Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

Note 1. That since the justification of the sinner is a passage from the state of sin to the state of grace, and from the condition of a man odious to God to that of one loved, it is necessary that that passage be conceived as a motion from the term whence to the term whither, namely from sin, which is cast off and forsaken, to sanctifying grace, which is acquired and received: no otherwise than in natural generation there is made a motion from the privation of a form to the form itself. Thence the question is raised among Theologians, whether that casting off of sin and acquisition of grace are only one single thing, or rather a twofold mutation essentially distinct, each of which is truly real.

Note 2. That since it belongs to God alone by plenary and absolute authority to remit and absolve sin, and He has the supreme and full right thereto, and since a twofold remission of sin is customarily conceived and distinguished — one indeed by simple condonation, whereby the offended person freely and out of pure clemency remits the fault of the offender: the other by due satisfaction, whereby the guilty party, having merited punishment, satisfies exactly by enduring penalties the person offended according to the prescriptions of the law; so that a Judge could pronounce with equity that the guilty party has been absolved from all debt and guilt; hence it is disputed among Theologians whether God can, by full right, freely and out of pure clemency remit sin, not only without any satisfaction on the part of the sinner, but especially without the infusion of any sanctifying grace, and by mere external condonation alone.

Note 3. Sin can be thought to be remitted by external condonation alone, and without any condonation of grace, in three ways: namely first through supernatural acts as intermediary, in view of which God remits sin, as it were on account of dispositions fitting for remission and sufficient by divine ordination: second, speaking absolutely, and without any preceding supernatural act on the part of the sinner, but only by reason of certain purely natural acts, for instance natural penance, in view of which God, by His plenary authority, being content with such penance, although disproportionate to the remission of sin, would nevertheless will to condone and remit that sin: thirdly, finally, such remission can be thought to come about without any act of the sinner, whether natural or supernatural, and even without any physical mutation of the sinner himself.

Two points therefore come up for discussion in the present Question: First, whether the remission of sin and the infusion of grace are two mutations essentially distinct: Second, whether sin can be remitted by mere external and gratuitous condonation without any infusion of grace.

First Conclusion. — THE REMISSION OF SIN AND THE INFUSION OF GRACE ARE TWO MUTATIONS ESSENTIALLY DISTINCT. So the Doctor in I dist. 16 q. 2, to whom Suarez subscribes lib. T cap. 11, and also many other Moderns.

It is proved first from Concil. Trident., Sess. 6 cap. 7, where it says:

Iu> stification is not the sole remission of sins, but is renewal. And below: In justification itself, together with what is infused, man receives. Which enumerates as two distinct things the remission of sins and renewal: let that conjunction be noted, and. The same holds in St. Chrysostom, Homily 20 on Genesis, saying: Through contrition God not only bestows the cure of wounds, and shows men cleansed from sins, but also makes just him who is weighed down by innumerable burdens of sins. By which words two mutations are signified, no otherwise than when we say: through calefaction not only is heat produced, but cold is also expelled; which mode of speaking we certainly do not use when speech concerns a single and simple mutation: for we do not say that through illumination not only is light produced, but darkness is also driven away; for the diffusion of light is the very repulsion of the darkness itself. — The Council of Noguntinum, last, chapter i, also favors this, where treating of justification it says: Which justification, together with the remission of sins, confers also sanctification and the renewal of the interior man.

The Doctor proves the Conclusion at the place cited above num. 1 by four reasons: First indeed: one and the same simply cannot be multiplied and not multiplied, otherwise it would be one and not one: if the remission of sin is multiplied; but the infusion of grace is not multiplied; for there are more remissions of sins, for in that manner in which anyone is called a sinner through a transitory act of sin, so manifoldly is he called a sinner on account of many faults, when he committed them, each of which ought to have its own proper remission, inasmuch as one remission can exist along with another, for instance if the sinner had committed one sin and not another: but the infusion of grace is single, for it is not necessary that several sanctifying graces be infused in order that the sinner be justified. Nay it would even be superfluous, because through the infusion of only one grace the sinner is sufficiently justified: therefore the infusion of grace and the remission of sin are not only a single mutation. — Second, the same is not separated from itself: but the infusion of grace and the remission of guilt can be separated from each other: therefore they are two distinct mutations. The Doctor proves the minor: both because, as we shall say in the following Conclusion, a remission can take place by external condonation without any infusion of grace; and thus this remission can be separated from the infusion of grace: and because in fact God conferred grace upon the first parents without any remission of their preceding sin: therefore the infusion of grace and the remission of sin can exist separately, and consequently they are not one and the same. — Third, guilt and grace are not formally opposed, nor formally repugnant from the nature of the thing: otherwise the created will, which is the effectiva of sin and guilt, would also be effectively destructive of grace; for the productive cause of one of two formally opposed things is destructive of the other, seeing that fire, which produces heat in a subject, removes cold from it: but it is false that the created will could effectively destroy grace, otherwise it could annihilate it by natural and proper virtue: for as grace is not produced except by creation, so it can cease only by annihilation: but those things which are not formally opposed can exist without each other, nor does one necessarily infer the position of the other: therefore the infusion of grace and the remission of sin do not follow upon one another necessarily; and consequently they are not wrought by a single simple mutation. — Fourthly, finally: a mutation is not toward some positive form unless from that which is formally its privation: but sin, as we said, is not formally the privation of sanctifying grace; for a single form has only a single privation: but sin can be multiplied in the sinner who has already lost grace through the first sin, and therefore sin is not formally the privation of grace.

You will say 1°. Concil. Trident., Sess. 6 cap. 3 says justification is a translation from the state of sin to the state of grace. And chapter 7: Man, it says, through the grace received and gifts becomes from unjust just, and from enemy friend: therefore it judges that immediately and without a new mutation sin is formally remitted through the infusion of grace; and consequently that in the justification of the sinner there is only a single mutation. —

I deny the consequence, and to the antecedent I say that the Council says only that in the justification of the sinner there takes place a true motion from a contrary into a contrary term; so that there is an expulsion of sin and an introduction of grace; but the Council does not intend that that motion be only single and simple, but composed of a twofold motion, such as is found in the production of heat and the expulsion of cold, where there are two motions essentially distinct: one from the non-being of heat to its being; the other truly from the being of cold in the subject to its non-being.

You will say 2°. If a twofold mutation intervene in the justification of the sinner, it is necessary that a twofold form intervene; for a twofold formal effect is found, namely the renewal of man and the expulsion of sin: but that seems to be against the mind of the Council of Trent affirming that we are cleansed from sin and renewed by the same grace: therefore there cannot be a twofold mutation. —

I deny the sequel of the major; for although in the justification of a sinner there is a twofold effect, yet these can proceed from a single form: thus by one heat the subject is made hot and free from cold, and immediately thereafter it is not necessary that, although the change be twofold, a twofold form should also intervene.

You ask 1°. Whether those changes are real? — The Doctor answers in the same place, num. 64, that the infusion of grace and the remission of guilt are not two real changes; since the remission of guilt, as it is not unto any positive form, nor does it necessarily take away anything real and positive, cannot be a real and positive change: for it is not a real change except unto a really positive term or a real privation: therefore there is only one real change, namely the infusion of grace, because it is unto a real form: but the other is moral, which for that reason the Doctor calls in the same place a change of reason, because it is not unto any real term.

You ask 2°. Which of these changes does God intend more especially? — The Doctor answers in 1. dist. 1. quaest. 6., that God intends the infusion of grace more especially: For, he says at num. 9, an agent acting according to right reason principally intends perfection rather than the absence of defect or imperfection, because he intends that absence only on account of perfection: therefore God more principally intends positive perfection, namely the infusion of grace, than the absence of imperfection, namely the remission of sin.

You will say. From the first Epistle of John, cap. 5: For this purpose the Son of God appeared, that he might destroy the works of the devil: but the destruction of the works of the devil is nothing other than the remission of sin: therefore this is especially intended by God. Moreover St. Augustine lib. 22. De Civit. Dei, c. 27 says: Our justification consists rather in the remission of sins than in the pursuit of virtues: therefore the chief change is the remission of sins. Finally, grace is not infused except that sin be expelled: therefore such expulsion is first intended. —

I deny all these consequences, and to the first antecedent I say that Christ the Lord came chiefly for this end, that He might bestow upon us the life of grace, according to that word of John 10: I came that they may have life, and may have it more abundantly: which communication of celestial and divine life, since it is incompatible with sin, Christ is consequently reckoned to have come that He might undo sin. —

To the second I say that St. Augustine does not compare the infusion of grace with the expulsion of sin; but he only means that our justice, being frail and precipitate, and not persevering long — since man often rises again and again falls — hence it comes about that the state of sin seems of longer duration and more persevering than the state of grace and justice. —

To the third I say that indeed grace was intended that sin might be remitted, but not that the remission of sin is the primary effect of its infusion, but only secondary, and consequently it is not intended first, but only secondarily.

Second conclusion. — SIN CAN BE REMITTED BY THE ABSOLUTE POWER OF GOD THROUGH THE MERE EXTRINSIC AND MERITORIOUS CONDONATION OF GOD.

So holds the Subtle Doctor in many places, especially in 1. dist. 16. quaest. 2. num. 1., where he says: Guilt can be remitted without the infusion of grace. For God can by His absolute power create man in pure natural state without guilt and without grace: therefore He can likewise repair him after the fall, and so remit guilt without the infusion of grace. The same is held by the Seraphic Doctor in 1. dist. ⟦illegible: dist. number illegible⟧ art. 1. quaest. 7., Ocham in the same place on 1. q. 3. art. 1., and the more celebrated of the Ancients. Among the Recentiors indeed Suarez lib. 7. De gratia, cap. 23.; Silvius l. 2. quaest. 113.; Martinezius disput. 11. q. 7.; and many others.

And it is proved first: the divine will is of no less power than the human: but a human will can remit an offense by mere and simple condonation and release: therefore much more can the divine accomplish this. —

It is confirmed, because God can release a vow without any production whatsoever of a quality in him to whom it is released, and solely by the extrinsic condonation of the vow: therefore by equal reason He can remit the offense. —

Nor does it matter that this release must be made known through revelation; otherwise the one vowing would not know that he was absolved, etc. For we shall say that it belongs only per accidens to the release of a vow that one knows himself to be absolved; for if then a man is held to fulfill the vow, this happens not by reason of the obligation of the vow, but by reason of an erroneous conscience, by which he judges the vow to bind, when in truth it does not bind: as he who fasts on Sunday thinking it to be a day of sacred fasting is bound to fasting not per se but per accidens, on account of an erroneous conscience: therefore truly a vow can be released even though that release and relaxation be not made known. —

Next, habitual grace is an effect of the divine will, whereby God freely loves man: therefore even with grace excluded God can love man: but in that case man so loved by God will not be in sin. For God hates sinners: therefore sin can be taken away without the conferral of grace. —

Finally, sin and grace are not immediate opposites: therefore one can be removed without the introduction of the other. The consequence is evident: for things which are not immediate opposites have some medium, and consequently the subject can exist without both. The antecedent likewise stands from the aforesaid reason of the Doctor; for God could from the beginning create man without sin and grace, and establish him in the purely natural state: but He can restore that same state after he has sinned: for such as He could create him from the beginning, such can He by His absolute power restore after sin. —

The Doctor adds, that once the act of sin has passed away, nothing remains in the sinner except the guilt of fault, which is chiefly explicated through the obligation to punishment which the sinner is bound to undergo: but God can remit this obligation to the sinner, and exempt him from any punishment, without conferring upon him grace or any other gift: therefore without any infusion of grace sin can be remitted by the mere external condonation.

You will say 1°. Sin cannot be remitted except by a form which expels that whereby the sinner is constituted hateful to God, and worthy of hatred and punishment: but such form is none other than habitual grace: therefore sin cannot be remitted without the infusion of that grace. —

I deny the major: for that which constitutes the sinner habitually and formally hateful to God is nothing other than sin remaining habitually until it is remitted: but for its remission there is not absolutely required another form, but only the divine release, by which the sinner is freed from the guilt of fault, no otherwise than a debtor is freed by the gratuitous remission of his creditor from the debt and obligation contracted by the loan.

You will say 2°. Man cannot be the object of the hatred of God without sin: therefore neither the object of love without grace. —

I deny the consequence: the reason of the disparity is, because the object of love is made by God, but is not presupposed: whereas the object of hatred is not made by God, but by the sinner, and so is presupposed to the divine hatred: wherefore God cannot fail to hate the sinner existing in sin, because that sin provokes the divine indignation: but He can love him without the infusion of grace, because He can constitute and render the object lovable in another manner than through the infusion of grace.

You will say 3°. So long is God understood to have hatred and indignation toward the sinner, until He infuse grace into him: therefore He cannot remit sin to him without the infusion of grace. The consequence stands: for sin remains habitually so long as the sinner is odious and hostile to God. The antecedent is proved, because God is understood to be hostile and angry against anyone so long as He repels him from His grace, or good will: but He repels the sinner from His grace or good will so long as He does not restore to him the grace taken away on account of sin: therefore, etc. —

I deny the antecedent: for in order to lay aside hatred and indignation it suffices that God no longer wish to have the reason of the sin committed, nor on account of it to be indignant against the sinner, but voluntarily renounce the right which He had of pursuing him with hatred and punishing him: which indeed He can accomplish by His absolute will.

To the proof I say that the good will of God, and grace accepted in this sense for any gratuitous favor whatever, is manifold; wherefore God can positively deny one of those gratuitous gifts and grant another; and thus if God were to remit sin to anyone without infusing sanctifying grace, He would not be reckoned to repel him from all His good will, or gratuitous favor: since that gratuitous remission of sin would be a great argument of the good will and favor of God, even if He did not wish to confer upon him further benefit: for the creditor is reckoned to bestow a great benefit upon the debtor while he releases the debt to him, even if he confer no new favor upon him.