Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

Note 1. That just as two things concur to elicit the act of faith: one indeed presuppositive, and the other formal, namely the proposition and revelation of the mysteries to be believed, and the act of faith itself, which the faithful give to the things proposed; so also a twofold resolution of faith can be distinguished: one indeed, which is made precisely with respect to the mere pro- position and revelation of the things to be believed, by which of course one can answer the question, why we believe that this or that was re- vealed by God; the other truly as it were with respect to assent, by which we answer the question, why we give our assent to God revealing the mysteries. Of both resolutions of faith, then, there must be treatment in what follows.

Note 2. Among the objects which are proposed to the intellect, and which move it to assent, some are per se evident, whose formal motive object is their very evidence; for this immediately moves the intellect to assent to them; others are in themselves unevident to us, to which therefore we assent only on account of some motive distinct from those objects. Whence the formal motive reason of an object is something intrinsic to the object, namely when it is evident, or extrinsic, while it is unevident; for such is the native propensity of the intellect toward things, that it assents to no object except inasmuch as it perceives its truth, either through the very obiec- tum itself, or through another with which it has some neces- sary connection. — Moreover the extrinsic formal motive, by which the intellect is enticed to assent to some object, is twofold: for sometimes it has a connatural connection with the material object, as happens when we know effects through causes, or causes through effects; for this medium is in some way intrinsic to the thing known on account of the natural and necessary connection of effect with cause, and of cause with effect. But sometimes that motive is altogether extrinsic to the material object, nor does it have any natural connection with it, but only a moral one, as happens whenever we give assent to some proposition on account of the mere testimony of another. Further, it must be observed, that when we know certain objects per se evident to us, the formal motive object of this knowledge is something one for the same reason that the thing known is one; but otherwise when the medium is distinct from the thing known; for while I believe, e.g., something to be true because Peter testifies it, the reason moving me to that assent is partly because I know Peter to be a truthful man, partly because I know he said this: for however much I might believe him not to be truthful, yet if I had ascertained that he said this; or conversely, if I knew he said this, and yet did not believe him to be truthful, that certainly which is proposed to me through him will not be certain and undoubted.

Note 3. That the Church is the congregation of all the Faithful under Christ the Lord her invisible head, and under the Roman Pontiff her visible head, the Vicar of Christ the Lord, and successor of Peter; which can be considered in a twofold manner according to her twofold state, namely either primitive, or successive; that is, either at the time of Christ and the Apos- tles, for which reason Apoc. 21 she is called the primitive Church; or at the time immediately following, and persevering until the end of the world, for which reason the Church of the present time, even unto the consummation of the age, shall be called founded upon the foundation of the Apostles and Prophets, with Christ Jesus Himself as the chief corner stone, as Paul writes to the Ephesians 2. Again, the Church can be considered, either inasmuch as she is the congregation of all the Faithful dispersed throughout the whole world, consisting of many men illustrious for supreme doctrine and sanctity of life, who from the times of Christ have ever persevered most constantly through so many ages until now in the same faith without any least change, notwithstanding the attacks of Pagans, Tyrants, and Heretics. Which surely is evident to be impossible unless divine power intervenes; for how could so many and such various men divided from one another by so great an interval, and differing by so great a diversity of mind, so harmoniously and constantly agree together and consent concerning the same mysteries utterly unevident and exceeding the powers of natural human genius, unless they were moved thereto by some divine power? especially since experience shows that all other Sects devoted to false opinions immediately fall into various divisions and silently become extinguished. Secondly, the Chur- ch can be considered as she is infallibly governed by the Holy Spirit, and who on account of His divine assistance cannot err in her dogmas and decrees of faith. Hence a twofold authority of the Church arises in proposing the mysteries of faith, one of which can be accounted political and civil; which chiefly arises from the truthfulness of so many men powerful in wisdom and holiness, and consequently in dignity of faith. For this reason St. Augustine in book 4 Contra Epistolam Fundamenti, chap. 5, counts among the chief motives which held him within the bosom of the Church and enticed him to give assent to the things proposed by her the wisdom of the Doctors, the consensus of the peoples, the force of miracles, antiquity, and the perpetual succession of Pontiffs, etc. But the other authority of the Church is accounted divine and infallible, which belongs to her inasmuch as she is the organ and instrument of the Holy Spirit, through whom He Himself promises His oracles, and assists her perpetually, according to that promise of Christ the Lord: The Spirit of your Father speaks in you. Matth. 10. Hence the Apostles decreeing that the legal observances need not be kept, Acts 15.¹ say: It has seemed good to the Holy Spirit, and to us. These things having been set forth, it must be determined what that motive may be, or principle certain and infallible, into which our faith can be resolved, both with respect to the proposition of the things to be believed, and with respect to the assent to be given to the things and objec- ts revealed and proposed. Concerning whose resolution the opinion of Authors is so manifold and varied, that almost as many senses appear as there are heads. In the first place, indeed, the Manichaeans, as St. Augustine relates, book De utilitate credendi, chap. 1, taught that it was superstitious for faith to command before reason, as if nothing were to be believed except what reason should persuade: which error Peter Abailard seems certainly to have renewed, who, as St. Bernard narrates, Epist. 190, in the first threshold of his Theology, or rather of his Folly-theology, defines faith to be an estimation: as if in it each one might think and speak what he pleased: or let the sacraments of our faith hang beneath an uncertain claim, and no longer subsist more certain in their certitude. The second opinion is that of the Lutherans and Calvinists, asserting that the ultimate resolution of our faith, both with respect to the proposition of the things to be believed, and with respect to the assent to the things proposed, ought to be made into Scripture alone, or into the internal motion of the Holy Spirit specially assisting each believer, so that from Sacred Scripture they may know what is to be believed. The third opinion is that of those who wish that resolution to be made into the very habit of divine faith, through which the objects appear to be believed. The fourth opinion is that of those who refer back this ultimate resolution to the authority of the Church; who indeed are again split into various opinions: First, Medina, book 6, De recta fide, chap. 11, contends that our faith ultimately rests upon the divine authority of the Church. Secondly, Valentia, qu. 1, p. 1, distinguishing between the proposition and definition of the things to be believed, says faith is resolved into the divine authority which is attributed to the Church; but the proposition into its human and civil authority. Thirdly, Suarez, disp. ⟦illegible: number⟧ sect. 8, distinguishing between the resolution of faith in itself, and with respect to us, says faith regarded according to its own na- ture is resolved into the divine authority of the Church, but regarded with respect to us must be resolved into the civil and human authority of the Church itself. Fourthly, De Lugo wishes the assent of faith to be resolved partly into divine authority, partly truly into the testimony of the Church, etc. The fourth opinion² is that of those who assert that the ultimate resolution with respect to the proposition and revelation of the things to be believed, and likewise the assent to be given them in private faith, is made into special revelation; but where the revealed objects must be believed with Catholic, that is universal, faith, then faith must be resolved into the very testimony of the Church, as well divine as human. The last opinion finally, which appears the more common and truer, and more conformable to the mind and doctrine of the Subtle Doctor, is that of those who teach that the ultimate resolution of faith ought to be made, with respect to the proposition and revelation of the things to be believed, into the very authority of the Church determining and pro- posing that this or that is revealed by God; but with respect to the assent which the believer gives to the things themselves revealed, that resolution ought to be made into the divine truth, both in knowing and in spea- king.

First Conclusion. Human reason is not a sufficient foundation on which Christian faith can rest, and consequently faith cannot be resolved into it. This is de fide, especially with respect to the former part,

Proof from that passage 1. ad Corinth. 2. our preaching is not in the persuasive words of human wisdom, but in showing of spirit and power, that your faith may not be in the wisdom of men, but in the power of God. And therefore the same St. Paul 2. ad Cor. 10. says that the understanding must be brought captive into obedience to Christ; but there would be no captivity of the understanding if it believed only those things which appeared evidently, and became known solely through natural reason. The same truth appears from those words of Christ the Lord Matth. 10. I confess to thee, Father, because thou hast hidden these things from the wise and prudent (namely the mysteries of faith), and hast revealed them to little ones. And chap. 12. the same Christ the Lord addressing Peter, who had testified Him to be the Son of God, says: Flesh and blood hath not revealed it to thee: where by the name of flesh and blood He signifies the natural power and operation of the intellect.

The same truth is evident from the common opinion of the holy Fathers; but especially of St. Dionysius, chap. 6, De divinis nominibus, where he says: Faith is the firm seat of believers, and the simple notion of truth in impersuasible truth certain. That is, the notion of those things which cannot be perceived nor proved by natural reason; whence St. Nazianzen admirably admonishes, Orat. 34. Let us follow faith rather than reason. And St. Hilary *lib. 8. De Trinitate, about the middle. The greatest merit, he says, of faith is to hope what you know not. To which St. Augustine elegantly accords Tract. 4. in Ioan. weighing that saying of Isaiah 7. Unless you believe, you shall not understand; for he says: We believe that we may know, we do not know that we may believe ⟦illegible: attribution words garbled beyond recovery in scan⟧ Hom. 25. in Evangelium: faith has no merit, to which human reason supplies the experiment.

It is proved also by reason: If faith rested upon human ratiocination, then chiefly either evident, or merely probable; but neither can be said. Not indeed the first, because the evidence of an object necessarily entices the intellect to assent; but faith does not thus necessitate, because it is free, and is received most freely by the will; For, says St. Augustine Hom. 26. in Ioan., in other things man can act unwillingly: but to believe only willingly; whence even the mysteries of faith can be denied by the liberty of free choice, and faith itself rejected, as is evident not only of infidels, who refuse to receive the faith, and become rebels to the light, while the mysteries of faith are announced to them, but even of the heretics themselves, who cast off the faith already received, and by their liberty refuse to believe certain mysteries of faith. Nor yet the second: otherwise the assent of faith would not be firm and stable, but only fluctuating and doubtful, which St. Bernard certainly condemns in Abailard with these words:

If faith fluctuates, vain is our hope. Foolish therefore would our Martyrs be, enduring things so bitter on account of uncertainties, nor doubting under doubt to enter by a long exit a hard exile for the reward of remuneration. But far be it that we should think that anything in our faith or hope hangs, as he thinks, by dubious estimation, and not rather that the whole of what is in it is supported by certain and solid truth, persuaded by oracles and miracles divinely given, established, and consecrated by the birth of the Virgin, the blood of the Redeemer, the glory of the Risen One. Those testimonies have been touched upon too much. If at all too much, the Spirit Himself in the last place renders testimony to our spirit, that we are sons of God. Vainly therefore does anyone dare to call faith an estimation, unless he has not yet recei> ved that Spirit, who either ignores the Gospel or thinks it a fable? I know whom I have believed, and am certain, cries the Apostle; and do you whisper to me: faith is an estimation? Do you prattle ambiguity to me, than which nothing is more certain? But Augustine otherwise: Faith, he says, is not held in the heart in which it is, by conjecturing or opining, by Him to whom it belongs, but with certain knowledge, conscience acclaiming. Far be it, far be it, that Christian faith should have these limits. Let those estimations belong to the Academics, whose it is to doubt of all things, to know nothing. I indeed secure proceed in the sentence of the Master of the Gentiles, and I know that I shall not be confounded. It pleases me, I confess, his definition of faith, even though he too secretly disparages it. Faith is, he says, the substance of things to be hoped for, the argument of things not appearing. Substance, he says, of things to be hoped for, not of empty phantasies of conjectures. You hear substance; it is not permitted you in faith to doubt or dispute at pleasure, nor to wander hither and thither through the emptiness of opinions, through the byways of errors. By the name of substance something certain and fixed is set before you. You are closed in by certain bounds, hemmed in by certain limits. For faith is not estimation, but certainty

Thus St. Bernard.

Abailard objected that passage Ecclesiasticus 19. He that believeth quickly is light of heart: but to believe quickly is to apply faith to a proposed thing before its manifest evidence, and its truth ascertained through ratiocination; therefore faith rests chiefly upon human testimony. — I answer, that the literal sense of that oracle must be understood of human faith, namely that it ought not to be applied except with prudent deliberation, seeing that it rests upon the testimony of a man, who lies open to error and falsehood; for of this human faith the Wise Man speaks, since he treats there of those who lend tacit ears to those twitching at and censuring the life of others. Add that even if that oracle were to be understood of divine faith, it would signify only that one ought not so quickly, and so tacitly, to believe one claiming to have a divine revelation, when from elsewhere it is not established by some other testimony that such a man making the assertion is worthy to be believed.

You will object 2. Other texts of Sacred Scripture in which it seems signified that what is to be believed must first be examined. Thus Luke 1. it is said of the Virgin that she did not lightly believe the Angel announcing the mystery of the Incarnation, but pondered what manner of salutation this might be: thus that text 1. Thes. 5. Prove all things; hold fast that which is good: and likewise that 1. Ioan. 4. Try the spirits, whether they be of God. — I answer to the first, that the Blessed Virgin indeed prudently examined whether he who spoke was a true messenger of God or a counterfeit, nor did she linger long in that doubt, but just as neither more quickly, so neither more slowly did she believe than was fitting; and therefore her faith is commended by Elizabeth saying to her, Blessed art thou that hast believed: nevertheless she did not believe on account of any human reason, but on account of this divine testimony proposed to her by the Angel: because no word shall be impossible with God: for when Mary heard this, she immediately answered the Angel: be it done to me according to thy word. Similarly to the other texts say, that the spirits are indeed to be tried whether they be of God, nor is credit to be readily given to those who like the Prophets, or Apostles, announce something on the part of God beyond the doctrine handed down by the Apostles, or approved by the Church, as all heresiarchs are accustomed to do: for all those Innovators must be tried, and from them must be required the indications and signs of their pretended divine mission and delegation, namely either miracles, or revelation of secrets, or certain prediction of future events, etc.

He objected 3. If one must believe the objects proposed without evident reason, the consequence will follow that many things can be believed against manifest reason; and thus the infidels will come to be excused, if they believe some most absurd things against manifest reason, seeing that they represent themselves as believing God with their reason contemned and cast aside; but to assert this seems absurd; therefore, etc. — I answer by denying the major, for while we deny that one must believe on account of the evident knowledge of reason, we do not exclude every use whatever of reason in eliciting the act of faith; for some intelligence and knowledge of the object is necessary before faith itself be applied: not indeed inasmuch as it is in itself, but on account of which it is proposed and offered to be believed; whence the infidels would not be excused if they believed certain things besides those which are proposed to them by the Church to be believed.

Second Conclusion. — FAITH DOES NOT REST UPON SACRED SCRIPTURE ALONE, NOR UPON AN INTERNAL MOTION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT, AND CONSEQUENTLY CANNOT BE RESOLVED INTO EITHER.

The Conclusion is proved first with respect to Sacred Scripture, namely that it is not a sufficient rule for discerning those things revealed by God from those which are not revealed by Him; for the most certain and infallible rule of faith ought to be most constant and altogether incorruptible; for if it were subject to corruption and alteration, no one could be certain and secure about the things regulated by it; but Sacred Scripture lies open to alteration and corruption, for it can be changed either by addition, or by detraction, or by voluntary transmutation, as is done by heretics who interpolate the divine Scripture, but also through the ignorance of men, indeed even their carelessness, as very often happens with Amanuenses or Typographers; hence there have been so many emendations and editions of the sacred Bibles, especially of the Vulgate emended in many places not only by Sixtus V but also by Clement VIII, notwithstanding which Franciscus Lucas, Theologian and Dean of the Cathedral Church of Saint-Omer, published a little book containing many varieties of readings by which the edition of Clement itself could be rendered more perfect, were the authority of another Roman Pontiff to be added; moreover that collection of Franciscus Lucas comprises four thousand and more passages which in the Bibles presented by Clement could be further emended. The same thing is notably evident in the Hebrew and Greek Codices.

Then, if Sacred Scripture of itself sufficed to discern the revealed from the unrevealed, it would also be sufficient to settle all controversies concerning faith; but of itself alone it is not sufficient for that, seeing that it does not even disclose which books are Canonical; for whole books are rejected as spurious by the Lutheran and Calvinist Heretics, for instance the book of Tobias, Judith, Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus, Maccabees; indeed even from the received Canonical books not only many verses, but also lengthy chapters are expelled by them. For in lib. Daniel. c. 3. there are 67 continuous verses, all of which they expunge; furthermore there are whole and lengthy chapters 13. and 14., comprising the histories of Susanna, and of Bel and the Dragon, and of Daniel's imprisonment, and of Anna the Prophetess, which they do not admit, inasmuch as by no testimony of Scripture itself can those books, verses, and chapters be condemned. Finally it contains very many texts fighting against each other, which do not seem able so easily to be reconciled by means of it: thus Ioan. 10. Christ the Lord says: The Father is greater than I. And chap. 14. the same testifies, I and the Father are one.

The heretics reply, that the conflicting texts, being thus difficult of understanding, can be explicated and reconciled by others. — Truly, although I candidly confess that very many texts of the Scriptures can be thus explicated and reconciled by others, nevertheless nevertheless the interpretation and reconciliation of many must be sought from elsewhere than from Scripture itself, which is especially clear concerning the texts cited out of the Gospel of St. John; for when formerly the Arians attacked the Divinity of Christ the Lord, they objected the former text, and the Catholics answered with St. Athanasius that Christ was equal to the Father according to His Divinity ⟦illegible: closing clause garbled beyond recovery, apparently contrasting a lesser estate according to His human humility⟧. But when the Catholics objected the latter text to the Arians, these replied that it was to be understood of unity not of Divine essence, but of conformity of wills and affections. And so they explicated that confirmation out of that text Ioan. 17. where Christ the Lord entreats the Father that His Disciples all may be one: thou Father in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us: signifying thereby that He speaks only of unity of affection, since the faithful could not have with each other or with God unity of essence and entity. And further on: And let them be one, as we also are one. Whence if such were universally the response of the Heretics, that the interpretation of Scriptural texts reconciled was not to be sought elsewhere than from Scripture itself, a palm would have had to be conceded to the Arians, seeing that they elucidated Scripture opposing them through other texts of the same Scripture; which likewise the Catholics could not so easily perform.

Moreover Sacred Scripture is in very many places most difficult, as St. Peter testifies, Epist. 2. cap. ult. where speaking of St. Paul he says: as also in all his epistles, speaking in them of these things, in which are certain things hard to be understood, which the unlearned and unstable wrest, as also the other Scriptures. By which words the holy Father signifies that in Sacred Scripture there are certain obscure things whose sense they cannot attain by their own interpretation; whence the same admonishes there cap. 1.

Every prophecy of Scripture is not made by its own interpretation: for prophecy came not by the will of man at any time, but holy men of God spoke inspired by the Holy Ghost

therefore Sacred Scripture of itself cannot sufficiently discern what is to be believed from what is not to be believed. ⟦illegible: one or more lines apparently lost here by the scan; text resumes at a word ending "-tissima"⟧ tissima: but that private revelation is altogether uncertain, and that internal inspiration altogether doubtful, whether it be from the Holy Spirit. Nor does it stand in the way that it is said 3. Regum alt., God gave a spirit of lying into the mouth of the Prophets of Achab, who nevertheless all thought themselves moved by the Spirit of God, when Sedecias, one of those Pseudo-Prophets, addressing and striking Micheas the true Prophet of God, said: Did the Spirit of the Lord then depart from me, and speak to thee? Wherefore St. John, Epist. I. cap. 4. admonishes: Do not believe every spirit, but try the spirits if they be of God; therefore if we ourselves must try and judge the spirit, it cannot itself be our judge; for it is not permitted to judge the judge. Then: If that internal spirit could be a certain rule of faith and piety, it would follow that anyone whatever could indulge his genius at pleasure, and defend and commend a most perverse doctrine devised by himself, and even horrendous crimes, boasting that this was inspired in him by the Holy Spirit; for who could show this to be false, if there were no other judge of this matter besides internal inspiration? Hence we see the Libertines noting most flagrant crimes, Luther and other Apostates proving with feigned authority and inspiration of the Holy Spirit sacrilegious marriages, adulteries, compilations of Monasteries, conspiracies against Princes set over them, and other crimes of this kind. Finally: If that private spirit were a sufficient rule of faith for discerning what is to be believed from what is not to be believed, a continual occasion of schisms would be given; for whoever should think and imagine himself to possess a revealing spirit, could choose as object of faith whatever pleased him most, nor could he be accused of error by anyone whatever, seeing that he would affirm that he receives it from the Holy Spirit speaking inwardly; indeed it will often happen that the same spirit will seem contrary to itself, while one asserts that something has been revealed to him the contrary of which another says has been revealed to him; thus among the Lutherans and Calvinists (who receive this internal spirit as a certain rule) that spirit is altogether contrary in very many things, especially concerning the divine Eucharist; whereas the Lutherans believe the body of Christ the Lord to be really and substantially present in the Eucharist, the Calvinists affirm the contrary.

Which argument Campianus indeed urges excellently, Orat. I. ad Academicos, where he speaks thus:

Why therefore do you tear one another apart, when all glory in the same spirit? The spirit of the Calvinians receives six epistles which do not please the spirit of the Lutheran; yet neither rests upon anything but the Holy Spirit. The Anabaptists call the History of Job a stage-play mixed with tragic and comic laws; who know this? The teaching Spirit. Castalio basely deemed that mystical Song of Solomon, which Catholics admire as a Paradise, as hidden manna, as sumptuous delights in Christ, of no more worth than a love-song with an handmaid, and a venal amatory colloquy with the chambermaids of the court. From where did he draw it? From the Holy Spirit. Concerning the Apocal. of John, whose authority Jerome confirms ringing in his Epist. ad Paulinum, Luther, and Brentius, and Kemnitius desire some difficult thing I know not what of an Aristarchus: you, namely, inclined that it be deposed; whom did they consult? They commit it to the Spirit. And preferring far above the three prior epistles of Paul, he decrees that the unique Gospel of John thenceforth is to be named beautiful, true, preeminent. Seeing that he, so far as lay in him, would gladly have enrolled even the Apostles as companions of his quarrels: under what Doctor? The Spirit. Indeed even that petty brother did not hesitate to assail the Gospel of Luke in a wanton > style: because in it the good works of virtue are commended to us more frequently; whom did he consult? The Spirit. Theodore Beza dared to translate corrupt and vitiated that arcane word out of Luke chap. 22. This is the chalice of the new testament in my blood, which (Chalice) shall be shed for you: who indicated that this speech admits no exposition except of the wine of the chalice converted into the blood of Christ? The Spirit. Finally since all believe each his own spirit, they lie about the name of the Holy Spirit with horrible blasphemy. Do not those acting thus betray themselves, are they not easily refuted, are they not held in an assembly of such men as you are, Academicians, and bound with the least effort?» So far he.

OBIICIES 1. Various texts of Scripture, by which it seems intimated that Sacred Scripture is chiefly to be consulted in establishing the things of faith: thus Christ the Lord addressing the Jews, who were calling His Divinity into doubt and denying Him to be the true Messiah, said Ioan. 5. Search the Scriptures, for they give testimony of me. And shortly after: If you believed Moses, perhaps you would believe me also. And Luke ult. He uses the Scriptures to confirm the truth of His resurrection; and consequently Christ the Lord plainly teaches that Sacred Scripture is a true and legitimate rule of faith, which ought chiefly to be heard in proposing the things of faith. The same St. Paul indicates 1. ad Timoth. 3. where after he had told him, from thy infancy thou hast known the holy letters, he adds: all Scripture divinely inspired is profitable to teach, etc.

I answer that these and similar texts signify nothing else than that Scripture is indeed an infallible rule of faith; since it is the written word of God, it is necessary that it be a rule of truth, because there is no surer rule than the authority of God, which is contained in His word, and applied through it; whence just as it is impossible for God to lie immediately of Himself, so also it is impossible for Him to make falsehood through another, since morally both are equivalent. From this however it does not follow, that Sacred Scripture of itself is a sufficien­tiens rule, whereby things to be believed are discerned from things not to be believed, which alone we intend in the present Conclusion.

OBIICIES 2. Likewise many texts of Scripture, by which it is intimated that the Spirit of God speaking in us and inspiring those things which are to be believed and done is to be heard. Thus that text of the first to Cor. 2. is said, that the animal man perceiveth not those things that are of the Spirit of God... But the spiritual man judgeth all things, and he himself is judged of no man. Whence it is consequent that whoever is moved by the Spirit of God can rightly judge and discern what things are to be believed from those not to be believed. Similarly 1. Ioan. 2. the Apostle exhorts the faithful: Let the unction, which you have received from him, abide in you; and you have no need that any man teach you: but as his unction teacheth you of all things, and is truth, and is no lie; and as it hath taught you, abide in him.

I answer to the first. Truly the spiritual man, insofar as he is moved and governed by the Spirit of God, judges all things rightly, nor ought he therefore to be reproved by anyone; yet because it is not always clear to us whether he here and now is directed by the Spirit of God — since indeed many think themselves moved by the Spirit of God who are nevertheless driven by the spirit of wickedness, as is evident not only of the Prophets of Ahab but also of those Jews whom St. Paul rebuked, who had a zeal of God, but not according to knowledge — hence it comes about that we stand in need of another judge and director, from whom we may infallibly receive which things are to be believed and which are not to be believed.

To the second I say that St. John there is dealing only with those who were instructed in the faith, both by themselves and by the other Apostles; whence by the unction which he wills to remain in them he signifies that same faith which they had received from God through the preaching of the Apostles; hence he exhorts them not to fall away from that faith, and not to hear other Pseudo-apostles turning them away from the right faith. Thereupon he premised: These things I write to you concerning those who seduce you. But that another cannot be the meaning of St. John appears not only from the text, but is also evinced by an open reason; for if the internal unction and inspiration of the Holy Spirit alone sufficed for discerning those things which are to be believed and done from those not to be believed and done, it would follow that neither the faithful, to whom he was writing, nor indeed even infidels to be converted would have need in any way of any Doctor or instructor; and forthwith sacred Scripture would be vain also for them, because God would sufficiently reveal privately to each one all things that are to be believed and done, nor would anyone be bound to believe anything other than what God had made known to him through that internal revelation, which is absurd.

Third Conclusion. — THE ULTIMATE TERMINATIVE OBJECT OF THE ASSENT OF INFUSED FAITH IS NOT THE VERY HABIT OF DIVINE FAITH ITSELF. This is the doctrine of the Doctor, question 23, cited n. 7, etc.

Proof first: because, as we shall say below, supernatural habits do not incline the powers sensibly toward their objects, nor do they confer upon them an easier operation, but only give to the faculties the virtue of producing an act supernatural in substance; but that sensible propensity and facility of the faculty in eliciting its operations arises either from preventing grace or from acquired habits; now that which terminates ultimately, or into which our assent of infused faith is ultimately resolved, ought to confer facility for eliciting that assent, for this reason indeed does it terminate ultimately, namely because in it, as in the firmest motive of its assent, the intellect rests: therefore that assent cannot be resolved into the very habit of faith.

Second, if the assent of infused faith were resolved into the very habit of faith itself, so that that habit were the cause why one would ultimately give assent to things proposed, it would follow, says the Doctor, first part, n. 11, that all having the habit of infused faith, as soon as something to be believed by divine faith was proposed to them, would straightway give their assent, even if they had nowhere heard, or at least had forgotten, that it was revealed by God; for they would have in the very habit of faith a motive sufficiently determinative of the intellect for giving assent; but it is absurd that one should believe something by divine faith without any intention whatsoever toward God: therefore, etc. It would follow secondly that the assent of faith would not require the command of the will, and consequently would not be free, nor forthwith any virtue: because that habit of faith, since it is not free of itself, nor by reason of its subject, namely the intellect, would incline naturally and necessarily the intellect to assent; but it is absurd to assert that divine faith is not a virtue, nor the act of faith free: otherwise it would not be meritorious: whence St. Augustine, Homily 25 on John: The rest, he says, man can do unwillingly: but to believe only willingly. Therefore, etc. It would follow thirdly that some faithful person having infused faith could give assent to the mysteries of faith without any instruction whatsoever; for if infused faith had that power of determining the intellect to giving assent, that God is trine and one, e.g. through the mere apprehension of the terms, the consequence would be that a baptized child, as soon as he obtains the use of reason and liberty, and apprehends those terms, God is trine and one, would be inclined necessarily to give assent to those very terms, without any further instruction whatsoever, and without any motive that might lead him by the hand to giving assent; but that this is false not only experience demonstrates, but reason also will convince; because the intellect cannot give assent to any unevident object unless the command of the will intervene: but the will cannot move the intellect to give assent unless that assent have some motive: therefore, etc. — To this add, that thence it would follow that faith would not be faith; for the assent of faith, whether divine or human, is necessarily elicited on account of the testimony of someone who is credited; but if the infused habit should of itself sufficiently move the intellect to give assent, no external testimony would be needed for that, and consequently it would not be a true assent of faith.

You will object 1. Into that must the assent of faith be resolved which makes manifest the objects to be believed; but through the light of faith the objects to be believed are made manifest; for this reason St. Peter calls it a lamp, Epistle 2, chapter 1: Unto which benefits attending, as unto a lamp that shineth in a dark place: therefore, etc.

I distinguish the major: that which makes manifest the objects to be believed by way of a light holding itself on the side of the motivating and terminative object, I concede; on the side of the principle, I deny. The minor likewise I distinguish: faith is a light having the ratio of a principle with respect to the act and assent of faith, because it concurs as concausa with the intellect in which it inheres for eliciting that assent; but it does not move objectively, because it is not known; but the light of which we treat is that which objectively manifests the truth, and which is called the known medium, and is the reason which we can offer why we believe; but this is the testimony of him who speaks and attests, whether divine or human; for if anyone should require why I believe something most certainly, I may rightly reply, because a man worthy of credence has testified to me that it is certain.

You will urge: Corporeal light sufficiently manifests colors to sight: similarly beatific light, although it is an elicitive habit of the clear vision of God, nevertheless so manifests God that the intellect gives assent to that vision without any other medium: therefore also faith, which is likened to corporeal light, and to which the light of glory corresponds, moves of itself also sufficiently the intellect to giving assent to the propositions of faith.

I deny the consequence, and the reason of the disparity is first, because, says de Lugo, distinction 1, section 2, bodily sight is not moved by light to believing the truth of color, nor does it discourse formally or virtually; but light in it is required either as a principle co-efficing the species of colors, or as a condition and production of vision; and perhaps although it be a medium of the vision itself, still it is not a medium unknown and unperceived by the eye; because the eye, seeing colored objects, perceives also the light by which they are illuminated; but the habit of faith is a medium unknown, and consequently cannot sufficiently move the intellect to assent, so that into it it should pour out its credulity and in it find rest.

To the second I say similarly that there is no parity; because that light, since it clearly represents to the intellect the objects as they are in themselves, consequently brings it about that the intellect gives assent to them on account of their evidence; but it is otherwise with the habit of faith, which however much it illuminate the intellect, nevertheless leaves the objects which it manifests always obscure; whence it tends only toward them on account of another's testimony. To these add, that the habit of faith and of the light of glory agree with each other in this, that they are a light holding itself on the side of the principle, because they manifest objects only in the genus of efficient cause, insofar as they produce acts of manifestation; just as the eyes themselves also are wont to be called lights among the Latins, because they make seeing; yet knowledge is not resolved into them.

You will object 2. The assent of faith is resolved into the revelation of God: but divine revelation is made through the medium of the light of faith: therefore the habit of faith is that into which the assent of faith is resolved.

I distinguish the major: the assent of faith is resolved into the revelation of God, revelation properly so called being taken for the veracity of God revealing the mysteries, I concede; improperly so called for that whole thing through which the mysteries are manifested, I deny. The minor likewise I distinguish: God reveals improperly through the medium of the light of faith, I concede; properly, I deny: for the proper revelation of God is the speech of God; but God is not held to speak to us properly when he grants the habit of divine faith, otherwise he would be held to address infants while they are baptized, since he infuses into them the habit of faith; similarly he would be said to speak to us when he bestows the intellect, because through it we can believe him and know other objects, which certainly is absurd; for the intellectual faculty or the habit of faith is not properly the word of God, whence its production and bestowal cannot be held to be properly so called speech or revelation.

You will object 3. Into that is the assent of faith concerning some mystery, e.g. of the Incarnation, resolved, through which that mystery becomes credible to us; but through the habit of faith all mysteries become credible; for by its defect we could not in any way believe as we ought: therefore into the habit of faith the assent given to any mystery whatsoever is ultimately resolved.

I distinguish the major: into that must the assent of faith be resolved through which the object becomes credible with a credibility holding itself on the side of the believing power, I deny; holding itself on the side of the motive persuading the truth and terminative of that same assent, I concede. The minor likewise I distinguish: through the habit of faith the object becomes credible with a credibility arising on the side of the principle eliciting the act of assent, I concede; on the side of the motive, or term, toward which that assent ought to tend and as it were find rest in it as in the ultimate reason, I deny: for properly something is said to be credible when, reasons and motives being adduced, it is persuaded to be worthy of belief, nor ought assent be denied to it on account of the persuasive reasons which allure to it.

Fourth Conclusion. — THE AUTHORITY OF THE CHURCH AND ITS TESTIMONY CANNOT BE, WHETHER PARTIAL OR TOTAL, THE FIRST FOUNDATION ON WHICH OUR ASSENT OF FAITH RESTS, NOR FORTHWITH THE TERM INTO WHICH IT IS ULTIMATELY RESOLVED. This seems to be the genuine doctrine of the Doctor, which he indicates in book 1, distinction 11, question 4, n. 15, where after he had said that the Church in the Lateran Council under Innocent III, chapter Firmiter, rightly defined that in the sacrament of the Eucharist there takes place the transubstantiation of bread into the body of Christ, although this truth would be contained only implicitly in sacred Scripture, he adds: Whatever is proposed by the Church to be believed must be believed to pertain to the substance of the faith, and this after that solemn declaration made by the Church. And if you ask why the Church willed to choose that understanding of this article so difficult, when the words of Scripture could be saved according to an easier understanding, and truer according to appearance, concerning this article, saying that the Scriptures were expounded with that spirit with which they were written; and thus it is to be supposed that the Catholic Church expounded them with that spirit with which the faith was handed down to us, namely the spirit of truth; and therefore she chose this article because it is true: for it was not in the power of the Church to make this true, the matter belonging not to things but to God instituting; but the Church explained the understanding handed down from God, directed in this, as is believed, by the spirit of truth.

By which words the Doctor recalls even the divine testimony itself of the Church in things to be believed and proposed back to the supreme veracity of God, and thus it must be reduced to divine authority; and forthwith, according to the mind of the Doctor, the authority of the Church, whether divine or human, is not even a partial term into which the assent of faith ought to be resolved.

Proof therefore of the Conclusion: first indeed by the authority of sacred Scripture, which intimates that the assent of faith is elicited only on account of the divine testimony. Thus Matthew 15, Christ the Lord addressing Peter, who had confessed him to be the Son of God, says: Flesh and blood hath not revealed it to thee, but my Father, etc. And John 1: No man hath seen God at any time: The Only-begotten Son of God hath the testimony of God in himself. Hence St. Paul, second, writing to us, calls the hearing of faith: you have received it not as the word of men, but as the word of God. And 1 John 5: He who believeth not the Son maketh him a liar, because he believeth not in the testimony which God hath testified of his Son. By all which it is openly signified that the assent of faith ought to be elicited only on account of the sole divine testimony, whereby it is strengthened, and into which it is resolved.

The same the holy Fathers teach, especially indeed St. Augustine, in the book Contra Epistolam Fundamenti, chapter 14, where he says: Let us follow those who invite us first to believe what we are not able to see, that we, having been made firmer by the faith itself, may merit to understand what we believe, no longer strengthening our mind inwardly by men, but by God himself.

By which words St. Augustine teaches that we are indeed promoted to faith through the doctrine and ministry of men; but that the assent of faith is made only on account of the authority of God alone.

Proof also by reason: theological faith differs from human faith in this, that the latter is supported by human, the former by divine testimony; but however much the Church be guided through the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit, and by this reason her testimony rest upon divine authority and receive firmness and certitude from it; nevertheless her testimony is only human, nor consequently can it be called the word of God or divine revelation: therefore into her testimony the assent of faith is not resolved, nor does it find rest in it. The major stands. The minor is proved: the same judgment must be held concerning the authority granted by God to the Church around the determination and proposition of things to be believed, as concerning the power of binding law around rightly and becomingly instituting morals; but however much this legislative power of the Church be from God, laws sanctioned by the Church are not held to be divine, but human, because they arise only from the human Ecclesiastical authority; otherwise laws sanctioned by princes would also be called divine: for there is no authority except from God: whence Proverbs 8, God himself testifies: By me kings reign, and lawmakers decree just things: therefore although the Church have the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit in establishing and proposing things of faith, her testimony is not purely divine, but human; and forthwith faith ought not ultimately to terminate at it, but necessarily ought to be reduced to something further, whereby it is supported and rests. Add that the authority of the Church, however divine, is only a participation of divine authority, and therefore necessarily ought to be resolved into that very authority: therefore our assent of faith cannot be firmly established in quiet in it, but further must be resolved into divine authority.

It is confirmed: into that faith cannot ultimately be resolved even partially as to assent, which of itself formally is something created; but the testimony of the Church, even insofar as it is the organ of the Holy Spirit, is something created: therefore into it faith as to assent cannot be resolved even partially. The minor stands: for the Church insofar as it is taken for the collection of those men who are moved and directed by the divine inspiration of the Holy Spirit, imports only men, who doubtless are something created. But the major is proved: for that into which our faith is ultimately resolved as to assent must be the formal motive of that assent; but the formal motive of such assent, under which we give assent to God through faith, is not something created but uncreated, namely divine truth in speaking and knowing, as was said above: therefore, etc.

Response from de Lugo: if the adequate formal object under which our faith exists were partially something created, our faith would not be adequately divine, nor should we believe God on account of his sole authority or veracity, but only partially; because indeed the assent of faith would also be elicited on account of something created, namely on account of the testimony of the Church. Secondly, if the assent of faith rested partially upon human authority, it would follow that it is partly fallible: for just as it is infallible because it has for its formal object the infallible divine authority, so if it rest upon human authority, which of itself is fallible, it will also be fallible. For the assent of faith cannot have greater infallibility than the motive upon which it rests has. — It is confirmed, because the intellect cannot give assent to any conclusion with a firmness of certitude stronger than the principles on account of which it gives assent: therefore if the testimony on account of which it gives partial assent be fallible, it cannot have entirely firm and infallible assent around the objects proposed through faith to be believed. Thence that the assent of the intellect, as also the conclusion, follows for the most part the lot of the weaker and more infirm principle; and forthwith if one of the motives of the assent of faith be fallible and uncertain, even the assent will be fallible and doubtful.

You will object 1. Christ the Lord seemed to require that faith from men which would exclude not human reasons, but would even rest upon them: therefore according to his teaching divine faith can also rest upon human testimony. The antecedent is proved from that John 10: If you believe not me, believe the works: where he proposes the miraculous works wrought by him as a reason upon which the assent of faith might rest. And chapter 11 he said to the Disciples: Lazarus is dead, and I rejoice for you, that you may believe, etc. Similarly John 4 it is said of the Samaritans: Many believed in him on account of the word of the woman giving testimony, because he said to me all things whatsoever I have done. — It is confirmed from that to the Romans 10: You are fellow citizens of the Saints, and of the household of God, built upon the foundation of the Apostles and Prophets. Where Paul reduces the whole faith to the Apostles, through whose preaching it first shone forth. Hence St. Augustine seems to suppose in book De Spiritu et Littera, chapter 34, that faith terminates ultimately even at the persuasion of men, since he says: For neither can the rational soul believe by any free will whatever, if there be wanting the incantation or persuasion by which it believes; he did not say persuasion which remains, but by which it believes: as if indicating that it also enters into the formal ratio: which he also said in book 1 to Simplicianus, question 2: Who can believe unless touched by some calling, that is, by some attestation of things?

I answer, that in all these nothing else is signified than that human authority and persuasion are required for the assent of faith, not as the formal reason of giving assent, but only as a condition proposing and applying, or disposing the intellect to assent; even as the apprehension of the intellect is a condition applying the formal object to the will: namely for demonstrating its goodness, which allures the will to pursuing it; for just as the will cannot love an object unless its goodness be proposed to it by the intellect, so similarly the faithful cannot give assent to God, especially Catholic and general faith, while it reveals the mysteries, unless through the Church and human testimony the divine revelation become known to him and be proposed.

They object 2. The assent of human faith, which is given to the King speaking through Legates, is resolved partially into the authority of those Legates: therefore similarly the assent of faith, which we offer to God speaking through the Church and Saints and Apostolic men, ought partially to be resolved into their authority. The consequence is clear from a parity of reason: for God (says de Lugo) does not otherwise act with men through his Prophets or Apostles than do earthly Kings through their Legates; whence St. Paul writes, 2 Corinthians 5: Therefore we are ambassadors for Christ.

The antecedent stands purely plainly: for when some legate, who is held to be an upright man, proposes something on the part of the King, he is believed not only on account of his words on account of the authority of the King, but also on account of his private and particular testimony.

I deny the consequence: and the reason of the disparity is open, that faith whereby the King is believed speaking through his Legates, since it is human, is no wonder that the testimony of the legate have the ratio of that partial object, because the testimony of the legate is of the same ratio and order with the testimony of the King, and of itself sufficient for conciliating the assent of human faith; but it is otherwise with theological faith, which since it is divine can be supported by the sole testimony of God revealing, and consequently cannot of itself ultimately rest upon the testimony of the Church, which is purely human.

You will object 3. If the testimony of the Church ought to be resolved into something else, namely into the testimony of God, it would follow that in the assent of divine faith a vicious circle is committed; for the faithful would believe the authority of the Church on account of divine revelation, and again divine revelation on account of the authority of the Church; for if you ask some faithful person why he believes God to be trine, e.g., he will reply, because the Church testifies: if again you require whence he knows the testimony of the Church to be true, he will answer, because God, who is truthful in speaking, revealed through sacred Scripture the Church to be the pillar of truth, and to have the assistance of the Holy Spirit in things of faith to be decided and proposed: therefore either it is necessary that a vicious circle be admitted in the assent of faith, or that it be partially resolved into the very testimony of the Church.

I deny the major, and to its proof I say, that the resolution of the assent of faith into the testimony of the Church is not made by the same ratio by which it is made into the testimony of God; since it is resolved into the testimony of the Church as into a rule proposing things to be believed, and discerning them from things not to be believed; but it is resolved into the testimony of God as into the formal reason of believing, or giving assent to the mysteries revealed. Whence in that assent no vicious circle is committed: since a vicious circulation is not made when a passage is made from one thing to another according to a diverse ratio and in a diverse genus of cause; but this occurs in the present case; indeed the faithful believes the mysteries revealed on account of divine revelation, as on account of the formal cause of believing; but he believes that revelation to be divine and true on account of the authority of the Church, as on account of a condition applying the things to be believed, and discerning things to be believed from things not to be believed; but to give assent to one thing as to the formal reason, and to another as to a directive or dispositive reason for assent, is to give assent on account of a diverse reason and in a diverse genus of cause: therefore in that assent no vicious circle is made.

You will object 4. Into that is faith ultimately resolved which is the motive why we believe other things; but the authority of the Church is the motive why we believe all mysteries. It is proved by the authority of St. Augustine praised above: I would not believe the Gospel unless the authority of the Catholic Church moved me: therefore, etc.

I deny the minor, and to the authority of St. Augustine I say, that he is to be understood concerning the motive of credibility of the Gospel; but not concerning the ultimate motive of credulity itself, or of faith. Whence that on account of which St. Augustine said it, not that he thought the testimony of the Church to be the terminative object of theological faith, through which among other things I believe sacred Scripture to be the word of God; but because the authority of God being set aside, that judgment, which necessarily precedes the act of faith, would have had no sufficient foundation whereon he might judge firmly that the Gospels were written by divine authority to be believed; nor for discerning between the true Gospel and those books which in the first times of the Church were circulated under the name of the Gospel of Paul and of certain other Apostles, which the Church reproved as supposititious and spurious offspring.

You will object 5. We must have some certain and infallible rule of faith, to which we adhere firmly, that we may not be as little children wavering, and carried about with every wind of doctrine, says St. Paul to the Ephesians 4; but this visible and infallible rule cannot be other than the authority of the Church: therefore our faith can be resolved into the Church as authority, and be established in her.

I distinguish the major: we must have an infallible rule of faith, through which we know what things are to be believed, or not, I concede: into which as into the ultimate term and motive our faith be resolved, I deny. And thus the minor being distinguished, I deny the consequence. For although the Church be an infallible rule of faith, yet our faith is not resolved into her, as into an ultimate formal cause, but only as into a condition, whether per se or per accidens, required for assent. I say per accidens, because certainly the faith of the Patriarchs and Apostles and of all those who heard the divine mysteries immediately from God revealing did not depend upon the authority of the Church proposing and revealing the matter of faith.

They object 6. The divine testimony pertains of itself to the formal object of faith; but when the Church proposes and defines something according to divine authority and through that infallibility which she has from the assistance of the Holy Spirit, she proposes and defines through an authority committed to her: therefore her testimony pertains to the terminative object of faith.

I distinguish the major: the divine testimony absolute and immediate pertains to the terminative object of faith, I concede: immediate and only participated, such as is the testimony of the Church, I deny. Or otherwise: the divine testimony pertains to the object of faith either per se or reductively, I concede; reductively only, I deny. But the testimony of the Church is only a certain participation of the divine testimony, and is reduced to that as to its principle; whence faith cannot ultimately be resolved into it, especially since that itself is resolved into something else.

Fifth Conclusion. — FAITH AS REGARDS THE PROPOSITION AND REVELATION OF THINGS TO BE BELIEVED IS RESOLVED INTO THE TESTIMONY OF THE CHURCH INSOFAAR AS SHE IS GOVERNED BY THE HOLY SPIRIT; AS REGARDS THE ASSENT, IT IS RESOLVED INTO DIVINE VERACITY, OR INTO THE TRUTH OF GOD IN KNOWING AND SPEAKING: This seems more conformable to the doctrine of the Doctoris Subtilis in 3. dist. 23, n. 11, where he says: I give assent to this proposition, God is trine and one, because previously I give assent to God revealing this truth, etc.

Proof moreover of the first part from all those texts of Scripture by which the Church is said to be ruled and governed by the Holy Spirit, and to be His organ in handing down and proposing the things of faith. Whence 1. to Timothy 3. the Church of God is called the pillar and firmament of truth, because assuredly our faith, as regards the proposition of the things to be believed, rests upon her; whence Saint Augustine, book Contra Epistolam Fundamenti, chapter 5, steadfastly says: I would not believe the Gospel unless the authority of the Catholic Church moved me, which authority once taken away, I could not even believe the Gospel. And further below, speaking of the book of the Acts of the Apostles, he says: I must believe that book if I believe the Gospel, because the Catholic authority commends both Scriptures alike to me. Moreover Christ the Lord would have the authority of the Church esteemed so great that He decrees in Matthew 18 that he be held as a Heathen and Publican who has not heard the Church in receiving correction, much more in giving assent to the things proposed by her.

The second part is gathered tacitly from what has been said: since faith as regards assent is ultimately resolved into that which is its formal object under which: whereas divine veracity, or the truth of God in knowing and revealing, is the formal object under which of our faith: therefore our faith as regards assent is resolved into that divine veracity. The major stands: for that into which faith is resolved as regards assent must be the formal motive of such assent: but the formal motive whereby through faith we assent to God, and the formal object under which of faith, are entirely the same; therefore faith is resolved into that divine veracity itself.

YOU WILL SAY 1: That very divine veracity, or the truth of God in knowing and saying, is resolved into the truth of God in being: therefore into it also the assent of our faith ought to be resolved.

I distinguish the antecedent: it is thus resolved under the ratio of being, I concede: under the ratio of motive, I deny. Whence the consequence must be denied, for the first motive of divine faith, from which it receives its infallibility itself, and by which it is distinguished from human faith, is the very authority or veracity of God, which embraces the infinite wisdom of God, by which He cannot be deceived, and the same goodness, by which He cannot deceive.

YOU WILL SAY 2. If divine truth be the ultimate motive whereby the faithful believe the revealed mysteries, nor can faith be grounded ultimately in anything else than in it as ultimate foundation and term, it would follow that most simple believers do not believe with divine faith, since most of them do not believe precisely on account of the authority of God revealing, but either on account of the authority of parents, or of Pastors, or of the Church herself proposing the things of faith: but the consequent is absurd: therefore also that from which it follows.

I deny the major: for no one is truly a believer who does not believe the things proposed to him on account of the authority of God, at least implicitly; for although many do not think explicitly of divine revelation and authority, yet they are borne toward it confusedly at least and implicitly, while they believe those things which are proposed to them both by the Church and by Parents, or Pastors, when they judge that what is proposed has been revealed by God. But that it mostly happens that even the learned and those instructed in the divine mysteries often seem not to think about divine authority or revelation while they believe, this occurs on account of habit and facility in believing, whereby it comes about that they are moved by the authority of God to believe without any reflection: for which reason, those who devote themselves to sacred ministries, for the most part perform them with legitimate intention even actual; nevertheless because they do not reflect upon it, they seem to themselves afterwards to have lacked legitimate intention.

YOU WILL SAY 3: By faith we believe that God is the first truth: yet this we do not believe on account of His own testimony, for it would seem ridiculous to believe someone to be truthful because he himself said so. Then, by faith we believe that God exists: but this we do not believe on account of His testimony: both because it would be absurd to believe someone to exist because he himself testified to it, since he could not testify to it unless he existed; and because what is less known cannot be the reason for knowing what is better known: but it is better known that God exists, since this is established by natural reason, than that this truth is attested by Him: therefore we cannot believe that God exists on account of His truth. Finally, we believe that God revealed the articles of faith: but this we do not believe on account of another reason, otherwise there would be a process into infinity: therefore some assent of faith cannot be resolved into the very veracity of God.

I answer to the first by denying the minor: for it is not by natural reason alone that it becomes known to us that God is truthful, just as by the same light it is established that He is infinitely perfect; but it also appears through the testimony of God Himself attesting His own divine veracity. Whence in answer to the proof, I say that the reason is not equal between God attesting Himself truthful and a man who should testify the same of himself; because he proves it by no arguments, nor is any just reason present to me whereby he might move me to believe him to attest truly while he pronounces himself truthful: but since with the natural light it is certain to us that God is supremely wise, and good, so that to Him it conflicts either to be deceived or to deceive; hence deservedly we believe Him while He professes Himself truthful: we believe, I say, indeed with a firmer assent than that other, which could be elicited on account of natural reason: for faith is more certain than any natural science, as we shall say below. To the second I deny the minor: and in answer to its proof I say that the reason is not the same concerning the testimony of God and of men, because the testimony of man not only makes its object inevident, but also that testimony is fallible: and thus it is a medium of knowing far more uncertain and imperfect than evident natural reason is; whence that testimony generates only opinion, or human faith; but human faith cannot subsist together with certain and evident cognition of the existence of something, as we said in the Logic, treating of the assent of the intellect: and consequently it is no wonder, if one cannot believe someone to exist on account of his testimony, when he has evident knowledge of that existence. But it is otherwise in divine faith, which surpasses every natural science in certainty, because divine testimony is infinitely more certain than any natural science; therefore although there be granted any cognition whatsoever drawn from human reason concerning the existence of God, or another object, we are still deservedly moved by divine testimony, that we may believe it more firmly than that assent is firm which would arise from natural reason; whence although from the very fact that God speaks to us we know evidently that He exists, nevertheless the will could still command the intellect, that it should believe that divine existence on account of the testimony of God affirming it.

To the other proof of the same minor I say, that what is less known does not always make the assent less certain, for a more evident proposition does not always produce a more evident assent, but it suffices that it be more certain in the thing known: whence the obscure revelation of God can be the reason why I assent more firmly to some thing otherwise naturally known to me evidently; and thus although the faith whereby I believe that God testifies Himself to exist be more obscure than the cognition whereby I naturally know Him to be, since it is however absolutely more certain, it can generate a firmer assent.

To the third I deny the minor: for we believe that God revealed the articles of faith on account of that very revelation: for as light is not only the reason why I see colors, but also why I perceive the light itself: so divine revelation is the formal ratio of believing at once both the revelation itself, and the things revealed through it: and immediately it does not follow, that that revelation ought to be believed through another, and that a process into infinity ought to be made.