Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

How great is the dignity and excellence of divine Faith is elegantly described by William of Paris, Bishop, Tract. De virtutibus, cap. 1, where he introduces Faith thus reciting her prerogatives and encomia:

I am the first life of the human mind, Habacuc saying: The just liveth by faith: for since God is the life of souls, and since there are three conjunctions of His with the soul, the first to the intellect, the second to the affection, the third to the interior sense, I am the first, by which I mortify the human mind and subject it to God; I am the light in the works of creation and of man's reformation, created first even as light among the divine operations: I am the pillar of light leading the intellect forth from the Egypt of error, protecting it against the weapons of Heretics and Philosophers: I am the first warrior of God, powerfully assaulting and victoriously entering first the citadel of the human mind, that is, the intellectual faculty, and slaying in that citadel the very first enemy of God, that is, human wisdom, or at least taking it captive, or, as the Apostle says, 2. ad Cor. 10., leading into captivity every understanding that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God.... I am she who (if it be lawful to say so) deifies God in the world; for He is not approached for worship except through me.... I have cast down idols, put demons to flight, caused temples to be sanctified, cleansed the earth, restored the worship of God.. I am the virginity of the hu- man mind, that is, the integrity of the intellect, violated neither by the adultery of idolatry nor of heresy,

etc. — This is she, says St. Bernard, Serm. 76. in Cantica, which, knowing no falsehood, touches the inaccessible, discovers the unknown, comprehends the immense, apprehends things to come, transcends the limits of human reason and the bounds of experience, nay the very use of nature, and in a certain manner encloses within her most chaste bosom eternity itself. — Hence excellently St. Augustine, Serm. 1. De verbis Apostoli, and Serm. 18. De Tempore, cap. 12, says:

To none are riches greater, to none treasures, to none honors, to none is there a greater substance of this world, than the Catholic faith, which lifts up sinful men, enlightens the blind, cures the infirm, beatifies Catechumens, justifies the impious, restores penitents, augments the Just, crowns Martyrs.

Wherefore we undertake in this Disputation to delineate the nature, fecundity, and outstanding gifts of this most excellent and wholly divine virtue in the three following articles, of which the first will explain the object of faith, the second its habit, the third its act. Moreover, it ought to seem wonderful to no one that, contrary to the custom of many theologians, I here raise no questions concerning theological places, or those divine armories from which are drawn the oracles by which the dogmas of faith are wont to be defended and illustrated, such as Sacred Scripture, Councils, the decrees of the supreme Pontiffs, and the documents of the holy Fathers: for indeed besides the fact that such questions are appended only incidentally to adorn this matter, it is certain that they have been so happily and copiously anticipated by the Controversialists of our time that nothing would seem left to add. Add that it has long since been my conviction that these difficulties can be explained neither briefly as their dignity deserves, nor in few words with the fruit that could be hoped for: since on those controversies so very many arguments have been proposed back and forth both by our own writers and by adversaries, and at copious length, weighed on either side, to wish to embrace the explanation of them all in few words does not seem anything easier than if one should pretend to shut up the Ocean in a vessel. Where- fore lest the present Tomus exceed its proper magnitude and grow into that bulk which could be read only with distaste; nor be carried about by younger students of theology (especially for whose benefit we write) except with tedious labor; therefore we have for the present refrained from those questions, intending to dispute upon them (if God shall ever so grant) in a special volume.

It has been established by Philosophy that every intellectual habit is specified by its object, nor can we otherwise come to know its nature than through its order to the object about which it is occupied; whence, following a fitting method, Theologians investigating the nature of divine Faith scrutinize it from the delineation of its object. Now the object of any habit is called that which is obiected, that is, set before the intellect to be known through that habit: and this is customarily distinguished as twofold, namely material and formal. The former is so named not because it is corporeal and constituted of physical matter, but either because it is that about which the intellect transacts, so that it may discover its truth, just as some craftsman is occupied about matter which he works according to the rules of his art; or by reason of that analogy and similitude which it has with matter; for as matter is indifferent to the various forms by which it may be informed, so this is indifferent to the various sciences and diverse habits by which it may be attained and perceived: for the same human body, for example, is at once the object of Medicine as curable, of Physics as natural, and of Geometry as extended. But the formal object is that formalitas to be found in the material object which determines it to a certain science and peculiar habit; so that by the same account it be not perceived by another habit; thus the naturalness of the human body determines it to Physics, curability to Medicine, measurability to Geometry. —

Again, the material object is divided into primary and secondary. Primary is that to which all things which the intellect considers by means of that habit are referred, or which is first by the priority of perfection, because it is far nobler than the other objects. Secondary is called that which is ordered to the primary, or which is less noble than it. — Similarly the formal object is divided into the formal object quod, and the formal object quo. The former is that which formally terminates the habit, or the act of the intellect elicited by means of the habit, and is that formality of the material object which is attained per se and on its own account by the power, or habit, while the rest are attained by reason of it. The latter, however, is that account by which the material object first moves the intellect to assent to the object; thus, for example, the formal object quod of the visual power is color, because that is perceived per se and on its own account by the eye: but the formal object quo is light, by means of which sight perceives colors. We ask, therefore, what may be the object of faith, both material and formal, concerning which several points remain to be determined. First indeed, what may be the object, both material and formal, of Theological faith. Second, into what the assent of faith ought ultimately to be resolved, as into the motive of assent. Third, whether and how all the things to be believed are ordered among themselves and contained in the Symbol. Fourth, whether the objects of faith are so necessarily true that what are false can by no reason be revealed by God, so as to be believed as true. Fifth, whether the objects of faith ought to be credible; and what are the motives of their credibility.

WHAT IS THE MATERIAL OBJECT OF FAITH.

Note 1. The name of faith has a varied signification both in Scripture and among the Holy Fathers. First, indeed, it is taken for truthfulness in keeping promises: thus Romans 3. Will their unbelief make the faith of God of none effect? God forbid; God is true, but every man is a liar, etc. On which account Christ the Lord is called in Apocalypse 1. the faithful witness, that is, truthful: and the etymology of the word fides accords, which is derived from the words fin and dien, because what is said comes to pass, as St. Augustine observes, Epistle 19 to St. Jerome from Cicero, book De Officiis. — Secondly, faith is used for faithful execution of the ministry committed: thus Isaiah 11. concerning the coming Messiah it is foretold: Faith shall be the girdle of his loins. And according to this acceptation, in Luke 12. the steward is called the faithful dispenser. And in chapter 16. of the same Christ the Lord says: He that is faithful in that which is least, is faithful also in that which is greater. — Thirdly, it is used for conscience, or practical judgment about things to be done: in which sense that passage of Romans 14. is commonly understood: All that is not of faith, that is (what is against the dictate of conscience), is sin. — Fourthly, it is sometimes taken for confidence; thus Christ speaking to the Apostles in Matthew 8. says: Why are you fearful, O ye of little faith? There the discourse is about the Apostles fearing shipwreck: but fear is opposed to confidence: and immediately there faith is taken for confidence; hence St. James admonishes one praying faithfully to ask with nothing wavering. And this in conformity with Mark 11. All things whatsoever you ask when ye pray, believe that you shall receive, and they shall come unto you. Which acceptation of faith heretics will have to be the genuine one, using Christian and justifying faith for the very confidence by which anyone believes sins are forgiven him by God. — Fifthly, faith is sometimes taken for the object of faith, or doctrine; thus Acts 6. it is said: A great multitude also of the priests obeyed the faith. And Apocalypse 2. to the Bishop of the Church of Pergamus it is said: Thou hast kept my name, and hast not denied my faith: hence St. Athanasius where he expressed and declared the principal truths of the mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation, adds: This is the Catholic Faith, which unless everyone believe faithfully and firmly, he cannot be saved. — Sixthly, more properly faith is taken for the habit, or supernatural act of the intellect, by which we assent with certainty indeed, but not evidently, to truths revealed by God on account of His very revelation and authority. In which sense the Apostle to the Hebrews 11. describes faith thus: But faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not. Which description is made by the property and effect of faith itself: for faith is the basis and foundation of hope, for therefore we certainly hope for temporal goods, because through it we know they have been promised to us by God. It is likewise the evidence of things that appear not, that is, conviction and most certain persuasion of those things which are not seen, nor known, nor believed from elsewhere, than because they have been revealed by God. Hence faith can rightly be defined: the supernatural habit or act of the intellect, by which we firmly, though obscurely, assent to those things which God has revealed either immediately or mediately.

Note 2. The object of any habit or science may be either inadequate or adequate. The first is called that which is only partially attained by the habit itself; thus the human body is called the inadequate object of Physics, because it is only as it were a part of natural body, about which the whole of Physics is occupied. This again is twofold: namely either primary by reason of dignity; thus God is called the primary object of Metaphysics, and the rational soul is reckoned the primary object of Physics, inasmuch as it treats of man; for the other things are either less noble than God or than the soul; or secondary, inasmuch as it is indeed attained by the habit, but not with so much nobility and dignity on account of its lesser perfection. The adequate object is called that to which all things attained by the habit are referred, and are ordered to it. They can however be ordered in two ways, namely either by intrinsic order, or only by extrinsic. In the former way they are said to be ordered, when namely all acts elicited by means of the habit are so conversant about such an object, that in their entity, or in their intrinsic manner of tending toward those objects, they declare also an intrinsic order and respect to the object of attribution; just as e.g. all creatures which are seen in the Word by the beatific intellect are perceived by it in such a way that with them God Himself is seen: or those objects can be so ordered that nevertheless they can also be attained by acts which of themselves declare no order to the object of attribution; thus e.g. although the knowledge by which a Physician investigates the nature and virtue of some plant could conduce to restoring health to an infirm person, yet it is not ordered to that in such wise that it cannot also be for another end, to which the nature and virtue of that plant could serve: for that knowledge represents only the nature and virtue of the plant, which of itself is indifferent, to be ordered and applied to the health of man, or to another end, to which it could be ordered; whence that ordering is rather extrinsic, namely on the part of the one having that knowledge, not truly intrinsic and on the part of that knowledge. Therefore it is asked whether God, or something other than God, is the adequate object of attribution of faith, such that all its acts necessarily declare an order to God, nor can they attain anything by faith without God being likewise perceived by that act.

Note 3. That God, in order relative to faith, can be considered in various ways: First indeed, under the reason of Deity, or divine essence, inasmuch as namely it is the font and origin not only of all divine perfections, but also of all created beings whatsoever, which emanate from His ocean of entity like certain little rivers, and flow back and are ordered into it as into their end. Secondly, under the reason of supreme Lord, inasmuch as namely He has authority over all created beings whatsoever, which owe obedience to Him at His nod. Thirdly, under the reason of first truth, and that threefold: namely, either in being, or in knowing, or in saying; for truth is distinguished threefold: first indeed in being, which is the very infinite entity of God claiming for Himself from eternity the all-mannered and most real reason of infinite being; by reason of which He is called the true God, that is, having true Deity, and is distinguished from false and lying gods. Truth in knowing is the very supreme and infinite wisdom of God, by which He knows things as they are in themselves, so that it is impossible for Him in any way to be deceived in their apprehension. Finally truth in saying, or revealing, which in us is a moral virtue, or propensity, and inclination to say what is true; in God however it is the supreme inclination to speak truth in all those things which He enunciates either by Himself or through others, so that He cannot deceive anyone; which inclination is also called veracity.

From this manifold consideration of God, the opinion of Authors varies concerning the formal object of faith. For some, with our Aureolus, will God to be the formal object of faith under the reason of Deity. Some few, with William of Paris, Tract. De Fide, judge God to be the object of faith itself, under the reason of Lord, or inasmuch as He commands something, though not evident, to be firmly believed. The rest however will God to be assigned the object of faith under the reason of first truth, and that either in being, or in knowing, or in saying.

Four things therefore occur here chiefly to be determined: The first indeed, what is the adequate object of attribution of faith. The second, whether God is the primary and more principal object, and that either under the reason of Deity, or under the reason of Redeemer and Savior. Thirdly, whether God can be reckoned the formal object of faith under the reason of first truth in being. Fourthly, what is the formal object under which, or motive of faith.

First Conclusion. — THE MATERIAL OBJECT OF DIVINE FAITH GENERALLY AND ADEQUATELY TAKEN IS EVERY BEING REVEALABLE BY GOD. Thus the Doctor in 3. dist. 23. num. 6. where he says: It can be held that there be one faith of all credibles, because it regards the credible not under the proper reasons of those things, but as they are revealed by God, and it believes all things revealed by Him to be true, by the same habit whereby it believes the Revealer to be truthful.

But the Conclusion is proved: That is said to be the object of attribution of any habit into which all acts to be elicited by the same habit tend directly and per se: but absolutely all acts of faith tend immediately and directly into being revealable by God: therefore, etc. The major stands from what was said in Note 2. The minor also is evident per se; for there is no act of faith which does not tend directly into that which has been revealed by God, and that for no other reason than because it was revealed by God, who can neither deceive nor be deceived.

Next, that is the adequate object of attribution of any habit, about which it can operate: but faith cannot operate except about the object revealed by God, as will appear below: therefore it is necessary that revealable being be the object of attribution of faith. It is evident: for all matter which can be informed by the formal reason of any habit pertains to its material object, and is comprehended under it: but every revealable being can be informed by divine testimony, which is the formal object of divine faith.

2. Finally, although de facto not only all objects which are perceived through divine faith, but also all acts which are elicited through it, can be ordered to God directly, or at least indirectly, nevertheless it is certain that God can reveal many truths to be known through faith, which are not ordered more to the glory or knowledge of God than those natural truths which the Philosopher speculates. I confess however that God in some sense can be called the adequate object of attribution of faith, inasmuch as namely all things which are perceived through divine faith are referred directly or indirectly to the knowledge of God. Indeed all things which are believed by divine faith truly contribute to manifesting more perspicaciously and evidently the essence or perfections or operations of God; for truly in the mysteries which immediately regard Divinity itself, the matter is open: similarly the mysteries which pertain to the Incarnation of the Word are conversant about God as existing and operating in our humanity: but those which make discourse about Angels and men even look toward God; for Angels and men are His images, servants, sons, and heirs. Finally the rest are ordered to God mediately or immediately, not only as to the ultimate end, but also that through their knowledge and acquaintance, as it were carrying a torch before them, God may be known more excellently.

You will say. Faith cannot be conversant about every revealable being: therefore revealable being as such is not the object of attribution of faith. The consequence is evident: for the adequate object of any habit ought not to exceed the attainment and power of that habit. The antecedent is proved: for faith cannot tend except into what has de facto been revealed. For, says the Apostle, faith is by hearing: but hearing by the word of God: are those things revealable which have not de facto been revealed? therefore, etc.

I distinguish the antecedent: faith cannot actually be conversant about every revealable thing, pass; by virtue and aptitude, I deny. I confess indeed that an act of assent cannot be elicited except about those things which have been revealed: yet the very habit of faith of itself is capable of inclining the intellect, in which it inheres, to assent to any revealable whatsoever, wherever revelation concerning it shall have occurred. But we have said advisedly rather revealable being than revealed being to be the object of attribution of faith, that namely we might expound more openly the power and efficacy of faith, and might signify so great is the force of that divine virtue, that although now it inclines the intellect only to assenting to determined articles and certain definitions, nevertheless it is of itself sufficient to incline and bind the intellect to assenting to infinitely many syncategorematic propositions, if just so many were successively proposed and revealed to the intellect by God through eternity. For this, says the Doctor in the place cited above, does not exceed the virtue nor the capacity of a finite power or habit.

Second Conclusion. — GOD IS THE PRIMARY AND MORE PRINCIPAL OBJECT OF DIVINE FAITH, AND THAT PRECISELY UNDER THE REASON OF DEITY. This is the doctrine of the Doctor in 3. d. 23. num. 15. where he says: One must posit infused faith on account of firm assent, so that it regards God as first object, about which as object some certitudes are formed, which are eminently in the articles more mediately or more immediately, according as it thus is thus they regard. He had said before num. 10. Thus God infused into us the habit of faith inclining our intellect into the assent of the articles, such that faith regards God Himself, about whom the articles are formed, to which as secondary objects we assent ⟦illegible: a few words appear lost in the scan here⟧ per ha-

The first part of the Conclusion is proved: First indeed from sacred Scripture, which expressly signifies that faith tends into God, and is chiefly conversant about Him; hence it is called the faith of God: for Christ admonishes Mark 11. Have the faith of God. Wherefore St. Paul 1. Thessal. says: Your faith, which is toward God: whence to Hebr. 11. he admonishes: he that cometh to God must believe that he is: by which words he signifies that the first act of faith tends especially into the existence of God: which indeed St. Augustine most excellently teaches, lib. 1. De Civit. Dei, c. 29. The first and greatest office of faith is, that there be belief in the true God: by all which it appears that faith tends into God as into its primary and principal object, to which the other things which it perceives are ordered and referred, not only in the reason of being, but also in the reason of credible object. — Next, that is reckoned the principal object of any science or habit which has the reason of subject in the principal conclusions or articles and sanctions: but so it is with God with respect to faith; for truly it stands that God, as One, Three, Creator, Redeemer, etc., is the subject in the principal articles of faith: therefore, etc. — Finally, that ought to be called the principal object of any intellective habit, to whose more excellent cognition all those things are recalled which are known through that habit by the intellect: all things which are made known through divine faith are referred to this end, that we may know who, what sort, and how great God is in Himself, and in what way we ought to worship Him and tend into Him, that we may be given His eternal felicity: therefore God is truly the principal object of faith.

The second part also is proved, namely that God under the reason of Deity has the reason of object of faith; not truly under the reason of any extrinsic denomination, for instance Redeemer, Sanctifier, or Glorifier: Both because God is the same object of Theology as of divine faith, says the Doctor in Prologo q. 3. quaestiuncula 2. laterali n. T. since indeed Theology leans chiefly upon the principles and light of faith, and both tend about God as God is, though diversely; for faith tends into God by simple assent, which it exhibits to things revealed by God, but Theology by illation, which it elicits from the very knowledge of God received through faith, which is as it were the leading-by-hand of Theology itself to God: and because God ought to be reckoned the adequate object of faith according to that reason which is intended first and principally through faith: but God is intended sooner under the reason of Deity than under any other reason whatever: therefore He ought to be reckoned the adequate object of faith under the reason of Deity. The major stands. The minor is proved: there are more orders of perfections in God, of which certain are wholly intrinsic, as to be one, three, good, etc., others truly even extrinsic, as to be de facto Creator, Justifier, and Glorifier: but the prior order of divine perfections, which chiefly constitute and illustrate the entity and Deity of God, is attained through faith sooner than the perfections of the latter order, since indeed divine faith is borne into God, first inasmuch as God is, and believes first of God that which in Him is first credible: but the perfections of the prior order just as they are prior in the being of the thing, because it is prior for an absolute thing to be according to itself than by order to another, so are they prior according to the reason of the credible, for the reason of the credible follows upon the truth of the thing, but truth upon entity: therefore since God is prior according to the reason of Deity than under any other reason whatever, He is also sooner attainable through faith, and consequently under the reason of Deity the adequate object of faith.

You will object 1. The humanity of Christ ought no less to be reckoned the object of faith than the Divinity: therefore this is not the adequate object of faith. The antecedent is proved from that John 17. Now this is eternal life, that they may know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent. Which words are not only to be understood of beatific cognition, but also of the knowledge of faith, with which accords that John 20. But these things are written, that you may believe, because Jesus is the Christ the Son of God, and that be- lieving you may have life in his name. Hence Christ the Lord Himself in John 14. admonished: You believe in God, believe also in me. Therefore the humanity of Christ the Lord no less regards the object of faith than the Divinity.

I deny the antecedent, and to its proof I say, from these divine oracles only this is elicited, that the humanity of Christ regards more proximately the adequate object of faith than all other created things whatsoever, which are comprehended under the object of faith, both on account of its more intimate conjunction with the Divinity, and because it is the first and principal medium of our salvation, and the most excellent benefit of God toward men: whence it follows that it pertains to faith only secondarily, like the other benefits of God, and like the other media bestowed upon us for salvation, namely that from its cognition the supreme goodness and mercy of God toward us may be better made known. Hence foolishly does Calvin accuse the scholastic Doctors, as if they openly fought against the divine Scriptures, when they assert God to be the primary object of faith but not likewise Christ, whom, he says, against the divine oracles they separate and exclude from the object of faith; how calumnious this is openly stands; since indeed we do not refuse that Christ the Lord should be reckoned as primary among the secondary objects of faith; such that faith directs the human intellect sooner into God as He is God than into God as He is man, which certainly is not alien from the mind of Christ the Lord Himself; since indeed from the oracles soon praised and other similar ones it stands that Christ intimated that faith is to be directed sooner into God than into Himself.

You will object 2. Every science and intellective habit supposes concerning its subject, or object, that it is, and what it is, as Aristotle teaches lib. 1 Posteriorum: but faith is an intellective habit: therefore it supposes the existence and essence of God, and consequently supposes God under the reason of Deity, and accordingly under that reason is not occupied about God, nor tends into Him.

I answer. 1. The major can be denied universally speaking; for neither is that prenotion concerning the subject and object, that it is, required by Aristotle for every science and intellective habit whatsoever, but only for the most perfect demonstration, by which the first pro- perty is demonstrated of its essence; for there are more demonstrations by which the very existence of the subject or object is proved at least a posteriori; but distinct cognition of its essence is rather intended than supposed through science: whence the major generally speaking is not true.

I answer 2. Distinguishing the major: every intellective habit supposes its object, both as to whether it is, and as to what it is, when the object concurs to its production together with the intellect, I concede: otherwise, I deny. Similarly the minor distinguished, the consequence must be denied: for faith since it is a habit divinely infused, as we shall say below, is produced by God alone, as efficient cause, not truly partly by the intellect, partly by God as object: and immediately it ought not to suppose the essence and existence of God, but is legitimately occupied about both.

You will object 3. Very many things fall under faith, and through it are certainly believed, which can by no reason be ordered to a more excellent knowledge of God, or to the manifestation of His glory, for instance that Tobias had a dog, and that this dog coming as it were a messenger rejoiced in the wagging of his tail, as we read Tobit 11: therefore God cannot be reckoned the ade- quate object of faith under the reason of Deity.

I deny the antecedent. And to its proof I say that history of the dog of Tobias, and things similar, are ordered to God, both because they conduce to manifesting the veracity of God, which cannot deceive even in the lightest matter: for since faith professes God truthful in all things, and leans most of all upon His truth- fulness in saying, hence whatever it perceives absolutely, it orders into God: for this is the virtual discourse of faith: Whatever God says is true: but God, through at least the Canonical writer of the book of Tobias, said that the same Tobias had a dog: therefore that is true. It also con- duces to commending the exquisite goodness of God toward His faithful clients, such as was Tobias: whose most welcome part of the history was that advent of the dog preceding and announcing the approach of the younger Tobias, joyful with his tail. Finally it conduces to signifying that wise ordination of divine Providence, whereby after various hard- ships, and diverse trials and tribulations He introduces prosperity, and abundantly pours forth joy not only in the greatest, but also in the least things. The other things which could be objected against this Conclusion have already been weighed and dissolved in the above-praised preliminary Question of our Theology. Therefore let there be

Third Conclusion. God under the reason of first truth in being is the formal object of divine faith.

It is proved. That is the formal object by which it is specified, and through which it is distinguished from other habits: but faith is conversant about the truth of God in being, and through it is distinguished from other intellective habits: therefore, etc. The major stands. The minor is proved as to the first part by the authority of St. Dionysius, lib. De divinis nominibus, c. 1. where he says: Faith is about simple and ever-existing truth: but truth simple and ever-existing is none other than the very truth of God in being: therefore, etc. It is proved also as to the second: for God under another reason is the object of faith than of hope and charity: but He is the object of hope as faithful, of charity truly as supremely good: therefore He ought also to be the object of faith as supremely true. It is confirmed: if God could be reckoned the object of faith under some other reason, especially as most of our authors will, under the reason of first truth in knowing, and saying: but that does not seem admissible: both because the formal object of one habit ought to be one thing: but the truth of God in kno- wing and revealing is not something one; since indeed the truth of God in knowing is His most real and wholly divine intrinsic perfection; but truth in saying or revealing is something extrinsic, contingent, and a respect of reason: and because the formal object of a real habit ought also to be real, or, says the Doctor in 3. dist. 23. n. 6., The formal reason of habit is not a reason or being of reason: but to be revealed that God is Three and One does not say beyond God Th- ree and One except a respect of reason, just as to be known says nothing except a respect of reason beyond the thing which is known: therefore the assent to God three and one because of revelation, as the formal reason of the object, to which I assent through a real habit, is a being of reason, which is inconvenient, since a real habit has a real formal object, just as a real power a real formal object: therefore passive revelation, since it is a thing of reason, cannot be the for- mal reason of tending into this God is three and one: finally be- cause the formal object ought to be something intrinsic to the material object: but the truth of God, or divine revelation, is not something intrinsic to God, nor a divine perfection affecting His essence: therefore, etc.

You will say 1. That is the formal object of faith into which the thing itself is resolved, or which is the reason on account of which we believe God: but the reason on account of which we believe God revealing is not the very truth of God in being, but veracity or truth in saying: therefore God under the reason of first truth in being is not the formal object of faith.

I distinguish the major. The formal object motivating, and with respect to the believer, I concede: specifying, and with respect to faith, I deny. For the specifying formal ob- ject and the motivating differ in this, that the former chiefly regards the habit which is conversant about it; the latter however the faculty and power which through the habit tends into the object; hence the spe- cifying object ought to be something intrinsic to the material object; the motivating however can be something extrinsic; for whatever can entice the faculty, so that it be occupied about the object, can have the reason of motivating object.

You will say 2. Faith is a practical habit; for it is not ordered only to knowing supernatural truth; but also to loving it, and obtaining it by good works; for faith without works is dead, says St. James: therefore it ought to have a practi- cal and operable object: but God under the reason of first truth in knowing is not a practical object: therefore under this reason He is not the object of faith.

I deny the minor. For God, as first truth, is represented not only through faith as speculable object, but also as practical; because for some object to be reckoned practical, it is not necessary that it be operable by us, but it suffices that it can be obtained by us, and that from it as from the first rule of all rectitude and probity of morals the reason of actions can be de- rived: but by this reason God, as first truth in being, can be regarded, for thus indeed He is our ultimate end, ex

Fourth Conclusion. — THE FORMAL OBJECT BY WHICH, OR FORMAL REASON WHEREBY FAITH TENDS INTO GOD, IS THE TRUTH OF GOD NOT ONLY IN SPEAKING, BUT ALSO IN KNOWING. This seems more conformable to the mind of the Doctor in 3. distinct. 23. where he says:

It can be said, that acquired faith is like infused faith in some respect, indeed in many. For as acquired faith assents, or believes the word of someone, because he believes the veracity of the one asserting it to be true, so infused faith assents to some revealed thing, because it believes God, or the veraci- ty of God asserting it. And because what God asserts supernaturally He reveals, therefore faith assenting to that revealed thing, because it assents to the veraci- ty of the revealer, is a supernatural habit: but He reveals credi- ble things when He infuses the habit: and in this manner of speaking, faith has not certainty from the object, but from the veracity of the witness, namely God.

By this the Doctor signifies that the divine truth is the motive, or the reason under which faith tends toward God, so that however much God might be the first truth in being, nevertheless faith would not tend toward Him unless He were likewise the first truth in knowing and speaking, which can deceive no one.

The Conclusion is proved, moreover: Under that reason is faith occupied concerning God, under which God moves the created intellect to give assent to things revealed; but this God supplies through both truths, in know- ing and in speaking. Proof: for under that reason He entices the created intellect to assent to things revealed, under which He is apprehended as altogether truthful and infallible in proposing and revealing; but for this it is necessary that He be known as the first truth in knowing and speaking; for both these truths are necessarily prerequisite, so that the intel- lect may give assent to the things revealed without any hesitation, or fear of error and deception; for if either one is lacking, the intellect will remain doubtful about the things proposed: for however truthful God may be, and may have a propensity to speak the truth, if the intellect is un- certain about His infinite wisdom and His infallible apprehension of those things which He knows, it will be in doubt whether what God proposes is in reality true, just as, however much one may know a man to be truthful, nevertheless because on account of his limited faculty of understanding he very often lies open to error and apprehends things otherwise than they are, it comes to pass that he does not believe so firmly that something proposed by a man is true; therefore just as it is necessary that the intellect know certainly that God cannot deceive anyone, because He is infinitely good and truthful, so also it is needful that it know that He cannot be deceived, because He is supremely wise, so that, with both pieces of knowledge concurring, it may give firm assent to the things revealed.

It is confirmed: In order that the testimony of God may be the formal reason under which faith believes, it must appear altogether infallible; but it cannot so appear unless God is apprehended as the first truth both in speaking and in knowing; therefore, etc. The major stands; for since faith is altogether infallible, it must also rest upon an altogether infallible motive. The minor how- ever is proved: in order that the testimony of God may be altogether infallible, it does not suffice that God cannot be deceived in speaking, but it is further required that He cannot err in knowing; for he who can err in knowing can also deceive others, if not out of malice, at least out of ignorance; therefore, in order to establish this divine infallibility, it is as necessary that God be known as true and infinitely wise in knowing, as that He be truthful and supremely good in speaking.

You will say 1. To different habits there ought to belong a different object quo, or a diverse reason under which they tend toward their object; but faith and Prophecy are distinct habits, and consequently diverse are the reasons by which they tend toward the object; but Prophecy tends toward God, as toward the first truth infallible in knowing and revealing; therefore under this reason faith cannot tend toward Him.

I distinguish the minor: Prophecy tends toward the first truth infallible in knowing, and speaking in the same manner as faith — this I deny; in another manner — this I grant. For faith indeed tends toward the first truth, but in an unevident and obscure manner, so that if there were an evident manifestation of the object, the assent given to that proposed object would not be an act of faith, but either of science, or of another habit. Prophecy, however, stands indifferent toward an obscure, or evi- dent proposition of the object. Hence it is that although faith had no place in Christ the Lord, yet in Him was the gift of Prophecy. Add to this that Prophecy and faith have various other differences; for Prophecy is granted only for the illumination of the intellect, while faith is ordered also to a pious motion of the will; faith regards something eternal, and if it contemplates certain temporal things, for instance the mystery of the Incarnation, it regards them only inasmuch as something eternal underlies them, namely inasmuch as God is incarnate, crucified, dead, etc. Likewise faith is chiefly ordered toward the proper sanctification of the subject; Prophecy, however, tends toward temporal things and toward the sanctification of others;

You will say 2. The formal object quo, as well as quod, ought to be some one thing; but, as was said above, the truth of God in knowing and speaking is not one thing, seeing that one is eternal and the other temporal, one intrinsic to God and the other extrinsic; therefore it cannot be accounted the formal object quo, or the reason under which the intellect is moved to assent to the things revealed.

I distinguish the major: It must be one thing in the order of being, or according to entity — this I deny; in the order of the moving object, or according to the formality of the motive — this I grant. The minor I like- wise distinguish: the divine truths in knowing and speaking are not one thing in respect of entity — this I grant; in respect of the reason of the motive — this I deny. For just as the same act can tend toward two partial ends, and the assent of a conclusion can be elicited on account of two assents to the premises, and their two truths, and as one act of human faith can be exercised on account of the testi- monies of two persons, so that it depends partially upon each; so one and the same act of divine faith can depend upon two motives concurring partially toward it; whence although divine truth in speaking and revealing be not one thing according to entity, nevertheless because the knowledge of each must be presupposed as the condition sine qua non the assent of faith would not be elicited, therefore they agree together in the unity of the motive.

You will say 3. If the truth of God in speaking were the formal mo- tive object of faith, then chiefly either inasmuch as it is active revelation on the part of God, or inasmuch as it is passive revelation on the part of the believer; but neither can be said. Not indeed the first, because the formal reason under which must be intrinsic to the formal object quo; for in every science the reason for asse- nting to any conclusion is the intrinsic truth of that conclusion itself; but active revelation, since it is a relation of God ad extra, is not something intrinsic to God revealing, nor to the things revealed. Nor yet the second, since passive revelation is a mere extrinsic denomination, and a regard of reason, it would follow that the motive of divine faith is a being of reason, and consequently that our faith is founded upon a being of reason.

I deny the minor, and to its proof I say that the formal reason under which of faith is the active revelation itself, or the manifestation on the part of God of the truths pertaining to faith; for the whole reason why we assent to things re- vealed is because God, who is infallible and truthful in speaking, proposed and revealed such truths to be believed. Whence although the formal reason under which in the sciences must be intrinsic to the conclusion, namely because scien- tific assent is elicited on account of the evidence of the conclusion itself elicited from premises evidently known; yet it is otherwise in faith, which moves to assent only on account of the extrinsic testimony of the speaker.

Note 1. That just as two things concur to elicit the act of faith: one indeed presuppositive, and the other formal, namely the proposition and revelation of the mysteries to be believed, and the act of faith itself, which the faithful give to the things proposed; so also a twofold resolution of faith can be distinguished: one indeed, which is made precisely with respect to the mere pro- position and revelation of the things to be believed, by which of course one can answer the question, why we believe that this or that was re- vealed by God; the other truly as it were with respect to assent, by which we answer the question, why we give our assent to God revealing the mysteries. Of both resolutions of faith, then, there must be treatment in what follows.

Note 2. Among the objects which are proposed to the intellect, and which move it to assent, some are per se evident, whose formal motive object is their very evidence; for this immediately moves the intellect to assent to them; others are in themselves unevident to us, to which therefore we assent only on account of some motive distinct from those objects. Whence the formal motive reason of an object is something intrinsic to the object, namely when it is evident, or extrinsic, while it is unevident; for such is the native propensity of the intellect toward things, that it assents to no object except inasmuch as it perceives its truth, either through the very obiec- tum itself, or through another with which it has some neces- sary connection. — Moreover the extrinsic formal motive, by which the intellect is enticed to assent to some object, is twofold: for sometimes it has a connatural connection with the material object, as happens when we know effects through causes, or causes through effects; for this medium is in some way intrinsic to the thing known on account of the natural and necessary connection of effect with cause, and of cause with effect. But sometimes that motive is altogether extrinsic to the material object, nor does it have any natural connection with it, but only a moral one, as happens whenever we give assent to some proposition on account of the mere testimony of another. Further, it must be observed, that when we know certain objects per se evident to us, the formal motive object of this knowledge is something one for the same reason that the thing known is one; but otherwise when the medium is distinct from the thing known; for while I believe, e.g., something to be true because Peter testifies it, the reason moving me to that assent is partly because I know Peter to be a truthful man, partly because I know he said this: for however much I might believe him not to be truthful, yet if I had ascertained that he said this; or conversely, if I knew he said this, and yet did not believe him to be truthful, that certainly which is proposed to me through him will not be certain and undoubted.

Note 3. That the Church is the congregation of all the Faithful under Christ the Lord her invisible head, and under the Roman Pontiff her visible head, the Vicar of Christ the Lord, and successor of Peter; which can be considered in a twofold manner according to her twofold state, namely either primitive, or successive; that is, either at the time of Christ and the Apos- tles, for which reason Apoc. 21 she is called the primitive Church; or at the time immediately following, and persevering until the end of the world, for which reason the Church of the present time, even unto the consummation of the age, shall be called founded upon the foundation of the Apostles and Prophets, with Christ Jesus Himself as the chief corner stone, as Paul writes to the Ephesians 2. Again, the Church can be considered, either inasmuch as she is the congregation of all the Faithful dispersed throughout the whole world, consisting of many men illustrious for supreme doctrine and sanctity of life, who from the times of Christ have ever persevered most constantly through so many ages until now in the same faith without any least change, notwithstanding the attacks of Pagans, Tyrants, and Heretics. Which surely is evident to be impossible unless divine power intervenes; for how could so many and such various men divided from one another by so great an interval, and differing by so great a diversity of mind, so harmoniously and constantly agree together and consent concerning the same mysteries utterly unevident and exceeding the powers of natural human genius, unless they were moved thereto by some divine power? especially since experience shows that all other Sects devoted to false opinions immediately fall into various divisions and silently become extinguished. Secondly, the Chur- ch can be considered as she is infallibly governed by the Holy Spirit, and who on account of His divine assistance cannot err in her dogmas and decrees of faith. Hence a twofold authority of the Church arises in proposing the mysteries of faith, one of which can be accounted political and civil; which chiefly arises from the truthfulness of so many men powerful in wisdom and holiness, and consequently in dignity of faith. For this reason St. Augustine in book 4 Contra Epistolam Fundamenti, chap. 5, counts among the chief motives which held him within the bosom of the Church and enticed him to give assent to the things proposed by her the wisdom of the Doctors, the consensus of the peoples, the force of miracles, antiquity, and the perpetual succession of Pontiffs, etc. But the other authority of the Church is accounted divine and infallible, which belongs to her inasmuch as she is the organ and instrument of the Holy Spirit, through whom He Himself promises His oracles, and assists her perpetually, according to that promise of Christ the Lord: The Spirit of your Father speaks in you. Matth. 10. Hence the Apostles decreeing that the legal observances need not be kept, Acts 15.¹ say: It has seemed good to the Holy Spirit, and to us. These things having been set forth, it must be determined what that motive may be, or principle certain and infallible, into which our faith can be resolved, both with respect to the proposition of the things to be believed, and with respect to the assent to be given to the things and objec- ts revealed and proposed. Concerning whose resolution the opinion of Authors is so manifold and varied, that almost as many senses appear as there are heads. In the first place, indeed, the Manichaeans, as St. Augustine relates, book De utilitate credendi, chap. 1, taught that it was superstitious for faith to command before reason, as if nothing were to be believed except what reason should persuade: which error Peter Abailard seems certainly to have renewed, who, as St. Bernard narrates, Epist. 190, in the first threshold of his Theology, or rather of his Folly-theology, defines faith to be an estimation: as if in it each one might think and speak what he pleased: or let the sacraments of our faith hang beneath an uncertain claim, and no longer subsist more certain in their certitude. The second opinion is that of the Lutherans and Calvinists, asserting that the ultimate resolution of our faith, both with respect to the proposition of the things to be believed, and with respect to the assent to the things proposed, ought to be made into Scripture alone, or into the internal motion of the Holy Spirit specially assisting each believer, so that from Sacred Scripture they may know what is to be believed. The third opinion is that of those who wish that resolution to be made into the very habit of divine faith, through which the objects appear to be believed. The fourth opinion is that of those who refer back this ultimate resolution to the authority of the Church; who indeed are again split into various opinions: First, Medina, book 6, De recta fide, chap. 11, contends that our faith ultimately rests upon the divine authority of the Church. Secondly, Valentia, qu. 1, p. 1, distinguishing between the proposition and definition of the things to be believed, says faith is resolved into the divine authority which is attributed to the Church; but the proposition into its human and civil authority. Thirdly, Suarez, disp. ⟦illegible: number⟧ sect. 8, distinguishing between the resolution of faith in itself, and with respect to us, says faith regarded according to its own na- ture is resolved into the divine authority of the Church, but regarded with respect to us must be resolved into the civil and human authority of the Church itself. Fourthly, De Lugo wishes the assent of faith to be resolved partly into divine authority, partly truly into the testimony of the Church, etc. The fourth opinion² is that of those who assert that the ultimate resolution with respect to the proposition and revelation of the things to be believed, and likewise the assent to be given them in private faith, is made into special revelation; but where the revealed objects must be believed with Catholic, that is universal, faith, then faith must be resolved into the very testimony of the Church, as well divine as human. The last opinion finally, which appears the more common and truer, and more conformable to the mind and doctrine of the Subtle Doctor, is that of those who teach that the ultimate resolution of faith ought to be made, with respect to the proposition and revelation of the things to be believed, into the very authority of the Church determining and pro- posing that this or that is revealed by God; but with respect to the assent which the believer gives to the things themselves revealed, that resolution ought to be made into the divine truth, both in knowing and in spea- king.

First Conclusion. Human reason is not a sufficient foundation on which Christian faith can rest, and consequently faith cannot be resolved into it. This is de fide, especially with respect to the former part,

Proof from that passage 1. ad Corinth. 2. our preaching is not in the persuasive words of human wisdom, but in showing of spirit and power, that your faith may not be in the wisdom of men, but in the power of God. And therefore the same St. Paul 2. ad Cor. 10. says that the understanding must be brought captive into obedience to Christ; but there would be no captivity of the understanding if it believed only those things which appeared evidently, and became known solely through natural reason. The same truth appears from those words of Christ the Lord Matth. 10. I confess to thee, Father, because thou hast hidden these things from the wise and prudent (namely the mysteries of faith), and hast revealed them to little ones. And chap. 12. the same Christ the Lord addressing Peter, who had testified Him to be the Son of God, says: Flesh and blood hath not revealed it to thee: where by the name of flesh and blood He signifies the natural power and operation of the intellect.

The same truth is evident from the common opinion of the holy Fathers; but especially of St. Dionysius, chap. 6, De divinis nominibus, where he says: Faith is the firm seat of believers, and the simple notion of truth in impersuasible truth certain. That is, the notion of those things which cannot be perceived nor proved by natural reason; whence St. Nazianzen admirably admonishes, Orat. 34. Let us follow faith rather than reason. And St. Hilary *lib. 8. De Trinitate, about the middle. The greatest merit, he says, of faith is to hope what you know not. To which St. Augustine elegantly accords Tract. 4. in Ioan. weighing that saying of Isaiah 7. Unless you believe, you shall not understand; for he says: We believe that we may know, we do not know that we may believe ⟦illegible: attribution words garbled beyond recovery in scan⟧ Hom. 25. in Evangelium: faith has no merit, to which human reason supplies the experiment.

It is proved also by reason: If faith rested upon human ratiocination, then chiefly either evident, or merely probable; but neither can be said. Not indeed the first, because the evidence of an object necessarily entices the intellect to assent; but faith does not thus necessitate, because it is free, and is received most freely by the will; For, says St. Augustine Hom. 26. in Ioan., in other things man can act unwillingly: but to believe only willingly; whence even the mysteries of faith can be denied by the liberty of free choice, and faith itself rejected, as is evident not only of infidels, who refuse to receive the faith, and become rebels to the light, while the mysteries of faith are announced to them, but even of the heretics themselves, who cast off the faith already received, and by their liberty refuse to believe certain mysteries of faith. Nor yet the second: otherwise the assent of faith would not be firm and stable, but only fluctuating and doubtful, which St. Bernard certainly condemns in Abailard with these words:

If faith fluctuates, vain is our hope. Foolish therefore would our Martyrs be, enduring things so bitter on account of uncertainties, nor doubting under doubt to enter by a long exit a hard exile for the reward of remuneration. But far be it that we should think that anything in our faith or hope hangs, as he thinks, by dubious estimation, and not rather that the whole of what is in it is supported by certain and solid truth, persuaded by oracles and miracles divinely given, established, and consecrated by the birth of the Virgin, the blood of the Redeemer, the glory of the Risen One. Those testimonies have been touched upon too much. If at all too much, the Spirit Himself in the last place renders testimony to our spirit, that we are sons of God. Vainly therefore does anyone dare to call faith an estimation, unless he has not yet recei> ved that Spirit, who either ignores the Gospel or thinks it a fable? I know whom I have believed, and am certain, cries the Apostle; and do you whisper to me: faith is an estimation? Do you prattle ambiguity to me, than which nothing is more certain? But Augustine otherwise: Faith, he says, is not held in the heart in which it is, by conjecturing or opining, by Him to whom it belongs, but with certain knowledge, conscience acclaiming. Far be it, far be it, that Christian faith should have these limits. Let those estimations belong to the Academics, whose it is to doubt of all things, to know nothing. I indeed secure proceed in the sentence of the Master of the Gentiles, and I know that I shall not be confounded. It pleases me, I confess, his definition of faith, even though he too secretly disparages it. Faith is, he says, the substance of things to be hoped for, the argument of things not appearing. Substance, he says, of things to be hoped for, not of empty phantasies of conjectures. You hear substance; it is not permitted you in faith to doubt or dispute at pleasure, nor to wander hither and thither through the emptiness of opinions, through the byways of errors. By the name of substance something certain and fixed is set before you. You are closed in by certain bounds, hemmed in by certain limits. For faith is not estimation, but certainty

Thus St. Bernard.

Abailard objected that passage Ecclesiasticus 19. He that believeth quickly is light of heart: but to believe quickly is to apply faith to a proposed thing before its manifest evidence, and its truth ascertained through ratiocination; therefore faith rests chiefly upon human testimony. — I answer, that the literal sense of that oracle must be understood of human faith, namely that it ought not to be applied except with prudent deliberation, seeing that it rests upon the testimony of a man, who lies open to error and falsehood; for of this human faith the Wise Man speaks, since he treats there of those who lend tacit ears to those twitching at and censuring the life of others. Add that even if that oracle were to be understood of divine faith, it would signify only that one ought not so quickly, and so tacitly, to believe one claiming to have a divine revelation, when from elsewhere it is not established by some other testimony that such a man making the assertion is worthy to be believed.

You will object 2. Other texts of Sacred Scripture in which it seems signified that what is to be believed must first be examined. Thus Luke 1. it is said of the Virgin that she did not lightly believe the Angel announcing the mystery of the Incarnation, but pondered what manner of salutation this might be: thus that text 1. Thes. 5. Prove all things; hold fast that which is good: and likewise that 1. Ioan. 4. Try the spirits, whether they be of God. — I answer to the first, that the Blessed Virgin indeed prudently examined whether he who spoke was a true messenger of God or a counterfeit, nor did she linger long in that doubt, but just as neither more quickly, so neither more slowly did she believe than was fitting; and therefore her faith is commended by Elizabeth saying to her, Blessed art thou that hast believed: nevertheless she did not believe on account of any human reason, but on account of this divine testimony proposed to her by the Angel: because no word shall be impossible with God: for when Mary heard this, she immediately answered the Angel: be it done to me according to thy word. Similarly to the other texts say, that the spirits are indeed to be tried whether they be of God, nor is credit to be readily given to those who like the Prophets, or Apostles, announce something on the part of God beyond the doctrine handed down by the Apostles, or approved by the Church, as all heresiarchs are accustomed to do: for all those Innovators must be tried, and from them must be required the indications and signs of their pretended divine mission and delegation, namely either miracles, or revelation of secrets, or certain prediction of future events, etc.

He objected 3. If one must believe the objects proposed without evident reason, the consequence will follow that many things can be believed against manifest reason; and thus the infidels will come to be excused, if they believe some most absurd things against manifest reason, seeing that they represent themselves as believing God with their reason contemned and cast aside; but to assert this seems absurd; therefore, etc. — I answer by denying the major, for while we deny that one must believe on account of the evident knowledge of reason, we do not exclude every use whatever of reason in eliciting the act of faith; for some intelligence and knowledge of the object is necessary before faith itself be applied: not indeed inasmuch as it is in itself, but on account of which it is proposed and offered to be believed; whence the infidels would not be excused if they believed certain things besides those which are proposed to them by the Church to be believed.

Second Conclusion. — FAITH DOES NOT REST UPON SACRED SCRIPTURE ALONE, NOR UPON AN INTERNAL MOTION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT, AND CONSEQUENTLY CANNOT BE RESOLVED INTO EITHER.

The Conclusion is proved first with respect to Sacred Scripture, namely that it is not a sufficient rule for discerning those things revealed by God from those which are not revealed by Him; for the most certain and infallible rule of faith ought to be most constant and altogether incorruptible; for if it were subject to corruption and alteration, no one could be certain and secure about the things regulated by it; but Sacred Scripture lies open to alteration and corruption, for it can be changed either by addition, or by detraction, or by voluntary transmutation, as is done by heretics who interpolate the divine Scripture, but also through the ignorance of men, indeed even their carelessness, as very often happens with Amanuenses or Typographers; hence there have been so many emendations and editions of the sacred Bibles, especially of the Vulgate emended in many places not only by Sixtus V but also by Clement VIII, notwithstanding which Franciscus Lucas, Theologian and Dean of the Cathedral Church of Saint-Omer, published a little book containing many varieties of readings by which the edition of Clement itself could be rendered more perfect, were the authority of another Roman Pontiff to be added; moreover that collection of Franciscus Lucas comprises four thousand and more passages which in the Bibles presented by Clement could be further emended. The same thing is notably evident in the Hebrew and Greek Codices.

Then, if Sacred Scripture of itself sufficed to discern the revealed from the unrevealed, it would also be sufficient to settle all controversies concerning faith; but of itself alone it is not sufficient for that, seeing that it does not even disclose which books are Canonical; for whole books are rejected as spurious by the Lutheran and Calvinist Heretics, for instance the book of Tobias, Judith, Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus, Maccabees; indeed even from the received Canonical books not only many verses, but also lengthy chapters are expelled by them. For in lib. Daniel. c. 3. there are 67 continuous verses, all of which they expunge; furthermore there are whole and lengthy chapters 13. and 14., comprising the histories of Susanna, and of Bel and the Dragon, and of Daniel's imprisonment, and of Anna the Prophetess, which they do not admit, inasmuch as by no testimony of Scripture itself can those books, verses, and chapters be condemned. Finally it contains very many texts fighting against each other, which do not seem able so easily to be reconciled by means of it: thus Ioan. 10. Christ the Lord says: The Father is greater than I. And chap. 14. the same testifies, I and the Father are one.

The heretics reply, that the conflicting texts, being thus difficult of understanding, can be explicated and reconciled by others. — Truly, although I candidly confess that very many texts of the Scriptures can be thus explicated and reconciled by others, nevertheless nevertheless the interpretation and reconciliation of many must be sought from elsewhere than from Scripture itself, which is especially clear concerning the texts cited out of the Gospel of St. John; for when formerly the Arians attacked the Divinity of Christ the Lord, they objected the former text, and the Catholics answered with St. Athanasius that Christ was equal to the Father according to His Divinity ⟦illegible: closing clause garbled beyond recovery, apparently contrasting a lesser estate according to His human humility⟧. But when the Catholics objected the latter text to the Arians, these replied that it was to be understood of unity not of Divine essence, but of conformity of wills and affections. And so they explicated that confirmation out of that text Ioan. 17. where Christ the Lord entreats the Father that His Disciples all may be one: thou Father in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us: signifying thereby that He speaks only of unity of affection, since the faithful could not have with each other or with God unity of essence and entity. And further on: And let them be one, as we also are one. Whence if such were universally the response of the Heretics, that the interpretation of Scriptural texts reconciled was not to be sought elsewhere than from Scripture itself, a palm would have had to be conceded to the Arians, seeing that they elucidated Scripture opposing them through other texts of the same Scripture; which likewise the Catholics could not so easily perform.

Moreover Sacred Scripture is in very many places most difficult, as St. Peter testifies, Epist. 2. cap. ult. where speaking of St. Paul he says: as also in all his epistles, speaking in them of these things, in which are certain things hard to be understood, which the unlearned and unstable wrest, as also the other Scriptures. By which words the holy Father signifies that in Sacred Scripture there are certain obscure things whose sense they cannot attain by their own interpretation; whence the same admonishes there cap. 1.

Every prophecy of Scripture is not made by its own interpretation: for prophecy came not by the will of man at any time, but holy men of God spoke inspired by the Holy Ghost

therefore Sacred Scripture of itself cannot sufficiently discern what is to be believed from what is not to be believed. ⟦illegible: one or more lines apparently lost here by the scan; text resumes at a word ending "-tissima"⟧ tissima: but that private revelation is altogether uncertain, and that internal inspiration altogether doubtful, whether it be from the Holy Spirit. Nor does it stand in the way that it is said 3. Regum alt., God gave a spirit of lying into the mouth of the Prophets of Achab, who nevertheless all thought themselves moved by the Spirit of God, when Sedecias, one of those Pseudo-Prophets, addressing and striking Micheas the true Prophet of God, said: Did the Spirit of the Lord then depart from me, and speak to thee? Wherefore St. John, Epist. I. cap. 4. admonishes: Do not believe every spirit, but try the spirits if they be of God; therefore if we ourselves must try and judge the spirit, it cannot itself be our judge; for it is not permitted to judge the judge. Then: If that internal spirit could be a certain rule of faith and piety, it would follow that anyone whatever could indulge his genius at pleasure, and defend and commend a most perverse doctrine devised by himself, and even horrendous crimes, boasting that this was inspired in him by the Holy Spirit; for who could show this to be false, if there were no other judge of this matter besides internal inspiration? Hence we see the Libertines noting most flagrant crimes, Luther and other Apostates proving with feigned authority and inspiration of the Holy Spirit sacrilegious marriages, adulteries, compilations of Monasteries, conspiracies against Princes set over them, and other crimes of this kind. Finally: If that private spirit were a sufficient rule of faith for discerning what is to be believed from what is not to be believed, a continual occasion of schisms would be given; for whoever should think and imagine himself to possess a revealing spirit, could choose as object of faith whatever pleased him most, nor could he be accused of error by anyone whatever, seeing that he would affirm that he receives it from the Holy Spirit speaking inwardly; indeed it will often happen that the same spirit will seem contrary to itself, while one asserts that something has been revealed to him the contrary of which another says has been revealed to him; thus among the Lutherans and Calvinists (who receive this internal spirit as a certain rule) that spirit is altogether contrary in very many things, especially concerning the divine Eucharist; whereas the Lutherans believe the body of Christ the Lord to be really and substantially present in the Eucharist, the Calvinists affirm the contrary.

Which argument Campianus indeed urges excellently, Orat. I. ad Academicos, where he speaks thus:

Why therefore do you tear one another apart, when all glory in the same spirit? The spirit of the Calvinians receives six epistles which do not please the spirit of the Lutheran; yet neither rests upon anything but the Holy Spirit. The Anabaptists call the History of Job a stage-play mixed with tragic and comic laws; who know this? The teaching Spirit. Castalio basely deemed that mystical Song of Solomon, which Catholics admire as a Paradise, as hidden manna, as sumptuous delights in Christ, of no more worth than a love-song with an handmaid, and a venal amatory colloquy with the chambermaids of the court. From where did he draw it? From the Holy Spirit. Concerning the Apocal. of John, whose authority Jerome confirms ringing in his Epist. ad Paulinum, Luther, and Brentius, and Kemnitius desire some difficult thing I know not what of an Aristarchus: you, namely, inclined that it be deposed; whom did they consult? They commit it to the Spirit. And preferring far above the three prior epistles of Paul, he decrees that the unique Gospel of John thenceforth is to be named beautiful, true, preeminent. Seeing that he, so far as lay in him, would gladly have enrolled even the Apostles as companions of his quarrels: under what Doctor? The Spirit. Indeed even that petty brother did not hesitate to assail the Gospel of Luke in a wanton > style: because in it the good works of virtue are commended to us more frequently; whom did he consult? The Spirit. Theodore Beza dared to translate corrupt and vitiated that arcane word out of Luke chap. 22. This is the chalice of the new testament in my blood, which (Chalice) shall be shed for you: who indicated that this speech admits no exposition except of the wine of the chalice converted into the blood of Christ? The Spirit. Finally since all believe each his own spirit, they lie about the name of the Holy Spirit with horrible blasphemy. Do not those acting thus betray themselves, are they not easily refuted, are they not held in an assembly of such men as you are, Academicians, and bound with the least effort?» So far he.

OBIICIES 1. Various texts of Scripture, by which it seems intimated that Sacred Scripture is chiefly to be consulted in establishing the things of faith: thus Christ the Lord addressing the Jews, who were calling His Divinity into doubt and denying Him to be the true Messiah, said Ioan. 5. Search the Scriptures, for they give testimony of me. And shortly after: If you believed Moses, perhaps you would believe me also. And Luke ult. He uses the Scriptures to confirm the truth of His resurrection; and consequently Christ the Lord plainly teaches that Sacred Scripture is a true and legitimate rule of faith, which ought chiefly to be heard in proposing the things of faith. The same St. Paul indicates 1. ad Timoth. 3. where after he had told him, from thy infancy thou hast known the holy letters, he adds: all Scripture divinely inspired is profitable to teach, etc.

I answer that these and similar texts signify nothing else than that Scripture is indeed an infallible rule of faith; since it is the written word of God, it is necessary that it be a rule of truth, because there is no surer rule than the authority of God, which is contained in His word, and applied through it; whence just as it is impossible for God to lie immediately of Himself, so also it is impossible for Him to make falsehood through another, since morally both are equivalent. From this however it does not follow, that Sacred Scripture of itself is a sufficien­tiens rule, whereby things to be believed are discerned from things not to be believed, which alone we intend in the present Conclusion.

OBIICIES 2. Likewise many texts of Scripture, by which it is intimated that the Spirit of God speaking in us and inspiring those things which are to be believed and done is to be heard. Thus that text of the first to Cor. 2. is said, that the animal man perceiveth not those things that are of the Spirit of God... But the spiritual man judgeth all things, and he himself is judged of no man. Whence it is consequent that whoever is moved by the Spirit of God can rightly judge and discern what things are to be believed from those not to be believed. Similarly 1. Ioan. 2. the Apostle exhorts the faithful: Let the unction, which you have received from him, abide in you; and you have no need that any man teach you: but as his unction teacheth you of all things, and is truth, and is no lie; and as it hath taught you, abide in him.

I answer to the first. Truly the spiritual man, insofar as he is moved and governed by the Spirit of God, judges all things rightly, nor ought he therefore to be reproved by anyone; yet because it is not always clear to us whether he here and now is directed by the Spirit of God — since indeed many think themselves moved by the Spirit of God who are nevertheless driven by the spirit of wickedness, as is evident not only of the Prophets of Ahab but also of those Jews whom St. Paul rebuked, who had a zeal of God, but not according to knowledge — hence it comes about that we stand in need of another judge and director, from whom we may infallibly receive which things are to be believed and which are not to be believed.

To the second I say that St. John there is dealing only with those who were instructed in the faith, both by themselves and by the other Apostles; whence by the unction which he wills to remain in them he signifies that same faith which they had received from God through the preaching of the Apostles; hence he exhorts them not to fall away from that faith, and not to hear other Pseudo-apostles turning them away from the right faith. Thereupon he premised: These things I write to you concerning those who seduce you. But that another cannot be the meaning of St. John appears not only from the text, but is also evinced by an open reason; for if the internal unction and inspiration of the Holy Spirit alone sufficed for discerning those things which are to be believed and done from those not to be believed and done, it would follow that neither the faithful, to whom he was writing, nor indeed even infidels to be converted would have need in any way of any Doctor or instructor; and forthwith sacred Scripture would be vain also for them, because God would sufficiently reveal privately to each one all things that are to be believed and done, nor would anyone be bound to believe anything other than what God had made known to him through that internal revelation, which is absurd.

Third Conclusion. — THE ULTIMATE TERMINATIVE OBJECT OF THE ASSENT OF INFUSED FAITH IS NOT THE VERY HABIT OF DIVINE FAITH ITSELF. This is the doctrine of the Doctor, question 23, cited n. 7, etc.

Proof first: because, as we shall say below, supernatural habits do not incline the powers sensibly toward their objects, nor do they confer upon them an easier operation, but only give to the faculties the virtue of producing an act supernatural in substance; but that sensible propensity and facility of the faculty in eliciting its operations arises either from preventing grace or from acquired habits; now that which terminates ultimately, or into which our assent of infused faith is ultimately resolved, ought to confer facility for eliciting that assent, for this reason indeed does it terminate ultimately, namely because in it, as in the firmest motive of its assent, the intellect rests: therefore that assent cannot be resolved into the very habit of faith.

Second, if the assent of infused faith were resolved into the very habit of faith itself, so that that habit were the cause why one would ultimately give assent to things proposed, it would follow, says the Doctor, first part, n. 11, that all having the habit of infused faith, as soon as something to be believed by divine faith was proposed to them, would straightway give their assent, even if they had nowhere heard, or at least had forgotten, that it was revealed by God; for they would have in the very habit of faith a motive sufficiently determinative of the intellect for giving assent; but it is absurd that one should believe something by divine faith without any intention whatsoever toward God: therefore, etc. It would follow secondly that the assent of faith would not require the command of the will, and consequently would not be free, nor forthwith any virtue: because that habit of faith, since it is not free of itself, nor by reason of its subject, namely the intellect, would incline naturally and necessarily the intellect to assent; but it is absurd to assert that divine faith is not a virtue, nor the act of faith free: otherwise it would not be meritorious: whence St. Augustine, Homily 25 on John: The rest, he says, man can do unwillingly: but to believe only willingly. Therefore, etc. It would follow thirdly that some faithful person having infused faith could give assent to the mysteries of faith without any instruction whatsoever; for if infused faith had that power of determining the intellect to giving assent, that God is trine and one, e.g. through the mere apprehension of the terms, the consequence would be that a baptized child, as soon as he obtains the use of reason and liberty, and apprehends those terms, God is trine and one, would be inclined necessarily to give assent to those very terms, without any further instruction whatsoever, and without any motive that might lead him by the hand to giving assent; but that this is false not only experience demonstrates, but reason also will convince; because the intellect cannot give assent to any unevident object unless the command of the will intervene: but the will cannot move the intellect to give assent unless that assent have some motive: therefore, etc. — To this add, that thence it would follow that faith would not be faith; for the assent of faith, whether divine or human, is necessarily elicited on account of the testimony of someone who is credited; but if the infused habit should of itself sufficiently move the intellect to give assent, no external testimony would be needed for that, and consequently it would not be a true assent of faith.

You will object 1. Into that must the assent of faith be resolved which makes manifest the objects to be believed; but through the light of faith the objects to be believed are made manifest; for this reason St. Peter calls it a lamp, Epistle 2, chapter 1: Unto which benefits attending, as unto a lamp that shineth in a dark place: therefore, etc.

I distinguish the major: that which makes manifest the objects to be believed by way of a light holding itself on the side of the motivating and terminative object, I concede; on the side of the principle, I deny. The minor likewise I distinguish: faith is a light having the ratio of a principle with respect to the act and assent of faith, because it concurs as concausa with the intellect in which it inheres for eliciting that assent; but it does not move objectively, because it is not known; but the light of which we treat is that which objectively manifests the truth, and which is called the known medium, and is the reason which we can offer why we believe; but this is the testimony of him who speaks and attests, whether divine or human; for if anyone should require why I believe something most certainly, I may rightly reply, because a man worthy of credence has testified to me that it is certain.

You will urge: Corporeal light sufficiently manifests colors to sight: similarly beatific light, although it is an elicitive habit of the clear vision of God, nevertheless so manifests God that the intellect gives assent to that vision without any other medium: therefore also faith, which is likened to corporeal light, and to which the light of glory corresponds, moves of itself also sufficiently the intellect to giving assent to the propositions of faith.

I deny the consequence, and the reason of the disparity is first, because, says de Lugo, distinction 1, section 2, bodily sight is not moved by light to believing the truth of color, nor does it discourse formally or virtually; but light in it is required either as a principle co-efficing the species of colors, or as a condition and production of vision; and perhaps although it be a medium of the vision itself, still it is not a medium unknown and unperceived by the eye; because the eye, seeing colored objects, perceives also the light by which they are illuminated; but the habit of faith is a medium unknown, and consequently cannot sufficiently move the intellect to assent, so that into it it should pour out its credulity and in it find rest.

To the second I say similarly that there is no parity; because that light, since it clearly represents to the intellect the objects as they are in themselves, consequently brings it about that the intellect gives assent to them on account of their evidence; but it is otherwise with the habit of faith, which however much it illuminate the intellect, nevertheless leaves the objects which it manifests always obscure; whence it tends only toward them on account of another's testimony. To these add, that the habit of faith and of the light of glory agree with each other in this, that they are a light holding itself on the side of the principle, because they manifest objects only in the genus of efficient cause, insofar as they produce acts of manifestation; just as the eyes themselves also are wont to be called lights among the Latins, because they make seeing; yet knowledge is not resolved into them.

You will object 2. The assent of faith is resolved into the revelation of God: but divine revelation is made through the medium of the light of faith: therefore the habit of faith is that into which the assent of faith is resolved.

I distinguish the major: the assent of faith is resolved into the revelation of God, revelation properly so called being taken for the veracity of God revealing the mysteries, I concede; improperly so called for that whole thing through which the mysteries are manifested, I deny. The minor likewise I distinguish: God reveals improperly through the medium of the light of faith, I concede; properly, I deny: for the proper revelation of God is the speech of God; but God is not held to speak to us properly when he grants the habit of divine faith, otherwise he would be held to address infants while they are baptized, since he infuses into them the habit of faith; similarly he would be said to speak to us when he bestows the intellect, because through it we can believe him and know other objects, which certainly is absurd; for the intellectual faculty or the habit of faith is not properly the word of God, whence its production and bestowal cannot be held to be properly so called speech or revelation.

You will object 3. Into that is the assent of faith concerning some mystery, e.g. of the Incarnation, resolved, through which that mystery becomes credible to us; but through the habit of faith all mysteries become credible; for by its defect we could not in any way believe as we ought: therefore into the habit of faith the assent given to any mystery whatsoever is ultimately resolved.

I distinguish the major: into that must the assent of faith be resolved through which the object becomes credible with a credibility holding itself on the side of the believing power, I deny; holding itself on the side of the motive persuading the truth and terminative of that same assent, I concede. The minor likewise I distinguish: through the habit of faith the object becomes credible with a credibility arising on the side of the principle eliciting the act of assent, I concede; on the side of the motive, or term, toward which that assent ought to tend and as it were find rest in it as in the ultimate reason, I deny: for properly something is said to be credible when, reasons and motives being adduced, it is persuaded to be worthy of belief, nor ought assent be denied to it on account of the persuasive reasons which allure to it.

Fourth Conclusion. — THE AUTHORITY OF THE CHURCH AND ITS TESTIMONY CANNOT BE, WHETHER PARTIAL OR TOTAL, THE FIRST FOUNDATION ON WHICH OUR ASSENT OF FAITH RESTS, NOR FORTHWITH THE TERM INTO WHICH IT IS ULTIMATELY RESOLVED. This seems to be the genuine doctrine of the Doctor, which he indicates in book 1, distinction 11, question 4, n. 15, where after he had said that the Church in the Lateran Council under Innocent III, chapter Firmiter, rightly defined that in the sacrament of the Eucharist there takes place the transubstantiation of bread into the body of Christ, although this truth would be contained only implicitly in sacred Scripture, he adds: Whatever is proposed by the Church to be believed must be believed to pertain to the substance of the faith, and this after that solemn declaration made by the Church. And if you ask why the Church willed to choose that understanding of this article so difficult, when the words of Scripture could be saved according to an easier understanding, and truer according to appearance, concerning this article, saying that the Scriptures were expounded with that spirit with which they were written; and thus it is to be supposed that the Catholic Church expounded them with that spirit with which the faith was handed down to us, namely the spirit of truth; and therefore she chose this article because it is true: for it was not in the power of the Church to make this true, the matter belonging not to things but to God instituting; but the Church explained the understanding handed down from God, directed in this, as is believed, by the spirit of truth.

By which words the Doctor recalls even the divine testimony itself of the Church in things to be believed and proposed back to the supreme veracity of God, and thus it must be reduced to divine authority; and forthwith, according to the mind of the Doctor, the authority of the Church, whether divine or human, is not even a partial term into which the assent of faith ought to be resolved.

Proof therefore of the Conclusion: first indeed by the authority of sacred Scripture, which intimates that the assent of faith is elicited only on account of the divine testimony. Thus Matthew 15, Christ the Lord addressing Peter, who had confessed him to be the Son of God, says: Flesh and blood hath not revealed it to thee, but my Father, etc. And John 1: No man hath seen God at any time: The Only-begotten Son of God hath the testimony of God in himself. Hence St. Paul, second, writing to us, calls the hearing of faith: you have received it not as the word of men, but as the word of God. And 1 John 5: He who believeth not the Son maketh him a liar, because he believeth not in the testimony which God hath testified of his Son. By all which it is openly signified that the assent of faith ought to be elicited only on account of the sole divine testimony, whereby it is strengthened, and into which it is resolved.

The same the holy Fathers teach, especially indeed St. Augustine, in the book Contra Epistolam Fundamenti, chapter 14, where he says: Let us follow those who invite us first to believe what we are not able to see, that we, having been made firmer by the faith itself, may merit to understand what we believe, no longer strengthening our mind inwardly by men, but by God himself.

By which words St. Augustine teaches that we are indeed promoted to faith through the doctrine and ministry of men; but that the assent of faith is made only on account of the authority of God alone.

Proof also by reason: theological faith differs from human faith in this, that the latter is supported by human, the former by divine testimony; but however much the Church be guided through the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit, and by this reason her testimony rest upon divine authority and receive firmness and certitude from it; nevertheless her testimony is only human, nor consequently can it be called the word of God or divine revelation: therefore into her testimony the assent of faith is not resolved, nor does it find rest in it. The major stands. The minor is proved: the same judgment must be held concerning the authority granted by God to the Church around the determination and proposition of things to be believed, as concerning the power of binding law around rightly and becomingly instituting morals; but however much this legislative power of the Church be from God, laws sanctioned by the Church are not held to be divine, but human, because they arise only from the human Ecclesiastical authority; otherwise laws sanctioned by princes would also be called divine: for there is no authority except from God: whence Proverbs 8, God himself testifies: By me kings reign, and lawmakers decree just things: therefore although the Church have the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit in establishing and proposing things of faith, her testimony is not purely divine, but human; and forthwith faith ought not ultimately to terminate at it, but necessarily ought to be reduced to something further, whereby it is supported and rests. Add that the authority of the Church, however divine, is only a participation of divine authority, and therefore necessarily ought to be resolved into that very authority: therefore our assent of faith cannot be firmly established in quiet in it, but further must be resolved into divine authority.

It is confirmed: into that faith cannot ultimately be resolved even partially as to assent, which of itself formally is something created; but the testimony of the Church, even insofar as it is the organ of the Holy Spirit, is something created: therefore into it faith as to assent cannot be resolved even partially. The minor stands: for the Church insofar as it is taken for the collection of those men who are moved and directed by the divine inspiration of the Holy Spirit, imports only men, who doubtless are something created. But the major is proved: for that into which our faith is ultimately resolved as to assent must be the formal motive of that assent; but the formal motive of such assent, under which we give assent to God through faith, is not something created but uncreated, namely divine truth in speaking and knowing, as was said above: therefore, etc.

Response from de Lugo: if the adequate formal object under which our faith exists were partially something created, our faith would not be adequately divine, nor should we believe God on account of his sole authority or veracity, but only partially; because indeed the assent of faith would also be elicited on account of something created, namely on account of the testimony of the Church. Secondly, if the assent of faith rested partially upon human authority, it would follow that it is partly fallible: for just as it is infallible because it has for its formal object the infallible divine authority, so if it rest upon human authority, which of itself is fallible, it will also be fallible. For the assent of faith cannot have greater infallibility than the motive upon which it rests has. — It is confirmed, because the intellect cannot give assent to any conclusion with a firmness of certitude stronger than the principles on account of which it gives assent: therefore if the testimony on account of which it gives partial assent be fallible, it cannot have entirely firm and infallible assent around the objects proposed through faith to be believed. Thence that the assent of the intellect, as also the conclusion, follows for the most part the lot of the weaker and more infirm principle; and forthwith if one of the motives of the assent of faith be fallible and uncertain, even the assent will be fallible and doubtful.

You will object 1. Christ the Lord seemed to require that faith from men which would exclude not human reasons, but would even rest upon them: therefore according to his teaching divine faith can also rest upon human testimony. The antecedent is proved from that John 10: If you believe not me, believe the works: where he proposes the miraculous works wrought by him as a reason upon which the assent of faith might rest. And chapter 11 he said to the Disciples: Lazarus is dead, and I rejoice for you, that you may believe, etc. Similarly John 4 it is said of the Samaritans: Many believed in him on account of the word of the woman giving testimony, because he said to me all things whatsoever I have done. — It is confirmed from that to the Romans 10: You are fellow citizens of the Saints, and of the household of God, built upon the foundation of the Apostles and Prophets. Where Paul reduces the whole faith to the Apostles, through whose preaching it first shone forth. Hence St. Augustine seems to suppose in book De Spiritu et Littera, chapter 34, that faith terminates ultimately even at the persuasion of men, since he says: For neither can the rational soul believe by any free will whatever, if there be wanting the incantation or persuasion by which it believes; he did not say persuasion which remains, but by which it believes: as if indicating that it also enters into the formal ratio: which he also said in book 1 to Simplicianus, question 2: Who can believe unless touched by some calling, that is, by some attestation of things?

I answer, that in all these nothing else is signified than that human authority and persuasion are required for the assent of faith, not as the formal reason of giving assent, but only as a condition proposing and applying, or disposing the intellect to assent; even as the apprehension of the intellect is a condition applying the formal object to the will: namely for demonstrating its goodness, which allures the will to pursuing it; for just as the will cannot love an object unless its goodness be proposed to it by the intellect, so similarly the faithful cannot give assent to God, especially Catholic and general faith, while it reveals the mysteries, unless through the Church and human testimony the divine revelation become known to him and be proposed.

They object 2. The assent of human faith, which is given to the King speaking through Legates, is resolved partially into the authority of those Legates: therefore similarly the assent of faith, which we offer to God speaking through the Church and Saints and Apostolic men, ought partially to be resolved into their authority. The consequence is clear from a parity of reason: for God (says de Lugo) does not otherwise act with men through his Prophets or Apostles than do earthly Kings through their Legates; whence St. Paul writes, 2 Corinthians 5: Therefore we are ambassadors for Christ.

The antecedent stands purely plainly: for when some legate, who is held to be an upright man, proposes something on the part of the King, he is believed not only on account of his words on account of the authority of the King, but also on account of his private and particular testimony.

I deny the consequence: and the reason of the disparity is open, that faith whereby the King is believed speaking through his Legates, since it is human, is no wonder that the testimony of the legate have the ratio of that partial object, because the testimony of the legate is of the same ratio and order with the testimony of the King, and of itself sufficient for conciliating the assent of human faith; but it is otherwise with theological faith, which since it is divine can be supported by the sole testimony of God revealing, and consequently cannot of itself ultimately rest upon the testimony of the Church, which is purely human.

You will object 3. If the testimony of the Church ought to be resolved into something else, namely into the testimony of God, it would follow that in the assent of divine faith a vicious circle is committed; for the faithful would believe the authority of the Church on account of divine revelation, and again divine revelation on account of the authority of the Church; for if you ask some faithful person why he believes God to be trine, e.g., he will reply, because the Church testifies: if again you require whence he knows the testimony of the Church to be true, he will answer, because God, who is truthful in speaking, revealed through sacred Scripture the Church to be the pillar of truth, and to have the assistance of the Holy Spirit in things of faith to be decided and proposed: therefore either it is necessary that a vicious circle be admitted in the assent of faith, or that it be partially resolved into the very testimony of the Church.

I deny the major, and to its proof I say, that the resolution of the assent of faith into the testimony of the Church is not made by the same ratio by which it is made into the testimony of God; since it is resolved into the testimony of the Church as into a rule proposing things to be believed, and discerning them from things not to be believed; but it is resolved into the testimony of God as into the formal reason of believing, or giving assent to the mysteries revealed. Whence in that assent no vicious circle is committed: since a vicious circulation is not made when a passage is made from one thing to another according to a diverse ratio and in a diverse genus of cause; but this occurs in the present case; indeed the faithful believes the mysteries revealed on account of divine revelation, as on account of the formal cause of believing; but he believes that revelation to be divine and true on account of the authority of the Church, as on account of a condition applying the things to be believed, and discerning things to be believed from things not to be believed; but to give assent to one thing as to the formal reason, and to another as to a directive or dispositive reason for assent, is to give assent on account of a diverse reason and in a diverse genus of cause: therefore in that assent no vicious circle is made.

You will object 4. Into that is faith ultimately resolved which is the motive why we believe other things; but the authority of the Church is the motive why we believe all mysteries. It is proved by the authority of St. Augustine praised above: I would not believe the Gospel unless the authority of the Catholic Church moved me: therefore, etc.

I deny the minor, and to the authority of St. Augustine I say, that he is to be understood concerning the motive of credibility of the Gospel; but not concerning the ultimate motive of credulity itself, or of faith. Whence that on account of which St. Augustine said it, not that he thought the testimony of the Church to be the terminative object of theological faith, through which among other things I believe sacred Scripture to be the word of God; but because the authority of God being set aside, that judgment, which necessarily precedes the act of faith, would have had no sufficient foundation whereon he might judge firmly that the Gospels were written by divine authority to be believed; nor for discerning between the true Gospel and those books which in the first times of the Church were circulated under the name of the Gospel of Paul and of certain other Apostles, which the Church reproved as supposititious and spurious offspring.

You will object 5. We must have some certain and infallible rule of faith, to which we adhere firmly, that we may not be as little children wavering, and carried about with every wind of doctrine, says St. Paul to the Ephesians 4; but this visible and infallible rule cannot be other than the authority of the Church: therefore our faith can be resolved into the Church as authority, and be established in her.

I distinguish the major: we must have an infallible rule of faith, through which we know what things are to be believed, or not, I concede: into which as into the ultimate term and motive our faith be resolved, I deny. And thus the minor being distinguished, I deny the consequence. For although the Church be an infallible rule of faith, yet our faith is not resolved into her, as into an ultimate formal cause, but only as into a condition, whether per se or per accidens, required for assent. I say per accidens, because certainly the faith of the Patriarchs and Apostles and of all those who heard the divine mysteries immediately from God revealing did not depend upon the authority of the Church proposing and revealing the matter of faith.

They object 6. The divine testimony pertains of itself to the formal object of faith; but when the Church proposes and defines something according to divine authority and through that infallibility which she has from the assistance of the Holy Spirit, she proposes and defines through an authority committed to her: therefore her testimony pertains to the terminative object of faith.

I distinguish the major: the divine testimony absolute and immediate pertains to the terminative object of faith, I concede: immediate and only participated, such as is the testimony of the Church, I deny. Or otherwise: the divine testimony pertains to the object of faith either per se or reductively, I concede; reductively only, I deny. But the testimony of the Church is only a certain participation of the divine testimony, and is reduced to that as to its principle; whence faith cannot ultimately be resolved into it, especially since that itself is resolved into something else.

Fifth Conclusion. — FAITH AS REGARDS THE PROPOSITION AND REVELATION OF THINGS TO BE BELIEVED IS RESOLVED INTO THE TESTIMONY OF THE CHURCH INSOFAAR AS SHE IS GOVERNED BY THE HOLY SPIRIT; AS REGARDS THE ASSENT, IT IS RESOLVED INTO DIVINE VERACITY, OR INTO THE TRUTH OF GOD IN KNOWING AND SPEAKING: This seems more conformable to the doctrine of the Doctoris Subtilis in 3. dist. 23, n. 11, where he says: I give assent to this proposition, God is trine and one, because previously I give assent to God revealing this truth, etc.

Proof moreover of the first part from all those texts of Scripture by which the Church is said to be ruled and governed by the Holy Spirit, and to be His organ in handing down and proposing the things of faith. Whence 1. to Timothy 3. the Church of God is called the pillar and firmament of truth, because assuredly our faith, as regards the proposition of the things to be believed, rests upon her; whence Saint Augustine, book Contra Epistolam Fundamenti, chapter 5, steadfastly says: I would not believe the Gospel unless the authority of the Catholic Church moved me, which authority once taken away, I could not even believe the Gospel. And further below, speaking of the book of the Acts of the Apostles, he says: I must believe that book if I believe the Gospel, because the Catholic authority commends both Scriptures alike to me. Moreover Christ the Lord would have the authority of the Church esteemed so great that He decrees in Matthew 18 that he be held as a Heathen and Publican who has not heard the Church in receiving correction, much more in giving assent to the things proposed by her.

The second part is gathered tacitly from what has been said: since faith as regards assent is ultimately resolved into that which is its formal object under which: whereas divine veracity, or the truth of God in knowing and revealing, is the formal object under which of our faith: therefore our faith as regards assent is resolved into that divine veracity. The major stands: for that into which faith is resolved as regards assent must be the formal motive of such assent: but the formal motive whereby through faith we assent to God, and the formal object under which of faith, are entirely the same; therefore faith is resolved into that divine veracity itself.

YOU WILL SAY 1: That very divine veracity, or the truth of God in knowing and saying, is resolved into the truth of God in being: therefore into it also the assent of our faith ought to be resolved.

I distinguish the antecedent: it is thus resolved under the ratio of being, I concede: under the ratio of motive, I deny. Whence the consequence must be denied, for the first motive of divine faith, from which it receives its infallibility itself, and by which it is distinguished from human faith, is the very authority or veracity of God, which embraces the infinite wisdom of God, by which He cannot be deceived, and the same goodness, by which He cannot deceive.

YOU WILL SAY 2. If divine truth be the ultimate motive whereby the faithful believe the revealed mysteries, nor can faith be grounded ultimately in anything else than in it as ultimate foundation and term, it would follow that most simple believers do not believe with divine faith, since most of them do not believe precisely on account of the authority of God revealing, but either on account of the authority of parents, or of Pastors, or of the Church herself proposing the things of faith: but the consequent is absurd: therefore also that from which it follows.

I deny the major: for no one is truly a believer who does not believe the things proposed to him on account of the authority of God, at least implicitly; for although many do not think explicitly of divine revelation and authority, yet they are borne toward it confusedly at least and implicitly, while they believe those things which are proposed to them both by the Church and by Parents, or Pastors, when they judge that what is proposed has been revealed by God. But that it mostly happens that even the learned and those instructed in the divine mysteries often seem not to think about divine authority or revelation while they believe, this occurs on account of habit and facility in believing, whereby it comes about that they are moved by the authority of God to believe without any reflection: for which reason, those who devote themselves to sacred ministries, for the most part perform them with legitimate intention even actual; nevertheless because they do not reflect upon it, they seem to themselves afterwards to have lacked legitimate intention.

YOU WILL SAY 3: By faith we believe that God is the first truth: yet this we do not believe on account of His own testimony, for it would seem ridiculous to believe someone to be truthful because he himself said so. Then, by faith we believe that God exists: but this we do not believe on account of His testimony: both because it would be absurd to believe someone to exist because he himself testified to it, since he could not testify to it unless he existed; and because what is less known cannot be the reason for knowing what is better known: but it is better known that God exists, since this is established by natural reason, than that this truth is attested by Him: therefore we cannot believe that God exists on account of His truth. Finally, we believe that God revealed the articles of faith: but this we do not believe on account of another reason, otherwise there would be a process into infinity: therefore some assent of faith cannot be resolved into the very veracity of God.

I answer to the first by denying the minor: for it is not by natural reason alone that it becomes known to us that God is truthful, just as by the same light it is established that He is infinitely perfect; but it also appears through the testimony of God Himself attesting His own divine veracity. Whence in answer to the proof, I say that the reason is not equal between God attesting Himself truthful and a man who should testify the same of himself; because he proves it by no arguments, nor is any just reason present to me whereby he might move me to believe him to attest truly while he pronounces himself truthful: but since with the natural light it is certain to us that God is supremely wise, and good, so that to Him it conflicts either to be deceived or to deceive; hence deservedly we believe Him while He professes Himself truthful: we believe, I say, indeed with a firmer assent than that other, which could be elicited on account of natural reason: for faith is more certain than any natural science, as we shall say below. To the second I deny the minor: and in answer to its proof I say that the reason is not the same concerning the testimony of God and of men, because the testimony of man not only makes its object inevident, but also that testimony is fallible: and thus it is a medium of knowing far more uncertain and imperfect than evident natural reason is; whence that testimony generates only opinion, or human faith; but human faith cannot subsist together with certain and evident cognition of the existence of something, as we said in the Logic, treating of the assent of the intellect: and consequently it is no wonder, if one cannot believe someone to exist on account of his testimony, when he has evident knowledge of that existence. But it is otherwise in divine faith, which surpasses every natural science in certainty, because divine testimony is infinitely more certain than any natural science; therefore although there be granted any cognition whatsoever drawn from human reason concerning the existence of God, or another object, we are still deservedly moved by divine testimony, that we may believe it more firmly than that assent is firm which would arise from natural reason; whence although from the very fact that God speaks to us we know evidently that He exists, nevertheless the will could still command the intellect, that it should believe that divine existence on account of the testimony of God affirming it.

To the other proof of the same minor I say, that what is less known does not always make the assent less certain, for a more evident proposition does not always produce a more evident assent, but it suffices that it be more certain in the thing known: whence the obscure revelation of God can be the reason why I assent more firmly to some thing otherwise naturally known to me evidently; and thus although the faith whereby I believe that God testifies Himself to exist be more obscure than the cognition whereby I naturally know Him to be, since it is however absolutely more certain, it can generate a firmer assent.

To the third I deny the minor: for we believe that God revealed the articles of faith on account of that very revelation: for as light is not only the reason why I see colors, but also why I perceive the light itself: so divine revelation is the formal ratio of believing at once both the revelation itself, and the things revealed through it: and immediately it does not follow, that that revelation ought to be believed through another, and that a process into infinity ought to be made.

NOTE 1. That the object of faith can be taken in a threefold way: First indeed, for the very object of faith both material and formal, inasmuch namely as it signifies all the things to be believed on account of divine veracity. Second, for the external proposition whereby we announce something of the subject of faith, affirming or denying. Third, for the very concept of the mind, whereby we conceive the objects of faith. It is certain however that the object of faith taken in the first way, if it be understood of the primary object, since it is God Himself, is an altogether simple thing; but if it be taken for the secondary objects together with the primary, it is indeed complex: for thus it embraces all those things which can be set before the intellect to be known through faith. ⟦illegible: Luare?⟧ the whole difficulty seems to be about the object of faith on the side either of the knower, or of the speaker.

It must moreover be observed that the complexity, which is found in the mode of conceiving of the human intellect, does not proceed from this, that its object is expressed through several words: for this bears accidentally upon whether a mental complexity is to be posited or not posited, as de Lugo observes best, d. 3. sect. 2. num. 33. For it is accidental that now words are so destined to signify that we need several words to express one mental proposition: just as the Chinese do not have an Alphabet as we do, from whose characters all our words are formed, but have characters signifying an entire word; so it could come about that single words were instituted for single entire propositions, such that one simple word would signify this whole complex, man is rational, and as such would represent the mental proposition complexly, which would be made by the composition of the predicate with the subject. On the contrary however it can come about that the concept be incomplex, although it be expressed by us through complex words: thus for example an Angel apprehends by one simple concept the union of the rational soul with the human body, which nevertheless we cannot express, namely the union, the body, and the soul, except through several words; and consequently, just as a complex concept can be expressed by a single word, so also an incomplex concept can be uttered by a complex enunciation.

NOTE 2. That the principal mysteries and objects of faith are contained in certain articles and symbols. Now an article, as Richard of Saint Victor says, Is an incisible truth concerning God constraining us to believe, that is, directing the intellect with respect to all those things which are commonly to be believed; or according to Saint Isidore, An article is a perception of divine truth, tending toward it itself; that is, an article is that which illumines us unto perceiving divine truth, and moves the intellect to believe it. Hence under the name of Articles are understood not indeed all the revealed truths which are contained in Sacred Scripture, or in Councils, but the principal chapters of the same: for just as the structure of the human body is sustained and connected by certain limbs and articulations, lest it dissolve and perish; so in our faith there are certain things more principal and capital, which if they were dissolved, silently the whole fabric of faith would perish and fall. Now Symbolum is a Greek word, which signifies sign or indication and collection: thus in military art the sign which is given to soldiers, that they may recognize one another and be distinguished from enemies, is called a Symbolum: although also properly the name Symbol is used to signify the collection which is wont to be made from the union of many for some work. Moreover for both these reasons the name of Symbol is used by the Church to signify a brief summary, or rule of faith gathered from various articles of things to be believed and proposed to the faithful, whereby they may recognize one another and be distinguished from heretics. Now it is called a Symbol by Augustine, or by him who is the author of Serm. 115. De Tempore: The comprehension of our faith is simple, brief, and full: that simplicity may provide for rudeness, brevity for memory, and fullness for doctrine. But a threefold Symbol above all is admitted in the Church: first indeed the Apostolic, which was composed by the Apostles before they were divided into various provinces, as shall be proved within: the second is called Nicene, which was ordained for the most part in the Council of Nicaea, that the Faithful might profess more explicitly certain articles impugned by heretics, and therefore on account of the error of Arius especially, who denied the divinity of the Son, this was declared more explicitly in the Nicene Symbol. But when Macedonius afterwards impugned the Divinity of the Holy Spirit, the Council of Constantinople added to the former Nicene Symbol, after those words, Et in Spiritum sanctum: Dominum, et vivificantem, qui cum Patre, et Filio simul adoratur, et conglorificatur: qui locutus est per Prophetas. And also those words: De Spiritu sancto ex Maria Virgine. Likewise also that: Cuius regni non erit finis. The third Symbol is called of Saint Athanasius, who although he had not the authority of composing a symbol, yet because that formula, whereby he explicitly professed his faith, clearly and brightly declared the principal articles of faith, it not only pleased and was approved by the supreme Pontiffs, to whom he had directed it, but moreover was accepted by the whole Church: and therefore it obtained the name and force of a Symbol. But that Athanasius was the author of this Symbol stands from Saint Gregory Nazianzen in the Oration De laudibus Athanasii: as also from Saint Augustine on Psal. 120. and from the consensus of the whole Church, which solemnly recites this Symbol in the name of Saint Athanasius on the days of the

NOTE 3. That the objects of faith can be regarded in a twofold way, namely either in the being of the thing, or inasmuch as they are things constituted by their own native principles and properties; or in the being of the credible, inasmuch namely as they are proposed to the intellect to be believed through faith. But things in the being of the credible can have among themselves a various order, namely either an order of existence, or of dignity, or of the habitude of one to another, or of dependence or emanation of one from another. It is certain however, says the Doctor in 3. dist. 23, that there is some order among the credibles themselves: first, according to the being of existence, because certain things are prior in existing than others, namely divine than created, necessary than contingent, and eternal than temporal. Second, according to the being of dignity, for some things are more worthy and more noble in their entity, as those which pertain to God in Himself, as also those which pertain to Christ the Lord, for these far excel the other things which are apprehended through faith. Third, neither is there doubt concerning the order of necessity: for some things are necessary simply, as the essence and attributes of God: likewise the immortality of the soul, its rationality, and similar things: others are contingent, as the creation of the world, the passion of Christ, etc. Finally there is no doubt concerning the order of duration, since some things are eternal, and from eternity, others temporal but past, others future. The whole difficulty could be concerning the order in the being of the credible, namely whether the credibility of some objects depends upon the faith of others, which must first be supposed believed. But there can be compared either the material objects of faith among themselves, such that the faith of some objects depends objectively upon the faith of others, nor are any believed except on account of others; or the formal objects can be compared among themselves, namely divine truth in knowing with truth in saying; or finally the material with the formal, namely the things to be believed with the motive of credibility.

These things therefore premised for the sake of clarity, three things are here to be resolved: First, whether the object of faith be complex or incomplex, both on the side of the act, whereby it is believed, and on the side of the thing, which is known through faith. Second, whether there be some order among the objects both material and formal of faith. Third, whether all the objects of faith be included distinctly and sufficiently in the symbol of the Apostles.

First Conclusion. — THE OBJECT OF FAITH BOTH ON THE SIDE OF THE THING BELIEVED AND ON THE SIDE OF THE ACT OF THE BELIEVER CAN BE COMPLEX, OR INCOMPLEX.

The truth of this conclusion is evident from the first and second Notable; for truly certain things are most simple objects of faith, both in themselves, and in their apprehension, namely divine eternity, wisdom, and the other attributes of God, which just as they are in themselves altogether simple, so can they be perceived by a simple and unique act of faith. But certain things are complex only in themselves, not indeed according to their apprehension: thus for example in that assent of faith: Man duly prepared, by making the sacred Synaxis receives an increase of grace, the object, or objective proposition is complex, which nevertheless is apprehended by a single and incomplex act of faith. But certain things are complex both in themselves, and according to their apprehension, for example The disciples of Christ the Lord on the day of Pentecost received the fullness of the Holy Spirit; this objective proposition of faith is complex in itself, for it involves two predicates and subjects: first, that the Apostles received the fullness of the Holy Spirit: second, that they received it on the day of Pentecost. It is also complex according to assent; forsooth while there are acts of the intellect at least partial, whereby assent is given to this proposition, which is virtually double, although formally it may seem one. But if the assent of faith be considered on the side of the act of the intellect composing and dividing, or affirming or denying, or apprehending the revealed truths through composition or negation of the predicate with the subject, it is certain on this account that faith is complex both on the side of the object, and on the side of the act: both because men receive the objects to be believed in no other way than through human words, whereby they represent the objects complexly, namely through propositions consisting of subject and predicate, which since they generate species similar to the object and predicate apt for producing distinct apprehensions of the extremes, hence it is that there follows a complex assent composing the predicate with the subject. ⟦illegible: Idde qunl?⟧ says de Lugo, disp. 3. sect. 2. n. 16, whenever the truth of a proposition does not appear clearly, but is to be believed on account of another medium and motive, it is necessary that there intervene a discourse at least virtual for assenting to it: since therefore the revealed truths are such, it is necessary that we assent to them, that it be done through a discourse at least virtual, inferring namely from this, that those things which God says are true, and that God has revealed this thing to be, the consequence is that it is true: but where there is discourse, it is necessary that there be complexity, both on the side of the object, and on the side of the assent. Therefore in every composite act of faith it is necessary that there intervene complexity on the side of the act and of the object.

Second Conclusion. — ALL THE MATERIAL OBJECTS ALIKE REGARD FAITH IMMEDIATELY; YET CERTAIN ONES SEEM TO PERTAIN TO IT MORE PRINCIPALLY THAN OTHERS. This according to the truth of the thing ought to be common as regards both parts, although some seem verbally to dissent:

The first part stands; for all the objects of faith alike rest upon the formal motive of credibility, namely the truth of God in knowing and saying, and alike immediately are revealed by God, and proposed by the Church, for neither does the Church have greater infallibility in proposing one object than in another, nor ought less to be believed to God when He reveals one object than while He reveals another, since He is not less truthful by reason of the one than of the other: therefore all the objects of faith are credible by equal reason.

You will say 1. God does not affirm all things equally, for some He merely enunciates simply, but others with an oath: therefore not all revealed things demand an equal faith.

I deny the consequence; since perjury conflicts no less with God than lying; for each of these directly militates against His supreme veracity: whence although He accommodates Himself to our infirmity, at times He may use an oath, that He may provoke our assent in a more efficacious manner: nevertheless that oath does not denote a greater truth of some thing than if He should merely enunciate and reveal it. ⟦illegible: Idde qund?⟧ every revelation of God and attestation of truth could be judged an oath: forsooth since God ⟦illegible: rii?⟧ attests the truth of the revealed by Himself, He wills it to be believed on account of His veracity, which properly is to swear.

You will say 2. Not all things which are revealed are equally true: therefore not all are equally credible. The antecedent is evident, for those things which are purely divine are truer than created things. For they are more necessary and more beings, and consequently have greater truth, and consequently are more credible. It is confirmed by the example of charity well regulated and ordered; for this loves more those things which have greater goodness: therefore also faith ought to believe more those things which have greater and firmer truth.

I answer, granting the antecedent, by distinguishing the consequence: those things ought to be believed more which have greater truth, when the motive of believing is the very proper truth of the object believed evidently appearing through itself, pass over: when the motive of believing is another truth, which is participated equally by other true objects, revealed, and known through faith, I deny. Since therefore the ultimate motive of faith is not the truth of the object believed evidently appearing, but the veracity and testimony of God, all things alike are credible to which this motive belongs equally: but all revealed things equally participate the motive of credibility, because God is equally infallible and truthful in revealing one object and others: and consequently faith believes all things on account of the same motive. To the confirmation it may be said that the argument can be retorted, for just as charity does not always provoke to loving those creatures which are in themselves more perfect, and which participate more of divine goodness and perfection, but those from which a greater glory of God arises, because the ultimate motive of loving on account of charity is not the very perfection of the creature, but the goodness and glory of God: whence if from the creation of man a greater glory of God resulted than from the creation of an Angel, on the motive of charity one ought to love man more than an Angel: therefore just as charity loves equally those things from which an equal glory of God results, so faith ought to believe equally all things credible, because in them the divine veracity appears equally.

The second part also stands: since indeed among the objects credible some are more noble, namely those which are divine; others less noble, such as are all created things, among which moreover there is a multiple and various order of dignity according to their greater or lesser perfection; hence it is that just as the natural light of the intellect inclines more toward knowing a truth more noble, so also the light of faith will incline the intellect more concerning the things to be believed that are divine, than concerning those which are purely created. From these things therefore it follows that the material objects of faith can be believed separately from one another, when they have no natural dependence, nor is one essentially and necessarily presupposed to the other from the nature of the thing: since all those objects are revealed by God equally, and thus equally vindicate to themselves infallibility from the veracity and revelation of God. I said, when one does not necessarily and naturally presuppose the other: for there are certain objects which, that they be believed, suppose the faith of others, upon which they necessarily depend: thus I cannot believe that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, unless I believe that in God there are Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; nor that God is a remunerator, unless I believe Him to exist; nor that all men will rise again, unless I believe all men will die; for resurrection supposes death essentially. But if the formal objects of faith be compared among themselves, for example the truth of God in knowing with His truth in saying and revealing, they preserve some order in their existence, but not in the being of the credible: forsooth it is prior that God be true in knowing than in speaking: for truth in knowing is eternal, divine, and intrinsic to God: but truth in speaking and revealing is temporal, and extrinsic to God. In the being however of the credible they say there is no order of prior or posterior: since they serve one another mutually, that they be believed, since neither can be believed except on account of the other, namely veracity on account of revelation, and revelation on account of veracity. If finally the material objects of faith be compared with the formal, it is certain that they ought to preserve order mutually in the ratio of the credible; for the material depend upon the formal, that they be believed: since the motives of veracity and revelation are not believed on account of the material objects, but contrariwise the material are believed on account of those motives. But all these things are lighter than that we should linger longer in them.

Third Conclusion. — THE OBJECTS TO BE BELIEVED ARE CONTAINED SUFFICIENTLY IN THE SYMBOL OF THE APOSTLES AS REGARDS SUBSTANCE.

It is proved: The sum of the things to be regarded most in believing looks to God subsisting in His Divinity, or in our humanity, according to that of John 17. Haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te solum Deum verum, et quem misisti Iesum Christum. But those two chapters of things to be believed are explained expressly in the Symbol, and those things which look to the knowledge of each are declared sufficiently in it, as Saint Augustine testifies, Serm. 181. De tempore: The Symbol, he says, is brief in words, but great in sacraments; whatever has been handed down in the Scriptures concerning God and Christ is contained in the Symbol. Which truth indeed the Alensis proves and elucidates excellently, q. 96. memb. 5. art. 1. and the Seraphic Doctor in 3. dist. 25. art. 1. q. 1, where he proves the sufficiency of the things to be believed contained in the Symbol both on the side of the Authors composing it; and on the side of the Articles of faith containing truths. On the side indeed of the Authors composing it:

Because, he says, the universality of the Apostles convened there, than which there is no doubt something could not lie hidden of those things which pertain to the complement of faith. And that they might have greater firmness, each placed there his own part, and all together approved the individual parts: that one Church, which was to be founded upon the Apostles, might have one credulity and confession of faith, whereby indeed it would be called the Catholic faith, that is, the universal faith. Universal, I say, because given to all, and constituted by all the Apostles, who were the foundation of the universal Church. Whence Peter first saying his own particle: Credo in Deum Patrem omnipotentem Creatorem caeli et terrae. Second Andrew subjoined: Et in Iesum Christum Filium eius unicum Dominum nostrum. Third John added: Qui conceptus est de Spiritu sancto, natus ex Maria Virgine. Fourth James the Greater brought in: Passus sub Pontio Pilato, crucifixus, mortuus, et sepultus. Fifth Thomas subjoined: Descendit ad inferna, tertia die resurrexit a mortuis. Sixth James the Less adds: Ascendit ad caelos, sedet ad dexteram Dei Patris omnipotentis. Seventh Philip added: Inde venturus est iudicare vivos et mortuos. Eighth Bartholomew brought in: Credo in Spiritum sanctum. Ninth Matthew subjoined: Sanctam Ecclesiam Catholicam. Tenth Simon Chanaanaeus added: Sanctorum communionem. Because in the communion of Saints is the remission of sins. Eleventh Judas Thaddaeus superadded: Carnis resurrectionem. And the sense is, that God will raise up that flesh itself. Twelfth Matthias completed: Vitam aeternam. Amen. And thus the Apostles in full and integral number of twelve composed that Symbol, when they were gathered together. Nevertheless it can also be taken on the side of the constituent articles, since indeed all articles are concerning God, either according as He is in His proper nature, or according as He is united to human nature, it is necessary that certain articles look to the Divinity; certain ones to the humanity. But those which look to the Divinity, either regard the divine essence in itself, or regard the persons or hypostases of the divine essence, or regard its operations. If they regard the divine essence itself in itself, thus there is one article, according as the divine essence is one and simple, and this is intimated when it is said: Credo in Deum. But if they regard the persons or hypostases of the divine essence, according as there are three persons, there are three articles. One of which is: Credo in Deum Patrem omnipotentem. Another truly is noted when it is said: Et in Iesum Christum Filium eius unicum Dominum nostrum. Another when it is said: Credo in Spiritum sanctum. But if they regard the operations of the divine essence, this can be in a threefold way, according as its operation is threefold: one of which is in the confe> rring of nature, and this is creation. Another in the confe> rring of grace, and this is sanctification. The third is in the confe> rring of glory, and this is the glorious resurrection. And according to this then there are three articles: one of which is noted when it is said: Credo in Creatorem caeli et terrae. Another when it is said: Sanctam Ecclesiam Catholicam, sanctorum communionem, remissionem peccatorum. Another when it is said: Carnis resurrectionem. Et vitam aeternam. Amen. And thus there are seven articles concerning the Divinity regarding the divine essence itself in itself, and in its persons, and in its works. And their sufficiency is evident, because it cannot itself be considered in more ways. Similarly concerning the humanity only seven principal articles are found, according to the seven acts of Christ the Redeemer, which are ordered to our redemption. The first of which is to become incarnate: and concerning this there is one article: Qui conceptus est de Spiritu sancto. The second is to be born; and concerning this there is another article: Natus ex Maria Virgine. The third is to pay the price for us: and concerning this there is another article: Passus sub Pontio Pilato, crucifixus, mortuus, et sepultus. The fourth is to despoil hell; and concerning this there is the article: Descendit ad inferna. The fifth is to triumph over death; and concerning this there is another article: Tertia die resurrexit a mortuis. The sixth is to transcend heavenly things: and concerning this there is another article: Ascendit ad caelos, sedet ad dexteram Dei Patris omnipotentis. The seventh to come to judgment: and concerning this there is another article: Inde venturus est iudicare vivos, et mortuos. And thus it is evident that there are seven articles looking to the Deity, and seven looking to the humanity, in which the universality of faith is contained, according as it is signified in 1. Apoc. where John says he saw seven candlesticks, and in the midst of the seven candlesticks one like to the son of man, and he had in his right hand seven stars. For by the seven luminous stars, which are of celestial nature, are understood the seven articles looking to the Divinity: but by the seven golden candlesticks, which are of earthly matter, nevertheless excellent and refined, are understood the seven articles regarding the humanity: and therefore he says, that in the midst of these he saw one like to the son of man. Therefore since these fourteen articles are contained in the Apostolic Symbol, hence it is that faith is contained in that Symbol sufficiently and fully as regards those things which are principally to be believed. And therefore the reasons toward that part are to be conceded.

You will say 1. If all the articles to be believed are contained sufficiently in that Symbol, why was it necessary to add other Symbols? But besides the Symbol of the Apostles the Church also has other Symbols, namely the Nicene Symbol, and the Symbol of Saint Athanasius: therefore the Apostolic Symbol does not embrace sufficiently all the things to be believed.

The Seraphic Doctor answers ib. ad 5. arg: that the Apostolic Symbol is sufficient unto the knowledge of the things to be believed; but that the others were added for the fuller explanation of the things to be believed, and for the confutation of heresies; whence the Apostolic Symbol is sufficient for instructing the common people concerning those things which it must believe explicitly; but the other two Symbols are necessary for Pastors and Rectors, both for explaining those things which are contained in the Apostolic Symbol, and for refuting various errors. The Nicene Symbol, says the Seraphic Doctor, was > composed for the confutation of many hereses springing up. Whence certain things are added for greater expression, whereby heresies can be confuted, and besides, to eliminate the heresy of Manichaeus not only is it said: Credo in Deum, but I believe in one God. Nor is it only said: Creatorem caeli et terrae, but also of all things visible and invisible. But for the confutation of the heresy of Arius not only is it said: Credo in Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum, but also there is added: Et in unum Dominum Iesum Christum Filium Dei unigenitum … up to where: Per quem omnia facta sunt. But for the confutation of the heresy of Eutyches, and Nestorius, who said the Holy Spirit was the servant of the Father and the Son, it is not said only: Credo in Spiritum sanctum, but there is added: Dominum et vivificantem, qui ex Patre procedit, and the Latins added, Filioque, on account of the error of the Greeks. Who together with the Father, and the Son is adored at once, etc. And there is added: Qui locutus est per Prophetas, for the destruction of the error of certain ones, who said that the Prophets spoke as phanatics. And thus it is evident, that those Symbols do not superabound, nor does the Apostolic fall short: because although in it faith is contained sufficiently as regards the proper and simple confession of faith, nevertheless it was opportune to add something to it for the fuller explanation, and on account of confuting heretical depravity.

You will say 2. The sum of the things to be believed is contained chiefly in these two, namely the existence of God, and His justice by way of order to rewarding men, according to that of Saint Paul to the Heb. 11. Accedentem ad Deum oportet credere quia est, et inquirentibus se remunerator est: but these two are not contained in the Apostolic Symbol: therefore it does not embrace sufficiently all the things to be believed.

I deny the minor. For we profess that God exists, when we say: Credo in Deum: for by these words we profess that there is one God: but remuneration is contained in those last words, Et vitam aeternam, in which is contained eternal beatitude for those observing the commandments of God: and consequently that divine justice sufficiently appears in rewarding the good, and punishing the evil: just as also all the other divine attributes become known, either by the name of God, or through the divine omnipotence: for He who is omnipotent, consequently is infinite, and thereby illustrated with all the perfections which look to infinite being.

You will say 3. Among the mysteries of faith to be believed explicitly by all, one of the chiefest is the Sacrament of the Eucharist, which on that account is called by Antonomasia Mysterium fidei: because it especially flees the natural grasp of the senses and of the human intellect: but that mystery is not contained in the Apostolic Symbol, nor even in the other two: therefore those Symbols do not embrace sufficiently all the things to be believed.

The same Seraphic Doctor answers ad 3. That this article is not principal, but is contained under some article, just as the other Sacraments. Now some wish to say, that it is reduced to the Article concerning Omnipotence: others however to the Article concerning the Passion, because this is the memorial of the passion: but it is better to recall it to the Article concerning the unity of the Church, and the remission of sins, to which also the other Sacraments are recalled: for in the Sacraments themselves is made the remission of sins, and is attended the union of the whole Church of Saints.

Certain ones add that this mystery is not posited in the Symbol, because there are contained in it only those things which were necessary to be known unto faith explicit pertaining to the intellect: but the explicit faith of the Eucharist is not necessary on account of itself, but unto fulfilling worthily the precept of receiving the Eucharist; whence, as Saint Augustine observes tract. 11. in Ioan, the Catechumens, who were formerly taught all the mysteries to be believed before they received baptism, heard nothing concerning the Sacrament of the Eucharist: therefore it is no wonder if in the Symbol, which the Catechumens even before receiving baptism are taught, nor must they profess, this article be not contained, whose explicit faith is not exacted from them until they should be about to receive this Sacrament.

I answer, that this ought to seem doubtful to no Catholic; since this very thing the Holy Fathers plainly hand down, and most especially St. Clement, Epist. 1. ad Iacobum, and lib. 1. Recognitionum: St. Ambrose Serm. 38. Chrysostom Homil. 1. et 2. De Symbolo, Augustine Serm. 115. et 118. De Tempore, and St. Leo Epist. 13. ad Pulcheriam, and Serm. 3. De Passione, where he says: Ipsa Catholici Symboli brevis et perfecta confessio duodecim Apostolorum est insignita sententia. Whence Baronius ad an. 11. judges that the Symbol was composed in the tenth year after the Passion of Christ, namely before the Apostles were divided into various provinces. This also can be urged from the reason alleged by those same Holy Fathers just praised, who will that on this account the Apostles published this Symbol, that they might have one and the same rule of faith, which all of them would propose to all peoples. Secondly, that each individual Faithful might the more easily commit this brief formula of faith to memory, and profess it more frequently. Thus Augustine Hom. 12. in Serm. De Symbolo. Thirdly, that by this brief formula the faithful might be fortified as if by a shield against all the frauds of heretics. So St. Chrysostom Hom. De Symbolo. Those same Fathers add that the Apostols did not hand down this Symbol in writing, but verbally: Lest, says Eusebius Emissenus Hom. 2. De Symbolo, it could be corrupted and vitiated by heretics. Whence it is no wonder if this Symbol is not held by the faithful as Sacred Scripture, since it was not written by the Apostles, but handed over to the faithful, that it might be preserved in their memory. Add that although the Apostles delivered it with the Holy Spirit ruling and governing as regards the truth of the sentences, yet not dictating the individual words, which seems necessary for Canonical Scripture: and moreover, although it be certain that this Symbol was published by the Apostles, yet it is not of faith, nor defined by the Church, nor received by her among the divine Scriptures.

WHETHER, AND IN WHAT MANNER FAITH RECEIVED PROGRESS AND AUGMENTATION WITH THE SUCCESS OF TIMES.

NOTE 1. From the Seraphic Doctor in 3. d. 25. art. 2, the augmentation of faith can be considered in a threefold manner: First indeed, as regards the multitude of things to be believed. Secondly, as regards the fullness of light. Thirdly, as regards the certitude of knowledge. First, I say, the augmentation of faith can be regarded as regards the multitude of things to be believed, and that either according to their addition, or with respect to their explication: for the objects to be believed can be considered as more numerous, or fewer at one time than at another: moreover, those which are proposed only implicitly at one time can be proposed at another time as things to be believed explicitly and distinctly. Similarly faith can receive an augmentation of new light with the success of times, so that those things which were revealed more obscurely at one time may appear more distinctly and more openly at another time through a more abundant illustration of doctrine and a more perspicuous proposition of the things to be believed. Finally faith can be compared either to the truth dictating, or to the intellect assenting. It is asked, however, whether in all these ways faith receives augmentation, so that now there are more, or fewer things to be believed, and that more clearly and distinctly, and also more firmly and with more certain assent, than the faithful of the nascent Church believed.

NOTE 2. Faith concerning some object can be had in a twofold manner, namely either implicitly, or explicitly. Explicit faith is, when assent is borne to the very object, as such is, so that he who believes, being questioned, can say in particular that he believes it. Implicit faith is, when we believe something, in which other things are involved, although it be hidden from us what those are, or we cannot believe this, without by that very fact believing others at least in common. Now this implicit faith can arise first from the reason of the formal object of the same thing. E.g., he who by infused faith believes one article on account of the divine authority, by that very fact seems to embrace implicitly whatever God has revealed: just as he who de- tests one grave sin, precisely because it is a grave offense of God, by that very fact seems implicitly to detest every grave sin, in which the same motive of detestation is found. Secondly, implicit containment can ari- se from this, that there be believed some collection of things taken together, in which other objects are contained, which in themselves and in particular are unknown: thus while some rustic believes all things which are believed by the Roman Church, he has implicit faith concerning all the articles and truths Ca- tholic pertaining to the integrity of faith. Finally, thirdly, it can hap- pen that something connected with another be believed, and that either because one proposition is connected with another in reality itself, or by the identity of the thing, although the connection itself cannot be known without faith; and in this way, he who believes God to be infinite, implicitly believes Him to be triune: or also the particular is known implicitly in the universal, as is evident of itself.

NOTE 3. The state of faith, as well as of the Church, can be distinguis- hed in a threefold manner, according to the threefold law of Nature, Scripture, and Grace. The state of Nature was from Adam even to Moses: that of Scripture indeed from Moses even unto Christ: finally that of Grace from the very nativity of Christ the Lord even unto the consummation of the age. Moreover each of these states can be distinguished into divers times: even as St. Gregory, Homil. 2. in Matth., distinguishes the state of the law of Nature from the very beginning of the world even unto the deluge: from the deluge and Noe even unto Abra- ham: and from Abraham even unto Moses. Similarly in each of those states men can be distinguished into two classes, namely into those who were Princes, Pastors and Rulers of others, and into those who in the manner of sheep are ruled by pastors, and are instructed and illumined in the truths of faith.

These things thus premised, there must be determined first, whether the faith of the Church has always been equal in any state whatsoever, both implicit as well as explicit, concerning the same objects to be believed. Secondly, whether the objects to be believed became known more clearly at one time than at another. Thirdly, whether they were believed at one time with greater and firmer certitude than at another.

First Conclusion. — FAITH AS REGARDS THE SUBSTANCE OF THE THINGS TO BE BELIEVED WAS THE SAME IMPLICITLY IN ALL THE FAITHFUL OF WHATEVER STATE OF THE CHURCH, AND LIKEWISE EXPLICITLY IN THE PRINCES AND RULERS, BUT NOT SO IN THE COMMON RUN OF THE FAITHFUL, UP TO THE STATE OF THE LAW OF GRACE. This Conclusion consists of three parts, of which

The First is gathered from the Apostle to the Heb. 11. where, when he had said: Sine fide impossibile est placere Deo, he adds: Credere enim oportet accedentem ad Deum, quia est, et inquirentibus se remunerator sit: but very many in any state whatsoever of the Church pleased God: therefore they must have believed that He exists, and that He is the remunerator of those who seek Him: but the substance of the things to be believed is contained chiefly in virtue of these two articles, namely the divine existence, which involves not only the Deity, but also all the attributes and the operations and excellencies of God, and the salvation of men, unto which all the operations of God ad extra are ordained; for all things are on account of the Elect: therefore, etc. — It is confirmed from this, that in the same place the Apostle says faith is the substance of things to be hoped for: but the things to be hoped for at any time whatsoever were the same according to substance, namely eternal beatitude, and those things which pertain to it; whence in the same place he adds: Iuxta fidem defuncti sunt omnes isti (namely the ancient Fathers) non acceptis repromissionibus, sed a longe eas aspicientes, et salutantes. Wherefore 2. ad Cor. 1. speaking of the ancient Fathers, he says: Habentes autem eumdem spiritum fidei. By which he signifies that the ancient Fathers had the same faith as ourselves.

It is proved moreover: the sum of faith chiefly concerns God subsistent in His Divinity, or in our humanity: but this faith has ever existed in every state of the Church: therefore, etc. The major is evident from that Ioann. 17. Haec est autem vita aeterna: ut cognoscant te solum verum Deum, et quem misisti Iesum Christum. But the minor is proved from that Actor. 4. where of Christ it is said: Non est aliud nomen sub caelo datum hominibus, in quo oporteat nos salvos fieri; whence as many as were faithful in any state whatsoever of the Church directed all their hope toward Christ, as toward the fountain of grace, and the Author, and Mediator of God and men. Hence Heb. 13. it is said: Christus heri, et hodie, et in saecula; by which Paul signifies that although Christ the Lord appeared only in the middle of the times, nevertheless He derived the influx of His divine operation and power into all peoples quite absolutely, at any time whatsoever, and under whatever law, of Nature, Scripture, or Grace: hence Apocal. 13. it is said: Agnus occisus ab origine mundi, because the future sacrifice of this divine victim, whereby the sins of men ought to be expiated, was always present to God, so that by His understanding and regard He might be moved to impart grace to men: wherefore all the faithful quite absolutely placed their hope and salvation in the Messias Himself; whence David, Psal. 21. In te speraverunt Patres nostri, speraverunt et liberasti eos; ad te clamaverunt, et salvi facti sunt.

But that the grace and succor of that divine Mediator profited men unto salvation long before His coming into the world, St. Paul teaches most excellently 1. ad Cor. 10. in these words: Patres nostri omnes sub nube fuerunt, et omnes mare transierunt, et omnes in Moyse baptizati sunt in nube, et in mari: et omnes eamdem escam spiritualem manducaverunt, et omnes eamdem potum spiritualem biberunt: bibebant autem de spiritali consequente eos Petra: Petra autem erat Christus. Hence the Holy Fathers teach that faith in Christ has always been necessary unto salvation for men in whatever state. Which also St. Paul not obscurely intimates to the Rom. 3. where, when he had said: Omnes peccaverunt, et egent gloria Dei, he adds: Iustificati per gratiam ipsius, per redemptionem, quae est in Christo Iesu, quem proposuit Deus propitiationem per fidem in sanguine ipsius ad ostensionem iustitiae suae, propter remissionem praecedentium delictorum, in sustentatione Dei, ad ostensionem iustitiae eius in hoc tempore, ut sit ipse iustus, et iustificans eum, qui est ex fide Iesu Christi. — Hence St. Augustine, Tract. ⟦tract-number illegible⟧ in Ioan. teaches most excellently that the faith of the Synagogue and of the Church is the same, as regards its object: The times, he says, have been varied, not faith: the sound of the word has been changed ⟦illegible: two short words garbled beyond recovery⟧: nevertheless the same faith joins both together. And Serm. S. De Tempore: One, he says, is the faith of the new, and of the old Testament. Wherefore lib. 1. Retractat., cap. 18. he teaches that the Christian religion existed from the beginning of the world, although it was not called by that name: The very thing, he says, which is now called the Christian religion, existed also among the Ancients, nor was it absent from the beginning of the human race, until the Same should come in the flesh, whence the true Religion, which already existed, began to be called Christian. For when after the resurrection and Ascension into heaven the Apostles had begun to preach, and very many believed, first at Antioch, as it is written, the Disciples were called Christians. Therefore in our times this is the Christian Religion, not because it did not exist in prior times, but because in later times it received this name, to know and attain which is most secure salvation. — To this most excellently accords St. Leo, Serm. De Nativitate:

Let them cease therefore, he says, the complaint of those who, murmuring impiously against the divine dispensations, complain of the tardiness of the divine Nativity: as though what was wrought in the last age of the world had not been bestowed in times past. The Incarnation of the Word brought this fruitful advantage, that it was made so that the sacrament of human salvation should never cease in any antiquity whatsoever. What the Apostles preached, this the Prophets announced: nor is that fulfilled late which has always been believed. But the wisdom and benignity of God by this delay of His salutary work made us more eager for His vocation, so that what had been foretold through so many ages by many signs, many voices, and many mysteries might in these days of the Gospel be without ambiguity: and the nativity, which was about to exceed every miracle and every measure of understanding, begat in us a faith the more steadfast, the more its preaching had been both more ancient and more frequent. Not therefore by a new counsel did God provide for human affairs, nor by a late compassion: but from the constitution of the world He instituted one and the same cause of salvation for all. But the grace of God, whereby the whole body of the Saints has always been justified, was increased at the birth of Christ; it did not begin. And this sacrament of great piety was then fulfilled throughout the whole world already filled, and then also prevailed in its significations, so that they are no less profitable who believed in it as promised than those who received it as given.

To this also the reason lends its aid: for all the faithful at any time whatsoever ought to tend toward the same beatitude, and through the same Mediator Christ: therefore it was necessary that all mutually agree in the same faith, at least implicit, and according to substance.

The second part is proved, namely that at all times the Rulers, Pastors, and Princes of the faithful had explicit faith concerning the principal mysteries; for this Christ the Lord signifies Luke 10. speaking generally to the Apostles: Beati oculi qui vident quae vos videtis; dico enim vobis, quod multi Prophetae, et reges voluerunt videre quae vos videtis, et non viderunt: et audire quae auditis, et non audierunt. From which St. Irenaeus rightly gathers, lib. 4. cap. 24. If they desired, therefore they believed in Him. Hence St. Leo Epist. 23. says that from the beginning of the human race Christ coming in the flesh was announced to men. Which announcement indeed and faith certain Gentiles also propagated amid the midst of the darkness of idolatry, as is evident in the case of the most holy man Job, who cap. 19. says: scio, quia Redemptor meus vivit. — But when this faith had been obscured by the infidelity of the Gentiles and almost extinguished, it was again raised up in Abraham; who had a more explicit faith of the mysteries, and especially of the Incarnation, as Christ the Lord testifies Ioan. 8. Abraham pater vester exultavit, ut videret diem meum: vidit et gavisus est. But from that most holy Patriarch the faith concerning the Word to be incarnate was propagated to all his posterity, whence St. Paul to the Gal. 3. Abrahae dictae sunt promissiones, et semini eius. But that divine faith, through the frequent revelations made to the Patriarchs Isaac and Jacob, God cultivated even unto the very times of Moses, concerning whom, before he received the law, St. Paul to the Heb. 11. writes thus: Fide Moyses grandis factus negavit se esse filium filiae Pharaonis, magis eligens affligi cum populo Dei, quam temporalis peccati habere iucunditatem, maiores divitias aestimans thesauro AEgyptiorum improperium Christi: aspiciens enim in remunerationem. Before the other Israelites moreover, who lived after Moses, David and Isaias had the expression concerning the Incarnation of the Word, and its mysteries of Life, Death, and Resurrection: for of David we read Matth. 22. that he calls Christ Lord in spirit, saying: Dixit Dominus Domino meo, sede a dextris meis, etc.; and of Isaias indeed Ioan. 12. Haec dixit Isaias quando vidit gloriam eius, et locutus est de eo.

The third part St. Gregory teaches openly, Hom. 16. in Ezechielem, where about the middle, he says: Dei cognitio, quae in Patribus spiritualibus fuit, nota toti populo Hebraeorum non fuit: Nam omnipotentem Deum, sanctam videlicet Trinitatem, cum Prophetae praedicarent, populus ignorabat, solum decalogum tenebat in fide, legem Trinitatis nesciens. By which he signifies that not all the faithful Israelites had explicit faith concerning the principal mysteries of faith, for instance the Trinity, and likewise the Divinity of the Messias to come: much less did they know the special mysteries, which the Christian people now believes explicitly, and which are expressed and declared distinctly in the Symbol; whence St. Paul to the Ephes. 3. says: Aliis generationibus non est agnitum filiis hominum, sicuti nunc revelatum est sanctis Apostolis eius, et Prophetis in spiritu. To which accords

S. Ioan., Epist. 1. cap. 5. Scimus quoniam Filius Dei venit, et dedit nobis sensum, ut cognoscamus verum Deum, et simus in vero Filio eius.

From these things therefore it follows that explicit faith concerning some objects in particular was not always equal, nor did the common faithful of the old Testament, nay rather even their Rulers, know the mysteries of faith so distinctly as the rude common run of Christians knows them also. Moreover even in the very state of the law of nature or of writing the equality of faith was not always the same, at one time the knowledge of things growing dim, at another renewed through the Prophets; which also happens in the state of the law of grace; for the faithful of all ages did not have equally explicit and distinct faith concerning many objects; for it happened that, when their elders had explicit knowledge of certain things, afterwards the same faith, lulled into the shadows of ignorance in most of their posterity, was again recalled to light and secured by the definitions of Councils, the sanctions of Pontiffs, and the labor and study of Doctors.

You will say 1. The whole Christian faith is contained in the new law: but the new law is wholly contained in the old law; for it is that mystical wheel within a wheel, as Ezechiel notes, cap. 1. therefore the faithful of the old Testament ought to have had a more open and explicit faith than those of the new. — I deny the consequence: for although the New Testament be enclosed at least implicitly in the old, yet from thence it is not consequent that the ancient faithful had the same explicit faith of the mysteries as ourselves: for, as the holy Apostle notes repeatedly, all things happened to them in figure.

You will say 2. The object being varied, the habit also is changed: therefore if the faithful of the new Testament believe something which was not acknowledged by the faithful of the old Testament, it follows that faith also has been changed, the contrary of which we taught above from St. Augustine saying: Tempora variata sunt, non fides, etc. — I distinguish the antecedent: the object being changed according to the intrinsic reason of the object, I concede: according to a various proposition of the same object, and a more or less explicit revelation of the same; I deny. Now the objects of faith are varied only in such wise, that those things which were formerly proposed more obscurely are now proposed and expounded more distinctly.

You will say 3. All the mysteries of faith, especially those which concern the life and state of Christ the Lord, which are not true of the past, were at some time true of the future: therefore just as it is now true that Christ has been incarnate, born, and has suffered, so it was true in the past that Christ was to be incarnate, to be born, and to suffer; and by the same reason by which it is now credible of the past, it was credible of the future. — I answer, that all things which we believe of the past were indeed to be believed of the future implicitly, I concede: explicitly only, and distinctly, I deny. For the objects of faith are proposed to us more explicitly and more distinctly than of old to the Jews; and accordingly we now believe explicitly more things than was believed by those who preceded the advent and preaching of Christ, as will be shown

Second Conclusion. — ACCORDING TO THE DIVERSITY OF TIMES FAITH HAD ITS PROFECTION, AS TO THE AUGMENTATION OF LIGHT. So the Seraphic Doctor, d. 25. art. 2. q. 2. and formerly faith was held by Prophets and Patriarchs: wherefore that Savior who is to be adored is called the Light of the world, John 8., because, as Isaias had foretold, chap. 9., at his coming the people that walked in darkness saw a great light: to them that dwelt in the region of the shadow of death a light is risen. Hence He said to the Apostles, Luke 8.: To you it is given to know the mystery of the kingdom of God: but to the rest in parables, that seeing they may not see, and hearing may not understand. Wherefore John 15. He said to the same: You I have called friends: because all things whatsoever I have heard from my Father I have made known to you; whence the Apostle to the Ephesians 1.: We have redemption through his blood, the remission of sins according to the riches of his grace, which hath superabounded in us in all wisdom and prudence, that he might make known to us the sacrament of his will. From all which it is evident that God illumines the faithful of the New Testament with a richer light of faith than those of the old, so that the faithful of the ancient Church were illumined by faith like the twilight of dawn, whereas to us divine faith shines forth according to the fullness of all its light; for the path of the faithful, as of the Just, is as a shining light, proceeding and growing unto the perfect day. Which truth S. Leo admirably expounds, Sermon 13. On the Passion: where, having said: The Incarnation of the Word and the death and resurrection of Christ have become the salvation of all the faithful: and the blood of one Just man, which the Father purchased for us, because we believe it shed for the reconciliation of the world, conferred this upon the Fathers, who likewise believed it was to be shed. Finally he concludes: Nothing therefore, most beloved, differs from the ancient significations in the Christian religion, nor was salvation ever hoped for by the preceding Just from any other than the Lord Jesus Christ, the dispensations being varied according to the reason of the divine will, yet flashing forth one and the same light in the testimonies of the Law, the oracles of the Prophets, and the oblations of victims; because it thus beseemed those peoples to hunger, so that they could not receive the things revealed as future, but accepted them veiled; and so the authority of the Gospel would be the greater, to which so many signs, and all the miracles and mysteries of the pages of the Old Testament had ministered. Hence he adds in Sermon 2. On the Ascension: What was conspicuous in our Redeemer passed over into sacraments, and that faith might be more excellent and more firm, doctrine succeeded to vision: whose authority, illuminated by heavenly rays, the hearts of believers followed.

This truth S. Gregory also proves in his Homilies on Ezechiel, Homily 6., where he says:

With the increases of times grew the knowledge of the spiritual Fathers. For Moses knew more than Abraham; the Prophet more than Moses; the Apostles more than the Prophets, being instructed in the knowledge of almighty God. I err if this very Scripture does not say: Many shall pass over, and knowledge shall be manifold. But let us show, if we can, from the words of the same Scripture what we have said of Adam, Moses, the Prophets, and the Apostles. Who even knows not that Abraham spoke with God? And yet the Lord says to Moses: I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, and my name Adonai I did not show them. Behold, more had been made known to Moses than to Abraham, since he declares that of himself which he narrated that he had not declared to Abraham. But let us see whether the Prophets could apprehend more divine knowledge than Moses. Certainly the Psalmist says: How have I loved thy law, O Lord! it is my meditation all the day. And he subjoined: Above all who teach me I have understood, because thy testimonies are my meditation. And again: I have understood above the Ancients. He therefore who relates that he meditated on the law, and testifies that he understood above all who teach him and above the ancients, manifests that he received the divine law more than Moses. How, however, shall we show that the Apostles were taught more than the Prophets? Certainly the Truth says: Many kings and prophets desired to see the things that you see, and to hear the things that you hear, but did not see them. Therefore they knew more of divine science than the Prophets, because the things which those had seen only in spirit, these also saw corporally. Fulfilled therefore is that sentence of Daniel which we cited above: because many shall pass over, and knowledge shall be manifold. Let the measure of the reed, then, which is six cubits and a palm, be taken as ten cubits, and the measure of ten cubits rise at last to thirteen, because as the world is carried toward its end, so much the more widely is the approach of eternal knowledge opened to us.

We must conclude, therefore, with the Seraphic Doctor praised above, that according to the diversity of times faith grew: first, in respect of the exhibition of truth; secondly, on account of the greater diffusion of grace; thirdly, on account of the clearer instruction; for those who now believe know the same things more clearly than men of old knew them, because the truth is now exhibited by Christ: now too the grace of the Holy Spirit is more abundantly diffused in the Sacraments of the new law on account of the merit of Christ, and the price already paid: now too faith is preached, taught, proved, and defended more openly, by the evident evidence of Christ and of His followers.

Third Conclusion. — FAITH, AS TO THE FIRMNESS OF ASSENT, WAS FAR GREATER AND MORE EXCELLENT IN THE NEW LAW THAN IN THE OLD.

Hugh of St. Victor proves this, book 1. On the Sacraments, part 11. chapter ⟦illegible: digit⟧. where he says: There are two things according to which faith is said to grow, knowledge and affection: according to knowledge faith grows when it is instructed unto science; according to affection, when it is stirred up unto devotion. Thence he says there was a notable figure in the book of Numbers, chap. 13., in the cluster of grapes, which was carried by two men on a staff: for that cluster, he says, on the staff, is Christ on the cross, whose mystery two peoples carry in Sacrament: those who went before carried, but did not see: because they who preceded his advent bore the sacraments of his passion, but not all were able to understand them through knowledge: but the second carry and see, because the faithful after the advent of Christ receive the Sacrament of his passion through faith, and already openly know it through revealed knowledge: hence it is that, since our faith has a fuller and clearer irradiation, it also imports a firmer assent of the intellect. Whence S. Leo, Sermon 2. On the Ascension of the Lord, says: This faith, increased by the Ascension of the Lord and strengthened by the gift of the Holy Spirit, neither prisons, nor exiles, nor famine, nor fires, nor the lacerations of beasts, nor torments refined by the cruelties of persecutors terrified. For this faith throughout the whole world, not only men, but even women, and not merely boys not yet grown, but even tender virgins, declared even unto the shedding of their blood. This faith cast out devils, drove away sicknesses, raised the dead. Whence even the blessed Apostles themselves, who were confirmed by so many miracles and instructed by so many sermons, yet dreaded at first the atrocity of the Lord's passion, and had received the truth of his resurrection not without hesitation, advanced so much by the Ascension of the Lord that whatever had before brought them fear was turned into joy.

We must conclude, therefore, with the Seraphic Doctor, question 3., that faith receives increase in three ways: first extensively, as to the explication of articles; secondly intensively, as to a clearer illumination; thirdly radically, as to the adhesion of certitude and devotion. Which increase indeed regards not only different men in different states, but also those living under the same law. For, as Hugh of St. Victor observes, praised above, according to the increments of faith diverse kinds of men are found.

For certain believers there are who choose to believe out of piety alone, but do not comprehend by reason whether it is to be believed or not. Others indeed approve by reason what they already believe by faith. Others again experience by the understanding of a purified mind what they believe by faith and approve by reason. In the first, faith alone makes the choice. In the second, reason joins approval. In the third, purity of understanding apprehends certitude.

Note 1. That falsity can be conceived as able to inhere in the object of faith arises from a twofold head: first indeed, on the part of God speaking and revealing, if namely He were to lie and propose false things for true; secondly, on the part of man believing, if certainly human faith could incline the believer so that he firmly judged something to have been revealed by God which was not so; such that one be moved by divine faith to elicit an assent that is false and erroneous. Now there was once the blasphemy of the Priscillianists, so called from Priscillian Bishop of Abula, who said with shameless mouth that God can be the author of lying and falsity, that from this they might conclude it lawful not only to lie, but even to confirm a lie by oath for the sake of concealing a secret; whence this saying was current among them: swear, forswear, betray not the secret. Although all Catholics execrated that impiety, nevertheless there were not wanting some Doctors who, while they granted that God by ordinary power can in no way lie or say what is false, yet judged that by absolute power He could do this, whether per se or through others. So taught Gabriel, in 3. dist. 12. question 1.; Peter of Ailly, in 1. question 12.; and Holcot, in 2. dist. 5. Yet they seem to temper that opinion thus, that, to decline the odium of the word lying, they do not admit that God can lie; because, says Gabriel, a lie signifies a false statement with some disorder and moral malice; but God, even if He said what is false, would do nothing morally evil, and therefore would not lie.

Note 2. To lie is nothing else than to say something knowingly otherwise than we perceive it: so S. Augustine in the Enchiridion, chap. 18., who there collects that to lie is not the same as to say what is false: one can say what is false without lying, since he doubtless judges it to be true; and therefore, since he does not speak against his mind, he also does not lie; seeing that to lie is to go against the mind: on the contrary, one can say what is true who nonetheless truly lies, because evidently that which he utters is indeed true, yet he judged it to be false, and therefore knowingly said otherwise than he perceived; which truth S. Augustine luminously expounds there in these words:

Better is he who unknowingly says what is false, thinking it true, than he who knowingly bears the will to deceive, not knowing that what he says is true; for the former has not one thing in his mind and another in his word; but in the latter, whatever in itself may be the thing he says, nevertheless one thing is shut up in his breast and another ready on his tongue, which is the proper evil of the liar.

From which it may be inferred that a twofold falsity can be distinguished in words, namely material and formal. Material falsity is when someone, thinking true what he says, is deceived and deceives, on which account indeed no lie is committed, but perhaps levity and rashness in speaking, which involves some mark or malice of lying. Formal falsity, however, is when someone, knowing that what he says is false, affirms and vends it as true; or knowing it to be true, denies it, in which formally consists the reason and malice of the lie. Moreover, in God there is no place for deception or material falsity; for since God cannot be deceived, but necessarily knows all that is true, hence it follows that He cannot speak what is false without lying, and speaking against His mind.

Note 3. That God can be conceived to lie through others in three ways: first indeed properly, namely by commanding someone to announce false things for true in his own name, or in the name of God Himself speaking; secondly, by stimulating and inciting him thereto by some interior motion, not otherwise than by his grace preventing us He raises us to certain good works; thirdly, by producing in him either the habit of lying, whereby he is moved and has facility to say false things for true, or by producing in his intellect a false assent. Which again can be conceived possible in two ways: first indeed, producing it in the intellect by Himself alone; in which case the intellect would understand passively through Him, but not actively; secondly, so that He concur with the intellect in a special manner for its production, determining him toward it, on which account He causes in him preventing graces and similar true illuminations, which although physically produced also by the intellect, yet because God is their principal cause, and man does not concur in them freely, are attributed to God alone as their absolute cause. Whence the Canon of Orange, Can. 20., says: God does many good things in man which man does not do, namely acting in a moral manner and freely, or else in such wise that they ought to be imputed to man.

First Conclusion. — IT CONFLICTS WITH GOD TO LIE BOTH THROUGH HIMSELF AND THROUGH OTHERS, EVEN BY EXTRAORDINARY POWER. This is the common teaching among Catholic Doctors.

And it is proved by open texts of Scripture. First indeed, Num. 23.: God is not as a man, that he should lie: nor as the son of man, that he should be changed. Hath he said, and not done? hath he spoken, and not fulfilled? From which testimony three things may be inferred: First, that God cannot only not lie with that lie which would be sin, but cannot even say what is false; otherwise this reasoning of the Prophet would be null: God cannot lie: therefore what He promised He will fulfil; for one might answer that God indeed cannot lie, yet can say and promise what is false; and consequently from His very promise it would not follow that the thing is to be posited. Second, that there it is affirmed that lying conflicts with God no less than change: it is impossible for God to be changed even by absolute power: therefore it is likewise impossible for Him to lie. Third, which may be inferred, is that when God is compared with man in respect of the repugnance of lying, He is not compared in respect of act; for there are certain men who de facto have not lied, as is evident of the Blessed Virgin and S. John the Baptist: but that comparison is made in respect of capacity, because the nature of God is not capable of a lie, as human nature is; whence by antonomasia God in holy Scripture is called truthful; but man a liar: so John 8.: He that sent me is true. To the Romans 3.: But God is true: but every man a liar. — It is confirmed from that passage to the Hebrews 6., where the Apostle says: Willing God to show more abundantly to the heirs of the promise the immutability of his counsel, interposed an oath: that by two immutable things, in which it is impossible for God to lie, we might have the strongest comfort: by which the Apostle signifies both the promise of God and the oath to be two immutable things, in which it is impossible for God to lie, both in promise and in oath: wherefore Christ the Lord, Luke 21., used to say: Heaven and earth shall pass away: but my words shall not pass away: for it is just as if He said: heaven and earth could fail, doubtless by absolute power, for by ordinary power they shall not fail.

It is proved secondly by the authority of the Holy Fathers, who with common consent teach that it is as impossible for God to lie as for God not to be, or not to be omnipotent. Thus S. Denis, chap. 8. On the Divine Names: A lie about oneself, he says, is a lapse from truth, it is a lapse from that which is; but God cannot lapse from that which is: as if he said, the negation of truth is a withdrawal from being: but God cannot withdraw from being: therefore neither from truth. Similarly S. Athanasius in the book On the Incarnation of the Word infers that therefore a lie cannot be found in God, because otherwise He would not be God. It is absurd, he says, to say that God can lie; for if He said that we are to perish, He would not be God, if we did not perish. Which consequence S. Anselm approves, book 1. Cur Deus homo, chap. 12., saying: For it does not follow, he says, that it is just to lie if God wills to lie: but rather that that God is not: For the will can by no means will to lie unless in it truth has been corrupted: nay, which has been corrupted by deserting truth. And he subjoins: Therefore when it is said: If God wills to lie: it is nothing else than if God is of such a nature as wills to lie, and therefore it does not follow that a lie is just, unless it be understood as we say of two impossibles: if this is, that is: because neither this nor that is. — Nor does it avail to reply that S. Anselm speaks only of a lie as including malice, on which account it conflicts with God; for he rather proves that the matter itself of lying could not be found in God without malice and turpitude: for he says that act cannot come to be from the fact that God wills it: therefore he judges it cannot be separated from turpitude. Which again the reason he adduces explains, because the will cannot will to lie unless in it truth has been corrupted: which corruption of truth he supposes to conflict with the divine will, because otherwise the will, deserting truth, would be corrupted; therefore according to the mind of S. Anselm the very corruption of truth also conflicts with God, and therefore a lie conflicts with Him. — S. Ambrose demonstrates the same impossibility from the repugnance of lying with the omnipotence of God. That impossibility, he says, is one not of weakness but of virtue and Majesty, because truth admits no lie, nor the power of God the error of untruth. To him subscribes S. Augustine: God is omnipotent, and although He is omnipotent, He cannot die, cannot be deceived, cannot lie. How many things He cannot, and is omnipotent! and therefore He is omnipotent because He cannot: for if He could die, He would not be omnipotent: if He could lie, be deceived, act unjustly, He would not be omnipotent; nay, if this were in Him, He would not have been worthy to be omnipotent. In the same sense speaks Chrysostom, Homily I. on the Symbol. You believe, he says, in God omnipotent, of whose power His inability cannot be found unable: yet He cannot something, to wit, be deceived, deceive, lie. But it is certain that not even by absolute power can He be deceived: therefore in the same way He cannot deceive. Which he repeats again in book I. On Providence after the middle. Likewise Bernard, Sermon on All Saints: God can neither be deceived nor deceive.

The reason also lends its support. First indeed, lying and falsity conflict with God no less than sin: but sin absolutely conflicts with God: therefore also lying. The minor is evident: for God neither sins nor can sin, as we sufficiently proved in the second volume treating of divine Sanctity. The major is proved: therefore God cannot sin, because He is intrinsically and essentially holy: but He is also intrinsically and essentially true and truthful, because He is the first Truth, to which every lie and all falsity conflict: since a lie is a deviation from truth: but the first truth cannot be derived from truth: otherwise it would deviate from itself, and thus would not be the first and unfailing truth. Just as it would not be the first holiness, nor holy formally and intrinsically, if it could sin: for every sin is a deviation from rectitude and sanctity: therefore God can neither sin nor say what is false. — It is confirmed: if God could lie by any power whatsoever, He would not be supreme veracity, just as He would not be supreme goodness if He could act badly: for that truth and goodness would be greater which by no power could stray from the true and the right: but it is absurd to assert that God has not that truth and goodness than which a greater cannot be conceived: therefore, etc. — Furthermore, infinite authority in speaking, to whom the highest faith is owed, is truly a perfection simply simple, which is surely destroyed by the contrary, since even among men it is something unworthy to hold such authority, that one may be believed with fear: but this infinite authority in speaking would not be in God if He could in any way lie: therefore just as it is impossible that God lack any perfection simply simple, so it is impossible that He lie. Finally, if by absolute power God could lie, our whole faith would be changed, nor would the authority of holy Scripture be most constant and undoubted: for we most surely believe it because God revealed the things contained in it: but if in truth God could lie, whence would it be certain to us that He spoke truly, when He revealed this or that part of Scripture? Therefore either our faith is doubtful, or it is impossible for God to lie.

From these things, moreover, it is evident that just as God cannot lie or deceive by Himself, so neither through others who speak in His name; for if God had not the same incapacity of deceiving or saying what is false through others, the authority of sacred Scripture would be dubious and tottering, seeing that God Himself is He who spoke through the sacred Writers, and therefore Luke 1. and to the Hebrews 1. God is said to have spoken through the mouths of the Prophets, and in each case equally God is said to speak, that is, both per se and through ministers; hence where it is said Exodus 3. that God appeared to Moses and spoke to him in the flame of the burning bush, S. Stephen, Acts 7., said that God spoke to Moses through an Angel; for it is the same thing to speak by Himself as by an Angel delegated by Him: therefore by the same reason that God cannot lie and say what is false by Himself, it is established that He cannot lie either through an Angel or through another. It is confirmed: because just as it holds materially only that one speak by words, signs, or writing, since the obligation of telling or signifying or writing the truth is the same, so entirely materially it holds that God speak both per se immediately and through His messenger; seeing that the messenger delegated by Him is merely His instrument, just as Scripture or other signs which He uses: wherefore David called his tongue the pen of a scribe writing swiftly: therefore, etc.

You will object 1. Diverse texts of Scripture in which God is said to lead the wicked into fraud and error. Thus Job 12.: Who changeth the heart of princes, and deceiveth them, and maketh them to err as drunkards. And 1. to the Thessalonians 2.: The same (God) shall send them the operation of error, that they may believe a lie. And 3. Kings 22.: The Lord gave a spirit of lying in the mouth of all thy prophets; and there the Lord says to the spirit of lying: Thou shalt deceive, and prevail: go forth, and do so; similarly Ezechiel 14. God says: If the prophet shall err, and speak a word, I the Lord have deceived that prophet. And that passage of Jeremias 20.: Thou hast seduced me, O Lord, and I was seduced; thou hast been stronger than I, and hast prevailed. — I answer, in all these places the word deceive or seduce is used not actively, as if God commanded a lie, or impelled and led anyone into error and falsity; but only passively or permissively, inasmuch as God permits someone to be deceived in punishment of sins, and does not hinder or restrain him who is prompt and ready to be deceived; for it is not ⟦illegible: raw OCR “intrequens”⟧ in holy Scripture that to command and to permit are used for the same thing, as we have said many times elsewhere, which manifestly appears from the Evangelists. For Mark 10., when the Pharisees had said to Christ the Lord: Moses permitted a bill of divorce to be written: Christ the Lord answered: Because of the hardness of your heart he wrote you this precept. The same is read Matthew 19.; for when the Pharisees had said: Why then did Moses command to give a bill of divorce? Christ answered: He permitted you to put away your wife. From these texts compared together it appears that the words to command and to permit are taken indifferently for one and the same thing.

You will object 2. Likewise diverse texts of Scripture in which it appears that men inspired by the Spirit of God were sometimes liars: whence it follows that God can at least through ministers lie or assert what is false. Thus Genesis 22. Abraham, about to ascend the mountain to immolate his son Isaac, said to his servants: Wait ye here with the ass: I and the boy will hasten thither, and after we have worshipped, we will return to you: which was a certain promise, yet false and mendacious: for since by divine precept he ought to immolate his son, he could not without lying assert that Isaac would return with him. Similarly in the same place, chap. 20., Abraham urged his wife to assert before the Egyptians that she was his sister: Say, he says, that thou art my sister. And chap. 27. Jacob seems to have lied when he said to his Father: I am Esau thy firstborn. Many other like things are to be found in the Prophets, whose predictions were very many times false and mendacious. Such was the Prophecy of Jonas, when he said chap. 3.: Yet forty days, and Ninive shall be destroyed. And Isaias, who in 4. Kings chap. 20. said to Ezechias the King: Thou shalt die, and shalt not live; who nevertheless survived fifteen years, and so of many others.

Some answer, that it does not seem unfitting to admit that those personages celebrated in Scripture sometimes committed some slight lie, seeing that various of them sinned most gravely, which kind of lie the Subtle Doctor noted in 3. dist. 38. num. 13., concerning the deed of Jacob; for those most holy men did not always speak by divine instinct and aid. But because S. Augustine and others everywhere exempt the holy Patriarchs from the guilt of lying, therefore I answer to the first with the same S. Augustine, in the book ⟦De Mendacio?⟧, chap.

1. Abraham spoke those words in a prophetic spirit: I and the boy will return to you: for he hoped that his son after his immolation and death was to be recalled to life, that the divine promise might be fulfilled whereby God had promised that He would multiply his seed as the stars of heaven, and as the sand which is on the seashore: which truth S. Paul indicates when he says, to the Hebrews
2. By faith Abraham offered up his son Isaac, reckoning that God was able to raise him up even from the dead.

To the second we shall say with the same S. Augustine in the Questions on Genesis, that when Abraham said Sara was his sister, he willed the truth to be concealed, not a lie to be told: for she is called sister because she was the daughter of his father: whence Abraham himself says, Genesis 20.: Truly she is my sister, the daughter of my father, and not of my mother.

To the third we shall say that Jacob did not lie when he said: I am Esau thy firstborn: because what he said of Esau was true not as to person and substance, but as to the right and dignity of the firstborn, because the birthright was owed to him by right, and that on a twofold title: first indeed by divine decree, since God had revealed that the elder should serve the younger: secondly by human law, since he had purchased the birthright for a price from Esau: whence he could without lying present himself before his Father in place of Esau the firstborn, that he might receive his blessing due to the firstborn.

But to the last I say that prophecies are sometimes made only by way of commination, ⟦illegible: ut … si penitentiam egerit …, agam poenitentiam super malo quod ego rogitarabam facere⟧: whence since the Ninevites did penance at the preaching of Jonas, it is no wonder that God did not inflict upon them punishments untried. Sometimes indeed prophecies are made and things are foretold as future according to the order and disposition of natural causes, unless God suspend such order by extraordinary power. Whence Ezechias the King truly was about to die by reason of the pressing infirmity, unless God had restored health to him by a miracle and prolonged his life to a longer term.

You will object. 3. He who can speak equivocally and amphibologically can also lie: but God can speak amphibologically and equivocally both through Himself and through others: therefore also lie. The major is evident: for equivocation is a certain species of lying; since it is ordained to deceive and to instill a sense opposed to truth just as the lie itself is; for it matters nothing whether the words of the speaker signify something other than what he has in mind, or whether I perceive something other from the words of the speaker, if in each case I am equally deceived. But the minor is proved: since Christ the Lord truly seems to have used equivocal words: thus Mark 13., being asked by the Disciples concerning the time of the consummation of the world and the advent of the Judge, he answered: Of that day and hour no one knoweth, neither the angels in heaven, nor the Son. And yet He Himself knew it most well. Likewise John 7., when his brethren, or kinsmen, urged him: Go up hither, and go into Judaea, namely Jerusalem, as to the theater of the world, that thy disciples also, or students of thy doctrine, who are there, may see thy works which thou dost, &c. Manifest thyself to the world. Christ answered: My time is not yet come, &c. go ye up unto this festival day: but I do not go up unto this festival day. And yet, as his brethren asserted, at that very time He went up to the festival. With the same restriction the Angel Raphael seems to have spoken, Tobias 5., when, being asked, Of what house, or of what tribe art thou? he answered: I am Azarias, the son of the great Ananias; whereas before, answering Tobias the younger, he had said he was of the sons of Israel.

I answer. First, that one can use an amphibological voice, or equivocation, in two ways. First formally, namely intending by the words to signify another true sense, yet diverse from that which the hearers here and now conceive and think to be signified, such that there are no circumstances present from which the hearer could arrive at knowledge of the signification or sense of the words intended by the speaker. Secondly materially, when evidently there are certain circumstances from which the hearer can conceive what is the genuine sense of the words uttered by the speaker; especially when the hearer is a prudent and sagacious man; although perhaps on account of a defect of attention to the words of the speaker, and likewise consideration of those circumstances, he does not perceive the mind expressed by the speaker in equivocal words. Whence to the argument I say that God can by no means use equivocal words with formal amphibology; for this is a species of lying; for such speech, taken precisely in itself, is simply false, nor can it have a true sense by reason of the intention of the speaker or of a merely internal oration, which the speaker subintelliges, because unless this be in some way outwardly expressed, one cannot with the external conceive the internal oration, nor change its signification, nor consequently effect that that signification, which in itself is false, become true; and presently it can by no reason have a true signification, nor a legitimate sense. Add that veracity obliges us, not indeed to conform our mind to the mind, for that is supernatural and cannot otherwise be done; but to conform our words to our mind; so that nothing else appear in the words than what is in the mind of the speaker; for if they express the contrary, it is done against veracity; if they express the same thing, it is done fully enough for veracity. Which indeed will appear most true if you attend to the obligation of veracity, which since it is induced by the necessity of preserving human faith, so necessary for intercourse and political commerce, ought no less to have forbidden those mental restrictions than lying; for entirely the same inconveniences would arise from those restrictions as from lying. Since indeed all hearers would equally doubt whether the speaker added beyond the external words a mental restriction, whereby a sense contrary to that sense which the words would per se express was contained, just as they could doubt the truth if they told a lie, and consequently the prohibition of lying would be altogether useless; since he who would not dare to lie on account of the prohibition would use exactly the same words which liars used, and those words, with that mental restriction added, would obtain the same end as lying: therefore by the reason that God cannot lie either per se or through others, so neither can He use formal amphibological equivocation. He can indeed use material equivocation, because although he who thus speaks utters words in a particular and not common sense, yet by the very fact that circumstances are present which can indicate that particular sense to the hearer, there arises not on the part of the speaker, nor of his words, that the hearer take those words in another sense, but from the defect of the hearer himself, who will not employ that diligence and attention necessary for the circumstances, which could with easy labor indicate the genuine sense of the words intended by the speaker. These things premised, I answer to the first example, that Christ the Lord, in that reply whereby He told His Disciples He knew not the day of judgment, used only material equivocation; for from the circumstance of the person uttering this reply, the Apostols could tacitly judge that He did not deny that He absolutely knew the day of judgment; since many times He had told them that He had all that the Father had, and that He was truly the Son of God, and consequently had with the Father infinite science of all things; but that He spoke only with some restriction, indeed not expressed in words, but yet sufficiently to be understood from the condition of the person speaking. Add that Christ in that place wished to signify that He had been sent as legate by the Father to us: therefore just as a legate truly says he knows not that which anyone more curiously asks, because they are judged only to ask communication of that knowledge which the legate could communicate, nor ought he conceal in silence; so Christ the Lord said He knew not the day of judgment, which He ought to have concealed; wherefore again, questioned about that day, He restrained the curiosity of the questioners, Acts 1., saying: It is not for you to know the times or moments which the Father hath put in his own power.

To the second likewise I say, that Christ the Lord, answering his kinsmen that He would not go up to the festival day, used an equivocation not formal but material, namely according to the circumstance of their petition: for they asked Him to ascend publicly and openly: for they said: Go up hither, and go into Judaea, that thy disciples also may see thy works which thou dost. For no man doth anything in secret, and he seeketh himself to be in open; if thou do these things, manifest thyself to the world. Therefore in the same sense Christ answered that He did not ascend: which is not a restriction of the mind, but a retention of the sense proposed by the askers, just as if they asked, sup with us, and He answered, I will not sup, there being understood with you. Others add that nondum ascendo must be read there, or as others wish, non ascendo nunc, as other grave Interpreters have. Whence Christ said significantly: Go ye up unto this festival day: but I ascend not, that is, to this festival day, or to the first, or to the second day of the festival; since He ascended to Jerusalem only on the 1. day. From these things it is evident that Christ the Lord did not use a mental restriction in that reply; but made it with words signifying the truth, especially in those circumstances. — To the third I say that the Angel Raphael, in saying of himself that he was Azarias the son of the great Ananias, and also of the sons of Israel, lied in no way: for those words could bear a twofold sense, namely that he was such by genus and nativity, or by office and duty. For first he says of himself that he is of the sons of Israel, either because all the just are reckoned under the name of Israelites, or because Israil is interpreted seeing God: but the Angels always enjoy the intuitive vision of God; or because he had been destined specially by God to the guardianship of the Israelites. And truly he spoke when he named himself Azarias the son of the great Ananias; for Azarias signifies the help of God. Such indeed was Raphael according to office; since he bestowed most many signs and benefits of divine help upon Tobias himself, and also upon his wife and parents: for he led and brought back young Tobias sound, preserved him unharmed from the invading sea-monster, drove away the devil that beset the chamber of Sara and killed men joined to her in marriage, saw to the receipt of the money owed by Gabelus, and long ago restored sight to blind Tobias the elder; therefore he is deservedly called Azarias, or help from God. By like reason he also rightly called himself the son of the great Ananias. For Ananias signifies the grace of God, or the mercy of God. And since God is the Father of mercies, and Angels are called sons of God, Job 1. and Daniel 3., he rightfully vindicated to himself such a name.

Second Conclusion. — FALSENESS ALSO CANNOT INHERE IN FAITH ON THE PART OF THE BELIEVER.

The Conclusion is proved: if falsehood could inhere in faith, then chiefly either because some revelation could be proposed to us as divine, although in truth it were not such; toward believing which nevertheless theological faith would incline no less than if such revelation were truly divine; or because faith would incline to giving assent to a conclusion drawn from two premises, of which one were revealed, the other indeed natural and false, which nevertheless we should judge to be true: but in neither case would theological faith incline to that assent: therefore falsehood cannot inhere in it per accidens on the part of the believer. The major is evident: for scarcely can any other head be assigned whence that inclination of faith to a false assent should be sought. But the minor is proved: divine faith cannot in any way incline to a false and erroneous assent: but if it inclined to one or other of the aforementioned assents, it would truly tend of itself, at least partially, to eliciting a false assent: therefore, etc. The minor is evident: for the act whereby one believes something false is truly a false and erroneous assent, although he holds that falsehood for true; for that erroneous judgment cannot effect that what is in itself false be true. But the major is proved: first indeed by the authority of sacred Scripture and the Holy Fathers, from whom it is established that faith is a certain cognition, and consequently true. Thus Acts 26.: According to the most sure proof of our religion.

And 2. to Timothy 1.: I know whom I have believed, and I am certain, etc. Hence the Council of Trent, Session 6. chapter 9., reproving the vain confidence of heretics, says:

Whilst every one looks to himself, and to his own weakness and indisposition, he may fear and tremble about his own grace, since no man can know with the certitude of faith, which cannot be subject to falsehood, that he has obtained the grace of God.

The Holy Fathers confirm the same; for S. Basil, in the Moral Rule 80. chapter 21., says: Faith is the most certain completion of the soul concerning the truth of the words spoken. Chrysostom, Homily 21. on chapter 11. to the Hebrews: Faith, he says, cannot be called faith unless one has had certitude about the things that are not seen, more than about the things that are seen. Similarly S. Bernard, Epistle 190.: Faith, he says, is not opinion, but subsists in certain truth. From all which it may be inferred that every act of faith is a certain cognition, and consequently true: for certitude is the firm adhesion of the intellect assenting, and the necessary connection of the assent itself with the truth of the object proposed: therefore where the assent cannot be true, neither can it be certain: and consequently there will not be the assent of faith, which, since it must necessarily of itself be certain, conflicts with its being exercised about a false object.

Proof is given besides by reason: a true and perfect virtue cannot incline toward that which is evil in itself: but erroneous and false assent is evil in itself: therefore theological faith cannot incline toward it. The major stands: both because, as St. Augustine says, book 2. De Libero Arbitrio, cap. 19, Virtue is a good quality, which no one uses badly; and because, according to Aristotle and all Philosophers and Theologians, every virtue disposes a power toward its best, for it pertains in order to its object; whence just as moral virtue, which is in the will or appetite, perfects it and disposes it to the good, which is the best of that appetite, so intellectual virtue¹ ought to perfect the understanding unto the true, which is the best of the intellective power: therefore since infused faith by its essence is an intellectual virtue, it must so necessarily incline toward true acts that inclination toward false and erroneous ones altogether conflicts with it. — Next, if faith could be a principle of false and erroneous assent, it would follow that God could be the cause, at least mediate, of falsehood and error: but the consequent is seen to be false from the first Conclusion: therefore also that from which it is inferred. The major is plain: for just as if natural light, or the habit of first principles, inclined toward false assent, God would be reckoned at least the mediate cause of that assent, since He Himself bestows such light and the habit of first principles, as author of nature, so likewise He would have to be reckoned the author of false and erroneous assent, if faith could incline toward it, because He Himself infuses that habit, as author of grace: but it conflicts with God being even the mediate cause of false assent: therefore faith cannot incline toward false assent. — Finally, the habit of theological virtue is as it were a property of sanctifying grace belonging to the faculties of man constituted in the state of an adopted son of God by that same sanctifying grace, and the same are not given to that habit from its nature except for acts whereby man can merit the inheritance and eternal glory; whence the habit of faith is infused, that it may be the first and necessary beginning of all merit, not that man may be able to merit his salvation by supernatural acts proportioned to a supernatural end: yet faith could not be such if it could incline into false assent. For if it could elicit a false act or assent, by that act it could also be a principle of a proportionate supernatural act, which would be meritorious of eternal salvation, even if that act were false and did not proceed from a true revelation of God. Therefore faith cannot incline into false assent.

You will say 1. Sophistical doctrine is from God: but that inclines toward the false and leads into error: ergo it does not conflict that faith, inasmuch as it is infused by God, should incline toward erroneous assent. — I distinguish the minor: sophistical doctrine leads into error per se, I deny; per accidens, I concede. For sophistical doctrine per se is ordered only toward uncovering and guarding against fallacious discourses and the fallacies of reasoning, lest anyone, taking the probable for the true, be deceived: whence it is per accidens that one who knows that doctrine uses it to deceive and mislead the less cautious, and consequently if any deception is wrought through that doctrine, it will rather have to be charged against the teacher himself than against the doctrine.

You will say 2. The acts of other supernatural and moral virtues can be exercised about some fictitious and false object: ergo by equal reason faith will be able to incline toward assent concerning what someone believes to have been revealed by God, although de facto it is not so; and thereupon faith will be able to incline toward false assent on the part of the believer. The consequence stands from the parity of reason. The antecedent is proved by various examples: namely, when out of religion we adore a host not consecrated, which we truly judge consecrated; when from a motive of mercy we give alms to one who truly does not need such succor; when out of obedience we fast, thinking fasting is commanded, whereas it is not so; when out of justice we pay what we falsely think is owed to another. Likewise when we love and venerate a hypocritical man on account of the holiness which we falsely believe to be in him; again, if someone believed God was to be seen with bodily eyes, and hoped that this would come to pass. — I answer, denying the consequence: and the reason of the disparity is between intellectual and moral virtues, for the latter are exercised about truth; hence their whole perfection consists in conformity with the object, from which truth or falsity in the understanding is immediately derived; but the virtues of the will or moral virtues are exercised about the good proposed; and their perfection consists in conformity with the object, not as it is on the side of the thing, but as it is proposed by reason: for then the will operates well when it conforms itself to the dictate of reason, whether the internal object be truly good or not on the side of the thing. Whence the virtue of the will can sometimes be exercised about the false represented by the understanding as a true good, because then it conforms to its rule, namely the dictate of reason. But an intellectual virtue cannot be exercised about the false; for thus it would not conform to its rule, which is nothing other than the truth of the object.

You will say 3. It can happen that some Pastor or Bishop proposes to the people committed to him something to be believed as of divine faith which nevertheless would not be such, as has often been done by Pastors who lapsed into heresy and error: but in that case the rude common people would truly believe that proposed tenet; not indeed with human faith, since it would be proposed as an object of divine faith, and thereupon they would believe it with divine faith: therefore it can happen that divine faith per accidens, and from a presupposed false estimation, inclines into false assent. — I answer, granting the major, denying the minor: for in that case the rude people would not give assent with divine faith to the false object proposed by the Pastor, but only with human faith; for since divine faith is an intellectual virtue, which always tends to the true, just as moral virtue always tends to the good, therefore when truth fails in the object, the act whereby the understanding tends to it cannot be an act of perfect virtue, such as faith is. Yet I confess that in the said case the rustic, or any other of the laity, has a pious affection of the will, indeed a supernatural one, whereby he is prepared to believe with divine faith that mystery proposed to him, if it were true; by reason of which disposition and affection it can happen that, while giving assent even to a false object, he truly merits; but I deny that on that account he elicits an act of divine faith regarding the object proposed to him.

You insist. That rustic who thus assents experiences the same facility when he gives assent to the false object proposed by a heretical Pastor as he experiences in believing the true articles proposed by the same Pastor; but it would not be so unless he tended by the same habit of divine faith toward each article, both true and false: therefore with the same faith he believes the false object, which he judges to be true. — I deny the minor: for that facility does not proceed from the habit of infused faith, but acquired; because infused habits do not confer facility upon the power, but only supernatural virtue, that it may be able to produce supernatural acts. Therefore all the facility which anyone experiences in believing objects proposed, whether true or false, proceeds from the acquired habit of faith, whereby anyone is inclined to elicit acts of assent concerning the object proposed as revealed by God, whether meanwhile it be truly revealed by God or not.

You will urge. That assent is truly elicited by divine faith which has the divine veracity for its motive and formal object: but the assent given to a false object, which is judged revealed by God, is elicited no less on account of the divine veracity than is the assent which would be given to a true object: therefore truly that assent proceeds from divine faith; and thereupon divine faith can incline into the false. — I distinguish the major: if along with the motive it have the other conditions necessary for an act of divine faith, I concede; otherwise, I deny. And likewise the minor being distinguished, I deny the consequence. For an act, although elicited on account of the divine truth, still cannot be reckoned an act of theological and supernatural faith, since it is not an act of virtue but of vice, and of a defect of the understanding; rather it is only an act of acquired faith, which usually remains even in heretics, who erring about some article indeed lose the habit of infused faith, yet preserve the same facility and the same habit of acquired faith concerning other articles about which there is no controversy.

You will say 1. A syllogism can occur in which one of the premises will be true and of faith, the other however false, from which the conclusion drawn will be false, v. g. from these two premises: What is of duplex nature is duplex person: but in Christ there is duplex nature: a false and heretical conclusion is inferred: ergo in Christ there is duplex person. But toward the assent to that false conclusion both premises concur, as a twofold partial cause toward producing the same effect: ergo since one of them is of faith, the habit of faith seems at least partially to influence and concur toward eliciting that false assent. - I deny the minor: for the assent given to the conclusion of this syllogism is not elicited even partially by the proposition of faith, but only by the natural proposition, through perverse ratiocination and the application of an understanding wrongly twisting the true proposition, true and of faith, toward the false and erroneous conclusion; since indeed the true per se can neither incline nor tend into the false; whence if any assent proceed from the side of faith, it will be only material, not formal, namely insofar as faith inclines the understanding to believe the true proposition, namely that in Christ there is duplex nature, but it does not incline toward assent to the false conclusion, because that falsity arises only from the side of the understanding wrongly applying the premises to elicit that erroneous conclusion.

You ask whether God can cause false assent, either actual or habitual, that is, whether God can produce in a created understanding either an erroneous act, or at least a habit inclining toward the production of such acts? — I answer, that the more recent Theologians go off into various opinions about this resolution: For first, Medina q. 12. quaest. 21. Suarez, ibidem Tract. 4. sect. 2. and disp. 3. De fide, sect. 5. Turrian., 2. 2. dist. 3. dub. 1. Coninch., disp. 10. De fide, dub. 2. n. 30. hold that God cannot infuse a habit of error, and consequently they must hold that He cannot immediately infuse the very act of error; for it is more unbecoming to Him to infuse the latter than the habit. Second, Vasquez d. 90. cap. 1. and certain others contend that God, by His absolute power, by Himself alone infuses both the act and the habit of error, upon the hypothesis that a vital act can be produced by God alone without any concurrence of a second cause. Smeising., Tract. 2. De Deo, disp. 5. num. 275. judges that God can indeed infuse an erroneous habit, but not an act. Vasquez however disp. 90. cap. 1. Arriaga, tract. De fide, disp. 1. sect. 5. Poncius in the Commentary, ad 3. dist. 38. num. 29. Henriquez., disp. 3. quaest. 2. n. 13. and following teach that neither conflicts with God, upon the hypothesis that it does not conflict with God that He be able, per se alone and without any concurrence of a second cause, to produce a vital act. With these and other Scotists we subscribe.

Proof first concerning the habit: both because God can conserve an erroneous habit in the understanding by Himself alone, and that with a concurrence not only universal, as Coninch concedes, but even particular; for whenever God conserves anything by Himself alone, He performs this not only with universal concurrence, but also particular: for He conserves it without any particular second cause, as is supposed; and consequently He supplies the particular concurrence of the second cause: but whenever God thus stands related to an effect, He acts not only with universal concurrence, but also particular; because His concurrence then is not determined by any individual second cause, but the divine will determines itself immediately and specially to producing or conserving such an effect: ergo by equal reason God can produce an erroneous habit. Next, if the production of such a habit conflicted with God, it would be chiefly either on account of the physical or the moral imperfection of the effect produced: but neither can be said. Not indeed on account of physical imperfection; for God can produce many things physically, and imperfect as to entity. Nor on account of moral defect, both because that erroneous habit could conduce to the acquisition of eternal life even directly; nay more, one who would erroneously judge that something conduces to eternal life which truly would not conduce, and on that account would do it in the state of grace, without doubt would merit, and toward that merit that erroneous estimation would tend no less than if it had been true: since indeed in performing these things he would operate from an affection of pleasing and obeying God: therefore that erroneous act would be meritorious, and consequently the habit inclining toward it would conduce directly to eternal life; and because probable cognitions, or habits conducing to generating cognitions of that kind, can be infused by God: but among probable cognitions some are doubtless false, whenever namely both contradictories are probable: ergo God can be the per se cause of a false act, and consequently of an erroneous habit.

Proof also concerning the act: both because God can place before someone a stone or wood with such accidents that he would judge that stone to be a dragon: therefore God can cause an act of error by concurring with the understanding toward that act. The consequence is plain: for he who per se gives the occasion of some effect being produced, intending that such an effect be produced, and elsewhere concurs with the faculty toward eliciting such an act, is reckoned not only the physical cause, but also the moral cause, of the act. And because no repugnance appears thence; for if that conflicted, it would be chiefly because God would thence be reckoned the cause of error; accordingly He could deceive someone, which assuredly conflicts with God, who can neither be deceived nor deceive: but it would not be so, chiefly if that act were thus produced by God alone in the understanding, so that the latter would stand entirely passive, so that through that act the understanding would not become understanding and knowing, as the adversaries will; for then the understanding would not be reckoned to err more than a stone, if such an act were produced in it by God, as the Scotists judge possible: therefore it does not conflict with God to produce such an erroneous act.

You will say 1. God, since He is supremely good and holy, cannot lead into sin, nor produce by Himself alone a sinful act: ergo similarly, since He is supremely true and truthful, He cannot lead into error, nor produce an erroneous act. - I deny the consequence: and the reason of the disparity is that God, producing a sinful act or habit, would act badly and perversely against right reason and the rectitude of His will: for sin is nothing else than a deflection and swerving from the rectitude of the divine will and from the commandments or laws prescribed by it: but by producing error in another, or by willing that another err, God Himself would not on that account be reckoned to err: just as by causing death in another, He Himself is not said to die. Whence in this case God would not be said to act against the reason of His infinite truth, as He would act against His goodness if He produced a sinful habit or act: for the infinite truth of God formally consists in this, that nothing can be hidden from Him: and thereupon that He can neither be deceived in knowing, nor deceive in speaking; but to produce an erroneous act or habit is not thus to be deceived or to deceive; because by that production it is not signified that God knows things otherwise than they are, or that He signifies them otherwise in speaking than He truly knows them. Whence there is no parity, since it conflicts with infinite goodness to will or do every evil; but to infinite truth it conflicts only that it itself err, or deceive others by lying; not however that God produce error in another.

You will urge. If God produced human nature immediately with an inclination and necessity of assenting to false principles, He would truly be reckoned to deceive: ergo by similarity, if He produced a habit inclining toward erroneous assent, He would likewise be judged to lead into error. — I deny the antecedent: for although God would thus produce a nature inclining toward false assent, He nevertheless would not on that account be said to deceive in a manner conflicting with and unbecoming to Him, that is, proposing things otherwise than they truly are, or than He judges them to be; since indeed in that case God Himself would not deceive the understanding of that nature, but it would be deceived by the deceiving object set before it, or by the one proposing that object: for just as God is not a cause to whom the moral killing of a man ought to be attributed, although He made the nature capable of being killed and of undergoing death from causes so applied, but rather the killing itself must be charged against such causes; so although God created a nature with an inclination toward assenting to principles apprehended as false, yet from that it would not follow that such error or deception ought to be attributed to Him, which would have to be charged only against the very principles, or against those who apply those principles.

You will say 2. It implicates God in saying something false, because He is the first truth in speaking, as also in knowing and in being: but He would say what is false if by Himself alone He produced error in the understanding; for for God to speak or to say is nothing else than to instill knowledge in another; since indeed God has no need of words that He may speak to another, otherwise He could not speak to an Angel, or to a separate soul: therefore just as He cannot deceive anyone by speaking, so neither by producing error. - I deny the minor: for on that hypothesis God would not be reckoned to speak, or to say anything; because divine locution requires that God manifest Himself to judge this or that: which assuredly He would not do by producing an erroneous act or habit, because by that error produced God would not signify Himself to judge the same.

You will say 3. No cause can underlie why God should produce such an act, or erroneous habit: but God, being most wise, can operate nothing without a legitimate cause: therefore He cannot produce this act, or habit. - I deny the major: For first, God could perform these things that He might manifest His omnipotence in this respect, lest men doubt of it concerning the production of such an erroneous habit, or act, just as the adversaries judge Him powerless unto that. Second, that He might exercise His justice, punishing namely him in whom He would produce such an erroneous act or habit, on account of the neglected pursuit or conservation of legitimate and true cognition. Add that even if we could assign no particular cause why He would thus act, from that it is not consequent that He could not produce such effects on account of a cause unknown to us: for God can do more things than human understanding can grasp, and in that case His will could stand to Him in place of reason, as it also stood, that He did not sooner produce the world when He could have; for no other cause can be assigned than that it so pleased Him.

SIXTH QUESTION. Whether the object of faith must so necessarily be obscure that it cannot by any means be evident.

Note 1. That a twofold obscurity in faith can be distinguished: one indeed on the part of the formal object which is believed, the other truly on the part of the subject or believer. The obscurity on the part of the formal object, or of the medium upon which it leans, consists in this, that that medium, although it effects certain cognition, nevertheless does not effect it clear and intuitive: but the obscurity on the part of the subject, or of the understanding in which faith resides, consists in this, that such an understanding indeed believes God, and the things revealed by Him, on account of His divine testimony, yet does not see Him and the things revealed by Him. It is asked however whether obscurity both on the part of the formal object and on the part of the subject, consisting in this, that the truth believed through faith is not seen clearly, nor perceived intuitively through the very act of faith, pertains so to the formal reason of such an act that it cannot by any means be evident.

Note 2. That evidence is the clear and perspicuous truth of the object, which becomes known from the perspicuously necessary connection of the predicate with the subject; which certainly is twofold; for some object is evident from its terms, when namely the necessary connection of the predicate with the subject appears by natural light, as when it is said God is: but another is called evident from principles; thus through discourse it is evidently gathered that Peter is laughable, because every man is laughable. Moreover the evidence of a thing is twofold: one indeed intrinsic, the other truly extrinsic. The former is that which is sought from the very manifestation and presence of the thing itself, so that it can be intuitively beheld in itself, or at least so openly deduced from another thing known evidently and intuitively, that the understanding, with respect to the assent to be rendered to it by the very light of reason, in no wise waver or hang in doubt: the latter truly is that which is sought from extrinsic principles, with which it has not indeed a natural and necessary connection, but only a moral one; so that these are signs, or certain marks, from which it so evidently stands that the thing exists, that a prudent man rightly believes with certainty it to be so. Hence it is asked whether with this twofold evidence, or only with the latter, the object of faith can be evident, or evidently credible.

Note 3. That here is not raised the controversy about the simultaneous existence of the habit of science and of faith, whether divine or human, in the same understanding regarding the same object; that this is possible we have already sufficiently and abundantly demonstrated in our Philosophy, treating of the characters and properties of science: nor moreover is the present question raised, whether assent of faith can connaturally coexist with intuitive and scientific cognition of the object: for we proved there that this cannot occur, from the fact that while our understanding apprehends the object with the light of evident science, it cannot snatch it away through the inevident light of faith, as the Doctor excellently proves in 3. dist. 21. n. 21. where he concludes:

If it is held that there is one faith of all articles, it can be said that the Apostles had faith about the articles, and would thus have believed Christ to be crucified if they had not seen: but those things which they saw they did not believe for that time, nor ever afterward, in calling back to mind that crucifixion, did they have faith about it; just as neither when they saw it intuitively: yet they had the habit whereby they would have believed it if they had not seen.

Wherefore n. 13. after he had expounded four necessary conditions for science, namely that it be certain, evident, of a necessary thing, and through a cause, he subjoins: Science taken in that manner, it is impossible that science and faith be simultaneously about the same thing. Which assertion is indeed confirmed also by the most open doctrine of the SS. Fathers; for St. August., tract. 68. in Ioann. says: But faith, whereby the hearts of those who are to see God are cleansed while they sojourn, believes what it does not see: for if you see, it is not faith. And St. Chrysostom Homil. 22. on the epistle to the Hebrews says: It is the argument of things that are not seen; what is it that you wish to lose them, so that you fall away from faith! And St. Gregory, Homil. 26. in Evangelia: Faith, he says, is the argument of those things which cannot appear; for things which appear have no longer faith, but recognition. To these subscribes St. Bernard, lib. 5. De Consideratione, cap. 3. where he says: Faith is a voluntary certain foretaste of a truth not yet disclosed. Whence the same SS. Fathers, expounding that word of John 20. Because you have seen me, Thomas, you have believed: say that he saw one thing and believed another; for he saw a man, and believed God.

These things premised, three things only here remain to be resolved: First, that faith must necessarily have obscurity both on the part of the object and on the part of the subject: Second, that the object of faith be evidently credible: Third, what are the principal motives and arguments of our faith.

First Conclusion. — THEOLOGICAL FAITH NECESSARILY HAS ANNEXED OBSCURITY BOTH ON THE PART OF THE OBJECT AND ON THE PART OF THE SUBJECT. This is common as to either part, whereof

The first is proved from that word of the Apostle to the Hebrews 11. Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the argument of things not appearing. By which words he openly indicates that the object of faith is so obscure that it does not appear. Hence Dionysius lib. De mystica Theologia, cap. 1. says: Only through the sacred darkness of mist can human minds, nor ought they, contemplate the divine mysteries. Wherefore the same Apostle 1. ad Corinth. 13. says: We see now through a glass and in a riddle, but then face to face; but glass and riddle openly declare the obscurity of divine revelation, upon which faith leans. Whence St. Cyril calls the mysteries of faith the riddle of the most sacred faith. To prove this serve all those authorities of the SS. Fathers soon lauded in the 3. Notable: for they signify that faith and vision are intrinsically opposed: but this opposition arises precisely not from the formal object indeed, namely from the divine truth; since the divine truth can be the object of faith and of intuitive vision: for the same divine truth, which wayfarers believe, the Blessed behold intuitively: therefore the reason of this opposition and distinction between faith and science must be sought from the object quod, or from its own reason, whereby faith and science are borne toward their object, so that faith perceive it obscurely, science intuitively.

The second part is likewise plain, namely that faith is also obscure on the part of the subject, so that the very habit of faith inclines the understanding in which it resides to perceive the mysteries in an obscure and inevident mode, so that the truth which it believes it does not perceive intuitively through another act. For- asmuch as faith leans wholly upon revelation, such is its act as is the medium and motive through which it tends toward the object: but divine revelation is altogether inevident and obscure: therefore the very act of faith too must be obscure and inevident. But this inevidence conduces most of all to the commendation of faith, and merit: For, says St. August., tract. 79. in Ioan., this is the praise of faith, that what is believed is not seen. Whence St. Leo, Serm. 2. De Ascensione: This is the rigor of great minds, and greatly the light of faithful souls, to believe without hesitation what is not seen with bodily gaze, and to fix desire there whither you cannot bring sight, etc. Hence St. Gregory, Homil. 26. in Evangelia, says excellently: Faith has no merit to which human reason offers experience.

You will say 1. Obscurity is nothing else than the negation of evidence and vi- sion: but no negation can necessarily pertain to the object and act of faith: therefore obscurity is not of the formal reason of the object and act of faith. The minor stands, since indeed the object and act of faith are some- thing positive: but no negation is of the formal reason of a po- sitive being. The major likewise is evident: since indeed obscure, in order to cognition, is nothing else than not being seen: but not being seen is something negative, or privative: therefore, etc. — I deny the major, and toward its proof I say that although to be obscure is expressed by a ne- gative name, nevertheless it is something positive; for there are many positive things which are signified only by negative names, as we said when treating of the negative attributes of God.

You will say 2. It can happen that someone has evident cognition of the reve- lation made to him: but in that case the act of faith will not be obscure: therefore obscurity is not of the formal reason of the act of faith. The major stands from various examples: for the first Angel, while he was a wayfarer, knew certainly and evidently that he could be illuminated by God alone, because he had no superior Angel from whom he might receive illumination: similarly the B. Virgin, when she knew she had not conceived by the ordinary way, and at once that she was a Virgin and a Mother, and had received such a sign from the Angel, as it were a certain argu- ment that the Son to be born of her would be the Son of God, from her ascertained Virginitate and fecundity had evident testimony concerning the divi- nity of her Son. The same evidence most of the Prophets had, whence David 2. Reg., cap. 23. says: God said to Israel, the strong of Israel spoke to me, the ruler of men, the just ruler in the fear of God: as the light of dawn at the rising of the sun in the morning without clouds shines, and as rain brings forth grass from the earth. This evidence likewise the Apostles and Evangelists had, for St. Ioan., Epist. 1. cap. 1. says: What we have heard, what we have seen with our eyes, what we have looked upon, and our hands have handled of the word of life … we declare unto you, and announce to you, etc. therefore the act of faith does not necessarily import obscurity. — I answer: that although there be evidence of the revelation on the part of the attesting one, nevertheless there remains obscurity and inevidence on the side of the thing revealed, and consequently faith can be had concerning it; for although it stood evident to me that God reveals to me some mystery, yet that mystery would not thereby be intrinsically evident to me, however evident it be that God supremely truthful attests it; for to the thing revealed there would accrue thence only a certain extrinsic evidence, founded on these extrinsic principles, yet evident ones: Whatever God reveals is true: namely God reveals Himself to be trine in persons. Thence indeed it evidently follows that this proposition is true: therefore God is trine: and accordingly the existence of the truth of this proposition is evident, not the evidence of the thing in itself, but only extrinsically elicited from the premises premised. Hence notwithstanding the evidence on the part of the attesting and revealing one, there always remains obscurity on the side of the thing revealed: whence that thing can still be believed by divine faith.

Which indeed the Doctor excellently teaches in 3. dist. 14. n. 17. where speaking of the Prophets and SS. Apostolis, those outstanding men who had certain cognition that God revealed truths to them, he says: Such men had a habit offering the greatest assent, so that while it stood they could not fail to assent to the truth. Yet that certitude was not evident from the evidence of the thing, because then there would be contradiction that such cognition and faith stood together: yet that certitude was firm, as is scientific certitude, which is caused by principles known from the evidence of terms: but it was not caused by such principles: therefore science could not be said to be from the evidence of the thing: yet it was greater certitude than the certitude of faith: because faith did not exclude every doubt, but some doubt can stand together with faith. By which words the Doctor signifies, not that the Prophets and Apostoli had cognition of the mysteries through a habit distinct from faith, and midway between faith and science, as some judge, but only that they had extrinsic evidence, which indeed made them more certain that God had revealed those truths, than other faithful believe such mysteries to be revealed by God: yet they did not have intrinsic evidence, which is required for intuitive or scientific cognition: in a word, they had the evidence of reve-

Second Conclusion. — THE MYSTERIES OF THE CHRISTIAN FAITH ARE EVIDENTLY CREDIBLE. This is common among Theologians; and it is Proved first by the authority of sacred Scripture, especially from Psal. 92. Thy testimonies are become exceedingly credible: as if he would say: by very many arguments you have demonstrated the mysteries revealed by you, and the law prescribed by you, truly to have you God for author; where significantly the particle exceedingly seems to signify no less than evident cognition; whence our Lyranus thus expounds: Credibilia facta sunt nimis, that is, more than the first principles of sciences. Wherefore St. Augustine, lib. 7. Confess., cap. 10. says: More easily would I doubt that I live, than that what I hear is true. The same is evinced from that word of Ioan. 15. where Christ, speaking of the Jews his worst enemies, says: If I had not come, and spoken to them, they would not have sin; but now they have no excuse for their sin. By which words He signifies that the motives of faith can generate evidence of credibility; for if they effected only probability, they would have an excuse who would follow another probable judgment, whereby they judged these mysteries not to be credible.

The same also reason urges: for since God wills us to believe most firmly and undoubtingly the things He reveals to us, and on that account deprives of eternal salvation and beatitude those who do not assent to such mysteries, and subjects them to eternal torments; right and just reason demanded that He openly offer signs of the truth which He exhibited to be believed, from which it could be known with certainty, which things are revealed by Him, and which truly are not.

⟦Illegible: opening words lost by OCR; text resumes:⟧ scibilitatis there is nothing certain and evidently opinionable, so likewise without evidence of credibility nothing is credible.

⟦Illegible: opening words lost by OCR; text resumes:⟧ the will can, by its own dominion over the understanding, command it to believe something which even does not appear evidently credible: for the will cannot move the understanding, that it be borne beyond the sphere of its object. But since the object of the understanding is that which appears of things, the will cannot move the understanding, that it believe firmly and with certainty what does not appear certainly credible. Finally, that ought to be reckoned evidently credible which is established by most efficacious reasons and most valid arguments: but there are many arguments and motives whereby the mysteries of faith appear true; whence St. August., lib. Contra Epist. Fundamenti, cap. 5. says: Many are the things which most justly hold me in the Catholic: the consensus of peoples and nations, an authority begun in miracles, nourished in hope, confirmed in charity, and strengthened by antiquity. It holds too the succession of Priests from the very seat of Peter the Apostle, to whom the Lord entrusted His sheep, down to the present Episcopate. Finally it holds the very name of Catholic, which not without cause amid so many heresies this Church alone has obtained, so that although all heretics wish themselves to be called Catholics, yet when any foreign pilgrim asks where the Catholic assembly is held, none of the heretics dares point out his own basilica or house. Hence excellently Pico della Mirandola writes in Epist. 1.: Great madness it is not to believe the Gospel, whose truth the blood of Martyrs donates, the Apostolic voices resound, prodigies prove, reason confirms, the elements speak, demons confess; but far greater madness it is not to doubt the truth of the Gospel, and yet to believe as if you did not doubt its falsity.

You will say. 1: If the mysteries of our faith were evidently credible, no one of sound mind, to whom they were sufficiently proposed, could reject them, and judge what is contrary to them more credible: but this militates against constant experience: therefore, &c. The minor is plain: for it stands from the very beginning of the nascent Church that not only the wiser among the Jews, and the gentile Philosophers, but even heretics otherwise versed in matters of the Christian religion assail very many mysteries of faith, and hold their contraries as true, and defend them most constantly. But the major is proved: no one of sound mind can think contrary to what he knows evidently true, and judges worthy of faith, otherwise he would resist manifest truth, and thereupon would strip off the dictate and light of reason.

I deny the major: for although the objects of faith be evidently credible, nevertheless they can be denied and assailed by men otherwise prudent and sagacious: either because they are not duly proposed to them: or because they themselves do not weigh and examine them with the attentive and diligent consideration they ought, but for the most part turn their consideration away from their examination, and convert it to other things opposed to them: or because they are led by perverse affection, lest offering assent to such mysteries and divine truths, they thence be held not only to captivate the understanding in obedience of faith, and thus in a certain manner strip off the natural liberty of assent and use of reason, but truly also to embrace those things which conflict with the delight of the senses. Hence it comes about that from fear of that troublesome captivity into obedience of faith, and likewise of undertaking the obligation to a stricter life, they refuse to examine and penetrate the mysteries proposed: or they attempt to weaken the reasons and motives whereby they become evidently credible, and to darken them with contrary reasons: or because out of love of liberty they refuse to attend to them; for just as although one knows evidently that the good of temperance is prudently lovable, he can nevertheless not love it: so likewise although someone knows his sect cannot be prudently retained, yet with depraved affection he can will to adhere to it, just as everyone who perishes from malice knows evidently that he acts imprudently, yet does not on that account cease from acting. Add to these that God sometimes denies to infidels and heretics those proximately efficacious aids whereby their understanding may be moved and applied to perceiving the evidence of the credibility of the mysteries of faith, as St. Paul teaches 2. ad Cor. IV. saying: The god of this world has blinded the minds of unbelievers, that the illumination of the gospel of the glory of Christ may not shine upon them.

You insist: If it were so that infidels, to whom the mysteries of faith are proposed, knew them to be evidently credible, it would follow that they would likewise know their sects and others opposed to the Christian religion to be evidently incredible, and not to be followed with prudent judgment, because they would be unprovable; for indeed what is incredible is not probable: but the contrary appears; therefore, etc.

— I distinguish the major: they would know evidently that those sects are not prudently credible, I concede: that they are not in any wise credible, whether prudently or imprudently, I deny. For although after sufficient proposition of the mysteries they still pertinaciously remain in their error, from that it is not consequent that they do not know their sect ought not prudently to be adhered to; but they thus conduct themselves because they are rebels against the light, and love darkness rather than light.

You will say 2: If the mysteries of our faith were evidently credible, any Philosopher could naturally know their possibility: but Theologians deny this can occur: ergo, etc. The sequel of the major is proved; what is judged impossible is incredible: ergo what is judged evidently credible is judged also evidently not impossible: but possible, and not impossible are equipollent terms: ergo what is judged not impossible is judged evidently possible: for indeed from the opposite of the consequent to the opposite of the antecedent one argues well, v. g. Peter runs: therefore he is moved, rightly inferred, he is not moved, therefore he does not run.

— I deny the major of the sequel, for whose proof I say that this consequence does not hold: something is judged evidently credible; therefore it is judged evidently not to be impossible; but it ought to be inferred; therefore it is evidently judged that it does not appear impossible. For in order that something be credible, it is not necessary that it be judged really not to be impossible, but it suffices that its impossibility do not appear. Hence with regard to that rule of Logic, that from the opposite of the consequent one rightly argues to the opposite of the antecedent, I say that it is understood only of the contradictory opposite, not indeed of the contrary opposite; e.g., Peter is a man; therefore Peter is an animal: it would not be well argued: Peter is not an animal; therefore he is a brute, although a brute is indeed the opposite of man, because plainly a brute is not opposed to man contradictorily but contrarily. Therefore only this can be inferred: he is not an animal; therefore he is not a man: for thus one argues to the contradictory proposition of the antecedent, or to its negative. The same must be said of the aforementioned argument.

You will insist: This consequence is evident: some object is credible by divine faith; therefore it is true; for by divine faith nothing but truth can be believed; therefore if the mysteries of the Christian religion are evidently credible by divine faith, it follows that they are evidently true. But it is false that the mysteries of our faith are evidently true; otherwise they would be objects of science, not of faith. Therefore they are not evidently credible.

I answer, that it does not follow that if the mysteries of faith are evidently credible, they are also evidently true. For it is one thing that some proposition be true, and another that it be credible: for truth is sought from the intrinsic connection of subject and predicate; but credibility is taken from the extrinsic testimony of the speaker, and likewise from the signs and motives which render that proposition credible or worthy of belief. Add that although the mysteries of faith are evidently credible, it still does not follow that they are evidently credible by divine faith: for how could it be known evidently that something was to be believed by divine faith, when it cannot be known evidently that divine and infused faith exists? Therefore we know only evidently that those mysteries are so proposed that, as far as lies in us, we may prudently endeavor to believe them firmly and without any hesitation, leaving aside whether that assent be elicited by the forces of nature alone or through infused faith.

You will urge: If only the credibility of the mysteries were known evidently, and not their truth, it would follow that in that prior step their truth would be known only probably, and then also that the truth of the contrary and opposing proposition would appear probable, and consequently certain assent could not be had: for we cannot give certain assent to any object if at the same instant its opposite appears probable.

— I answer, that even if at that instant at which the objects of faith are proposed with those motives whereby they appear evidently credible, the truth of the opposing object also seems probable, nevertheless those motives manifesting the credibility of the object of faith, though they have not sufficient power to manifest evidently their truth, have yet sufficient power to show evidently that the will of the prudent man can imperate an assent excluding every fear which could arise from contrary motives: hence at that instant at which the assent of faith is elicited there is no actual fear regarding the opposing object, nor probable assent to it, but only certain motives are present which could generate fear unless restrained by the command of the will.

You will insist again: All arguments against our faith are evidently solved; therefore it is even evidently shown that those mysteries are not only evidently credible but also evidently true: for where the inefficacy of contrary arguments is shown, it appears that they were proving what is false.

— I deny the consequence: for it is one thing that those arguments do not convince the point intended, and another thing to prove that they tend toward proving what is false: hence although we can show the first evidently, yet the second cannot be shown evidently.

Finally you will say: That doctrine is not evidently credible which contains things utterly unworthy of the majesty of God. But such is the doctrine of the Christian faith; for it teaches that God becomes man, is enclosed in the Virgin's womb, nourished at her breast, crucified, dies, etc.: which things are unworthy of the majesty of God: therefore the mysteries of faith are not evidently credible.

— I deny the minor: for these mysteries, although they signify in some part the depression and humility of God, nevertheless commend His divine majesty elsewhere in a wondrous manner; for Christ was conceived, but by the operation of the Holy Spirit; He was born, but of a Virgin; reclined in a manger, but sought and found by Kings, a star shining and showing the way, He is adored; crucified and dead, but at His death the earth trembled, the sun was darkened, and all the elements by their convulsion showed Him to be the Ruler of the world and supreme Lord. Add that those mysteries must be judged the more worthy of the majesty of God because they altogether transcend human reason, nor can they be penetrated by it at all: whence Tertullian, already once and again praised by us, speaks excellently, saying in his book De carne Christi: Christ was born: not shameful, because it is to be believed: He died: credible, because incredible: He rose again: possible, because it is judged impossible. For what is the whole Gospel but mere folly, if compared with human reason? And against Marcion he says: That God assumed certain things unworthy of Himself, but necessary for us, and therefore already worthy of God, since nothing is so worthy of God as the salvation of man.

Third conclusion. — THE MOTIVES AND ARGUMENTS WHEREBY THE MYSTERIES OF OUR CHRISTIAN RELIGION BECOME EVIDENTLY CREDIBLE ARE VARIOUS, BUT CHIEFLY SIX CAPITAL ONES. This is common among Theologians who, although they assign very many motives of this kind, and the Subtle Doctor, question 2 of the Prologue, numbers 8 and 13, multiplies them to the number ten, nevertheless they can rightly be reduced to five.

The first argument is drawn from the purity, efficacy, and concord of the doctrine. It appears, I say, that the Christian Religion was truly published by God from the purity of its doctrine, and from the marvelous consensus of its Doctors; for no other sect thinks as perfectly and sublimely concerning the magnitude of God and His divine prerogatives as the Christian one, which preaches God infinitely perfect and holy, and removes from Him everything that savors of vice or defect; which certainly the other sects do not achieve: for the Jews, after they fell away from the true faith, fell into various errors concerning the perfections of God, as Louis of Granada demonstrates at length in his Catechism, p. 22. But the Gentiles worship vices as divinities, and venerate demons as gods; heretics moreover judge even unworthy things of God. — Likewise no other sect instills in its followers such zeal for perfection as the Christian religion; for it is that which calls minds away from attachment to earthly things and translates them to the love of heavenly ones: for it persuades contempt of riches, honors, and pleasures, incites to frequent fasting and other afflictions of the body, whereby the impulses of the flesh may be broken and itself subjected to the spirit; whence it must be an argument that the Christian religion is altogether heavenly, for that religion cannot fail to be heavenly which tears away human nature clinging to lowly and perishable things so as to promote it toward heavenly goods, which combats love of earthly things so as to implant love of eternal ones: finally, so translates the human affection that the man who reforms his morals according to the rules and institutions of the prescribed faith and Christian doctrine be truly judged heavenly, for his conversation is wholly in heaven. — St. Paul also explains admirably the efficacy of this doctrine while calling Christianity the renovation of man, Ephesians 4. Be renewed, he says, in the spirit of your mind: and put on the new man, who according to God is created in justice and holiness of truth, etc.; and the reformation, Romans 12. Be not conformed to this world, but be reformed in the newness of your sense. Whence the Royal Psalmist seems to have prophesied concerning the Christian law, Psalm 18, where he says: The law of the Lord is unspotted, converting souls. Unspotted indeed, because it eliminates utterly all vices and sins, even the least. Converting souls, because it not only orders and rightly composes exterior acts, as all human laws do, but interior ones too, since it forbids not only killing but further being angry, nor only prohibits adultery but even looking upon a woman to lust after her; whence it reforms the whole man, as Lactantius beautifully explains, book 6, chapter 25:

The precepts of God, because they are both simple and true, daily experiences demonstrate how powerful they are in the souls of men. Give me a man who is irascible, reviling, and vain; with a very few words I shall make him gentle as a lamb. Give me a covetous, avaricious man; presently I shall present him liberal, bestowing money with full hands. Give me one fearful of pain and death; presently he will despise crosses and fires, peril and the bull. Give me a lustful man, an adulterer, a glutton; presently you will see him sober, chaste, continent. Give me a cruel man, thirsting for blood; presently he will change into true clemency. Give me an unjust man, foolish, a sinner; immediately he will be both equitable and prudent and innocent: for so great is the force of divine wisdom that, poured into the breast of man, it expels the folly of transgressions with a single onset.

— Finally it appears that the Christian doctrine is divinely inspired from the marvelous consensus and concord both of the authors of Sacred Scripture and of the sacred Doctors; for, as the Doctor says, number 1, many authors of different ages and times cannot agree in principles and conclusions, especially moral ones, unless God specially assists them, and their minds are inclined by Him to assent: but our Doctors, however differently disposed and existing at different times, agreed in a wondrous manner concerning the moral precepts, and likewise concerning the principal truths to be believed of faith; therefore, etc. The Doctor proves the major, first indeed by the authority of St. Augustine, book 18 De Civitate, chapter 41. Our authors surely ought to be few, lest what ought to be precious in religion grow cheap through multitude, and yet not so few that their consensus not be marvelous. For among the multitude of Philosophers who have left monuments of their dogmas even by literary labor, one will not easily find that they agree in all things which they thought. He proves it also with this reason:

Since the intellect, as regards assent, is by nature moved by an object evident in itself or in another, nothing else seems able to cause such an assent from an object unless it virtually includes the evidence of the object: for if nothing of the kind moves the intellect, there will remain to it a Theology neutral. But nothing is of such a kind regarding things not evident from the terms except an intellect superior to ours; and no intellect superior to man can effectively teach man, except God.

— He confirms this most strongly from the fact that those later sacred Writers were not disciples of the earlier ones; for, he says, Ezechiel prophesying in Babylon at the time when Jeremias was prophesying in Judea could not have concorded with him unless they had had some common Doctor above human intellect. This is true above all of the Authors of the New Testament, who, since they proscribed many legal and ceremonial precepts of the Old Testament, would undoubtedly also have dissented from the Authors of that same Testament concerning moral precepts, unless He who had dictated the old Testament to the earlier Writers had inspired the same things to be written by the Authors of the new Testament.

Hence arises the second motive and argument for the truth of our faith and religion, namely the holiness of life and purity of morals, which shines forth especially in the cultivators of the Christian faith and law; for very many in every age, and in every stage of life, have been illustrious for sanctity, even among those who before embracing this heavenly religion were given over to most grievous sins; which certainly is an argument that the religion they followed is true, because a false religion does not lead to true sanctity; for religion is the foundation of sanctity, nor could that heavenly building be erected upon a pernicious and sacrilegious lie, such as is every pretense and every lie in religion. Nor can it happen that a false religion call the soul away from earthly things and translate it to heavenly ones, so as to kindle the mind with divine love, and impel it toward promoting the salvation of neighbors and the glory of God, even with open loss of all goods, and imminent loss of life, even through most perilous labors and various kinds of torments; but Christian faith and religion works all these things in its followers. — Nor do these facts stand in the way, that also among Catholic faithful there are many who not only do not live holily but even lie under most grievous vices; for they do this not from the indulgence of religion but from the perverse use of free will; since there are three things which can call man away from evil and incite him to good, namely fear of punishment, hope of reward, and the honesty of the good work itself; these three the Christian religion proposes most excellently and everywhere inculcates upon its followers; whence if some of its followers do not aspire to that sanctity, this must be imputed not to religion itself but to the liberty of free will, which perversely uses these good incentives against them all.

The third motive is that the Christian faith itself is coeval with the world; for our faith has been propagated from the very beginning of the nascent world down to us by immutable succession; indeed, as we said, the object of faith has always been believed the same, for what the Ancients believed implicitly we believe explicitly; hence the Christian and Catholic religion surpasses in antiquity not only heretics but all Gentile idolaters, against whom therefore we can press what Tertullian objected to the heretics of his time, book De praescriptione, chapter 37. Who are you? When and whence did you come? What are you doing in what is mine, you who are not mine? Finally, by what right, Marcion, do you cut down my wood? By what license, Valentinus, do you divert my springs?

By what power, Apelles, do you change my boundaries? It is my possession: why do others sow there at your pleasure and feed? My possession it is: because I possess it; I possess it first; I hold firm titles of origin from the very authors themselves to whom the thing belonged. I am the heir of the Apostles: as they received by their testimony, as they committed it in faith, as they adjured, so I hand it on. Those men certainly they always disinherited and disowned as strangers, as enemies.

The fourth argument for the truth of our faith is drawn from the marvelous propagation of the same throughout the whole world; for it required the power of God, and His special protection and favor, that the Christian faith should be diffused through the entire globe; which will appear most evidently if anyone consider, first, the readiness or swiftness with which that faith was announced and received among all nations; for St. Paul testifies to the Colossians 1. that the truth of the Gospel had already shone through the whole universe in his own time: The Gospel, he says, which has come to you, as also it is in the whole world, and bringeth forth fruit and groweth, as also in you, etc. Hence Justin Martyr, who lived at the beginning of the second century, says in his dialogue with Trypho: There is no race of men, whether of Barbarians or Greeks, or of those who use wagons instead of houses, or who have no use of houses, among whom prayers and Eucharisties are not made in the name of Jesus, who was fixed to the cross, to the Creator of all things. — Secondly, truly divine is the work whereby the propagated Christian faith was defended; not by power, not by arms, not by wealth, but by rustic, despised, ignoble, unlettered, and contemptible men, who persuaded Princes, Doctors, Sophists, Leaders, Orators, Kingdoms, Provinces, and the whole world to embrace a faith utterly repugnant to sense, precepts difficult, contempt of temporal goods, and the supreme cult and Divinity of its Author's life, that of one man publicly punished and crucified; which indeed would have been impossible unless the finger of God promoted His cause, and unless this work, as Augustine said, book 22 De Civitate, chapter 8, had been of divine power, not of human persuasion: especially since it was done while Kings, Princes, Emperors, Priests, Magistrates, the People, and the whole world opposed themselves. All these things holy Chrysostom weighs admirably, Sermon 3 De Pentecoste, in these words:

The Fishers traversed the whole earth, and finding it infirm restored it to health, and called it back from ruin to stability; not wielding shields, not bending bows, not shooting arrows, not exacting money, not relying on eloquence: choosing poverty, or possessing the kingdom of heaven: having no human consolations, but having the Lord with them. They traversed the whole universe, sheep together with wolves, and wounded by beasts they were not killed: but rather the wolves were converted to the gentleness of the sheep.

The fifth argument is drawn from divine testimony: for God revealed, confirmed, and strengthened the mysteries of our faith. He revealed them, I say, through the Prophets long before they were accomplished: hence the Doctor argues thus, number 3, God alone can naturally, without protection from another, foresee contingencies with certitude: therefore He alone, or one instructed by Him, can predict them with certitude, according to that saying of Isaias: Show the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that ye are gods: but all the mysteries of Christ the Lord were foretold by the Prophets long before He Himself appeared on earth and conversed with men: for His Incarnation is foretold in Baruch: He was seen upon earth, and conversed with men. His birth of a Virgin, Isaias 7: Behold a virgin shall conceive, and bear a son. The place of His Nativity, Micheas 5: And thou, Bethlehem Ephrata, art a little one among the thousands of Juda: out of thee shall he come forth unto me that is to be the ruler in Israel. His preaching, Isaias 61: The spirit of the Lord is upon me, because the Lord hath anointed me: he hath sent me to preach to the meek, to heal the contrite of heart, and to preach a release to the captives, &c. His miracles, Isaias 35: Then shall the eyes of the blind be opened, and the ears of the deaf unstopped. Then shall the lame man leap as a hart, and the tongue of the dumb shall be free. His entrance into Jerusalem, Zachary 9: Behold thy king will come to thee, the just and saviour: he is poor, and riding upon an ass, and upon a colt the foal of an ass. His betrayal by a disciple, Psalm 40: He that ate bread with me hath greatly supplanted me. His sale for thirty pieces of silver, Zachary 11: And they weighed for my wages thirty pieces of silver. And shortly after: And I took the thirty pieces of silver, and cast them into the house of the Lord. The pains and tortures of His passion endured with supreme patience and meekness, Isaias 53: He shall be led as a sheep to the slaughter, and shall be dumb as a lamb before his shearer, and he shall not open his mouth, &c. His crucifixion between thieves, same chapter, verse 12: He was reputed with the wicked. The mockings and blasphemies of the Jews, the division of His garments, and His prayer for enemies on the cross, Psalm 21, throughout the whole. The drinking of gall and vinegar, Psalm 68: They gave me gall for my food, and in my thirst they gave me vinegar to drink. The Resurrection, Psalm 15: For thou wilt not leave my soul in hell; nor wilt thou give thy holy one to see corruption. Finally His ascension into heaven is foretold, Psalm 67: Thou hast ascended on high, thou hast led captivity captive: thou hast received gifts in men.

Whence Tertullian speaks excellently; having said in the Apologeticus, chapter 20, A fitting testimony of Divinity, I think, is the truth of prophecy, he concludes:

Hence therefore among us faith also in future things is safe, namely already proved, because along with those things which daily are proved they were foretold. The same voices sound, the same letters mark, the same Spirit strikes; one time it is to speak out foretold things after having divined them, &c.

St. Augustine uses the same argument, Sermon 27 De Verbis Apostoli, chapter 1., where he says:

For there are infidels who so detract from Christ as to say that what he did he did by magical arts (like those Jews who said: In Beelzebub, prince of devils, he casteth out devils, Luke 11). Infidels therefore can refer the voice sent down from heaven to illicit curiosities and to magical arts: but the Prophets were beforehand. There was not yet the man Christ when He sent the Prophets. If then He wrought by magical arts that He might be worshipped when dead, was He perchance a magician before He was born?

— Second, God confirmed these same mysteries by innumerable miracles; for these are as it were the very subscriptions of God Himself, who alone doth great wonders, Ps. 135. Hence the Apostle, writing to the Hebrews 2. concerning the Christian faith, says: It was confirmed, God also bearing witness by signs, and wonders, and divers virtues, and distributions of the Holy Ghost. But since those miracles have God for their author, it cannot be that they were wrought in confirmation of any falsehood; whence it must be concluded with Richard of St. Victor, lib. 1. De Trinitate, chap. 2.: Indeed, the things revealed to us from heaven have been confirmed by prodigies so many, so great, so wonderful, that it would seem a kind of madness to doubt them even a little. Would that the Jews would attend to it, would that the Pagans take note of it, with what security of conscience on this side we may approach the divine judgment! Would that with every confidence we could say to God: Lord, if there be error, we have been deceived by Thee? For these things in us are confirmed by signs and prodigies so great, and such as could not have been wrought save by Thee.

Nor do I deny that infidels and heretics pick at the miracles wrought in confirmation of the Christian and Catholic faith. But either those miracles were truly wrought, or they were not. If they were wrought, there is no reason why they should be called into doubt; but if no miracles at all were performed in confirmation of the Christian faith, it is surely a great miracle that without miracle the whole world neglected the religion and cult of idols, approved through so many centuries and held in honor and veneration by so many wise and most powerful men, without any signs or prodigies whatsoever, so that the Christian religion should take its place.

By which argument S. Augustine makes use in Util. contra infideles, where he says:

Since it stands agreed that the empire of the Romans, filled throughout the whole world with so many powerful men, philosophers, and orators, at first resisting the doctrine of Christ, was afterwards converted to it: I ask whether by the power of signs and prodigies this change was made from the ancient rites and long-observed religion into this new and unheard-of one? If you shall confess that the world was drawn to this persuasion by the force of miracles, which it could in no wise resist, you must confess that this religion proceeded from God the author of miracles, who alone doth great wonders: but if on the other hand you deny that the world was summoned by any miracles to receive this faith, in denying the miracles you bring upon yourself an enormous miracle: for what can be called more wonderful than that the Roman Empire, and all Gentility together, deserting their paternal rites, with no signs seen nor works to be marveled at, should have embraced of their own accord the religion which they attacked so fiercely and strove to overturn, and should have been so constant in retaining it.

Thus far S. Augustine. — Thirdly finally, He strengthened it even by the testimony of infidels opposing the Christians, as the Doctor teaches most excellently in the same place num. 13.; for, as Eucherius speaks beautifully, Hom. 2. De Paschate: Openly, beyond doubt, he relies upon privileges who asserts his cause from the instruments of adversaries. Now very many infidels spoke and wrote admirably concerning Christ and the Christians; but above the rest the Doctor praises the testimony of Josephus: for he, lib. 18. De antiquit., chap. 1., reports these things concerning the Lord Christ:

Now at that time there was Jesus, a wise man, if indeed it be lawful to call him a man: for he was a worker of marvelous deeds, and a teacher of all those who gladly hear the things that are true. And he drew to himself many of the Jews, and many also from among the nations. This man was Christ. And when Pilate had decreed, upon the accusation of the first men of our nation, that he should be crucified, those who had loved him from the beginning did not forsake him: for he appeared to them alive again on the third day: according as the divinely inspired Prophets had foretold these and countless other wonders; and even unto this day the race of Christians, named from him, persists both in name and in stock.

Philo too, most eloquent of the Jews, wrote a book concerning the holiness and purity of life of the first Christians dwelling at Alexandria, as St. Jerome testifies in his book De Scriptoribus Ecclesiasticis, where treating of St. Mark and the Alexandrian Church, he says: Philo, most eloquent of the Jews, seeing Alexandria the first Church still judaizing, wrote a book concerning their manner of life, as if in praise of his nation.

Finally, God has sufficiently testified that the Christian religion is divinely inspired by that marvelous and utterly stupendous fortitude and constancy of the countless Martyrs, who also took their name thence (says Suarez) because with their own blood they bore great testimony to the faith; for although infidels, both Pagans and heretics, died in defense of their errors, as Nicephorus reports of Apollinarius, lib. 4. Hist., chap. 23., Many heresies glory in their Martyrs, yet we do not on that account go over to their opinions; nevertheless there are more circumstances attending the Martyrs of Christians and Catholics which declare and confirm in wondrous manner the truth and sanctity of the Christian religion. First indeed, this is chiefly brought about by the countless multitude of Martyrs: for in defense of other sects they are rare who underwent death; but in defense of the Christian faith, and for its propagation, so many endured a noble death amid torments of every kind more atrocious than the rest, that St. Jerome deservedly wrote to Heliodorus that he found the number of Martyrs in the Annals of the Pontiffs so abundant, that if we wished to celebrate the memory of them all, a solemnity would fall to each single day of more than three thousand: wherefore with full right S. Gregory, Hom. 17. on the Gospels, addressing the Christian faithful, says: Look over the whole world, Brethren, it is full of Martyrs; already almost more are they whom we see not than we who are; how many witnesses of the truth have we: they are numberless to God, multiplied beyond the sand to us; because their multitude cannot be comprehended by us. Second, the very burning desire of suffering for Christ commends in the Christian and Catholic Martyrs a special protection and upholding of God, whereby they not only did not shun torments, but even offered themselves spontaneously to tyrants and executioners to be slain and sacrificed: whence Tertullian at the beginning of the book ad Scapulam: We neither shrink from nor dread those things which we suffer at the hands of the ignorant: since, when we took upon ourselves this sect upon acceptance of its terms, we covenanted to enter upon these contests having pledged even our souls, desiring to obtain what God promises, and fearing to endure what threatens from another life. Finally, we strive against all your cruelty, nay rather breaking forth unbidden: and we rejoice more at being condemned than acquitted. Third, the same thing is attested by that marvelous constancy not only of soul, but also alacrity in undergoing whatever more direful and atrocious torments and punishments. For what S. Luke relates of the Apostles and Disciples, Act. 5.: And they indeed went from the council rejoicing that they were accounted worthy to suffer reproach for the name of Jesus, befell also in the other Martyrs, who, inebriated even amid their torments with heavenly consolation and sweetness, for the most part rang out divine praises, insulted the executioners tormenting them, and confessed most constantly the name and Divinity of Christ the Lord, as SS. Marcus and Marcellianus, brothers of Rome, bore witness most nobly, who, when the Judge had cried out to them bound to the stake: Come to your senses, wretches, and deliver yourselves from these tortures: answered: Never have we feasted so sweetly as we now gladly suffer these things for the cause of Jesus Christ, in whose love we have begun to be fastened: would that they allow us to suffer these things so long as with this corruptible body we are to live.

The Doctor finally deduces a sixth motive and argument of the credibility and firmness of our faith from the stability and perpetuity of the Church: for surely that religion must be judged divinely instituted which abode stable from the beginning of its institution in the profession of the same faith and doctrine through very many years, even notwithstanding the various persecutions of adversaries, and this without any support of secular and earthly power: but such is the Christian and Catholic religion: therefore, &c. The major stands: for God is not wont to concur in the preservation of any sect for so long a time as the Christian religion has lasted, unless it be that which professes truth, especially where that religion is attacked by various enemies, and there be liberty of disputing concerning the mysteries and articles of faith, that the truth may appear the more evident, as happens in the Christian religion. The minor also is evident: for from the beginning of its institution the Church has been propagated even unto us throughout the whole world; whence the Doctor concludes num. 9. with S. Augustine, lib. De utilitate credendi, cap. 17.: Since then we see such authority of God, such profit, and such handling thereof, do we hesitate to give ourselves back to the bosom of that Church which, unto the confession of the human race, by the successions of Bishops from the apostolic seat — heretics barking around it in vain, condemned partly by the judgment of the people itself, partly by the weight of Councils, partly even by the majesty of miracles — obtained the summit of authority? And shortly after: What else can be so displeasing to opinion, and yet so aided by divine help, as to wish to resist with such labor the aforesaid authority? Hence (as elsewhere) Actor. 5.: If this design or work be of men, it will come to nought; but if it be of God, you cannot overthrow it, lest perhaps you be found even to fight against God. More may be added to this argument from the most illustrious characters and marks with which the Catholic Church is adorned, and by which she is set apart from the conventicles of heretics. But a more convenient place will be taken for speaking of these, when, God willing, we shall begin the Treatise on the Church.

Not slight is the controversy among Catholics and Heretics, the Lutherans and Calvinists, concerning the habits of Faith, Hope, and Charity: for since these plainly deny that anything real is infused into us divinely in justification, and affirm that we are justified by the sole non-imputation of sin, and by the extrinsic favor and acceptance of God, as we demonstrated from their writings in the preceding Treatise when treating of sanctifying grace, hence they likewise deny and reject every habit, or quality and virtue infused by God, which not only aids us in eliciting supernatural acts, but also confers upon us the faculty and power for doing so. That we may assuredly assail this heretical dogma, and establish the Catholic truth and sentiment concerning supernatural habits upon an impregnable and most firm foundation, four points above all must be discussed in this article: First, whether a habit of faith is given: Second, what it is, and of what kind: Third, in what subjects it is found and perseveres: Fourth, what causes it has.

Note 1. It is certain and indubitable among all Catholics that the infused virtues are to be admitted, which are bestowed divinely upon men both adult and infant in baptism. As to adults, this is most clearly taught by Innocent II cap. Maiores, for he says: That indeed which the objectors bring forward, that faith, or charity, and other virtues are not infused into infants as being non-consenting, is not absolutely granted by most, since on this account a question is debated among Theological Doctors, some asserting that through the power of baptism fault indeed is remitted to infants, but grace is not conferred: others saying that sin is forgiven and virtues are infused, having them as to habit, not as to use, until they come to adult age. Where he plainly supposes it to be held by all as certain and indubitable that those habits are infused into adults, as consenting by their baptism and divine vocation, while they are being baptized, and that it is only doubtful whether the same happens in infants. Similarly the Council of Vienna, related in the Clementine De summa Trinitate, after teaching that baptism profits unto salvation both infants and adults; yet that it is disputed among Theologians whether in baptism virtues and informing grace are also infused into infants beyond the remission of fault, adds: But we, attending to the general efficacy of the death of Christ, which through baptism is applied equally to all the baptized, have deemed the second opinion, which says that informing grace and virtues are conferred in baptism upon infants as well as adults, as the more probable, and more consonant and harmonious with the sayings of the Saints and Doctors of modern Theology, to be chosen with the approval of the sacred Council. Where he plainly supposes as indubitable that said virtues are infused; but since the efficacy of the death of Christ generically is applied in baptism both to infants and to adults, from the fact that those virtues are infused into adults, meanwhile these also are infused into infants (for those words signify this: We attending, &c., by which the reason of the ensuing decision is rendered), and that this is to be chosen as more consonant with the Fathers and Theologians. Now the difficulty is whether those virtues truly are habits, and those supernaturally permanently abiding in us; which that it may appear the more evident,

Note 2. This distinction is found between supernatural habits divinely infused per se, and natural ones acquired by one's own labor and repeated and reiterated acts: First, that the latter confer merely facility upon the faculty in which they inhere, that it may break forth more promptly and expeditiously into its operations and elicit acts; but the former bestow not so much that facility as virtue upon the potency in which they inhere for eliciting their acts, so that the faculty without acquired habits could indeed operate absolutely, though with some difficulty: but without supernatural habits could not in any way elicit the acts toward which those habits incline. Second, those habits differ in this, that acquired ones do not promote the potency beyond its lot and natural state, but stimulate and aid it toward eliciting the acts naturally due to it; but the supernatural promote the faculty and soul to a state naturally undue, and confer upon it force for eliciting acts above the powers of nature, so that the faculty without habits of this kind could not in any way exercise such acts, even though it expended all its force and activity thereon. Nevertheless they agree in this, that both those habits inexist in the faculty by way of co-principle, and concur with it partially in the production of the act to which they are ordered.

Note 3. Something can be called supernatural by either of these two ways, namely either as to substance, or as to mode. That is called supernatural as to substance which in its entity is such that it could not be produced by any secondary cause of the natural order, however duly applied and prepared for acting, unless some principle were implanted in that secondary cause, already naturally complete and indeed sufficiently disposed for eliciting natural acts, but not for producing those acts or effects which are called supernatural. I said already naturally complete and disposed for acting: for it is certain that a secondary cause, however prepared and expedite of itself for acting, cannot elicit its acts nor produce effects without the special concurrence of God, which is necessary for producing any effect whatsoever; and therefore that faculty has not of itself, without such concurrence, an adequate physical virtue unto that effect: but this concurrence is required on account of the essential subordination of the secondary cause to the first, and also on account of the essential dependence of every effect upon the same first cause; nor is that exigency made on account of the special perfection and dignity of one effect rather than another: for that concurrence is required alike for eliciting acts and producing effects imperfect and perfect; whence this concurrence does not suppose a potency sufficiently complete, but completes and perfects it by way of co-principle in the elicition of acts connatural to it. But when an act is of such entity and dignity that it cannot be produced by a potency thus complete and expedite for acting, unless that faculty be aided, and be rendered powerful for that production through some form to be produced and infused by God alone, then that act is judged supernatural as to substance; because its production altogether exceeds the capacity and activity of the faculty otherwise sufficiently disposed for eliciting acts which would be purely natural. Supernatural according to mode is called that which, although it could be done and produced by the forces of nature by secondary causes without any divinely implanted form, is nevertheless here and now done by God beyond the exigency of nature, as sight restored to a blind man, a rose brought forth in winter, water turned into wine by miracle, as was done at Cana of Galilee.

These things premised, there remain only two points to be determined: First indeed, whether the virtues of Faith, Hope, and Charity are habits or qualities permanently abiding in us: Second, whether they are supernatural as to substance, or as to mode.

First Conclusion. — INDEED THE VIRTUES OF FAITH, HOPE, AND CHARITY ARE QUALITIES PERMANENTLY ABIDING IN US BY WAY OF HABIT. This is common among Theologians. And

Proof from the authority of the Council of Vienna, and of Clement V in the first Notable cited above: for from the sentence of the same Council it stands that supernatural virtues, as well as justifying grace, are infused divinely into infants in baptism: but they are not infused by way of act, of which those infants are altogether incapable: therefore they must be infused by way of habit. Nor does it matter that Clement V with the Council of Vienna approving does not define it to be altogether certain that the virtues are infused in baptism even into infants: for it suffices that he assert this to be the more probable, and more consonant with the sayings of the Holy Fathers and Doctors of Theology, and consequently against that definition, which Clement V made with the Council of Vienna approving

Whoever should teach the contrary to be more probable would sin. He adds that Clement V asserts in an equal degree of certitude that informing grace and virtues are conferred in baptism upon infants as well as adults. By which he insinuates that each is equally certain, nor can one be denied without the other: but it is altogether certain that informing, or justifying, grace is infused into infants in baptism: therefore according to the mind both of the Council of Vienna and of Clement V it ought equally to be certain that the virtues of Faith, Hope, and Charity are infused by way of habit into those same infants, seeing that they are altogether incapable of acts.

Proof second, and the preceding argument is confirmed by the authority of the Council of Trent, Sess. 6. cap. 7., where after enumerating the dispositions which precede justification, and recounting within them the act of faith and hope, it subjoins: This disposition and preparation is followed by justification itself, which is not mere remission of sins, but sanctification also and renovation of the interior man through the grace received and gifts. Wherein the reception of grace and gifts in justification is co-distinguished from the preparation which it follows, and in which actual faith was already supposed: therefore by the name of gifts, which are afterward infused, something permanent and co-distinct from acts must be understood. — It is confirmed from the fact that there the same Council, after saying that the formal cause of justification is inherent justice divinely infused, according to each one's disposition, straightway infers: Whence in justification itself, together with the remission of sins, man receives all these things at once infused through Jesus Christ, into whom he is ingrafted: Faith, Hope, and Charity. By which words the Council declares what those gifts are whose reception it had said above is included in justification. It is confirmed also by the following words, where the Council teaches that this faith, of which it speaks, is that which, it says, Catechumens before the sacrament of baptism seek from the Church by the tradition of the Apostles, when they seek the faith that proffers life eternal: but this faith is neither sought from the Church nor given save through baptism, unto which the very Catechumens come: but through baptism actual faith is not given, seeing that infants are incapable thereof; nor do the Catechumens even ask for the act of faith, because they come to baptism with actual faith, or act of faith: therefore the mind of the Council is that those virtues of which it speaks are qualities by way of habit permanently abiding in us. Finally it is confirmed from Vega, lib. I. on Trent, cap. 21., where he teaches that after Trent the virtue of faith distinct from the act of believing is to be said to be infused concerning faith: for after he had recounted the words of the Council of Vienna cited above in the first Notable, thus does that famous Interpreter of the doctrine of the Council of Trent speak, seeing that he was eyewitness and earwitness thereof: It seemed good to this holy Synod (namely the Tridentine) to approve that opinion and to pronounce anathema against him who asserts the contrary: for it understood this to be the common faith of the Church, although not under the name of habits. The same Sotus, lib. De natura et gratia, cap. 18., who himself also was present at the Tridentine Council.

From which it is legitimately inferred, after the Council of Trent, to seem certain that the virtues of Faith, Hope, and Charity are infused into us by way of habit: Both because the Council expressly defines Faith, Hope, and Charity to be infused into us: but according to the common manner of speaking these necessarily signify some act, or habit: therefore the Council defines some act, or habit, to be infused into us: but it cannot be said that an act is infused into us; because acts are given to us not only by God, but are also elicited by us: therefore the Council defines a habit to be infused into us: And because, there the same Council cap. 15. and Can. 28. defines that faith, when justifying grace has been lost through mortal sin, is not lost save through infidelity, and is verily of faith: but these cannot belong to an act: for the latter is neither lost through sin, nor does it remain the same before and after sin, and straightway the Council speaks of habitual and permanently abiding faith.

You will say 1: The Council does not expressly define that habits of Faith, Hope, and Charity are infused into us: but it is inferred only from certain of its sayings: but a proposition which is not expressly defined in Councils, but is only inferred from some of their sayings, is not altogether certain, but is only a theological proposition: therefore, etc. — I distinguish the minor: if it be inferred only by reason of some connection which that proposition would have with the thing defined in the Council, it would not be altogether certain, let that pass: but if it be inferred from the force of the signification of the words, and the identity of what is signified, or because the thing signified by both words is the same, I deny the major. For, as we said, if the words of the Council are taken properly, they signify not an act, but the habit of faith: therefore, etc.

You will say 2: The Council of Trent intends only to condemn heretics asserting that our justification is not wrought through any form inherently adhering in us, but only through an extrinsic acceptance of God: therefore it defines only that we are formally just through some intrinsic form, whether meanwhile this be act or habit. — I deny the consequence: both because the Lutheran heretics, against whom chiefly that definition of the Tridentine Council militates, not only taught these things, but also perversely denied that we are just through intrinsic habits; and condemned the opinion which teaches that habits of Faith, Hope, and Charity are infused into us; and consequently as the Council intends to condemn them, so it intends also to define this opinion. And because Councils often in their definitions not only condemn the opinions of heretics, but at the same time also explain what is to be thought concerning the proposed matter, as even appears from the very words of the Council itself.

You will say 3: God labors nothing in vain, nor does He concede anything useless: but supernatural virtues by way of habit would be useless and vain in most of their subjects, especially in infants; which indeed is proved, because habits are given for the eliciting of acts: but infants are incapable of acts to be elicited: therefore also of habits to be received. — I answer first, that if the argument concluded anything, it would even follow that infants through baptism do not receive Faith, Hope, and Charity, because they are incapable of the acts of those virtues: but this directly militates against the definition of the Council of Trent: therefore, etc. — I answer second with the Seraphic Doctor in II. d. 4. qu. 2., that the incapacity of infants for eliciting acts does not make them incapable of receiving habits:

For it must be noted, he says, that the powers of the soul are impeded in two ways by an evil habit, and by concupiscence, or by fault: and on the contrary this impediment is removed by grace, or the virtues, whereby they are expedited for operating. Therefore the virtues render the powers facile, perfecting them, and this by removing fault: but they do not effect another expedition. Hence since an infant has both impediments, one is removed by the virtues, not both: and therefore he is not altogether facile for operating. Now a habit of this expeditive kind has a multiple origin. For one is innate, one acquired, one infused. The first begins with nature, and takes its origin from its principles: and therefore it is imperfect in imperfect nature, and grows as nature grows, and is perfected when nature is perfected, as appears in natural judgment. But the second, namely the acquired, takes its origin from free will, which has no use until nature is somehow perfected: and therefore it follows perfected nature. But the third takes its origin from God, not from nature, nor from free will, and can be in an infant before the use of free will: but because it has not its origin from nature, it can be perfect while nature is imperfect.

Second Conclusion. — THE THREE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES, NAMELY FAITH, HOPE, AND CHARITY ARE INFUSED PER SE AND SUPERNATURAL IN ENTITY.

Proof first from Sacred Scripture: for Ioan. 6.: This is the work of God, that you believe in him whom he hath sent. To the Philippians 1.: For unto you it is given for Christ, not only to believe in him, etc. And to the Romans 5.: The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, etc. Then, says the Doctor in 3. d. 28. n. 3., the Apostle to the Hebrews 11. says: Without faith it is impossible to please God: but it is certain that many do please, and many have pleased God; therefore it is necessary to posit faith with respect to the credibles revealed to us. And that he speaks of infused faith, appears through the same I. to the Corinthians 12., where he says: And I shew unto you yet a more excellent way, and after cap. 13. he subjoins concerning those theological virtues, which are ways more excellent than all acquired habits: for there he speaks of infused faith, just as of infused charity. Finally, it belongs to Him to grant faith whose it is to increase faith: but it belongs to God alone to increase faith;

and therefore, says the Doctor n. 16., the Apostles prayed. Luke 17.: Lord, increase our faith. And the Church in the Collect for the faithful beseeches the same increase of faith in these words: Almighty everlasting God, give us the increase of Faith, Hope, and Charity: yet this would not need to be asked, if the whole assent were from the will.

The same truth is proved from the definition of the Council of Milevis, Can. I., Arausican. II. Can. 25., and of Trent, Sess. 6. Can. 3. and cap. 1., as was said in the preceding Conclusion. Which truth indeed the Council of Voguntinum celebrated two years after the said sixth Session of the Council of Trent defined lucidly; whence cap. 8. it has a certain periphrasis of that seventh chapter of the sixth Session of Trent, in these words:

Justification together with the remission of sins confers also sanctification and interior renovation, inasmuch as, through the merit of Christ, who now communicates himself to the believer, having received with all sins forgiven the grace of God, and through the Holy Spirit together with faith at once hope and charity poured forth in the heart: and these gifts abiding in him, he is not only reputed, but truly exists just.

From these words it is clear that the Fathers of that Council asserted that Faith, Hope, and Charity, which the Council of Trent had defined to be divinely infused in justification, are not acts but habitual gifts abiding in the very person justified, and that this pertains to Catholic doctrine. The same Saint Ambrose teaches most excellently in the book De Vocatione Gentium, last chapter, and Saint Augustine in the book De Natura et Gratia, chapters 2, 3, and 4, and often elsewhere. Whence the Doctor concludes admirably at n. 11: That one must posit infused faith on account of the authority of Scripture and of the Saints.

Various arguments too are brought forward by Theologians persuading this truth; yet since that truth depends upon divine revelation alone. Hence it comes about, says the Doctor just praised at n. 14, that it cannot be demonstrated that infused faith is present in anyone unless faith is presupposed, namely that he wishes to believe Scripture and the Saints; but it would never be shown to an infidel: but just as I believe God to be three and one, so I believe myself to have infused faith, by which I believe this, and this from God, that He may perfect the soul in first act: because it belongs to God to perfect perfectly when He perfects. Just as when He heals someone according to the body, He heals perfectly for the state in which he is: so also according to the soul; and because in the soul there is the image of God according to three powers, which were deformed by sin, Christ Himself reforming them, perfects the will through charity, and thus the intellect through faith. — Nevertheless we can affirm that God wished to give supernatural habits precisely so that the acts of those virtues might be elicited more connaturally; for since, speaking generically, an effect is compared to its cause as a branch to its root, it is more connatural that, as far as possible, an effect arise from a cause proportioned to itself, and which contains the effect in its power, either totally or at least partially. Hence, since the acts of faith, hope, and charity are of supernatural order, as we shall say in the following Article, it was fitting that they be elicited by a faculty elevated to that order and proportioned in first act to operations of that kind: but this elevation and proportion is brought about especially through a supernatural habit, permanently persevering in the faculty, and having the character of a co-principle with the faculty eliciting such supernatural acts. For when some cause in itself has no proportion to its effect, it is necessary that it receive at least something within itself by which it be proportioned in first act to producing the effect and contain it within itself; therefore the intellect, that it may produce a supernatural act, to which of itself it has no intrinsic proportion, is intrinsically proportioned through the intrinsic infused habit, by which it is already a cause proportioned to such an effect and contains it within itself.

You will say: To elicit an act supernatural in entity, it is enough that the power be elevated by some transient and intrinsic virtue, and by an aid merely actual: therefore for this an infused habit does not seem to be necessarily required. — I answer, that this indeed could be done, but not so connaturally; inasmuch as a habit, or quality permanently persevering in the soul, has the character of a co-principle, hence it constitutes the soul in that degree and supernatural state in a more fitting order, so that it may truly be proportioned and commensurate to the dignity of eliciting a supernatural act: for although this proportion and commensuration could also come about through an actual and transitory aid, nevertheless since that aid would not be persevering in the soul, neither would it seem to be so in its power that it could use it at will for eliciting an act, in the way it can use a habit infused into it and long persevering in it. Add to these things that by those three supernatural virtues man is held to be constituted in the supernatural order; whence just as there follow upon the rational soul, which constituted man in the rank of rational nature, the powers or faculties intrinsic by which man operates as rational, so to the state of justifying grace, by which man is constituted quasi in a higher nature and supernatural state, there are owed also faculties congruent to the nature placed in that state, by which he may operate conformably to the end to which he is ordained in that state: but those faculties or powers cannot be others than those habitual supernatural virtues: therefore man elicits supernatural acts more fitly and connaturally through the concourse of these habits than through the concourse of any natural and transitory aid.

You will seek 1. Whether those infused habits are so subject to the will in operating that it can use them or not use them at will? — I answer that a habit, whether acquired or infused, is not first and per se and immediately in the power of the will in the way an act to be elicited is, which the will can produce per se, or through powers subjected to it, either elicitively or imperatively: but only indirectly, and insofar as it is in the power of the will itself to use that habit by acting or not acting. For if the habit were a cause wholly necessitated and naturally determined of itself to act, hence it would incline of itself the faculty in which it resides to operate at the very moment all things required for operation are posited, nor could the will restrain the natural activity of that habit except by taking from it something necessary for operation, e.g., either ceasing to propose to it the object about which it is to tend and diverting thought elsewhere, or determining itself to non-action. For just as, since the visual power is an agent wholly necessary of itself, the will cannot directly impede its action, but only indirectly, namely either by closing the eyes or turning them to another object, so, since habits, whether acquired or infused, do not necessitate the power to act, but leave it to its natural liberty, if it is free; hence it follows that the habit is indirectly subject to the will in operating, and thus it is in the power of the will whether the habit operate or not operate, and produce an act or not produce it.

You will seek 2. Whether supernatural habits confer upon the faculty not only virtue but also activity? — I answer, that it seems more probable that supernatural habits confer only the faculty of acting and activity, but not facility. This indeed is proved first by experience: for a baptized child, although he has the habit of faith, does not for that reason experience greater facility for believing when he becomes an adult than if he had not been baptized: indeed an adult heretic who receives himself to the Catholic faith, although he receives the habit of faith in his justification, afterwards experiences no less inclination and propensity toward heresy; and consequently the infused habit of faith does not remove the contrary facility which had been induced by the habit of heresy: therefore it confers no facility, but only activity and virtue for eliciting the act of faith. Next, if infused habits conferred facility, it would follow that those who have such habits more intense ought also, other things being equal, to experience greater facility in operating than those who have them less intense; but this openly conflicts with experience: both because those who live lukewarmly for a long time without mortal sin, and frequently frequent the sacraments, augment within themselves sanctifying grace and the infused habits through their reception and good works, though elicited remissly, and yet after long exercise do not feel greater facility in the exercise of the virtues than at the beginning: therefore it is a sign that those habits confer no facility. Finally, if such habits conferred facility in eliciting virtuous acts, they would do so either per se and immediately by inclining the power to elicit such acts, as acquired habits confer facility by inclining the power so that it exercise its acts more promptly and readily; or indirectly and mediately, namely by bringing it about that the goodness of the object, insofar as fitting, be apprehended and sought more efficaciously: just as efficacious speech often stimulates and inclines the minds of hearers to performing some work: but neither can be said. Not indeed the first, because otherwise we would be able to sense such inclination in ourselves, and thus detect that we have infused habits, especially when we know from elsewhere that we do not have compared and acquired habits; yet experience shows this to be false. Nor the second, for it is known from experience itself that habits of the will never excite in us such apprehension unless they first incline the will per se and immediately toward love of the object, and thereby bring it about that the object pleases, and consequently that the intellect apprehend it as desirable, and finally that the affection also blaze forth more into its love and pursuit: therefore it does not appear how such habits could confer facility.

You will seek ⟦denote?⟧: Whether the habit of faith is single and simple, or composed from the aggregation of several habits corresponding to several articles, just as we said that every total science is not one simple quality, but an ordered collection of distinct particular sciences inclining toward assent to diverse conclusions? — I answer, that the common opinion of Theologians is that the habit of faith is single: for Saint Thomas teaches this, question I, article 6, and the Subtle Doctor, distinction 23, n. 6, where he says:

It can be held that there is one faith of all things credible, because it does not regard credible things under their proper reasons, but as revealed by God, and it believes all things revealed by Him as true by the same habit by which it believes the Revealer to be truthful. For if I have a habit by which I believe you to be truthful, by the same habit I believe these things which you assert to be true, however much they may be of diverse reasons; because I assent to them only accidentally, namely by this, that I assent to your truthfulness, and thus I assent to them as asserted by you. So here, for I assent to things credible revealed by God because I assent to the truthfulness of God; and thus faith regards all things credible as revealed by God, not under their proper reasons; and therefore one faith could be about all things credible, even if geometrical and physical things, however diverse and of another order, were introduced here as things credible: for in all of them there would be one reason for believing them to be true: because they are revealed by God.

— The answer can be proved from that text to the Ephesians I: One Lord, one faith, one baptism, where the Apostle compares the unity of faith with the unity of God and of baptism: but it is certain that God is one in number, as also baptism: therefore by equal reason it is a sign that faith has the same unity. — It is also proved by reason that there is one habit where there is one formal motive: but there is one formal motive of faith, namely divine truth revealing, which informs all things credible in the same manner, although those revelations are made in diverse ways: therefore faith also is one in species. — Yet I do not judge it to be one simple quality wholly indivisible, as if it could in no way be composed of intensive parts of the same species; for it is certain that faith, like the other supernatural habits, can receive degrees of intensity, whether through frequenting the sacraments, or through meritorious acts, or through the supreme liberality of God; therefore, as we said, the Church prays for her children: Grant us the increase of faith, hope, and charity

THREE things above all come here to be determined: First indeed, whether the infused habit of faith has the true and perfect ratio of virtue: Second, whether that habit is to be called speculative or practical: Third finally, whether it is discursive or merely assentive. That these may be perceived more evidently,

Note 1. Virtue is distributed generically into moral and intellectual. Moral is that which is ordered to a work or act good of itself morally: intellectual truly, that which tends to the true, insofar as it perfects the intellect, as Aristotle himself hands down in 6 Ethics., chapters 1, 2, etc. Moreover, intellectual virtue can be regarded in two ways; for one is simply intellectual, and is per se ordered only to the perfection of the intellect itself, and consists solely in the cognition and apprehension of truth; but another is partly intellectual and partly moral; intellectual indeed, insofar as it tends to knowing the truth by which the intellect is perfected; moral truly, inasmuch as that cognition and apprehension of truth is ordered to informing the will and directing it in eliciting morally good acts. Again, this moral intellectual virtue can be considered either insofar as it is true virtue, or insofar as it is perfect virtue: for it is one thing that some habit be a virtue, and another that it be a perfect virtue: for the first requires only that it have the essence and definition of virtue; for the second however it is required that it have the mode and perfection of virtue, or that it order man to his ultimate end simpliciter: For, says Arist., lib. I Physic., virtue is the disposition of the perfect to the best: whence elsewhere he teaches virtue to be that which makes its possessor good simpliciter, and renders its work perfect. It is asked therefore whether faith in itself, and insofar as it is distinguished from charity and hope, is true virtue and perfect.

NOTA 2. Besides the infused habit of faith residing in the intellect, by which it is inclined to assenting to truths proposed although not evident, another is commonly admitted in the will, namely by which the will is inclined to commanding the intellect that it give assent to the proposition revealed, however obscure and non-evident; which habit indeed certain men wish to be a special virtue of obedience, as Medina teaches, lib. ⟦illegible: 1?⟧ De recta in Deum fide, chapter 2. Since, he says, no one can believe unless he captivates the intellect into the service of faith, as the Apostle teaches in chapter 6 of Acts, and 2 ad Corinthians chapter 10; yet no one can captivate the intellect except by subjecting it to the command of the will, which is certainly rendered through the obediential virtue. Some together with Lessius, Tract. De praedestinatione Angelorum et hominum, disp. 1. sect. ⟦b?⟧ assertion 2, judge it to be a habit of religion. Others truly together with Valentia, Tract. De fide, qu. 1. punct. ⟦t?⟧ dub. 1, contend it to be a habit of studiousness, inasmuch as its office is to apply the intellect, not only to eliciting its own act, but also to eliciting it thus or otherwise about this or that object. There are also those who judge the habit residing in the will, by which it inclines to moving the intellect that it assent to a non-evident proposition, to be the very habit of faith residing in the will; not that one and the same habit physically inheres in the intellect and the will at once, but that that habit is indeed double physically, but uniting morally, because they are ordered to the same act, namely to giving assent to the proposition revealed. Thus Alensis seems to teach, 3 part. q. 78. memb. 3. But none of these opinions is proved to me. Not indeed the first, because obedience per se has only the precept of a superior for its motive; but the honesty of believing is not the precept of a superior, although it be the matter upon which a precept can fall: whence it must first be honest before it be precepted: and consequently that integrity regards the habit of another virtue than obedience. Nor the second, because studiousness is ordered to regulating the appetite for knowing, and to blunting the vices opposed to it, namely curiosity and sloth, or excess and negligence: but willing to believe is not ordered to that, both because it presupposes science and knowledge of that which is to be believed, and because a studious man after he knows what is to be believed can not will to believe it, and consequently studiousness does not move toward that assent. Not finally the fourth, both because the habit of faith is properly intellectual, and consequently regards only the intellect, and because willing to believe, and believing de facto, pertain to diverse faculties, and consequently also pertain to diverse habits; for if the same habit sufficed for the diverse acts of diverse powers, it would follow that one habit would suffice for the diverse acts of the will and the intellect, which is altogether false. — I judge therefore, more probably, that the habit by which the will is inclined to commanding the intellect that it assent to the proposition revealed is a certain special habit, which can be called the habit of pious affection. Thus teach Suarez in 3. part. qu. 7. and dist. 3. De Fide, qu. 2. and many others more Recent, even among our own, especially Castillo d. 6. qu. 8. n. 19. for habits, like powers, ought to be specified by order to special objects: but the honesty found in the will of believing is specially distinct from the objects of other virtues, as we said just now, and consequently regards a special virtue, which can rightly be called the pious motion of the will, inasmuch as through that habit the will is piously moved to commanding the intellect that it assent to the proposition revealed. The difficulty therefore is, whether the habit of faith residing in the intellect, and insofar as it is distinguished from this habit of pious motion, is true virtue and perfect.

NOTANDUM 3. From Aristotle, lib. 3. De Anima, discourse is twofold: one indeed objective, and another formal. Objective is every that object, or those objects, which have such connexion and dependence among themselves that by their nature they demand terminating the acts of the intellect, which concur to formal discourse. Formal truly discourse is argumentation, which is an oration, in which a less known proposition is inferred from a more known one, whether meanwhile that proposition be known by natural light, or be evident, or only certain. Hence it is necessarily required that in discourse several cognitions intervene, and that the last be caused from the prior ones, either in the genus of efficient cause, as Saint Thomas teaches, 1. part. qu. 11. art. 7. or in the genus of material cause or dispositive and having itself after the manner of an antecedent condition, as Durandus wills in 2. disp. 24. qu. 2. Moreover it must be adverted to that the sense of faith can be thought to rely on discourse in two ways: first indeed, so that from premises containing divine testimony the assent to the truth testified would be deduced, e.g. whatever God says is true: but He says Himself to be trine in persons, and one in essence: therefore it is true; second, so that from premises believed the assent to another truth be elicited, v.gr. every man is risible: but Christ is man: therefore He is risible. Hence it is controverted among Theologians, whether faith relies on discourse from a proposition revealed, as much toward a revealed as toward a non-revealed one.

These things thus prenoted, three things above all remain to be determined: First, whether faith is true and perfect virtue: Second, whether it is discursive: Third, whether it is speculative or practical.

First Conclusion. — INTELLECTUAL FAITH SEPARATELY FROM HOPE AND CHARITY IS INDEED TRUE VIRTUE, BUT NOT SIMPLICITER PERFECT. Thus commonly all Theologians with the Doctor in 3. dist. 36. n. 30, where he supposes the common doctrine, Faith, Hope, and Charity to be Theological virtues.

It is proved also by reason: Of the ratio of virtue is, first, that it perfect a power in order to some good and honest act: second, that that act be in some way arduous and difficult: third, that of itself it signify order to the ultimate end, and be by its nature apt to be referred to it: but these three are found in the habit and act of faith, even separately from charity: first namque this inclines and determines the intellective power to right operation, for to believe the Revealer is a notable good: likewise it perfects the intellective power, since it instils into it knowledge far more excellent than any natural science and cognition whatsoever. Second, it inclines to the arduous and difficult: since indeed it is difficult to assent to non-evident truths, and often against, or at least beyond, the common judgment of reason. Finally, of its nature it is ordered to the ultimate end, namely God: for it uncovers and declares the mysteries so that the will be kindled more easily to divine love.

The Doctor teaches the second part at n. 31 where he says:

if it is asked whether Faith and Hope without Charity would be virtues: It can be said, as was said before of the moral virtues, that in their species they can be perfect, namely insofar as they are principles of their own acts respecting their own objects; but that ultimate perfection, which they have in attaining the end to which they are ordered by charity, they cannot have without it. And this perfection indeed, both in morals and in these, although it is commonly said to consist in attaining the end through some elicited operation, or through some order of these, or their acts, to the end, can nevertheless be said principally to consist in this, that one be accepted by God, ordered to beatitude; for thus no virtue, nor its act, is accepted without charity, which alone divides between the children of the kingdom and of perdition.

You will say. Virtue is that which places the power in the ultimate degree of perfection due to its act: but faith, since it is obscure, does not communicate to the intellect the ultimate degree of perfection due to its act; for it communicates to it neither clarity nor evidence: therefore it is only a virtue improperly and broadly taken, namely insofar as it signifies a laudable habit inclining to good. — I distinguish the major: so it constitutes it either in genus or in species, I concede: in species only, I deny. True indeed it is that every virtue ought to constitute the power in its best, if best be taken in genus and universally: for every virtue of the will disposes it to honesty, which is the best of the will; and every virtue of the intellect disposes it to the cognition of truth, which is the best of the intellect. But if the speech is about the best in species, it is false: for not every virtue of the will brings to it the supreme degree of honesty; for this competes to charity alone: yet other virtues also are in the will. Nor does every virtue of the intellect bring to it the supreme degree of evidence: for physical science is not in that degree of evidence in which Mathematics is. Therefore to the ratio of virtue it suffices that it infallibly attain the good of its power, which is gathered from Aristotle 6. Ethic., chapters 2 and 3, who demanded no other condition. But this most of all competes to faith; for although it be exceeded by science in evidence, nevertheless it is the more excellent science, both in supernaturalness and in certitude and infallibility; on account of which with better right it merits the appellation of virtue.

You will say 2. Faith is not numbered by Aristotle among the virtues of the intellect: therefore it is a sign that he did not acknowledge it as a virtue of the intellect. — I deny the consequence: for it is not wonderful that he did not reckon faith among intellectual virtues; since he himself did not acknowledge divine supernatural faith with the excellence of infallibility which Theologians acknowledge in it. Human faith however he rightly did not number among virtues, since it lies open to error, into which, as far as it is of itself, it can lead the intellect, which chiefly stands against the definition of virtue, as is clear.

Second Conclusion. — CHRISTIAN FAITH IS NOT DISCURSIVE, BUT ASSENTS IMMEDIATELY TO THINGS REVEALED, INASMUCH AS THEY ARE REVEALED. This is the opinion of the Subtle Doctor in 3. dist. 24. n. 14, and he proves it by the authority of Saint Augustine, lib. 18. De Civit., chapter 11. where speaking of those things contained in Sacred Scripture, he says that they are commended to us by divine utterances, although through men, not instilled by contentions of arguments, lest he who knew them, namely as they were handed down in Scripture, should fear to contemn not the genius of man but the eloquence of God: whence the Doctor concludes,

that he who assents to them has a habit, not indeed of science, but a habit whereby he assents immediately to all and each, and not to one on account of another, of those things which are handed down in Scripture; nay more, if some things handed down there were proved from others, he would not assent to them because so proved: but to every saying in the Canon he assents, not because it is proved in the said manner, but solely on account of the authority of God, by reason of which he assents immediately to all things handed down in Scripture, not to one on account of another by syllogistic discourse.

The same Saint Damascene teaches, lib. 1. De Fide, chapter 12. he proves likewise that it is not inquisitive, nor consequently discursive. Hence Saint Ambrose, lib. 1. De Fide, says: Take away hence arguments, where faith is sought, as if to say there must be no ratiocination. Wherefore Tertullian, lib. De praescriptionibus, chapter 7. says: We have no need of curiosity after Christ, nor of inquiry after the Gospel: when we believe, we desire to believe nothing beyond.

It is proved similarly by reason: First namque in every discourse the assent given to the premise or principle is distinguished really from that which is exercised about the conclusion: but the assent of Faith concerning divine revelation is not distinguished really from the assent which is of the thing revealed: therefore that assent itself is not properly discursive. The major is evident, for discourse is an oration in which one thing is inferred from another: but one would not be inferred from another, if by the same act anyone gave assent to principle and conclusion: for then that assent would be simple, not truly illative. The minor also is evident; for the formal object of the assent of faith is the thing revealed, considered indeed not materially and according to its entity, but formally, or reduplicatively as revealed: and consequently when anyone assents to a thing revealed, he also assents to the revelation. — It is confirmed from this, that the habit of faith is distinguished from the theological habit, as all Theologians agree: but it is distinguished from it from no other source than because Theology is formally discursive, supposing divine revelation, or the proposition revealed, as true, that from it it may elicit another: but faith by a single intuition attains immediately divine revelation and the thing revealed. — Next, divine revelation is believed immediately and without discourse as such; therefore also the article revealed by it. The antecedent is evident: for in that argument something can be proved to be truly revealed by God. The consequence is proved by the example of vision; for just as a colored and illuminated thing is seen immediately, because color and light inexisting in the thing itself are seen immediately, color indeed as the material object of sight, light truly as its formal object; whereas the thing revealed by God is only the material object of the act of faith: but divine revelation the formal object: therefore by one and simple act of faith believes the thing revealed and worthy of revelation: and consequently faith is not discursive. — Finally, that assent is properly discursive only when through some antecedent judgment two things are judged to be either the same or conjoined, so that from one conceded the other also seems ought to be conceded; whereas the internal assent of faith does not require that antecedent judgment concerning the connexion of the revelation with the thing revealed: therefore that act is not a discourse, nor consequently is the habit inclining to it discursive. The major is plain from the common doctrine of the Dialecticians, who teach that two judgments are required for argumentation, namely judgment must be made of the goodness of the consequence, and accordingly judgment must also be made of the connexion of the extremes with the middle, and by force of that judgment of such a consequence, assent must be given to the thing enunciated through the conclusion. But the minor is proved: both because when anyone believes God to be trine, e.g., he does not precisely and formally believe the thing to be so on account of the connexion which the extremes of this proposition have among themselves, and with the motive itself or medium, namely divine revelation; nor does he therefore assent from this, that he see such a connexion, and judge of the goodness of that consequence inferred from the antecedent, as is especially evident in idiot and rude men, who although they know not how to judge of the goodness of a consequence from the antecedent, nevertheless elicit preeminent acts of faith, and sometimes far more excellent than those who are most expert Theologians. — It is confirmed, if that judgment were required for faith, it would follow that whoever apprehended better that connexion of the extremes, namely of the truth to be believed and of divine revelation, and penetrated more acutely the goodness of that consequence from the antecedent, would elicit thereby more perfect acts of divine faith, just as whoever penetrates better the connexion of some scientific truth with the scientific medium has a more perfect act of science: but experience shows this to be false: therefore, &c.

You will say 1. Every argument comes about with discourse: but from the Apostle to the Hebrews 11. Faith is the argument of things that appear not: therefore it is discursive.

I distinguish the major: argument properly so called, insofar as it signifies the inference of one thing from another, comes about with discourse, I concede: argument improperly so called, and insofar as it signifies only the certitude or manifestation and conviction of those things which are comprehended neither by sense nor by reason, comes about with discourse, I deny. But in this latter manner the Apostle calls faith an argument, so that just as by discursive argument we arrive at the cognition of a thing inferred from another, and by the very force of the argument we are convinced to assent with certitude to the truth of it, so also through divine faith we have cognition of the things revealed by God, no less certain than that cognition is which is acquired through argumentations and most certain demonstrations.

You will say 2. In the same manner, proportion being preserved, one must philosophize about the assent of divine faith and about the assent of human faith: but the latter is elicited through discourse: therefore also the former. — I deny the major as regards the present undertaking, and the reason of disparity is that human faith is not borne toward human authority itself as immediate and per se certain, but as certain and known through something else, namely through experience of the probity of life and perfect knowledge of the speaker; by which human authority ought above all to stand firm, so that it move toward assent: whence the intellect can infer from the cognition of such principles a conclusion containing assent: but divine faith is borne immediately toward the very authority or truth of God; and thus the intellect, leaning upon that alone as formal motive, can be determined by the will so that without any discourse it tend toward whatever material object of divine faith, just as on account of the certitude of the first principles it tends immediately toward assent to such principles.

You will say 3. If it were not necessary for the assent of faith to be made with a discourse, one proposition of faith ought not to be inferred from another: yet this is done frequently; for in 1. Corinth. 15. the Apostle reasons thus: If the dead rise not: then Christ is not risen: but Christ is risen: therefore the dead shall rise. Likewise S. John, chapter 4. of his First Epistle, runs thus: Let us love one another, because he first loved us: therefore faith is discursive.

I distinguish the minor: such an inference ought not to be made with respect to the inferrer himself, as if he needed such a discourse, so that by the assent given to one proposition he were moved to assent to another proposition deduced from it, I concede: with respect to those who would not know that the deduced proposition had been revealed unless such an inference were made, I deny the minor. But to its proof the Doctor answers at n. 15. that those texts of Scripture are not true argumentations:

Because an argument makes faith about some matter which was otherwise doubtful: therefore in an argument properly so called the conclusion is believed and consented to on account of the argument and its evidence. But if Paul had said this, the dead shall rise, I would have believed him then just as now: nor is that conclusion of greater formality than if he had simply narrated it: likewise just as I believe the conclusion or consequent, so also the antecedent, and conversely: for as I believe that the dead shall rise, so I believe Christ rose again, because we have no certainty of the resurrection of Christ except from the testimony of others, as is clear from the Apostle, where above, who says: if Christ be not risen, we are found false > witnesses, and therefore all the certainty which is had concerning the resurrection of Christ and of the dead is nothing other than the certainty of faith, and not beyond. Likewise what John said, Let us love one another, etc., he said to move our souls to the love of Christ. That however Christ loved us with that love of which he speaks, this has been believed by us, and thus it holds certainty concerning the conclusion, yet not greater than concerning the principle; and therefore since the principle is not known from the evidence of the thing, it cannot have science of the conclusion. But if anyone has a habit beyond faith, that man assents to all and each of the things said in the Canon, and not to any one on account of another; because although one thing might follow from another, he nevertheless has no greater certainty about that which follows than about that from which it follows.

These words of the Doctor. By which he clearly signifies that all propositions which are elicited from others in Scripture, whether one be of faith or both, are by no means to be judged of faith as thus deduced, because the assent given to them so does not rest upon immediate revelation or testimony of God.

You will say 4. It happens often that from propositions believed through faith others are inferred which likewise pertain to faith: thus from this proposition of faith believed, Christ is truly God and man, the Fathers of the Council of Constantinople rightly gathered that in him there is a twofold will, namely divine and human, in this syllogism: where there is a twofold intellectual nature, there is a twofold will: but in Christ there are two intellectual natures, divine and human: therefore also a twofold will; whereby indeed that last proposition is of faith, and elicited from that prior one, which is equally of faith, namely, in Christ there are two intellectual natures. — I answer, those inferences are not made through the habit of faith, but by Theology, which draws forth those conclusions from revealed principles; whence the truths expressed in those deduced propositions are not of faith, but are Theological conclusions, insofar as they are considered as inferred through a discourse, although the same are of faith, inasmuch as they fall under immediate divine revelation.

You will say finally: Whenever any assent regards two things, such that it attains one only through mediation of the other, by which it is caused, so often is it a legitimate and true discourse: but the interior assent of divine faith regards first and per se the divine revelation, and through it the very thing revealed, to which therefore it faithfully assents, because it offers assent to the divine revelation: therefore the interior assent of divine faith is discursive. — I distinguish the major: if it attains one thing through another by way of inducing knowledge of the other, I concede: if by way of formal object affecting and determining the material object, I deny. For an assent can be understood to regard two things in such a way that it attains one through the other in two ways: first indeed, if it is occupied about one as about the formal, and through it attains the material object insofar as it is informed by such a formal object; secondly, if it attains one as primarily known, in order that through it knowledge of the second be deduced. Now the first manner by no means imports the formal reason of a discourse, otherwise the operations of the senses, e.g. the vision by which the eye terminates in the colored as luminous, would be discursive, because it perceives color only through the mediation of light. The second manner indeed is discursive; but the assent of our divine faith attains the revealed thing only as material object, and revelation indeed as formal object, and thus it is by no reason to be called discursive.

Third Conclusion. — DIVINE FAITH IS TO BE CALLED ABSOLUTELY PRACTICAL, NOT HOWEVER SPECULATIVE. This is the Doctor's, question 1. of the Prologue, num. 31. where he resolves therefore that Theology is practical, because it rests upon divine faith, which is practical. And num. 41. answering the arguments he says:

To the first I answer, that faith is not a speculative habit; nor is believing a speculative act; nor is the vision following believing a speculative vision, but practical: for the nature of that vision is to be conformed to fruition, and to be had prior in the created intellect, so that fruition may be elicited conformably to it.

By these words the Doctor signifies that faith is absolutely practical, and that there is no force in the argument of those who contended that therefore faith is speculative, because the beatific vision succeeded to it, which is speculative: for the Doctor denies that the beatific vision is speculative, and contends that it is truly practical, because therefore the beatific vision precedes in the intellect, that fruition may follow in the will. Now this Conclusion, sufficiently proved, remains from art. 1. question 1. of the Proemial Disputation concerning Theology in common; for it rests upon the same reasons by which we proved there that Theology is practical, and we solved all the difficulties and arguments by which the contrary opinion is usually attacked by Thomists holding otherwise. Therefore, lest we retrace courses already worn, we have refrained from repeating them.

NOTE 1. The present question involves various and manifold difficulties, which several Theologians set forth and explain at greater length; but we, striving after brevity and clarity, will reduce them all chiefly to three heads, investigating and resolving: First, whether the habit of faith existed in wayfarers who were innocent: second, whether it perseveres in all wayfarers who are defiled by mortal sin: third, whether it exists in those who are at the term of beatitude or of damnation. Now it is certain that the Angels were for some time wayfarers, and were not established in the state of beatitude from the beginning of their creation, as we taught in the Treatise on the Angels, disputation 8; which Saint Augustine also clearly teaches in his commentary on Genesis, book 4, chapter 3, where he says:

The angelic nature was first created uniform, and called heaven, according to that text: In the beginning God created heaven, etc.; and second it was formed, and called light, when it was turned to the Creator, and adhering to Him was perfected by direction, according to that text: And God said: Be light made, and light was made.

In that state, moreover, the Angels were provided with the means necessary for meriting beatitude: but whether they also had infused faith is disputed among Theologians: for very many, with Alvarez 3. part. question 68. member 8. article 2., contend that in the Angels as wayfarers there was not faith properly so called, but that they had some more excellent scientific knowledge, namely either a supernatural knowledge of infused science, or evidence in the attesting witness, which, properly speaking, is not faith but science; while the other Theologians defend the affirmative part, with whom we also subscribed ourselves, in volume 1, Treatise 1, disputation 3, article 2, question 3, conclusion ⟦illegible: n.⟧ whence here only the first Parents must be treated of.

NOTE 2. That the Blessed have every perfection whatsoever which most befits their state of beatitude: since beatitude is a state perfect by the aggregation of all goods: and therefore it is certain that they are endowed and illumined with every virtue whatever, which has no repugnance nor incompossibility with that state of beatitude. But because three things above all fill out and perfect that lot of the Blessed, namely the intuitive vision of God, eternal and intimate fruition, and ineffable delight and divine pleasure, which from the vision of God by the intellect, and the fruition of Him by the will, overflows into the very substance of the soul and all its faculties; hence those things are said to be repugnant to that beatific state which are opposed either to that perspicuous vision of God, or to intimate fruition, or to delight; but whether faith directly or indirectly conflicts with any one of these three, by reason of which it could not subsist together with the beatific state, must be determined in the present place.

NOTE 3. Sinful wayfarers can be considered chiefly in a twofold state; for they are either heretics, or only defiled by mortal sin. I call a heretic one who, although initiated into Christian Doctrine and by the sacrament of baptism enrolled among Christians and the Faithful, nevertheless professes and maintains some error pertinaciously against the object and rules of faith, and the definition of the Church. Hence three things chiefly concur to make heresy: First, that such an error be pertinacious; for he who, merely because divine revelation, or the definition of the Church concerning some proposition commonly received and believed by all other faithful, has not been ascertained by him, should waver in doubt, and, his mind not being fixed, should incline to neither assenting part, affirming or denying, would not be judged a heretic. Second, that he who pertinaciously maintains it shall have been initiated not only by the sacrament of baptism, but also in that he professes the Christian faith as to the other articles; for by this a heretic is distinguished from an infidel; inasmuch as an infidel is he who was neither initiated by baptism nor professes the Christian faith in any way. Third and lastly, it is necessary, in order that anyone be judged a heretic, that he profess the faith according to some part at least of the New Testament, at least by human faith. For if he abjures it on every side, whether baptized or not, he is not to be called a heretic, but either a Jew or a Pagan, although by reason of the baptism received he be subject to the Church, and consequently liable to the same punishments as heretics. It is asked, therefore, whether sinners defiled by mortal sin, as well as those infected with heresy alone, preserve infused faith.

Four things, therefore, remain to be resolved in this Question: First, whether the first Parents had faith in the state of innocence, and lost it by sinning. Second, whether the souls of the faithful departing from this life, whether received into heaven or languishing in purgatory, preserve the habit of faith. Third, whether the damned, both men and demons, have infused faith. Fourth, whether that infused habit of faith perseveres in heretics.

First Conclusion. — IT IS PROBABLE THAT THE FIRST PARENTS IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE HAD INFUSED FAITH, AND LOST IT BY THEIR SIN. This is the more common opinion among Theologians, especially as to the first part, which indeed ⟦illegible: …⟧. Proof: first, because the first Parents in the state of innocence were acceptable and pleasing to God, as all confess: but by the Apostle, Hebrews 11.: Without faith it is impossible to please God. For he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and is a rewarder to them that seek him. Therefore, etc. Second, the same truth is confirmed by the authority of the supreme Pontiffs, who condemned the proposition of Baius: Absurd is the opinion of those who say that man was raised from the beginning by a supernatural and gratuitous gift, above the condition of nature, so that he might worship God supernaturally by Faith, Hope, and Charity: therefore the proposition contrary to this condemned one is approved. Third and lastly, in that state the first Parents were able to merit: but nothing is more congruent for merit than knowledge: therefore it must be granted that the first Parents had it.

You will say: Faith is imperfect knowledge: but in the state of innocence nothing was imperfect: therefore neither faith. — I distinguish the major: it is imperfect knowledge by order to intuitive and beatific knowledge, I concede: by order to all other knowledges which a wayfarer can have of the ordinary way, I deny. The minor likewise I distinguish: the state of innocence admitted nothing imperfect that pertained to the state of the wayfarer, I concede: that would be called imperfect by order to the beatific state, I deny.

The second part is also proved, and the foregoing is confirmed: first indeed by the authority of the ancient Theologians and holy Fathers, for above all Tertullian, book 1. Against Marcion, chapter 12., says:

Who will doubt that that very fault of Adam is to be pronounced heresy, because he admitted it by the choice of his own rather than of the divine sentence; except that Adam never said to his Potter: you did not define me prudently: he confessed his seduction, he did not conceal her who seduced: he was a heretic exceedingly rude, etc.

The same is taught by Saint Ambrose, Epistle 33., which is to Marcellina his sister, where he introduces God speaking thus to Adam: You acknowledge yourself naked, because you have lost the good garments of faith.

But this truth Saint Prosper defends most openly in many places, especially in the response to the excerpts of the Genoese, doubt 3., where, speaking of Adam, and of human nature, which had fallen through his sin, he says:

What, then, is the reason that he wills faith alone to be commanded to that same nature, which unless it had first lost it, would lack none of the other goods? For Adam, in believing the devil, did not believe God. And shortly after: How could faith, once lost in Adam, be found in any of his sons, unless the same Spirit, who works all things in all, were to infuse it?

And a little below he concludes thus: All men therefore lost what Adam lost: but he first lost faith, which we all, because we were able to lose it first, ought to receive first. By these words he clearly signifies that Adam truly lost faith. He teaches the same in book against the Collator, chapter 19. This also S. Fulgentius teaches in the book On the Incarnation and Grace of Christ, saying: The first man, deceived by diabolical persuasion, fell from humility, because he lost faith: but in losing faith he lost divine protection.

You will say 1. If Adam and Eve had lost infused faith, they would truly have been heretics: but it is not so; for he is not to be judged an infidel and heretic who does not oppose with obstinate mind the truth divinely revealed to him by sinning: but neither Adam nor Eve, by sinning, pertinaciously opposed the truth divinely revealed to them: therefore, &c. The major is evident: for heresy is an error of faith contrary together with obstinacy. Whence S. Augustine, Epistle 162, says: Those who defend such a perverse opinion with no obstinate spirit, and are ready to be corrected, and seek the truth with all diligence, are not to be reckoned among heretics. And in book 1, On Baptism against the Donatists, c. 16, assigning the difference between two men believing the same error, but with this distinction, that one is within the Church and the other outside the Church, and baptized by heretics, he speaks thus: Let me set up two persons in this manner, that is, one of these holding concerning Christ what Photinus altogether opined, and being baptized in his heresy outside the communion of the Catholic Church; but the other holding this same thing, yet being baptized in the Catholic Church, thinking it itself to be the Catholic faith: the latter I say is not yet a heretic, unless he should prefer to resist the doctrine of the Catholic faith manifested to him. But neither Adam nor Eve were obstinate in sin, nor rebels against the divine reproach; indeed each excused his own sin, the one accusing his wife his companion, the other accusing the serpent as the instigator of the crime committed: therefore, &c. — I distinguish the major: he who does not oppose truth with obstinacy, when the truth which he opposes is not evident to him, nor is he certain that it was revealed by God, is not to be reckoned a heretic, I concede: otherwise, I deny. But to the first Parents of mankind it was most evidently clear that God had threatened them with death if they should eat of the fruit of the forbidden tree: therefore, giving faith to the devil who said: You shall not die the death, &c., it follows that they denied it to him who had said: Of the tree of knowledge of good and evil thou shalt not eat: for in what day soever thou shalt eat of it, thou shalt die the death.

You will urge: Even if the first Parents had known that God had forbidden the use of that forbidden fruit under threat of death, it was not therefore clear to them whether that divine sentence would be merely comminatory, or whether it would truly have to be carried into execution. For since they had attained supreme dominion over all creatures, they could without difficulty suspect that God did not wish to bind their liberty to the fruit of one little tree; and consequently it is clear either that they did not attend sufficiently to the divine words, or that their sense and understanding in no way gave assent. It is confirmed from this, that the devil, masked in the image of the serpent, accomplished nothing else by tempting than with lying words simulating himself a friend of God and vindicator of the divine glory, that the divine words were to be understood not in that sense which they supposed, but in one far different: Why hath he commanded, &c.; as if he said: do not think that this was prohibited in words: for why would God have commanded you to abstain your hand from the fruit of some tree, when all are good and healthful? Thus almost interprets S. Epiphanius concerning the heresy of the Caians, question 3, and it is deduced from the Apostle, 2. ad Cor. 11, where he compares their seduction through the Pseudo-Apostles to the seduction of Eve through the serpent, saying: I fear lest as the serpent seduced Eve by his subtilty, so your minds should be corrupted. For just as the Pseudo-Apostles do not openly calumniate God, nor pronounce that he has spoken falsely: for if they said this, they would deservedly have no hearer, but would be expelled by all; but transforming themselves into Apostles, they simulate zeal for the honor of God and the salvation of souls, affirming that this or that divine oracle is to be understood not as others understand it. For neither do the Calvinists say that Christ lied when he said: This is my Body: but they affirm that those words are not rightly received by Catholics according as they sound, since they are to be interpreted by trope. Therefore it is to be inferred that the first parents fell rather through error and doubt, than through infidelity and heresy. — I deny the consequence. For they could not twist the words of the divine prohibition into another sense without open loss of faith, since it had been sufficiently intimated to them, both by the light of natural reason and of the indited sciences, and by the light of faith, that by this precept their obedience was to be proven; nor were they urged by any passion, nor labored under any error or ignorance, and the divine words had been intimated without any ambiguity; there is no doubt that only hesitating and failing in faith could they suspect something other than our signification of the words, nor believe the tempter intimating something else. For what else does the mind of heretics accomplish than to interpret the divine words signifying Christian truths beyond their native sense and that of the Church? Nor did the Apostle will anything else: for just as the Corinthians, giving faith to the Pseudo-Apostles, had fallen from the faith of Christ; so Eve, thinking with the devil against the divine commandment, fell away from the divine faith together with her husband.

You will say 2. Whoever sins only, either from rash presumption, or from inordinate love of creatures, does not fall from faith; but either from hope, or from charity, or from both at once: but Adam sinned thus; first indeed from rash presumption of pursuing pardon: for as S. Augustine says, book 4, Of the City of God, chapter 11, Adam, since he was inexperienced in the divine severity, could be deceived in this, that he believed what was committed to be venial. Chapter 13. And he thought he transgressed the precept venially if he did not abandon the companion of his life even in the fellowship of sinning. Secondly from inordinate love of his spouse; for, as the same S. Augustine speaks, book 11, On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 12, or whoever else may be the author of that book, Adam did not wish to sadden Eve, whom he believed able to pine away without his solace if he were alienated from her in mind, and that discord wholly perish; not indeed from concupiscence of the flesh's embrace, since he had not yet felt in the resisting law of his members a law against the law of his mind, but from a certain friendly benevolence, whereby it happens that God is offended lest man become an enemy from a friend. — I distinguish: whoever sins from presumption or from inordinate love having no antecedent or consequent infidelity, I concede: otherwise, I deny. But if anyone's motion were presumption or inordinate love in Adam, there is no doubt he had antecedent or consequent infidelity: for since he was driven by no enticement to sin of the flesh and passion, how could it have come about that he should slip into it, if he had believed the loss of death of body and soul, of all heavenly charisms, and of supreme dominion over all creatures to be instantly incurred, as God had threatened? I confess that men for the most part conquered by concupiscence, or chained by an ineluctable habit of sinning, are not summoned even to threatened and expected punishments: but nothing of the sort may be suspected in Adam; especially since, as the praised Augustine says, no law of members opposed the law of the mind in him; and consequently it is necessary that the divine faith first extinguished, either by not believing the words of God, or by twisting them into another sense, before he lapsed into presumption or inordinate affection.

Second Conclusion. — It is more probable that the blessed do not have faith, but otherwise concerning the souls mourning in purgatory. This is the more common opinion among Theologians regarding each part; although Alensis contradicts it, 3. par. qu. 61. memb. 1, and Durandus in 3. d. 32. q. 3, whom the Master of the Sentences seems to favor in 3. dist. 23.

The first part the Doctor proves, dist. 31. nu. 2, where he clearly signifies that the habit of faith or hope does not remain in the Blessed:

No habit, he says, is to be posited as remaining there in vain: but a habit would be there in vain whose inclination would then be impossible: but faith from its reason inclines only into latent truth, according to the gloss upon that Hebrews 11. Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not: and hope inclines only into an absent commodious good, according to Romans 8. Hope that is seen, is not hope, taking hope for the thing hoped for, namely for the object: but these inclinations cannot be had in the fatherland, where truth will be manifest, and the good possessed: therefore those habits will not remain, because they would be superfluous.

By these words the Doctor not only affirms that the habit of faith and hope does not remain in the Blessed, but also proves it by this argument: the most perfect state, such as is the beatific, suffers nothing idle and useless: but the habits of faith and of hope in that state would be idle; since in it they could never elicit their act, for the act of faith involves the imperfection of obscurity; but the act of hope connotes the absence of the object; but obscure cognition and actual possession of the object cannot subsist with the clear and intuitive vision of the same object, and its actual possession: therefore in the state of beatitude the habits of faith and hope would be in vain.

The same truth is confirmed from the Apostle, 1. ad Cor. 13, where he teaches every imperfect cognition is to be banished from the beatific state: for he says: We know in part, and we prophesy in part: but when that which is perfect shall come, that which is in part shall be done away. That is, that which is imperfect, and infuses only incomplete perfection, such as we at least have through faith, which indeed confers on us certain cognition of the divine mysteries, but inevident and obscure: whence that cognition is indeed perfect on the part of certitude, but imperfect on the part of obscurity: whence the same Apostle adds: Now I know in part; but then I shall know even as I am known. And now there remain faith, hope, and charity. Where by that adversative but, he seems to intimate the diversity of the way, in which these three remain, from the state of the fatherland, where charity alone remains, of which he had premised; charity never falls away, according to which sense Jerome received the words of S. Paul there, saying: Charity never falleth away, that is, it alone remains in the future. Chrysostom, Homily 31 on that place, saying charity is greater, because faith and hope pass away, but charity endures always. August. Sermon 53, De Tempore. Anselm upon that place of Paul, and others.

You will object 1. S. Irenaeus, book 4, chapter 25, where he teaches the three theological virtues remain in the state of beatitude; for he says: Paul, he says, all things being done away, faith, hope, and love remain. To him subscribes Tertullian, book On Patience, near the end, saying: Deservedly charity shall never fall away, the rest shall be done away, consummated, exhausted: tongue, knowledge, prophecy: faith, hope, love remain.

I answer. That S. Irenaeus and Tertullian wish not that faith and hope remain in the Blessed according to their specific formal reasons, namely the inevident cognition of the revealed object, and the firm tending into the absent object; but only according to some common reason of attaining the first truth and highest good; inasmuch namely that through the beatific vision succeeding faith, there is had firm and most certain cognition of God, just as it was had through faith, though in a more imperfect mode: similarly through fruition succeeding hope God is most perfectly possessed as present, who before through hope only was possessed as absent.

You will object 2. If the habits of faith and hope did not remain in the Blessed, chiefly because they would be useless in them: but it is not so: therefore, etc. The major is clear from what was just said. But the minor is proved; for since objects of a threefold kind can underlie the cognition of the Blessed, whereof some pertain per se to beatitude, such as the vision of the divine essence illumined by its attributes, and subsisting in the three divine persons: others are those which pertain to it only concomitantly, such as all the mysteries of the Incarnate Word and of our Redemption: others indeed are wholly outside the state and lot of beatitude, such as may be judged the knowledge of all those things which have been done in the world, or are being done, or are brought about, even unto the consummation of the age; although perhaps faith does not remain in the Blessed as to the objects of the first and second kind, unto which the beatific vision is terminated per se, nevertheless it can remain as to the objects of the third kind; for indeed nothing stands in the way why one of the Blessed cannot, by God specially revealing, know the things which have been done, or are being done, or will be done hereafter, and believe them on account of the divine revelation: for no contradiction can be conceived that God should render His essence manifest to someone by intuitive vision, and yet conceal from him the things that are being done in the world, or are to be done, which He may manifest afterwards, either per se, or through Angels: therefore as to these objects there can be an act of faith; and hence the habit in the Blessed will not be wholly useless.

I answer. Indeed that it is so; yet that assent will not be an act of theological faith, but either angelic or human, if what is revealed be made known through an Angel or another blessed soul; for those acts do not tend to God as to the object included directly or indirectly in those objects unto which they are terminated. In the case certainly he will give assent to the objects proposed to him by God, and that on account of the testimony of God, not obscurely known indeed, but clearly: and hence that assent will not be faith proper and strict, but evident knowledge through a demonstrative medium a posteriori; which evident knowledge does not conflict with the beatific state, at least concerning those objects which are not seen in the Word, nor possessed elsewhere by most perfect immediate cognition.

You will object 3. If the habits of faith and hope did not remain in the fatherland, chiefly because in that state habit and act are incompossible: but it is not so; for if there were some opposition of faith with beatitude, especially either on the side of act, or on the side of habit, or on the side of the act of beatitude with the habit of faith, for a threefold comparison can be made: first indeed, between the act of vision and the act of faith: second, between the habit of faith and the light of glory: third, between the act of vision together with the habit of faith, or between the act of faith with the habit of the light of glory: yet on neither side is it repugnant that faith be able to subsist with the beatific vision: therefore, etc.

I deny the minor: for first it is clear that the act of faith conflicts with the act of vision; both because one and the same object cannot be seen at once clearly and obscurely, as has already been proven several times; and because beatitude, since it is a status bringing the aggregation of all goods, and also the exclusion of all evil, consequently ought to exclude dread of every evil; for he who fears some evil of his own is not blessed on every side: but an obscure assent, such as is the assent of faith, always has annexed a dread of error, and hence infers a power of dreading, which per se is an evil; for to be able to fear evil itself is no slight evil; but if the act of faith could stand together with the act of vision, it would follow that in the same instant the evil of obscurity would stand together with the vision of God, and in consequence in that instant man would not be plainly and on every side blessed. — The habit of faith also conflicts with the habit of the light of glory: because it inclines to opposite acts, namely the unevident and the evident, whence it is necessary that one or other habit be perpetually useless: but such will not be the habit of the light of glory, which by its nature exacts permanence or perpetuity, and the state of beatitude completed in the blessed subject, and in consequence exacts perpetual privation of all obscurity, and of actual faith; and hence it infers the uselessness of the habit of faith, since it can now serve for no act. — Third and lastly, it is repugnant that the habit of faith subsist with the act of the light of glory, because the clear vision of God cannot be given connaturally except to one having the light of glory: therefore since this light of glory exacts of itself the negation of the habit of faith, it equally infers its act. Nor does it matter that Saint Paul perhaps had the beatific vision in his rapture; for I answer that although Saint Paul had truly had the beatific vision, the contrary of which we taught when treating of the beatific vision, still it would not be consequent that the act of the beatific vision could subsist connaturally with the habit of faith: for that conjunction of vision with the habit of faith in Saint Paul would not have been connatural, but against the connatural laws of each. Whence from it one may not infer that that act of vision could subsist connaturally with the habit, as it truly ought to subsist in the Blessed, otherwise a perpetual miracle would be required, that the habit of faith might be preserved together with the actual beatific vision, even as a miracle was needed that the moderate coolness might be preserved in the three children cast into the Babylonian furnace.

The second part is also commonly admitted by Theologians: both because those souls are still in the state of the way, and hence have everything that per se conduces to the sanctity of such a status, such as the theological virtues; and because there is nothing in those souls that conflicts with the habit or act of faith; for although (as de Lugo says) they can know God their Creator evidently from creatures, yet this knowledge is not incompossible with faith concerning the same object, as is clear in the Angels, who in the state of the way knew God more perfectly, and could still have had faith. — Then, many things about God are credible which are not known by natural power from creatures, such as the Trinity, and likewise many other things about creatures are believed through faith which could not be discovered by natural reason, such as the hypostatic union, the future resurrection, the universal judgment, and countless others. — Finally, an obscure revelation, upon which strict faith can be founded, is not repugnant to the state of those souls, since that is not the beatific state excluding all pains and anguish, but rather a darksome state, full of solicitude and anxiety, though with certitude of one's own salvation. And although concerning certain objects perhaps they have revelation evident to themselves, and not obscure, it suffices nevertheless if they do not have so clear a revelation of such a kind concerning all objects that the habit of faith must be retained, which will not there be wholly idle.

Third Conclusion. — Demons and the damned do not have infused faith. This is the more common opinion among Theologians against Durandus, in 3. dist. 23. question 9., where he says that faith remains in the damned; and

It is proved first by the authority of Saint Dionysius, book On the Divine Names, chapter 1., where he says that the damned lack all divine gifts; as also of Saint Augustine, book 9. Of the City of God, chapter 21., saying that the demons know Christ, not, he says, by the light of faith, but by the efficacy of signs.

It is also proved by reason: First, because habitual infused faith is granted for this purpose, both that one may become a member of Christ implanted in His mystical body, which is the Church; and that it may be the root of justification, and the foundation of things hoped for: but the damned, whether men or demons, are neither in act nor in potency members of Christ and of the Church, seeing that they are as branches cut off, withered, and cast into the fire; nor are they capable either of justification, or of the beatitude and salvation to be hoped for: therefore they are equally incapable of faith. — Second, the gifts and aids of grace are not communicated to the damned: but the habit of faith is an excellent gift: therefore it does not remain in the damned. The major is clear from that text Matthew 7., where Christ said: Give not that which is holy to dogs; neither cast ye your pearls before swine. Moreover, the state of the damned is a state of supreme misery: but if they had any supernatural gift, their state would not be one of supreme misery. For a greater misery could befall those who did not have that supernatural gift itself; therefore that state of the damned must be judged not to be illumined by the habit of faith. — Third and lastly, God grants nothing in vain: but that infused habit of faith would be altogether in vain in demons and the damned, since it would concur efficaciously toward no act of faith; for the act of faith cannot be elicited without gratuitous supernatural aid: but this aid is deservedly denied to the damned, for whom there is now no place for grace and mercy. Add that such aid would be given to them in vain: for since supernatural acts are ordered to justification and beatitude, that end ceasing, as it ceases in the damned, all supernatural means ordered to both ought also to cease. Nor does it stand in the way that there remains in the damned the character of Baptism, or of Confirmation, or of Priesthood: since that character is not per se an operative quality, but only an indelible sign of power, or of grace received, which sign assuredly perseveres in them deservedly unto their greater torment and bruising: but the habit of infused faith is a quality per se operative, which where it can no longer elicit its act, it is necessary that it perish.

You will say 1. Saint James chapter 2. teaches that actual faith is in the demons: therefore also habitual. The consequence is evident. But the antecedent is proved, for he says: The devils believe, and tremble: where he certainly speaks of the act of infused faith, otherwise he would not rightly use that example, to prove that faith alone, even infused, does not suffice for salvation, which he surely intends there, as Salvian observes and admonishes most excellently, book 4. On Providence, not far from the beginning, where he weighs the aforesaid oracle of the Apostle thus:

This very fruit of faith the Apostle testifies to be unfruitful without good works, saying: Faith without good works is dead. And again: For as the body without the spirit is dead, so faith without works is dead. He adds also certain harsher things for crushing those who flatter themselves with presumption of Christian faith; but someone will say: You have faith, and I have works. Show me thy faith without works, and I will show thee my faith by my works. Whereby he indeed indicates that the good acts of Christian faith are as it were witnesses; because unless a Christian do good works, he can in no way prove his faith, and by this, that he cannot prove it, that it is, it must be altogether held as if it were not. For since he thought it to be held in no wise by this, he at once demonstrates it himself in what follows, saying to the Christian: Thou believest that there is one God: thou dost well: the devils believe, and tremble. Let us consider what the Apostle willed to say in this place; let us not be angry at the divine testimonies, but acquiesce: and let us not contradict, but profit. Thou believest, says the divine discourse to the Christian, that God is one, thou dost well: the devils also believe, and tremble: did the Apostle err, that he compared the faith of a Christian man to a demon? Not at all: but wishing to show that which was said above, that without good works he ought to usurp nothing to himself by the arrogance of faith. And therefore he says that God is believed by demons, namely that as the demons, while they believe God to be, nevertheless persevere in perversity, so also certain men have as it were a demoniacal credulity, who, while they assert themselves to believe God, nevertheless do not cease from evil work. But he subjoins, to the shame and condemnation of sinful men, that the demons not only believe the name of God, but also fear, and tremble. That is to say: wherefore, he says, dost thou flatter thyself, O man whosoever thou art, about a credulity which without fear and obedience of God is nothing? The demons have something more. For thou hast only one thing, they two: thou hast credulity, thou hast not fear: they have credulity equally, and fear.

— Some answer, first, that the Apostle uses the verb believe in the present for the past; so that the sense is: the demons, when they were wayfarers, also believed, and yet because they had not works they were damned: therefore thou too, Christian, having a sterile faith without works, shalt be no less subject to eternal damnation: for it is most familiar among the Hebrews to write one tense for another, as is clear from that text Luke 7. To whom less is forgiven, he loveth less, that is, he loved less, as the holy Fathers expound, Ambrose,

Chrysostom, etc. Others answer that the Apostle does not equate the faith of demons with the faith of wayfaring man in all respects, but only in this, that both are sterile and useless for salvation as long as they exist without charity and good works. But this solution supposes faith to be in the damned in the manner in which it is in a sinner, and hence that the very habit of faith subsists also in the damned and in demons, which is against the Conclusion. Therefore I judge, with others, that it must be said otherwise and more correctly, that the Apostle there proves only from defect of works that faith is dead, even as by defect of fruits a tree is shown to be dead; and to prove this he brings forward the faith of the demon, which faith (whatever it be, whether acquired or infused) we gather to be dead because it lacks works: equally therefore the faith of the sinful man, which is sterile, will be proven dead. To these add that the demons and the damned can believe by acquired faith, which they procured for themselves through repeated acts of infused faith while they were wayfarers, as will appear from what is to be said below.

⟦Illegible: opening words of the following obiection lost in faded print; text resumes:⟧ …by the sole sin of infidelity it is lost: but there are many damned who nowhere admitted the sin of infidelity, and who died with the habit of faith: therefore they retain the same habit of infused faith.

I answer. That infused faith is destroyed not only by the sin of infidelity opposed to it absolutely speaking, but also from defect of pious affection toward believing as one ought, and on account of the unworthiness of the state. For although in wayfarers the habit of faith is not wont to perish except on account of infidelity, nevertheless it is not wonderful that it perishes in the damned, who elicited no act of infidelity: partly because they no longer have a pious affection toward believing; partly because their state is one of supreme misery, and consequently has no supernatural benefit, such as is the habit of faith; finally because, as we said, they are no longer ordained to justification and beatitude, and consequently faith in them would be useless. Hence it comes about that although the damned know within the same supernatural truths which they knew in the way, yet they do not know them in the same manner, namely by the habit of infused faith, but only by the habit of acquired faith, or perhaps also by a special manifestation of God, whereby God sets before them those mysteries which they had believed in the way, but especially those which regard eternal felicity, which through their own fault they lost, namely that at its sight they may be tormented more bitterly.

You will insist. Nothing hinders that a pious affection toward believing remain in the damned: therefore equally nothing can hinder that the habit of faith remain in them. The consequence is evident from what was said just above. But the antecedent is proved; for since synderesis and inclination to good remain in the damned, it does not conflict that some pious affection be found also in them, as is evident from the rich man feasting, who though buried ⟦in hell⟧ and tortured by flames, wished salvation to his brethren, and besought Abraham to send Lazarus to them, so that he might exhort them to penance.

I deny the antecedent. For although the damned always have synderesis unto more bitter torment, yet since they always act from a perverse intention of the end, and all their acts, however much they may have a good object, are ordinarily evil, it conflicts that any pious affection toward the first truth revealing and expounding the mysteries be in them. Nor did the rich man beseech from a pious affection — nay, altogether perverse — that Lazarus should labour for the conversion of his brethren; for he demanded this lest, namely, he be tortured more harshly on account of their damnation, and the most wicked example and occasion of sinning which he had given them.

Fourth Conclusion. — THE HABIT OF INFUSED FAITH PERSISTS IN A SINNER STRIPPED OF SANCTIFYING GRACE AND CHARITY. This is determined in the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 15, where it is defined that it must be asserted that not only through infidelity, by which faith itself also is lost, but also through any other mortal sin, even if faith be not lost, the grace of justification once received is lost. And Canon 23:

If anyone shall say that grace being lost through sin, faith also is at the same time always lost with it; or that the faith which remains is not true faith, although it be not living; or that he who has faith without charity is not a Christian: let him be anathema.

It is proved: first indeed from sacred Scripture, for the Apostle, 1. ad Cor. 13, clearly supposes faith to be able to exist without charity, and consequently it to subsist in a sinful man; for he says: If I should have all faith… but have not charity, it profiteth me nothing: and S. James demonstrates this openly chapter 2, where he says: Faith without works is dead: there is therefore a living faith and a dead faith; living faith indeed, namely that faith which works through charity, says the Apostle to the Galatians 5; but dead faith, whereby it is sundered from charity; for since the life of the soul consists in grace and charity, that will be called living faith which is formed by charity; but that dead which exists without charity; whence S. Augustine book On the Trinity, chapter 18, says excellently that faith can exist without charity, but not profit. And S. Bernard, Sermon 2, On the Resurrection:

Just as, he says, we discern the life of this body from its motion, so also the life of faith from good works. Wherefore the life indeed of the body is the soul, whereby it moves and senses: but the life of faith is charity, because through it it works, as the Apostle says: faith, which worketh by love: whence, charity growing cold, faith dies, as the body when the soul withdraws. Therefore just as the body through the withdrawal of the soul does not cease to be, so neither does faith altogether perish on account of its separation from charity and grace ⟦illegible: one or more words lost in faded print⟧.

It is proved also by reason: Faith is not destroyed by that which is not opposed to it, neither physically nor morally: but not every sin is opposed to faith, nor destroys its formal reason of object, and presently man existing in mortal sin can believe all things that are proposed as revealed by God: therefore he can in that state have both ⟦illegible: passage lost in faded print; marginal citation legible: inquit Suarez disp. 5. sect. 3. num. 3.⟧ … man can hope, and repent imperfectly through supernatural attrition, and pray to God as supernatural Author, adore him, and serve him, as regards certain precepts that occur to be kept: but these he cannot accomplish without infused faith: therefore man in sin⟦?⟧ can conserve faith. — Finally, faith is judged to perish through sin because it would have necessary connexion with sanctifying grace, such as charity has: but it is not so, for neither is it a property of it, nor ⟦word uncertain in print: “compars”⟧, but only its foundation as of the whole spiritual edifice, which certainly can remain, that edifice destroyed, just as the house demolished, the foundation subsists no less entire. Advert however that faith subsisting in a sinner is called formless and dead, but that which remains in a just man is called living and formed: for charity is as it were the form perfecting faith, not indeed physically, as some wish; because it is false that the habit of charity concurs immediately with the habit of faith toward its assent, since the latter precedes every act of charity: therefore such information of charity is not necessary for this effect: but only morally: and that under a twofold title, first indeed inasmuch as from the fellowship of charity the acts of faith are made meritorious of eternal life, which without charity have no reward. Secondly, because formless faith behaves after the manner of a root, or tree bearing no fruit, in which state it is judged dead, that is, deprived of spiritual life, and all comeliness and beauty, whereby it may become grateful and acceptable to God.

Yet I would not have you think with certain older Theologians that formless and formed faith are distinct habits in entity, whereof one subsists in the sinner, and perishes upon the advent of grace; and conversely here it recedes, grace succeeding, with another habit of formless faith; nor, as others wished, that both those habits remain in the just man, while in the sinner only the habit of formless faith subsists. Which variety of opinions indeed perhaps took its origin from this, that they thought living and dead faith to differ no less than a living man and a dead one, whom they judged to differ not only in number but in species; but now the concordant opinion of Theologians teaches that the same faith in number, which before was formless on account of the lack of grace, becomes formed through its increase: for just as the same body, which had been living, not only remains the same dead, but truly is the same, when it is raised anew and recalled to life, so also the habit of faith, which was alive with charity present, dies through its absence, and again receives life through its advent. Which certainly, says de Lugo disp. 16. sect. 3. n. 5., the parables and similitudes indicate to be true, by which Scripture and the Fathers are wont to signify this. For faith without charity is likened to a lamp without oil, such as the foolish virgins had. Which same lamp, that it might revive, they prepared to adorn with oil added, not another lamp, but the same. So also S. Jerome, tom. 1, on chapter 26 of Isaiah near the beginning, compares good works or charity to a wall. ⟦illegible: one line badly garbled by faded print (“Haem a benurali fit poredtr, tnqiuit, inecat e tuei, et tntemesale”); sense from context: the wall of faith is furnished with an outer rampart⟧ sit munimento, for it does not suffice for faith to have a wall, unless faith itself be confirmed by works. Where you see that the very same faith, which without works does not suffice, must be confirmed by good works: for neither does the wall being posited change the rampart, but the same altogether perseveres. So also says S. Bernard, Sermon 24, on the Canticles: The death of faith, he says, is the separation of charity: dost thou believe in Christ? do the works of Christ, that thy faith may live: let thy love animate thy faith, prove it by acts, it shall not incur ⟦tergiversatione⟧ work, whom faith of heavenly things raises up. The same therefore is faith, which charity withdrawing dies, and returning is vivified and animated. In his own sense also Bede on chapter 2 of James said, that dead faith revives and is animated through works of charity. But it is certain that nothing can revive and rise again unless that very same thing which had fallen and been dead. The reason of this assertion is clear: because the same faith which is formless, since it suffices for supernatural assent concerning things revealed on account of divine authority, suffices upon the advent of charity for believing the same objects, which assent in man already just will be grateful to God, and meritorious de condigno: why then should another habit of faith be added? Add that it is not credible that man sinning there be given him then another new habit of faith, which would certainly be a supernatural gift of God given anew to man without any disposition on his part, nay with indisposition and actual demerit, on account of which he would deserve to be stripped of all gifts, not indeed to receive new ones.

Fifth Conclusion. — THE HABIT OF INFUSED FAITH DOES NOT REMAIN IN HERETICS. This is determined in the Council of Trent in the places praised in the preceding Conclusion, where it says faith is lost through the sin of infidelity. Which is also Proved from sacred Scripture, for Luke 8 it is said there are some who believe for a time, and in time of temptation fall away: and the Apostle, 1. ad Timoth. 1, speaking of Alexander, and Hymeneus, exhorts Timothy that he hold faith, and a good conscience, which some rejecting, have made shipwreck concerning the faith. But they are said to have made shipwreck who lost the ship, that is, the Church, as S. Chrysostom expounds, Homily 5, saying:

As he who suffers shipwreck, having lost all things, remains naked, so he who falls away from faith retains nothing further to himself of the gifts and virtues of God.

Whence in the same place chapter 6. concerning the heretical man, saying, he says: He is proud, knowing nothing, that is, believing nothing with certainty and firmness: whence in the same place he exhorts Timothy: Keep the deposit, avoiding profane novelties of words, and oppositions of knowledge falsely so called, which some promising have erred concerning the faith: by which words the Apostle signifies that truly the infidel man and heretic falls away from faith. — The same is gathered from the First Epistle of S. John, chapter 2. where the Apostle, speaking of heretics, whom he calls Antichrists, says: They went out from us, but they were not of us: for if they had been of us, they would certainly have continued with us. From which words the holy Fathers gather that a heretical man is severed from the Church, nor is he any longer joined at all to the mystical body of Christ.

It is proved moreover by reason; First indeed: he loses faith who cannot be judged faithful: but a heretic cannot be judged faithful: therefore faith does not persevere in him. The minor stands: for heresy is formal infidelity, and consequently a heretic cannot be esteemed faithful. The major also is clear, for as long as anyone has the habit of faith, however doubtful he may be concerning certain articles, he can truly be called faithful, just as he who knows many philosophical conclusions, although he err concerning one or another, is nevertheless called absolutely a philosopher. — Then, he has not the habit of infused faith who cannot be moved by the formal reason of the object of such a habit: but a heretic cannot be moved by the formal reason of the object of infused faith; for this formal reason is revelation itself, as notified through the altogether infallible Church: therefore since a heretic does not believe the Church to be infallible in proposing all things revealed by God, otherwise he would believe one article no more than another, it follows that he has lost faith. — Finally, if anyone before receiving the habit of faith would refuse to believe some article, for instance the presence of the body of Christ in the Eucharist, although he were prepared to believe all the articles expressed in the three Symbols, of the Apostles, of S. Athanasius, and of the Council of Nicaea, he could not receive faith: therefore if he be so perversely disposed after it has been received, he will not be able to keep it. The consequence is clear by a similar case: for just as one pursuing one man with hatred, although he love all others, cannot receive nor preserve the habit of charity, so in like manner he who is perversely disposed toward one article to be believed cannot receive the habit of faith: for as charity moves to loving all men absolutely without exception, so also faith to believing all objects whatsoever revealed by God.

You will say. A heretic who denies one article of faith, for instance purgatory, or some Sacrament, still experiences the same facility and promptitude concerning other articles: therefore he still has the same habit of faith.

I distinguish the antecedent: he experiences the same facility by reason of infused faith, I deny: by reason of faith acquired through various acts, which he exercised before the heresy, I concede. The consequent similarly I distinguish; he has the same habit of faith divinely infused, I deny: acquired I concede. That man therefore, says the Doctor dist. 23. n. 1. without infused faith believes other articles, because infused faith is corrupted when heresy is generated; otherwise faith and heresy would stand together: therefore by acquired faith he believes other articles; which namely was together with the preceding infused faith, if any such there was; for not in that instant in which infused faith is corrupted through heresy is acquired faith first generated, for that error does not dispose to faith for the time being, nay rather it is an indisposition that it be not then generated: therefore it preceded before that error, and thus it is certain that there is in us acquired faith. Thus the Doctor.

You will say 2: If through the sin of infidelity the habit of faith were destroyed, that destruction would occur either physically, or morally: but it can occur in neither manner. Not indeed morally, or demeritoriously; for indeed if through the sin of infidelity the habit of faith were destroyed, especially because on account of its unworthiness and enormity it would move God to take away from man every supernatural gift: yet this cannot be said; because there are other graver sins, for instance hatred of God, which nevertheless does not move God to take away the habit of faith from him who has such hatred. Nor even physically, for if the sin of heresy destroyed physically the habit of faith, either it would effect this in the reason of formal cause, or after the manner of a form, which by its present and formal efficacy would fight against faith and destroy it, as heat fights against cold, and whiteness against blackness, or after the manner of an efficient cause and mediately, producing namely something which would be altogether incompossible with faith: but neither can be said. Not indeed the first: both because an act is not opposed formally and immediately to a habit, but only to another act elicited from an opposite habit: and because the act of heresy which is not voluntary but undeliberate has every physical entity of the act of heresy which is deliberate, and nevertheless by its presence the habit of faith does not perish. Nor even in the genus of efficient cause; since the first act of heresy, however intense, cannot produce a habit contrary to the habit of faith, except perhaps according to entity, and the first degree of that habit of infidelity: but that habit thus produced according to the first degree would not suffice that the acquired habit be expelled: therefore much less that the infused habit be destroyed by it physically and efficiently, especially since no acquired habit conflicts by its nature with an infused habit; for the sinner however much he has vicious infused habits can nevertheless be justified no less, even if those vicious habits remain in him when justified.

I answer. The act of infidelity or heresy expels the habit of faith morally only, not only demeritoriously, but also dispositively: a twofold genus of destruction, as regards the present institution, can be distinguished; namely demerit and indisposition; but the act of infidelity not only fights against faith demeritoriously, inasmuch as namely it moves God to withdraw faith from the infidel, but also dispositively, for he who wills not to assent to one proposition of faith on account of the authority and divine revelation proposed by the Church, by that very fact has an impediment lest he offer assent to infused faith concerning other propositions; since the authority and divine revelation proposed through the Church is the unique and indivisible motive by which we assent through infused faith to all mysteries revealed: therefore where this motive is judged insufficient to excite the intellect to assent with respect to one, it ought by equal reason to be judged insufficient for assenting to others which are to be believed on account of the same motive.

You will say 3: One can lose an acquired habit, e.g. science concerning one object, and preserve it perfect and entire concerning another particular object of the same science; for the physician can with ease lose the habit of Physic with respect to the principles and properties of the natural body, and retain it with respect to Anatomy and the properties of the human body: therefore by equal reason the heretic will be able to lose the habit of faith with respect to one article, and preserve the same with respect to other articles to be believed by divine faith.

I deny the parity, and the reason of the disparity is, that the habit of total science is not simple and indivisible, but multiple and gathered from distinct habits, which are occupied about diverse parts of the same general and common object; but the habit of faith is altogether simple and indivisible; and consequently it ought not be wondered at that where it is lost, it perishes entirely.