Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

Note first. A fourfold genus of merits is distinguished by some Theologians. For one is called merit of condignity, another of congruity, a third of dignity, a fourth of impetration. That merit is called merit of condignity by which anyone merits from justice a supernatural reward proposed and promised by God to himself on account of the condignity of the work with such a reward. Merit of congruity is called that by which one attains that reward not on account of the condignity and equality of the work with the recompense, but only on account of the congruity by which the rewarder and remunerator is moved to bestow the reward out of his own goodness and mercy on account of the work elicited by the meriting one: although that work has no equality with such a reward, nor is that reward promised for such a work by the rewarder. Thus God, in respect of morally good works elicited by sinners in the state of sin, sometimes bestows the grace of faith and conversion. The Seraphic Doctor in 2 dist. 29 art. 2 qu. 3 judges that between these two merits, of condignity and of congruity, another must be admitted as mediating between both, which he calls the Verity of dignity, whereby namely one merits not indeed the essential reward, but the accidental, for the reason that he be worthy of attaining that reward by reason of the dignity of the work elicited by himself. Finally some Recentiors, besides these aforementioned genera of merits, judge that a fourth must moreover be admitted, which they call Merit of impetration, whereby one, not existing in grace, impetrates from divine mercy by his prayers and supplications the grace of conversion: which genus of merit they surely devised lest they should have to say that sinners merit the remission of sins from the help of God.

But whether these four genera of merits are to be admitted must here be determined.

Note secondly. That justice, according to which God is said to render a reward to the merits of the just, is neither legal nor distributive, but only commutative; for legal justice respects the right which the community has over persons and their goods in order to the common good, for the right of legal justice is founded in the title of community: but the right which the just acquire for themselves before God through merits is founded not in the title of community, but in this, that each exhibits to God services and good works elicited, for which God promised a condign reward. Distributive justice however per se respects the right which particulars have, founded in the title of community inasmuch as they are its members, and thence they have the right of participating in the common goods thereof, each according to his dignity; under which right indeed, as was said just now, the just do not enjoy in respect of the divine reward. Nor does it matter that the rewards are various and unequal, according as the merits are various and unequal; whence there results an inequality of proportion in the just man, who has so much more right to the reward as he has greater merits: this, I say, does not matter, for it is accidental to that justice in virtue of which rewards are rendered back, since it respects only the right of each, that it may compensate it with a proportionate recompense: whence if all were equal in merits, they would also be equal in reward. There remains therefore that that justice, in virtue of which the reward is granted to the merits of the just, is the very commutative justice, which respects the private rights of particulars qua such, that it may render what is due to them according to the equality and proportion of the work to the reward.

Note thirdly. That any work can be called condign, equal to a reward, in two ways, namely either by arithmetical equality and of quantity, or by geometrical equality and of proportion. But a work is held worthy of a reward by arithmetical equality when namely the work, inasmuch as it is of such a person, considered in itself and absolutely, is of so much value as is the reward which is rendered back to him: after which manner the daily labour of a hireling is of so much value in itself as is the wage by which it is justly wont to be compensated. It is truly worthy of a wage by an equality of proportion when, although the work considered in itself and absolutely, inasmuch as it is of such a person, is exceeded by the magnitude of the reward; nevertheless, considered according to certain circumstances, to wit, the excellence of the promiser, the motive for which he promises, and other conditions honouring and illustrating that promise, that work is held to be morally worthy of such a reward. Hence once such a cognition is touched upon, such a reward is owed to that work from justice. Thus Saul had justly promised his daughter in marriage to him who should kill Goliath; for although the daughter of a King was held to be a more excellent reward, and far worthier than what a common soldier ought to have for the killing of one adversary, nevertheless, attention being given to the solemn royal promise, and other circumstances weighed, namely that that giant was mocking the armies of Israel, nor did any dare to assail him in single combat, David justly merited the firstborn daughter of Saul in marriage as his vanquisher, and when she was denied to him, demanded her, though wedded to another. Yet there must be some proportion between the work and the merit, for foolishly and madly Herod had promised to give even the half of his kingdom to the daughter of Herodias for her dancing.

Three things therefore are to be determined in this Question: First, how manyfold is the genus of merits. Secondly, whether men truly can merit anything before God de condigno. Thirdly, whether the works of the just are meritorious de condigno by arithmetical equality, or only geometrical.

Conclusion first. — WE MUST DISTINGUISH MERIT TWOFOLDLY, NAMELY DE CONDIGNO, AND DE CONGRUO(?). This opinion is the more common and truer.

It is proved: A capital genus of merits must be assigned in as many ways as there are modes by which men can merit divine rewards: but that mode is twofold, namely by condignity, and by congruity: therefore, etc. The major is evident per se. The minor is proved: men can merit divine benefits in as many modes as there are modes by which divine rewards are obtained: but those modes are only two, namely from justice, and from seemliness and congruity: therefore, etc. It is proved further from Sacred Scripture, which acknowledges both this merit and that. Indeed merit de condigno, as is evidently apparent from what has been said; but also merit de congruo. For on the one hand it asserts that we are justified freely, Rom. 3, that is, without merit de condigno: on the other hand James 2 affirms that we are justified by works not only done in grace, which merit an increase of grace de condigno, but also by morally good works which are done in the state of mortal sin, of which St. James seems chiefly to be understood when to confirm this he uses the example of Rahab the harlot. Now for these works justification is owed only from seemliness and congruity: therefore Sacred Scripture acknowledges merit de congruo. — It is confirmed from this, that the same Scripture testifies that God promises pardon to penitents, and is moved by their tears and acts of penance to grant indulgence: therefore Scripture acknowledges some merit in the acts of the penitent before justification. — Item, the holy Fathers acknowledge merit, for Cyprian, in the Sermon de lapsis, says generally concerning the true penitent before the grace of justification received that he will make the Church glad, and will now merit not only the grace of God, but the crown. And Ambrose, lib. De poenitentia, cap. 3, speaking of the sinner under the parable of the prodigal, speaks thus: So quickly does he merit pardon that while he is yet afar off and coming the Father runs to meet him, and gives kisses, which is the mark of pure flesh. And Augustine, in Ps. 50 De Virinitatibus(?), speaks thus: They spoke penance, and merited true mercy. Whence Epist. 105. Lest even that remission of sins itself, he says, without some merit...

You will say first: Besides these two genera of merits there seem still to be two others necessarily to be admitted already mentioned by us, namely merit of dignity, and merit of impetration: therefore that division is defective. The antecedent is proved: for first that merit of dign(?) is that by which one would impetrate something distinct from glory: but this cannot be recalled neither …and merit of condignity; for hereby one merits only an increase of grace or glory: nor yet to merit of congruity: because that imports not obligation, but only congruity of bestowing a reward on account of the seemliness and dignity of the work. Similarly while a sinner merits the grace of conversion, or another benefit, he cannot merit it by merit of dignity because he is not in grace; nor by merit of congruity, because the works of a sinner are execrable to God: therefore beyond these two merits another must be assigned, namely merit of impetration, whereby assuredly by the force of impetration he impetrates that grace.

I deny the antecedent. And to the proof I say that both that merit of dignity and of impetration is recalled to merit of congruity. The former indeed, because such merit induces not the negation of giving from justice, but only from congruity of granting to a just man this or that benefit beyond right to the increase of grace, or the attainment of eternal glory. Similarly when someone, whether just or sinner, impetrates from God some benefit in virtue of his good works or prayers, either he impetrates it by reason of the divine pact, and of the dignity of the work proceeding from grace, or only from the pure mercy and goodness of God. If the former, that merit is of condignity: if truly the latter, it pertains to merit of congruity: therefore no reason appears for multiplying the genera of merits beyond the two members assigned.

You will say secondly: No merit of congruity is given: therefore the aforesaid division fails. The antecedent is evident: for that merit is one to which the reward corresponds equally; but to no work does the reward correspond equally unless it proceed from sanctifying grace; for God in justice owes the sinner nothing but vengeance and punishment, etc.

I deny the antecedent, because merit of congruity exists then when it is congruous for God to repay with that benefit a man doing this or that good moral work, which benefit the man intends to obtain through such a work: but sometimes it is congruous for God to repay to a man doing something the benefit which he intends to obtain. Thus it is congruous for God to grant, to the prayers of the just who devote themselves to works of mortification, the conversion of men given over to pleasures. It is equally congruous to grant to sinners asking pardon and mercy the grace of conversion and penitence: for which reason St. Augustine says that the same sins sometimes merit justification; thus Epistle 106: if anyone shall say that faith merits the grace of acting well, we cannot deny it, but confess it most gladly.

Second Conclusion. — IN TRUTH MEN MERIT BEFORE GOD DE CONDIGNO, OR FROM A JUSTICE AND AN EQUALITY OF THE WORK WITH THE SUPERNATURAL REWARD. This Conclusion follows from what we said in the preceding Question, in which it was proved that men truly merit something before God, for this reason, that He judges their works worthy of reward and recompense.

It is proved moreover by those testimonies of Scripture by which it is intimated that a right of the goods of justice is acquired through the merits of the just, having a certain equality with the reward. For first Scripture commends the condignity of works, Wisdom 3: God tried them (the just), and found them worthy of himself. And Apocalypse 3: They shall walk with me in white, because they are worthy. And 2 Thessalonians 1: In all your persecutions and tribulations which you endure for an example of the just judgment of God, that you may be counted worthy of the kingdom of God, for which you also suffer. And it commends justice when it adds: if so be (for "if indeed" according to the force of the Greek text) it is just before God to repay tribulation to those who trouble you, and to you who are troubled rest with us. And Hebrews 6: For God is not unjust, that he should forget your work and the love which you have shown in his name, who have ministered to the saints and do minister.

The same truth the Holy Fathers teach, who acknowledge condignity and justice in the good works of the just. Thus St. Cyprian, Epistle 26: The Lord will render to you a reward for this your charity, and will present the delightful fruit of so good a work: for he who exhorted is no less worthy of the reward of the crown than he who suffered. Chrysostom, homily on Lazarus: If God is just, he will render to these and to those according to their merits. Augustine in many places, especially book On Nature and Grace, chapter 2: God is not unjust, who would defraud the just of the reward of justice.

The same is established from those Councils praised in the First Conclusion of the preceding Question, but most of all from the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 16, where it attributes both conditions, of justice and of condignity, not obscurely to the good works of the just. Justice indeed, when it says at the beginning of the chapter, that eternal life is rendered to them by God as a just judge, as a reward and as a crown of justice; but condignity and equality with the reward it acknowledges in these same works, when about the middle of the same chapter it says, that such honor is given to good works in Sacred Scripture, that Christ promises that even he who gives a cup of cold water to one of his least ones shall not lose his reward. And the Apostle testifies that that which at present is momentary and light of our tribulation worketh above measure in us an eternal weight of glory. Therefore when the Council says that such honor is given to the good works of the just, the sense is that those works are so esteemed and become of such worth that they are judged worthy of so great a reward, namely eternal felicity.

Yet although these things are most commonly received among Theologians, nevertheless there are not wanting those who think otherwise; for Vasquez, disputation 213, together with several others, denies that merit de condigno acquires before God a true right of justice, and holds that the reward is owed on account of gratitude. But Durandus, in 2 dist. 21 q. 2, judges that the just do not properly and simply merit de condigno before God: not only because God cannot be obligated to man by justice, but also because meritorious works do not have an equality with the reward of eternal glory. That however their reasons and foundations may be resolved:

You will object first: There can be no justice between God and a creature: therefore although the just truly merit de condigno, yet they do not acquire toward God a right of justice, and consequently the reward is not owed to their merits by justice, but only by fidelity or gratitude.

I deny the antecedent; for it does not conflict that there be in men some true right of justice with respect to God, protected by His free institution and covenant: first because Holy Scripture frequently inculcates that a reward is justly owed to the works of the just from the pact and promise of God; for Scripture, which somewhere preaches that God will be faithful in fulfilling His promises, more often affirms that He will be a just judge, and that as such He will render the crown of justice: then because a burdensome promise, under the condition of a work having some equality with the thing promised, induces an obligation of justice in the promiser: but God promised the just eternal life under the condition of good works elicited in grace and having some equality with that reward, inasmuch as they are of the supernatural order even as that reward: therefore the just can through their good works acquire some right of justice toward God.

You will urge: That right of justice, if it existed, would be most especially of commutative justice: but there can be no right of commutative justice of man toward God: therefore, etc. The major is established from the second Notable point. The minor is proved: no one is obligated to another by commutative justice unless he receive something advantageous and useful to himself: but God can receive nothing advantageous and useful from creatures: therefore, etc. — I deny the minor, and to its proof I answer first by denying the major: for that anyone be obligated to another by commutative justice, it is not always necessary that he receive from him something advantageous and useful to himself; for it suffices if something be made pleasing to him by convention and promise of a reward. I answer secondly, denying the minor: for men can render to God something not only pleasing to Him, but even advantageous and useful to His extrinsic good, namely to His external glory. For although all the supernatural good works of men are more God's than man's, because they are done principally by Him, and by His grace preventing and cooperating; yet they are proper to the man himself, inasmuch as they are done by him freely, and can be elicited at the judgment of the same man for the glory of God or on account of another end: wherefore on this account God can be obligated to man not only by fidelity, but also by justice, when He constitutes Himself by pact and by mercy debtor of men.

You will object secondly. Whatever God bestows upon men He gives only by gratitude, or by fidelity, or by mercy: therefore none of those gifts is from justice. The antecedent is proved: for God confers nothing on man except from His pure goodness without any debt, and thus it is a benefit of mercy; or from a debt arising from a promise made, and thus it is a payment of fidelity; or from some motive intervening on the part of man, and thus it is an increase of gratitude: therefore, etc. — I deny the antecedent, for besides these three genera of divine(?) bestowal of benefits there is also a fourth, namely from the motive of justice, which conflicts less with God than gratitude itself; for gratitude properly so called respects a benefit properly so called: but the merit of man toward God is not a benefit properly so called, but an homage and service, which however great it may be cannot equal the benefits which he previously received from God; who hath first given to him, and recompense shall be made him? says the Apostle, Romans 11. Moreover all homages and services rendered to the Lord, especially those done from precept, cannot obligate God by gratitude, according to that saying of Christ, Luke 17: Doth he thank that servant for doing the things which he commanded him? So you also, when you shall have done all the things that are commanded you, say: We are unprofitable servants.

Third Conclusion. — THE MERITORIOUS WORKS OF THE JUST ARE DE CONDIGNO OF ETERNAL LIFE BY AN EQUALITY NOT OF QUANTITY, BUT OF PROPORTION. This is the more common and truer opinion,

And it is proved first from Holy Scripture, which teaches that the works of the just, even considered as done by the just and adopted sons of God, are not worthy of so great a reward. Romans 8: The sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the future glory which shall be revealed in us: where the Apostle speaks of those sufferings as endured by the sons of God and from the power of Christian hope: according to what he premised a little before: For the Spirit himself giveth testimony to our spirit that we are the sons of God. And 2 Corinthians 4: For that which at present is momentary and light of our tribulation worketh above measure in us an eternal weight of glory. By which words he intimates the reason of the inequality, because indeed those sufferings are transitory and finite, even as done by a just man and pleasing to God: but the reward is infinite, namely the vision and possession of God, which is of infinite worth, because it is of infinite and eternal duration. To the same belongs what Christ says, Luke 6: A good measure and pressed down and shaken together and running over shall they give into your bosom.

It is proved secondly from Councils and Fathers, for the Council of Sens celebrated under Clement VII teaches it not obscurely in decree of faith 16, when it says thus: And finally the place of all mercy will make for each one according to the measure of his works, not absolutely of condignity indeed, but rather by a gratuitous and liberal promise. By which covenant having been made concerning the daily denarius he hires laborers into his vineyard. — The Holy Fathers teach the same: especially St. Fulgentius(?), book 1 On the Truth of Predestination(?), chapter 10, giving the reason why eternal life is called grace by the Apostle, Romans 6, although it be the reward of merits: Grace, he says, is not unjustly called so, because God not only repays His gifts with His gifts, but because so greatly does the grace of the dignity of retribution overflow there, that incomparably and ineffably every merit may be(?) as it were a mere point(?), and it may be given from God and avail for the human will and operation. Preuserat(?) — Eusebius Emissenus had said before, Homily 3 on Quadragesima(?): Although, he says, we should toil with all the labors of soul and body, although we should strive to labor with all the forces of obedience, yet we shall be able to compare nothing worthy of merit for the heavenly goods, nor to offer them.

Reason likewise supports this: for the value of a finite work cannot merit the excellence of an infinite reward according to an equality of quantity, but only according to a certain condignity of proportion: but the value of good works in itself is finite: but the reward, namely eternal life, is infinite, since it is the enjoyment of God Himself. Therefore it superexceeds the value of finite merit: therefore between the two there can be no equality of quantity, but only of proportion. Wherefore the holy Apostle in many places, especially 1 Corinthians 9 and Philippians 3 and 2 Timothy 4, compares eternal life promised to the good works of the just to the prize and crown proposed to those contending in the stadium, which is accustomed to be equal only by an equality of proportion.

You will say: Of the finite to the infinite there is no proportion: but, as was said just now, meritorious works are of finite value: therefore there is not even an equality of proportion between those works and eternal glory. — I distinguish the major: there is no physical proportion, of thing to thing, I concede: for far does the infinite reward exceed finite merit, if it be considered according to its entity: there is no moral proportion of the dignity of the work to the dignity of the reward, I deny. For meritorious works have a certain supernatural and infinite dignity, not indeed from their own proper physical entity, but from the promise of the One accepting those works unto such a reward, and likewise from the intention and affection of the one acting, who strives with all his powers to expend so much service to God as he can, and consequently if he had infinite virtue he would produce an act of infinite entity. Whence the act elicited by him, although it be finite according to its effect, is nevertheless infinite according to its affection. But since God weighs rather the affection of the one acting than the effect of the work, thence it comes about that He judges it just and equitable to bestow an infinite reward for works finite in entity.

You will say secondly: If the just can merit de condigno eternal life, with the ordination and promise of God supervening, they can with the same supervening merit de condigno for another grace, and consequently remission of mortal sin, which is a secondary effect of sanctifying grace: but this consequent militates against the doctrine of the holy Fathers and Theologians affirming that no pure creature can merit, or satisfy, de condigno for mortal sin: wherefore the merits of Christ and His divine satisfaction for our sins were necessary. — I answer first, that the major can be denied: for it is far higher and more difficult for a just man to merit de condigno for another existing in mortal sin grace and remission of sins than for himself: because he himself is already reckoned worthy of grace and eternal glory, which are owed to him under the title of inheritance by reason of the sanctifying grace with which he is endowed: and therefore it does not follow that, if with the promise of God supervening his works have a certain condignity with eternal life, which is consummated grace, they must have the same with sanctifying grace to be bestowed on another enemy of God and hated by Him: for a friend can more easily merit for himself a benefit from a friend than from that friend's enemy, who could bestow the benefit. — I answer secondly, that the minor can be denied: for when the holy Fathers and Theologians deny that any pure creature can satisfy de condigno for mortal sin, they do not speak of merit and satisfaction from the rigor of justice, or of thing to thing, which certainly we do not attribute to the good works of the just; but only of an equality of proportion. Add to these things that that opinion of the Theologians is not generally received: for very many with the Subtle Doctor affirm that by an extraordinary disposition of God some creature can satisfy God for the sins of others, as was said in the preceding Treatise.