on Genesis, book 4, chapter 3, where he says:

The angelic nature was first created uniform, and called heaven, according to that text: In the beginning God created heaven, etc.; and second it was formed, and called light, when it was turned to the Creator, and adhering to Him was perfected by direction, according to that text: And God said: Be light made, and light was made.

In that state, moreover, the Angels were provided with the means necessary for meriting beatitude: but whether they also had infused faith is disputed among Theologians: for very many, with Alvarez 3. part. question 68. member 8. article 2., contend that in the Angels as wayfarers there was not faith properly so called, but that they had some more excellent scientific knowledge, namely either a supernatural knowledge of infused science, or evidence in the attesting witness, which, properly speaking, is not faith but science; while the other Theologians defend the affirmative part, with whom we also subscribed ourselves, in volume 1, Treatise 1, disputation 3, article 2, question 3, conclusion ⟦illegible: n.⟧ whence here only the first Parents must be treated of.

NOTE 2. That the Blessed have every perfection whatsoever which most befits their state of beatitude: since beatitude is a state perfect by the aggregation of all goods: and therefore it is certain that they are endowed and illumined with every virtue whatever, which has no repugnance nor incompossibility with that state of beatitude. But because three things above all fill out and perfect that lot of the Blessed, namely the intuitive vision of God, eternal and intimate fruition, and ineffable delight and divine pleasure, which from the vision of God by the intellect, and the fruition of Him by the will, overflows into the very substance of the soul and all its faculties; hence those things are said to be repugnant to that beatific state which are opposed either to that perspicuous vision of God, or to intimate fruition, or to delight; but whether faith directly or indirectly conflicts with any one of these three, by reason of which it could not subsist together with the beatific state, must be determined in the present place.

NOTE 3. Sinful wayfarers can be considered chiefly in a twofold state; for they are either heretics, or only defiled by mortal sin. I call a heretic one who, although initiated into Christian Doctrine and by the sacrament of baptism enrolled among Christians and the Faithful, nevertheless professes and maintains some error pertinaciously against the object and rules of faith, and the definition of the Church. Hence three things chiefly concur to make heresy: First, that such an error be pertinacious; for he who, merely because divine revelation, or the definition of the Church concerning some proposition commonly received and believed by all other faithful, has not been ascertained by him, should waver in doubt, and, his mind not being fixed, should incline to neither assenting part, affirming or denying, would not be judged a heretic. Second, that he who pertinaciously maintains it shall have been initiated not only by the sacrament of baptism, but also in that he professes the Christian faith as to the other articles; for by this a heretic is distinguished from an infidel; inasmuch as an infidel is he who was neither initiated by baptism nor professes the Christian faith in any way. Third and lastly, it is necessary, in order that anyone be judged a heretic, that he profess the faith according to some part at least of the New Testament, at least by human faith. For if he abjures it on every side, whether baptized or not, he is not to be called a heretic, but either a Jew or a Pagan, although by reason of the baptism received he be subject to the Church, and consequently liable to the same punishments as heretics. It is asked, therefore, whether sinners defiled by mortal sin, as well as those infected with heresy alone, preserve infused faith.

Four things, therefore, remain to be resolved in this Question: First, whether the first Parents had faith in the state of innocence, and lost it by sinning. Second, whether the souls of the faithful departing from this life, whether received into heaven or languishing in purgatory, preserve the habit of faith. Third, whether the damned, both men and demons, have infused faith. Fourth, whether that infused habit of faith perseveres in heretics.

First Conclusion. — IT IS PROBABLE THAT THE FIRST PARENTS IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE HAD INFUSED FAITH, AND LOST IT BY THEIR SIN. This is the more common opinion among Theologians, especially as to the first part, which indeed ⟦illegible: …⟧. Proof: first, because the first Parents in the state of innocence were acceptable and pleasing to God, as all confess: but by the Apostle, Hebrews 11.: Without faith it is impossible to please God. For he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and is a rewarder to them that seek him. Therefore, etc. Second, the same truth is confirmed by the authority of the supreme Pontiffs, who condemned the proposition of Baius: Absurd is the opinion of those who say that man was raised from the beginning by a supernatural and gratuitous gift, above the condition of nature, so that he might worship God supernaturally by Faith, Hope, and Charity: therefore the proposition contrary to this condemned one is approved. Third and lastly, in that state the first Parents were able to merit: but nothing is more congruent for merit than knowledge: therefore it must be granted that the first Parents had it.

You will say: Faith is imperfect knowledge: but in the state of innocence nothing was imperfect: therefore neither faith. — I distinguish the major: it is imperfect knowledge by order to intuitive and beatific knowledge, I concede: by order to all other knowledges which a wayfarer can have of the ordinary way, I deny. The minor likewise I distinguish: the state of innocence admitted nothing imperfect that pertained to the state of the wayfarer, I concede: that would be called imperfect by order to the beatific state, I deny.

The second part is also proved, and the foregoing is confirmed: first indeed by the authority of the ancient Theologians and holy Fathers, for above all Tertullian, book 1. Against Marcion, chapter 12., says:

Who will doubt that that very fault of Adam is to be pronounced heresy, because he admitted it by the choice of his own rather than of the divine sentence; except that Adam never said to his Potter: you did not define me prudently: he confessed his seduction, he did not conceal her who seduced: he was a heretic exceedingly rude, etc.

The same is taught by Saint Ambrose, Epistle 33., which is to Marcellina his sister, where he introduces God speaking thus to Adam: You acknowledge yourself naked, because you have lost the good garments of faith.

But this truth Saint Prosper defends most openly in many places, especially in the response to the excerpts of the Genoese, doubt 3., where, speaking of Adam, and of human nature, which had fallen through his sin, he says:

What, then, is the reason that he wills faith alone to be commanded to that same nature, which unless it had first lost it, would lack none of the other goods? For Adam, in believing the devil, did not believe God. And shortly after: How could faith, once lost in Adam, be found in any of his sons, unless the same Spirit, who works all things in all, were to infuse it?

And a little below he concludes thus: All men therefore lost what Adam lost: but he first lost faith, which we all, because we were able to lose it first, ought to receive first. By these words he clearly signifies that Adam truly lost faith. He teaches the same in book against the Collator, chapter 19. This also S. Fulgentius teaches in the book On the Incarnation and Grace of Christ, saying: The first man, deceived by diabolical persuasion, fell from humility, because he lost faith: but in losing faith he lost divine protection.

You will say 1. If Adam and Eve had lost infused faith, they would truly have been heretics: but it is not so; for he is not to be judged an infidel and heretic who does not oppose with obstinate mind the truth divinely revealed to him by sinning: but neither Adam nor Eve, by sinning, pertinaciously opposed the truth divinely revealed to them: therefore, &c. The major is evident: for heresy is an error of faith contrary together with obstinacy. Whence S. Augustine, Epistle 162, says: Those who defend such a perverse opinion with no obstinate spirit, and are ready to be corrected, and seek the truth with all diligence, are not to be reckoned among heretics. And in book 1, On Baptism against the Donatists, c. 16, assigning the difference between two men believing the same error, but with this distinction, that one is within the Church and the other outside the Church, and baptized by heretics, he speaks thus: Let me set up two persons in this manner, that is, one of these holding concerning Christ what Photinus altogether opined, and being baptized in his heresy outside the communion of the Catholic Church; but the other holding this same thing, yet being baptized in the Catholic Church, thinking it itself to be the Catholic faith: the latter I say is not yet a heretic, unless he should prefer to resist the doctrine of the Catholic faith manifested to him. But neither Adam nor Eve were obstinate in sin, nor rebels against the divine reproach; indeed each excused his own sin, the one accusing his wife his companion, the other accusing the serpent as the instigator of the crime committed: therefore, &c. — I distinguish the major: he who does not oppose truth with obstinacy, when the truth which he opposes is not evident to him, nor is he certain that it was revealed by God, is not to be reckoned a heretic, I concede: otherwise, I deny. But to the first Parents of mankind it was most evidently clear that God had threatened them with death if they should eat of the fruit of the forbidden tree: therefore, giving faith to the devil who said: You shall not die the death, &c., it follows that they denied it to him who had said: Of the tree of knowledge of good and evil thou shalt not eat: for in what day soever thou shalt eat of it, thou shalt die the death.

You will urge: Even if the first Parents had known that God had forbidden the use of that forbidden fruit under threat of death, it was not therefore clear to them whether that divine sentence would be merely comminatory, or whether it would truly have to be carried into execution. For since they had attained supreme dominion over all creatures, they could without difficulty suspect that God did not wish to bind their liberty to the fruit of one little tree; and consequently it is clear either that they did not attend sufficiently to the divine words, or that their sense and understanding in no way gave assent. It is confirmed from this, that the devil, masked in the image of the serpent, accomplished nothing else by tempting than with lying words simulating himself a friend of God and vindicator of the divine glory, that the divine words were to be understood not in that sense which they supposed, but in one far different: Why hath he commanded, &c.; as if he said: do not think that this was prohibited in words: for why would God have commanded you to abstain your hand from the fruit of some tree, when all are good and healthful? Thus almost interprets S. Epiphanius concerning the heresy of the Caians, question 3, and it is deduced from the Apostle, 2. ad Cor. 11, where he compares their seduction through the Pseudo-Apostles to the seduction of Eve through the serpent, saying: I fear lest as the serpent seduced Eve by his subtilty, so your minds should be corrupted. For just as the Pseudo-Apostles do not openly calumniate God, nor pronounce that he has spoken falsely: for if they said this, they would deservedly have no hearer, but would be expelled by all; but transforming themselves into Apostles, they simulate zeal for the honor of God and the salvation of souls, affirming that this or that divine oracle is to be understood not as others understand it. For neither do the Calvinists say that Christ lied when he said: This is my Body: but they affirm that those words are not rightly received by Catholics according as they sound, since they are to be interpreted by trope. Therefore it is to be inferred that the first parents fell rather through error and doubt, than through infidelity and heresy. — I deny the consequence. For they could not twist the words of the divine prohibition into another sense without open loss of faith, since it had been sufficiently intimated to them, both by the light of natural reason and of the indited sciences, and by the light of faith, that by this precept their obedience was to be proven; nor were they urged by any passion, nor labored under any error or ignorance, and the divine words had been intimated without any ambiguity; there is no doubt that only hesitating and failing in faith could they suspect something other than our signification of the words, nor believe the tempter intimating something else. For what else does the mind of heretics accomplish than to interpret the divine words signifying Christian truths beyond their native sense and that of the Church? Nor did the Apostle will anything else: for just as the Corinthians, giving faith to the Pseudo-Apostles, had fallen from the faith of Christ; so Eve, thinking with the devil against the divine commandment, fell away from the divine faith together with her husband.

You will say 2. Whoever sins only, either from rash presumption, or from inordinate love of creatures, does not fall from faith; but either from hope, or from charity, or from both at once: but Adam sinned thus; first indeed from rash presumption of pursuing pardon: for as S. Augustine says, book 4, Of the City of God, chapter 11, Adam, since he was inexperienced in the divine severity, could be deceived in this, that he believed what was committed to be venial. Chapter 13. And he thought he transgressed the precept venially if he did not abandon the companion of his life even in the fellowship of sinning. Secondly from inordinate love of his spouse; for, as the same S. Augustine speaks, book 11, On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 12, or whoever else may be the author of that book, Adam did not wish to sadden Eve, whom he believed able to pine away without his solace if he were alienated from her in mind, and that discord wholly perish; not indeed from concupiscence of the flesh's embrace, since he had not yet felt in the resisting law of his members a law against the law of his mind, but from a certain friendly benevolence, whereby it happens that God is offended lest man become an enemy from a friend. — I distinguish: whoever sins from presumption or from inordinate love having no antecedent or consequent infidelity, I concede: otherwise, I deny. But if anyone's motion were presumption or inordinate love in Adam, there is no doubt he had antecedent or consequent infidelity: for since he was driven by no enticement to sin of the flesh and passion, how could it have come about that he should slip into it, if he had believed the loss of death of body and soul, of all heavenly charisms, and of supreme dominion over all creatures to be instantly incurred, as God had threatened? I confess that men for the most part conquered by concupiscence, or chained by an ineluctable habit of sinning, are not summoned even to threatened and expected punishments: but nothing of the sort may be suspected in Adam; especially since, as the praised Augustine says, no law of members opposed the law of the mind in him; and consequently it is necessary that the divine faith first extinguished, either by not believing the words of God, or by twisting them into another sense, before he lapsed into presumption or inordinate affection.

Second Conclusion. — It is more probable that the blessed do not have faith, but otherwise concerning the souls mourning in purgatory. This is the more common opinion among Theologians regarding each part; although Alensis contradicts it, 3. par. qu. 61. memb. 1, and Durandus in 3. d. 32. q. 3, whom the Master of the Sentences seems to favor in 3. dist. 23.

The first part the Doctor proves, dist. 31. nu. 2, where he clearly signifies that the habit of faith or hope does not remain in the Blessed:

No habit, he says, is to be posited as remaining there in vain: but a habit would be there in vain whose inclination would then be impossible: but faith from its reason inclines only into latent truth, according to the gloss upon that Hebrews 11. Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not: and hope inclines only into an absent commodious good, according to Romans 8. Hope that is seen, is not hope, taking hope for the thing hoped for, namely for the object: but these inclinations cannot be had in the fatherland, where truth will be manifest, and the good possessed: therefore those habits will not remain, because they would be superfluous.

By these words the Doctor not only affirms that the habit of faith and hope does not remain in the Blessed, but also proves it by this argument: the most perfect state, such as is the beatific, suffers nothing idle and useless: but the habits of faith and of hope in that state would be idle; since in it they could never elicit their act, for the act of faith involves the imperfection of obscurity; but the act of hope connotes the absence of the object; but obscure cognition and actual possession of the object cannot subsist with the clear and intuitive vision of the same object, and its actual possession: therefore in the state of beatitude the habits of faith and hope would be in vain.

The same truth is confirmed from the Apostle, 1. ad Cor. 13, where he teaches every imperfect cognition is to be banished from the beatific state: for he says: We know in part, and we prophesy in part: but when that which is perfect shall come, that which is in part shall be done away. That is, that which is imperfect, and infuses only incomplete perfection, such as we at least have through faith, which indeed confers on us certain cognition of the divine mysteries, but inevident and obscure: whence that cognition is indeed perfect on the part of certitude, but imperfect on the part of obscurity: whence the same Apostle adds: Now I know in part; but then I shall know even as I am known. And now there remain faith, hope, and charity. Where by that adversative but, he seems to intimate the diversity of the way, in which these three remain, from the state of the fatherland, where charity alone remains, of which he had premised; charity never falls away, according to which sense Jerome received the words of S. Paul there, saying: Charity never falleth away, that is, it alone remains in the future. Chrysostom, Homily 31 on that place, saying charity is greater, because faith and hope pass away, but charity endures always. August. Sermon 53, De Tempore. Anselm upon that place of Paul, and others.

You will object 1. S. Irenaeus, book 4, chapter 25, where he teaches the three theological virtues remain in the state of beatitude; for he says: Paul, he says, all things being done away, faith, hope, and love remain. To him subscribes Tertullian, book On Patience, near the end, saying: Deservedly charity shall never fall away, the rest shall be done away, consummated, exhausted: tongue, knowledge, prophecy: faith, hope, love remain.

I answer. That S. Irenaeus and Tertullian wish not that faith and hope remain in the Blessed according to their specific formal reasons, namely the inevident cognition of the revealed object, and the firm tending into the absent object; but only according to some common reason of attaining the first truth and highest good; inasmuch namely that through the beatific vision succeeding faith, there is had firm and most certain cognition of God, just as it was had through faith, though in a more imperfect mode: similarly through fruition succeeding hope God is most perfectly possessed as present, who before through hope only was possessed as absent.

You will object 2. If the habits of faith and hope did not remain in the Blessed, chiefly because they would be useless in them: but it is not so: therefore, etc. The major is clear from what was just said. But the minor is proved; for since objects of a threefold kind can underlie the cognition of the Blessed, whereof some pertain per se to beatitude, such as the vision of the divine essence illumined by its attributes, and subsisting in the three divine persons: others are those which pertain to it only concomitantly, such as all the mysteries of the Incarnate Word and of our Redemption: others indeed are wholly outside the state and lot of beatitude, such as may be judged the knowledge of all those things which have been done in the world, or are being done, or are brought about, even unto the consummation of the age; although perhaps faith does not remain in the Blessed as to the objects of the first and second kind, unto which the beatific vision is terminated per se, nevertheless it can remain as to the objects of the third kind; for indeed nothing stands in the way why one of the Blessed cannot, by God specially revealing, know the things which have been done, or are being done, or will be done hereafter, and believe them on account of the divine revelation: for no contradiction can be conceived that God should render His essence manifest to someone by intuitive vision, and yet conceal from him the things that are being done in the world, or are to be done, which He may manifest afterwards, either per se, or through Angels: therefore as to these objects there can be an act of faith; and hence the habit in the Blessed will not be wholly useless.

I answer. Indeed that it is so; yet that assent will not be an act of theological faith, but either angelic or human, if what is revealed be made known through an Angel or another blessed soul; for those acts do not tend to God as to the object included directly or indirectly in those objects unto which they are terminated. In the case certainly he will give assent to the objects proposed to him by God, and that on account of the testimony of God, not obscurely known indeed, but clearly: and hence that assent will not be faith proper and strict, but evident knowledge through a demonstrative medium a posteriori; which evident knowledge does not conflict with the beatific state, at least concerning those objects which are not seen in the Word, nor possessed elsewhere by most perfect immediate cognition.

You will object 3. If the habits of faith and hope did not remain in the fatherland, chiefly because in that state habit and act are incompossible: but it is not so; for if there were some opposition of faith with beatitude, especially either on the side of act, or on the side of habit, or on the side of the act of beatitude with the habit of faith, for a threefold comparison can be made: first indeed, between the act of vision and the act of faith: second, between the habit of faith and the light of glory: third, between the act of vision together with the habit of faith, or between the act of faith with the habit of the light of glory: yet on neither side is it repugnant that faith be able to subsist with the beatific vision: therefore, etc.

I deny the minor: for first it is clear that the act of faith conflicts with the act of vision; both because one and the same object cannot be seen at once clearly and obscurely, as has already been proven several times; and because beatitude, since it is a status bringing the aggregation of all goods, and also the exclusion of all evil, consequently ought to exclude dread of every evil; for he who fears some evil of his own is not blessed on every side: but an obscure assent, such as is the assent of faith, always has annexed a dread of error, and hence infers a power of dreading, which per se is an evil; for to be able to fear evil itself is no slight evil; but if the act of faith could stand together with the act of vision, it would follow that in the same instant the evil of obscurity would stand together with the vision of God, and in consequence in that instant man would not be plainly and on every side blessed. — The habit of faith also conflicts with the habit of the light of glory: because it inclines to opposite acts, namely the unevident and the evident, whence it is necessary that one or other habit be perpetually useless: but such will not be the habit of the light of glory, which by its nature exacts permanence or perpetuity, and the state of beatitude completed in the blessed subject, and in consequence exacts perpetual privation of all obscurity, and of actual faith; and hence it infers the uselessness of the habit of faith, since it can now serve for no act. — Third and lastly, it is repugnant that the habit of faith subsist with the act of the light of glory, because the clear vision of God cannot be given connaturally except to one having the light of glory: therefore since this light of glory exacts of itself the negation of the habit of faith, it equally infers its act. Nor does it matter that Saint Paul perhaps had the beatific vision in his rapture; for I answer that although Saint Paul had truly had the beatific vision, the contrary of which we taught when treating of the beatific vision, still it would not be consequent that the act of the beatific vision could subsist connaturally with the habit of faith: for that conjunction of vision with the habit of faith in Saint Paul would not have been connatural, but against the connatural laws of each. Whence from it one may not infer that that act of vision could subsist connaturally with the habit, as it truly ought to subsist in the Blessed, otherwise a perpetual miracle would be required, that the habit of faith might be preserved together with the actual beatific vision, even as a miracle was needed that the moderate coolness might be preserved in the three children cast into the Babylonian furnace.

The second part is also commonly admitted by Theologians: both because those souls are still in the state of the way, and hence have everything that per se conduces to the sanctity of such a status, such as the theological virtues; and because there is nothing in those souls that conflicts with the habit or act of faith; for although (as de Lugo says) they can know God their Creator evidently from creatures, yet this knowledge is not incompossible with faith concerning the same object, as is clear in the Angels, who in the state of the way knew God more perfectly, and could still have had faith. — Then, many things about God are credible which are not known by natural power from creatures, such as the Trinity, and likewise many other things about creatures are believed through faith which could not be discovered by natural reason, such as the hypostatic union, the future resurrection, the universal judgment, and countless others. — Finally, an obscure revelation, upon which strict faith can be founded, is not repugnant to the state of those souls, since that is not the beatific state excluding all pains and anguish, but rather a darksome state, full of solicitude and anxiety, though with certitude of one's own salvation. And although concerning certain objects perhaps they have revelation evident to themselves, and not obscure, it suffices nevertheless if they do not have so clear a revelation of such a kind concerning all objects that the habit of faith must be retained, which will not there be wholly idle.

Third Conclusion. — Demons and the damned do not have infused faith. This is the more common opinion among Theologians against Durandus, in 3. dist. 23. question 9., where he says that faith remains in the damned; and

It is proved first by the authority of Saint Dionysius, book On the Divine Names, chapter 1., where he says that the damned lack all divine gifts; as also of Saint Augustine, book 9. Of the City of God, chapter 21., saying that the demons know Christ, not, he says, by the light of faith, but by the efficacy of signs.

It is also proved by reason: First, because habitual infused faith is granted for this purpose, both that one may become a member of Christ implanted in His mystical body, which is the Church; and that it may be the root of justification, and the foundation of things hoped for: but the damned, whether men or demons, are neither in act nor in potency members of Christ and of the Church, seeing that they are as branches cut off, withered, and cast into the fire; nor are they capable either of justification, or of the beatitude and salvation to be hoped for: therefore they are equally incapable of faith. — Second, the gifts and aids of grace are not communicated to the damned: but the habit of faith is an excellent gift: therefore it does not remain in the damned. The major is clear from that text Matthew 7., where Christ said: Give not that which is holy to dogs; neither cast ye your pearls before swine. Moreover, the state of the damned is a state of supreme misery: but if they had any supernatural gift, their state would not be one of supreme misery. For a greater misery could befall those who did not have that supernatural gift itself; therefore that state of the damned must be judged not to be illumined by the habit of faith. — Third and lastly, God grants nothing in vain: but that infused habit of faith would be altogether in vain in demons and the damned, since it would concur efficaciously toward no act of faith; for the act of faith cannot be elicited without gratuitous supernatural aid: but this aid is deservedly denied to the damned, for whom there is now no place for grace and mercy. Add that such aid would be given to them in vain: for since supernatural acts are ordered to justification and beatitude, that end ceasing, as it ceases in the damned, all supernatural means ordered to both ought also to cease. Nor does it stand in the way that there remains in the damned the character of Baptism, or of Confirmation, or of Priesthood: since that character is not per se an operative quality, but only an indelible sign of power, or of grace received, which sign assuredly perseveres in them deservedly unto their greater torment and bruising: but the habit of infused faith is a quality per se operative, which where it can no longer elicit its act, it is necessary that it perish.

You will say 1. Saint James chapter 2. teaches that actual faith is in the demons: therefore also habitual. The consequence is evident. But the antecedent is proved, for he says: The devils believe, and tremble: where he certainly speaks of the act of infused faith, otherwise he would not rightly use that example, to prove that faith alone, even infused, does not suffice for salvation, which he surely intends there, as Salvian observes and admonishes most excellently, book 4. On Providence, not far from the beginning, where he weighs the aforesaid oracle of the Apostle thus:

This very fruit of faith the Apostle testifies to be unfruitful without good works, saying: Faith without good works is dead. And again: For as the body without the spirit is dead, so faith without works is dead. He adds also certain harsher things for crushing those who flatter themselves with presumption of Christian faith; but someone will say: You have faith, and I have works. Show me thy faith without works, and I will show thee my faith by my works. Whereby he indeed indicates that the good acts of Christian faith are as it were witnesses; because unless a Christian do good works, he can in no way prove his faith, and by this, that he cannot prove it, that it is, it must be altogether held as if it were not. For since he thought it to be held in no wise by this, he at once demonstrates it himself in what follows, saying to the Christian: Thou believest that there is one God: thou dost well: the devils believe, and tremble. Let us consider what the Apostle willed to say in this place; let us not be angry at the divine testimonies, but acquiesce: and let us not contradict, but profit. Thou believest, says the divine discourse to the Christian, that God is one, thou dost well: the devils also believe, and tremble: did the Apostle err, that he compared the faith of a Christian man to a demon? Not at all: but wishing to show that which was said above, that without good works he ought to usurp nothing to himself by the arrogance of faith. And therefore he says that God is believed by demons, namely that as the demons, while they believe God to be, nevertheless persevere in perversity, so also certain men have as it were a demoniacal credulity, who, while they assert themselves to believe God, nevertheless do not cease from evil work. But he subjoins, to the shame and condemnation of sinful men, that the demons not only believe the name of God, but also fear, and tremble. That is to say: wherefore, he says, dost thou flatter thyself, O man whosoever thou art, about a credulity which without fear and obedience of God is nothing? The demons have something more. For thou hast only one thing, they two: thou hast credulity, thou hast not fear: they have credulity equally, and fear.

— Some answer, first, that the Apostle uses the verb believe in the present for the past; so that the sense is: the demons, when they were wayfarers, also believed, and yet because they had not works they were damned: therefore thou too, Christian, having a sterile faith without works, shalt be no less subject to eternal damnation: for it is most familiar among the Hebrews to write one tense for another, as is clear from that text Luke 7. To whom less is forgiven, he loveth less, that is, he loved less, as the holy Fathers expound, Ambrose,

Chrysostom, etc. Others answer that the Apostle does not equate the faith of demons with the faith of wayfaring man in all respects, but only in this, that both are sterile and useless for salvation as long as they exist without charity and good works. But this solution supposes faith to be in the damned in the manner in which it is in a sinner, and hence that the very habit of faith subsists also in the damned and in demons, which is against the Conclusion. Therefore I judge, with others, that it must be said otherwise and more correctly, that the Apostle there proves only from defect of works that faith is dead, even as by defect of fruits a tree is shown to be dead; and to prove this he brings forward the faith of the demon, which faith (whatever it be, whether acquired or infused) we gather to be dead because it lacks works: equally therefore the faith of the sinful man, which is sterile, will be proven dead. To these add that the demons and the damned can believe by acquired faith, which they procured for themselves through repeated acts of infused faith while they were wayfarers, as will appear from what is to be said below.

⟦Illegible: opening words of the following obiection lost in faded print; text resumes:⟧ …by the sole sin of infidelity it is lost: but there are many damned who nowhere admitted the sin of infidelity, and who died with the habit of faith: therefore they retain the same habit of infused faith.

I answer. That infused faith is destroyed not only by the sin of infidelity opposed to it absolutely speaking, but also from defect of pious affection toward believing as one ought, and on account of the unworthiness of the state. For although in wayfarers the habit of faith is not wont to perish except on account of infidelity, nevertheless it is not wonderful that it perishes in the damned, who elicited no act of infidelity: partly because they no longer have a pious affection toward believing; partly because their state is one of supreme misery, and consequently has no supernatural benefit, such as is the habit of faith; finally because, as we said, they are no longer ordained to justification and beatitude, and consequently faith in them would be useless. Hence it comes about that although the damned know within the same supernatural truths which they knew in the way, yet they do not know them in the same manner, namely by the habit of infused faith, but only by the habit of acquired faith, or perhaps also by a special manifestation of God, whereby God sets before them those mysteries which they had believed in the way, but especially those which regard eternal felicity, which through their own fault they lost, namely that at its sight they may be tormented more bitterly.

You will insist. Nothing hinders that a pious affection toward believing remain in the damned: therefore equally nothing can hinder that the habit of faith remain in them. The consequence is evident from what was said just above. But the antecedent is proved; for since synderesis and inclination to good remain in the damned, it does not conflict that some pious affection be found also in them, as is evident from the rich man feasting, who though buried ⟦in hell⟧ and tortured by flames, wished salvation to his brethren, and besought Abraham to send Lazarus to them, so that he might exhort them to penance.

I deny the antecedent. For although the damned always have synderesis unto more bitter torment, yet since they always act from a perverse intention of the end, and all their acts, however much they may have a good object, are ordinarily evil, it conflicts that any pious affection toward the first truth revealing and expounding the mysteries be in them. Nor did the rich man beseech from a pious affection — nay, altogether perverse — that Lazarus should labour for the conversion of his brethren; for he demanded this lest, namely, he be tortured more harshly on account of their damnation, and the most wicked example and occasion of sinning which he had given them.

Fourth Conclusion. — THE HABIT OF INFUSED FAITH PERSISTS IN A SINNER STRIPPED OF SANCTIFYING GRACE AND CHARITY. This is determined in the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 15, where it is defined that it must be asserted that not only through infidelity, by which faith itself also is lost, but also through any other mortal sin, even if faith be not lost, the grace of justification once received is lost. And Canon 23:

If anyone shall say that grace being lost through sin, faith also is at the same time always lost with it; or that the faith which remains is not true faith, although it be not living; or that he who has faith without charity is not a Christian: let him be anathema.

It is proved: first indeed from sacred Scripture, for the Apostle, 1. ad Cor. 13, clearly supposes faith to be able to exist without charity, and consequently it to subsist in a sinful man; for he says: If I should have all faith… but have not charity, it profiteth me nothing: and S. James demonstrates this openly chapter 2, where he says: Faith without works is dead: there is therefore a living faith and a dead faith; living faith indeed, namely that faith which works through charity, says the Apostle to the Galatians 5; but dead faith, whereby it is sundered from charity; for since the life of the soul consists in grace and charity, that will be called living faith which is formed by charity; but that dead which exists without charity; whence S. Augustine book On the Trinity, chapter 18, says excellently that faith can exist without charity, but not profit. And S. Bernard, Sermon 2, On the Resurrection:

Just as, he says, we discern the life of this body from its motion, so also the life of faith from good works. Wherefore the life indeed of the body is the soul, whereby it moves and senses: but the life of faith is charity, because through it it works, as the Apostle says: faith, which worketh by love: whence, charity growing cold, faith dies, as the body when the soul withdraws. Therefore just as the body through the withdrawal of the soul does not cease to be, so neither does faith altogether perish on account of its separation from charity and grace ⟦illegible: one or more words lost in faded print⟧.

It is proved also by reason: Faith is not destroyed by that which is not opposed to it, neither physically nor morally: but not every sin is opposed to faith, nor destroys its formal reason of object, and presently man existing in mortal sin can believe all things that are proposed as revealed by God: therefore he can in that state have both ⟦illegible: passage lost in faded print; marginal citation legible: inquit Suarez disp. 5. sect. 3. num. 3.⟧ … man can hope, and repent imperfectly through supernatural attrition, and pray to God as supernatural Author, adore him, and serve him, as regards certain precepts that occur to be kept: but these he cannot accomplish without infused faith: therefore man in sin⟦?⟧ can conserve faith. — Finally, faith is judged to perish through sin because it would have necessary connexion with sanctifying grace, such as charity has: but it is not so, for neither is it a property of it, nor ⟦word uncertain in print: “compars”⟧, but only its foundation as of the whole spiritual edifice, which certainly can remain, that edifice destroyed, just as the house demolished, the foundation subsists no less entire. Advert however that faith subsisting in a sinner is called formless and dead, but that which remains in a just man is called living and formed: for charity is as it were the form perfecting faith, not indeed physically, as some wish; because it is false that the habit of charity concurs immediately with the habit of faith toward its assent, since the latter precedes every act of charity: therefore such information of charity is not necessary for this effect: but only morally: and that under a twofold title, first indeed inasmuch as from the fellowship of charity the acts of faith are made meritorious of eternal life, which without charity have no reward. Secondly, because formless faith behaves after the manner of a root, or tree bearing no fruit, in which state it is judged dead, that is, deprived of spiritual life, and all comeliness and beauty, whereby it may become grateful and acceptable to God.

Yet I would not have you think with certain older Theologians that formless and formed faith are distinct habits in entity, whereof one subsists in the sinner, and perishes upon the advent of grace; and conversely here it recedes, grace succeeding, with another habit of formless faith; nor, as others wished, that both those habits remain in the just man, while in the sinner only the habit of formless faith subsists. Which variety of opinions indeed perhaps took its origin from this, that they thought living and dead faith to differ no less than a living man and a dead one, whom they judged to differ not only in number but in species; but now the concordant opinion of Theologians teaches that the same faith in number, which before was formless on account of the lack of grace, becomes formed through its increase: for just as the same body, which had been living, not only remains the same dead, but truly is the same, when it is raised anew and recalled to life, so also the habit of faith, which was alive with charity present, dies through its absence, and again receives life through its advent. Which certainly, says de Lugo disp. 16. sect. 3. n. 5., the parables and similitudes indicate to be true, by which Scripture and the Fathers are wont to signify this. For faith without charity is likened to a lamp without oil, such as the foolish virgins had. Which same lamp, that it might revive, they prepared to adorn with oil added, not another lamp, but the same. So also S. Jerome, tom. 1, on chapter 26 of Isaiah near the beginning, compares good works or charity to a wall. ⟦illegible: one line badly garbled by faded print (“Haem a benurali fit poredtr, tnqiuit, inecat e tuei, et tntemesale”); sense from context: the wall of faith is furnished with an outer rampart⟧ sit munimento, for it does not suffice for faith to have a wall, unless faith itself be confirmed by works. Where you see that the very same faith, which without works does not suffice, must be confirmed by good works: for neither does the wall being posited change the rampart, but the same altogether perseveres. So also says S. Bernard, Sermon 24, on the Canticles: The death of faith, he says, is the separation of charity: dost thou believe in Christ? do the works of Christ, that thy faith may live: let thy love animate thy faith, prove it by acts, it shall not incur ⟦tergiversatione⟧ work, whom faith of heavenly things raises up. The same therefore is faith, which charity withdrawing dies, and returning is vivified and animated. In his own sense also Bede on chapter 2 of James said, that dead faith revives and is animated through works of charity. But it is certain that nothing can revive and rise again unless that very same thing which had fallen and been dead. The reason of this assertion is clear: because the same faith which is formless, since it suffices for supernatural assent concerning things revealed on account of divine authority, suffices upon the advent of charity for believing the same objects, which assent in man already just will be grateful to God, and meritorious de condigno: why then should another habit of faith be added? Add that it is not credible that man sinning there be given him then another new habit of faith, which would certainly be a supernatural gift of God given anew to man without any disposition on his part, nay with indisposition and actual demerit, on account of which he would deserve to be stripped of all gifts, not indeed to receive new ones.

Fifth Conclusion. — THE HABIT OF INFUSED FAITH DOES NOT REMAIN IN HERETICS. This is determined in the Council of Trent in the places praised in the preceding Conclusion, where it says faith is lost through the sin of infidelity. Which is also Proved from sacred Scripture, for Luke 8 it is said there are some who believe for a time, and in time of temptation fall away: and the Apostle, 1. ad Timoth. 1, speaking of Alexander, and Hymeneus, exhorts Timothy that he hold faith, and a good conscience, which some rejecting, have made shipwreck concerning the faith. But they are said to have made shipwreck who lost the ship, that is, the Church, as S. Chrysostom expounds, Homily 5, saying:

As he who suffers shipwreck, having lost all things, remains naked, so he who falls away from faith retains nothing further to himself of the gifts and virtues of God.

Whence in the same place chapter 6. concerning the heretical man, saying, he says: He is proud, knowing nothing, that is, believing nothing with certainty and firmness: whence in the same place he exhorts Timothy: Keep the deposit, avoiding profane novelties of words, and oppositions of knowledge falsely so called, which some promising have erred concerning the faith: by which words the Apostle signifies that truly the infidel man and heretic falls away from faith. — The same is gathered from the First Epistle of S. John, chapter 2. where the Apostle, speaking of heretics, whom he calls Antichrists, says: They went out from us, but they were not of us: for if they had been of us, they would certainly have continued with us. From which words the holy Fathers gather that a heretical man is severed from the Church, nor is he any longer joined at all to the mystical body of Christ.

It is proved moreover by reason; First indeed: he loses faith who cannot be judged faithful: but a heretic cannot be judged faithful: therefore faith does not persevere in him. The minor stands: for heresy is formal infidelity, and consequently a heretic cannot be esteemed faithful. The major also is clear, for as long as anyone has the habit of faith, however doubtful he may be concerning certain articles, he can truly be called faithful, just as he who knows many philosophical conclusions, although he err concerning one or another, is nevertheless called absolutely a philosopher. — Then, he has not the habit of infused faith who cannot be moved by the formal reason of the object of such a habit: but a heretic cannot be moved by the formal reason of the object of infused faith; for this formal reason is revelation itself, as notified through the altogether infallible Church: therefore since a heretic does not believe the Church to be infallible in proposing all things revealed by God, otherwise he would believe one article no more than another, it follows that he has lost faith. — Finally, if anyone before receiving the habit of faith would refuse to believe some article, for instance the presence of the body of Christ in the Eucharist, although he were prepared to believe all the articles expressed in the three Symbols, of the Apostles, of S. Athanasius, and of the Council of Nicaea, he could not receive faith: therefore if he be so perversely disposed after it has been received, he will not be able to keep it. The consequence is clear by a similar case: for just as one pursuing one man with hatred, although he love all others, cannot receive nor preserve the habit of charity, so in like manner he who is perversely disposed toward one article to be believed cannot receive the habit of faith: for as charity moves to loving all men absolutely without exception, so also faith to believing all objects whatsoever revealed by God.

You will say. A heretic who denies one article of faith, for instance purgatory, or some Sacrament, still experiences the same facility and promptitude concerning other articles: therefore he still has the same habit of faith.

I distinguish the antecedent: he experiences the same facility by reason of infused faith, I deny: by reason of faith acquired through various acts, which he exercised before the heresy, I concede. The consequent similarly I distinguish; he has the same habit of faith divinely infused, I deny: acquired I concede. That man therefore, says the Doctor dist. 23. n. 1. without infused faith believes other articles, because infused faith is corrupted when heresy is generated; otherwise faith and heresy would stand together: therefore by acquired faith he believes other articles; which namely was together with the preceding infused faith, if any such there was; for not in that instant in which infused faith is corrupted through heresy is acquired faith first generated, for that error does not dispose to faith for the time being, nay rather it is an indisposition that it be not then generated: therefore it preceded before that error, and thus it is certain that there is in us acquired faith. Thus the Doctor.

You will say 2: If through the sin of infidelity the habit of faith were destroyed, that destruction would occur either physically, or morally: but it can occur in neither manner. Not indeed morally, or demeritoriously; for indeed if through the sin of infidelity the habit of faith were destroyed, especially because on account of its unworthiness and enormity it would move God to take away from man every supernatural gift: yet this cannot be said; because there are other graver sins, for instance hatred of God, which nevertheless does not move God to take away the habit of faith from him who has such hatred. Nor even physically, for if the sin of heresy destroyed physically the habit of faith, either it would effect this in the reason of formal cause, or after the manner of a form, which by its present and formal efficacy would fight against faith and destroy it, as heat fights against cold, and whiteness against blackness, or after the manner of an efficient cause and mediately, producing namely something which would be altogether incompossible with faith: but neither can be said. Not indeed the first: both because an act is not opposed formally and immediately to a habit, but only to another act elicited from an opposite habit: and because the act of heresy which is not voluntary but undeliberate has every physical entity of the act of heresy which is deliberate, and nevertheless by its presence the habit of faith does not perish. Nor even in the genus of efficient cause; since the first act of heresy, however intense, cannot produce a habit contrary to the habit of faith, except perhaps according to entity, and the first degree of that habit of infidelity: but that habit thus produced according to the first degree would not suffice that the acquired habit be expelled: therefore much less that the infused habit be destroyed by it physically and efficiently, especially since no acquired habit conflicts by its nature with an infused habit; for the sinner however much he has vicious infused habits can nevertheless be justified no less, even if those vicious habits remain in him when justified.

I answer. The act of infidelity or heresy expels the habit of faith morally only, not only demeritoriously, but also dispositively: a twofold genus of destruction, as regards the present institution, can be distinguished; namely demerit and indisposition; but the act of infidelity not only fights against faith demeritoriously, inasmuch as namely it moves God to withdraw faith from the infidel, but also dispositively, for he who wills not to assent to one proposition of faith on account of the authority and divine revelation proposed by the Church, by that very fact has an impediment lest he offer assent to infused faith concerning other propositions; since the authority and divine revelation proposed through the Church is the unique and indivisible motive by which we assent through infused faith to all mysteries revealed: therefore where this motive is judged insufficient to excite the intellect to assent with respect to one, it ought by equal reason to be judged insufficient for assenting to others which are to be believed on account of the same motive.

You will say 3: One can lose an acquired habit, e.g. science concerning one object, and preserve it perfect and entire concerning another particular object of the same science; for the physician can with ease lose the habit of Physic with respect to the principles and properties of the natural body, and retain it with respect to Anatomy and the properties of the human body: therefore by equal reason the heretic will be able to lose the habit of faith with respect to one article, and preserve the same with respect to other articles to be believed by divine faith.

I deny the parity, and the reason of the disparity is, that the habit of total science is not simple and indivisible, but multiple and gathered from distinct habits, which are occupied about diverse parts of the same general and common object; but the habit of faith is altogether simple and indivisible; and consequently it ought not be wondered at that where it is lost, it perishes entirely.

NOTE 1. Beyond controversy it is that the material, or subjective, cause of infused faith is the intellect of man, or of the Angel wayfarer; since, as we have said, because that habit is ordered to the knowledge of supernatural things, which become known only through divine revelation, it is necessary that it be seated in that faculty which alone is cognitive and capable of the perception of such objects. Moreover, the formal cause of it is nothing other than the first truth itself in speaking and revealing; for habits have no other formal cause, by which they become known and are distinguished from others, than that formal aspect of the object by which the acts of their habits are specified. And likewise the final cause of faith is the justification and salvation of man himself, according to that word of St. Peter, 1. chapter 1. Receiving the end of your faith, even the salvation of your souls. There remains therefore to say something about the efficient cause.

NOTE 2. All Theologians agree that the habit of infused faith is not produced or generated from repeated acts of believing the mysteries upon divine revelation; wherefore the habits of the theological virtues are said to be infused per se, and not only per accidens, because by their nature they require not to be made by acts, as acquired habits are made; but they are granted divinely in the manner of a potency, which is ordered not to acting more easily, but to acting simply; hence it is certain that these habits are infused by God. The difficulty, however, is whether the habit of faith can per se be so infused by God that it can be produced separately from the other habits of hope, especially charity, along with sanctifying grace. For the resolving of which difficulty there is a triple opinion of Authors: Most indeed teach, with Suarez, disp. 7. sect. 5. num. 6. that the habit of faith is often infused without the habit of sanctifying grace; but some, with Soto, book 1. De Natura, et Gratia, chapter 8. contend, that although the habit of faith is not infused outside the sacrament: nevertheless habitual faith is infused in baptism into a man otherwise disposed through actual faith, even though he has an obstacle to the habit of sanctifying grace; because, they say, since baptism is the sacrament of faith, it will at least have the infusion of this habit of faith for its effect. Finally, the third opinion denies that the habit of faith is ever infused without the habit of grace.

NOTE 3. A habit is a certain vestige of the act itself left by it in the potency, and impressed upon it, inclining it toward the object of the same act, so that it may produce other similar acts. For just as the act formally, after the manner of a thing passing through, moves and inclines the potency to its object, so the habit is a certain habitual and persevering inclination, moving the potency continuously, as far as lies with it, to the same object, especially when that occurs and is presented to the faculty; for when frequently we have elicited some acts concerning some object, we experience that we are gradually more and more inclined to exercise similar acts, and, the object being present, to be seized in a manner violently, so that it is necessary for us to apply force in order to abstain from such acts. Furthermore, that act by which the habit is generated can be considered in two ways: first, insofar as it is a certain quality inhering in the potency: so that the potency in no way perceives it, nor does it have anything sensible, either while it is produced or while it inheres; second, insofar as it affects the potency sensibly, and the potency by it tends vitally to the object.

These things premised, two points here occur to be determined: first, whether the habit of faith is necessarily infused together with the habit of charity, and sanctifying grace: second, whether the acts of infused faith can produce the habit of acquired faith.

First Conclusion — FAITH IS ALWAYS INFUSED TOGETHER WITH THE HABIT OF CHARITY, ALTHOUGH IN TRUTH THEY CAN BE INFUSED SEPARATELY. This is the Doctor's teaching, as to both parts, in 3. d. 36. num. 30. where speaking of the theological virtues, and their connection, he says:

but whether are they connected in coming to be, or in infusion, so that one cannot be infused without the other? I answer: whatsoever things can be separated in being, God can separate in coming to be: and therefore of themselves they are not necessarily connected in infusion, but they are connected by divine liberality. Because God perfects the whole man; so that just as corporally he healed no one unless perfectly, so also spiritually he heals man only if he heals him perfectly: but health is perfect if as regards the intellect he has faith, and as regards the will, hope, and charity. By which words the Doctor teaches according to the law and ordinary way that God in justification infuses at once Faith, Hope, and Charity, although he can infuse those virtues separately.

The first part is proven: first indeed from the Council of Vienna, where it is determined that it is more probable that grace and the virtues be infused through baptism both to infants and to adults. And from the Tridentine, Session 6. chapter 7. where it is said that in justification Faith, Hope, and Charity are infused at once.

Thence, it says, in justification itself, with the remission of sins, man receives all these things infused together through Jesus Christ, into whom he is engrafted, Faith, Hope, and Charity.

Which words I would not however have you take thus, as if those virtues could nowhere be infused separately, which would happen if the man to be justified were best disposed to those virtues, or unless he had previously had some of those virtues. For he adds:

For faith, unless hope and charity be added to it, neither unites perfectly with Christ, nor makes a living member of his body, for which reason it is most justly said to be dead and idle without works.

There he openly supposes that faith is sometimes infused into us before charity; for he treats of the total conversion and justification of man, by which the infidel converted is justified through the infusion of Faith, Hope, and Charity, and he says that infused faith, unless hope and charity be added, does not make us a member of Christ, but is idle and dead, which certainly would be less fittingly said, if faith were never infused into us before charity. — But that this does not happen ordinarily, the Doctor proves from d. 3. De Poenit., chapter sunt plures, etc. where it is said, that God never healed anyone whom he did not make wholly whole, in proof of which is brought forward that word of Matth. 12. where it is said that he made the whole man whole on the Sabbath, because he freed both the body from infirmity, and the soul from every contagion of sin. Moreover, in that Canon is added the reason of this assertion: For a certain impiety of infidelity it is, to hope for half a pardon from him who is just and justice itself. It is fitting therefore, says the Doctor, that God, who heals man through the infusion of supernatural virtues, make him wholly whole, and consequently that he infuse the three virtues together.

Nevertheless the second part also is evident, namely, that God sometimes infuses faith and hope before charity, as St. Augustine teaches, book 1. ad Simplicianum, qu. 2. near the beginning, where he says:

In some there is so great a grace of faith as does not suffice for obtaining the kingdom of heaven.

He speaks however of Catechumens having faith without charity; whence he adds:

In some there is so great a one, that they are already set apart for the body of Christ, and for the holy temple of God.

Hence he concludes:

There arise therefore certain beginnings of faith like to conceptions: not however is it enough only to be conceived, but one must be born, etc.

By which words the holy Doctor signifies that someone at the beginning of his conversion can have faith, although he does not yet have hope and charity. Which certainly appears true also from John 12. where of certain Princes of the Jews it is said: However many of the Princes believed in him, but because of the Pharisees they did not confess him, that they might not be cast out of the Synagogue: for they loved the glory of men more than the glory of God. By which it is signified that those Princes indeed had faith, but not hope and charity.

It is proven also by reason: For it seems fitting that when someone has the dispositions prerequisite of himself for the habit of faith, he receive it, even though on account of the lack of the disposition prerequisite for charity he cannot receive that: but an adult can sometimes have all the dispositions prerequisite for the habit of faith, even though he does not have those which are prerequisite for charity: therefore it is fitting that the habit of faith itself be infused into him, while he receives baptism with this disposition, v. g. even though on account of indisposition he cannot receive the habit of sanctifying grace, and charity. The major stands: for God, insofar as he is author of nature, or of grace, is wont to produce form according to the disposition of the subject. But the minor is proven: for it can happen that an adult has a mind prepared to believe, indeed and in fact believes all the mysteries of faith, as revealed by God, and proposed by the Church, as well as to profess that faith, that he come to baptism, having from elsewhere some depraved affection, namely, hatred of his neighbor; in which case he would have all the dispositions prerequisite for receiving faith, but not for receiving charity; and consequently he could receive faith without charity.

You will reply, that the very indisposition for receiving charity makes him unworthy that the habit of supernatural faith be conferred upon him; and consequently by the reason that he cannot receive charity, by the same he cannot obtain faith.

On the contrary. Demerit, or unworthiness sufficient, that God be moved to take away the habit of charity, does not suffice that he likewise be moved to take away the habit of faith, which is preserved in the soul even when charity has perished: therefore by equal reason unworthiness for receiving charity will not stand in the way, that one be able to receive the habit of faith. The consequence is proven: for it is no greater thing for God to infuse the grace of faith into a sinner than to preserve it in him: nor does the one become God less than the other; therefore both can equally happen.

From these things it appears easily reconciled the conflicting opinion of Authors concerning the infusion of faith conjointly, or separately, from charity, and sanctifying grace, namely, that God nowhere infuses the habit of faith without the habit of charity, when the subject is sufficiently disposed to receive both habits; but he infuses one without the other, when he has indeed the disposition for the reception of one habit, but not for the reception of the other.

Second Conclusion. — SUPERNATURAL ACTS OF FAITH, HOPE, AND CHARITY IN US WAYFARERS GENERATE NATURAL AND ACQUIRED HABITS CONCERNING THE SAME FORMAL OBJECT, INTO WHICH THE SUPERNATURAL ACTS OF THOSE HABITS TEND. This is likewise the Doctor's teaching, because if a Jewish boy not baptized were educated among Christian boys, and did not know himself to be a Jew, or unbaptized, he himself would believe the very same mysteries in which Christians believe: but he would not believe through infused faith, which is not granted to an infidel without baptism, which he did not receive: therefore he would believe through acquired faith. — He confirms it from this, that we ourselves believe many things upon the relation of parents, and others, whom we have not seen:

Therefore, he says, by equal reason, on account of the same truth, we could believe through acquired faith the same mysteries which we believe through divine faith. Finally also because if some baptized man, who believed through infused faith all the articles, fall into heresy by refusing to believe one article, namely, the Trinity of persons, in that state he no longer has supernatural faith, as was said above, yet nevertheless he believes the other articles no less firmly than before, insofar as he perceives them by his own experience; for he who falls into heresy on account of the denied real presence of the body of Christ our Lord in the Eucharist, experiences that he believes no less firmly the unity of God, the Trinity of persons, the Incarnation, etc. than before: but he does not believe those things through infused faith, because he lost it through heresy: therefore he believes through acquired faith; and consequently that acquired faith is given, not only actual, but even habitual.

Nor does it matter that the Doctor there asserts that acquired faith is not acquired through elicited supernatural acts of infused faith, but only through merely natural acts: for it suffices for the purpose at hand that the Doctor approves that acquired faith be given concerning the same formal object into which the habit of infused faith tends: which he proves also elsewhere, especially Quodlib. 14. where he expressly says that one could believe with acquired credulity God immediately revealing.

But that supernatural acts can truly produce a natural acquired habit, is plain, because the act produces the habit insofar as the potency is sensibly moved by it, or borne to the object: but the intellect is borne to the object in exactly the same perceptible, and as it were sensible manner by a supernatural act, and by a natural act: therefore each act produces a habit in it. The major stands: for not otherwise is the potency facilitated by repeated acts, and acquires the habit of producing subsequent acts, than because, as was said, those acts, as sensible, leave their vestige in the potency. The minor is proven: for not otherwise does the potency on its part influence into supernatural acts than into natural ones, nor do the former affect it sensibly otherwise than these; so that we can in no way perceive and distinctly know whether we produce a supernatural act, or indeed only a natural one; and consequently since the potency stands in the same way toward the object through supernatural acts, and natural ones, thence it happens that just as natural acts produce a habit, so also supernatural acts ought to produce one.

It is confirmed by experience itself, whereby it is established that the just, who exercise themselves more frequently in some act of supernatural virtue, acquire great facility in its exercise; which is an open sign that they acquire a natural habit: therefore supernatural acts beget a habit of this kind.

You will object 1. Acts do not produce habits unless like those from which they are generated: yet supernatural acts are not generated from natural habits: therefore they cannot produce such habits.

I distinguish the major: those acts do not produce habits unless wholly like those habits from which they are generated, I deny: in some respect, I concede. But habits generated through supernatural acts are like to infused habits, not indeed according to the aspect of supernaturality, but according to the aspect of inclination and determination of the potency to tending toward the object: for this suffices, that they formally incline the potency to eliciting some act concerning the formal object of such supernatural acts, abstracting from the aspect of natural, or supernatural; for by this very fact that the potency is so inclined, it is sufficiently determined to eliciting that act easily.

You will object 2. Acquired faith and infused faith are distinguished no less than science and opinion: but science cannot beget the habit of opinion, nor opinion the habit of science: therefore assent of faith elicited on account of the authority of God cannot generate the habit of believing on account of human authority alone.

I deny the major, and the reason of the disparity is, that opinion and science have entirely distinct formal objects, but infused and acquired faith are not distinguished by formal objects; since both tend to the same formal object, namely, to the thing revealed to be believed on account of the authority of God: for it would be absurd to say that one could not by the powers of nature believe something to be true because it is revealed by God, just as he can believe something to be true when he judges that man truthful who said it, for without doubt the revelation of God, probabilistically known, is a stronger motive to induce a man to believe, than the revelation of a man. Add that, if one could not for the same motive believe by human faith and divine faith, but would necessarily have to be moved by another motive to believe by human faith, and by another by divine faith, it would follow that he could also know when he was moved by one motive, and when by the other; and consequently he could know when he elicited an act of supernatural faith, or when he elicited only an act of acquired faith; and thus by parity of reason he could distinctly know when he had supernatural charity, and when he did not have it, and in consequence he could know certainly without any revelation that he was in the state of grace, or not; which certainly we shall demonstrate to be erroneous when treating of justifying grace. Therefore acquired faith and infused faith can be concerned about the same formal object, and through the same motive. Which is confirmed moreover: for God could reveal to a man, or to the Church, that to relieve a poor man, v. g. would be honest with natural honesty, revealing nothing about the particular honesty which it would have inasmuch as it conduces to eternal life; in which case the will could tend through the natural habit of mercy to that act: therefore a natural habit can tend to an object known by natural faith alone.