Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

Since the reason of an internal and inherent form belongs both to acts and to habits, and since it is certain among us Catholics that we are justified through an internal form, the question is rightly raised in the present place whether the internal formal cause of our justification consists in an act or in a habit.

Note 1°. Concerning the resolution of the present difficulty, Theologians agree among themselves: First, indeed, that it is certain from faith that infants are justified in baptism through an infused habit; for it must be believed with certain faith that every just man is justified by inhering justice, for this has been defined concerning infants as well as adults in the Council of Trent: concerning infants, Sess. 4. Can. 5.; but concerning adults, Sess. 6. cap. 7. Now this inhering justice cannot be any act; they are not capable of such a thing: therefore it must be some habit, since it can be nothing else than an accident. They agree secondly that all adults who are justified from sins by the virtue of the sacrament are also justified through a habit, because from the Council of Trent, Sess. 14. cap. 1., attrition or sorrow for sin committed, conceived from the consideration of the turpitude of sin or from fear of hell and punishments — which outside the sacrament would not suffice for blotting out sin nor have annexed to it grace whereby sin is formally blotted out — if joined with hope of pardon, suffices for the remission of sins with the sacrament: but with the sacrament added there does not appear what other grace and inhering justice should be infused into the penitent except habitual; for it cannot be said that an act of perfect contrition is infused, or of the love of God above all things, since of many who are justified from attrition through the sacrament scarcely one experiences that such an act is infused into him at that instant when the sacrament is completed. Therefore it must be certain among Catholics that upon an adult justified by the virtue of the sacrament some habit of grace and holiness is infused: but there remains the difficulty to be solved, whether that infusion of habit is so necessarily presupposed to the formal reason of justification that no man can be formally justified through any act of perfect contrition or charity.

Note 2°. From the Subtle Doctor, in 1. dist. 17. qu. 2. n. 18., that a human act can be conceived as necessary to the blotting out of sin in two ways; namely either by way of previous disposition, or by way of concomitance. In the first way, he says, an unformed act suffices, nay, it is always unformed, because the disposition preceding the blotting out of sin is always without grace and charity, by whose alone inherence and inclination toward the act the act is said to be formed. In the second way, I say that a formed act is required; for in that instant in which sin is blotted out, charity is present, and consequently if an act is required as concomitant, it is required as formed.

Note 3°. That it is certain that in justification together with sanctifying grace, and the habit of charity really distinct from it only conceptually, other supernatural habits also are infused, as the Council of Trent teaches, Sess. 6. cap. 7, in these words: In justification itself, together with the remission of sins, man receives all these things at once infused through Jesus Christ, into whom he is ingrafted, faith, hope, and charity: for faith, unless hope and charity be added to it, neither unites him perfectly with Christ, nor makes him a living member of His body. Hence arises the difficulty whether all those infused habits are reckoned by equal reason necessary to justification as grace itself and charity, so that the formal cause of our justification is not one simple habit, but a collection of several. Three things therefore must be determined in this Question: First, whether formal justification takes place so necessarily through a habit that no one can be formally justified through acts of perfect contrition and charity. Second, whether for this formal justification several infused habits are necessarily required. Third, whether justification takes place properly through the habit of sanctifying grace under the precise formal reason of grace, or rather insofar as it is formally charity.

First conclusion. — NEITHER THE ACT OF CHARITY NOR OF PERFECT CONTRITION JUSTIFIES FORMALLY, BUT ONLY DISPOSITIVELY.

It is proved 1. from holy Scripture, in all those texts in which the remission of sins is promised to penitents, as some gift of God proceeding from His pure mercy. Thus Psal. 50: A contrite and humbled heart, O God, thou wilt not despise. Proverbs 28: He who shall confess and forsake them (namely his crimes) shall obtain mercy. Ecclesiastes 17: With great mercy of His and propitiation toward those who turn to Him, etc. Therefore formal justification is not partly an effect of man, partly a gift of God, but is a gratuitous benefit of God. — Moreover holy Scripture in several places distinguishes contrition or the love of God above all things from the remission of sins, as from a diverse and new benefit obtained from it and promised to it, as a new grace and mercy. Thus Joel 2 it is said: Be converted to me with all your heart, in fasting and in weeping and in mourning: and rend your hearts, and not your garments: and be converted to the Lord your God, for he is gracious and merciful, patient and rich in mercy, and ready to forgive evil. By which former words, be converted to me with all your heart, perfect contrition is signified; but by these latter, for he is gracious and merciful, it is declared ⟦illegible: totum?⟧ that God may thus mercifully forgive the contrite: therefore that conversion through an act of love and contrition is not formally the remission of sins itself and justification, but something preparing for them and moving God to release sins and infuse the habit of sanctifying grace.

In the same manner speak the holy Fathers, who reckon and distinguish contrition and the remission of sins as two benefits; thus St. Chrysostom, Homil. 50. ad populum, says:

I have spent my whole life in sins, and if I do penance, I shall be saved; and especially hence it appears that this depends on the clemency of the Lord, lest you trust in your penance: for can your penance so blot out sins? If penance alone were sufficient, you might justly fear; but since into penance the mercy of God is mingled, take confidence.

St. Ambrose subscribes, lib. 1. De Paenitentia, cap. 1., where he says: He awaits our groans, but temporal ones, that He may remit eternal ones: He awaits our tears, that He may pour forth His piety: He awaits our conversion, that He Himself may return to grace: and he treats there of perfect contrition, of which alone that word of Isaiah 30 is generally true, which he expounds: When she shall have groaned, then shall she be saved. The same holds St. Augustine in Psal. 140, on those words, Gracious and merciful is the Lord, patient and very merciful, where he says thus: God has promised indulgence to your conversion: but He has not promised tomorrow to your delay. Now the conversion to which God promises pardon outside the sacrament is none other than perfect contrition, or the love of God above all things: therefore according to the mind of St. Augustine the pardon of sins is a new grace distinct from contrition.

It is proved 2. from the Council of Trent, and that Sess. 6. cap. 6., where among the dispositions to justifying grace it enumerates the acts of penance and of love, whereby man begins to love God as the fountain of all justice; for it says: and begin to love Him (namely God) as the fountain of all justice, and are therefore moved against sins by some hatred and detestation. Then in the following chapter it calls this very love and detestation of sins, together with the other acts of the sinner described above, a disposition or preparation for justification itself: This, it says, disposition or preparation is followed by justification itself: since however penance abstracts from perfect and imperfect, as does likewise the incipient love of God, and the Council speaks in general of penance and love, it follows that it equally comprehends perfect penitence and love of God inclined and imperfect: but a disposition to justification cannot be formal justification itself: therefore the mind of the Council is not that we can be justified through acts of contrition or of the love of God. —

Secondly, cap. 1. of that session, the Council teaches that there is one formal cause of our justification: since however it equally teaches that we are justified through a habit, it follows that it holds formal justification not to take place through an act; otherwise not one only, but two formal causes of our justification would exist: for if those formal causes were truly several, doubtless the Council would have enumerated them, just as it enumerates several efficient causes, namely God as principal cause, and Baptism as instrumental cause: and just as it also retains several final causes, namely the glory of God and of Christ, and life eternal. —

Thirdly, the same is gathered from Can. 3 of the same session, where it says: If anyone shall say that without the preventing inspiration and help of the Holy Spirit man can believe, hope, love, or repent, as he ought, so that the grace of justification may be conferred upon him, let him be anathema. By which words, as is apparent, the Council distinguishes the grace of sanctification from the acts of contrition and love, even as from the acts of faith and hope. —

Finally, the same Council, Session 14, chapter 4, teaches that the motion of contrition was necessary at any time whatsoever for obtaining the forgiveness of sins, and that in a man fallen after baptism it prepares him for the remission of sins only then: but who would say that a form prepares or obtains its own formal effect? Now that the discourse there concerns perfect contrition is evident: both because it declares the nature of this contrition by the example of David, whose contrition no one doubts was perfect: and because the Council in that chapter hands down not only the manner by which we can be justified through contrition within the Sacrament of Penance, but also outside the sacrament: finally because it teaches that it was necessary at any time whatsoever for obtaining the forgiveness of sins, where by the phrase at any time it signifies also the time of the law of nature and of Moses. But since in neither of those states did adults have sacraments by which grace would be conferred ex opere operato, it is certain that this motion of contrition, which for either state was necessary for restoring forgiveness, had to be perfect contrition; for according to the same Council in the same place, supernatural attrition outside the sacrament is insufficient for obtaining the forgiveness of sins: therefore since the Council says that that contrition, which at any time was necessary for obtaining forgiveness, was preparatory to the remission of sins, it judges that we are not formally justified by it.

It is proved thirdly by reason: First, the justification of an adult outside the sacrament with the vow of receiving it takes place in the same manner and through the same formal cause as his justification through the sacrament de facto received: but the justification of an impious adult in the really received sacrament takes place formally through the habit of grace, not however through acts of love and contrition: therefore this justification of an impious adult outside the sacrament does not take place through supernatural acts of love and perfect contrition, but through habitual grace itself infused by God. The minor is admitted by all, seeing that attrition suffices together with the sacrament for obtaining justification, which nevertheless can justify neither formally nor preparatorily outside the sacrament, and consequently the grace conferred through the sacrament is neither formally that act of attrition, nor its effect, but only the effect of the sacrament producing such grace ex opere operato. The major similarly holds: for the vow of the sacrament, beyond the real reception of it, adds to the act of contrition a tacit or express volition of receiving the sacrament, and an efficacious desire of the effect of such a sacrament: but such a volition, whether express or tacit, adds nothing of power and efficacy to the virtue of the act of contrition itself, nor does it bring it about that one who is not joined to the sacrament should come to the same justifying form outside the sacrament, for it confers nothing supernatural upon him: therefore just as that act of perfect contrition joined with the really received sacrament is not the formal cause of justification in the adult through the really received sacrament, but that cause is none other than habitual grace; so also that act of perfect contrition cannot be, together with the vow of the sacrament, the unformed cause of the justification of an adult outside the sacrament. —

Secondly, to forgive sin is the proper work and benefit of God, according to that of Isaiah 43: I am he that blots out your iniquities. And Mark 2: Who can forgive sins but God alone? Reason also supports these words: for to forgive sins belongs to him alone who is offended by them: but God alone is principally offended by sins: therefore it belongs to him alone to forgive sins: but if man could blot out his sins by contrition, not God alone, but man too would forgive himself his sins by effecting contrition. For the effect which the form formally bestows is effected efficiently by the efficient cause of the form.

Nor does it stand in the way that Priests also forgive sins, John 20: Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them: for Priests forgive sins as Christ's Ministers; in what way would a man not thereby forgive himself his own sins through contrition elicited by himself?

Second reason: because according to the Tridentine Session 6, chapter 8, we are said to be justified freely: and this for the reason that, as the Council itself testifies, no works preceding justification merit the grace of justification itself, namely de condigno, as the Theologians explain. But if contrition formally sanctified, we would not be justified freely in the sense expounded by the Council, because contrition, according to the more probable opinion, precedes grace in nature: therefore it would merit that same grace de condigno: hence grace, as the Council says in the same place, would not be grace, but reward and wage. The consequence is proved: because if contrition of itself formally sanctified the subject, in that prior state of nature, in which it would precede grace, it would be the work of a subject already worthy and sanctified by that very contrition, as by a form formally sanctifying: and accordingly in that prior state it would be condignly meritorious of the grace by which it is infused in the subsequent instant of nature.

You will object 1°. Various texts of Sacred Scripture seem to ascribe to contrition and love the sanctity of the soul and purgation from sin: thus John 14: If anyone loves me, he will keep my commandments, and my Father will love him, etc. By which words the love of God toward us is ascribed to our love toward God: but in this mutual love consists the perfect sanctity of the soul. Hence to the Colossians 3 charity is called the bond of perfection. And 1 Timothy 1: The end of the commandment and of the law is consummation, charity.

And Romans 13: the fullness of the law. To the same act of charity the remission of sins is attributed: thus Luke 7: Many sins are forgiven him because he loved much. Proverbs 10: Charity covers all offenses. 1 Peter 4: Charity covers a multitude of sins. 1 John 3: We know that we are translated from death to life, because we love the brethren. There, moreover, Scripture speaks not of the habit, but of the act of charity: because in those places it exhorts us to the act of charity, not to the habit, and while commending charity itself, it commends likewise the very act of love. —

I answer, all these texts are to be understood of actual charity, which reconciles divine love to us, indeed not formally, but only efficiently, and meritoriously de congruo, or by way of proximate disposition, from which such an effect infallibly follows; and consequently from them it is not evinced that actual charity is the formal reason by which we are justified, and by which sins are loosed; but only that it merits de congruo, and infallibly disposes us for the reception of sanctifying grace, which God infallibly bestows when this ultimate disposition is posited.

You will object 2°. Those texts of Scripture by which adherence with God is attributed to the actual love of God: 1 John 4: God is charity, and he who abides in charity abides in God, and God in him: but from 1 Corinthians 6: He who is joined to God is one spirit: yet man cannot, while remaining in the state of mortal sin, either abide in God, or be one spirit with him: therefore since through charity he abides in God and adheres to him, it must be that man through it is justified and loosed from sin. —

I answer, these texts of Scripture are solved by the same reasoning as the preceding ones; for they need not necessarily be expounded in the formal sense, but can be excellently understood in the causal sense, namely that love is the cause why we abide in God, and are one spirit with him, insofar namely as it is the cause why we are in turn loved by God, and why his Spirit inhabits us. A cause, I say, either morally efficient, and meritorious de congruo, always inferring such an effect, or also proximately dispositional, and infallibly connected with such an effect, but not a cause formalizing justification. That however the Apostle did not wish to signify anything else is gathered from similar words of the same Apostle: for in the same chapter he says: Whosoever shall confess that Jesus is the Son of God, God abides in him, and he in God: but the act of faith cannot be the formal reason, but only a dispositional one, why God abides in us: therefore the same must be said of the acts of charity, which concur to justification only dispositively, though in a more excellent and more infallible manner than the act of faith.

⟦Obiection opener and Augustinian citation illegible in the faded print; text resumes:⟧ He says: True charity is the fullest and most perfect justice: and in the last chapter: Charity begun is begun justice: charity advanced is advanced justice: charity great is great justice: charity perfect is perfect justice: therefore according to the mind of St. Augustine charity is the formal reason of our justification. St. Bernard subscribes, Sermon 83 on the Canticle, where expounding that word of Ephesians 5: Be imitators of God as most dear children, and walk in love, he speaks thus: The conformity of the whole marries the soul to the Word: since namely it is like him by nature, yet exhibits itself like to him by will, loving as she is chosen; therefore if she loves perfectly, she is united: therefore according to the mind of those holy Fathers, actual charity is the formal cause of our justification. —

I deny the consequence; for, as I have already said more than once, love and actual charity is called the justice and sanctity of the soul, not in the formal sense, but causal and meritorious, in that manner namely in which Christ is said 1 Corinthians 1 to be made for us wisdom from God, and justice, and sanctification, that is, the cause of the justice and of the sanctification granted to us through him and on account of his merits. Nor does it matter that St. Bernard in the book De modo bene vivendi, Sermon 1, which concerns the fear of God, says: This fear is holy, because it introduces into the mind of man perfect charity, for perfect charity is perfect sanctity. For I answer that there is a twofold sanctity: one actual, consisting in acts; another habitual, consisting in habits; now perfect actual charity is called perfect actual sanctity; not because it is a form perfecting and sanctifying the soul primarily and principally, but only secondarily, insofar namely as it is the most perfect and most holy among the supernatural acts proceeding from that very habitual charity and sanctity, and augmenting and perfecting them meritoriously, insofar namely as it merits their increase.

You will object 4°. If anyone existing in mortal sin, before sin were forgiven him, were assumed to see God and to love him, without any habit of grace and charity, he would be blessed, and consequently justified; since indeed sin conflicts with perfect beatitude: but such a justification would not take place through a habit, which we suppose is not infused: therefore it would take place through an act of charity, and consequently that act can suffice ⟦illegible: a few words illegible here between "sufficere potest" and "hac in hypothesi"⟧ hac in hypothesi, if habitual mortal sin be not forgiven him: for beatitude is a state perfected by the aggregation of all goods and the removal of all evils; and therefore with that state mortal sin, which is supreme misery, cannot subsist: but in that case that sin could remain unforgiven; because neither vision nor love is a condign satisfaction for mortal sin, nor equivalent to it: and even if it were such, still God could refuse to accept it.

You will object 5°. The love of God is more efficacious for converting the soul to God the ultimate end than was the will of the first man for turning away his posterity from God: therefore anyone existing in original sin can be justified and cleansed from it by love alone without a habit, and even from personal sin. The consequence is evident. But the antecedent is proved: for the posterity of Adam were turned away from God by another's will alone; but when they love God, they are converted to him by their own will, which surely seems a more efficacious manner of conversion. Similarly, although an adult has been converted by his own will through actual sin to a creature which he loved, nevertheless through the affection of contrition from his whole heart he turns away from it far more perfectly than he had been converted to it; since indeed he turns away from it expressly, insofar namely its love conflicts with love of God; but so he had not been converted to it. —

I deny the antecedent, and to the first part I say that the will of the first parent was far more efficacious for turning us away from God than our will is for converting us to God; for Adam's will turns us away from God by a habitual aversion; but the love of our will converts us to God only by an actual conversion. Now habitual aversion is greater, because it is the privation of habitual justice, which is more perfect than the very love which is an actual conversion. Nor does it matter that that was done by another's will, this by our own; for that only proves this to be more perfect in the order of free operation, not however in moral goodness and malice. —

To the second part of the antecedent I answer similarly, that the love of man is not so powerful for converting man to God, placating him, and perfectly satisfying him, as was mortal guilt powerful for offending him, and incurring his aversion and indignation; for habitual sin is a fault physically past remaining morally until gratuitous pardon, or perfect satisfaction, intervene, such as the very love or contrition of the sinner is not: for the offended party is not judged perfectly placated until he render back all that he had taken away by reason of the offense: therefore neither will God be judged placated toward the sinner until he render back to him the first robe, namely sanctifying grace.

You will object 6°. Justification which takes place through an act is more lasting than that which takes place through a habit; for when the habit is taken away habitual justice is removed: but truly even if the habit of justice were taken away from him who had exercised the act of contrition and love, he would always remain just and holy by virtue of that act, just as he always remains a sinner and unjust from the past act of sin: therefore contrition or love without a habit confers some sanctification distinct from habitual sanctification. —

I deny the subsumption; for, says the Friend, in the same way, once the habit of grace is removed, he who had been justified by habit and act together would cease to be holy and just no less than he who was so by habit alone; because since grace alone is the justifying form, once it is removed the formal effect of the just and holy would be taken away. Moreover, because such a habit would not cease demeritoriously and culpably, but only physically, and by the mere will of God, such cessation would induce no stain in the subject, but only a pure negation of grace, which would not constitute an object of hatred and uncleanness, but only of non-friendship, since the stain was already supposed to have been perfectly wiped away and pardoned through the past habit of grace, nor would it return through such a removal of grace: otherwise past stains already wiped away and pardoned would always return as new sins. But the case of the act of sin and of contrition is disparate, because the act of sin is able of itself alone formally to constitute the subject stained and unjust; but the act of contrition does not formally take away habitual sin, which is the foundation and object of our enmity toward God, but dispositively: whereas sin formally takes away grace, which is the foundation and object of our friendship toward God.

You will object 7°. The proper act of Penance is the intention of satisfying God for the offense or stain of the sin committed, whose intention's object is that form by which satisfaction is formally made to God; and consequently this cannot be a habit, but an act, because satisfaction is essentially an action; but no human action can be a true and formal satisfaction by the nature of the thing except that which formally of itself and by its own nature destroys that stain, because with that alone posited nothing further remains of right demanding satisfaction: but if any human action by its nature can destroy the stain of sin, most of all perfect contrition: therefore this is formally sanctifying and remissive of sin. —

I answer, denying the major: for the virtue of penance does not intend to exhibit to God condign satisfaction for a mortal offense, nor even for the eternal punishment which is remitted either through the sacrament or through the vow of the sacrament together with the guilt: but it intends to satisfy for the temporal punishment remaining after the guilt committed: and for the remission of the guilt itself, and the reparation of the divine right, as far as it is possible for a creature to repair the divine right.

It is urged. The act of contrition pleases God just as the offense morally displeases him: therefore satisfaction for the guilt is de condigno and equal by equal measure. The antecedent is proved: the act of contrition is as good as the act of sin was evil: for if anyone, for example, sinned mortally through omission of the act of love due from precept, the positing of this act is as good as its omission was evil. — I deny the antecedent: for the offense against God from a man so vile, and obligated to God by so many benefits, is far greater and graver than any satisfaction whatsoever owed to God could be: just as it is far less that a subject love the King than that he commit a capital offense against him, nor is he viler who judges that condign satisfaction be made to the King through the love and sorrow of the offender, so that the King should have nothing further which he might demand toward satisfaction from the offender.

Second Conclusion. — THE FORMAL RATIO OF JUSTIFICATION IS ONE AND SIMPLE REAL HABIT OF SANCTIFYING GRACE, REALLY INDISTINCT FROM CHARITY. This is the more common opinion.

It is proved first: if besides the real habit of sanctifying grace and of charity other habits were required, especially the habits of faith and hope: yet those habits do not formally contribute to sanctification, except by way of disposition and preparation: therefore the sanctifying form is not a collection of several habits. The major is evident. The minor is proved: both from the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 7, where although it declares that faith, hope, and charity are infused in justification, it nevertheless attributes the power of justifying to charity alone. For faith, unless hope and charity be added to it, neither unites one perfectly with Christ, nor makes him a living member of his body. It does not hold, then, that faith and hope of themselves formally contribute to justification, but only by benefit of charity. Next, by sanctifying grace we are made like Christ our Lord, according to that of Hebrews 2: Wherefore it behoved him in all things to be made like unto his brethren: but neither faith nor hope were in Christ, since he was always in possession: therefore those two virtues do not formally contribute to justification. Finally, at the instant of justification, in which man becomes from unjust just, and from impious holy, neither faith nor hope contribute anything to the expulsion of sin and the conciliation of the love of God: therefore that effect is attributed to sanctifying grace alone.

You will say: The Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 7 says: «In justification itself, together with the remission of sins, man receives through Christ, into whom he is ingrafted, all these infused at once — faith, hope, and charity»: therefore by the mind of the Council those three virtues equally contribute to justification. — I answer, that faith and hope are enumerated by the Council not indeed as partial justifying forms, but only as dispositions: faith indeed as foundation, and hope as buttress. Which Origen also admirably explains on chapter 1 of the Epistle to the Romans: The first beginnings of salvation, he says, and the very foundations are faith; the progress and increase of the building is hope; but the perfection and crown of the whole work is charity.

You will say 2. Of the nature of justice it is intrinsic that it formally accomplish two things in us: the first indeed, that it constitute us pleasing and friendly to God; the second, however, that it confer upon us the faculty of acting well: but it accomplishes the first through grace, and the second through the theological virtues: therefore both those virtues and grace alike are the form of justification. — I deny the consequence: for indeed if this were true, it would follow also that the intrinsic moral virtues, and likewise the gifts of the Holy Spirit, must be reckoned among the forms of justification, since they confer a principle of acting naturally: for just as man cannot be truly just unless he be truly faithful, so neither unless he be truly a worshipper of God, and truly penitent. Therefore just as penance and religion do not have the nature of the form of justification, so neither do the theological virtues: for just as it is said, 1 John 3, he who hath hope sanctifieth himself, so of the one doing penance it is said Ezekiel 18, He shall revive his own soul.

Third Conclusion. — GRACE UNDER ITS PROPER CONCEPT AS GRACE, AND NOT UNDER THE CONCEPT OF CHARITY, IS THE FORMAL RATIO OF JUSTIFICATION.

It is proved 1. From that passage of Titus 3: That, being justified by his grace, we may be heirs according to the hope of life everlasting. Where by the same grace he says we are justified by which we are heirs of life everlasting: but by grace, and not by charity, we are given such right of inheritance, since charity is only the principle of operation: therefore we are justified precisely by grace. — It is confirmed from the Council of Trent, Session 5, Canon ⟦illegible: canon number lost in OCR⟧, where it decrees that by the grace of Jesus Christ our Lord, conferred in baptism, the guilt of original sin is remitted. The argument is also aided: that must be called the formal justifying ratio which constitutes us sharers of the divine nature, and confers upon us eternal inheritance: but this grace performs under its formal concept, and not under the concept of charity: for charity indeed makes us partakers of the divine attribute of love, but not of the divine nature: therefore we are sanctified by grace under its formal concept of grace.

You will object 1. Many texts of Scripture pour the power of sanctifying into charity itself. Thus 1 John 3: Behold what manner of charity the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called, and should be the sons of God. And chapter 4: Every one that loveth is born of God. And there again: God is charity: and he that abideth in charity abideth in God, and God in him. Hence Romans 13: Love is the fulfilling of the law. — I answer, that all these things are indeed said truly of charity, not formally, but really, and inasmuch as it is one and the same real habit with sanctifying grace, as St Augustine also explains, book De Spiritu et Littera, c. 32, saying: The charity of God is said to be poured forth in our hearts, not whereby he himself loves us, but whereby he makes us lovers of himself: even as the justice of God, whereby by his gift we are made just. As if to say, we are made just by the gift of grace. Hence in Psalm 118: Who works justice in man, he says, but he who justifies the impious, that is, by the gift of grace he makes just the impious. Hence also the Apostle: being justified freely by his grace.

You will object 2. Sanctity, says Dionysius in De Coelesti Hierarchia, cap. 12. It is free from every crime, perfect, and on every side immaculate purity: but this belongs only to love and charity: for just as impurity is contracted from contact with an impure thing, so supreme purity is found from union with God, who is the fountain and origin of all purity. But that union is made only through love: therefore that purity and sanctity is also made through love. — I answer, that by these things is proved that love is a preparation for purity, which is grace; but not that it is itself formally purity, for if purity is born from adherence to God, which takes place through love, it follows that love is not purity itself, but a way leading to purity. Add that such conjunction of the soul to God takes place through actual love, not formally, but only dispositively; nor through the habit of charity formally, but only really, inasmuch namely as charity is really the same as sanctifying grace.

You will object 3. The Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 7, where speaking of justification it says: This happens in justification, when by the merit of that most sacred passion the charity of God is poured forth through the Holy Spirit into the hearts of those who are justified, and inheres in them. Therefore it holds that charity justifies formally qua charity. — I deny the consequence: for as is clear, the Council does not say that the form of justification is charity, but that justification takes place through grace while charity is poured forth. Nor does it matter that there it does not name grace; for earlier it had designated it as the formal cause of our justification at the beginning of the chapter, saying: through the reception of grace: wherefore it judged it superfluous to name it again.