Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

WHAT IS THE MATERIAL OBJECT OF FAITH.

Note 1. The name of faith has a varied signification both in Scripture and among the Holy Fathers. First, indeed, it is taken for truthfulness in keeping promises: thus Romans 3. Will their unbelief make the faith of God of none effect? God forbid; God is true, but every man is a liar, etc. On which account Christ the Lord is called in Apocalypse 1. the faithful witness, that is, truthful: and the etymology of the word fides accords, which is derived from the words fin and dien, because what is said comes to pass, as St. Augustine observes, Epistle 19 to St. Jerome from Cicero, book De Officiis. — Secondly, faith is used for faithful execution of the ministry committed: thus Isaiah 11. concerning the coming Messiah it is foretold: Faith shall be the girdle of his loins. And according to this acceptation, in Luke 12. the steward is called the faithful dispenser. And in chapter 16. of the same Christ the Lord says: He that is faithful in that which is least, is faithful also in that which is greater. — Thirdly, it is used for conscience, or practical judgment about things to be done: in which sense that passage of Romans 14. is commonly understood: All that is not of faith, that is (what is against the dictate of conscience), is sin. — Fourthly, it is sometimes taken for confidence; thus Christ speaking to the Apostles in Matthew 8. says: Why are you fearful, O ye of little faith? There the discourse is about the Apostles fearing shipwreck: but fear is opposed to confidence: and immediately there faith is taken for confidence; hence St. James admonishes one praying faithfully to ask with nothing wavering. And this in conformity with Mark 11. All things whatsoever you ask when ye pray, believe that you shall receive, and they shall come unto you. Which acceptation of faith heretics will have to be the genuine one, using Christian and justifying faith for the very confidence by which anyone believes sins are forgiven him by God. — Fifthly, faith is sometimes taken for the object of faith, or doctrine; thus Acts 6. it is said: A great multitude also of the priests obeyed the faith. And Apocalypse 2. to the Bishop of the Church of Pergamus it is said: Thou hast kept my name, and hast not denied my faith: hence St. Athanasius where he expressed and declared the principal truths of the mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation, adds: This is the Catholic Faith, which unless everyone believe faithfully and firmly, he cannot be saved. — Sixthly, more properly faith is taken for the habit, or supernatural act of the intellect, by which we assent with certainty indeed, but not evidently, to truths revealed by God on account of His very revelation and authority. In which sense the Apostle to the Hebrews 11. describes faith thus: But faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not. Which description is made by the property and effect of faith itself: for faith is the basis and foundation of hope, for therefore we certainly hope for temporal goods, because through it we know they have been promised to us by God. It is likewise the evidence of things that appear not, that is, conviction and most certain persuasion of those things which are not seen, nor known, nor believed from elsewhere, than because they have been revealed by God. Hence faith can rightly be defined: the supernatural habit or act of the intellect, by which we firmly, though obscurely, assent to those things which God has revealed either immediately or mediately.

Note 2. The object of any habit or science may be either inadequate or adequate. The first is called that which is only partially attained by the habit itself; thus the human body is called the inadequate object of Physics, because it is only as it were a part of natural body, about which the whole of Physics is occupied. This again is twofold: namely either primary by reason of dignity; thus God is called the primary object of Metaphysics, and the rational soul is reckoned the primary object of Physics, inasmuch as it treats of man; for the other things are either less noble than God or than the soul; or secondary, inasmuch as it is indeed attained by the habit, but not with so much nobility and dignity on account of its lesser perfection. The adequate object is called that to which all things attained by the habit are referred, and are ordered to it. They can however be ordered in two ways, namely either by intrinsic order, or only by extrinsic. In the former way they are said to be ordered, when namely all acts elicited by means of the habit are so conversant about such an object, that in their entity, or in their intrinsic manner of tending toward those objects, they declare also an intrinsic order and respect to the object of attribution; just as e.g. all creatures which are seen in the Word by the beatific intellect are perceived by it in such a way that with them God Himself is seen: or those objects can be so ordered that nevertheless they can also be attained by acts which of themselves declare no order to the object of attribution; thus e.g. although the knowledge by which a Physician investigates the nature and virtue of some plant could conduce to restoring health to an infirm person, yet it is not ordered to that in such wise that it cannot also be for another end, to which the nature and virtue of that plant could serve: for that knowledge represents only the nature and virtue of the plant, which of itself is indifferent, to be ordered and applied to the health of man, or to another end, to which it could be ordered; whence that ordering is rather extrinsic, namely on the part of the one having that knowledge, not truly intrinsic and on the part of that knowledge. Therefore it is asked whether God, or something other than God, is the adequate object of attribution of faith, such that all its acts necessarily declare an order to God, nor can they attain anything by faith without God being likewise perceived by that act.

Note 3. That God, in order relative to faith, can be considered in various ways: First indeed, under the reason of Deity, or divine essence, inasmuch as namely it is the font and origin not only of all divine perfections, but also of all created beings whatsoever, which emanate from His ocean of entity like certain little rivers, and flow back and are ordered into it as into their end. Secondly, under the reason of supreme Lord, inasmuch as namely He has authority over all created beings whatsoever, which owe obedience to Him at His nod. Thirdly, under the reason of first truth, and that threefold: namely, either in being, or in knowing, or in saying; for truth is distinguished threefold: first indeed in being, which is the very infinite entity of God claiming for Himself from eternity the all-mannered and most real reason of infinite being; by reason of which He is called the true God, that is, having true Deity, and is distinguished from false and lying gods. Truth in knowing is the very supreme and infinite wisdom of God, by which He knows things as they are in themselves, so that it is impossible for Him in any way to be deceived in their apprehension. Finally truth in saying, or revealing, which in us is a moral virtue, or propensity, and inclination to say what is true; in God however it is the supreme inclination to speak truth in all those things which He enunciates either by Himself or through others, so that He cannot deceive anyone; which inclination is also called veracity.

From this manifold consideration of God, the opinion of Authors varies concerning the formal object of faith. For some, with our Aureolus, will God to be the formal object of faith under the reason of Deity. Some few, with William of Paris, Tract. De Fide, judge God to be the object of faith itself, under the reason of Lord, or inasmuch as He commands something, though not evident, to be firmly believed. The rest however will God to be assigned the object of faith under the reason of first truth, and that either in being, or in knowing, or in saying.

Four things therefore occur here chiefly to be determined: The first indeed, what is the adequate object of attribution of faith. The second, whether God is the primary and more principal object, and that either under the reason of Deity, or under the reason of Redeemer and Savior. Thirdly, whether God can be reckoned the formal object of faith under the reason of first truth in being. Fourthly, what is the formal object under which, or motive of faith.

First Conclusion. — THE MATERIAL OBJECT OF DIVINE FAITH GENERALLY AND ADEQUATELY TAKEN IS EVERY BEING REVEALABLE BY GOD. Thus the Doctor in 3. dist. 23. num. 6. where he says: It can be held that there be one faith of all credibles, because it regards the credible not under the proper reasons of those things, but as they are revealed by God, and it believes all things revealed by Him to be true, by the same habit whereby it believes the Revealer to be truthful.

But the Conclusion is proved: That is said to be the object of attribution of any habit into which all acts to be elicited by the same habit tend directly and per se: but absolutely all acts of faith tend immediately and directly into being revealable by God: therefore, etc. The major stands from what was said in Note 2. The minor also is evident per se; for there is no act of faith which does not tend directly into that which has been revealed by God, and that for no other reason than because it was revealed by God, who can neither deceive nor be deceived.

Next, that is the adequate object of attribution of any habit, about which it can operate: but faith cannot operate except about the object revealed by God, as will appear below: therefore it is necessary that revealable being be the object of attribution of faith. It is evident: for all matter which can be informed by the formal reason of any habit pertains to its material object, and is comprehended under it: but every revealable being can be informed by divine testimony, which is the formal object of divine faith.

2. Finally, although de facto not only all objects which are perceived through divine faith, but also all acts which are elicited through it, can be ordered to God directly, or at least indirectly, nevertheless it is certain that God can reveal many truths to be known through faith, which are not ordered more to the glory or knowledge of God than those natural truths which the Philosopher speculates. I confess however that God in some sense can be called the adequate object of attribution of faith, inasmuch as namely all things which are perceived through divine faith are referred directly or indirectly to the knowledge of God. Indeed all things which are believed by divine faith truly contribute to manifesting more perspicaciously and evidently the essence or perfections or operations of God; for truly in the mysteries which immediately regard Divinity itself, the matter is open: similarly the mysteries which pertain to the Incarnation of the Word are conversant about God as existing and operating in our humanity: but those which make discourse about Angels and men even look toward God; for Angels and men are His images, servants, sons, and heirs. Finally the rest are ordered to God mediately or immediately, not only as to the ultimate end, but also that through their knowledge and acquaintance, as it were carrying a torch before them, God may be known more excellently.

You will say. Faith cannot be conversant about every revealable being: therefore revealable being as such is not the object of attribution of faith. The consequence is evident: for the adequate object of any habit ought not to exceed the attainment and power of that habit. The antecedent is proved: for faith cannot tend except into what has de facto been revealed. For, says the Apostle, faith is by hearing: but hearing by the word of God: are those things revealable which have not de facto been revealed? therefore, etc.

I distinguish the antecedent: faith cannot actually be conversant about every revealable thing, pass; by virtue and aptitude, I deny. I confess indeed that an act of assent cannot be elicited except about those things which have been revealed: yet the very habit of faith of itself is capable of inclining the intellect, in which it inheres, to assent to any revealable whatsoever, wherever revelation concerning it shall have occurred. But we have said advisedly rather revealable being than revealed being to be the object of attribution of faith, that namely we might expound more openly the power and efficacy of faith, and might signify so great is the force of that divine virtue, that although now it inclines the intellect only to assenting to determined articles and certain definitions, nevertheless it is of itself sufficient to incline and bind the intellect to assenting to infinitely many syncategorematic propositions, if just so many were successively proposed and revealed to the intellect by God through eternity. For this, says the Doctor in the place cited above, does not exceed the virtue nor the capacity of a finite power or habit.

Second Conclusion. — GOD IS THE PRIMARY AND MORE PRINCIPAL OBJECT OF DIVINE FAITH, AND THAT PRECISELY UNDER THE REASON OF DEITY. This is the doctrine of the Doctor in 3. d. 23. num. 15. where he says: One must posit infused faith on account of firm assent, so that it regards God as first object, about which as object some certitudes are formed, which are eminently in the articles more mediately or more immediately, according as it thus is thus they regard. He had said before num. 10. Thus God infused into us the habit of faith inclining our intellect into the assent of the articles, such that faith regards God Himself, about whom the articles are formed, to which as secondary objects we assent ⟦illegible: a few words appear lost in the scan here⟧ per ha-

The first part of the Conclusion is proved: First indeed from sacred Scripture, which expressly signifies that faith tends into God, and is chiefly conversant about Him; hence it is called the faith of God: for Christ admonishes Mark 11. Have the faith of God. Wherefore St. Paul 1. Thessal. says: Your faith, which is toward God: whence to Hebr. 11. he admonishes: he that cometh to God must believe that he is: by which words he signifies that the first act of faith tends especially into the existence of God: which indeed St. Augustine most excellently teaches, lib. 1. De Civit. Dei, c. 29. The first and greatest office of faith is, that there be belief in the true God: by all which it appears that faith tends into God as into its primary and principal object, to which the other things which it perceives are ordered and referred, not only in the reason of being, but also in the reason of credible object. — Next, that is reckoned the principal object of any science or habit which has the reason of subject in the principal conclusions or articles and sanctions: but so it is with God with respect to faith; for truly it stands that God, as One, Three, Creator, Redeemer, etc., is the subject in the principal articles of faith: therefore, etc. — Finally, that ought to be called the principal object of any intellective habit, to whose more excellent cognition all those things are recalled which are known through that habit by the intellect: all things which are made known through divine faith are referred to this end, that we may know who, what sort, and how great God is in Himself, and in what way we ought to worship Him and tend into Him, that we may be given His eternal felicity: therefore God is truly the principal object of faith.

The second part also is proved, namely that God under the reason of Deity has the reason of object of faith; not truly under the reason of any extrinsic denomination, for instance Redeemer, Sanctifier, or Glorifier: Both because God is the same object of Theology as of divine faith, says the Doctor in Prologo q. 3. quaestiuncula 2. laterali n. T. since indeed Theology leans chiefly upon the principles and light of faith, and both tend about God as God is, though diversely; for faith tends into God by simple assent, which it exhibits to things revealed by God, but Theology by illation, which it elicits from the very knowledge of God received through faith, which is as it were the leading-by-hand of Theology itself to God: and because God ought to be reckoned the adequate object of faith according to that reason which is intended first and principally through faith: but God is intended sooner under the reason of Deity than under any other reason whatever: therefore He ought to be reckoned the adequate object of faith under the reason of Deity. The major stands. The minor is proved: there are more orders of perfections in God, of which certain are wholly intrinsic, as to be one, three, good, etc., others truly even extrinsic, as to be de facto Creator, Justifier, and Glorifier: but the prior order of divine perfections, which chiefly constitute and illustrate the entity and Deity of God, is attained through faith sooner than the perfections of the latter order, since indeed divine faith is borne into God, first inasmuch as God is, and believes first of God that which in Him is first credible: but the perfections of the prior order just as they are prior in the being of the thing, because it is prior for an absolute thing to be according to itself than by order to another, so are they prior according to the reason of the credible, for the reason of the credible follows upon the truth of the thing, but truth upon entity: therefore since God is prior according to the reason of Deity than under any other reason whatever, He is also sooner attainable through faith, and consequently under the reason of Deity the adequate object of faith.

You will object 1. The humanity of Christ ought no less to be reckoned the object of faith than the Divinity: therefore this is not the adequate object of faith. The antecedent is proved from that John 17. Now this is eternal life, that they may know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent. Which words are not only to be understood of beatific cognition, but also of the knowledge of faith, with which accords that John 20. But these things are written, that you may believe, because Jesus is the Christ the Son of God, and that be- lieving you may have life in his name. Hence Christ the Lord Himself in John 14. admonished: You believe in God, believe also in me. Therefore the humanity of Christ the Lord no less regards the object of faith than the Divinity.

I deny the antecedent, and to its proof I say, from these divine oracles only this is elicited, that the humanity of Christ regards more proximately the adequate object of faith than all other created things whatsoever, which are comprehended under the object of faith, both on account of its more intimate conjunction with the Divinity, and because it is the first and principal medium of our salvation, and the most excellent benefit of God toward men: whence it follows that it pertains to faith only secondarily, like the other benefits of God, and like the other media bestowed upon us for salvation, namely that from its cognition the supreme goodness and mercy of God toward us may be better made known. Hence foolishly does Calvin accuse the scholastic Doctors, as if they openly fought against the divine Scriptures, when they assert God to be the primary object of faith but not likewise Christ, whom, he says, against the divine oracles they separate and exclude from the object of faith; how calumnious this is openly stands; since indeed we do not refuse that Christ the Lord should be reckoned as primary among the secondary objects of faith; such that faith directs the human intellect sooner into God as He is God than into God as He is man, which certainly is not alien from the mind of Christ the Lord Himself; since indeed from the oracles soon praised and other similar ones it stands that Christ intimated that faith is to be directed sooner into God than into Himself.

You will object 2. Every science and intellective habit supposes concerning its subject, or object, that it is, and what it is, as Aristotle teaches lib. 1 Posteriorum: but faith is an intellective habit: therefore it supposes the existence and essence of God, and consequently supposes God under the reason of Deity, and accordingly under that reason is not occupied about God, nor tends into Him.

I answer. 1. The major can be denied universally speaking; for neither is that prenotion concerning the subject and object, that it is, required by Aristotle for every science and intellective habit whatsoever, but only for the most perfect demonstration, by which the first pro- perty is demonstrated of its essence; for there are more demonstrations by which the very existence of the subject or object is proved at least a posteriori; but distinct cognition of its essence is rather intended than supposed through science: whence the major generally speaking is not true.

I answer 2. Distinguishing the major: every intellective habit supposes its object, both as to whether it is, and as to what it is, when the object concurs to its production together with the intellect, I concede: otherwise, I deny. Similarly the minor distinguished, the consequence must be denied: for faith since it is a habit divinely infused, as we shall say below, is produced by God alone, as efficient cause, not truly partly by the intellect, partly by God as object: and immediately it ought not to suppose the essence and existence of God, but is legitimately occupied about both.

You will object 3. Very many things fall under faith, and through it are certainly believed, which can by no reason be ordered to a more excellent knowledge of God, or to the manifestation of His glory, for instance that Tobias had a dog, and that this dog coming as it were a messenger rejoiced in the wagging of his tail, as we read Tobit 11: therefore God cannot be reckoned the ade- quate object of faith under the reason of Deity.

I deny the antecedent. And to its proof I say that history of the dog of Tobias, and things similar, are ordered to God, both because they conduce to manifesting the veracity of God, which cannot deceive even in the lightest matter: for since faith professes God truthful in all things, and leans most of all upon His truth- fulness in saying, hence whatever it perceives absolutely, it orders into God: for this is the virtual discourse of faith: Whatever God says is true: but God, through at least the Canonical writer of the book of Tobias, said that the same Tobias had a dog: therefore that is true. It also con- duces to commending the exquisite goodness of God toward His faithful clients, such as was Tobias: whose most welcome part of the history was that advent of the dog preceding and announcing the approach of the younger Tobias, joyful with his tail. Finally it conduces to signifying that wise ordination of divine Providence, whereby after various hard- ships, and diverse trials and tribulations He introduces prosperity, and abundantly pours forth joy not only in the greatest, but also in the least things. The other things which could be objected against this Conclusion have already been weighed and dissolved in the above-praised preliminary Question of our Theology. Therefore let there be

Third Conclusion. God under the reason of first truth in being is the formal object of divine faith.

It is proved. That is the formal object by which it is specified, and through which it is distinguished from other habits: but faith is conversant about the truth of God in being, and through it is distinguished from other intellective habits: therefore, etc. The major stands. The minor is proved as to the first part by the authority of St. Dionysius, lib. De divinis nominibus, c. 1. where he says: Faith is about simple and ever-existing truth: but truth simple and ever-existing is none other than the very truth of God in being: therefore, etc. It is proved also as to the second: for God under another reason is the object of faith than of hope and charity: but He is the object of hope as faithful, of charity truly as supremely good: therefore He ought also to be the object of faith as supremely true. It is confirmed: if God could be reckoned the object of faith under some other reason, especially as most of our authors will, under the reason of first truth in knowing, and saying: but that does not seem admissible: both because the formal object of one habit ought to be one thing: but the truth of God in kno- wing and revealing is not something one; since indeed the truth of God in knowing is His most real and wholly divine intrinsic perfection; but truth in saying or revealing is something extrinsic, contingent, and a respect of reason: and because the formal object of a real habit ought also to be real, or, says the Doctor in 3. dist. 23. n. 6., The formal reason of habit is not a reason or being of reason: but to be revealed that God is Three and One does not say beyond God Th- ree and One except a respect of reason, just as to be known says nothing except a respect of reason beyond the thing which is known: therefore the assent to God three and one because of revelation, as the formal reason of the object, to which I assent through a real habit, is a being of reason, which is inconvenient, since a real habit has a real formal object, just as a real power a real formal object: therefore passive revelation, since it is a thing of reason, cannot be the for- mal reason of tending into this God is three and one: finally be- cause the formal object ought to be something intrinsic to the material object: but the truth of God, or divine revelation, is not something intrinsic to God, nor a divine perfection affecting His essence: therefore, etc.

You will say 1. That is the formal object of faith into which the thing itself is resolved, or which is the reason on account of which we believe God: but the reason on account of which we believe God revealing is not the very truth of God in being, but veracity or truth in saying: therefore God under the reason of first truth in being is not the formal object of faith.

I distinguish the major. The formal object motivating, and with respect to the believer, I concede: specifying, and with respect to faith, I deny. For the specifying formal ob- ject and the motivating differ in this, that the former chiefly regards the habit which is conversant about it; the latter however the faculty and power which through the habit tends into the object; hence the spe- cifying object ought to be something intrinsic to the material object; the motivating however can be something extrinsic; for whatever can entice the faculty, so that it be occupied about the object, can have the reason of motivating object.

You will say 2. Faith is a practical habit; for it is not ordered only to knowing supernatural truth; but also to loving it, and obtaining it by good works; for faith without works is dead, says St. James: therefore it ought to have a practi- cal and operable object: but God under the reason of first truth in knowing is not a practical object: therefore under this reason He is not the object of faith.

I deny the minor. For God, as first truth, is represented not only through faith as speculable object, but also as practical; because for some object to be reckoned practical, it is not necessary that it be operable by us, but it suffices that it can be obtained by us, and that from it as from the first rule of all rectitude and probity of morals the reason of actions can be de- rived: but by this reason God, as first truth in being, can be regarded, for thus indeed He is our ultimate end, ex

Fourth Conclusion. — THE FORMAL OBJECT BY WHICH, OR FORMAL REASON WHEREBY FAITH TENDS INTO GOD, IS THE TRUTH OF GOD NOT ONLY IN SPEAKING, BUT ALSO IN KNOWING. This seems more conformable to the mind of the Doctor in 3. distinct. 23. where he says:

It can be said, that acquired faith is like infused faith in some respect, indeed in many. For as acquired faith assents, or believes the word of someone, because he believes the veracity of the one asserting it to be true, so infused faith assents to some revealed thing, because it believes God, or the veraci- ty of God asserting it. And because what God asserts supernaturally He reveals, therefore faith assenting to that revealed thing, because it assents to the veraci- ty of the revealer, is a supernatural habit: but He reveals credi- ble things when He infuses the habit: and in this manner of speaking, faith has not certainty from the object, but from the veracity of the witness, namely God.

By this the Doctor signifies that the divine truth is the motive, or the reason under which faith tends toward God, so that however much God might be the first truth in being, nevertheless faith would not tend toward Him unless He were likewise the first truth in knowing and speaking, which can deceive no one.

The Conclusion is proved, moreover: Under that reason is faith occupied concerning God, under which God moves the created intellect to give assent to things revealed; but this God supplies through both truths, in know- ing and in speaking. Proof: for under that reason He entices the created intellect to assent to things revealed, under which He is apprehended as altogether truthful and infallible in proposing and revealing; but for this it is necessary that He be known as the first truth in knowing and speaking; for both these truths are necessarily prerequisite, so that the intel- lect may give assent to the things revealed without any hesitation, or fear of error and deception; for if either one is lacking, the intellect will remain doubtful about the things proposed: for however truthful God may be, and may have a propensity to speak the truth, if the intellect is un- certain about His infinite wisdom and His infallible apprehension of those things which He knows, it will be in doubt whether what God proposes is in reality true, just as, however much one may know a man to be truthful, nevertheless because on account of his limited faculty of understanding he very often lies open to error and apprehends things otherwise than they are, it comes to pass that he does not believe so firmly that something proposed by a man is true; therefore just as it is necessary that the intellect know certainly that God cannot deceive anyone, because He is infinitely good and truthful, so also it is needful that it know that He cannot be deceived, because He is supremely wise, so that, with both pieces of knowledge concurring, it may give firm assent to the things revealed.

It is confirmed: In order that the testimony of God may be the formal reason under which faith believes, it must appear altogether infallible; but it cannot so appear unless God is apprehended as the first truth both in speaking and in knowing; therefore, etc. The major stands; for since faith is altogether infallible, it must also rest upon an altogether infallible motive. The minor how- ever is proved: in order that the testimony of God may be altogether infallible, it does not suffice that God cannot be deceived in speaking, but it is further required that He cannot err in knowing; for he who can err in knowing can also deceive others, if not out of malice, at least out of ignorance; therefore, in order to establish this divine infallibility, it is as necessary that God be known as true and infinitely wise in knowing, as that He be truthful and supremely good in speaking.

You will say 1. To different habits there ought to belong a different object quo, or a diverse reason under which they tend toward their object; but faith and Prophecy are distinct habits, and consequently diverse are the reasons by which they tend toward the object; but Prophecy tends toward God, as toward the first truth infallible in knowing and revealing; therefore under this reason faith cannot tend toward Him.

I distinguish the minor: Prophecy tends toward the first truth infallible in knowing, and speaking in the same manner as faith — this I deny; in another manner — this I grant. For faith indeed tends toward the first truth, but in an unevident and obscure manner, so that if there were an evident manifestation of the object, the assent given to that proposed object would not be an act of faith, but either of science, or of another habit. Prophecy, however, stands indifferent toward an obscure, or evi- dent proposition of the object. Hence it is that although faith had no place in Christ the Lord, yet in Him was the gift of Prophecy. Add to this that Prophecy and faith have various other differences; for Prophecy is granted only for the illumination of the intellect, while faith is ordered also to a pious motion of the will; faith regards something eternal, and if it contemplates certain temporal things, for instance the mystery of the Incarnation, it regards them only inasmuch as something eternal underlies them, namely inasmuch as God is incarnate, crucified, dead, etc. Likewise faith is chiefly ordered toward the proper sanctification of the subject; Prophecy, however, tends toward temporal things and toward the sanctification of others;

You will say 2. The formal object quo, as well as quod, ought to be some one thing; but, as was said above, the truth of God in knowing and speaking is not one thing, seeing that one is eternal and the other temporal, one intrinsic to God and the other extrinsic; therefore it cannot be accounted the formal object quo, or the reason under which the intellect is moved to assent to the things revealed.

I distinguish the major: It must be one thing in the order of being, or according to entity — this I deny; in the order of the moving object, or according to the formality of the motive — this I grant. The minor I like- wise distinguish: the divine truths in knowing and speaking are not one thing in respect of entity — this I grant; in respect of the reason of the motive — this I deny. For just as the same act can tend toward two partial ends, and the assent of a conclusion can be elicited on account of two assents to the premises, and their two truths, and as one act of human faith can be exercised on account of the testi- monies of two persons, so that it depends partially upon each; so one and the same act of divine faith can depend upon two motives concurring partially toward it; whence although divine truth in speaking and revealing be not one thing according to entity, nevertheless because the knowledge of each must be presupposed as the condition sine qua non the assent of faith would not be elicited, therefore they agree together in the unity of the motive.

You will say 3. If the truth of God in speaking were the formal mo- tive object of faith, then chiefly either inasmuch as it is active revelation on the part of God, or inasmuch as it is passive revelation on the part of the believer; but neither can be said. Not indeed the first, because the formal reason under which must be intrinsic to the formal object quo; for in every science the reason for asse- nting to any conclusion is the intrinsic truth of that conclusion itself; but active revelation, since it is a relation of God ad extra, is not something intrinsic to God revealing, nor to the things revealed. Nor yet the second, since passive revelation is a mere extrinsic denomination, and a regard of reason, it would follow that the motive of divine faith is a being of reason, and consequently that our faith is founded upon a being of reason.

I deny the minor, and to its proof I say that the formal reason under which of faith is the active revelation itself, or the manifestation on the part of God of the truths pertaining to faith; for the whole reason why we assent to things re- vealed is because God, who is infallible and truthful in speaking, proposed and revealed such truths to be believed. Whence although the formal reason under which in the sciences must be intrinsic to the conclusion, namely because scien- tific assent is elicited on account of the evidence of the conclusion itself elicited from premises evidently known; yet it is otherwise in faith, which moves to assent only on account of the extrinsic testimony of the speaker.