Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

The chief flower and fruit of sanctifying grace are the good works of the just themselves, by which they may merit eternal life as a reward and recompense. Hence, in order that we may set the crown upon this treatise undertaken on divine Grace, it was necessary that, after expounding and unlocking the fecundity and pre-eminences of that divine grace, we should also touch briefly upon meritorious works. Wherefore we shall propose the four following Questions to be unfolded: first indeed, whether and what is the merit of good works; second, how manyfold it is; third, what conditions it requires; fourth, what the just man can merit for himself.

WHETHER AND WHAT IS THE MERIT OF GOOD WORKS.

Note 1. The name of merit is used in four ways in the Sacred Scriptures. First, it is taken at times in a good sense, at times in a bad sense, when something is attributed to good and to evil works; for the former are worthy of retribution of reward, the latter of retribution of punishment. To good works indeed the name of merit is attributed in Ecclesiasticus 16: Mercy will make a place to every man according to the merit of his works; but to evil works the same name of merit is ascribed in 2 Paralipomenon 19: Thou hast deserved the wrath of the Lord. And Job 6: Would that my sins were weighed, by which I have merited wrath. Second, the name of merit, taken in a good sense, is extended generally to every work to which some reward corresponds, whether from the dignity of the one working or from the liberality of the bestower; on which account not only infants newly baptized are said to merit the kingdom of heaven, but also the Church in the blessing of the Paschal candle says: O happy fault, which merited to have such and so great a Redeemer! Third, the name of merit is used more strictly to signify sometimes the well-earned reward itself; in which manner among the holy Fathers celestial glory and eternal felicity is called the merit of good works passively, namely because it is truly the recompense and crown of those good works. Finally, the name of merit is used most strictly and most properly insofar as it signifies a free action ordered toward a reward promised to it, whether from the dignity of the person working, or from the excellence of the work itself, or from the congruity or justice of the one rewarding. Hence merit is customarily distinguished threefold: the first, to which a reward is owed by the rigor of law, and which therefore is called merit of the rigor of justice; the second, to which a reward is owed by justice on account of the dignity of the work, and which is called merit of condignity; the third finally is that to which a reward is conferred from fittingness and congruity and the liberality of the one rewarding, which therefore is called merit of congruity.

Note 2. The name of merit in this fourth and last acceptation is so odious to the heretics of this age that Calvin did not hesitate to write in book 3 of his Institutes, chapter 5, that whoever first adapted it to human works compared with the judgment of God consulted very badly for the sincerity of faith; wherefore he there calls this name most arrogant. Certainly, he says, as it is most arrogant, nothing can more obscure the grace of God and diminish men than pride. For that most shameless heresiarch judges that we can merit nothing before God by our works; for he says in the same place:

We do not divide the praise of good works between God and man, as the Sophists do, but we preserve it whole and unimpaired for the Lord. We assign only this much to man, that those very things which were good he polluted and contaminated with his own impurity; for there will be nothing from man however perfect which is not stained with some blemish. Let the Lord therefore call into judgment those things which are best in human works: he will acknowledge in them his own justice indeed, but the disgrace and shame of man. Therefore good works please God, nor are they unfruitful to their authors. What more? He appoints the most ample benefits of God in place of remuneration, not because they so deserve it, but because the divine benignity appoints this reward for them of itself.

From these words it must be gathered that Calvin holds that our good works procure for us a reward and prize not by their own dignity, but from the liberality of God.

Note 3. And although absolutely speaking God should not be called a debtor with respect to a creature — since there is nothing in us which is not the work of his divine omnipotence and munificence — nevertheless out of goodness and fidelity he constitutes himself our debtor; or, as St. Augustine says in Psalm 109: God made himself a debtor to us, not by receiving anything from us, but by promising so much to us. And in Sermon 151 De tempore: The promiser God was made a debtor by his own goodness, not by our prerogative. What have we given him, that we might hold him a debtor? St. Cyprian concurs, in the book De opere et elemosyna, at the end, where he says of the true Merciful One: He merits Christ as judge, he reckons God a debtor to himself. And Fulgentius in the prologue on Paul to Monimus: Of his own bounty he deigned to make himself a debtor. And Bernard in the book De Gratia et libero Arbitrio: A promise indeed to be paid out of mercy, yet nonetheless to be discharged out of justice. For since God is faithful and true (Apocalypse 19), true indeed in promising and faithful in fulfilling what he has promised, thence it is that where he has promised something he is bound to fulfill it by truth and fidelity: and presently, since he has pledged ⟦leg.? raw: pluribi⟧ that he will give eternal life to those who worthily receive the sacraments and fulfill the divine commandments, no one ought to doubt that when man has rendered these, he has God as his debtor.

These things thus premised, two points remain for us to determine: first, whether truly good works elicited by a just man merit anything; second, what is the definition and nature of merit.

First Conclusion. — TRULY THE JUST MAN CAN BY HIS GOOD WORKS MERIT SOMETHING FROM GOD VERILY AND PROPERLY. For this is determined by faith in the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 16, in these words:

To men justified, whether they have preserved perpetually the grace received or recovered what was lost, the words of the Apostle are to be set forth: Abound in every good work, knowing that your labor is not in vain in the Lord; for God is not unjust, that he should forget your work and the love which you have shown in his name, and do not lose your confidence, which hath a great reward. And therefore to those who work well even unto the end and hope in God, everlasting life is to be proposed both as a grace mercifully promised to the sons of God through Christ Jesus, and as a reward faithfully to be rendered by the promise of God himself for their good works and merits.

Hence Canon 32 thus decrees:

If anyone shall say that the good works of a justified man are so gifts of God, that they are not also the good merits of the justified man himself; or that the justified man, by the good works which are done by him through the grace of God and the merit of Jesus Christ, of whose living member he is, does not truly merit an increase of grace, eternal life, and the attainment of that eternal life itself, if however he die in grace, and also an increase of glory: let him be anathema.

Proof 1. this truth from various oracles of Sacred Scripture. First indeed from all those in which it is asserted that God rewards the good works of the just with a recompense, for reward and merit are correlates. Thus Genesis 15, God promises Abraham: I am thy reward exceeding great. Wisd. 5. But the just shall live for evermore, and their reward is with the Lord. Ecclesiasticus 18. Be not wanting in justice until death, for the reward of good works is with the Lord. Matthew 5. Your reward is very great in heaven. 1 Cor. 15. Every one shall receive his own reward according to his own labour. Likewise from those texts in which God is said to render or repay to man according to his works. Thus Ps. 61. Thou wilt render to every man according to his works. The same is found in Matthew 16 and 25, and Romans 2. Now to render to every man according to his works is to assign a reward due to good works. Likewise from those passages in which the just are said to do something worthy before God, which dignity surely is none other than that of works which are worthy of reward and recompense. Wisd. ch. 3. God tempted them, and found them worthy of himself. Colossians 1. That you may walk worthy of God in all things pleasing, being fruitful in every good work. 2 Thessalonians 1. That you may be counted worthy of the kingdom of God. Finally from those places in which it is expressly stated that God renders a reward for good works as merits. Thus Ecclesiasticus 16. Mercy makes place to every one according to the merit of his works. There although the Greek text has not "according to the merit of his works," but only "according to his works," yet greater account must be had of the Vulgate, which was taken from Greek exemplars more correct than those now extant, and which alone is authentic, and without doubt expresses the true sense of Scripture. For it is the same thing to make place to anyone according to his works, and to make place to him according to the merit of his works. For if ⟦illegible: page ends mid-sentence; raw "Si enim er nperilus. imm non est", possibly "ex operibus, iam non est…"⟧ …grace. Rom. 11. And, To him that worketh, the reward is not reckoned according to grace...

Proof second from the Council of Orange, Can. 18. A reward is owed to good works if they are done; but grace, which is not owed, goes before, that they may be done. From the Lateran Council under Innocent III., and it is cited in the chapter Firmiter: Pleasing God by right faith and good works, they deserve to attain eternal blessedness. From the Florentine Council in the decree of union with the Greeks, where, treating of Purgatory, he says that the souls even of those who after Baptism received have incurred no stain of sin whatever, and also those who, after contracting the stain of sin, either in their bodies or when stripped of the same bodies, are purged, are received straightway into heaven, and clearly behold God himself three and one as he is; yet, on account of the diversity of merits, one more perfectly than another.

It is proved thirdly from Pope Celestine, Epist. to the Bishops of Gaul, cap. 12. So great, he says, is the goodness of God toward men, that he wills our merit to be what are his own gifts, and that for those things which he has bestowed he is going to give eternal rewards.

It is proved fourthly from the Fathers; Cyprian, Epist. 56, and the book De unitate Ecclesiae, in these words: Our merits receive their reward. Hilary, Can. 9 on Matthew. Ambrose on chapter 17 of Luke, and Serm. 7 on Ps. 118, where speaking of the just man he says: He knows that the kingdom of heaven, the fellowship of Angels, and also a crown laid up of merits, is reserved for him. And St. Augustine, Epist. 105. Are the merits of the just then none at all? Plainly they are, since they are just. And afterwards: As by the merit of sin death is rendered as it were a stipend, so by the merit of justice eternal life is rendered as it were a stipend. And afterwards: What merit therefore is there before grace? by which merit does he receive grace, since every good merit of ours is wrought in us only by grace, and since when God crowns our merits, he crowns nothing else than his own gifts? Whence in the book De gestis Pelagii, cap. 11, and in the book De Gratia et libero Arbitrio, cap. 8: When grace has been given, our merits also begin to be good through it, however; for if it withdraw itself, man falls, not raised up, but precipitated, by free will. And afterwards: Considering those words of the Apostle: I have fought a good fight, I have finished my course, etc., he subjoins: He commemorates these surely now as his good merits, that he may obtain the crown after good merits, who obtained grace after evil merits. Finally mark what follows: There is laid up for me, he says, a crown of justice, which the Lord, the just judge, will render to me in that day — which crown would the just judge render, if the merciful Father had not given grace, etc. And cap. 7. If therefore thy good merits are the gifts of God, God does not crown thy merits as thy merits, but as his own gifts. And Serm. 18 De verbis Apostoli, cap. 5. When God crowns thy merit, he crowns nothing but his own gifts. — To these subscribes St. Prosper, in answer to cap. 6 of the Gauls: Man, being justified, he says, received a gift whereby he might acquire merit, and merit. And St. Bernard, Serm. 68 on the Canticles: Dost thou dare, he says, to have merit? Know what thou hast received, thou hast held; pernicious pride is a want of merits.

Reason also lends its support; for there place is given to merit where place is given to justice: whereas between man and God there is place for justice, not indeed according to absolute equality, but according to a certain proportion, inasmuch namely as each operates according to his own mode; God indeed by ordaining man to the ultimate end, man truly by acting according to the ordination of God.

They object, the heretics adduce various texts of Scripture, by which they endeavour to prove, first, that all our works are unclean: thus Isaiah 64. We are become all of us as an unclean thing, and all our justices as the rag of a menstruous woman: therefore so far are our works from meriting any reward before God, that rather they provoke divine indignation.

Secondly, that all our works are unprofitable: thus Luke 15(?). When you shall have done all things that are commanded you, say: We are unprofitable servants. Thirdly, that eternal life is given to us as an inheritance as to sons, out of mercy and grace: therefore not on account of good works. The antecedent is evident from that Isaiah 55. All you that thirst, come to the waters: come, buy without money, and without any exchange. Likewise from that Romans 8. If sons, heirs also; heirs indeed of God. The consequence also appears true from that Romans 11. To him that worketh, the reward is reckoned not according to grace, but according to debt; and consequently, since eternal life is conferred upon us gratis, it is evident that it is not given on account of merits.

I answer, all these contexts of Sacred Scripture are not opposed to us. Not indeed the first: for, as even Calvin confesses, the mind of Isaiah is only to repress the complaint of the Jews, who, sent into exile, felt the anger of God against themselves: but the Prophet is not treating of the whole human race. And I say with St. Jerome that there speech is instituted only concerning the Jews, whose justices, that is, their sacrifices, observances, and legal ceremonies, which both there and elsewhere are often called justice in Scripture, were reputed unclean at the coming of Christ, for the reason that the Jewish people at that time provoked divine wrath by adding many things perversely against the commands of the law, and honoured God with lips only and outward rite. The text itself favours this exposition; for the chapter from which the aforesaid words were drawn is wholly about the coming of the Messiah; for so it begins: Who would rend the heavens, and come down. And afterwards: Thou art gone down, and at thy presence the mountains melted away.

To the second text I say that the passage has a threefold sense; of which the first is, that we are unprofitable servants because we do nothing useful for eternal life according to the condition of nature and human birth, but only according to the benefit of grace and divine adoption. Thus St. Ambrose expounds it, lib. 8 on Luke; Know therefore, he says, that thou art a servant bound by very many services of homage; prefer not thyself, because thou art called a son of God: grace must be acknowledged, but nature must not be ignored. The second sense is, that we are unprofitable servants in respect of God, who has no need of our goods, although we are useful in respect of ourselves, because whatsoever good we do by the observance of the commandments redounds to our own commodity and utility. Thus Bede interprets this passage. The third sense is, that we are unprofitable servants according to the common manner of speaking, whereby we are wont to call an unprofitable servant him who does nothing of himself, but performs only those things which are commanded; which interpretation seems to fit the mind of Christ the Lord; for he subjoins: what we ought to do, we have done. — To the third objection I say that, although eternal life is given out of grace, yet it is given as a reward: because, as the Council of Orange rightly said, Can. 18. A reward is owed to good works if they are done; but grace, which is not owed, goes before, that they may be done.

They object secondly. A servant is not held to merit anything, when he performs all that he owes to pay as due obedience to his Lord: but men who are the servants of God owe to God all that they bestow upon his honour and service: therefore under this title they merit nothing. — I answer first, denying the major; both because a servant by the service bestowed upon his Lord merits what is needful to himself for food and clothing, according to that word of 1 Corinthians 9: Thou shalt not muzzle the mouth of the ox that treadeth out the corn. And also because when the Lord covenants with a servant about wages, then the servant, in virtue of the pact and promise, can merit something: but God covenants with men about the conferring of eternal felicity upon those who keep the divine commandments, and who do or suffer something for the glory of God. I answer secondly, that men are not only the servants of God but adopted sons, and endowed with that liberty which Christ merited for us: and henceforth by that liberty they can merit something before God through their good works.

They object thirdly. Since Christ has merited eternal life for us, either his own merit suffices us for obtaining it, or it does not. If it suffices, our merits are superfluous: if it does not suffice, his oblation was insufficient for our salvation, which to assert is impious and blasphemous. — I answer, that the merit of Christ is most sufficient, nor is its sufficiency in any way diminished by the cooperation of our merits, but only applied: for as the operative power of creatures in natural works does not argue insufficiency of the divine omnipotence, but rather demonstrates and makes known that omnipotence, opening namely how God not only gave being to creatures, but communicated to them the power of operating: so the meritorious power and cooperation of the just argues rather the sufficiency and excellence of the merits of Christ, who not only could grant to the just supernatural being, but also the virtue of operating supernaturally and of meriting. Whence as the sufficiency of the good works of Christ, his prayer, love, abstinence, and other acts, does not exclude our prayer, love, abstinence, and other good works, so neither does the sufficiency of the merits of Christ exclude our good merits.

Finally they object St. Augustine, who seems in several places to exclude human merits, especially lib. De Praedest. sanctorum, cap. 15, where he says: Human merits here waste away, which perished through Adam; that what reigns may be the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord. — I answer, that St. Augustine by these words excludes only human merits elicited by the sole powers of nature: for in that chapter he institutes a comparison between Christ and the Christian; and proves that as Christ did not merit his own Incarnation, so neither can the Christian merit his own vocation. Hence after the aforesaid words he subjoins: Whosoever in our Head beholds the antecedent merits of that singular generation, let him seek in ourselves, his members, the proceeding merits of our multiplied regeneration; for that generation was not rendered back to Christ, but given, that he might be born of the Spirit and the Virgin alien from every obligation of sin; so also to us, that we might be born again of water and the Spirit, it was not rendered back for any merit, but given gratis.

Conclusion second. — MERIT IS AN ACT OF FREE AND HONEST POWER, ELICITED BY MAN AS WAYFARER, AND ACCEPTED BY GOD, AS WORTHY OF A REWARD DUE UNDER SOME TITLE OF GOODNESS OR JUSTICE.

WORTHY OF A REWARD DUE UNDER SOME TITLE OF GOODNESS OR JUSTICE.

It is gathered from the Doctor Subtle in 2 dist. 17 n. 1, where he says: I say that merit is something accepted or to be accepted in someone, for which something is to be rendered back by the accepter to him in whom it is, quasi as due to him for that merit, or beyond that for which he merited. And there the Doctor notes that since in respect of God nothing is to be accepted which was not accepted from eternity, therefore, he says, in the description of merit one need not place "to be accepted" in order to God. — The work is said therefore first to be free: for since natural acts, or coerced and involuntary ones, merit no praise nor reward whatever. There is added honest, whereby it is signified that the meritorious work ought to be an act of some virtue: for vicious and sinful works provoke not reward, but punishment and vengeance. There follows, elicited by man as wayfarer. For, says the Doctor in 1 dist. 21 qu. 2, to posit merit of congruity or of condignity in the soul after death does not seem consonant with Theological doctrine, which posits that state as immune from these. — The remaining parts are added to explain the diversity of merits. For to merits of condignity a reward is owed under the title of justice, but to merits of congruity only under the title of goodness and mercy. Moreover all the aforementioned parts of the definition will more clearly appear, and will be confirmed, in the following third Question, in which we shall open the conditions necessary to merit.

Note first. A fourfold genus of merits is distinguished by some Theologians. For one is called merit of condignity, another of congruity, a third of dignity, a fourth of impetration. That merit is called merit of condignity by which anyone merits from justice a supernatural reward proposed and promised by God to himself on account of the condignity of the work with such a reward. Merit of congruity is called that by which one attains that reward not on account of the condignity and equality of the work with the recompense, but only on account of the congruity by which the rewarder and remunerator is moved to bestow the reward out of his own goodness and mercy on account of the work elicited by the meriting one: although that work has no equality with such a reward, nor is that reward promised for such a work by the rewarder. Thus God, in respect of morally good works elicited by sinners in the state of sin, sometimes bestows the grace of faith and conversion. The Seraphic Doctor in 2 dist. 29 art. 2 qu. 3 judges that between these two merits, of condignity and of congruity, another must be admitted as mediating between both, which he calls the Verity of dignity, whereby namely one merits not indeed the essential reward, but the accidental, for the reason that he be worthy of attaining that reward by reason of the dignity of the work elicited by himself. Finally some Recentiors, besides these aforementioned genera of merits, judge that a fourth must moreover be admitted, which they call Merit of impetration, whereby one, not existing in grace, impetrates from divine mercy by his prayers and supplications the grace of conversion: which genus of merit they surely devised lest they should have to say that sinners merit the remission of sins from the help of God.

But whether these four genera of merits are to be admitted must here be determined.

Note secondly. That justice, according to which God is said to render a reward to the merits of the just, is neither legal nor distributive, but only commutative; for legal justice respects the right which the community has over persons and their goods in order to the common good, for the right of legal justice is founded in the title of community: but the right which the just acquire for themselves before God through merits is founded not in the title of community, but in this, that each exhibits to God services and good works elicited, for which God promised a condign reward. Distributive justice however per se respects the right which particulars have, founded in the title of community inasmuch as they are its members, and thence they have the right of participating in the common goods thereof, each according to his dignity; under which right indeed, as was said just now, the just do not enjoy in respect of the divine reward. Nor does it matter that the rewards are various and unequal, according as the merits are various and unequal; whence there results an inequality of proportion in the just man, who has so much more right to the reward as he has greater merits: this, I say, does not matter, for it is accidental to that justice in virtue of which rewards are rendered back, since it respects only the right of each, that it may compensate it with a proportionate recompense: whence if all were equal in merits, they would also be equal in reward. There remains therefore that that justice, in virtue of which the reward is granted to the merits of the just, is the very commutative justice, which respects the private rights of particulars qua such, that it may render what is due to them according to the equality and proportion of the work to the reward.

Note thirdly. That any work can be called condign, equal to a reward, in two ways, namely either by arithmetical equality and of quantity, or by geometrical equality and of proportion. But a work is held worthy of a reward by arithmetical equality when namely the work, inasmuch as it is of such a person, considered in itself and absolutely, is of so much value as is the reward which is rendered back to him: after which manner the daily labour of a hireling is of so much value in itself as is the wage by which it is justly wont to be compensated. It is truly worthy of a wage by an equality of proportion when, although the work considered in itself and absolutely, inasmuch as it is of such a person, is exceeded by the magnitude of the reward; nevertheless, considered according to certain circumstances, to wit, the excellence of the promiser, the motive for which he promises, and other conditions honouring and illustrating that promise, that work is held to be morally worthy of such a reward. Hence once such a cognition is touched upon, such a reward is owed to that work from justice. Thus Saul had justly promised his daughter in marriage to him who should kill Goliath; for although the daughter of a King was held to be a more excellent reward, and far worthier than what a common soldier ought to have for the killing of one adversary, nevertheless, attention being given to the solemn royal promise, and other circumstances weighed, namely that that giant was mocking the armies of Israel, nor did any dare to assail him in single combat, David justly merited the firstborn daughter of Saul in marriage as his vanquisher, and when she was denied to him, demanded her, though wedded to another. Yet there must be some proportion between the work and the merit, for foolishly and madly Herod had promised to give even the half of his kingdom to the daughter of Herodias for her dancing.

Three things therefore are to be determined in this Question: First, how manyfold is the genus of merits. Secondly, whether men truly can merit anything before God de condigno. Thirdly, whether the works of the just are meritorious de condigno by arithmetical equality, or only geometrical.

Conclusion first. — WE MUST DISTINGUISH MERIT TWOFOLDLY, NAMELY DE CONDIGNO, AND DE CONGRUO(?). This opinion is the more common and truer.

It is proved: A capital genus of merits must be assigned in as many ways as there are modes by which men can merit divine rewards: but that mode is twofold, namely by condignity, and by congruity: therefore, etc. The major is evident per se. The minor is proved: men can merit divine benefits in as many modes as there are modes by which divine rewards are obtained: but those modes are only two, namely from justice, and from seemliness and congruity: therefore, etc. It is proved further from Sacred Scripture, which acknowledges both this merit and that. Indeed merit de condigno, as is evidently apparent from what has been said; but also merit de congruo. For on the one hand it asserts that we are justified freely, Rom. 3, that is, without merit de condigno: on the other hand James 2 affirms that we are justified by works not only done in grace, which merit an increase of grace de condigno, but also by morally good works which are done in the state of mortal sin, of which St. James seems chiefly to be understood when to confirm this he uses the example of Rahab the harlot. Now for these works justification is owed only from seemliness and congruity: therefore Sacred Scripture acknowledges merit de congruo. — It is confirmed from this, that the same Scripture testifies that God promises pardon to penitents, and is moved by their tears and acts of penance to grant indulgence: therefore Scripture acknowledges some merit in the acts of the penitent before justification. — Item, the holy Fathers acknowledge merit, for Cyprian, in the Sermon de lapsis, says generally concerning the true penitent before the grace of justification received that he will make the Church glad, and will now merit not only the grace of God, but the crown. And Ambrose, lib. De poenitentia, cap. 3, speaking of the sinner under the parable of the prodigal, speaks thus: So quickly does he merit pardon that while he is yet afar off and coming the Father runs to meet him, and gives kisses, which is the mark of pure flesh. And Augustine, in Ps. 50 De Virinitatibus(?), speaks thus: They spoke penance, and merited true mercy. Whence Epist. 105. Lest even that remission of sins itself, he says, without some merit...

You will say first: Besides these two genera of merits there seem still to be two others necessarily to be admitted already mentioned by us, namely merit of dignity, and merit of impetration: therefore that division is defective. The antecedent is proved: for first that merit of dign(?) is that by which one would impetrate something distinct from glory: but this cannot be recalled neither …and merit of condignity; for hereby one merits only an increase of grace or glory: nor yet to merit of congruity: because that imports not obligation, but only congruity of bestowing a reward on account of the seemliness and dignity of the work. Similarly while a sinner merits the grace of conversion, or another benefit, he cannot merit it by merit of dignity because he is not in grace; nor by merit of congruity, because the works of a sinner are execrable to God: therefore beyond these two merits another must be assigned, namely merit of impetration, whereby assuredly by the force of impetration he impetrates that grace.

I deny the antecedent. And to the proof I say that both that merit of dignity and of impetration is recalled to merit of congruity. The former indeed, because such merit induces not the negation of giving from justice, but only from congruity of granting to a just man this or that benefit beyond right to the increase of grace, or the attainment of eternal glory. Similarly when someone, whether just or sinner, impetrates from God some benefit in virtue of his good works or prayers, either he impetrates it by reason of the divine pact, and of the dignity of the work proceeding from grace, or only from the pure mercy and goodness of God. If the former, that merit is of condignity: if truly the latter, it pertains to merit of congruity: therefore no reason appears for multiplying the genera of merits beyond the two members assigned.

You will say secondly: No merit of congruity is given: therefore the aforesaid division fails. The antecedent is evident: for that merit is one to which the reward corresponds equally; but to no work does the reward correspond equally unless it proceed from sanctifying grace; for God in justice owes the sinner nothing but vengeance and punishment, etc.

I deny the antecedent, because merit of congruity exists then when it is congruous for God to repay with that benefit a man doing this or that good moral work, which benefit the man intends to obtain through such a work: but sometimes it is congruous for God to repay to a man doing something the benefit which he intends to obtain. Thus it is congruous for God to grant, to the prayers of the just who devote themselves to works of mortification, the conversion of men given over to pleasures. It is equally congruous to grant to sinners asking pardon and mercy the grace of conversion and penitence: for which reason St. Augustine says that the same sins sometimes merit justification; thus Epistle 106: if anyone shall say that faith merits the grace of acting well, we cannot deny it, but confess it most gladly.

Second Conclusion. — IN TRUTH MEN MERIT BEFORE GOD DE CONDIGNO, OR FROM A JUSTICE AND AN EQUALITY OF THE WORK WITH THE SUPERNATURAL REWARD. This Conclusion follows from what we said in the preceding Question, in which it was proved that men truly merit something before God, for this reason, that He judges their works worthy of reward and recompense.

It is proved moreover by those testimonies of Scripture by which it is intimated that a right of the goods of justice is acquired through the merits of the just, having a certain equality with the reward. For first Scripture commends the condignity of works, Wisdom 3: God tried them (the just), and found them worthy of himself. And Apocalypse 3: They shall walk with me in white, because they are worthy. And 2 Thessalonians 1: In all your persecutions and tribulations which you endure for an example of the just judgment of God, that you may be counted worthy of the kingdom of God, for which you also suffer. And it commends justice when it adds: if so be (for "if indeed" according to the force of the Greek text) it is just before God to repay tribulation to those who trouble you, and to you who are troubled rest with us. And Hebrews 6: For God is not unjust, that he should forget your work and the love which you have shown in his name, who have ministered to the saints and do minister.

The same truth the Holy Fathers teach, who acknowledge condignity and justice in the good works of the just. Thus St. Cyprian, Epistle 26: The Lord will render to you a reward for this your charity, and will present the delightful fruit of so good a work: for he who exhorted is no less worthy of the reward of the crown than he who suffered. Chrysostom, homily on Lazarus: If God is just, he will render to these and to those according to their merits. Augustine in many places, especially book On Nature and Grace, chapter 2: God is not unjust, who would defraud the just of the reward of justice.

The same is established from those Councils praised in the First Conclusion of the preceding Question, but most of all from the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 16, where it attributes both conditions, of justice and of condignity, not obscurely to the good works of the just. Justice indeed, when it says at the beginning of the chapter, that eternal life is rendered to them by God as a just judge, as a reward and as a crown of justice; but condignity and equality with the reward it acknowledges in these same works, when about the middle of the same chapter it says, that such honor is given to good works in Sacred Scripture, that Christ promises that even he who gives a cup of cold water to one of his least ones shall not lose his reward. And the Apostle testifies that that which at present is momentary and light of our tribulation worketh above measure in us an eternal weight of glory. Therefore when the Council says that such honor is given to the good works of the just, the sense is that those works are so esteemed and become of such worth that they are judged worthy of so great a reward, namely eternal felicity.

Yet although these things are most commonly received among Theologians, nevertheless there are not wanting those who think otherwise; for Vasquez, disputation 213, together with several others, denies that merit de condigno acquires before God a true right of justice, and holds that the reward is owed on account of gratitude. But Durandus, in 2 dist. 21 q. 2, judges that the just do not properly and simply merit de condigno before God: not only because God cannot be obligated to man by justice, but also because meritorious works do not have an equality with the reward of eternal glory. That however their reasons and foundations may be resolved:

You will object first: There can be no justice between God and a creature: therefore although the just truly merit de condigno, yet they do not acquire toward God a right of justice, and consequently the reward is not owed to their merits by justice, but only by fidelity or gratitude.

I deny the antecedent; for it does not conflict that there be in men some true right of justice with respect to God, protected by His free institution and covenant: first because Holy Scripture frequently inculcates that a reward is justly owed to the works of the just from the pact and promise of God; for Scripture, which somewhere preaches that God will be faithful in fulfilling His promises, more often affirms that He will be a just judge, and that as such He will render the crown of justice: then because a burdensome promise, under the condition of a work having some equality with the thing promised, induces an obligation of justice in the promiser: but God promised the just eternal life under the condition of good works elicited in grace and having some equality with that reward, inasmuch as they are of the supernatural order even as that reward: therefore the just can through their good works acquire some right of justice toward God.

You will urge: That right of justice, if it existed, would be most especially of commutative justice: but there can be no right of commutative justice of man toward God: therefore, etc. The major is established from the second Notable point. The minor is proved: no one is obligated to another by commutative justice unless he receive something advantageous and useful to himself: but God can receive nothing advantageous and useful from creatures: therefore, etc. — I deny the minor, and to its proof I answer first by denying the major: for that anyone be obligated to another by commutative justice, it is not always necessary that he receive from him something advantageous and useful to himself; for it suffices if something be made pleasing to him by convention and promise of a reward. I answer secondly, denying the minor: for men can render to God something not only pleasing to Him, but even advantageous and useful to His extrinsic good, namely to His external glory. For although all the supernatural good works of men are more God's than man's, because they are done principally by Him, and by His grace preventing and cooperating; yet they are proper to the man himself, inasmuch as they are done by him freely, and can be elicited at the judgment of the same man for the glory of God or on account of another end: wherefore on this account God can be obligated to man not only by fidelity, but also by justice, when He constitutes Himself by pact and by mercy debtor of men.

You will object secondly. Whatever God bestows upon men He gives only by gratitude, or by fidelity, or by mercy: therefore none of those gifts is from justice. The antecedent is proved: for God confers nothing on man except from His pure goodness without any debt, and thus it is a benefit of mercy; or from a debt arising from a promise made, and thus it is a payment of fidelity; or from some motive intervening on the part of man, and thus it is an increase of gratitude: therefore, etc. — I deny the antecedent, for besides these three genera of divine(?) bestowal of benefits there is also a fourth, namely from the motive of justice, which conflicts less with God than gratitude itself; for gratitude properly so called respects a benefit properly so called: but the merit of man toward God is not a benefit properly so called, but an homage and service, which however great it may be cannot equal the benefits which he previously received from God; who hath first given to him, and recompense shall be made him? says the Apostle, Romans 11. Moreover all homages and services rendered to the Lord, especially those done from precept, cannot obligate God by gratitude, according to that saying of Christ, Luke 17: Doth he thank that servant for doing the things which he commanded him? So you also, when you shall have done all the things that are commanded you, say: We are unprofitable servants.

Third Conclusion. — THE MERITORIOUS WORKS OF THE JUST ARE DE CONDIGNO OF ETERNAL LIFE BY AN EQUALITY NOT OF QUANTITY, BUT OF PROPORTION. This is the more common and truer opinion,

And it is proved first from Holy Scripture, which teaches that the works of the just, even considered as done by the just and adopted sons of God, are not worthy of so great a reward. Romans 8: The sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the future glory which shall be revealed in us: where the Apostle speaks of those sufferings as endured by the sons of God and from the power of Christian hope: according to what he premised a little before: For the Spirit himself giveth testimony to our spirit that we are the sons of God. And 2 Corinthians 4: For that which at present is momentary and light of our tribulation worketh above measure in us an eternal weight of glory. By which words he intimates the reason of the inequality, because indeed those sufferings are transitory and finite, even as done by a just man and pleasing to God: but the reward is infinite, namely the vision and possession of God, which is of infinite worth, because it is of infinite and eternal duration. To the same belongs what Christ says, Luke 6: A good measure and pressed down and shaken together and running over shall they give into your bosom.

It is proved secondly from Councils and Fathers, for the Council of Sens celebrated under Clement VII teaches it not obscurely in decree of faith 16, when it says thus: And finally the place of all mercy will make for each one according to the measure of his works, not absolutely of condignity indeed, but rather by a gratuitous and liberal promise. By which covenant having been made concerning the daily denarius he hires laborers into his vineyard. — The Holy Fathers teach the same: especially St. Fulgentius(?), book 1 On the Truth of Predestination(?), chapter 10, giving the reason why eternal life is called grace by the Apostle, Romans 6, although it be the reward of merits: Grace, he says, is not unjustly called so, because God not only repays His gifts with His gifts, but because so greatly does the grace of the dignity of retribution overflow there, that incomparably and ineffably every merit may be(?) as it were a mere point(?), and it may be given from God and avail for the human will and operation. Preuserat(?) — Eusebius Emissenus had said before, Homily 3 on Quadragesima(?): Although, he says, we should toil with all the labors of soul and body, although we should strive to labor with all the forces of obedience, yet we shall be able to compare nothing worthy of merit for the heavenly goods, nor to offer them.

Reason likewise supports this: for the value of a finite work cannot merit the excellence of an infinite reward according to an equality of quantity, but only according to a certain condignity of proportion: but the value of good works in itself is finite: but the reward, namely eternal life, is infinite, since it is the enjoyment of God Himself. Therefore it superexceeds the value of finite merit: therefore between the two there can be no equality of quantity, but only of proportion. Wherefore the holy Apostle in many places, especially 1 Corinthians 9 and Philippians 3 and 2 Timothy 4, compares eternal life promised to the good works of the just to the prize and crown proposed to those contending in the stadium, which is accustomed to be equal only by an equality of proportion.

You will say: Of the finite to the infinite there is no proportion: but, as was said just now, meritorious works are of finite value: therefore there is not even an equality of proportion between those works and eternal glory. — I distinguish the major: there is no physical proportion, of thing to thing, I concede: for far does the infinite reward exceed finite merit, if it be considered according to its entity: there is no moral proportion of the dignity of the work to the dignity of the reward, I deny. For meritorious works have a certain supernatural and infinite dignity, not indeed from their own proper physical entity, but from the promise of the One accepting those works unto such a reward, and likewise from the intention and affection of the one acting, who strives with all his powers to expend so much service to God as he can, and consequently if he had infinite virtue he would produce an act of infinite entity. Whence the act elicited by him, although it be finite according to its effect, is nevertheless infinite according to its affection. But since God weighs rather the affection of the one acting than the effect of the work, thence it comes about that He judges it just and equitable to bestow an infinite reward for works finite in entity.

You will say secondly: If the just can merit de condigno eternal life, with the ordination and promise of God supervening, they can with the same supervening merit de condigno for another grace, and consequently remission of mortal sin, which is a secondary effect of sanctifying grace: but this consequent militates against the doctrine of the holy Fathers and Theologians affirming that no pure creature can merit, or satisfy, de condigno for mortal sin: wherefore the merits of Christ and His divine satisfaction for our sins were necessary. — I answer first, that the major can be denied: for it is far higher and more difficult for a just man to merit de condigno for another existing in mortal sin grace and remission of sins than for himself: because he himself is already reckoned worthy of grace and eternal glory, which are owed to him under the title of inheritance by reason of the sanctifying grace with which he is endowed: and therefore it does not follow that, if with the promise of God supervening his works have a certain condignity with eternal life, which is consummated grace, they must have the same with sanctifying grace to be bestowed on another enemy of God and hated by Him: for a friend can more easily merit for himself a benefit from a friend than from that friend's enemy, who could bestow the benefit. — I answer secondly, that the minor can be denied: for when the holy Fathers and Theologians deny that any pure creature can satisfy de condigno for mortal sin, they do not speak of merit and satisfaction from the rigor of justice, or of thing to thing, which certainly we do not attribute to the good works of the just; but only of an equality of proportion. Add to these things that that opinion of the Theologians is not generally received: for very many with the Subtle Doctor affirm that by an extraordinary disposition of God some creature can satisfy God for the sins of others, as was said in the preceding Treatise.

Note first. That since in merit adequately taken three things can be considered, namely the person rewarding, the person meriting, and the meritorious work, from each of those headings certain conditions are required; to wit, some on the part of God rewarding, others on the part of man working or meriting, and finally others on the part of the work itself or of the merit: on the part indeed of God rewarding and recompensing a pact concerning the rendering of a reward is required; but on the part of man meriting the state of grace and of the way is required; finally on the part of the work liberty is necessary, or that the work be done freely with liberty properly so called, as well as honesty, because a meritorious work must be morally good, and supernatural, since merit is under the title of grace. Of all which conditions we must treat in the present Question.

Note secondly. As regards the explication of the first condition, these two things are to be distinguished, namely that the promise of God is required for this, that a good work have an equality and proportion with the reward, and that that promise is required for merit de condigno, in such wise that this promise confers no dignity upon the meritorious work. In the former way indeed the promise is intrinsic to the meritorious work, because it contributes to its dignity. But in the latter it is only extrinsic. The truth of which distinction is understood from those things which occur in commutative justice among men; for a pact is sometimes extrinsic to the thing to be exchanged, when evidently the exchange would take place no less even if the pact did not proceed; sometimes however it is intrinsic to the thing to be exchanged, when manifestly no exchange of some thing with another takes place except by the force and reason of the preceding pact. — It was said above that good works elicited from grace have an equality of proportion with the reward by reason of the divine promise and of the pact entered into by God with man: whether however this promise is so necessary to the condignity of the work, that without it the work does not have the adequate reason of merit, some Theologians deny with Vasquez, disputation 213, chapter 8, where he teaches that the divine promise has indeed accrued to the works of the just, yet in no way pertains to the reason of merit, but rather accrues to works already worthy and meritorious.

Note thirdly. That the necessity of sanctifying grace for meriting is required not only by reason of washing away mortal sin, because manifestly those who are in the state of mortal sin are incapable of acquiring a right before God unto eternal life, yea are liable to damnation and eternal death, but sanctifying grace is required for merit most especially by reason of the disproportion which our works have with so great a reward unless they be done by adopted sons of God, to whom it altogether befits that an inheritance be set forth by a father as the reward of labors; whence also in the state of innocence sanctifying grace was necessary for the first parents in order to merit: whereupon deservedly by supreme Pontifical law Gregory XIII and Pius V condemned this eighteenth proposition of Michael Baius: They hold with Pelagius, who say that it is necessary to the reason of merit that man through the grace of adoption be raised up to the deified state.

First Conclusion. — THAT THE WORKS OF THE JUST MAY TRULY BE MERITORIOUS OF ETERNAL LIFE, THERE IS REQUIRED ON THE PART OF GOD A PROMISE AND PACT CONCERNING THE GIVING OF A REWARD. Thus the Subtle Doctor, in 1 dist. 17 q. 3 n. 22, where speaking of the meritorious act he says: It is believed to be one condition in the act, namely that it is acceptable to God: not only by a certain common acceptation, inasmuch as He accepts every creature, or also that now He wills the act abstracted from sin, otherwise it would not be from Him: but from a special acceptation, which is in the divine will an ordination of that act to eternal life as of merit condign to reward: in this manner we believe also our nature, although beatifiable, to be habitually accepted as just, that is, when it does not act(?) in act: nevertheless still in the divine will He orders it to eternal life, as worthy of so great a good according to the disposition which it habitually has in itself.

The conclusion is proved; First indeed from the Council of Sens, chapter 16, where it decrees: God makes for each one a place according to the measure of his works, not by absolute condignity, but by a gratuitous and liberal promise; by which covenant having been made concerning the daily denarius, he sent laborers into his vineyard. And there it gives the reason why God could not be obligated toward men without His promise, saying: And although your works, namely those of the just, are such that God by a certain right of His can exact them from us: and the saints, even if they have done all things that are commanded them, ought both to acknowledge and to say that they are unprofitable servants; yet since they flow from charity, and are effects of the grace of God, and because God most liberally promised to those who work according to His will a reward, they are deemed worthy of the same remuneration both of temporal goods and of eternal life. The Council of Trent also favors this, Session 6, chapter 16, where it says: To those who work well unto the end and trust in God, eternal life is to be proposed, both as grace mercifully promised to the sons of God through Jesus Christ, and as a reward to be faithfully rendered by the promise of God Himself to their good works and merits.

It is proved secondly from Holy Scripture; namely from all those oracles by which eternal life is signified to us to be rendered on account of the divine promise. Thus notable is that parable Matthew 20, where concerning the laborers sent into the vineyard by the householder, we read that having made a convention with the laborers concerning a daily denarius, he sent them into his vineyard; and afterwards: Friend, I do thee no wrong, hast thou not agreed with me for a denarius? take what is thine own. Wherefore the Apostle very often expounds eternal life under the name of promise. Thus Hebrews 6: By faith and patience they shall inherit the promises. And chapter 10: And doing the will of God you may receive the promise. Hence James, chapter 1, pronounces: Blessed is the man that endureth temptation, for when he hath been proved he shall receive the crown of life which God hath promised to them that love him. And the Apostle, 1 Timothy 4: Godliness is profitable to all things, having promise of the life that now is and of that which is to come.

It is proved also by reason: For merit de condigno there is required that he who merits some reward have a true right to obtain it: but man cannot acquire any true right to obtain some reward from God unless the divine promise intervene: therefore neither can he merit de condigno before God without a promise of this kind. The major stands: because for no other cause is eternal life called in Scripture a crown of justice, a hire, and a reward, than that it may be shown to be owed to man from a certain justice, and that man may have some right to obtain that reward. But the minor is urged; because man cannot have a true right to obtain a reward from God unless God be held by justice to render him such a reward, and consequently unless God be debtor to him. For to him that worketh, says the Apostle, Romans 4, the reward is not reckoned according to grace but according to debt. Hence St. Augustine on Psalm 83, expounding that text of Timothy 4, What reward the Lord shall render me in that day the just judge, says: He will bestow pardon, He will render the crown: He is donor of indulgence, debtor of the crown. But it is impossible that God, who is supreme Lord of all, to whom by infinite titles we owe all our things, should become debtor to us, unless there intervene a certain promise and pact on His part, whereby He binds Himself to render to us a reward condign in this or that work: but since God cannot owe man some reward short of His free promise, it is necessary that that intervene, that man may truly merit de condigno. It is confirmed: if anyone were bound to cultivate another's field under some other title, while both his body and instruments were held under the dominion and power of another. It is confirmed secondly, because no other reason can be rendered than the lack of the divine promise why we do not merit de condigno perseverance for ourselves, and efficacious aids for overcoming whatever temptations and for exercising any good work whatsoever, just as we merit eternal life, which is far more excellent than perseverance itself and those efficacious aids: likewise why souls of the dead do not merit in purgatory, since they are not yet at the terminus; finally, why Christ the Lord in fact did not merit some things for us which certainly He could otherwise merit: e. g. efficacious aids for all unto perseverance, and the restoration of original justice, or the election of all efficaciously unto glory: for speaking per se He could equally have merited this condignly as the other benefits which we receive from God on account of His merit, had God so ordained and promised: therefore the first and principal reason is the lack of the divine ordination and promise.

You will say. A promise is not necessary in merit among men: therefore neither with God. The sequence is evident from parity of reason. For the antecedent is proved: for he who cultivates the field of another, the latter commanding and seeing or willing it, merits receiving a wage from the lord by justice, although no express pact and promise concerning such a wage has intervened, and he is compelled in judgment to pay the debt owed.

I answer first, that the antecedent can be denied, for even among men there cannot be merit de condigno from mere justice without some public promise, or a private pact tacit or express: for in the alleged example a tacit pact intervenes, because when someone sees or perceives that another, in hope of obtaining gain, labors for his utility, who is not bound to such labor from elsewhere, he tacitly consents to bind himself to compensate such labor. I answer secondly, denying the consequence; for there is not equal reason of man toward man, and of the same man compared to God, because man can expend his labor for the utility of another, to whom he owes such labor under no title: but all good works of the just are owed to God under another title than justice, for they are gifts of God Himself, and God can require them under the title of gratitude; whence each one of the just ought to appropriate that saying of David, 1 Paralipomenon: All these things which we have received of thy hand we have given to thee: therefore they cannot obligate God without His own pact and promise to contend with Him for a reward on account of them, especially so great a one as is the eternal wage.

You will say. Any mortal sin whatsoever, in order to merit eternal punishment, does not need that some pact intervene: therefore also good works merit eternal life with every pact excluded.

I deny the consequence, and the reason of the disparity is, that more is required for good merit than for evil: for in evil merit there is not a right, but a debt; for he who sins constitutes himself debtor of punishment before God, and God acquires a right to inflict punishment upon him if He wills, on account of the injury received; but he who merits de condigno makes God debtor to himself, and acquires a right of receiving a reward: but God cannot become debtor with respect to a creature without His gratuitous promise, as was said just now.

You will say. If the promise of God were necessary for the reason of merit, it would follow that many just men do not merit eternal life, because a promise does not bind unless given and accepted: but what just man accepts that divine promise; for that a promise may be accepted, it must be known to him who works: but to very many just men, and those working well, such a divine pact concerning the rendering of a reward is unknown: therefore, etc.

I answer by denying the major, for no one can merit before God without faith, for, as St. Paul says, Hebrews 11: He that cometh to God must believe that he is, and is a rewarder to them that seek him. Although however they have not distinctly known what and how great that reward is, and whether it has been only proposed, or indeed also promised: nevertheless it suffices for acquiring a right that they accept it, whatever it may be from God, and howsoever it be constituted. There is therefore no believer who has not at least a confused confidence in the divine reward promised, which he at least virtually and interpretatively accepts; because each one is presumed to wish to acquire by his works whatever he can, for anyone easily consents to what is for his own good.

Second Conclusion. — FOR MERIT OF CONDIGNITY THERE IS REQUIRED ON THE PART OF THE WORKER THAT HE BE IN THE STATE OF WAY AND GRACE. This likewise is common on both sides: the first part of which is proved by all those texts of Scripture by which it is signified that the time of meriting is determined by God to be none other than the time of the present life. Thus Ecclesiasticus ⟦cap.?⟧ Whatsoever thy hand is able to do, do it earnestly: for neither work, nor reason, nor wisdom, nor knowledge shall be in hell, whither thou art hastening. By which names of knowledge and wisdom is signified that cognition which is necessary for meriting. And chapter 11: If the tree fall to the south, or to the north, in what place soever it shall fall, there shall it be. And Ecclesiasticus, chapter 14: Before death work justice: for there is no finding food in hell. And chapter 16: Every mercy will make a place to every one according to the merit of his works, and according to the meditation of his journey. John 9: The night cometh when no man can work: where by night Christ understands death. Hence the Apostle admonished, 2 Corinthians 6: Behold, now is the acceptable time; behold, now is the day of salvation. And Galatians 6: Whilst we have time, let us work good to all: for, he says, Hebrews 9: It is appointed unto men once to die, and after this the judgment. The thing also holy Cyprian teaches in the book Ad Demetrianum, near the end: When this passing away shall have occurred, there is no longer any place for penance; here life is either lost or held. Jerome, expounding these words of Galatians 6, For what things a man soweth, those also shall he reap, says: The time of sowing is the present life which we run; when this life has passed away, the time of working (namely, meritoriously) is taken away. August., in the Enchiridion, chapter 11

Let no man hope that what he has neglected here he will be able to merit after he has migrated to God. St. Prosper finally, sentence 172: In vain does man promise himself after this body what he neglected to acquire in this body.

Reason also favors this; since the present life is the way to immortality and reward, it was fitting that it should be the stadium and the time of meriting, whereby we might attain the reward promised us; for merit is a certain way or tending toward the reward, and accordingly it was becoming that as long as we run in the stadium of this mortal life we can merit the reward of immortal blessing, but not when constituted outside this state. But by the name of wayfarer the theologians understand man dwelling in a mortal body and mortal condition: wherefore neither those who, freed from the body, have passed from among the living, nor those who have risen again after taking it up anew, are reckoned wayfarers. Hence the most blessed Virgin, who rose again after death and was assumed into heaven in her glorious body, must not be placed in the number of wayfarers; on the contrary, Lazarus, and all those who by divine power were raised from the dead, truly were wayfarers and could merit. The same must not be thought of Enoch and Elias, who although still mortal, because nevertheless they did not live under the mortal condition⟦illegible: one or more lines lost in faded print between "mor-" and "peculiari lege", presumably "…tali qua caeteri mortales vivunt, sed"⟧ by a peculiar law they were, and are preserved alive unto the last times to contend with Antichrist, they ought not be accounted wayfarers: for, says Tertullian in book Adversus Iudaeos, chapter 2: Enoch, far from having tasted death, is a candidate for eternity. Or as he says in book De Resurr. Carnis, chapter 43: Enoch and Elias, not yet having passed through resurrection, because not having finished life, yet translated from the world, and by this very fact already candidates for eternity: therefore in that state they cannot merit; otherwise either frequent and ordinary concurrence of God for acting well would have to be denied them, or finally they would equal, indeed far surpass, the merits of the other Saints, and even of the most blessed Virgin herself, because it is incredible that in so long and enduring a time they did not exercise far more pious and meritorious acts than the most holy Virgin could elicit in the whole space of her life: or that with an almost infinite multitude of good acts they did not equal her intense acts, especially since they live a quiet and tranquil life free from every molestation of temptations, and hence most prepared for all works of virtue. Add to these that sacred Scripture seems to favor our observation, speaking of Enoch when he was translated, as if time were no longer counted to him, his age being completed at the number of 36 years. The second part also is proved, namely that the state of sanctifying grace is necessarily required for meriting. It is proved, I say, from Genesis 4: The Lord had respect to Abel, and to his offerings. By which words, as St. Greg. observes, Moralia 22, chapter 8, it is signified that God first regards the person rather than the gift: nor does He hold the offerer pleasing on account of the gifts, but the gifts on account of the offerer. So likewise in John 15 the Lord Christ teaches that, as the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, so you also, unless you abide in me, namely through living faith, which is joined to charity and grace. And a little after: If any one abide not in me, he shall be cast forth as a branch, and shall wither, and they shall gather him up, and cast him into the fire. Hence the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 16, places this among the conditions required for meriting, that those who merit be justified, and inserted into Christ as living branches and living members: > For since, it says,

Christ Jesus himself, as head into the members, and as vine into the branches, continually infuses virtue into the very justified themselves, which virtue always precedes, accompanies, and follows their good works, and without which they could not in any way be pleasing and meritorious before God, etc. Wherefore deservedly was the contrary error condemned by the supreme Pontiffs Pius V and Gregory XIII, condemning this proposition no. 1 of Baius: The opinion of Pelagius is that a good work done apart from the grace of adoption is not meritorious of the heavenly kingdom.

The holy Fathers also concur, especially St. Augustine, book De fide et operibus, chapter 14: Good works follow, he says, the man justified; they do not precede him that he may be justified; in which place he speaks of works meritorious of eternal life, not of goods morally good. And book De spiritu et littera, chapter 29: Through the spirit, he says, incorporated and made his member, each one can work justice, giving intrinsic growth. Hence St. Prosper, against the chapters of the Gauls, chapter 6, says: Man justified, that is, made pious from impious, receives with no preceding good merit the gift by means of which he acquires and merits.

Reason also favors this: for he who is not justified by justifying grace is guilty of sin, on account of which he merits de condigno death and eternal punishment, according to Romans 6: The wages of sin is death, and consequently incurs privation of eternal glory: but it is impossible for man simultaneously to merit privation of and possession of eternal glory: therefore as long as he lies in sin he cannot merit eternal life de condigno. Then, all works done without sanctifying grace are works of man the enemy of God, and consequently cannot satisfy Him: therefore much less can they merit the promised reward. Finally, if the state of grace were not required for merit, it would follow that by one mortal sin all merits do not perish: for as a preceding sin would not prevent new merits from being made, so neither would a subsequent sin extinguish merits already made: but the consequence is against Scripture saying that, if the just man turn away from his justice, all the justices which he hath done shall not be remembered any more.

You will say. Sacred Scripture plainly hands down that whoever keeps the divine commandments shall obtain eternal life, nor is the state of grace required for that. Thus Matthew 19: If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments: hence St. Augustine, book De natura et gratia, chapter 2. Nature, he says, of the human race procreated from the flesh of that one transgressor, if it can suffice itself for fulfilling the law and perfecting justice, ought to be secure concerning the reward, that is, concerning eternal life: even if in some nation, or in some earlier time faith in the blood of Christ lay hidden from it: for God is not unjust, who defrauds the just of the wage of justice: therefore the state of justice is not necessary for meriting eternal life.

I deny the consequence, and to the text of Scripture I say that no one keeps the commandments perfectly who does not love God with his whole heart, whole soul, whole mind, and whole strength, for this is the first commandment; but by the force of this love man is justified, if he be not yet just, and by the virtue of the same he attains eternal salvation if he persevere in keeping the commandments. To the second I answer that St. Augustine does not want that man can merit eternal life without habitual grace; nay rather the contrary is gathered from the lauded words. God is unjust, who would defraud the just of the wage of justice: for in those words he supposes that those to whom eternal life is owed are just. Therefore he only intends to show against the Pelagians that man cannot keep all the precepts of the law by his own powers, because otherwise Christ would have died gratuitously, as he himself infers in chapters 1 and 2 of the preface of the aforesaid book — than which inference he demonstrates to be true from this, that he who keeps the whole law and fulfills justice merits eternal life: whence it becomes a consequence that if anyone can fulfill the whole law and keep justice without grace, even without it he can obtain eternal life: whence it follows that Christ died gratuitously, nor should He be called the author of our glorification.

You will urge. St. Augustine teaches in several places that the opinion of the Pelagians was that the grace of adoption, by which men are constituted sons of God, is necessary for the attainment of the kingdom of heaven: for he says in book De peccatorum meritis et remissione, chapter 18: but they (the Pelagians) move something worthy of consideration and discussion. They seem to offer who say that infants newly born brought forth from their mothers' wombs receive baptism not for the remitting of sin, but that, lacking spiritual generation, they may be created in Christ, and become partakers of his kingdom of heaven, etc. He has the same in several places elsewhere. The Pelagians, however, held on the other side that grace was not necessary for keeping the whole law, but that it could be fulfilled by the powers of nature: therefore since St. Aug. says in the place cited above, De natura et gratia, that human nature ought to be secure concerning the reward if it suffice itself for keeping the commandments, he seems to strengthen both opinions of the Pelagians, and consequently to grant that for keeping the law help of grace is indeed necessary, but for obtaining eternal glory the grace of adoption is not required.

I deny the consequence; for the Pelagians taught two things: first indeed, that infants do not need the grace of adoption for the remission of original sin, because they did not acknowledge such a sin: second, that they need grace for the kingdom of heaven. The first opinion, as erroneous and heretical, St. Augustine condemns: not so the second; nay in book 6 Contra Iul., chapter ⟦?⟧ he writes this: We give thanks that you think not this: for none are born unto the kingdom of God unless they be ⟦illegible: word after "perfundantur" uncertain, raw "admittitis/admittis"⟧, and thus you judge being washed far better than being born. He therefore approves the opinion of the Pelagians in this, that they deemed the grace of adoption necessary for the kingdom of heaven.

You will say. Man can merit before man, even if he be his enemy: therefore also before God.

I deny the consequence; for man can merit before man in two ways: first indeed by a work grateful, and pleasing, while he is his friend: second by a work which although it be not grateful nor pleasing, nevertheless merits the reward on account of a pact entered into: but it is otherwise before God: for man cannot merit before God except by a work that is grateful, and pleasing to his divine ma- jesty, and consequently except it be done by a man who is a friend of God, for truly the gifts of the un- just profit not the Most High. Ecclesiasticus, chapter 34.

You ask: whether habitual grace suffices for meriting?

I answer, that it does not suffice, but beyond it actual grace is required, as can be gathered from what was said in the proof of the present Conclusion, and most of all from

the words of Christ the Lord, John 15: I am the vine, etc. For just as, that the branch may bear fruit, it is not enough that it be united to the vine, but moreover it is required that it draw virtue from it; so, that man may produce good works, it does not suffice that he cohere to Christ through sanctifying grace as branch to vine, and member to head; but, as Trent says, it is necessary that virtue continually infuse itself into the justified themselves, which virtue always precedes, accompanies, and follows their good works, etc. Therefore the works of the just, that they may be meritorious, must proceed from the help of prevenient and concomitant grace, which is certainly actual. Add that a meritorious work ought to be a supernatural act, such as it would not be precisely unless it proceeded from the help of actual grace, as will be proved

Third Conclusion. — THERE ARE THREE CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR MERIT ON THE PART OF THE MERITORIOUS ACT:

The first is, that the act be free, and elicited by the will or by its freely acting command. And it is proved from the manner of speaking of Scripture, which praises the works of man for this reason, that whereas he could have acted badly, he acted justly and uprightly: thus Ecclesiasticus 31, after it has been said of the just man: He that could have transgressed, and hath not transgressed, do evil, and hath not done it; immediately adds: Therefore his goods are established in the Lord. By which words it is sufficiently declared that the good works of the just are worthy of praise and reward because they proceed from liberty: hence the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 9: If I do this thing willingly, I have a reward: for by the word willingly he understands a free act of the will; in which sense St. Augustine uses and explains this text in book De gratia et libero arbitrio, chapter 2.

The holy Fathers also subscribe, who teach with one accord, that as no one merits punishment unless acting freely against the precepts of the law, so neither reward and wage, unless fulfilling those very precepts freely. Thus St. Basil, Homily 9: Virtue is apprehended from the will. Hieronym., book 2 Contra Iovinian. God made us of free choice, he says, nor are we drawn by necessity to vices or to virtues: otherwise where there is necessity, there is neither crown nor condemnation. Clement of Alexandria, book 1 Stromatum: Neither praises, he says, nor blames, nor honors exist, if the soul has not the power of experiencing or undertaking. As if he said we are worthy neither of praise nor of blame, except on account of good and evil works which are done freely. And St. Augustine, book De gratia et libero arbitrio, chapter 2: When, he says, he acts willingly, then it must be said that it is good, then may the reward of a good work be hoped for from him of whom it was said: who will render to every one according to his works. Hence in book De spiritu et littera, chapter 5, he says: God gave to man free will, without which neither ⟦illegible: bene?⟧ nor evil is done. Finally St. Bernard, Sermon 81 on the Canticles: Where, he says, there is not liberty, neither is there merit: therefore beings running by animal reason merit nothing, because they lack deliberation, and likewise liberty.

Reason also supports this: First indeed, because as natural and physical property supposes physical being of the thing whose property it is, so moral property supposes moral being: but merit is a moral property of an act: therefore it must suppose its being moral: but the moral being of an act is nothing else than its liberty: therefore that the act be meritorious, it must be free. Second, the wage is owed to the meritorious work: but a debt arises only from this, that someone gives to another what was his own, or whose disposal lay within his liberty; for no one can give except only that of which he is master, but man with respect to God is master only of his free actions: therefore by free actions alone man acquires for himself a right to the reward. Third finally, the reason of the wage with respect to a good work is the same as that of punishment with respect to an evil work: but evil works, unless they be done freely, do not merit punishment: therefore neither do good works merit the wage, unless they proceed from a free will.

It must however be observed here first, that it is one thing to accept certain actions unto eternal life: another indeed to accept them unto the reward of eternal life: for in the former manner God can accept non-free actions, as He accepted the death of the Innocents, which although it was not free, nor properly meritorious, nevertheless obtained eternal glory for them. Hence St. Bernard, Sermon on the Nativity of the Innocents: Truly thy martyrs are they, O God, he says, in whom neither man nor Angel found merit, that this singular prerogative of grace may be more evidently commended.

The second condition of the meritorious work is, that it be a good and honest act. Scripture itself persuades this, which ascribes the reason of merit before God to no other works than good ones. Thus Romans 2, where the Apostle said that God would render to every one according to his works, he adds: To them indeed who according to patience of good work seek glory and honor and incorruption, eternal life, etc. 2 Peter chapter 1: Endeavour that by your good works you make sure your calling and election. 1 John 3: We have confidence towards God, because we keep his commandments, and do those things that are pleasing in his sight.

The reason of this also is open: for the works which are done are either indifferent, or evil, or morally good: if indifferent, they merit neither praise nor blame, nor punishment nor reward, seeing they assume neither moral goodness nor malice: if evil, they merit not praise and reward, but blame and chastisement: therefore that they may obtain reward and recompense, they must be morally good. Then, that a work be meritorious before God, it must have the reason of service toward Him: but an evil act cannot have the reason of service toward God, nor even an indifferent act, unless perhaps it be graced by a good end or other circumstance, by which reason it ceases to be indifferent: therefore only the morally good act can have the reason of service, and consequently the reason of a meritorious work. Finally, the meritorious act, as we shall soon say, must be supernatural, and elicited with the actual help of the Holy Spirit; but a supernatural act cannot be evil nor indifferent; for the Holy Spirit moves neither toward evil acts, nor converts to indifferent ones: therefore, etc.

Thirdly finally, the condition is that the meritorious act be supernatural in entity: and consequently that it be elicited with the actual help of grace. So the Doctor in the second book, distinction 28. And it is proved: First indeed from all those texts of Scripture by which the help of actual grace is intimated to be necessary for a good work, as we have demonstrated several times already. It is proved likewise from Councils: Thus in the Council of Diospolis Pelagius was commanded to acknowledge that grace is given for each single act: in the second Council of Orange, Canon 18: The reward, it says, is owed to good works if they are done, but grace which is not owed precedes that they be done, according to that saying of Christ, John 15. I am the true vine, and you are the branches; he that abideth in me, and I in him, the same beareth much fruit, for without me you can do nothing: and Trent, Session 6, chapter 16, where it defines that without the influx of the virtue of Christ, which precedes and accompanies and follows the good works of the just, they can by no means be reputed meritorious: hence Session 14, chapter 8 teaches, that for satisfying for the temporal punishment remaining after sins remitted the influx of grace is required. But greater is the reason why it should be required for merit of condignity, seeing that act seems nobler and more difficult than satisfaction itself; because this has only temporal punishment to pay; but that meritorious act tends toward attaining eternal reward; wherefore the Council adds in the same place: > For of ourselves, as of ourselves, we can do nothing, because through him who comforts us we can do all things: thus man has nothing wherein to glory, but all our glorying is in Christ, in whom we live, in whom me-

rit, in whom we satisfy.

This surely Catholic doctrine Pope Celestine plainly taught, Epistle 1 to the Bishops of Gaul, chapter 12, where he says: For let us not doubt that all the merits of man are preceded by the grace of God, through which it comes about that we begin both to will and to do some good thing: with which aid and gift of God certainly free will is not taken away, but freed; so great is the goodness of God toward men, that He wills our merits to be His gifts: and for these things which He has bestowed, He is about to give eternal rewards: therefore meritorious works either are supernatural in entity, such especially are the acts of faith, hope, and charity, which proceed from supernatural habits and virtues: or if they be natural, insofar as they proceed from the moral virtues, namely temperance, justice, etc., they are at least supernatural to that extent, that without the grace of God and special supernatural help they cannot be done.

You ask. What conditions are required for merit of congruity?

I answer that for merit of congruity, first it is not required on the part of the worker that he be constituted in sanctifying grace; since a sinner can merit de congruo certain helps necessary for performing penance, as has already been said when treating of merit from congruity. But it is necessarily required that he be a wayfarer, on account of the reasons assigned in the preceding Conclusion; since the same reasoning holds for merit of congruity as of condignity with respect to the state of way.

On the part indeed of the act it is required likewise that it be good and free, and that it be elicited with the help of actual grace, for we cannot merit beforehand any divine duty pertaining to salvation by purely natural, necessary, or indifferent acts, and consequently it is necessary that the meritorious act be in some respect supernatural, be free elicitive or imperative, and good both from its circumstances and from its end.

But it is not necessary for merit of congruity that a divine promise intervene; for there are many things which man merits de congruo, namely the gift of perseverance, which nevertheless God has not promised to give to those meriting. Add that here a pact is required in merit of condignity, that the work may induce a right of justice to the reward: but merit of congruity does not induce such a right: therefore it does not require a pact. Yet it sometimes happens that a pact intervenes in merit of congruity; for God in Scripture promises forgiveness of sins to the penitent man; although nevertheless by those acts of penance before habitual grace man merits only de congruo.

You ask. Whether the external act adds anything above the merit of the internal act?

I affirm with the Subtle Doctor, Quodlibet 18, in that article, where he simply and absolutely teaches that in the external act there is something pe-⟦illegible: fragment lost in faded print between "pecu-" and "interno", presumably "…peculiare quiddam…"⟧ that with the internal and external taken together a greater merit intervenes than in the internal alone: for just as in those two acts there are two goodnesses, and, as the Doctor says, two imputabilities, so likewise two merits appear to be. By which opinion certainly those texts of Scripture can be proved, in which the wage is promised to external acts: thus Matthew 10: And whosoever shall give to drink to one of these little ones a cup of cold water only, in the name of a disciple, amen I say to you, he shall not lose his reward: and in the same place verse 32: Every one therefore that shall confess me before men, I will also confess him before my Father: hence 2 Corinthians 4 tribulations and outward scourges patiently endured are said to contribute toward deserving eternal glory: For that which is at present momentary and light of our tribulation, worketh for us above measure exceedingly an eternal weight of glory.

Reason also supports this; for merit is a service redounding to the honor or advantage of a superior, and of him who can compensate it with that reward: but exterior action increases the service of God, because it chiefly redounds to his honor; for it conduces to exciting in others the knowledge and praise of God and the interior affections of virtues: therefore although the external act increase merit not from that aspect by which it is a morally good action, nevertheless it increases it in the reason of merit, because it increases in the reason of service. It is confirmed., because the satisfaction of our works grows by the external act, seeing that satisfaction is the vindication and voluntary chastisement of fault, which is chastised ⟦illegible: word uncertain, raw "aerius", perhaps "aequius/facilius"⟧ by internal and external actions, than only by in- ternal ones: therefore merit too grows by external action.

NOTE 1. It is already certain from what has been said that the just merit eternal life by good works; hence Sacred Scripture designates eternal life under the name of reward and crown, to signify that it is granted worthily to those who labor and fight generously; and this has been defined in various Councils, the Lateran, the Florentine, and especially the Tridentine, Session 6, Canon 32, in these words: If anyone shall say that the good works of a justified man are so gifts of God as not also to be the good merits of the justified man himself, or that the justified man himself, by the good works which are performed by him through the grace of God and the merit of Jesus Christ, of whom he is a living member, does not truly merit an increase of grace, eternal life, and the attainment of that eternal life itself — if however he die in grace — and even an increase of glory, let him be anathema. In these words the Council signifies that a justified man can merit three things: first indeed an increase of grace; second, the attainment of eternal life; third, an increase of glory itself. That he merits the attainment of eternal life is clear from what has been said; but in what manner he can merit an increase of grace and glory must be determined in the present place.

NOTE 2. It is likewise certain from what has been said that none of the just can merit condignly the grace of final perseverance, as is evident from all those texts of Scripture in which the just are admonished to work out their salvation with fear and trembling. Thus: He who thinks himself to stand, let him take heed lest he fall, 1 Corinthians 10. But thou standest by faith; be not high-minded, but fear, Romans 11. Hold that which thou hast, lest another receive thy crown, Apocalypse 3. Wherefore the Council of Trent, Session 6, Canon 16, decrees: If anyone shall say that he will for certain have that great gift of perseverance with absolute and infallible certainty, unless he shall have learned this by special revelation, let him be anathema. And the reason of this is fitting, because since the state of this present life is a state of fear and solicitude, it was fitting that God should not presuppose perseverance upon condign merit. Nevertheless the same Council teaches in the same place, chapter 13, that that gift can at least be obtained by congruous merit, in these words:

Let no one promise himself anything with absolute certainty; although all ought most firmly to place and repose their hope in God's help: for God, unless they fail of his grace, will bring to completion, as he began, the good work, working in them to will and to accomplish. Yet those who think themselves to stand, let them take heed lest they fall, and with fear and trembling let them work out their salvation in labors, in watchings, in almsdeeds, in prayers and oblations, in fastings and chastity. For they must fear, knowing that they are born again unto the hope of glory, and not yet unto glory, because of the combat which remains with the flesh, with the world, with the devil, in which they cannot be victors unless with the grace of God they obey the Apostle saying: We are debtors not to the flesh, to live according to the flesh; for if you live according to the flesh you shall die: but if by the spirit you mortify the deeds of the flesh, you shall live.

NOTE 3. It is likewise certain that man cannot merit for himself the first actual grace, neither condignly nor congruously; because, as we have said (in the preceding Question), every merit presupposes the very help of actual grace granted us by God out of pure mercy: and this truth was determined in all those Councils in which the dogma of the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians was slain and exploded. Hence that common theological maxim: the principle of merit does not fall under merit; for merit is presupposed to the reward, either as existing or as absolutely future: for it is rendered and owed to someone precisely because he either has already wrought well, or is foreseen to be about absolutely to work well. Merit therefore causes its reward by its being, whether actually existing or absolutely future, and is forthwith presupposed to its effect: therefore also the principle from which it necessarily has it that it be merit must be presupposed to the effect of that merit, nor can it be the effect of that merit, and consequently cannot fall under merit, nor be the reward and moral effect thereof; for the principle of merit is necessarily presupposed to this merit and to its causality. Hence the Apostle plainly teaches, Ephesians 2: By grace you are saved through faith, and this not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God, not of works, that no one may glory. Hence the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 8, when expounding these words of the Apostle to the Romans 3, Justified freely by his grace, says: But we say to be justified freely for this reason, that nothing of those things which precede justification, whether faith or works, merits the grace of justification itself; for by grace, no longer by works: otherwise, as the same Apostle says, grace would no longer be grace.

These things therefore presupposed, there chiefly remain three points here to be determined: First, whether the just man equally merits an increase of sanctifying grace and of glory. Second, whether he can merit condignly his reparation if it should happen that he fall from grace. Third and finally, what the just man can merit for another, and how.

First Conclusion. — IN VERY TRUTH THE JUST, BY GOOD WORKS PERFORMED FROM THE HELP OF GRACE, CAN MERIT AN INCREASE OF SANCTIFYING GRACE AND OF ETERNAL GLORY. This assertion, in both parts, is of faith determined in the Council of Trent, Canon 32, praised above. It is proved first from Sacred Scripture, which teaches that justified men go from virtue to virtue, and are further justified by good works. Thus Proverbs 4: The path of the just as a shining light goes forward and grows even to the perfect day. Psalm 91: The just shall flourish like the palm tree, he shall be multiplied like the cedar of Libanus, or, as another version has it, he shall rise aloft. For there ought to be a proportion between the just and things naturally living, such that the just grow in justice and holiness as living things grow substantially until they attain the perfection proper to them. Hence deservedly the Council of Trent, chapter 10, expressly says:

If therefore, having been justified and made friends of God and of his household, going from virtue to virtue they are renewed, as the Apostle says, from day to day, that is, mortifying the members of their flesh and presenting them as instruments of justice unto sanctification through observance of the commandments of God and of the Church, in that very justice received through the grace of Christ, with faith cooperating in good works they grow and are further justified, as it is written: He that is just, let him be justified still; and again: Do you see that by works a man is justified, and not by faith only. And holy Church asks for this increase of justice when she prays: give us, O Lord, an increase of faith, hope, and charity: which indeed Christ not obscurely signified to be an increase of grace in Matthew 25, when in the express parable of the talents granted to those who had gained others by trading he adds this word: for to every one that hath shall be given, and he shall abound: to signify that those who well use the grace ⟦illegible: faint intermediate words; perhaps "granted to him"⟧ shall enjoy its increase.

where Christ, answering the young man asking what he ought to do to obtain eternal life truly and securely, first replies: If thou wilt enter into life keep the commandments: and afterwards, inviting him to perfection, thus addresses him: if thou wilt be perfect, go, sell whatsoever thou possessest, and give to the poor, and come follow me, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven: that is, thou shalt obtain a greater glory than they obtain who are to be crowned only on account of simple observance of the commandments. — Hence the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 15: As star differs from star in brightness, so shall the resurrection of the dead be. By which he signifies that there will be a diversity in the reward of glory on account of an inequality of merits: which he more clearly signifies in 2 Corinthians 4, saying: Although our outward man is corrupted, yet that which is within is renewed day by day; for that which at present is momentary and light of our tribulation worketh above measure in sublimity an eternal weight of glory. And the weight of glory ought to correspond to the measure of grace, which is likewise increased through tribulations endured by the grace of Christ; hence chapter ⟦9⟧: He who soweth sparingly shall also reap sparingly: and he who soweth in blessings, in blessings shall also reap. By those words he alludes to that parable of Christ in Matthew 13, where he compares the merit of the kingdom of heaven to seed falling into good ground and bearing fruit unequally, some thirtyfold, some sixtyfold, and some truly a hundredfold.

You will say 1: Eternal life is given only out of mercy, according to Psalm 102: Who crowneth thee in mercy and commiserations; moreover it is called grace by the Apostle, Romans 6, the grace of God is life everlasting. And in chapter 11 he affirms that we are saved by grace, and not by works: therefore neither eternal life itself, nor its increase, can the just man merit by his own good works. — I deny the consequence, and to the antecedent I say that eternal life is called a benefit of mercy and grace because, as St. Augustine says, book On Grace and Free Will, chapter 8: Without doubt eternal life also, which is rendered to a good life, is of the grace of God: for it too is given gratis, because gratis was given that to which it is given; but that to which it is given it is merely grace, whereas what is given to it, since it is its reward, is grace for grace, as it were a reward for justice. Or, as he says in the book On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 13: Without doubt it must be confessed that grace is called eternal life for this reason, because it is rendered for those merits which grace bestowed upon man; rightly indeed is that understood which we read in the Gospel, grace for grace, that is, for those things which grace bestowed.

You will say 2: From the Apostle to the Romans 8: The sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the glory to come: therefore the more numerous the good works are, they will not merit a greater reward. — I distinguish the antecedent: they are not proportionate with respect to duration, because they are momentary, I concede; they are not proportionate with respect to value, I deny; because they are works of living members of Christ, elicited by his spirit and grace, and merit eternal life and its increase, according to that saying of the same Apostle, 2 Corinthians ⟦4⟧: That which at present is momentary and light of our tribulation worketh above measure in sublimity an eternal weight of glory in us.

Second Conclusion. — THE JUST CANNOT MERIT CONDIGNLY BY THE ORDINARY WAY SUCH A REPARATION IF IT SHOULD HAPPEN THAT THEY FALL FROM GRACE.

It is proved first from that saying of Ezekiel 18: If the just man turn himself away from his justice and commit iniquity, all his justices which he hath done shall not be remembered. For these words would be false if God conferred upon man reparation after his fall out of justice in respect of those works.

Next, the Council of Trent openly pronounces that no merit precedes the justification of man: but if God attended to good works previously elicited by a man existing in sin, in order to bestow sanctifying grace upon him condignly, it would follow that that sinful man's merit would precede sanctifying grace: therefore, etc.

Finally, if a just man could merit condignly his justification after a fall, it would follow that one who has once been justified could nowhere be damned, seeing that in the state of restored grace he could again merit his reparation if he should fall a second time: which is absurd and alien to Catholic truth: therefore, etc.

You will object 1. That saying of Josaphat, 2 Paralipomenon chapter 19: Aid the impious, and thou shalt be joined in friendship with those who hate the Lord, and for this cause thou didst indeed deserve the wrath of the Lord, but good works are found in thee, because thou hast taken away the groves out of the land of Juda. Therefore good works performed in the state of justifying grace can merit reparation after a fall. — I deny the consequence: for there is no question there of meriting reparation after a fall, but of the remission of temporal punishments, which God does not inflict on account of preceding good works. Second I say that even if the question were of reparation after a fall, it would not be gathered that it was made on account of the works done by Josaphat himself in the state of grace; for he had already been justified from that sin which he had committed by entering into friendship and confederation with Achab the impious king; indeed in the preceding chapter Scripture relates that when the Syrians surrounded him fighting, he cried out to the Lord, and he helped him, and turned them away from him, whereupon he had already done penance and made the Lord propitious to himself.

You will object 2. That saying of Psalm 70: When my strength shall fail, forsake me not: but this prayer would be useless unless sufficient aid for rising again were granted to sinful man on account of good works elicited in grace: therefore, etc. — I distinguish the minor: unless it were granted on account of condign merit, I deny; on account of congruous merit, I concede. Add that the Royal Prophet by those words asks not for reparation after a fall, but for aids in time of tribulation and infirmity, but chiefly that he not desert him in old age, since he had been his hope from youth, confirmed from the womb, and from the belly of his mother his protector.

You will object 3. That saying of Hebrews 6: God is not unjust, that he should forget your work, and the love which you have shown in his name, you who have ministered to the saints, and do minister. — I answer, that at that place no question is of meriting reparation after a fall, since the Apostle there speaks of saints and the just, as is gathered from those words, who do minister, but of the reward of good works which, done in grace, revive through penance. Or I say that the Apostle speaks to Hebrews fallen into mortal sin, as some interpreters hold. Those words, God is not unjust, are understood under this tacit condition: if you recover yourselves and do penance; so that the sense is that God would be unjust if he denied the reward to the just for works done in grace, provided they either preserve grace perpetually or recover it when lost.

Third Conclusion. — NO MAN CAN OF HIMSELF MERIT FOR ANOTHER CONDIGNLY THE FIRST GRACE, NOR OTHER BENEFITS OF GRACE; BUT HE CAN MERIT THEM CONGRUOUSLY.

The first part is proved: First indeed from Sacred Scripture, which teaches that each one is to receive the reward according to his own proper labor, not according to another's; and that God will render to each one according to his works, as appears in Matthew 16 and 1 Corinthians 3. To this also pertains the form of Christ's judgment handed down in Matthew 25, in which the just judge decrees reward or punishment for each one according to his own and private merits, not another's. Hence St. Chrysostom relates in Homily 13 to the people, that no one merits for another, but each for himself, because each one is to be judged for his own deeds, not for another's. On which point St. Jerome rightly weighs that the wise virgins answered the foolish: Lest perhaps it suffice not for us and for you, etc., not out of avarice, but out of fear: for each one shall receive the reward from his own works; neither in the day of judgment can the virtues of others relieve the vices of others. — But the reason of this assertion is the divine ordinance itself, whereby God, namely, has not decreed to grant to the just condignly the grace or glory of another, but only their own; and that for just cause, because sanctifying grace, which is the principle of condign merit, tends per se first to the proper perfection and sanctification of the just man himself: it was fitting therefore that the just rather merit grace and glory for himself than for another.

You will say: A just man can satisfy out of justice for another, as appears both from indulgences and from pilgrimages imposed in satisfaction, which can sometimes be fulfilled through an interposed person: therefore by equal reason he will be able to merit glory condignly for others. — I deny the consequence, and the reason of the disparity is that in satisfaction the penalty is assessed according to the proportion of the sinner's fault, not truly according to that disposition of soul in which he exists while the offense still remains, because sometimes the greatest guilt of temporal penalty can be found in the more just man, and less in the less just; but truly condign merit of glory is assessed according to the disposition of him to whom it ought to be granted; for according to the measure of sanctifying grace and charity will be the measure of the beatific vision; whence the account is not the same for satisfaction as for merit.

You will say 2: The first parent, since he was head of the whole human race, by his sin merited the privation of sanctifying grace for his posterity: therefore by his penance he could by the same reason merit its restitution of the same grace. — I answer first, that indeed this could have been done if God had so ordained by his absolute power, as he was able in fact to ordain; for, as was said in the preceding Treatise, God by his absolute power could communicate the dignity of head to pure man, though in some inferior degree with respect to grace conferred and to be merited than that which he conferred upon Christ. Whence it did not conflict with the first parent, as he was natural head of the whole human race to be propagated, that he also become moral head of the same to be justified, if namely God had so ordered it; but since things were not so constituted, because Adam was not instituted by God head of all men in spiritual things with respect to the influx of supernatural gifts — for this was reserved for Christ the Lord — but only regarding the vision of original justice, which he had received for himself and for his posterity; therefore however austere and severe his penance may have been, nevertheless he could not merit for his posterity the restitution of first grace.

The second part is proved, namely that a just man can merit congruously for others grace and glory. For this is gathered from those texts of Scripture in which God directly or through Prophets appoints that sinners implore the aid and prayer of the just in order to obtain pardon. Thus Job ¹ 42. God, angry at Job's friends, admonishes them to offer a holocaust:

But Job says my servant shall pray for you, and his face I will accept, that folly be not imputed to you. So likewise God testifies to many that he conferred very many benefits upon the Jews on account of Abraham his beloved, on account of Isaac his servant, and Israel his holy one, and other most holy men. Hence St. Ambrose, book 5 on Luke, affirms that God forgives others on the merit of others, and while approving some grants pardon of their errors to others. And St. Augustine, Sermon 99, chapter 11, On Saint Stephen, says: He merited forgiveness for his enemies: he merited to rejoice in heaven over the friendships of blessed Paul who followed after. — The reason also of this is, that since men are members of one human commonwealth, as it were of one moral body, they can benefit one another by their good works, and merit at least congruously, according to Psalm 114: I am a partaker of all them that fear thee, they bring it about that we become partakers of themselves unto eternity. Amen.