Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

NOTE 1. That a twofold opposition of things is distinguished by Theologians: one indeed physical; the other truly moral and demeritorious. The prior is that which intervenes between natural positive physical entities fighting against each other, as between heat and cold, white and black. The other is found between extremes set apart from themselves, not by reason of physical entities, but by reason of dignity and indignity, or by reason of a superior ordination willing either extreme to subsist or to be preserved. Hence the controversy, whether grace and sin are opposed physically, and so exclude one another, whether positively, as cold heat, or at least privatively, as light darkness and darkness light: or only morally, and by ordination of God. The prior part is defended by Cajetan, 1.2 q. 93, and Vasquez, disp. 201, whom not a few Recentiores follow: but the latter part is defended, with the Subtle Doctor, by all the more illustrious Theologians.

NOTE 2. That although it be found and certain among Theologians that sanctifying grace and sin, according to the ordinary disposition of things and the usual ordination of divine providence, nowhere subsist together, yet among them there is no agreement whether, according to the extraordinary power of God and beyond the established laws, these opposite extremes can stand together in such wise that not only an actual sin, or a sinful act, can be elicited by a just man without on that account losing the justice which God has preserved by extraordinary virtue, but also that guilt of fault, or stain of sin remaining in the sinner after the act elicited, can subsist with that heavenly and divine quality of justifying grace. The negative part some Ancients and Recentiores defend; but the affirmative very many, with the Subtle Doctor, champion.

NOTE 3. Or rather to be recalled from the fifth volume, Treatise On Sins: that mortal sin remaining habitually is not merely the privation of grace taken away on account of sin, but is the very actual sin remaining morally, until it be remitted by God or deleted by condign satisfaction: just as among men offenses and injuries subsist morally until they are pardoned through grace, or extinguished through equal satisfaction or payment. Hence it comes about that the remission of sin is not precisely the infusion of grace, but, as the Doctor teaches in 1 dist. 16, question 2, that remission of sin and infusion of grace are truly two mutations, if not real, at least moral, as we demonstrated more fully within. Wherefore it does not absolutely follow that upon the infusion of grace the remission of sin ought necessarily to follow, as will appear within. Three things therefore principally come to be solved in this Question: First indeed, whether sin and grace expel one another physically and naturally: or only morally, and by divine ordination. Second, whether in the ordinary way they can subsist together, at least for some instant of time. Finally third, whether by the extraordinary ordination of God sin, both actual and habitual, can remain with sanctifying grace.

First Conclusion. — SANCTIFYING GRACE AND MORTAL SIN ARE NOT OPPOSED TO ONE ANOTHER NOR DO THEY EXPEL ONE ANOTHER PHYSICALLY, BUT ONLY MORALLY: AND THE SAME NOT FROM THE NATURE OF THE THING, BUT BY THAT DIVINE ORDINATION. This Conclusion consists chiefly of two parts: of which the first is that of the Doctor in 8 d. n ⟦illegible⟧ where he proves that hatred of neighbor does not fight with charity from the nature of the thing, nor destroy it naturally, but only demeritoriously: For the transgression of the precept, he says, does not corrupt the positive habit, nor the act of loving God: but merits that God withdraw himself, and thus neither habit nor act can inhere. The same must be said of sin with respect to grace, which is really distinct from charity, proved above from the Doctor himself. Which moreover he openly teaches in 1 d. 1 n. 33, where he says that grace and the infused virtues in us are corrupted by some act of ours, not as if by a nature of repugnance, but only by a demeritorious cause; for the soul sinning merits that grace not be conserved in it. And thus in the second instant of nature, on account of such a demerit as it were preceding, God does not conserve grace, and thus it is annihilated.

This truth is proved: physical opposition is either relative, between relations fighting diametrically against one another, or contrary, or contradictory, or privative: but in none of these modes do sin and sanctifying grace fight against one another: therefore they are not opposed to one another, nor do they expel one another physically. The major is certain. The minor likewise easily appears: For first it appears that grace and sin do not fight against one another, neither contrarily nor relatively: for these oppositions intervene only between positive forms in the same subject incompatible with respect to the same, as heat and cold in the same subject, paternity and filiation on the same foundation with respect to the same term: but sin is not something positive, as we have abundantly proved in the Disputation On Sins: consequently it does not militate with those oppositions against sanctifying grace. — Nor do they fight contradictorily: for this opposition intervenes only between being and non-being universally taken: but grace and sin do not have this general latitude of being and non-being: indeed they are within determined and special enclosures of being and special non-being. Finally they do not fight privatively: for sin is not formally the privation of sanctifying grace itself, but of rectitude and conformity, which ought to inhere in the sinful act. This reason will be confirmed from what is said below, and those things which are wont to be objected against this truth will at the same time be solved.

The second part is likewise that of the same Doctor in l. c. dist. 16 num. 18, where he says, that grace and sin are not opposed immediately simply from the nature of the extremes, but from divine institution: and the induction of one to the motion of the other does not follow except in opposites immediate in themselves: but whether the expulsion of fault follows upon grace is doubtful, since they are not formally opposed: which truth he proves thus ibidem num. ⟦illegible⟧.

In those things which are formally opposed to one another, the effective and productive cause of one of the opposites is destructive of the other: for an agent producing heat, e.g., destroys cold, and a form induced into a subject removes the privation of that same form from it: but the effective cause of sin is not destructive of grace; for the created will alone is the effective cause of sin, because from it are the fault and the depraved sinful act and the guilt: yet it cannot destroy grace, because grace is not destroyed unless annihilated: but a creature cannot annihilate anything physically, any more than create, especially by ordinary power, as all confess: therefore grace and sin do not fight formally from the nature of the thing, but only from the disposition and ordination of God.

Secondly. the donation of grace and the expulsion of sin are two distinct benefits, granted gratuitously by God: therefore one does not import the necessary consecution or presence of the other. The antecedent is clear from the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 1, saying that justification is not the mere remission of sins, but also sanctification and renovation of the interior man through the voluntary reception of grace and gifts. The same truth St. Augustine teaches tract. 72 on John, where he says: Let him judge who can, whether it be greater to create just Angels than to justify impious men: certainly if the power is equal on both sides, this belongs to greater mercy. There he expressly says that the expulsion of sin is a benefit distinct from the infusion of grace itself, which was granted to the Angels in their creation, as we taught with him in the treatise On the Angels. Therefore it is one thing to infuse grace, another to remit sin, and both are the gratuitous benefit of God; consequently he can confer one apart from the other: and consequently one does not naturally and necessarily follow upon the position of the other. It will appear more evidently, and moreover this truth will be confirmed, from what is said below.

You will say. If the infusion of grace did not import necessarily the remission of sin, and this were a certain benefit consequent upon it, it would follow that the application of the merits of Christ would be made not only in the infusion itself ⟦illegible: locus interruptus⟧ of our Lord Jesus Christ he communicates: yet this is done in this justification of the impious, when by the merit of his most holy Passion the charity of God is diffused through the Holy Spirit in the hearts of those who are justified, and inheres in them: whence in justification itself, together with the remission of sins, man receives all these things infused at once through Jesus Christ, in whom he is ingrafted by faith, hope, and charity. By which words he signifies that there is one formal cause of justification, whereby there is not only the interior renovation of man, but also the remission of sins. The instance against the major is clear; for if the remission of sins does not necessarily and naturally follow upon the infusion of grace, it will be necessary that the merits of Christ applied in the very application of grace be applied anew, that in view of them the greatest gift, namely the remission of sins, may follow. — I answer, denying ⟦illegible⟧ major: for although the infusion of grace and the remission of sins is a twofold benefit, one of which does not naturally follow from the other, hence it is not consequent that the very application of the merits of Christ also ought to be twofold; for it suffices for that, that the merits of Christ be applied once through the infusion of grace, that they may avail equally for the remission of sins, which upon the infusion of sanctifying grace follows infallibly, in the ordinary way, according to the divine decree, not indeed physically and from the nature of the thing, but only morally and by divine ordination.

You will say 2°. Sin is a habitual aversion from God; but grace a habitual conversion to God: but aversion and conversion are opposed from the nature of the thing: therefore setting aside any ordination of God, sin and grace are opposed. — I distinguish the minor: aversion and conversion of the same character, and within the same line, are opposed to one another, I concede: otherwise, I deny: whence the consequence is denied. For aversion from God through sin is something moral and in the genus of morals: but conversion to God through grace is something physical and in the genus of being; whence one is not opposed to the other from the nature of the thing. To these add, that grace from the nature of the thing and by force of natural entity has not precisely that it be formally a conversion to God, but only by the ordination of God producing and ordaining such a quality, that it be the medium of the conversion of the soul to him, and the motive of its love toward him.

You will say 3°. While the sinner is justified, two formal effects occur, namely the renovation of his interior, and the remission and pardon of sin: but those two effects either proceed from one and the same form, or from two. If from one, that form is either intrinsic, namely grace, or extrinsic, namely the simple and gratuitous pardon and external favor of God merciful. If they proceed from grace; therefore grace expels sin from the nature of the thing and formally, and consequently the expulsion of sin naturally follows upon the infusion of grace. If from external favor, it is consequent that we are not justified by inhering grace, the contrary of which appears from the preceding Question. But if those two effects proceed formally from two causes, of which one be pure internal sanctifying grace, and the other truly the external favor of God, it follows that there is a twofold formal cause of our justification, the contrary of which appears from the Council of Trent praised above: it follows also that we are justified partly by something internal, partly by something external, whose falsity likewise is clear from what has been said. — I answer, that those two formal effects proceed from grace alone, not indeed from the nature of the thing, but only by divine ordination, for that external favor, that is, the mercy and goodness of God, is only the efficient cause, not truly the formal cause, of justification.

Second Conclusion. — GRACE AND MORTAL SIN CANNOT SUBSIST TOGETHER IN THE ORDINARY WAY FOR ANY INSTANT. Thus the Doctor in 2 dist. 5 question 1 n. 6, and in ⟦illegible: dist./q. reference garbled in OCR ("in t. dist. t. q.5.")⟧ where, responding to the third argument, he says that baptism expels every sin, not because in the same instant grace and sin inhere, etc. It is gathered from St. Augustine, book 3 On Free Will, chapter 15, where he says:

Lest for a point of time the beauty (namely of grace) be defiled, so that there should be ⟦perrati?⟧ disgrace in it.

Proof first. According to the law and providence established by God, habitual charity is infused into no one unless he be perfectly united to Christ, and a living member of him be elicited: but from the Council of Trent, Session VI, Canon 7, There is nothing of damnation in those who are truly partakers with Christ, nor can anyone be a living member of Christ and at the same time dead through sin. Moreover from 1 John IV, He that abideth in charity abideth in God, and God in him. But no one can abide in God even for an instant, and at the same time for an instant be alienated from him through mortal sin: therefore grace and sin cannot be together.

Finally, grace expels sin demeritoriously: but there is no repugnance that in the same instant in which man merits punishment the same be inflicted: therefore in the same instant in which man sins grace is expelled, and consequently they do not subsist together even for an instant. The minor proves from a similar case. For while someone disposes himself lastly toward grace through confession, he merits de congruo grace, which is conferred upon him in the same instant of time: similarly the increase of grace is given in the same instant of time in which he merits by a more intense act of charity: therefore similarly the expulsion of grace, which is the punishment of sin, is caused in the same instant of time in which one sins.

You will say 1. The subtraction of grace is a punishment inflicted on account of the demerit of sin: therefore it behooves that sin first be consummated before grace be expelled; and consequently grace and sin are together for some instant of time. — I deny the consequence: for sin is consummated prior by priority, duitaxat of nature, but not by priority of time, than the expulsion of grace: just as the privation of a physical form ceases from a subject by priority of nature before a form is induced, but not by priority of time: otherwise for some instant of time the subject would exist stripped of every form.

You will say 2. Doctor Subtilis in 4. dist. 17|ordinatio:liber.4/distinctio.17. question 2. n. 13. says that in that instant in which sin is deleted, charity inheres: therefore he judges that sin and charity, which is really the same as sanctifying grace, can exist together for some instant. — I deny the consequence: for the Doctor indeed affirms, that the deletion of sin and grace are together, but not that sin and grace exist together.

You will urge. Actual remission of sin connotes actual sin existing: but by concession grace and the remission of actual sin can be together: therefore also sin and grace can subsist together. — I distinguish the major: actual remission of sin connotes actual sin which exists: I deny: that it ceases: I concede: just as equally illumination connotes darknesses not existing, but ceasing.

Third Conclusion. — BY THE EXTRAORDINARY POWER OF GOD SANCTIFYING GRACE AND MORTAL SIN NOT ONLY HABITUAL BUT ALSO ACTUAL CAN EXIST TOGETHER IN THE SAME SUBJECT.

Thus the Doctor in 4. dist. 16. question 2. with whom subscribe Ockam, q. 3. art. 1. Mayronius, in 2. dist. 21. Gabriel, in 1. dist. 11. Bellarmine, book 2 On Justification, chapter 16. Suarez book 4 On Grace. chapter 11, and the whole chapter 20, and the more celebrated five Recentiores.

And it is proved first: God, by His absolute power, can bring about whatever does not imply a contradiction and some manifest opposition: but no evident contradiction appears why sin and grace should not coexist simultaneously in the same subject: therefore by the absolute power of God this can be done. The major is self-evident. The minor is proved: first, because habitual grace and sin, as we said, are not opposed to one another — not contradictorily, since they do not clash like being and non-being; nor contrarily, since sin is not something positive; nor relatively, since relations are something positive, of which kind sin is not; nor even privatively, since sin does not consist formally in the physical privation of habitual grace, but in the privation of actual rectitude: therefore sin and grace do not conflict with each other by any opposition: and consequently God can preserve both at once in the same subject, such that He may not remit the sin of the one to whom He bestows sanctifying grace.

Second: habitual and sanctifying grace, since it can be produced physically by God alone, can also be destroyed by Him alone physically, and its conservation suspended: but given sin there is nothing that physically compels God to destroy grace and to suspend His conserving concurrence with it, just as, heat having been produced in water, God is not compelled to destroy and take away from it ⟦leg. ignem? raw: trigus⟧: therefore just as God can preserve heat and ⟦leg. ignem? raw: irigus⟧ in the same subject, by equal reason He will be able, by His absolute power, to preserve sanctifying grace together with sin in the same will.

Third: the formal effect of grace is to constitute man specially lovable to God and loved; but the formal effect of sin is to constitute the subject averse from God and converted to creatures: yet these two do not conflict simultaneously, for loving another and not being loved in return, or even being offended by him, do not imply a contradiction, as appears in human affairs; for the father most often pursues the son with love by whom he is not only not loved with reciprocal love, nay, is offended by disobedience and reluctance of spirit.

It is confirmed: if man, created in the pure state of nature, were to sin, God could refrain from annihilating him at once, but could preserve him in his natural being: yet by preserving him thus it would follow that He loved him with natural love: therefore God can preserve a man who does not love Him, nay, who is averse to Him. Therefore by similar reasoning, if man in the state of grace were to sin, God could preserve grace in him, and so, preserving him, love him with supernatural love: for as loving a person on account of the goodness of his nature, and hating his action, do not conflict with each other, so neither will loving a person on account of habitual grace, while at the same time having hatred of his depraved action, involve a contradiction.

You will object. 1. There cannot be at once mortal actual sin with the actual love of God above all things: therefore neither can habitual grace or charity and actual or habitual sin coexist.

I answer. With the antecedent granted, I deny the consequence: for it is one thing that two contrary vital acts including a contradiction in their objects cannot exist simultaneously, even by absolute power, because one destroys the object of the other, as assent and dissent concerning the same thing, or assent concerning contradictorily opposed objects: but the love of God above all things and actual mortal sin are of this kind: for the love of God above all things includes formally, or at least virtually, an efficacious displeasure at every mortal sin, and a nolition of it together with an absolute will and purpose of not sinning; with such purpose and nolition actual sin manifestly conflicts, because it is not committed without an actual will contrary to that purpose. It is otherwise, however, with habitual grace and mortal actual or habitual sin: because mortal sin does not consist formally in the physical absence of the habit of grace or charity, but in the privation of rectitude, with which remaining habitually, or even actually, it does not conflict for the habit of grace or charity to be preserved: for although the habit of grace by its nature demands morally that it not be preserved in a subject so perversely disposed and unworthy, this nevertheless does not import an absolute necessity on God's part of not preserving grace: for God can act according to the moral, and also the natural exigency of a created form, and preserve those things which would otherwise destroy themselves.

You will object. 2. It implies someone being at once just and unjust, pleasing and odious to God, worthy of His glory and at the same time unworthy, and doomed to eternal death and damnation: whereas by sanctifying grace man has that he be just, and pleasing to God, and worthy of eternal life; but by sin, that he be unjust, odious to God, and doomed to eternal death: therefore it implies someone having sin and grace at once.

Distinguo. I distinguish the minor: he who is in grace is just, pleasing to God, and worthy of eternal life, physically and from the nature of the thing, I deny: morally, from good pleasure, and from the ordination of God, I grant. Hence the consequentia must be denied: for this grace does not hold in justified man by its native virtue, but only by divine ordination, as we said: whereupon, notwithstanding this moral disposition and ordination, God could preserve grace physically together with sin. Hence add that being pleasing and odious to God, and what must be said of the others, are not effects of contradictories, but only of contraries, arising from distinct foundations. Hence as contraries can be preserved divinely: so, notwithstanding morally opposite effects, the principles from which they arise can subsist together: for one and the same man, by reason of a diverse principle, can be worthy and unworthy of the same thing: thus the son of a king, by right of birth and primogeniture, is worthy of the royal crown and kingdom; which however, on account of crimes, or conspiracy against his Father, he is judged unworthy; so likewise a man who would be created in pure naturals would, by virtue of his nature, be worthy of some natural beatitude, which however he could become unworthy of morally and demeritoriously on account of sin.

You will object. 3. By mortal sin man is habitually averse from God; by grace, however, habitually converted to Him: but the same cannot at once be converted and averse with respect to the same, just as neither can he be ⟦leg.? raw: unieus⟧ and distinct: therefore neither can anyone have sin and grace at once.

Distinguo maiorem. By mortal sin man is averse from God, and by grace converted wholly and totally, I deny: in a certain respect, I grant. For sin is not an aversion wholly and totally from God, but only in a certain respect, namely by way of offense and injury of one remaining habitual, until it be remitted by God. Likewise sanctifying grace and charity are not a conversion of every kind excluding all aversion whatsoever, but only that which would come about through hatred of God: whence it also tolerates vicious habits opposed to the love of and conversion to God: and consequently grace does not necessarily and absolutely exclude sin.

You will object. 4. God cannot at once hate and love the same man: but He hates the one having sin, and loves the one having grace: therefore the same man cannot have both.

Distinguo maiorem. With respect to the same thing, by reason of one and the same motive, I grant: by reason of a diverse one, I deny. For God both hates and loves all sinners; He hates indeed insofar as they oppose Him, but He loves them because they are the works of His hands: For you love all things that are, and hate nothing of the things which you have made. Wis. 2. Hence it does not conflict that the same thing, by diverse reason, be lovable in one respect, and odiable in another.

You will object. 5. If grace could subsist with sin, it would follow that the expulsion of sin is not the formal effect of grace, and while God should cease to will to preserve grace together with sin, then sin would not be driven out by grace, but by the mere will of God: but the consequent is against the common opinion of Theologians: therefore also that from which it follows.

I deny the sequel of the major. For since the expulsion of sin is only a secondary effect of grace, it does not follow that if it be impeded by God, it is on that account judged to be destroyed: just as by similar reasoning the expulsion of fire would no less be the formal effect of heat, although for a time it might be suspended by the absolute power of God, so that fire together with heat might be preserved in the same subject. Nor does it follow either, that when ⟦garbled in scan: raw "darium, quem antea suspendebat"⟧

You will object. 6. When God cannot preserve both opposite forms, e.g. sin and grace, there is no need of a special will of God to remove one of them, but it suffices that the opposite form be induced: as, because God cannot preserve at once in the same column the denominations of right and left with respect to one and the same animal, therefore, the denomination of right being posited, the denomination of left is excluded without any other special will of God: therefore because God cannot preserve grace and sin by the ordinary way, it will suffice that grace be granted to the soul, so that sin may depart from it.

I answer. The antecedent is ⟦leg. verum? raw: rerum⟧ when forms are opposed by the nature of the thing and repugnant, such as right and left; but otherwise if they are opposed only demeritoriously and morally, as sin and grace.

You will object lastly, citing the Subtle Doctor in 2 dist. 37 n. ⟦?⟧ saying that privation of grace is not sin except insofar as it is of justice owed. He judges, then, that sin is a privation of owed grace: but a form and the privation of a form cannot exist at once even by absolute power: therefore neither grace and sin.

I answer. Therefore the Doctor calls sin a privation of justice, because this privation is the effect of sin: but an effect is often called by the name of its cause, for which reason St. Paul calls concupiscence sin, not because it is such formally, as we have said several times already, but because it is from sin and leads into sin. Add that the Subtle Doctor does not prove this absolutely, but by supposition; for he adds afterward: that (namely grace) the will deprived itself of demeritoriously.