Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

Note first. That since in merit adequately taken three things can be considered, namely the person rewarding, the person meriting, and the meritorious work, from each of those headings certain conditions are required; to wit, some on the part of God rewarding, others on the part of man working or meriting, and finally others on the part of the work itself or of the merit: on the part indeed of God rewarding and recompensing a pact concerning the rendering of a reward is required; but on the part of man meriting the state of grace and of the way is required; finally on the part of the work liberty is necessary, or that the work be done freely with liberty properly so called, as well as honesty, because a meritorious work must be morally good, and supernatural, since merit is under the title of grace. Of all which conditions we must treat in the present Question.

Note secondly. As regards the explication of the first condition, these two things are to be distinguished, namely that the promise of God is required for this, that a good work have an equality and proportion with the reward, and that that promise is required for merit de condigno, in such wise that this promise confers no dignity upon the meritorious work. In the former way indeed the promise is intrinsic to the meritorious work, because it contributes to its dignity. But in the latter it is only extrinsic. The truth of which distinction is understood from those things which occur in commutative justice among men; for a pact is sometimes extrinsic to the thing to be exchanged, when evidently the exchange would take place no less even if the pact did not proceed; sometimes however it is intrinsic to the thing to be exchanged, when manifestly no exchange of some thing with another takes place except by the force and reason of the preceding pact. — It was said above that good works elicited from grace have an equality of proportion with the reward by reason of the divine promise and of the pact entered into by God with man: whether however this promise is so necessary to the condignity of the work, that without it the work does not have the adequate reason of merit, some Theologians deny with Vasquez, disputation 213, chapter 8, where he teaches that the divine promise has indeed accrued to the works of the just, yet in no way pertains to the reason of merit, but rather accrues to works already worthy and meritorious.

Note thirdly. That the necessity of sanctifying grace for meriting is required not only by reason of washing away mortal sin, because manifestly those who are in the state of mortal sin are incapable of acquiring a right before God unto eternal life, yea are liable to damnation and eternal death, but sanctifying grace is required for merit most especially by reason of the disproportion which our works have with so great a reward unless they be done by adopted sons of God, to whom it altogether befits that an inheritance be set forth by a father as the reward of labors; whence also in the state of innocence sanctifying grace was necessary for the first parents in order to merit: whereupon deservedly by supreme Pontifical law Gregory XIII and Pius V condemned this eighteenth proposition of Michael Baius: They hold with Pelagius, who say that it is necessary to the reason of merit that man through the grace of adoption be raised up to the deified state.

First Conclusion. — THAT THE WORKS OF THE JUST MAY TRULY BE MERITORIOUS OF ETERNAL LIFE, THERE IS REQUIRED ON THE PART OF GOD A PROMISE AND PACT CONCERNING THE GIVING OF A REWARD. Thus the Subtle Doctor, in 1 dist. 17 q. 3 n. 22, where speaking of the meritorious act he says: It is believed to be one condition in the act, namely that it is acceptable to God: not only by a certain common acceptation, inasmuch as He accepts every creature, or also that now He wills the act abstracted from sin, otherwise it would not be from Him: but from a special acceptation, which is in the divine will an ordination of that act to eternal life as of merit condign to reward: in this manner we believe also our nature, although beatifiable, to be habitually accepted as just, that is, when it does not act(?) in act: nevertheless still in the divine will He orders it to eternal life, as worthy of so great a good according to the disposition which it habitually has in itself.

The conclusion is proved; First indeed from the Council of Sens, chapter 16, where it decrees: God makes for each one a place according to the measure of his works, not by absolute condignity, but by a gratuitous and liberal promise; by which covenant having been made concerning the daily denarius, he sent laborers into his vineyard. And there it gives the reason why God could not be obligated toward men without His promise, saying: And although your works, namely those of the just, are such that God by a certain right of His can exact them from us: and the saints, even if they have done all things that are commanded them, ought both to acknowledge and to say that they are unprofitable servants; yet since they flow from charity, and are effects of the grace of God, and because God most liberally promised to those who work according to His will a reward, they are deemed worthy of the same remuneration both of temporal goods and of eternal life. The Council of Trent also favors this, Session 6, chapter 16, where it says: To those who work well unto the end and trust in God, eternal life is to be proposed, both as grace mercifully promised to the sons of God through Jesus Christ, and as a reward to be faithfully rendered by the promise of God Himself to their good works and merits.

It is proved secondly from Holy Scripture; namely from all those oracles by which eternal life is signified to us to be rendered on account of the divine promise. Thus notable is that parable Matthew 20, where concerning the laborers sent into the vineyard by the householder, we read that having made a convention with the laborers concerning a daily denarius, he sent them into his vineyard; and afterwards: Friend, I do thee no wrong, hast thou not agreed with me for a denarius? take what is thine own. Wherefore the Apostle very often expounds eternal life under the name of promise. Thus Hebrews 6: By faith and patience they shall inherit the promises. And chapter 10: And doing the will of God you may receive the promise. Hence James, chapter 1, pronounces: Blessed is the man that endureth temptation, for when he hath been proved he shall receive the crown of life which God hath promised to them that love him. And the Apostle, 1 Timothy 4: Godliness is profitable to all things, having promise of the life that now is and of that which is to come.

It is proved also by reason: For merit de condigno there is required that he who merits some reward have a true right to obtain it: but man cannot acquire any true right to obtain some reward from God unless the divine promise intervene: therefore neither can he merit de condigno before God without a promise of this kind. The major stands: because for no other cause is eternal life called in Scripture a crown of justice, a hire, and a reward, than that it may be shown to be owed to man from a certain justice, and that man may have some right to obtain that reward. But the minor is urged; because man cannot have a true right to obtain a reward from God unless God be held by justice to render him such a reward, and consequently unless God be debtor to him. For to him that worketh, says the Apostle, Romans 4, the reward is not reckoned according to grace but according to debt. Hence St. Augustine on Psalm 83, expounding that text of Timothy 4, What reward the Lord shall render me in that day the just judge, says: He will bestow pardon, He will render the crown: He is donor of indulgence, debtor of the crown. But it is impossible that God, who is supreme Lord of all, to whom by infinite titles we owe all our things, should become debtor to us, unless there intervene a certain promise and pact on His part, whereby He binds Himself to render to us a reward condign in this or that work: but since God cannot owe man some reward short of His free promise, it is necessary that that intervene, that man may truly merit de condigno. It is confirmed: if anyone were bound to cultivate another's field under some other title, while both his body and instruments were held under the dominion and power of another. It is confirmed secondly, because no other reason can be rendered than the lack of the divine promise why we do not merit de condigno perseverance for ourselves, and efficacious aids for overcoming whatever temptations and for exercising any good work whatsoever, just as we merit eternal life, which is far more excellent than perseverance itself and those efficacious aids: likewise why souls of the dead do not merit in purgatory, since they are not yet at the terminus; finally, why Christ the Lord in fact did not merit some things for us which certainly He could otherwise merit: e. g. efficacious aids for all unto perseverance, and the restoration of original justice, or the election of all efficaciously unto glory: for speaking per se He could equally have merited this condignly as the other benefits which we receive from God on account of His merit, had God so ordained and promised: therefore the first and principal reason is the lack of the divine ordination and promise.

You will say. A promise is not necessary in merit among men: therefore neither with God. The sequence is evident from parity of reason. For the antecedent is proved: for he who cultivates the field of another, the latter commanding and seeing or willing it, merits receiving a wage from the lord by justice, although no express pact and promise concerning such a wage has intervened, and he is compelled in judgment to pay the debt owed.

I answer first, that the antecedent can be denied, for even among men there cannot be merit de condigno from mere justice without some public promise, or a private pact tacit or express: for in the alleged example a tacit pact intervenes, because when someone sees or perceives that another, in hope of obtaining gain, labors for his utility, who is not bound to such labor from elsewhere, he tacitly consents to bind himself to compensate such labor. I answer secondly, denying the consequence; for there is not equal reason of man toward man, and of the same man compared to God, because man can expend his labor for the utility of another, to whom he owes such labor under no title: but all good works of the just are owed to God under another title than justice, for they are gifts of God Himself, and God can require them under the title of gratitude; whence each one of the just ought to appropriate that saying of David, 1 Paralipomenon: All these things which we have received of thy hand we have given to thee: therefore they cannot obligate God without His own pact and promise to contend with Him for a reward on account of them, especially so great a one as is the eternal wage.

You will say. Any mortal sin whatsoever, in order to merit eternal punishment, does not need that some pact intervene: therefore also good works merit eternal life with every pact excluded.

I deny the consequence, and the reason of the disparity is, that more is required for good merit than for evil: for in evil merit there is not a right, but a debt; for he who sins constitutes himself debtor of punishment before God, and God acquires a right to inflict punishment upon him if He wills, on account of the injury received; but he who merits de condigno makes God debtor to himself, and acquires a right of receiving a reward: but God cannot become debtor with respect to a creature without His gratuitous promise, as was said just now.

You will say. If the promise of God were necessary for the reason of merit, it would follow that many just men do not merit eternal life, because a promise does not bind unless given and accepted: but what just man accepts that divine promise; for that a promise may be accepted, it must be known to him who works: but to very many just men, and those working well, such a divine pact concerning the rendering of a reward is unknown: therefore, etc.

I answer by denying the major, for no one can merit before God without faith, for, as St. Paul says, Hebrews 11: He that cometh to God must believe that he is, and is a rewarder to them that seek him. Although however they have not distinctly known what and how great that reward is, and whether it has been only proposed, or indeed also promised: nevertheless it suffices for acquiring a right that they accept it, whatever it may be from God, and howsoever it be constituted. There is therefore no believer who has not at least a confused confidence in the divine reward promised, which he at least virtually and interpretatively accepts; because each one is presumed to wish to acquire by his works whatever he can, for anyone easily consents to what is for his own good.

Second Conclusion. — FOR MERIT OF CONDIGNITY THERE IS REQUIRED ON THE PART OF THE WORKER THAT HE BE IN THE STATE OF WAY AND GRACE. This likewise is common on both sides: the first part of which is proved by all those texts of Scripture by which it is signified that the time of meriting is determined by God to be none other than the time of the present life. Thus Ecclesiasticus ⟦cap.?⟧ Whatsoever thy hand is able to do, do it earnestly: for neither work, nor reason, nor wisdom, nor knowledge shall be in hell, whither thou art hastening. By which names of knowledge and wisdom is signified that cognition which is necessary for meriting. And chapter 11: If the tree fall to the south, or to the north, in what place soever it shall fall, there shall it be. And Ecclesiasticus, chapter 14: Before death work justice: for there is no finding food in hell. And chapter 16: Every mercy will make a place to every one according to the merit of his works, and according to the meditation of his journey. John 9: The night cometh when no man can work: where by night Christ understands death. Hence the Apostle admonished, 2 Corinthians 6: Behold, now is the acceptable time; behold, now is the day of salvation. And Galatians 6: Whilst we have time, let us work good to all: for, he says, Hebrews 9: It is appointed unto men once to die, and after this the judgment. The thing also holy Cyprian teaches in the book Ad Demetrianum, near the end: When this passing away shall have occurred, there is no longer any place for penance; here life is either lost or held. Jerome, expounding these words of Galatians 6, For what things a man soweth, those also shall he reap, says: The time of sowing is the present life which we run; when this life has passed away, the time of working (namely, meritoriously) is taken away. August., in the Enchiridion, chapter 11

Let no man hope that what he has neglected here he will be able to merit after he has migrated to God. St. Prosper finally, sentence 172: In vain does man promise himself after this body what he neglected to acquire in this body.

Reason also favors this; since the present life is the way to immortality and reward, it was fitting that it should be the stadium and the time of meriting, whereby we might attain the reward promised us; for merit is a certain way or tending toward the reward, and accordingly it was becoming that as long as we run in the stadium of this mortal life we can merit the reward of immortal blessing, but not when constituted outside this state. But by the name of wayfarer the theologians understand man dwelling in a mortal body and mortal condition: wherefore neither those who, freed from the body, have passed from among the living, nor those who have risen again after taking it up anew, are reckoned wayfarers. Hence the most blessed Virgin, who rose again after death and was assumed into heaven in her glorious body, must not be placed in the number of wayfarers; on the contrary, Lazarus, and all those who by divine power were raised from the dead, truly were wayfarers and could merit. The same must not be thought of Enoch and Elias, who although still mortal, because nevertheless they did not live under the mortal condition⟦illegible: one or more lines lost in faded print between "mor-" and "peculiari lege", presumably "…tali qua caeteri mortales vivunt, sed"⟧ by a peculiar law they were, and are preserved alive unto the last times to contend with Antichrist, they ought not be accounted wayfarers: for, says Tertullian in book Adversus Iudaeos, chapter 2: Enoch, far from having tasted death, is a candidate for eternity. Or as he says in book De Resurr. Carnis, chapter 43: Enoch and Elias, not yet having passed through resurrection, because not having finished life, yet translated from the world, and by this very fact already candidates for eternity: therefore in that state they cannot merit; otherwise either frequent and ordinary concurrence of God for acting well would have to be denied them, or finally they would equal, indeed far surpass, the merits of the other Saints, and even of the most blessed Virgin herself, because it is incredible that in so long and enduring a time they did not exercise far more pious and meritorious acts than the most holy Virgin could elicit in the whole space of her life: or that with an almost infinite multitude of good acts they did not equal her intense acts, especially since they live a quiet and tranquil life free from every molestation of temptations, and hence most prepared for all works of virtue. Add to these that sacred Scripture seems to favor our observation, speaking of Enoch when he was translated, as if time were no longer counted to him, his age being completed at the number of 36 years. The second part also is proved, namely that the state of sanctifying grace is necessarily required for meriting. It is proved, I say, from Genesis 4: The Lord had respect to Abel, and to his offerings. By which words, as St. Greg. observes, Moralia 22, chapter 8, it is signified that God first regards the person rather than the gift: nor does He hold the offerer pleasing on account of the gifts, but the gifts on account of the offerer. So likewise in John 15 the Lord Christ teaches that, as the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, so you also, unless you abide in me, namely through living faith, which is joined to charity and grace. And a little after: If any one abide not in me, he shall be cast forth as a branch, and shall wither, and they shall gather him up, and cast him into the fire. Hence the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 16, places this among the conditions required for meriting, that those who merit be justified, and inserted into Christ as living branches and living members: > For since, it says,

Christ Jesus himself, as head into the members, and as vine into the branches, continually infuses virtue into the very justified themselves, which virtue always precedes, accompanies, and follows their good works, and without which they could not in any way be pleasing and meritorious before God, etc. Wherefore deservedly was the contrary error condemned by the supreme Pontiffs Pius V and Gregory XIII, condemning this proposition no. 1 of Baius: The opinion of Pelagius is that a good work done apart from the grace of adoption is not meritorious of the heavenly kingdom.

The holy Fathers also concur, especially St. Augustine, book De fide et operibus, chapter 14: Good works follow, he says, the man justified; they do not precede him that he may be justified; in which place he speaks of works meritorious of eternal life, not of goods morally good. And book De spiritu et littera, chapter 29: Through the spirit, he says, incorporated and made his member, each one can work justice, giving intrinsic growth. Hence St. Prosper, against the chapters of the Gauls, chapter 6, says: Man justified, that is, made pious from impious, receives with no preceding good merit the gift by means of which he acquires and merits.

Reason also favors this: for he who is not justified by justifying grace is guilty of sin, on account of which he merits de condigno death and eternal punishment, according to Romans 6: The wages of sin is death, and consequently incurs privation of eternal glory: but it is impossible for man simultaneously to merit privation of and possession of eternal glory: therefore as long as he lies in sin he cannot merit eternal life de condigno. Then, all works done without sanctifying grace are works of man the enemy of God, and consequently cannot satisfy Him: therefore much less can they merit the promised reward. Finally, if the state of grace were not required for merit, it would follow that by one mortal sin all merits do not perish: for as a preceding sin would not prevent new merits from being made, so neither would a subsequent sin extinguish merits already made: but the consequence is against Scripture saying that, if the just man turn away from his justice, all the justices which he hath done shall not be remembered any more.

You will say. Sacred Scripture plainly hands down that whoever keeps the divine commandments shall obtain eternal life, nor is the state of grace required for that. Thus Matthew 19: If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments: hence St. Augustine, book De natura et gratia, chapter 2. Nature, he says, of the human race procreated from the flesh of that one transgressor, if it can suffice itself for fulfilling the law and perfecting justice, ought to be secure concerning the reward, that is, concerning eternal life: even if in some nation, or in some earlier time faith in the blood of Christ lay hidden from it: for God is not unjust, who defrauds the just of the wage of justice: therefore the state of justice is not necessary for meriting eternal life.

I deny the consequence, and to the text of Scripture I say that no one keeps the commandments perfectly who does not love God with his whole heart, whole soul, whole mind, and whole strength, for this is the first commandment; but by the force of this love man is justified, if he be not yet just, and by the virtue of the same he attains eternal salvation if he persevere in keeping the commandments. To the second I answer that St. Augustine does not want that man can merit eternal life without habitual grace; nay rather the contrary is gathered from the lauded words. God is unjust, who would defraud the just of the wage of justice: for in those words he supposes that those to whom eternal life is owed are just. Therefore he only intends to show against the Pelagians that man cannot keep all the precepts of the law by his own powers, because otherwise Christ would have died gratuitously, as he himself infers in chapters 1 and 2 of the preface of the aforesaid book — than which inference he demonstrates to be true from this, that he who keeps the whole law and fulfills justice merits eternal life: whence it becomes a consequence that if anyone can fulfill the whole law and keep justice without grace, even without it he can obtain eternal life: whence it follows that Christ died gratuitously, nor should He be called the author of our glorification.

You will urge. St. Augustine teaches in several places that the opinion of the Pelagians was that the grace of adoption, by which men are constituted sons of God, is necessary for the attainment of the kingdom of heaven: for he says in book De peccatorum meritis et remissione, chapter 18: but they (the Pelagians) move something worthy of consideration and discussion. They seem to offer who say that infants newly born brought forth from their mothers' wombs receive baptism not for the remitting of sin, but that, lacking spiritual generation, they may be created in Christ, and become partakers of his kingdom of heaven, etc. He has the same in several places elsewhere. The Pelagians, however, held on the other side that grace was not necessary for keeping the whole law, but that it could be fulfilled by the powers of nature: therefore since St. Aug. says in the place cited above, De natura et gratia, that human nature ought to be secure concerning the reward if it suffice itself for keeping the commandments, he seems to strengthen both opinions of the Pelagians, and consequently to grant that for keeping the law help of grace is indeed necessary, but for obtaining eternal glory the grace of adoption is not required.

I deny the consequence; for the Pelagians taught two things: first indeed, that infants do not need the grace of adoption for the remission of original sin, because they did not acknowledge such a sin: second, that they need grace for the kingdom of heaven. The first opinion, as erroneous and heretical, St. Augustine condemns: not so the second; nay in book 6 Contra Iul., chapter ⟦?⟧ he writes this: We give thanks that you think not this: for none are born unto the kingdom of God unless they be ⟦illegible: word after "perfundantur" uncertain, raw "admittitis/admittis"⟧, and thus you judge being washed far better than being born. He therefore approves the opinion of the Pelagians in this, that they deemed the grace of adoption necessary for the kingdom of heaven.

You will say. Man can merit before man, even if he be his enemy: therefore also before God.

I deny the consequence; for man can merit before man in two ways: first indeed by a work grateful, and pleasing, while he is his friend: second by a work which although it be not grateful nor pleasing, nevertheless merits the reward on account of a pact entered into: but it is otherwise before God: for man cannot merit before God except by a work that is grateful, and pleasing to his divine ma- jesty, and consequently except it be done by a man who is a friend of God, for truly the gifts of the un- just profit not the Most High. Ecclesiasticus, chapter 34.

You ask: whether habitual grace suffices for meriting?

I answer, that it does not suffice, but beyond it actual grace is required, as can be gathered from what was said in the proof of the present Conclusion, and most of all from

the words of Christ the Lord, John 15: I am the vine, etc. For just as, that the branch may bear fruit, it is not enough that it be united to the vine, but moreover it is required that it draw virtue from it; so, that man may produce good works, it does not suffice that he cohere to Christ through sanctifying grace as branch to vine, and member to head; but, as Trent says, it is necessary that virtue continually infuse itself into the justified themselves, which virtue always precedes, accompanies, and follows their good works, etc. Therefore the works of the just, that they may be meritorious, must proceed from the help of prevenient and concomitant grace, which is certainly actual. Add that a meritorious work ought to be a supernatural act, such as it would not be precisely unless it proceeded from the help of actual grace, as will be proved

Third Conclusion. — THERE ARE THREE CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR MERIT ON THE PART OF THE MERITORIOUS ACT:

The first is, that the act be free, and elicited by the will or by its freely acting command. And it is proved from the manner of speaking of Scripture, which praises the works of man for this reason, that whereas he could have acted badly, he acted justly and uprightly: thus Ecclesiasticus 31, after it has been said of the just man: He that could have transgressed, and hath not transgressed, do evil, and hath not done it; immediately adds: Therefore his goods are established in the Lord. By which words it is sufficiently declared that the good works of the just are worthy of praise and reward because they proceed from liberty: hence the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 9: If I do this thing willingly, I have a reward: for by the word willingly he understands a free act of the will; in which sense St. Augustine uses and explains this text in book De gratia et libero arbitrio, chapter 2.

The holy Fathers also subscribe, who teach with one accord, that as no one merits punishment unless acting freely against the precepts of the law, so neither reward and wage, unless fulfilling those very precepts freely. Thus St. Basil, Homily 9: Virtue is apprehended from the will. Hieronym., book 2 Contra Iovinian. God made us of free choice, he says, nor are we drawn by necessity to vices or to virtues: otherwise where there is necessity, there is neither crown nor condemnation. Clement of Alexandria, book 1 Stromatum: Neither praises, he says, nor blames, nor honors exist, if the soul has not the power of experiencing or undertaking. As if he said we are worthy neither of praise nor of blame, except on account of good and evil works which are done freely. And St. Augustine, book De gratia et libero arbitrio, chapter 2: When, he says, he acts willingly, then it must be said that it is good, then may the reward of a good work be hoped for from him of whom it was said: who will render to every one according to his works. Hence in book De spiritu et littera, chapter 5, he says: God gave to man free will, without which neither ⟦illegible: bene?⟧ nor evil is done. Finally St. Bernard, Sermon 81 on the Canticles: Where, he says, there is not liberty, neither is there merit: therefore beings running by animal reason merit nothing, because they lack deliberation, and likewise liberty.

Reason also supports this: First indeed, because as natural and physical property supposes physical being of the thing whose property it is, so moral property supposes moral being: but merit is a moral property of an act: therefore it must suppose its being moral: but the moral being of an act is nothing else than its liberty: therefore that the act be meritorious, it must be free. Second, the wage is owed to the meritorious work: but a debt arises only from this, that someone gives to another what was his own, or whose disposal lay within his liberty; for no one can give except only that of which he is master, but man with respect to God is master only of his free actions: therefore by free actions alone man acquires for himself a right to the reward. Third finally, the reason of the wage with respect to a good work is the same as that of punishment with respect to an evil work: but evil works, unless they be done freely, do not merit punishment: therefore neither do good works merit the wage, unless they proceed from a free will.

It must however be observed here first, that it is one thing to accept certain actions unto eternal life: another indeed to accept them unto the reward of eternal life: for in the former manner God can accept non-free actions, as He accepted the death of the Innocents, which although it was not free, nor properly meritorious, nevertheless obtained eternal glory for them. Hence St. Bernard, Sermon on the Nativity of the Innocents: Truly thy martyrs are they, O God, he says, in whom neither man nor Angel found merit, that this singular prerogative of grace may be more evidently commended.

The second condition of the meritorious work is, that it be a good and honest act. Scripture itself persuades this, which ascribes the reason of merit before God to no other works than good ones. Thus Romans 2, where the Apostle said that God would render to every one according to his works, he adds: To them indeed who according to patience of good work seek glory and honor and incorruption, eternal life, etc. 2 Peter chapter 1: Endeavour that by your good works you make sure your calling and election. 1 John 3: We have confidence towards God, because we keep his commandments, and do those things that are pleasing in his sight.

The reason of this also is open: for the works which are done are either indifferent, or evil, or morally good: if indifferent, they merit neither praise nor blame, nor punishment nor reward, seeing they assume neither moral goodness nor malice: if evil, they merit not praise and reward, but blame and chastisement: therefore that they may obtain reward and recompense, they must be morally good. Then, that a work be meritorious before God, it must have the reason of service toward Him: but an evil act cannot have the reason of service toward God, nor even an indifferent act, unless perhaps it be graced by a good end or other circumstance, by which reason it ceases to be indifferent: therefore only the morally good act can have the reason of service, and consequently the reason of a meritorious work. Finally, the meritorious act, as we shall soon say, must be supernatural, and elicited with the actual help of the Holy Spirit; but a supernatural act cannot be evil nor indifferent; for the Holy Spirit moves neither toward evil acts, nor converts to indifferent ones: therefore, etc.

Thirdly finally, the condition is that the meritorious act be supernatural in entity: and consequently that it be elicited with the actual help of grace. So the Doctor in the second book, distinction 28. And it is proved: First indeed from all those texts of Scripture by which the help of actual grace is intimated to be necessary for a good work, as we have demonstrated several times already. It is proved likewise from Councils: Thus in the Council of Diospolis Pelagius was commanded to acknowledge that grace is given for each single act: in the second Council of Orange, Canon 18: The reward, it says, is owed to good works if they are done, but grace which is not owed precedes that they be done, according to that saying of Christ, John 15. I am the true vine, and you are the branches; he that abideth in me, and I in him, the same beareth much fruit, for without me you can do nothing: and Trent, Session 6, chapter 16, where it defines that without the influx of the virtue of Christ, which precedes and accompanies and follows the good works of the just, they can by no means be reputed meritorious: hence Session 14, chapter 8 teaches, that for satisfying for the temporal punishment remaining after sins remitted the influx of grace is required. But greater is the reason why it should be required for merit of condignity, seeing that act seems nobler and more difficult than satisfaction itself; because this has only temporal punishment to pay; but that meritorious act tends toward attaining eternal reward; wherefore the Council adds in the same place: > For of ourselves, as of ourselves, we can do nothing, because through him who comforts us we can do all things: thus man has nothing wherein to glory, but all our glorying is in Christ, in whom we live, in whom me-

rit, in whom we satisfy.

This surely Catholic doctrine Pope Celestine plainly taught, Epistle 1 to the Bishops of Gaul, chapter 12, where he says: For let us not doubt that all the merits of man are preceded by the grace of God, through which it comes about that we begin both to will and to do some good thing: with which aid and gift of God certainly free will is not taken away, but freed; so great is the goodness of God toward men, that He wills our merits to be His gifts: and for these things which He has bestowed, He is about to give eternal rewards: therefore meritorious works either are supernatural in entity, such especially are the acts of faith, hope, and charity, which proceed from supernatural habits and virtues: or if they be natural, insofar as they proceed from the moral virtues, namely temperance, justice, etc., they are at least supernatural to that extent, that without the grace of God and special supernatural help they cannot be done.

You ask. What conditions are required for merit of congruity?

I answer that for merit of congruity, first it is not required on the part of the worker that he be constituted in sanctifying grace; since a sinner can merit de congruo certain helps necessary for performing penance, as has already been said when treating of merit from congruity. But it is necessarily required that he be a wayfarer, on account of the reasons assigned in the preceding Conclusion; since the same reasoning holds for merit of congruity as of condignity with respect to the state of way.

On the part indeed of the act it is required likewise that it be good and free, and that it be elicited with the help of actual grace, for we cannot merit beforehand any divine duty pertaining to salvation by purely natural, necessary, or indifferent acts, and consequently it is necessary that the meritorious act be in some respect supernatural, be free elicitive or imperative, and good both from its circumstances and from its end.

But it is not necessary for merit of congruity that a divine promise intervene; for there are many things which man merits de congruo, namely the gift of perseverance, which nevertheless God has not promised to give to those meriting. Add that here a pact is required in merit of condignity, that the work may induce a right of justice to the reward: but merit of congruity does not induce such a right: therefore it does not require a pact. Yet it sometimes happens that a pact intervenes in merit of congruity; for God in Scripture promises forgiveness of sins to the penitent man; although nevertheless by those acts of penance before habitual grace man merits only de congruo.

You ask. Whether the external act adds anything above the merit of the internal act?

I affirm with the Subtle Doctor, Quodlibet 18, in that article, where he simply and absolutely teaches that in the external act there is something pe-⟦illegible: fragment lost in faded print between "pecu-" and "interno", presumably "…peculiare quiddam…"⟧ that with the internal and external taken together a greater merit intervenes than in the internal alone: for just as in those two acts there are two goodnesses, and, as the Doctor says, two imputabilities, so likewise two merits appear to be. By which opinion certainly those texts of Scripture can be proved, in which the wage is promised to external acts: thus Matthew 10: And whosoever shall give to drink to one of these little ones a cup of cold water only, in the name of a disciple, amen I say to you, he shall not lose his reward: and in the same place verse 32: Every one therefore that shall confess me before men, I will also confess him before my Father: hence 2 Corinthians 4 tribulations and outward scourges patiently endured are said to contribute toward deserving eternal glory: For that which is at present momentary and light of our tribulation, worketh for us above measure exceedingly an eternal weight of glory.

Reason also supports this; for merit is a service redounding to the honor or advantage of a superior, and of him who can compensate it with that reward: but exterior action increases the service of God, because it chiefly redounds to his honor; for it conduces to exciting in others the knowledge and praise of God and the interior affections of virtues: therefore although the external act increase merit not from that aspect by which it is a morally good action, nevertheless it increases it in the reason of merit, because it increases in the reason of service. It is confirmed., because the satisfaction of our works grows by the external act, seeing that satisfaction is the vindication and voluntary chastisement of fault, which is chastised ⟦illegible: word uncertain, raw "aerius", perhaps "aequius/facilius"⟧ by internal and external actions, than only by in- ternal ones: therefore merit too grows by external action.