Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

Note 1. That falsity can be conceived as able to inhere in the object of faith arises from a twofold head: first indeed, on the part of God speaking and revealing, if namely He were to lie and propose false things for true; secondly, on the part of man believing, if certainly human faith could incline the believer so that he firmly judged something to have been revealed by God which was not so; such that one be moved by divine faith to elicit an assent that is false and erroneous. Now there was once the blasphemy of the Priscillianists, so called from Priscillian Bishop of Abula, who said with shameless mouth that God can be the author of lying and falsity, that from this they might conclude it lawful not only to lie, but even to confirm a lie by oath for the sake of concealing a secret; whence this saying was current among them: swear, forswear, betray not the secret. Although all Catholics execrated that impiety, nevertheless there were not wanting some Doctors who, while they granted that God by ordinary power can in no way lie or say what is false, yet judged that by absolute power He could do this, whether per se or through others. So taught Gabriel, in 3. dist. 12. question 1.; Peter of Ailly, in 1. question 12.; and Holcot, in 2. dist. 5. Yet they seem to temper that opinion thus, that, to decline the odium of the word lying, they do not admit that God can lie; because, says Gabriel, a lie signifies a false statement with some disorder and moral malice; but God, even if He said what is false, would do nothing morally evil, and therefore would not lie.

Note 2. To lie is nothing else than to say something knowingly otherwise than we perceive it: so S. Augustine in the Enchiridion, chap. 18., who there collects that to lie is not the same as to say what is false: one can say what is false without lying, since he doubtless judges it to be true; and therefore, since he does not speak against his mind, he also does not lie; seeing that to lie is to go against the mind: on the contrary, one can say what is true who nonetheless truly lies, because evidently that which he utters is indeed true, yet he judged it to be false, and therefore knowingly said otherwise than he perceived; which truth S. Augustine luminously expounds there in these words:

Better is he who unknowingly says what is false, thinking it true, than he who knowingly bears the will to deceive, not knowing that what he says is true; for the former has not one thing in his mind and another in his word; but in the latter, whatever in itself may be the thing he says, nevertheless one thing is shut up in his breast and another ready on his tongue, which is the proper evil of the liar.

From which it may be inferred that a twofold falsity can be distinguished in words, namely material and formal. Material falsity is when someone, thinking true what he says, is deceived and deceives, on which account indeed no lie is committed, but perhaps levity and rashness in speaking, which involves some mark or malice of lying. Formal falsity, however, is when someone, knowing that what he says is false, affirms and vends it as true; or knowing it to be true, denies it, in which formally consists the reason and malice of the lie. Moreover, in God there is no place for deception or material falsity; for since God cannot be deceived, but necessarily knows all that is true, hence it follows that He cannot speak what is false without lying, and speaking against His mind.

Note 3. That God can be conceived to lie through others in three ways: first indeed properly, namely by commanding someone to announce false things for true in his own name, or in the name of God Himself speaking; secondly, by stimulating and inciting him thereto by some interior motion, not otherwise than by his grace preventing us He raises us to certain good works; thirdly, by producing in him either the habit of lying, whereby he is moved and has facility to say false things for true, or by producing in his intellect a false assent. Which again can be conceived possible in two ways: first indeed, producing it in the intellect by Himself alone; in which case the intellect would understand passively through Him, but not actively; secondly, so that He concur with the intellect in a special manner for its production, determining him toward it, on which account He causes in him preventing graces and similar true illuminations, which although physically produced also by the intellect, yet because God is their principal cause, and man does not concur in them freely, are attributed to God alone as their absolute cause. Whence the Canon of Orange, Can. 20., says: God does many good things in man which man does not do, namely acting in a moral manner and freely, or else in such wise that they ought to be imputed to man.

First Conclusion. — IT CONFLICTS WITH GOD TO LIE BOTH THROUGH HIMSELF AND THROUGH OTHERS, EVEN BY EXTRAORDINARY POWER. This is the common teaching among Catholic Doctors.

And it is proved by open texts of Scripture. First indeed, Num. 23.: God is not as a man, that he should lie: nor as the son of man, that he should be changed. Hath he said, and not done? hath he spoken, and not fulfilled? From which testimony three things may be inferred: First, that God cannot only not lie with that lie which would be sin, but cannot even say what is false; otherwise this reasoning of the Prophet would be null: God cannot lie: therefore what He promised He will fulfil; for one might answer that God indeed cannot lie, yet can say and promise what is false; and consequently from His very promise it would not follow that the thing is to be posited. Second, that there it is affirmed that lying conflicts with God no less than change: it is impossible for God to be changed even by absolute power: therefore it is likewise impossible for Him to lie. Third, which may be inferred, is that when God is compared with man in respect of the repugnance of lying, He is not compared in respect of act; for there are certain men who de facto have not lied, as is evident of the Blessed Virgin and S. John the Baptist: but that comparison is made in respect of capacity, because the nature of God is not capable of a lie, as human nature is; whence by antonomasia God in holy Scripture is called truthful; but man a liar: so John 8.: He that sent me is true. To the Romans 3.: But God is true: but every man a liar. — It is confirmed from that passage to the Hebrews 6., where the Apostle says: Willing God to show more abundantly to the heirs of the promise the immutability of his counsel, interposed an oath: that by two immutable things, in which it is impossible for God to lie, we might have the strongest comfort: by which the Apostle signifies both the promise of God and the oath to be two immutable things, in which it is impossible for God to lie, both in promise and in oath: wherefore Christ the Lord, Luke 21., used to say: Heaven and earth shall pass away: but my words shall not pass away: for it is just as if He said: heaven and earth could fail, doubtless by absolute power, for by ordinary power they shall not fail.

It is proved secondly by the authority of the Holy Fathers, who with common consent teach that it is as impossible for God to lie as for God not to be, or not to be omnipotent. Thus S. Denis, chap. 8. On the Divine Names: A lie about oneself, he says, is a lapse from truth, it is a lapse from that which is; but God cannot lapse from that which is: as if he said, the negation of truth is a withdrawal from being: but God cannot withdraw from being: therefore neither from truth. Similarly S. Athanasius in the book On the Incarnation of the Word infers that therefore a lie cannot be found in God, because otherwise He would not be God. It is absurd, he says, to say that God can lie; for if He said that we are to perish, He would not be God, if we did not perish. Which consequence S. Anselm approves, book 1. Cur Deus homo, chap. 12., saying: For it does not follow, he says, that it is just to lie if God wills to lie: but rather that that God is not: For the will can by no means will to lie unless in it truth has been corrupted: nay, which has been corrupted by deserting truth. And he subjoins: Therefore when it is said: If God wills to lie: it is nothing else than if God is of such a nature as wills to lie, and therefore it does not follow that a lie is just, unless it be understood as we say of two impossibles: if this is, that is: because neither this nor that is. — Nor does it avail to reply that S. Anselm speaks only of a lie as including malice, on which account it conflicts with God; for he rather proves that the matter itself of lying could not be found in God without malice and turpitude: for he says that act cannot come to be from the fact that God wills it: therefore he judges it cannot be separated from turpitude. Which again the reason he adduces explains, because the will cannot will to lie unless in it truth has been corrupted: which corruption of truth he supposes to conflict with the divine will, because otherwise the will, deserting truth, would be corrupted; therefore according to the mind of S. Anselm the very corruption of truth also conflicts with God, and therefore a lie conflicts with Him. — S. Ambrose demonstrates the same impossibility from the repugnance of lying with the omnipotence of God. That impossibility, he says, is one not of weakness but of virtue and Majesty, because truth admits no lie, nor the power of God the error of untruth. To him subscribes S. Augustine: God is omnipotent, and although He is omnipotent, He cannot die, cannot be deceived, cannot lie. How many things He cannot, and is omnipotent! and therefore He is omnipotent because He cannot: for if He could die, He would not be omnipotent: if He could lie, be deceived, act unjustly, He would not be omnipotent; nay, if this were in Him, He would not have been worthy to be omnipotent. In the same sense speaks Chrysostom, Homily I. on the Symbol. You believe, he says, in God omnipotent, of whose power His inability cannot be found unable: yet He cannot something, to wit, be deceived, deceive, lie. But it is certain that not even by absolute power can He be deceived: therefore in the same way He cannot deceive. Which he repeats again in book I. On Providence after the middle. Likewise Bernard, Sermon on All Saints: God can neither be deceived nor deceive.

The reason also lends its support. First indeed, lying and falsity conflict with God no less than sin: but sin absolutely conflicts with God: therefore also lying. The minor is evident: for God neither sins nor can sin, as we sufficiently proved in the second volume treating of divine Sanctity. The major is proved: therefore God cannot sin, because He is intrinsically and essentially holy: but He is also intrinsically and essentially true and truthful, because He is the first Truth, to which every lie and all falsity conflict: since a lie is a deviation from truth: but the first truth cannot be derived from truth: otherwise it would deviate from itself, and thus would not be the first and unfailing truth. Just as it would not be the first holiness, nor holy formally and intrinsically, if it could sin: for every sin is a deviation from rectitude and sanctity: therefore God can neither sin nor say what is false. — It is confirmed: if God could lie by any power whatsoever, He would not be supreme veracity, just as He would not be supreme goodness if He could act badly: for that truth and goodness would be greater which by no power could stray from the true and the right: but it is absurd to assert that God has not that truth and goodness than which a greater cannot be conceived: therefore, etc. — Furthermore, infinite authority in speaking, to whom the highest faith is owed, is truly a perfection simply simple, which is surely destroyed by the contrary, since even among men it is something unworthy to hold such authority, that one may be believed with fear: but this infinite authority in speaking would not be in God if He could in any way lie: therefore just as it is impossible that God lack any perfection simply simple, so it is impossible that He lie. Finally, if by absolute power God could lie, our whole faith would be changed, nor would the authority of holy Scripture be most constant and undoubted: for we most surely believe it because God revealed the things contained in it: but if in truth God could lie, whence would it be certain to us that He spoke truly, when He revealed this or that part of Scripture? Therefore either our faith is doubtful, or it is impossible for God to lie.

From these things, moreover, it is evident that just as God cannot lie or deceive by Himself, so neither through others who speak in His name; for if God had not the same incapacity of deceiving or saying what is false through others, the authority of sacred Scripture would be dubious and tottering, seeing that God Himself is He who spoke through the sacred Writers, and therefore Luke 1. and to the Hebrews 1. God is said to have spoken through the mouths of the Prophets, and in each case equally God is said to speak, that is, both per se and through ministers; hence where it is said Exodus 3. that God appeared to Moses and spoke to him in the flame of the burning bush, S. Stephen, Acts 7., said that God spoke to Moses through an Angel; for it is the same thing to speak by Himself as by an Angel delegated by Him: therefore by the same reason that God cannot lie and say what is false by Himself, it is established that He cannot lie either through an Angel or through another. It is confirmed: because just as it holds materially only that one speak by words, signs, or writing, since the obligation of telling or signifying or writing the truth is the same, so entirely materially it holds that God speak both per se immediately and through His messenger; seeing that the messenger delegated by Him is merely His instrument, just as Scripture or other signs which He uses: wherefore David called his tongue the pen of a scribe writing swiftly: therefore, etc.

You will object 1. Diverse texts of Scripture in which God is said to lead the wicked into fraud and error. Thus Job 12.: Who changeth the heart of princes, and deceiveth them, and maketh them to err as drunkards. And 1. to the Thessalonians 2.: The same (God) shall send them the operation of error, that they may believe a lie. And 3. Kings 22.: The Lord gave a spirit of lying in the mouth of all thy prophets; and there the Lord says to the spirit of lying: Thou shalt deceive, and prevail: go forth, and do so; similarly Ezechiel 14. God says: If the prophet shall err, and speak a word, I the Lord have deceived that prophet. And that passage of Jeremias 20.: Thou hast seduced me, O Lord, and I was seduced; thou hast been stronger than I, and hast prevailed. — I answer, in all these places the word deceive or seduce is used not actively, as if God commanded a lie, or impelled and led anyone into error and falsity; but only passively or permissively, inasmuch as God permits someone to be deceived in punishment of sins, and does not hinder or restrain him who is prompt and ready to be deceived; for it is not ⟦illegible: raw OCR “intrequens”⟧ in holy Scripture that to command and to permit are used for the same thing, as we have said many times elsewhere, which manifestly appears from the Evangelists. For Mark 10., when the Pharisees had said to Christ the Lord: Moses permitted a bill of divorce to be written: Christ the Lord answered: Because of the hardness of your heart he wrote you this precept. The same is read Matthew 19.; for when the Pharisees had said: Why then did Moses command to give a bill of divorce? Christ answered: He permitted you to put away your wife. From these texts compared together it appears that the words to command and to permit are taken indifferently for one and the same thing.

You will object 2. Likewise diverse texts of Scripture in which it appears that men inspired by the Spirit of God were sometimes liars: whence it follows that God can at least through ministers lie or assert what is false. Thus Genesis 22. Abraham, about to ascend the mountain to immolate his son Isaac, said to his servants: Wait ye here with the ass: I and the boy will hasten thither, and after we have worshipped, we will return to you: which was a certain promise, yet false and mendacious: for since by divine precept he ought to immolate his son, he could not without lying assert that Isaac would return with him. Similarly in the same place, chap. 20., Abraham urged his wife to assert before the Egyptians that she was his sister: Say, he says, that thou art my sister. And chap. 27. Jacob seems to have lied when he said to his Father: I am Esau thy firstborn. Many other like things are to be found in the Prophets, whose predictions were very many times false and mendacious. Such was the Prophecy of Jonas, when he said chap. 3.: Yet forty days, and Ninive shall be destroyed. And Isaias, who in 4. Kings chap. 20. said to Ezechias the King: Thou shalt die, and shalt not live; who nevertheless survived fifteen years, and so of many others.

Some answer, that it does not seem unfitting to admit that those personages celebrated in Scripture sometimes committed some slight lie, seeing that various of them sinned most gravely, which kind of lie the Subtle Doctor noted in 3. dist. 38. num. 13., concerning the deed of Jacob; for those most holy men did not always speak by divine instinct and aid. But because S. Augustine and others everywhere exempt the holy Patriarchs from the guilt of lying, therefore I answer to the first with the same S. Augustine, in the book ⟦De Mendacio?⟧, chap.

1. Abraham spoke those words in a prophetic spirit: I and the boy will return to you: for he hoped that his son after his immolation and death was to be recalled to life, that the divine promise might be fulfilled whereby God had promised that He would multiply his seed as the stars of heaven, and as the sand which is on the seashore: which truth S. Paul indicates when he says, to the Hebrews
2. By faith Abraham offered up his son Isaac, reckoning that God was able to raise him up even from the dead.

To the second we shall say with the same S. Augustine in the Questions on Genesis, that when Abraham said Sara was his sister, he willed the truth to be concealed, not a lie to be told: for she is called sister because she was the daughter of his father: whence Abraham himself says, Genesis 20.: Truly she is my sister, the daughter of my father, and not of my mother.

To the third we shall say that Jacob did not lie when he said: I am Esau thy firstborn: because what he said of Esau was true not as to person and substance, but as to the right and dignity of the firstborn, because the birthright was owed to him by right, and that on a twofold title: first indeed by divine decree, since God had revealed that the elder should serve the younger: secondly by human law, since he had purchased the birthright for a price from Esau: whence he could without lying present himself before his Father in place of Esau the firstborn, that he might receive his blessing due to the firstborn.

But to the last I say that prophecies are sometimes made only by way of commination, ⟦illegible: ut … si penitentiam egerit …, agam poenitentiam super malo quod ego rogitarabam facere⟧: whence since the Ninevites did penance at the preaching of Jonas, it is no wonder that God did not inflict upon them punishments untried. Sometimes indeed prophecies are made and things are foretold as future according to the order and disposition of natural causes, unless God suspend such order by extraordinary power. Whence Ezechias the King truly was about to die by reason of the pressing infirmity, unless God had restored health to him by a miracle and prolonged his life to a longer term.

You will object. 3. He who can speak equivocally and amphibologically can also lie: but God can speak amphibologically and equivocally both through Himself and through others: therefore also lie. The major is evident: for equivocation is a certain species of lying; since it is ordained to deceive and to instill a sense opposed to truth just as the lie itself is; for it matters nothing whether the words of the speaker signify something other than what he has in mind, or whether I perceive something other from the words of the speaker, if in each case I am equally deceived. But the minor is proved: since Christ the Lord truly seems to have used equivocal words: thus Mark 13., being asked by the Disciples concerning the time of the consummation of the world and the advent of the Judge, he answered: Of that day and hour no one knoweth, neither the angels in heaven, nor the Son. And yet He Himself knew it most well. Likewise John 7., when his brethren, or kinsmen, urged him: Go up hither, and go into Judaea, namely Jerusalem, as to the theater of the world, that thy disciples also, or students of thy doctrine, who are there, may see thy works which thou dost, &c. Manifest thyself to the world. Christ answered: My time is not yet come, &c. go ye up unto this festival day: but I do not go up unto this festival day. And yet, as his brethren asserted, at that very time He went up to the festival. With the same restriction the Angel Raphael seems to have spoken, Tobias 5., when, being asked, Of what house, or of what tribe art thou? he answered: I am Azarias, the son of the great Ananias; whereas before, answering Tobias the younger, he had said he was of the sons of Israel.

I answer. First, that one can use an amphibological voice, or equivocation, in two ways. First formally, namely intending by the words to signify another true sense, yet diverse from that which the hearers here and now conceive and think to be signified, such that there are no circumstances present from which the hearer could arrive at knowledge of the signification or sense of the words intended by the speaker. Secondly materially, when evidently there are certain circumstances from which the hearer can conceive what is the genuine sense of the words uttered by the speaker; especially when the hearer is a prudent and sagacious man; although perhaps on account of a defect of attention to the words of the speaker, and likewise consideration of those circumstances, he does not perceive the mind expressed by the speaker in equivocal words. Whence to the argument I say that God can by no means use equivocal words with formal amphibology; for this is a species of lying; for such speech, taken precisely in itself, is simply false, nor can it have a true sense by reason of the intention of the speaker or of a merely internal oration, which the speaker subintelliges, because unless this be in some way outwardly expressed, one cannot with the external conceive the internal oration, nor change its signification, nor consequently effect that that signification, which in itself is false, become true; and presently it can by no reason have a true signification, nor a legitimate sense. Add that veracity obliges us, not indeed to conform our mind to the mind, for that is supernatural and cannot otherwise be done; but to conform our words to our mind; so that nothing else appear in the words than what is in the mind of the speaker; for if they express the contrary, it is done against veracity; if they express the same thing, it is done fully enough for veracity. Which indeed will appear most true if you attend to the obligation of veracity, which since it is induced by the necessity of preserving human faith, so necessary for intercourse and political commerce, ought no less to have forbidden those mental restrictions than lying; for entirely the same inconveniences would arise from those restrictions as from lying. Since indeed all hearers would equally doubt whether the speaker added beyond the external words a mental restriction, whereby a sense contrary to that sense which the words would per se express was contained, just as they could doubt the truth if they told a lie, and consequently the prohibition of lying would be altogether useless; since he who would not dare to lie on account of the prohibition would use exactly the same words which liars used, and those words, with that mental restriction added, would obtain the same end as lying: therefore by the reason that God cannot lie either per se or through others, so neither can He use formal amphibological equivocation. He can indeed use material equivocation, because although he who thus speaks utters words in a particular and not common sense, yet by the very fact that circumstances are present which can indicate that particular sense to the hearer, there arises not on the part of the speaker, nor of his words, that the hearer take those words in another sense, but from the defect of the hearer himself, who will not employ that diligence and attention necessary for the circumstances, which could with easy labor indicate the genuine sense of the words intended by the speaker. These things premised, I answer to the first example, that Christ the Lord, in that reply whereby He told His Disciples He knew not the day of judgment, used only material equivocation; for from the circumstance of the person uttering this reply, the Apostols could tacitly judge that He did not deny that He absolutely knew the day of judgment; since many times He had told them that He had all that the Father had, and that He was truly the Son of God, and consequently had with the Father infinite science of all things; but that He spoke only with some restriction, indeed not expressed in words, but yet sufficiently to be understood from the condition of the person speaking. Add that Christ in that place wished to signify that He had been sent as legate by the Father to us: therefore just as a legate truly says he knows not that which anyone more curiously asks, because they are judged only to ask communication of that knowledge which the legate could communicate, nor ought he conceal in silence; so Christ the Lord said He knew not the day of judgment, which He ought to have concealed; wherefore again, questioned about that day, He restrained the curiosity of the questioners, Acts 1., saying: It is not for you to know the times or moments which the Father hath put in his own power.

To the second likewise I say, that Christ the Lord, answering his kinsmen that He would not go up to the festival day, used an equivocation not formal but material, namely according to the circumstance of their petition: for they asked Him to ascend publicly and openly: for they said: Go up hither, and go into Judaea, that thy disciples also may see thy works which thou dost. For no man doth anything in secret, and he seeketh himself to be in open; if thou do these things, manifest thyself to the world. Therefore in the same sense Christ answered that He did not ascend: which is not a restriction of the mind, but a retention of the sense proposed by the askers, just as if they asked, sup with us, and He answered, I will not sup, there being understood with you. Others add that nondum ascendo must be read there, or as others wish, non ascendo nunc, as other grave Interpreters have. Whence Christ said significantly: Go ye up unto this festival day: but I ascend not, that is, to this festival day, or to the first, or to the second day of the festival; since He ascended to Jerusalem only on the 1. day. From these things it is evident that Christ the Lord did not use a mental restriction in that reply; but made it with words signifying the truth, especially in those circumstances. — To the third I say that the Angel Raphael, in saying of himself that he was Azarias the son of the great Ananias, and also of the sons of Israel, lied in no way: for those words could bear a twofold sense, namely that he was such by genus and nativity, or by office and duty. For first he says of himself that he is of the sons of Israel, either because all the just are reckoned under the name of Israelites, or because Israil is interpreted seeing God: but the Angels always enjoy the intuitive vision of God; or because he had been destined specially by God to the guardianship of the Israelites. And truly he spoke when he named himself Azarias the son of the great Ananias; for Azarias signifies the help of God. Such indeed was Raphael according to office; since he bestowed most many signs and benefits of divine help upon Tobias himself, and also upon his wife and parents: for he led and brought back young Tobias sound, preserved him unharmed from the invading sea-monster, drove away the devil that beset the chamber of Sara and killed men joined to her in marriage, saw to the receipt of the money owed by Gabelus, and long ago restored sight to blind Tobias the elder; therefore he is deservedly called Azarias, or help from God. By like reason he also rightly called himself the son of the great Ananias. For Ananias signifies the grace of God, or the mercy of God. And since God is the Father of mercies, and Angels are called sons of God, Job 1. and Daniel 3., he rightfully vindicated to himself such a name.

Second Conclusion. — FALSENESS ALSO CANNOT INHERE IN FAITH ON THE PART OF THE BELIEVER.

The Conclusion is proved: if falsehood could inhere in faith, then chiefly either because some revelation could be proposed to us as divine, although in truth it were not such; toward believing which nevertheless theological faith would incline no less than if such revelation were truly divine; or because faith would incline to giving assent to a conclusion drawn from two premises, of which one were revealed, the other indeed natural and false, which nevertheless we should judge to be true: but in neither case would theological faith incline to that assent: therefore falsehood cannot inhere in it per accidens on the part of the believer. The major is evident: for scarcely can any other head be assigned whence that inclination of faith to a false assent should be sought. But the minor is proved: divine faith cannot in any way incline to a false and erroneous assent: but if it inclined to one or other of the aforementioned assents, it would truly tend of itself, at least partially, to eliciting a false assent: therefore, etc. The minor is evident: for the act whereby one believes something false is truly a false and erroneous assent, although he holds that falsehood for true; for that erroneous judgment cannot effect that what is in itself false be true. But the major is proved: first indeed by the authority of sacred Scripture and the Holy Fathers, from whom it is established that faith is a certain cognition, and consequently true. Thus Acts 26.: According to the most sure proof of our religion.

And 2. to Timothy 1.: I know whom I have believed, and I am certain, etc. Hence the Council of Trent, Session 6. chapter 9., reproving the vain confidence of heretics, says:

Whilst every one looks to himself, and to his own weakness and indisposition, he may fear and tremble about his own grace, since no man can know with the certitude of faith, which cannot be subject to falsehood, that he has obtained the grace of God.

The Holy Fathers confirm the same; for S. Basil, in the Moral Rule 80. chapter 21., says: Faith is the most certain completion of the soul concerning the truth of the words spoken. Chrysostom, Homily 21. on chapter 11. to the Hebrews: Faith, he says, cannot be called faith unless one has had certitude about the things that are not seen, more than about the things that are seen. Similarly S. Bernard, Epistle 190.: Faith, he says, is not opinion, but subsists in certain truth. From all which it may be inferred that every act of faith is a certain cognition, and consequently true: for certitude is the firm adhesion of the intellect assenting, and the necessary connection of the assent itself with the truth of the object proposed: therefore where the assent cannot be true, neither can it be certain: and consequently there will not be the assent of faith, which, since it must necessarily of itself be certain, conflicts with its being exercised about a false object.

Proof is given besides by reason: a true and perfect virtue cannot incline toward that which is evil in itself: but erroneous and false assent is evil in itself: therefore theological faith cannot incline toward it. The major stands: both because, as St. Augustine says, book 2. De Libero Arbitrio, cap. 19, Virtue is a good quality, which no one uses badly; and because, according to Aristotle and all Philosophers and Theologians, every virtue disposes a power toward its best, for it pertains in order to its object; whence just as moral virtue, which is in the will or appetite, perfects it and disposes it to the good, which is the best of that appetite, so intellectual virtue¹ ought to perfect the understanding unto the true, which is the best of the intellective power: therefore since infused faith by its essence is an intellectual virtue, it must so necessarily incline toward true acts that inclination toward false and erroneous ones altogether conflicts with it. — Next, if faith could be a principle of false and erroneous assent, it would follow that God could be the cause, at least mediate, of falsehood and error: but the consequent is seen to be false from the first Conclusion: therefore also that from which it is inferred. The major is plain: for just as if natural light, or the habit of first principles, inclined toward false assent, God would be reckoned at least the mediate cause of that assent, since He Himself bestows such light and the habit of first principles, as author of nature, so likewise He would have to be reckoned the author of false and erroneous assent, if faith could incline toward it, because He Himself infuses that habit, as author of grace: but it conflicts with God being even the mediate cause of false assent: therefore faith cannot incline toward false assent. — Finally, the habit of theological virtue is as it were a property of sanctifying grace belonging to the faculties of man constituted in the state of an adopted son of God by that same sanctifying grace, and the same are not given to that habit from its nature except for acts whereby man can merit the inheritance and eternal glory; whence the habit of faith is infused, that it may be the first and necessary beginning of all merit, not that man may be able to merit his salvation by supernatural acts proportioned to a supernatural end: yet faith could not be such if it could incline into false assent. For if it could elicit a false act or assent, by that act it could also be a principle of a proportionate supernatural act, which would be meritorious of eternal salvation, even if that act were false and did not proceed from a true revelation of God. Therefore faith cannot incline into false assent.

You will say 1. Sophistical doctrine is from God: but that inclines toward the false and leads into error: ergo it does not conflict that faith, inasmuch as it is infused by God, should incline toward erroneous assent. — I distinguish the minor: sophistical doctrine leads into error per se, I deny; per accidens, I concede. For sophistical doctrine per se is ordered only toward uncovering and guarding against fallacious discourses and the fallacies of reasoning, lest anyone, taking the probable for the true, be deceived: whence it is per accidens that one who knows that doctrine uses it to deceive and mislead the less cautious, and consequently if any deception is wrought through that doctrine, it will rather have to be charged against the teacher himself than against the doctrine.

You will say 2. The acts of other supernatural and moral virtues can be exercised about some fictitious and false object: ergo by equal reason faith will be able to incline toward assent concerning what someone believes to have been revealed by God, although de facto it is not so; and thereupon faith will be able to incline toward false assent on the part of the believer. The consequence stands from the parity of reason. The antecedent is proved by various examples: namely, when out of religion we adore a host not consecrated, which we truly judge consecrated; when from a motive of mercy we give alms to one who truly does not need such succor; when out of obedience we fast, thinking fasting is commanded, whereas it is not so; when out of justice we pay what we falsely think is owed to another. Likewise when we love and venerate a hypocritical man on account of the holiness which we falsely believe to be in him; again, if someone believed God was to be seen with bodily eyes, and hoped that this would come to pass. — I answer, denying the consequence: and the reason of the disparity is between intellectual and moral virtues, for the latter are exercised about truth; hence their whole perfection consists in conformity with the object, from which truth or falsity in the understanding is immediately derived; but the virtues of the will or moral virtues are exercised about the good proposed; and their perfection consists in conformity with the object, not as it is on the side of the thing, but as it is proposed by reason: for then the will operates well when it conforms itself to the dictate of reason, whether the internal object be truly good or not on the side of the thing. Whence the virtue of the will can sometimes be exercised about the false represented by the understanding as a true good, because then it conforms to its rule, namely the dictate of reason. But an intellectual virtue cannot be exercised about the false; for thus it would not conform to its rule, which is nothing other than the truth of the object.

You will say 3. It can happen that some Pastor or Bishop proposes to the people committed to him something to be believed as of divine faith which nevertheless would not be such, as has often been done by Pastors who lapsed into heresy and error: but in that case the rude common people would truly believe that proposed tenet; not indeed with human faith, since it would be proposed as an object of divine faith, and thereupon they would believe it with divine faith: therefore it can happen that divine faith per accidens, and from a presupposed false estimation, inclines into false assent. — I answer, granting the major, denying the minor: for in that case the rude people would not give assent with divine faith to the false object proposed by the Pastor, but only with human faith; for since divine faith is an intellectual virtue, which always tends to the true, just as moral virtue always tends to the good, therefore when truth fails in the object, the act whereby the understanding tends to it cannot be an act of perfect virtue, such as faith is. Yet I confess that in the said case the rustic, or any other of the laity, has a pious affection of the will, indeed a supernatural one, whereby he is prepared to believe with divine faith that mystery proposed to him, if it were true; by reason of which disposition and affection it can happen that, while giving assent even to a false object, he truly merits; but I deny that on that account he elicits an act of divine faith regarding the object proposed to him.

You insist. That rustic who thus assents experiences the same facility when he gives assent to the false object proposed by a heretical Pastor as he experiences in believing the true articles proposed by the same Pastor; but it would not be so unless he tended by the same habit of divine faith toward each article, both true and false: therefore with the same faith he believes the false object, which he judges to be true. — I deny the minor: for that facility does not proceed from the habit of infused faith, but acquired; because infused habits do not confer facility upon the power, but only supernatural virtue, that it may be able to produce supernatural acts. Therefore all the facility which anyone experiences in believing objects proposed, whether true or false, proceeds from the acquired habit of faith, whereby anyone is inclined to elicit acts of assent concerning the object proposed as revealed by God, whether meanwhile it be truly revealed by God or not.

You will urge. That assent is truly elicited by divine faith which has the divine veracity for its motive and formal object: but the assent given to a false object, which is judged revealed by God, is elicited no less on account of the divine veracity than is the assent which would be given to a true object: therefore truly that assent proceeds from divine faith; and thereupon divine faith can incline into the false. — I distinguish the major: if along with the motive it have the other conditions necessary for an act of divine faith, I concede; otherwise, I deny. And likewise the minor being distinguished, I deny the consequence. For an act, although elicited on account of the divine truth, still cannot be reckoned an act of theological and supernatural faith, since it is not an act of virtue but of vice, and of a defect of the understanding; rather it is only an act of acquired faith, which usually remains even in heretics, who erring about some article indeed lose the habit of infused faith, yet preserve the same facility and the same habit of acquired faith concerning other articles about which there is no controversy.

You will say 1. A syllogism can occur in which one of the premises will be true and of faith, the other however false, from which the conclusion drawn will be false, v. g. from these two premises: What is of duplex nature is duplex person: but in Christ there is duplex nature: a false and heretical conclusion is inferred: ergo in Christ there is duplex person. But toward the assent to that false conclusion both premises concur, as a twofold partial cause toward producing the same effect: ergo since one of them is of faith, the habit of faith seems at least partially to influence and concur toward eliciting that false assent. - I deny the minor: for the assent given to the conclusion of this syllogism is not elicited even partially by the proposition of faith, but only by the natural proposition, through perverse ratiocination and the application of an understanding wrongly twisting the true proposition, true and of faith, toward the false and erroneous conclusion; since indeed the true per se can neither incline nor tend into the false; whence if any assent proceed from the side of faith, it will be only material, not formal, namely insofar as faith inclines the understanding to believe the true proposition, namely that in Christ there is duplex nature, but it does not incline toward assent to the false conclusion, because that falsity arises only from the side of the understanding wrongly applying the premises to elicit that erroneous conclusion.

You ask whether God can cause false assent, either actual or habitual, that is, whether God can produce in a created understanding either an erroneous act, or at least a habit inclining toward the production of such acts? — I answer, that the more recent Theologians go off into various opinions about this resolution: For first, Medina q. 12. quaest. 21. Suarez, ibidem Tract. 4. sect. 2. and disp. 3. De fide, sect. 5. Turrian., 2. 2. dist. 3. dub. 1. Coninch., disp. 10. De fide, dub. 2. n. 30. hold that God cannot infuse a habit of error, and consequently they must hold that He cannot immediately infuse the very act of error; for it is more unbecoming to Him to infuse the latter than the habit. Second, Vasquez d. 90. cap. 1. and certain others contend that God, by His absolute power, by Himself alone infuses both the act and the habit of error, upon the hypothesis that a vital act can be produced by God alone without any concurrence of a second cause. Smeising., Tract. 2. De Deo, disp. 5. num. 275. judges that God can indeed infuse an erroneous habit, but not an act. Vasquez however disp. 90. cap. 1. Arriaga, tract. De fide, disp. 1. sect. 5. Poncius in the Commentary, ad 3. dist. 38. num. 29. Henriquez., disp. 3. quaest. 2. n. 13. and following teach that neither conflicts with God, upon the hypothesis that it does not conflict with God that He be able, per se alone and without any concurrence of a second cause, to produce a vital act. With these and other Scotists we subscribe.

Proof first concerning the habit: both because God can conserve an erroneous habit in the understanding by Himself alone, and that with a concurrence not only universal, as Coninch concedes, but even particular; for whenever God conserves anything by Himself alone, He performs this not only with universal concurrence, but also particular: for He conserves it without any particular second cause, as is supposed; and consequently He supplies the particular concurrence of the second cause: but whenever God thus stands related to an effect, He acts not only with universal concurrence, but also particular; because His concurrence then is not determined by any individual second cause, but the divine will determines itself immediately and specially to producing or conserving such an effect: ergo by equal reason God can produce an erroneous habit. Next, if the production of such a habit conflicted with God, it would be chiefly either on account of the physical or the moral imperfection of the effect produced: but neither can be said. Not indeed on account of physical imperfection; for God can produce many things physically, and imperfect as to entity. Nor on account of moral defect, both because that erroneous habit could conduce to the acquisition of eternal life even directly; nay more, one who would erroneously judge that something conduces to eternal life which truly would not conduce, and on that account would do it in the state of grace, without doubt would merit, and toward that merit that erroneous estimation would tend no less than if it had been true: since indeed in performing these things he would operate from an affection of pleasing and obeying God: therefore that erroneous act would be meritorious, and consequently the habit inclining toward it would conduce directly to eternal life; and because probable cognitions, or habits conducing to generating cognitions of that kind, can be infused by God: but among probable cognitions some are doubtless false, whenever namely both contradictories are probable: ergo God can be the per se cause of a false act, and consequently of an erroneous habit.

Proof also concerning the act: both because God can place before someone a stone or wood with such accidents that he would judge that stone to be a dragon: therefore God can cause an act of error by concurring with the understanding toward that act. The consequence is plain: for he who per se gives the occasion of some effect being produced, intending that such an effect be produced, and elsewhere concurs with the faculty toward eliciting such an act, is reckoned not only the physical cause, but also the moral cause, of the act. And because no repugnance appears thence; for if that conflicted, it would be chiefly because God would thence be reckoned the cause of error; accordingly He could deceive someone, which assuredly conflicts with God, who can neither be deceived nor deceive: but it would not be so, chiefly if that act were thus produced by God alone in the understanding, so that the latter would stand entirely passive, so that through that act the understanding would not become understanding and knowing, as the adversaries will; for then the understanding would not be reckoned to err more than a stone, if such an act were produced in it by God, as the Scotists judge possible: therefore it does not conflict with God to produce such an erroneous act.

You will say 1. God, since He is supremely good and holy, cannot lead into sin, nor produce by Himself alone a sinful act: ergo similarly, since He is supremely true and truthful, He cannot lead into error, nor produce an erroneous act. - I deny the consequence: and the reason of the disparity is that God, producing a sinful act or habit, would act badly and perversely against right reason and the rectitude of His will: for sin is nothing else than a deflection and swerving from the rectitude of the divine will and from the commandments or laws prescribed by it: but by producing error in another, or by willing that another err, God Himself would not on that account be reckoned to err: just as by causing death in another, He Himself is not said to die. Whence in this case God would not be said to act against the reason of His infinite truth, as He would act against His goodness if He produced a sinful habit or act: for the infinite truth of God formally consists in this, that nothing can be hidden from Him: and thereupon that He can neither be deceived in knowing, nor deceive in speaking; but to produce an erroneous act or habit is not thus to be deceived or to deceive; because by that production it is not signified that God knows things otherwise than they are, or that He signifies them otherwise in speaking than He truly knows them. Whence there is no parity, since it conflicts with infinite goodness to will or do every evil; but to infinite truth it conflicts only that it itself err, or deceive others by lying; not however that God produce error in another.

You will urge. If God produced human nature immediately with an inclination and necessity of assenting to false principles, He would truly be reckoned to deceive: ergo by similarity, if He produced a habit inclining toward erroneous assent, He would likewise be judged to lead into error. — I deny the antecedent: for although God would thus produce a nature inclining toward false assent, He nevertheless would not on that account be said to deceive in a manner conflicting with and unbecoming to Him, that is, proposing things otherwise than they truly are, or than He judges them to be; since indeed in that case God Himself would not deceive the understanding of that nature, but it would be deceived by the deceiving object set before it, or by the one proposing that object: for just as God is not a cause to whom the moral killing of a man ought to be attributed, although He made the nature capable of being killed and of undergoing death from causes so applied, but rather the killing itself must be charged against such causes; so although God created a nature with an inclination toward assenting to principles apprehended as false, yet from that it would not follow that such error or deception ought to be attributed to Him, which would have to be charged only against the very principles, or against those who apply those principles.

You will say 2. It implicates God in saying something false, because He is the first truth in speaking, as also in knowing and in being: but He would say what is false if by Himself alone He produced error in the understanding; for for God to speak or to say is nothing else than to instill knowledge in another; since indeed God has no need of words that He may speak to another, otherwise He could not speak to an Angel, or to a separate soul: therefore just as He cannot deceive anyone by speaking, so neither by producing error. - I deny the minor: for on that hypothesis God would not be reckoned to speak, or to say anything; because divine locution requires that God manifest Himself to judge this or that: which assuredly He would not do by producing an erroneous act or habit, because by that error produced God would not signify Himself to judge the same.

You will say 3. No cause can underlie why God should produce such an act, or erroneous habit: but God, being most wise, can operate nothing without a legitimate cause: therefore He cannot produce this act, or habit. - I deny the major: For first, God could perform these things that He might manifest His omnipotence in this respect, lest men doubt of it concerning the production of such an erroneous habit, or act, just as the adversaries judge Him powerless unto that. Second, that He might exercise His justice, punishing namely him in whom He would produce such an erroneous act or habit, on account of the neglected pursuit or conservation of legitimate and true cognition. Add that even if we could assign no particular cause why He would thus act, from that it is not consequent that He could not produce such effects on account of a cause unknown to us: for God can do more things than human understanding can grasp, and in that case His will could stand to Him in place of reason, as it also stood, that He did not sooner produce the world when He could have; for no other cause can be assigned than that it so pleased Him.

SIXTH QUESTION. Whether the object of faith must so necessarily be obscure that it cannot by any means be evident.

Note 1. That a twofold obscurity in faith can be distinguished: one indeed on the part of the formal object which is believed, the other truly on the part of the subject or believer. The obscurity on the part of the formal object, or of the medium upon which it leans, consists in this, that that medium, although it effects certain cognition, nevertheless does not effect it clear and intuitive: but the obscurity on the part of the subject, or of the understanding in which faith resides, consists in this, that such an understanding indeed believes God, and the things revealed by Him, on account of His divine testimony, yet does not see Him and the things revealed by Him. It is asked however whether obscurity both on the part of the formal object and on the part of the subject, consisting in this, that the truth believed through faith is not seen clearly, nor perceived intuitively through the very act of faith, pertains so to the formal reason of such an act that it cannot by any means be evident.

Note 2. That evidence is the clear and perspicuous truth of the object, which becomes known from the perspicuously necessary connection of the predicate with the subject; which certainly is twofold; for some object is evident from its terms, when namely the necessary connection of the predicate with the subject appears by natural light, as when it is said God is: but another is called evident from principles; thus through discourse it is evidently gathered that Peter is laughable, because every man is laughable. Moreover the evidence of a thing is twofold: one indeed intrinsic, the other truly extrinsic. The former is that which is sought from the very manifestation and presence of the thing itself, so that it can be intuitively beheld in itself, or at least so openly deduced from another thing known evidently and intuitively, that the understanding, with respect to the assent to be rendered to it by the very light of reason, in no wise waver or hang in doubt: the latter truly is that which is sought from extrinsic principles, with which it has not indeed a natural and necessary connection, but only a moral one; so that these are signs, or certain marks, from which it so evidently stands that the thing exists, that a prudent man rightly believes with certainty it to be so. Hence it is asked whether with this twofold evidence, or only with the latter, the object of faith can be evident, or evidently credible.

Note 3. That here is not raised the controversy about the simultaneous existence of the habit of science and of faith, whether divine or human, in the same understanding regarding the same object; that this is possible we have already sufficiently and abundantly demonstrated in our Philosophy, treating of the characters and properties of science: nor moreover is the present question raised, whether assent of faith can connaturally coexist with intuitive and scientific cognition of the object: for we proved there that this cannot occur, from the fact that while our understanding apprehends the object with the light of evident science, it cannot snatch it away through the inevident light of faith, as the Doctor excellently proves in 3. dist. 21. n. 21. where he concludes:

If it is held that there is one faith of all articles, it can be said that the Apostles had faith about the articles, and would thus have believed Christ to be crucified if they had not seen: but those things which they saw they did not believe for that time, nor ever afterward, in calling back to mind that crucifixion, did they have faith about it; just as neither when they saw it intuitively: yet they had the habit whereby they would have believed it if they had not seen.

Wherefore n. 13. after he had expounded four necessary conditions for science, namely that it be certain, evident, of a necessary thing, and through a cause, he subjoins: Science taken in that manner, it is impossible that science and faith be simultaneously about the same thing. Which assertion is indeed confirmed also by the most open doctrine of the SS. Fathers; for St. August., tract. 68. in Ioann. says: But faith, whereby the hearts of those who are to see God are cleansed while they sojourn, believes what it does not see: for if you see, it is not faith. And St. Chrysostom Homil. 22. on the epistle to the Hebrews says: It is the argument of things that are not seen; what is it that you wish to lose them, so that you fall away from faith! And St. Gregory, Homil. 26. in Evangelia: Faith, he says, is the argument of those things which cannot appear; for things which appear have no longer faith, but recognition. To these subscribes St. Bernard, lib. 5. De Consideratione, cap. 3. where he says: Faith is a voluntary certain foretaste of a truth not yet disclosed. Whence the same SS. Fathers, expounding that word of John 20. Because you have seen me, Thomas, you have believed: say that he saw one thing and believed another; for he saw a man, and believed God.

These things premised, three things only here remain to be resolved: First, that faith must necessarily have obscurity both on the part of the object and on the part of the subject: Second, that the object of faith be evidently credible: Third, what are the principal motives and arguments of our faith.

First Conclusion. — THEOLOGICAL FAITH NECESSARILY HAS ANNEXED OBSCURITY BOTH ON THE PART OF THE OBJECT AND ON THE PART OF THE SUBJECT. This is common as to either part, whereof

The first is proved from that word of the Apostle to the Hebrews 11. Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the argument of things not appearing. By which words he openly indicates that the object of faith is so obscure that it does not appear. Hence Dionysius lib. De mystica Theologia, cap. 1. says: Only through the sacred darkness of mist can human minds, nor ought they, contemplate the divine mysteries. Wherefore the same Apostle 1. ad Corinth. 13. says: We see now through a glass and in a riddle, but then face to face; but glass and riddle openly declare the obscurity of divine revelation, upon which faith leans. Whence St. Cyril calls the mysteries of faith the riddle of the most sacred faith. To prove this serve all those authorities of the SS. Fathers soon lauded in the 3. Notable: for they signify that faith and vision are intrinsically opposed: but this opposition arises precisely not from the formal object indeed, namely from the divine truth; since the divine truth can be the object of faith and of intuitive vision: for the same divine truth, which wayfarers believe, the Blessed behold intuitively: therefore the reason of this opposition and distinction between faith and science must be sought from the object quod, or from its own reason, whereby faith and science are borne toward their object, so that faith perceive it obscurely, science intuitively.

The second part is likewise plain, namely that faith is also obscure on the part of the subject, so that the very habit of faith inclines the understanding in which it resides to perceive the mysteries in an obscure and inevident mode, so that the truth which it believes it does not perceive intuitively through another act. For- asmuch as faith leans wholly upon revelation, such is its act as is the medium and motive through which it tends toward the object: but divine revelation is altogether inevident and obscure: therefore the very act of faith too must be obscure and inevident. But this inevidence conduces most of all to the commendation of faith, and merit: For, says St. August., tract. 79. in Ioan., this is the praise of faith, that what is believed is not seen. Whence St. Leo, Serm. 2. De Ascensione: This is the rigor of great minds, and greatly the light of faithful souls, to believe without hesitation what is not seen with bodily gaze, and to fix desire there whither you cannot bring sight, etc. Hence St. Gregory, Homil. 26. in Evangelia, says excellently: Faith has no merit to which human reason offers experience.

You will say 1. Obscurity is nothing else than the negation of evidence and vi- sion: but no negation can necessarily pertain to the object and act of faith: therefore obscurity is not of the formal reason of the object and act of faith. The minor stands, since indeed the object and act of faith are some- thing positive: but no negation is of the formal reason of a po- sitive being. The major likewise is evident: since indeed obscure, in order to cognition, is nothing else than not being seen: but not being seen is something negative, or privative: therefore, etc. — I deny the major, and toward its proof I say that although to be obscure is expressed by a ne- gative name, nevertheless it is something positive; for there are many positive things which are signified only by negative names, as we said when treating of the negative attributes of God.

You will say 2. It can happen that someone has evident cognition of the reve- lation made to him: but in that case the act of faith will not be obscure: therefore obscurity is not of the formal reason of the act of faith. The major stands from various examples: for the first Angel, while he was a wayfarer, knew certainly and evidently that he could be illuminated by God alone, because he had no superior Angel from whom he might receive illumination: similarly the B. Virgin, when she knew she had not conceived by the ordinary way, and at once that she was a Virgin and a Mother, and had received such a sign from the Angel, as it were a certain argu- ment that the Son to be born of her would be the Son of God, from her ascertained Virginitate and fecundity had evident testimony concerning the divi- nity of her Son. The same evidence most of the Prophets had, whence David 2. Reg., cap. 23. says: God said to Israel, the strong of Israel spoke to me, the ruler of men, the just ruler in the fear of God: as the light of dawn at the rising of the sun in the morning without clouds shines, and as rain brings forth grass from the earth. This evidence likewise the Apostles and Evangelists had, for St. Ioan., Epist. 1. cap. 1. says: What we have heard, what we have seen with our eyes, what we have looked upon, and our hands have handled of the word of life … we declare unto you, and announce to you, etc. therefore the act of faith does not necessarily import obscurity. — I answer: that although there be evidence of the revelation on the part of the attesting one, nevertheless there remains obscurity and inevidence on the side of the thing revealed, and consequently faith can be had concerning it; for although it stood evident to me that God reveals to me some mystery, yet that mystery would not thereby be intrinsically evident to me, however evident it be that God supremely truthful attests it; for to the thing revealed there would accrue thence only a certain extrinsic evidence, founded on these extrinsic principles, yet evident ones: Whatever God reveals is true: namely God reveals Himself to be trine in persons. Thence indeed it evidently follows that this proposition is true: therefore God is trine: and accordingly the existence of the truth of this proposition is evident, not the evidence of the thing in itself, but only extrinsically elicited from the premises premised. Hence notwithstanding the evidence on the part of the attesting and revealing one, there always remains obscurity on the side of the thing revealed: whence that thing can still be believed by divine faith.

Which indeed the Doctor excellently teaches in 3. dist. 14. n. 17. where speaking of the Prophets and SS. Apostolis, those outstanding men who had certain cognition that God revealed truths to them, he says: Such men had a habit offering the greatest assent, so that while it stood they could not fail to assent to the truth. Yet that certitude was not evident from the evidence of the thing, because then there would be contradiction that such cognition and faith stood together: yet that certitude was firm, as is scientific certitude, which is caused by principles known from the evidence of terms: but it was not caused by such principles: therefore science could not be said to be from the evidence of the thing: yet it was greater certitude than the certitude of faith: because faith did not exclude every doubt, but some doubt can stand together with faith. By which words the Doctor signifies, not that the Prophets and Apostoli had cognition of the mysteries through a habit distinct from faith, and midway between faith and science, as some judge, but only that they had extrinsic evidence, which indeed made them more certain that God had revealed those truths, than other faithful believe such mysteries to be revealed by God: yet they did not have intrinsic evidence, which is required for intuitive or scientific cognition: in a word, they had the evidence of reve-

Second Conclusion. — THE MYSTERIES OF THE CHRISTIAN FAITH ARE EVIDENTLY CREDIBLE. This is common among Theologians; and it is Proved first by the authority of sacred Scripture, especially from Psal. 92. Thy testimonies are become exceedingly credible: as if he would say: by very many arguments you have demonstrated the mysteries revealed by you, and the law prescribed by you, truly to have you God for author; where significantly the particle exceedingly seems to signify no less than evident cognition; whence our Lyranus thus expounds: Credibilia facta sunt nimis, that is, more than the first principles of sciences. Wherefore St. Augustine, lib. 7. Confess., cap. 10. says: More easily would I doubt that I live, than that what I hear is true. The same is evinced from that word of Ioan. 15. where Christ, speaking of the Jews his worst enemies, says: If I had not come, and spoken to them, they would not have sin; but now they have no excuse for their sin. By which words He signifies that the motives of faith can generate evidence of credibility; for if they effected only probability, they would have an excuse who would follow another probable judgment, whereby they judged these mysteries not to be credible.

The same also reason urges: for since God wills us to believe most firmly and undoubtingly the things He reveals to us, and on that account deprives of eternal salvation and beatitude those who do not assent to such mysteries, and subjects them to eternal torments; right and just reason demanded that He openly offer signs of the truth which He exhibited to be believed, from which it could be known with certainty, which things are revealed by Him, and which truly are not.

⟦Illegible: opening words lost by OCR; text resumes:⟧ scibilitatis there is nothing certain and evidently opinionable, so likewise without evidence of credibility nothing is credible.

⟦Illegible: opening words lost by OCR; text resumes:⟧ the will can, by its own dominion over the understanding, command it to believe something which even does not appear evidently credible: for the will cannot move the understanding, that it be borne beyond the sphere of its object. But since the object of the understanding is that which appears of things, the will cannot move the understanding, that it believe firmly and with certainty what does not appear certainly credible. Finally, that ought to be reckoned evidently credible which is established by most efficacious reasons and most valid arguments: but there are many arguments and motives whereby the mysteries of faith appear true; whence St. August., lib. Contra Epist. Fundamenti, cap. 5. says: Many are the things which most justly hold me in the Catholic: the consensus of peoples and nations, an authority begun in miracles, nourished in hope, confirmed in charity, and strengthened by antiquity. It holds too the succession of Priests from the very seat of Peter the Apostle, to whom the Lord entrusted His sheep, down to the present Episcopate. Finally it holds the very name of Catholic, which not without cause amid so many heresies this Church alone has obtained, so that although all heretics wish themselves to be called Catholics, yet when any foreign pilgrim asks where the Catholic assembly is held, none of the heretics dares point out his own basilica or house. Hence excellently Pico della Mirandola writes in Epist. 1.: Great madness it is not to believe the Gospel, whose truth the blood of Martyrs donates, the Apostolic voices resound, prodigies prove, reason confirms, the elements speak, demons confess; but far greater madness it is not to doubt the truth of the Gospel, and yet to believe as if you did not doubt its falsity.

You will say. 1: If the mysteries of our faith were evidently credible, no one of sound mind, to whom they were sufficiently proposed, could reject them, and judge what is contrary to them more credible: but this militates against constant experience: therefore, &c. The minor is plain: for it stands from the very beginning of the nascent Church that not only the wiser among the Jews, and the gentile Philosophers, but even heretics otherwise versed in matters of the Christian religion assail very many mysteries of faith, and hold their contraries as true, and defend them most constantly. But the major is proved: no one of sound mind can think contrary to what he knows evidently true, and judges worthy of faith, otherwise he would resist manifest truth, and thereupon would strip off the dictate and light of reason.

I deny the major: for although the objects of faith be evidently credible, nevertheless they can be denied and assailed by men otherwise prudent and sagacious: either because they are not duly proposed to them: or because they themselves do not weigh and examine them with the attentive and diligent consideration they ought, but for the most part turn their consideration away from their examination, and convert it to other things opposed to them: or because they are led by perverse affection, lest offering assent to such mysteries and divine truths, they thence be held not only to captivate the understanding in obedience of faith, and thus in a certain manner strip off the natural liberty of assent and use of reason, but truly also to embrace those things which conflict with the delight of the senses. Hence it comes about that from fear of that troublesome captivity into obedience of faith, and likewise of undertaking the obligation to a stricter life, they refuse to examine and penetrate the mysteries proposed: or they attempt to weaken the reasons and motives whereby they become evidently credible, and to darken them with contrary reasons: or because out of love of liberty they refuse to attend to them; for just as although one knows evidently that the good of temperance is prudently lovable, he can nevertheless not love it: so likewise although someone knows his sect cannot be prudently retained, yet with depraved affection he can will to adhere to it, just as everyone who perishes from malice knows evidently that he acts imprudently, yet does not on that account cease from acting. Add to these that God sometimes denies to infidels and heretics those proximately efficacious aids whereby their understanding may be moved and applied to perceiving the evidence of the credibility of the mysteries of faith, as St. Paul teaches 2. ad Cor. IV. saying: The god of this world has blinded the minds of unbelievers, that the illumination of the gospel of the glory of Christ may not shine upon them.

You insist: If it were so that infidels, to whom the mysteries of faith are proposed, knew them to be evidently credible, it would follow that they would likewise know their sects and others opposed to the Christian religion to be evidently incredible, and not to be followed with prudent judgment, because they would be unprovable; for indeed what is incredible is not probable: but the contrary appears; therefore, etc.

— I distinguish the major: they would know evidently that those sects are not prudently credible, I concede: that they are not in any wise credible, whether prudently or imprudently, I deny. For although after sufficient proposition of the mysteries they still pertinaciously remain in their error, from that it is not consequent that they do not know their sect ought not prudently to be adhered to; but they thus conduct themselves because they are rebels against the light, and love darkness rather than light.

You will say 2: If the mysteries of our faith were evidently credible, any Philosopher could naturally know their possibility: but Theologians deny this can occur: ergo, etc. The sequel of the major is proved; what is judged impossible is incredible: ergo what is judged evidently credible is judged also evidently not impossible: but possible, and not impossible are equipollent terms: ergo what is judged not impossible is judged evidently possible: for indeed from the opposite of the consequent to the opposite of the antecedent one argues well, v. g. Peter runs: therefore he is moved, rightly inferred, he is not moved, therefore he does not run.

— I deny the major of the sequel, for whose proof I say that this consequence does not hold: something is judged evidently credible; therefore it is judged evidently not to be impossible; but it ought to be inferred; therefore it is evidently judged that it does not appear impossible. For in order that something be credible, it is not necessary that it be judged really not to be impossible, but it suffices that its impossibility do not appear. Hence with regard to that rule of Logic, that from the opposite of the consequent one rightly argues to the opposite of the antecedent, I say that it is understood only of the contradictory opposite, not indeed of the contrary opposite; e.g., Peter is a man; therefore Peter is an animal: it would not be well argued: Peter is not an animal; therefore he is a brute, although a brute is indeed the opposite of man, because plainly a brute is not opposed to man contradictorily but contrarily. Therefore only this can be inferred: he is not an animal; therefore he is not a man: for thus one argues to the contradictory proposition of the antecedent, or to its negative. The same must be said of the aforementioned argument.

You will insist: This consequence is evident: some object is credible by divine faith; therefore it is true; for by divine faith nothing but truth can be believed; therefore if the mysteries of the Christian religion are evidently credible by divine faith, it follows that they are evidently true. But it is false that the mysteries of our faith are evidently true; otherwise they would be objects of science, not of faith. Therefore they are not evidently credible.

I answer, that it does not follow that if the mysteries of faith are evidently credible, they are also evidently true. For it is one thing that some proposition be true, and another that it be credible: for truth is sought from the intrinsic connection of subject and predicate; but credibility is taken from the extrinsic testimony of the speaker, and likewise from the signs and motives which render that proposition credible or worthy of belief. Add that although the mysteries of faith are evidently credible, it still does not follow that they are evidently credible by divine faith: for how could it be known evidently that something was to be believed by divine faith, when it cannot be known evidently that divine and infused faith exists? Therefore we know only evidently that those mysteries are so proposed that, as far as lies in us, we may prudently endeavor to believe them firmly and without any hesitation, leaving aside whether that assent be elicited by the forces of nature alone or through infused faith.

You will urge: If only the credibility of the mysteries were known evidently, and not their truth, it would follow that in that prior step their truth would be known only probably, and then also that the truth of the contrary and opposing proposition would appear probable, and consequently certain assent could not be had: for we cannot give certain assent to any object if at the same instant its opposite appears probable.

— I answer, that even if at that instant at which the objects of faith are proposed with those motives whereby they appear evidently credible, the truth of the opposing object also seems probable, nevertheless those motives manifesting the credibility of the object of faith, though they have not sufficient power to manifest evidently their truth, have yet sufficient power to show evidently that the will of the prudent man can imperate an assent excluding every fear which could arise from contrary motives: hence at that instant at which the assent of faith is elicited there is no actual fear regarding the opposing object, nor probable assent to it, but only certain motives are present which could generate fear unless restrained by the command of the will.

You will insist again: All arguments against our faith are evidently solved; therefore it is even evidently shown that those mysteries are not only evidently credible but also evidently true: for where the inefficacy of contrary arguments is shown, it appears that they were proving what is false.

— I deny the consequence: for it is one thing that those arguments do not convince the point intended, and another thing to prove that they tend toward proving what is false: hence although we can show the first evidently, yet the second cannot be shown evidently.

Finally you will say: That doctrine is not evidently credible which contains things utterly unworthy of the majesty of God. But such is the doctrine of the Christian faith; for it teaches that God becomes man, is enclosed in the Virgin's womb, nourished at her breast, crucified, dies, etc.: which things are unworthy of the majesty of God: therefore the mysteries of faith are not evidently credible.

— I deny the minor: for these mysteries, although they signify in some part the depression and humility of God, nevertheless commend His divine majesty elsewhere in a wondrous manner; for Christ was conceived, but by the operation of the Holy Spirit; He was born, but of a Virgin; reclined in a manger, but sought and found by Kings, a star shining and showing the way, He is adored; crucified and dead, but at His death the earth trembled, the sun was darkened, and all the elements by their convulsion showed Him to be the Ruler of the world and supreme Lord. Add that those mysteries must be judged the more worthy of the majesty of God because they altogether transcend human reason, nor can they be penetrated by it at all: whence Tertullian, already once and again praised by us, speaks excellently, saying in his book De carne Christi: Christ was born: not shameful, because it is to be believed: He died: credible, because incredible: He rose again: possible, because it is judged impossible. For what is the whole Gospel but mere folly, if compared with human reason? And against Marcion he says: That God assumed certain things unworthy of Himself, but necessary for us, and therefore already worthy of God, since nothing is so worthy of God as the salvation of man.

Third conclusion. — THE MOTIVES AND ARGUMENTS WHEREBY THE MYSTERIES OF OUR CHRISTIAN RELIGION BECOME EVIDENTLY CREDIBLE ARE VARIOUS, BUT CHIEFLY SIX CAPITAL ONES. This is common among Theologians who, although they assign very many motives of this kind, and the Subtle Doctor, question 2 of the Prologue, numbers 8 and 13, multiplies them to the number ten, nevertheless they can rightly be reduced to five.

The first argument is drawn from the purity, efficacy, and concord of the doctrine. It appears, I say, that the Christian Religion was truly published by God from the purity of its doctrine, and from the marvelous consensus of its Doctors; for no other sect thinks as perfectly and sublimely concerning the magnitude of God and His divine prerogatives as the Christian one, which preaches God infinitely perfect and holy, and removes from Him everything that savors of vice or defect; which certainly the other sects do not achieve: for the Jews, after they fell away from the true faith, fell into various errors concerning the perfections of God, as Louis of Granada demonstrates at length in his Catechism, p. 22. But the Gentiles worship vices as divinities, and venerate demons as gods; heretics moreover judge even unworthy things of God. — Likewise no other sect instills in its followers such zeal for perfection as the Christian religion; for it is that which calls minds away from attachment to earthly things and translates them to the love of heavenly ones: for it persuades contempt of riches, honors, and pleasures, incites to frequent fasting and other afflictions of the body, whereby the impulses of the flesh may be broken and itself subjected to the spirit; whence it must be an argument that the Christian religion is altogether heavenly, for that religion cannot fail to be heavenly which tears away human nature clinging to lowly and perishable things so as to promote it toward heavenly goods, which combats love of earthly things so as to implant love of eternal ones: finally, so translates the human affection that the man who reforms his morals according to the rules and institutions of the prescribed faith and Christian doctrine be truly judged heavenly, for his conversation is wholly in heaven. — St. Paul also explains admirably the efficacy of this doctrine while calling Christianity the renovation of man, Ephesians 4. Be renewed, he says, in the spirit of your mind: and put on the new man, who according to God is created in justice and holiness of truth, etc.; and the reformation, Romans 12. Be not conformed to this world, but be reformed in the newness of your sense. Whence the Royal Psalmist seems to have prophesied concerning the Christian law, Psalm 18, where he says: The law of the Lord is unspotted, converting souls. Unspotted indeed, because it eliminates utterly all vices and sins, even the least. Converting souls, because it not only orders and rightly composes exterior acts, as all human laws do, but interior ones too, since it forbids not only killing but further being angry, nor only prohibits adultery but even looking upon a woman to lust after her; whence it reforms the whole man, as Lactantius beautifully explains, book 6, chapter 25:

The precepts of God, because they are both simple and true, daily experiences demonstrate how powerful they are in the souls of men. Give me a man who is irascible, reviling, and vain; with a very few words I shall make him gentle as a lamb. Give me a covetous, avaricious man; presently I shall present him liberal, bestowing money with full hands. Give me one fearful of pain and death; presently he will despise crosses and fires, peril and the bull. Give me a lustful man, an adulterer, a glutton; presently you will see him sober, chaste, continent. Give me a cruel man, thirsting for blood; presently he will change into true clemency. Give me an unjust man, foolish, a sinner; immediately he will be both equitable and prudent and innocent: for so great is the force of divine wisdom that, poured into the breast of man, it expels the folly of transgressions with a single onset.

— Finally it appears that the Christian doctrine is divinely inspired from the marvelous consensus and concord both of the authors of Sacred Scripture and of the sacred Doctors; for, as the Doctor says, number 1, many authors of different ages and times cannot agree in principles and conclusions, especially moral ones, unless God specially assists them, and their minds are inclined by Him to assent: but our Doctors, however differently disposed and existing at different times, agreed in a wondrous manner concerning the moral precepts, and likewise concerning the principal truths to be believed of faith; therefore, etc. The Doctor proves the major, first indeed by the authority of St. Augustine, book 18 De Civitate, chapter 41. Our authors surely ought to be few, lest what ought to be precious in religion grow cheap through multitude, and yet not so few that their consensus not be marvelous. For among the multitude of Philosophers who have left monuments of their dogmas even by literary labor, one will not easily find that they agree in all things which they thought. He proves it also with this reason:

Since the intellect, as regards assent, is by nature moved by an object evident in itself or in another, nothing else seems able to cause such an assent from an object unless it virtually includes the evidence of the object: for if nothing of the kind moves the intellect, there will remain to it a Theology neutral. But nothing is of such a kind regarding things not evident from the terms except an intellect superior to ours; and no intellect superior to man can effectively teach man, except God.

— He confirms this most strongly from the fact that those later sacred Writers were not disciples of the earlier ones; for, he says, Ezechiel prophesying in Babylon at the time when Jeremias was prophesying in Judea could not have concorded with him unless they had had some common Doctor above human intellect. This is true above all of the Authors of the New Testament, who, since they proscribed many legal and ceremonial precepts of the Old Testament, would undoubtedly also have dissented from the Authors of that same Testament concerning moral precepts, unless He who had dictated the old Testament to the earlier Writers had inspired the same things to be written by the Authors of the new Testament.

Hence arises the second motive and argument for the truth of our faith and religion, namely the holiness of life and purity of morals, which shines forth especially in the cultivators of the Christian faith and law; for very many in every age, and in every stage of life, have been illustrious for sanctity, even among those who before embracing this heavenly religion were given over to most grievous sins; which certainly is an argument that the religion they followed is true, because a false religion does not lead to true sanctity; for religion is the foundation of sanctity, nor could that heavenly building be erected upon a pernicious and sacrilegious lie, such as is every pretense and every lie in religion. Nor can it happen that a false religion call the soul away from earthly things and translate it to heavenly ones, so as to kindle the mind with divine love, and impel it toward promoting the salvation of neighbors and the glory of God, even with open loss of all goods, and imminent loss of life, even through most perilous labors and various kinds of torments; but Christian faith and religion works all these things in its followers. — Nor do these facts stand in the way, that also among Catholic faithful there are many who not only do not live holily but even lie under most grievous vices; for they do this not from the indulgence of religion but from the perverse use of free will; since there are three things which can call man away from evil and incite him to good, namely fear of punishment, hope of reward, and the honesty of the good work itself; these three the Christian religion proposes most excellently and everywhere inculcates upon its followers; whence if some of its followers do not aspire to that sanctity, this must be imputed not to religion itself but to the liberty of free will, which perversely uses these good incentives against them all.

The third motive is that the Christian faith itself is coeval with the world; for our faith has been propagated from the very beginning of the nascent world down to us by immutable succession; indeed, as we said, the object of faith has always been believed the same, for what the Ancients believed implicitly we believe explicitly; hence the Christian and Catholic religion surpasses in antiquity not only heretics but all Gentile idolaters, against whom therefore we can press what Tertullian objected to the heretics of his time, book De praescriptione, chapter 37. Who are you? When and whence did you come? What are you doing in what is mine, you who are not mine? Finally, by what right, Marcion, do you cut down my wood? By what license, Valentinus, do you divert my springs?

By what power, Apelles, do you change my boundaries? It is my possession: why do others sow there at your pleasure and feed? My possession it is: because I possess it; I possess it first; I hold firm titles of origin from the very authors themselves to whom the thing belonged. I am the heir of the Apostles: as they received by their testimony, as they committed it in faith, as they adjured, so I hand it on. Those men certainly they always disinherited and disowned as strangers, as enemies.

The fourth argument for the truth of our faith is drawn from the marvelous propagation of the same throughout the whole world; for it required the power of God, and His special protection and favor, that the Christian faith should be diffused through the entire globe; which will appear most evidently if anyone consider, first, the readiness or swiftness with which that faith was announced and received among all nations; for St. Paul testifies to the Colossians 1. that the truth of the Gospel had already shone through the whole universe in his own time: The Gospel, he says, which has come to you, as also it is in the whole world, and bringeth forth fruit and groweth, as also in you, etc. Hence Justin Martyr, who lived at the beginning of the second century, says in his dialogue with Trypho: There is no race of men, whether of Barbarians or Greeks, or of those who use wagons instead of houses, or who have no use of houses, among whom prayers and Eucharisties are not made in the name of Jesus, who was fixed to the cross, to the Creator of all things. — Secondly, truly divine is the work whereby the propagated Christian faith was defended; not by power, not by arms, not by wealth, but by rustic, despised, ignoble, unlettered, and contemptible men, who persuaded Princes, Doctors, Sophists, Leaders, Orators, Kingdoms, Provinces, and the whole world to embrace a faith utterly repugnant to sense, precepts difficult, contempt of temporal goods, and the supreme cult and Divinity of its Author's life, that of one man publicly punished and crucified; which indeed would have been impossible unless the finger of God promoted His cause, and unless this work, as Augustine said, book 22 De Civitate, chapter 8, had been of divine power, not of human persuasion: especially since it was done while Kings, Princes, Emperors, Priests, Magistrates, the People, and the whole world opposed themselves. All these things holy Chrysostom weighs admirably, Sermon 3 De Pentecoste, in these words:

The Fishers traversed the whole earth, and finding it infirm restored it to health, and called it back from ruin to stability; not wielding shields, not bending bows, not shooting arrows, not exacting money, not relying on eloquence: choosing poverty, or possessing the kingdom of heaven: having no human consolations, but having the Lord with them. They traversed the whole universe, sheep together with wolves, and wounded by beasts they were not killed: but rather the wolves were converted to the gentleness of the sheep.

The fifth argument is drawn from divine testimony: for God revealed, confirmed, and strengthened the mysteries of our faith. He revealed them, I say, through the Prophets long before they were accomplished: hence the Doctor argues thus, number 3, God alone can naturally, without protection from another, foresee contingencies with certitude: therefore He alone, or one instructed by Him, can predict them with certitude, according to that saying of Isaias: Show the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that ye are gods: but all the mysteries of Christ the Lord were foretold by the Prophets long before He Himself appeared on earth and conversed with men: for His Incarnation is foretold in Baruch: He was seen upon earth, and conversed with men. His birth of a Virgin, Isaias 7: Behold a virgin shall conceive, and bear a son. The place of His Nativity, Micheas 5: And thou, Bethlehem Ephrata, art a little one among the thousands of Juda: out of thee shall he come forth unto me that is to be the ruler in Israel. His preaching, Isaias 61: The spirit of the Lord is upon me, because the Lord hath anointed me: he hath sent me to preach to the meek, to heal the contrite of heart, and to preach a release to the captives, &c. His miracles, Isaias 35: Then shall the eyes of the blind be opened, and the ears of the deaf unstopped. Then shall the lame man leap as a hart, and the tongue of the dumb shall be free. His entrance into Jerusalem, Zachary 9: Behold thy king will come to thee, the just and saviour: he is poor, and riding upon an ass, and upon a colt the foal of an ass. His betrayal by a disciple, Psalm 40: He that ate bread with me hath greatly supplanted me. His sale for thirty pieces of silver, Zachary 11: And they weighed for my wages thirty pieces of silver. And shortly after: And I took the thirty pieces of silver, and cast them into the house of the Lord. The pains and tortures of His passion endured with supreme patience and meekness, Isaias 53: He shall be led as a sheep to the slaughter, and shall be dumb as a lamb before his shearer, and he shall not open his mouth, &c. His crucifixion between thieves, same chapter, verse 12: He was reputed with the wicked. The mockings and blasphemies of the Jews, the division of His garments, and His prayer for enemies on the cross, Psalm 21, throughout the whole. The drinking of gall and vinegar, Psalm 68: They gave me gall for my food, and in my thirst they gave me vinegar to drink. The Resurrection, Psalm 15: For thou wilt not leave my soul in hell; nor wilt thou give thy holy one to see corruption. Finally His ascension into heaven is foretold, Psalm 67: Thou hast ascended on high, thou hast led captivity captive: thou hast received gifts in men.

Whence Tertullian speaks excellently; having said in the Apologeticus, chapter 20, A fitting testimony of Divinity, I think, is the truth of prophecy, he concludes:

Hence therefore among us faith also in future things is safe, namely already proved, because along with those things which daily are proved they were foretold. The same voices sound, the same letters mark, the same Spirit strikes; one time it is to speak out foretold things after having divined them, &c.

St. Augustine uses the same argument, Sermon 27 De Verbis Apostoli, chapter 1., where he says:

For there are infidels who so detract from Christ as to say that what he did he did by magical arts (like those Jews who said: In Beelzebub, prince of devils, he casteth out devils, Luke 11). Infidels therefore can refer the voice sent down from heaven to illicit curiosities and to magical arts: but the Prophets were beforehand. There was not yet the man Christ when He sent the Prophets. If then He wrought by magical arts that He might be worshipped when dead, was He perchance a magician before He was born?

— Second, God confirmed these same mysteries by innumerable miracles; for these are as it were the very subscriptions of God Himself, who alone doth great wonders, Ps. 135. Hence the Apostle, writing to the Hebrews 2. concerning the Christian faith, says: It was confirmed, God also bearing witness by signs, and wonders, and divers virtues, and distributions of the Holy Ghost. But since those miracles have God for their author, it cannot be that they were wrought in confirmation of any falsehood; whence it must be concluded with Richard of St. Victor, lib. 1. De Trinitate, chap. 2.: Indeed, the things revealed to us from heaven have been confirmed by prodigies so many, so great, so wonderful, that it would seem a kind of madness to doubt them even a little. Would that the Jews would attend to it, would that the Pagans take note of it, with what security of conscience on this side we may approach the divine judgment! Would that with every confidence we could say to God: Lord, if there be error, we have been deceived by Thee? For these things in us are confirmed by signs and prodigies so great, and such as could not have been wrought save by Thee.

Nor do I deny that infidels and heretics pick at the miracles wrought in confirmation of the Christian and Catholic faith. But either those miracles were truly wrought, or they were not. If they were wrought, there is no reason why they should be called into doubt; but if no miracles at all were performed in confirmation of the Christian faith, it is surely a great miracle that without miracle the whole world neglected the religion and cult of idols, approved through so many centuries and held in honor and veneration by so many wise and most powerful men, without any signs or prodigies whatsoever, so that the Christian religion should take its place.

By which argument S. Augustine makes use in Util. contra infideles, where he says:

Since it stands agreed that the empire of the Romans, filled throughout the whole world with so many powerful men, philosophers, and orators, at first resisting the doctrine of Christ, was afterwards converted to it: I ask whether by the power of signs and prodigies this change was made from the ancient rites and long-observed religion into this new and unheard-of one? If you shall confess that the world was drawn to this persuasion by the force of miracles, which it could in no wise resist, you must confess that this religion proceeded from God the author of miracles, who alone doth great wonders: but if on the other hand you deny that the world was summoned by any miracles to receive this faith, in denying the miracles you bring upon yourself an enormous miracle: for what can be called more wonderful than that the Roman Empire, and all Gentility together, deserting their paternal rites, with no signs seen nor works to be marveled at, should have embraced of their own accord the religion which they attacked so fiercely and strove to overturn, and should have been so constant in retaining it.

Thus far S. Augustine. — Thirdly finally, He strengthened it even by the testimony of infidels opposing the Christians, as the Doctor teaches most excellently in the same place num. 13.; for, as Eucherius speaks beautifully, Hom. 2. De Paschate: Openly, beyond doubt, he relies upon privileges who asserts his cause from the instruments of adversaries. Now very many infidels spoke and wrote admirably concerning Christ and the Christians; but above the rest the Doctor praises the testimony of Josephus: for he, lib. 18. De antiquit., chap. 1., reports these things concerning the Lord Christ:

Now at that time there was Jesus, a wise man, if indeed it be lawful to call him a man: for he was a worker of marvelous deeds, and a teacher of all those who gladly hear the things that are true. And he drew to himself many of the Jews, and many also from among the nations. This man was Christ. And when Pilate had decreed, upon the accusation of the first men of our nation, that he should be crucified, those who had loved him from the beginning did not forsake him: for he appeared to them alive again on the third day: according as the divinely inspired Prophets had foretold these and countless other wonders; and even unto this day the race of Christians, named from him, persists both in name and in stock.

Philo too, most eloquent of the Jews, wrote a book concerning the holiness and purity of life of the first Christians dwelling at Alexandria, as St. Jerome testifies in his book De Scriptoribus Ecclesiasticis, where treating of St. Mark and the Alexandrian Church, he says: Philo, most eloquent of the Jews, seeing Alexandria the first Church still judaizing, wrote a book concerning their manner of life, as if in praise of his nation.

Finally, God has sufficiently testified that the Christian religion is divinely inspired by that marvelous and utterly stupendous fortitude and constancy of the countless Martyrs, who also took their name thence (says Suarez) because with their own blood they bore great testimony to the faith; for although infidels, both Pagans and heretics, died in defense of their errors, as Nicephorus reports of Apollinarius, lib. 4. Hist., chap. 23., Many heresies glory in their Martyrs, yet we do not on that account go over to their opinions; nevertheless there are more circumstances attending the Martyrs of Christians and Catholics which declare and confirm in wondrous manner the truth and sanctity of the Christian religion. First indeed, this is chiefly brought about by the countless multitude of Martyrs: for in defense of other sects they are rare who underwent death; but in defense of the Christian faith, and for its propagation, so many endured a noble death amid torments of every kind more atrocious than the rest, that St. Jerome deservedly wrote to Heliodorus that he found the number of Martyrs in the Annals of the Pontiffs so abundant, that if we wished to celebrate the memory of them all, a solemnity would fall to each single day of more than three thousand: wherefore with full right S. Gregory, Hom. 17. on the Gospels, addressing the Christian faithful, says: Look over the whole world, Brethren, it is full of Martyrs; already almost more are they whom we see not than we who are; how many witnesses of the truth have we: they are numberless to God, multiplied beyond the sand to us; because their multitude cannot be comprehended by us. Second, the very burning desire of suffering for Christ commends in the Christian and Catholic Martyrs a special protection and upholding of God, whereby they not only did not shun torments, but even offered themselves spontaneously to tyrants and executioners to be slain and sacrificed: whence Tertullian at the beginning of the book ad Scapulam: We neither shrink from nor dread those things which we suffer at the hands of the ignorant: since, when we took upon ourselves this sect upon acceptance of its terms, we covenanted to enter upon these contests having pledged even our souls, desiring to obtain what God promises, and fearing to endure what threatens from another life. Finally, we strive against all your cruelty, nay rather breaking forth unbidden: and we rejoice more at being condemned than acquitted. Third, the same thing is attested by that marvelous constancy not only of soul, but also alacrity in undergoing whatever more direful and atrocious torments and punishments. For what S. Luke relates of the Apostles and Disciples, Act. 5.: And they indeed went from the council rejoicing that they were accounted worthy to suffer reproach for the name of Jesus, befell also in the other Martyrs, who, inebriated even amid their torments with heavenly consolation and sweetness, for the most part rang out divine praises, insulted the executioners tormenting them, and confessed most constantly the name and Divinity of Christ the Lord, as SS. Marcus and Marcellianus, brothers of Rome, bore witness most nobly, who, when the Judge had cried out to them bound to the stake: Come to your senses, wretches, and deliver yourselves from these tortures: answered: Never have we feasted so sweetly as we now gladly suffer these things for the cause of Jesus Christ, in whose love we have begun to be fastened: would that they allow us to suffer these things so long as with this corruptible body we are to live.

The Doctor finally deduces a sixth motive and argument of the credibility and firmness of our faith from the stability and perpetuity of the Church: for surely that religion must be judged divinely instituted which abode stable from the beginning of its institution in the profession of the same faith and doctrine through very many years, even notwithstanding the various persecutions of adversaries, and this without any support of secular and earthly power: but such is the Christian and Catholic religion: therefore, &c. The major stands: for God is not wont to concur in the preservation of any sect for so long a time as the Christian religion has lasted, unless it be that which professes truth, especially where that religion is attacked by various enemies, and there be liberty of disputing concerning the mysteries and articles of faith, that the truth may appear the more evident, as happens in the Christian religion. The minor also is evident: for from the beginning of its institution the Church has been propagated even unto us throughout the whole world; whence the Doctor concludes num. 9. with S. Augustine, lib. De utilitate credendi, cap. 17.: Since then we see such authority of God, such profit, and such handling thereof, do we hesitate to give ourselves back to the bosom of that Church which, unto the confession of the human race, by the successions of Bishops from the apostolic seat — heretics barking around it in vain, condemned partly by the judgment of the people itself, partly by the weight of Councils, partly even by the majesty of miracles — obtained the summit of authority? And shortly after: What else can be so displeasing to opinion, and yet so aided by divine help, as to wish to resist with such labor the aforesaid authority? Hence (as elsewhere) Actor. 5.: If this design or work be of men, it will come to nought; but if it be of God, you cannot overthrow it, lest perhaps you be found even to fight against God. More may be added to this argument from the most illustrious characters and marks with which the Catholic Church is adorned, and by which she is set apart from the conventicles of heretics. But a more convenient place will be taken for speaking of these, when, God willing, we shall begin the Treatise on the Church.