Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

The name of justification bears several significations in holy Scripture; for it is employed especially in four ways: First indeed for the divine law itself, which teaches justice and conduces to its attainment: thus Psalm 118: O that my ways may be directed to keep thy justifications. And further on: I will keep thy justifications; do not thou forsake me utterly. And again: In thy justifications I shall meditate; I will not forget thy words. Hence in Luke, chapter one, of Zachary and Elizabeth it is said: And they were both just, walking before God in all the commandments and justifications of the Lord without blame. — Second, for the declaration of justice or innocence made by judges in favor of someone in the external forum; by which reasoning to justify is the same as to make, or to esteem, pronounce, and declare someone to be just, whether meanwhile he be truly just or not: in which sense Proverbs 17 says: He that justifieth the wicked, and he that condemneth the just, both alike are an abomination to God. And Psalm 50: Judge the needy and the fatherless; do justice to the humble and the poor. Isaias 5: Woe to them that justify the wicked for rewards. This signification moreover extends even to a declaration of innocence made by private authority; by which reasoning Job, chapter 9, said: If I will justify myself, my own mouth shall condemn me: if I show myself innocent, he shall prove me wicked. And Luke 16: The Pharisees justified themselves. Wherefore the apology by which one defends and manifests one's innocence and justice is wont to be called a justification: thus Job 27: I will not desert my justification, which I have begun to hold. — Third, justification is taken for the acquisition and attainment of that justice and innocence whereby we are justified by God: thus Romans 3: Being justified freely by his grace, etc. And chapter 1: To him that believeth in him who justifieth the ungodly. And chapter 5: As by the offense of one, unto all men to condemnation, so also by the justice of one, unto all men to justification of life: and 1. Corinthians 6: Do not err: neither fornicators, nor effeminate, nor servers of idols shall possess the kingdom of God: and such indeed you were, but you are washed, but you are sanctified, but you are justified. — Fourth finally, this word is taken for the increase of the same justice: thus ⟦ref illegible⟧ Fear not to be justified even unto death. James 2. By works a man is justified, and not by faith only. Apocalypse, last chapter: He that is just, let him be justified still.

The first acceptance of justification does not pertain to our undertaking; the three others conduce to it. For the first of them the Lutherans and Calvinists employ for declaring that innocence which they wish ⟦illegible: …⟧ to be brought upon us through Christ by the imputation of his holiness; but the two latter significations are frequent among Catholics, who rightly contend that justification is wrought by something positive inhering in the souls of the just: by which reasoning justification can be considered either actively and efficiently, insofar as it signifies the action of God inwardly justifying man; or passively and subjectively, inasmuch as it designates the terminus of that action of the justifying God, namely the human soul enlightened and adorned by sanctifying grace.

But since justification is derived from justice, and to justify is the same as to make just, it must further be observed that justice is taken generically for the rectitude of any work whatever; for that is called just which is right, and measured, and congruent with its rules.

Wherefore the name of justice is employed especially in three ways: First indeed most generally, for the rectitude of any work whatsoever prescribed by law; in which sense Christ the Lord, Matthew 5, said: Unless your justice abound more than that of the scribes and Pharisees. — Second it is taken more specially for that rectitude which is in works toward another, in which sense justice is constituted a special virtue among the cardinal virtues. Third finally most specially, for that rectitude by which man is ordered to eternal life; in which sense the Apostle said, Romans 3: But the justice of God, by faith of Jesus Christ, unto all and upon all them that believe in him: and he calls it the justice of faith, because it begins from faith, and of God, because it is given by God; hence to the Philippians 3 he said: And may be found in him, not having my justice, which is of the law, but that which is of the faith of Christ Jesus, which is of God, justice founded on faith.

These things being thus premised, there must be determined in the present article: First, whether the justification of the impious is wrought by an inherent and intrinsic justice, or only by an imputative and external one. Second, whether in the justification of a sinner sins are so remitted that they are truly blotted out, and no longer subsist at all in the person justified. Third, whether habitual sanctifying grace can subsist, by the extraordinary power of God, together with mortal sin. Fourth, whether justice once possessed can be lost. Fifth finally, whether a man can be certain of his own justification.

Note 1. Among the innumerable errors of the heretics of this time, this one holds no last place, whereby they affirm that men are not justified formally by anything intrinsic, but only through the justice of Christ, by faith as it were grasped with the hand and applied to us: I say by that faith, which they call justifying, and wish to be distinct from historical faith, and from the faith of miracles; so that through that justifying faith man persuades himself with certainty that the justice of Christ pertains to him, and that on account of it his sins are not imputed to him by God. Thus above all teaches Calvin, book 3. Instit., chapter 11. n. 2. where he says: He shall be justified by faith, because the justice of works being excluded, he apprehends by faith the justice of Christ, clothed wherewith in the sight of the Lord he appears not as a sinner, but as it were as a just man. Hence in the Antidote to the Council of Trent, on Session 6. chapter 8. he boldly says: *I contend that it is false that any part of justice resides in a quality or habit residing in us. To this subscribe not only the Calvinists of France, article 20. of their confession of faith, but also those of Germany, as is evident from the Palatine Catechism approved in the Pseudo Synod of Dordrecht.

But how wretched and erroneous this opinion is, and how plainly it wars against Sacred Scripture itself, and likewise against the holy Fathers teaching us to be justified through inherent and intrinsic justice, will appear below.

Note 2. That we here institute discourse concerning the justification of the sinner, which according to the Council of Trent, Session 6. chapter 1. can rightly be described: Translation from the state of sin into the state of grace, and adoption of the Sons of God, through Jesus Christ our Savior: which translation indeed is not wrought by way of simple generation, or by way of simple motion from privation or negation of justice unto justice itself, such as was the justification of the Angels, and of the first parents in the instant of their creation, which therefore can be called motion, or change from lack of sanctifying grace unto sanctifying grace itself, but is wrought by motion from as it were a contrary into a contrary, or by a certain transmutation from the state of injustice unto the state of holiness and supernatural justice, according to which in the interior disposition of man the inferior powers of the soul are subjected to the superior, namely reason, while reason truly obeys God in all things perfectly and serves Him.

Note 3. The justice whereby we are named just can be called participatory justice of God, and of Christ: either by reason of origin, or by reason of imita- tion and similitude. Indeed by reason of origin it is called the justice of God, because God is He who justifieth, says the Apostle Romans 8. Similarly also the justice of Christ; not only because by His merit we are made just, but also because no one becomes just except through justice received from Him, for of His fullness we all have received: wherefore the Apostle to the Philip- pians 3 said: And be found in Christ not having my justice, but the justice which is of the faith of Jesus Christ. By reason truly of similitude it is called the justice of God, because namely through it we are assimilated to God. Hence Christ the Lord admonished us, Matthew 5: Be you therefore also perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect. By equal reason it is called the justice of Christ, because through sanctifying grace He who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, Himself shone in our hearts, unto the illumination of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Christ Jesus, says the Apostle 2. to the Corinthians 4. Hence most excellently he admonished the Ephesians chapter 4: Put on the new man, who ac- cording to God is created in justice, and holiness of truth. There remains therefore only this difficulty to be solved, whether also our justice is the very formal justice of Christ, which through merely external imputation is attributed to us; which difficulty, that it may be solved, let there be

One Conclusion. — THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE IMPIOUS CONSISTS FOR- MALLY IN INTRINSIC AND INHERENT JUSTICE.

This is determined by faith in the Council of Trent, Session 6. Can. 10.: If anyone shall say that me- n without the justice of Christ, whereby He merited for us justification, or through it He Himself formally just, let him be anathema. And Canon 11.: If anyone shall say that men are justified, either by the sole imputative justice of Christ, or by the sole remission of sins, excluding grace and charity, which is poured forth in their hearts through the Holy Spirit, and inheres in them: or also that the grace whereby we are justified is only the favor of God, let him be anathema.

This truth is proved by all those texts of Scripture, in which first it is said that God abides in us. Thus John 14: If anyone loves me, he will keep my word, and my Father will love him, and we will come to him, and will make our abode with him. 1. Corinthians 3: Know you not, that you are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you?

Secondly, from those in which it is said that man is regenerated and renewed, when he is sanctified. Ephesians 4: Be ye renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man, who according to God is created in justice and holiness. 1. Peter 1: Hath regenerated us unto a living hope: but the term of regene- ration ought to be something real, as also of generation.

Thirdly, from those in which grace is said to be the seed of God remaining in us.

1. John 3: Whosoever is born of God committeth not sin, for his seed abideth in him. Likewise, pledge of inheritance, as Ephesians 1. For all these things signify something created, and really inherent in man justified.

Fourthly, from those in which it is signified that the just have in themselves something, whereby they may be grateful and acceptable to God. Thus John 3: Behold what manner of charity the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be named, and be, the sons of God; knowingly moreover he adds, and be, that he might evidently express that we are named sons of God not by mere external appellation, but truly are so.

— Proof similarly by those same oracles, in which it is clearly taught that grace, and the justice whereby we are just, are something derived into us from the justice of Christ: thus John 1. Of his fulness we all have received grace for grace. Eph. 4. To every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the donation of Christ: and by this grace we are said, in Titus, chapter 3, to be renewed in the spirit of our mind: John 1, to be born again as sons of God: in Gal., 2, to be made alive in Christ. Rom. 5, to receive in ourselves the Holy Spirit, in whom we cry Abba, Father:

1. Cor. 6, by whom we are washed and justified. All of which things openly declare that man is justified before God through inherent grace; for to be renewed, born again, and made alive by something is for that thing to exist inwardly; for no one is renewed, born, and lives formally by that life whereby he may be in eternity, nor is anyone formally washed clean by the cleanness of another.

The same assertion is proved by those authorities of the holy Fathers praised in conclusion 1 of the first question of the preceding disputation. Which authorities being now omitted, I will bring forward a single one, Saint Augustine, whom the heretics falsely pretend to favor them: for that holy Doctor declares openly in very many places that we are justified by a justice not which is in God, or in Christ, but which inheres in us: so he speaks especially in book De Spiritu et littera, chapter 9, where, expounding this text of the Apostle, Romans 3, The justice of God was manifested, he says: He does not say the justice of man, or the justice of his own will, but the Justice of God, not that whereby God is just, but that wherewith he clothes man, when he justifies the ungodly. Which he plainly repeats in chapters 11, 18, and 32, where, expounding that passage of Romans 5, The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, he says: Not that whereby he himself loves us, but that whereby he makes us lovers of himself: as the justice of God, whereby by his gift we are made just; and the salvation of the Lord, whereby he makes us saved; and the faith of Jesus Christ, whereby he makes us faithful. This is the justice of God, which he not only teaches by the precept of the law, but also gives by the gift of the Spirit.

Finally it is proved by theological reason: by that same reason are we said to be justified through Christ by which we are defiled through Adam: yet we are not defiled only by the imputation of Adam's sin, but because we truly sinned all in him as in our head, whence it comes about that original sin inheres in each of Adam's posterity and affects them after the manner of a stain: therefore neither are we justified by the imputation of the justice of Christ. The major is evident from that celebrated antithesis which the Apostle instituted in Rom. 5 between the old man and the new, namely Adam and Christ. For as, he says, by the offense of one, unto all men to condemnation, so by the justice of one, unto all men to justification of life.

The major likewise appears true from what we have said concerning original sin in the fifth volume, wherein we proved that original sin truly inheres in each of Adam's posterity for no other reason than because all sinned in him, as in the head and stock of the whole human nature.

Secondly, no form denominates intrinsically and formally a subject in which it does not inhere. For whiteness, for example, cannot denominate a wall white in which it does not inhere: but that whereby we are said to be just is a form through which we are made formally just, for we are not said to be such only by extrinsic denomination; therefore we receive that appellation from some form inhering in us, and consequently we are not denominated such by that justice which resides in God, or in Christ.

Thirdly, finally, that justice whereby we are formally said to be just is capable of intension and remission, according to that saying of the second of Peter 3, Grow in grace: and of the Apocalypse at the end: He that is just, let him be justified still; which truth indeed we demonstrated openly in the preceding Disputation: but neither the justice of God nor the justice of Christ can admit of more and less: therefore it is necessary that we be justified by a justice inherent in us, which is capable of remission and intension.

They object 1. The heretics bring various texts of Scripture, which they falsely suppose to openly patronize their error. First indeed they produce that passage of Romans 4: But to him that believeth in him, who justifieth the ungodly, his faith is reputed to justice according to the purpose of the grace of God, that is, his faith is accepted by God, whereby he believes the justice of Christ to pertain to himself, and to be imputed to him through divine mercy: which interpretation seems genuine and most conformable to the mind of the Apostle, who in that chapter eleven times calls justice imputation.

— I deny this to be the mind of the holy Apostle; nay, the contrary appears from the same chapter; for there he proves Abraham to have been justified not from works, but from a living and perfect faith in God, which was reputed, that is, deputed to him unto justice; because against hope he believed in hope, that he might be made the father of many nations: but no one would say that the faith of Abraham, whereby he was justified, was something external; and consequently the Apostle there excludes justification which would come about by the imputation of something external.

I answer 2. I distinguish the antecedent: that faith is reputed to the believer in God unto justice dispositively, I concede: formally, and actually, I deny. I confess indeed that, by means of actual faith, of which the Apostle there speaks, as by a certain disposition, a man can prepare himself unto justice: so that faith itself be deputed to him as a means of obtaining it; and the justice of Christ itself is imputed to him after the manner of a moral and meritorious cause of his justification; but it does not follow thence that anyone is justified by the mere imputation of the justice of Christ apprehended through faith.

They object 2. That passage of Rom. 5: As by the disobedience of one man many were constituted sinners, so by the obedience of one man many are constituted just; therefore also just by the justice of Christ imputed to them. — I answer, the Apostle intends by those words nothing else than that as Adam by his actual disobedience was the meritorious cause that all who should be born of him would contract original sin, so Christ by his obedience was the meritorious cause that all who are brought to him as members to the head, and are born again of him, and adopted as sons of God, become just on account of his merits communicated to them. Wherefore with antecedent words the Apostle said: as by the offense of one, unto all men to condemnation, so by the justice of one, unto all men to justification of life. In which words the Apostle teaches that by the obedience of one man many are constituted just in the manner in which many are constituted sinners by the disobedience of one man: but when the Apostle says that by the disobedience of one man many are constituted sinners, the sense is not that they are sinners only extrinsically and imputatively, but intrinsically and inherently, especially in the opinion of the Calvinists, who constitute original sin in the rebellion of the flesh and concupiscence: therefore by parity, when many are said to be constituted just by the obedience of one man, the sense is not that they are just only by an imputative justice, but by an internal and inherent one.

They object 3. That passage of 1. Corinth. 1, Christ was made unto us wisdom of God, and justice, and sanctification, and redemption, that, as it is written: he that glorieth, may glory in the Lord: therefore there is no other justification and sanctification for us than the very justice of Christ, otherwise it would be lawful to glory from another source than in the Lord. — I distinguish the antecedent: Christ has been made unto us justice and sanctification effectively and meritoriously, because of his fulness we have received, I concede: formally, I deny. For often in Scripture a cause is accustomed to be called by the name of its effect, in which manner of speaking Psal. 26 says: The Lord is my illumination and my salvation; because he is the cause of salvation and of illumination: therefore Christ is said to be our justice and redemption, for the reason that he is the cause of our justice and redemption. Which indeed is evident from the same text, because Christ is said to have been made justice for us just as he is said to have been made wisdom for us: but he is not our wisdom in that sense that we are wise through his formal wisdom imputed to us: therefore neither is he our justice in that sense that his justice is imputed to us.

They object 4. That passage of 2. ad Corinth. 1, God who had not known sin, made sin for us, that we might be made the justice of God in him: whence they argue thus: we are made the justice of God in the same manner in which Christ was made sin; yet Christ was made sin only by the imputation of our sin: therefore we are made the justice of God by the imputation only of the justice of Christ. — I distinguish the major of this argument: we are made the justice of God in the same manner in which Christ was made sin, as to something, I concede: as to all things, I deny. For the comparison does not hold in all respects; but the similitude holds only in this, that Christ was made sin, that is, a victim for our sins, for sin sometimes in Scripture signifies the victim for sin, according to that saying of Osee 1, where of the Priests it is said: They shall eat the sins of my people, that is, the oblations offered for sins: but we are made just through his justice meritoriously and effectively: the dissimilitude indeed lies in this, that Christ was made sin only extrinsically, since truly he could not be a sinner: but we are made just intrinsically, who otherwise could not be.

They object 5. That passage of Ephes. 4, Put on the new man, who according to God is created in justice and holiness of truth: but to put on Christ is nothing else than to apply his very justice and merits to ourselves so as to cover our nakedness, that thence we may be reputed just, as Jacob put on the garments of Esau, that he might be reputed the firstborn. — I deny this to be the sense of the Apostle; for to put on Christ is nothing else than to become like unto Christ, and to participate in his grace and virtues, so that we be intrinsically just and holy, as he himself is intrinsically just and holy: for as no one is said to put on the garment of another unless that cloth be applied to his body in a manner suited to it, so do we not truly put on the justice of Christ unless it be applied truly and really to our soul. The truth of which interpretation is proved 1. from the same Apostle: for he says we put on the new man in the same manner in which we put off and strip ourselves of the old man, as he teaches ad Col. 3 in these words: Stripping yourselves of the old man with his acts, and putting on the new, etc. Yet to put off the old man is to lay aside the inward vices and sins with which we were stained and infected: therefore contrariwise, to put on the new is to put on the manners and virtues of Christ opposed to those vices and sins, as the holy Fathers expound, especially Chrysostom in Epist. ad Rom. ad cap. 13. n. 14, Put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ, where he says thus: To put on Christ is to have all virtue together in universality. And elsewhere he says that it is the same thing as for Christ to be conspicuous in us on every side by holiness and custom: for a clothed man seems to be that which he has put on: let Christ therefore appear in us. And Jerome in cap. 1. ad Ephes., n. 23, on those words: Put ye on the new man, has thus: Whoever therefore can imitate his conversation, and express in himself all his virtues, so as to be meek, as he was meek, and humble of heart: and to lay down his soul for his friends, as he laid it down for his sheep: when struck, let him not answer back; when cursed, let him not curse, but overcome pride by humility: such a one has put on the new man, and can say with the Apostle: I live, now not I: but Christ liveth in me. And similarly other Fathers and Interpreters say that to put on Christ is nothing else than to be adorned with the virtues of Christ, and to be such, both inwardly and also in outward life and profession, that all may acknowledge from it, as from the garment of Christ, that they are his servants: as the servants of magnates are distinguished by a certain kind of garments, or by colors proper and peculiar to them.

They object 6. Those words of the Apostle ad Philip. 3, I have counted all things loss, and do judge them to be dung, that I may gain Christ, and may be found in him, not having my justice, which is of the law, but that which is through the faith of Jesus Christ. Whence Calvin concludes that one's own justice must be held as guilt by him who wishes to obtain the justice of Christ. — I answer, by these words the justice of mine, which is of the law, is understood to mean the justice of the works of the law, which the Apostle therefore calls his own, because he was destined unto it through circumcision, as were the other Israelites. Thence there is opposed to it the justice which is of faith, which is ours not efficiently, that is, from ourselves, as if from ourselves, but from the gift of God, although it is certain that it is ours subjectively.

They object 1. Saint Ambrose, lib. 1. De Iacob et vita beata, where he explains our justification by the example of Jacob hiding himself in the habit and clothing of his brother: As there, he says, an alien person received the blessing for his own advantage; so we lie hid under the precious purity of Christ our firstborn brother, that we repeat the testimony of justice before the sight of God.

— I answer 1. The aforesaid sentence is not found in that book, and consequently it was lied about and fabricated by the heretics themselves, who cite no chapter even of that book from which that sentence might be taken. I answer 2. That even if Saint Ambrose, or another of the holy Fathers, had uttered these words, nevertheless nothing against our assertion can be evinced from them: for a twofold justice can be distinguished in us: one whereby we are justified formally, and from sinners become just: another whereby we satisfy God for fault and the punishments due on account of it. Now when the holy Fathers say that the justice of Christ imputed to us is represented by Jacob lying hidden under the garments of his brother Esau, that he might receive the blessing of his Father, they speak of a justice not formal, but satisfactory; insofar namely as Christ the Lord, by satisfying for us to his Father, was our surety; so that his justice is applied to us by right of satisfaction, and is accounted in a certain manner ours, while we are reconciled to God formally through grace inhering in us; nor indeed do we satisfy God by our own works, however good, except inasmuch as they rest upon the satisfaction of Christ.

They object 2. Saint Bernard, Sermon 61. on the Canticles, speaking thus: Shall I sing my justices? Lord, I will remember thy justice alone: for it is also mine, namely thou hast been made unto me justice from God. Shall I then fear lest it should not suffice for both of us? It is not a short mantle which according to the Prophet cannot cover two.

— I answer, Saint Bernard calls the justice of Christ his own meritoriously, and not as though he were just by the formal justice of Christ imputed to himself. The solution is evident from the antecedents and consequents: for there S. Bernard teaches that our merit rests upon the merits of Christ the Lord: My merit therefore, he says, is the mercy of the Lord: plainly I am not destitute of merit so long as he be not wanting in mercies: but if the mercies of the Lord are many, therefore I am rich in many merits. And shortly after he subjoins the words set forth in the objection. Hence as according to S. Bernard there the merit of Christ the Lord is not ours formally, but something wholly distinct, yet it is called ours by reason of its effect and advantage, insofar as it redounds to our good, seeing that our merit rests upon it; so also, that all things with him may correspond in S. Bernard, the justice of Christ the Lord is ours, not indeed formally, but in effect; insofar as our formal justice rests upon it, and is some new meritorious effect. And certainly Bernard acknowledged inherent justice in most clear words, when in Sermon 5. on that text: Credidi, etc., he distinguishes a threefold justice: one of God, upright, pure, and firm; a second of the Angels, pure, upright, but not firm, because God found even in his Angels perversity: lastly a third of men after the fall, not pure on account of venial sins committed, not firm, because man can depart from it, but upright.

They object 3. That justice whereby we ought to be pleasing to God must be most perfect, and complete in all its numbers, but above all free from the admixture of any vice whatsoever: but a justice which would be from ourselves, whatever it might be, would always be mixed with vices and would labor under most many defects: for, says Isaias, chapter 64, We are all become as one unclean, and all our justices as the rag of a menstruous woman. Therefore that we may be acceptable to God through justice, we must be covered with the justice of Christ as with a most precious mantle.

— I answer 1. By denying the minor, for from very many contexts of sacred Scripture it is plain that just men, by their own works wrought with the help of grace, are pleasing and acceptable to God, and have found grace in the sight of the Lord; and consequently it is false that men are unpleasing and odious to God by their own justice. I answer 2. That a twofold perfection can be distinguished in justice itself: one essential, the other accidental. The former consists in the very essence of justification, namely in the adherence and information of sanctifying grace, which affects and illumines our soul: the latter consists in its intension, as regards more perfect accidental degrees; but he who has justice according to the former perfection, although he lack great intension of it and other accidental perfections, does not on that account cease to have it formally; as he who has heat in a lesser degree is truly hot, and has nothing of cold. As to the Prophet, ⟦illegible: …⟧ he must be understood either of legal justice, which among the Jews at that time was utterly undermined, or of justice lost through iniquities and the public and manifest crimes of the Jews, whose loss of justice indeed the Prophet mourns: but his sense is not that justices whereby men are truly just contain anything of iniquity.

Note 1. Concerning the resolution of the present Question, the error of the heretics of this time is twofold: for Calvin in lib. 3. Instit. cap. 11. n. 22. teaches that in justification sins are not truly taken away, but covered; not eradicated, but scraped; not blotted out, but covered over, on account of the justice of Christ imputed to us; so that sins are said to be covered, as if they were not seen by God, while he does not punish them: and scraped away, as if they did not appear. Thence, in lib. 4. cap. 15. he says: It is now perspicuous how false is what certain men taught long ago, that by baptism we are loosed and exempted from original sin. The same Luther had asserted, as is evident from the second article among those condemned by Leo X. Their second error is that sin is covered and not imputed in justification in such a way that nothing of punishment ever remains to be paid to God, but the guilt of the whole punishment is abolished together with the fault.

Note 2. A twofold non-imputation and covering of sins can be conceived. First, so that they truly subsist and are only hidden: secondly, so that they are utterly blotted out: just as ulcers of the body, from which this metaphor is taken, can be said to be covered in two ways: first, namely by only hiding them, that they may not appear, in which manner they are covered by the wounded man himself. Secondly, by curing and removing them, in which manner they are cut away by the physician. Which Saint Augustine indeed expressly explains in enarratione 2. in Psal. 31. saying:

God therefore covers the wounds, not thou; for if thou, being ashamed, shalt wish to cover them, the physician will not cure them. Let the physician cover and cure, for he covers with a plaster; under the covering of the physician the wound is healed, under the covering of the wounded man the wound is concealed.

Similarly twofold is non-imputation: one indeed whereby that which is is not imputed: the second truly whereby that which really is not is not imputed. The former covering, and non-imputation, is the figment of the heretics: the latter is the Catholic assertion.

Note 3. So great, and so infinitely perfect, is the sanctity and justice of God, that if any man among mortals, however just, be compared with God, he appears unjust, as the stars and any other heavenly bodies, although shining from elsewhere, are darkened by the presence of the Sun and lie hidden as though wrapped in darkness: not because they truly do not shine, but because their lesser splendor is as it were extinguished and swallowed up by the super-shining light of the sun. Hence the unanimous voice of the just was with Job: Verely I know it is so, and that man cannot be justified compared with God. And in the same place, chapter 4: Shall man be justified in comparison of God, or shall man be more pure than his maker? Behold, they that serve him are not steadfast, and in his angels he found perversity: how much more they who dwell in houses of clay, who have an earthly foundation, shall be consumed as by a moth? Wherefore the Royal Prophet prayed Psal. 130: Enter not into judgment with thy servant, for in thy sight no man living shall be justified. Yet it does not thence follow, as Calvin wills in lib. 3. Instit. cap. 12., that men, however just, are truly always defiled with sin, nor that there is anyone shining with whatsoever sanctity who is not sullied by the veiled darkness of the crime of his own admission, whereby he would appear deformed and most foul before God, unless he shone and were aspectable through the justice of Christ superinduced upon him as it were a royal and most precious mantle; which error indeed will be refuted

Single Conclusion. — IN THE JUSTIFICATION OF ANY SINNER WHATEVER MORTAL SINS ARE SO REMITTED THAT THEY ARE TRULY BLOTTED OUT AND WASHED AWAY.

This is of faith, determined in the Council of Trent, Session 6, Can. 5. If anyone denies that by the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, which is conferred in Baptism, the guilt of original sin is remitted, or even asserts that everything having the true and proper nature of sin is not taken away, but says that it is only scraped, or not imputed, let him be anathema.

This Catholic truth is proved by all those oracles of sacred Scripture in which it is openly pronounced that God blots out and takes away sins: thus Psal. 50, Blot out my iniquity... blot out all my iniquities. Isaias 43, I am he that blots out thy iniquities for my own sake. Micheae 7, Who is a God like unto thee, who takes away iniquity? Zachariae 3, Behold I have taken away thy iniquity. And further: Behold I will engrave the graving thereof, saith the Lord of hosts, and I will take away the iniquity of that land in one day. — It is proved similarly from those sacred texts which teach that we are cleansed and washed from sins far more perfectly than bodies are washed by natural water and cleansed from filth: thus Psal. 50, Thou shalt sprinkle me with hyssop, O Lord, and I shall be cleansed: thou shalt wash me, and I shall be made whiter than snow:

Ezech. 36, I will pour upon you clean water, and you shall be cleansed from all your filthiness. 1. Cor. 6, after the Apostle had recounted the grievous sins of the Gentiles, he subjoins: And such indeed some of you were; but you are washed, but you are sanctified in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, and in the Spirit of our God. And 1. Ioan. 1, The blood of Jesus Christ his Son cleanses us from all sin. And further: If we confess our sins, he is faithful and just, to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all iniquity; yet these divine oracles would by no means stand, nor would they have a genuine and true, but a fallacious signification, if the filth of sins were not utterly taken away and washed away in justification: therefore it must be acknowledged that this is so done. — The same truth stands equally evident from those very texts in which the just are called immaculate in the sight of God. Thus Psal. 118, Blessed are the undefiled in the way, who walk in the law of the Lord. Ephes. 1, He chose us, that we should be holy and unspotted in his sight. 2. Petri 3, Endeavor to be found before him immaculate and inviolate in peace. To which add that passage of Ephes. 5, Christ loved the Church, and delivered himself up for it, that he might sanctify it, cleansing it by the laver of water in the word of life, that he might present to himself a glorious Church not having spot or wrinkle, or any such thing. From these I argue thus: he who is cleansed, washed, and made whiter than snow, does not remain truly filthy, foul, black, and covered with dirt. Similarly he whose iniquities are blotted out, taken away, and cast into the depth of the sea is neither again ⟦illegible: OCR "tirdatur"; fortasse "tingitur"⟧ nor stained. Finally, he who is without spot and without wrinkle must not be said to be infected with the stain and filth of sin. Yet in justification the sinner is cleansed, washed, and made whiter than snow, and his sin is removed, blotted out, and cast forth as far as possible, so that he remains immaculate in the sight of God: therefore the sinner justified is no longer defiled by sins truly subsisting in him.

Proof secondly, from the authority of the holy Fathers: and especially of St. Cyprian, Epistle 2, which is to Donatus, where he calls baptism the death of crimes, the life of virtues; of St. Chrysostom, book 3 On the Priesthood, chapter 6: To purge the leprosy of the body, he says, or to speak more certainly, to show it purged, was permitted to the Priests of the Jews: but to our priests it has been wholly granted not, I say, to prove the leprosy of the body purged, but the stains of the soul to purge. And book 2 On the Compunction of the Heart: The compunction of the heart like fire consumes and destroys every vice of the soul, and whatever stain has crept into the heart it wipes away entirely, and deletes utterly. Hence in Homily 1 on the first Epistle to the Corinthians he compares the man absolved by the King from his crime with the accused who is absolved from his sins by baptism. And he adds that the former still keeps and retains a downcast spirit; but the latter, whom baptism has washed, does not so, but possesses a mind purer than the rays of the sun. — St. Jerome, book 3 against Pelagius, says: What of man? Shall you now be made clean in the laver? and is it said of you: Who is this that goes up washed, leaning upon her kinsman, so that indeed you may be washed, but cannot keep your purity unless you are sustained by the Lord. — Above all others, however, St. Augustine confirms this truth, especially in the books against the Pelagians, who calumniated the Catholic Prelates as if they asserted that Baptism does not give the indulgence of sins, nor take away crimes, so that the roots of all sins may be held in evil flesh. Thus he beats back that calumny in book 1 On the Merits of Sins, chapter 1: Who but an infidel would affirm this against the Pelagians? For we say that baptism gives the indulgence of all sins, and takes away crimes, not shaves them, nor holds the roots of all sins in evil flesh, as if sins were to be cut back like hairs on a shaved head, whence they might grow again: for I have found that they employ even that similitude for their calumny, as though this were our sentiment and our speech. And in book 3 he relates...

Proof finally, by theological reason: if sins were not utterly deleted in the justified, but truly subsisted in them, it would follow that the soul neither truly rises again from sin, nor is perfectly healed by the vivifying and medicinal grace of Christ: but that consequent is openly false, and it militates against those texts of Scripture in which the soul is said through justification to rise again from the death of sin, and to be healed: thus 1 John 5: We know that we have passed from death to life, because we love the brethren. From Psalm 30: Heal my soul, O Lord, for I have sinned against thee; for he would not rise from death who remained infected with mortal sin, nor would a member be called healthy whose wound were merely covered with a plaster: therefore, etc. It would follow, secondly, that the justified would nowhere enter the heavenly city, nor enter the kingdom of heaven, because there shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven anything defiled; for they ought not to be called clean, but stained, in whom the stain of mortal sin remains; since that stain could not be taken from them before death, in the judgment of the heretics; for it would be taken either by the act of faith which they would then elicit, or by death itself. Not the first, because it would follow that the justified prevented by sudden death are damned through defect of that act of faith, which they could not elicit. Nor can the second be asserted, since death, formally considered, being something natural, is altogether disproportionate to the stain of sin to be deleted. Finally, thirdly, it would follow that the justified still has something whereby he would be hateful to God, and to be condemned to eternal torments: but this is false, because, says the Apostle to the Romans 8: There is nothing of damnation to those who are in Christ Jesus: that is, says the Council of Trent, Session 5, Can. n, they who have been truly buried with Christ in baptism unto death: who have not walked according to the flesh, but putting off the old man, and putting on the new, which was created according to God, have been made innocent, immaculate, pure, harmless, and beloved of God: heirs indeed of God, but coheirs of Christ, so that nothing at all of...

They object, the Heretics. 1. All those texts of Scripture in which sins are said to be covered, and not imputed: thus Psalm 31 and Romans 4: Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered: blessed is the man to whom the Lord hath not imputed sin: where the three terms, to forgive, to cover, and not to impute, are set down to signify the same thing; so that one is explained by another: for sins to be forgiven by God, they say, is nothing else than to be so covered that they do not appear in the sight of God: and to be covered is nothing else than not to be imputed unto punishment and damnation, according to that of Ezekiel 33: If I say to the wicked, thou shalt surely die, and he doth penance for his sin, all his sins which he hath sinned shall not be imputed to him: in which sense the Apostle, 2 Corinthians 5, said: God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself, not imputing to them their sins: therefore sins are not truly remitted in justification, but only covered. — I deny the consequence. For there is, as we said in the third Remarkable Point, a twofold covering of sins: one by which they are merely concealed, lest they appear: another by which they are cured, lest they remain. Now the aforesaid texts of Scripture are to be understood of the latter, not of the former. Hence St. Augustine in the preface to the aforesaid Psalm 31: Sins are covered, hidden, abolished: if God covers sins, he would not punish, he would not acknowledge, he chose rather to forgive. And afterwards he adds: Do not understand it so, that the said sins are covered as though there they exist and live, etc. — I answer 2. Gratuitously it is asserted that these words are placed to signify the same thing, and that one is explained by another: for they can be referred to diverse things, and signify distinct effects, of which the first augments the second, and the second the third, so that to forgive signifies only remission as regards fault and eternal punishment: but to cover denotes the abolishing of the memory of past sins, on account of acts of contrary virtues: finally, not to be imputed declares that they are not retained even as regards temporal punishment, but are so expunged and pardoned, that together with the guilt of fault, of the whole temporal...

They object, the Heretics. 2. That word of 1 Peter 4: Charity covereth a multitude of sins: therefore, since charity subsists, sins subsist, which are covered by it. Moreover that word of 1 John 1: if we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. Finally these words of the Lord's Prayer: Forgive us our debts. Upon which words St. Epiphanius says: How necessarily, how wholesomely are we admonished that we are sinners, who are compelled to pray for our sins, that while indulgence is asked of God, each should remember his own conscience: lest anyone please himself as though innocent, and hoping more by extolling himself, he is instructed and taught that he sins daily, while daily he is commanded to pray for his sins. Therefore there is none so acceptable, so holy, who is not infected with sins, and consequently sins are not deleted in justification, but covered. — I deny the consequence. And to the first text I say, its sense is not that charity covers the multitude of the sins of him in whom it is: but that charity, whereby we love our neighbor, covers the sins of our neighbor, that is, it brings it about that we dissemble, relieve, and pardon all his sins: but that this is the mind of the Apostle is clear from the preceding words, in which, addressing the faithful, he says: But above all things having continual mutual charity among yourselves. As also from what follows, saying: Using hospitality one towards another without murmuring, every one as he hath received grace ministering the same one towards another: which, as is evident, concern charity to be exercised toward our neighbor. To the second and third I say, those texts are to be understood of venial sins, which we said subsist with sanctifying grace in the Treatise On Grace.

You insist. Venial sins, by concession, subsist with sanctifying grace, nor do they prevent men from being just in any true and real sense, since surely such sins are not imputed to them; why therefore may not the same be said of graver sins, which we call mortal? — I answer, that the disparity is very great, in that venial sin is a very slight and imperfect stain, and in moral matters little is reckoned as nothing: hence it is no wonder that notwithstanding it, the just, who at times fall into it, are said still to be immaculate, that is, pure from grave stain, which alone is wont simply and absolutely to be called stain in the common manner of speaking, just as mortal sin alone is most frequently called absolutely sin in Scripture, as Romans 6: The wages of sin is death. James 1: Concupiscence, when it hath conceived, begetteth sin: but sin, when it is completed, begetteth death. Ezekiel 18: The soul that sinneth, the same shall die. Nor is it a wonder if notwithstanding venial sin they are named just: because venial sin, being a light offense, does not dissolve friendship with God, nor deprive one of his grace, and the infused habits of virtue, whereby the just is formally constituted, that is, pleasing to God, and habitually furnished to act well supernaturally in every kind of virtue. But the same cannot be said of mortal sin; for he is no less stained who is truly infected with some grave mortal sin, although it be not imputed in the Calvinist sense, that is, only covered and dissembled. Nor is he less unjust, both by actual injustice, because he sins equally, and also by habitual, because he equally merits to be deprived of the grace of God and the infused virtues, and is in fact deprived of them by God as judge, who established this general law, Ezekiel 18: The soul that sinneth, the same shall die. And verse 26: When the just man turneth himself away from his justice, and committeth iniquity, he shall die,

They object 4. In the justified man concupiscence always remains: but that is sin: therefore this subsists with sanctifying grace. — I answer, that concupiscence can be distinguished threefold, of which the first is the inclination to sin, which, although it is not formally sin, is nevertheless called by this name in the scriptures, because it is from sin, and inclines to sin, as the Council of Trent teaches, Session 5, Canon 5. The second is the inordinate motion, which anticipates reason and as it were casts over it the shadows of sin, that it may the more easily entice the will to sin, reason not resisting with its dictate. The third finally is the inordinate and free motion, whereby the will, agitated by the allurements and goads of concupiscence, gives assent to the forbidden thing. Concupiscence taken in the first and second manner can remain in a just man, seeing that it is not formally sin, but only entices to it; otherwise however of concupiscence taken in the third manner, especially when the forbidden thing, to which the will gives consent, is of great weight, such that that consent has the character of mortal sin.

They object 5. No one, however just, is exempted from sin unless he perfectly fulfills the precept of charity; for he who loves not remains in death: but from St. Augustine, book On the Perfection of Justice, chapter 8, the precept of charity is not perfectly fulfilled except in future glory: therefore every just man in this life is always vitiated by some sin. — I distinguish the minor: that precept shall not be fulfilled perfectly, that is, appreciatively:

I deny: that is, intensively, namely with that intensity and perfection wherewith God ought to be loved by a creature. I concede the minor, and deny the consequence. For although in this mortal life we are bound to love God with the whole soul, with the whole heart, and with all our strength; yet we are not bound to execute it according to every kind of intensity and perfection wherewith that love can be exercised by creatures according to their state; for it is certain, proportion preserved, that the virtue of the blessed is far more excellent than that of wayfarers. But by the force of that precept we are only bound to love God appreciatively, in such wise that we esteem him above all other lovable objects whatsoever: which certainly every just man fulfills, while he perseveres in justice and in the observance of the divine commandments.

NOTE 1. That a twofold opposition of things is distinguished by Theologians: one indeed physical; the other truly moral and demeritorious. The prior is that which intervenes between natural positive physical entities fighting against each other, as between heat and cold, white and black. The other is found between extremes set apart from themselves, not by reason of physical entities, but by reason of dignity and indignity, or by reason of a superior ordination willing either extreme to subsist or to be preserved. Hence the controversy, whether grace and sin are opposed physically, and so exclude one another, whether positively, as cold heat, or at least privatively, as light darkness and darkness light: or only morally, and by ordination of God. The prior part is defended by Cajetan, 1.2 q. 93, and Vasquez, disp. 201, whom not a few Recentiores follow: but the latter part is defended, with the Subtle Doctor, by all the more illustrious Theologians.

NOTE 2. That although it be found and certain among Theologians that sanctifying grace and sin, according to the ordinary disposition of things and the usual ordination of divine providence, nowhere subsist together, yet among them there is no agreement whether, according to the extraordinary power of God and beyond the established laws, these opposite extremes can stand together in such wise that not only an actual sin, or a sinful act, can be elicited by a just man without on that account losing the justice which God has preserved by extraordinary virtue, but also that guilt of fault, or stain of sin remaining in the sinner after the act elicited, can subsist with that heavenly and divine quality of justifying grace. The negative part some Ancients and Recentiores defend; but the affirmative very many, with the Subtle Doctor, champion.

NOTE 3. Or rather to be recalled from the fifth volume, Treatise On Sins: that mortal sin remaining habitually is not merely the privation of grace taken away on account of sin, but is the very actual sin remaining morally, until it be remitted by God or deleted by condign satisfaction: just as among men offenses and injuries subsist morally until they are pardoned through grace, or extinguished through equal satisfaction or payment. Hence it comes about that the remission of sin is not precisely the infusion of grace, but, as the Doctor teaches in 1 dist. 16, question 2, that remission of sin and infusion of grace are truly two mutations, if not real, at least moral, as we demonstrated more fully within. Wherefore it does not absolutely follow that upon the infusion of grace the remission of sin ought necessarily to follow, as will appear within. Three things therefore principally come to be solved in this Question: First indeed, whether sin and grace expel one another physically and naturally: or only morally, and by divine ordination. Second, whether in the ordinary way they can subsist together, at least for some instant of time. Finally third, whether by the extraordinary ordination of God sin, both actual and habitual, can remain with sanctifying grace.

First Conclusion. — SANCTIFYING GRACE AND MORTAL SIN ARE NOT OPPOSED TO ONE ANOTHER NOR DO THEY EXPEL ONE ANOTHER PHYSICALLY, BUT ONLY MORALLY: AND THE SAME NOT FROM THE NATURE OF THE THING, BUT BY THAT DIVINE ORDINATION. This Conclusion consists chiefly of two parts: of which the first is that of the Doctor in 8 d. n ⟦illegible⟧ where he proves that hatred of neighbor does not fight with charity from the nature of the thing, nor destroy it naturally, but only demeritoriously: For the transgression of the precept, he says, does not corrupt the positive habit, nor the act of loving God: but merits that God withdraw himself, and thus neither habit nor act can inhere. The same must be said of sin with respect to grace, which is really distinct from charity, proved above from the Doctor himself. Which moreover he openly teaches in 1 d. 1 n. 33, where he says that grace and the infused virtues in us are corrupted by some act of ours, not as if by a nature of repugnance, but only by a demeritorious cause; for the soul sinning merits that grace not be conserved in it. And thus in the second instant of nature, on account of such a demerit as it were preceding, God does not conserve grace, and thus it is annihilated.

This truth is proved: physical opposition is either relative, between relations fighting diametrically against one another, or contrary, or contradictory, or privative: but in none of these modes do sin and sanctifying grace fight against one another: therefore they are not opposed to one another, nor do they expel one another physically. The major is certain. The minor likewise easily appears: For first it appears that grace and sin do not fight against one another, neither contrarily nor relatively: for these oppositions intervene only between positive forms in the same subject incompatible with respect to the same, as heat and cold in the same subject, paternity and filiation on the same foundation with respect to the same term: but sin is not something positive, as we have abundantly proved in the Disputation On Sins: consequently it does not militate with those oppositions against sanctifying grace. — Nor do they fight contradictorily: for this opposition intervenes only between being and non-being universally taken: but grace and sin do not have this general latitude of being and non-being: indeed they are within determined and special enclosures of being and special non-being. Finally they do not fight privatively: for sin is not formally the privation of sanctifying grace itself, but of rectitude and conformity, which ought to inhere in the sinful act. This reason will be confirmed from what is said below, and those things which are wont to be objected against this truth will at the same time be solved.

The second part is likewise that of the same Doctor in l. c. dist. 16 num. 18, where he says, that grace and sin are not opposed immediately simply from the nature of the extremes, but from divine institution: and the induction of one to the motion of the other does not follow except in opposites immediate in themselves: but whether the expulsion of fault follows upon grace is doubtful, since they are not formally opposed: which truth he proves thus ibidem num. ⟦illegible⟧.

In those things which are formally opposed to one another, the effective and productive cause of one of the opposites is destructive of the other: for an agent producing heat, e.g., destroys cold, and a form induced into a subject removes the privation of that same form from it: but the effective cause of sin is not destructive of grace; for the created will alone is the effective cause of sin, because from it are the fault and the depraved sinful act and the guilt: yet it cannot destroy grace, because grace is not destroyed unless annihilated: but a creature cannot annihilate anything physically, any more than create, especially by ordinary power, as all confess: therefore grace and sin do not fight formally from the nature of the thing, but only from the disposition and ordination of God.

Secondly. the donation of grace and the expulsion of sin are two distinct benefits, granted gratuitously by God: therefore one does not import the necessary consecution or presence of the other. The antecedent is clear from the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 1, saying that justification is not the mere remission of sins, but also sanctification and renovation of the interior man through the voluntary reception of grace and gifts. The same truth St. Augustine teaches tract. 72 on John, where he says: Let him judge who can, whether it be greater to create just Angels than to justify impious men: certainly if the power is equal on both sides, this belongs to greater mercy. There he expressly says that the expulsion of sin is a benefit distinct from the infusion of grace itself, which was granted to the Angels in their creation, as we taught with him in the treatise On the Angels. Therefore it is one thing to infuse grace, another to remit sin, and both are the gratuitous benefit of God; consequently he can confer one apart from the other: and consequently one does not naturally and necessarily follow upon the position of the other. It will appear more evidently, and moreover this truth will be confirmed, from what is said below.

You will say. If the infusion of grace did not import necessarily the remission of sin, and this were a certain benefit consequent upon it, it would follow that the application of the merits of Christ would be made not only in the infusion itself ⟦illegible: locus interruptus⟧ of our Lord Jesus Christ he communicates: yet this is done in this justification of the impious, when by the merit of his most holy Passion the charity of God is diffused through the Holy Spirit in the hearts of those who are justified, and inheres in them: whence in justification itself, together with the remission of sins, man receives all these things infused at once through Jesus Christ, in whom he is ingrafted by faith, hope, and charity. By which words he signifies that there is one formal cause of justification, whereby there is not only the interior renovation of man, but also the remission of sins. The instance against the major is clear; for if the remission of sins does not necessarily and naturally follow upon the infusion of grace, it will be necessary that the merits of Christ applied in the very application of grace be applied anew, that in view of them the greatest gift, namely the remission of sins, may follow. — I answer, denying ⟦illegible⟧ major: for although the infusion of grace and the remission of sins is a twofold benefit, one of which does not naturally follow from the other, hence it is not consequent that the very application of the merits of Christ also ought to be twofold; for it suffices for that, that the merits of Christ be applied once through the infusion of grace, that they may avail equally for the remission of sins, which upon the infusion of sanctifying grace follows infallibly, in the ordinary way, according to the divine decree, not indeed physically and from the nature of the thing, but only morally and by divine ordination.

You will say 2°. Sin is a habitual aversion from God; but grace a habitual conversion to God: but aversion and conversion are opposed from the nature of the thing: therefore setting aside any ordination of God, sin and grace are opposed. — I distinguish the minor: aversion and conversion of the same character, and within the same line, are opposed to one another, I concede: otherwise, I deny: whence the consequence is denied. For aversion from God through sin is something moral and in the genus of morals: but conversion to God through grace is something physical and in the genus of being; whence one is not opposed to the other from the nature of the thing. To these add, that grace from the nature of the thing and by force of natural entity has not precisely that it be formally a conversion to God, but only by the ordination of God producing and ordaining such a quality, that it be the medium of the conversion of the soul to him, and the motive of its love toward him.

You will say 3°. While the sinner is justified, two formal effects occur, namely the renovation of his interior, and the remission and pardon of sin: but those two effects either proceed from one and the same form, or from two. If from one, that form is either intrinsic, namely grace, or extrinsic, namely the simple and gratuitous pardon and external favor of God merciful. If they proceed from grace; therefore grace expels sin from the nature of the thing and formally, and consequently the expulsion of sin naturally follows upon the infusion of grace. If from external favor, it is consequent that we are not justified by inhering grace, the contrary of which appears from the preceding Question. But if those two effects proceed formally from two causes, of which one be pure internal sanctifying grace, and the other truly the external favor of God, it follows that there is a twofold formal cause of our justification, the contrary of which appears from the Council of Trent praised above: it follows also that we are justified partly by something internal, partly by something external, whose falsity likewise is clear from what has been said. — I answer, that those two formal effects proceed from grace alone, not indeed from the nature of the thing, but only by divine ordination, for that external favor, that is, the mercy and goodness of God, is only the efficient cause, not truly the formal cause, of justification.

Second Conclusion. — GRACE AND MORTAL SIN CANNOT SUBSIST TOGETHER IN THE ORDINARY WAY FOR ANY INSTANT. Thus the Doctor in 2 dist. 5 question 1 n. 6, and in ⟦illegible: dist./q. reference garbled in OCR ("in t. dist. t. q.5.")⟧ where, responding to the third argument, he says that baptism expels every sin, not because in the same instant grace and sin inhere, etc. It is gathered from St. Augustine, book 3 On Free Will, chapter 15, where he says:

Lest for a point of time the beauty (namely of grace) be defiled, so that there should be ⟦perrati?⟧ disgrace in it.

Proof first. According to the law and providence established by God, habitual charity is infused into no one unless he be perfectly united to Christ, and a living member of him be elicited: but from the Council of Trent, Session VI, Canon 7, There is nothing of damnation in those who are truly partakers with Christ, nor can anyone be a living member of Christ and at the same time dead through sin. Moreover from 1 John IV, He that abideth in charity abideth in God, and God in him. But no one can abide in God even for an instant, and at the same time for an instant be alienated from him through mortal sin: therefore grace and sin cannot be together.

Finally, grace expels sin demeritoriously: but there is no repugnance that in the same instant in which man merits punishment the same be inflicted: therefore in the same instant in which man sins grace is expelled, and consequently they do not subsist together even for an instant. The minor proves from a similar case. For while someone disposes himself lastly toward grace through confession, he merits de congruo grace, which is conferred upon him in the same instant of time: similarly the increase of grace is given in the same instant of time in which he merits by a more intense act of charity: therefore similarly the expulsion of grace, which is the punishment of sin, is caused in the same instant of time in which one sins.

You will say 1. The subtraction of grace is a punishment inflicted on account of the demerit of sin: therefore it behooves that sin first be consummated before grace be expelled; and consequently grace and sin are together for some instant of time. — I deny the consequence: for sin is consummated prior by priority, duitaxat of nature, but not by priority of time, than the expulsion of grace: just as the privation of a physical form ceases from a subject by priority of nature before a form is induced, but not by priority of time: otherwise for some instant of time the subject would exist stripped of every form.

You will say 2. Doctor Subtilis in 4. dist. 17|ordinatio:liber.4/distinctio.17. question 2. n. 13. says that in that instant in which sin is deleted, charity inheres: therefore he judges that sin and charity, which is really the same as sanctifying grace, can exist together for some instant. — I deny the consequence: for the Doctor indeed affirms, that the deletion of sin and grace are together, but not that sin and grace exist together.

You will urge. Actual remission of sin connotes actual sin existing: but by concession grace and the remission of actual sin can be together: therefore also sin and grace can subsist together. — I distinguish the major: actual remission of sin connotes actual sin which exists: I deny: that it ceases: I concede: just as equally illumination connotes darknesses not existing, but ceasing.

Third Conclusion. — BY THE EXTRAORDINARY POWER OF GOD SANCTIFYING GRACE AND MORTAL SIN NOT ONLY HABITUAL BUT ALSO ACTUAL CAN EXIST TOGETHER IN THE SAME SUBJECT.

Thus the Doctor in 4. dist. 16. question 2. with whom subscribe Ockam, q. 3. art. 1. Mayronius, in 2. dist. 21. Gabriel, in 1. dist. 11. Bellarmine, book 2 On Justification, chapter 16. Suarez book 4 On Grace. chapter 11, and the whole chapter 20, and the more celebrated five Recentiores.

And it is proved first: God, by His absolute power, can bring about whatever does not imply a contradiction and some manifest opposition: but no evident contradiction appears why sin and grace should not coexist simultaneously in the same subject: therefore by the absolute power of God this can be done. The major is self-evident. The minor is proved: first, because habitual grace and sin, as we said, are not opposed to one another — not contradictorily, since they do not clash like being and non-being; nor contrarily, since sin is not something positive; nor relatively, since relations are something positive, of which kind sin is not; nor even privatively, since sin does not consist formally in the physical privation of habitual grace, but in the privation of actual rectitude: therefore sin and grace do not conflict with each other by any opposition: and consequently God can preserve both at once in the same subject, such that He may not remit the sin of the one to whom He bestows sanctifying grace.

Second: habitual and sanctifying grace, since it can be produced physically by God alone, can also be destroyed by Him alone physically, and its conservation suspended: but given sin there is nothing that physically compels God to destroy grace and to suspend His conserving concurrence with it, just as, heat having been produced in water, God is not compelled to destroy and take away from it ⟦leg. ignem? raw: trigus⟧: therefore just as God can preserve heat and ⟦leg. ignem? raw: irigus⟧ in the same subject, by equal reason He will be able, by His absolute power, to preserve sanctifying grace together with sin in the same will.

Third: the formal effect of grace is to constitute man specially lovable to God and loved; but the formal effect of sin is to constitute the subject averse from God and converted to creatures: yet these two do not conflict simultaneously, for loving another and not being loved in return, or even being offended by him, do not imply a contradiction, as appears in human affairs; for the father most often pursues the son with love by whom he is not only not loved with reciprocal love, nay, is offended by disobedience and reluctance of spirit.

It is confirmed: if man, created in the pure state of nature, were to sin, God could refrain from annihilating him at once, but could preserve him in his natural being: yet by preserving him thus it would follow that He loved him with natural love: therefore God can preserve a man who does not love Him, nay, who is averse to Him. Therefore by similar reasoning, if man in the state of grace were to sin, God could preserve grace in him, and so, preserving him, love him with supernatural love: for as loving a person on account of the goodness of his nature, and hating his action, do not conflict with each other, so neither will loving a person on account of habitual grace, while at the same time having hatred of his depraved action, involve a contradiction.

You will object. 1. There cannot be at once mortal actual sin with the actual love of God above all things: therefore neither can habitual grace or charity and actual or habitual sin coexist.

I answer. With the antecedent granted, I deny the consequence: for it is one thing that two contrary vital acts including a contradiction in their objects cannot exist simultaneously, even by absolute power, because one destroys the object of the other, as assent and dissent concerning the same thing, or assent concerning contradictorily opposed objects: but the love of God above all things and actual mortal sin are of this kind: for the love of God above all things includes formally, or at least virtually, an efficacious displeasure at every mortal sin, and a nolition of it together with an absolute will and purpose of not sinning; with such purpose and nolition actual sin manifestly conflicts, because it is not committed without an actual will contrary to that purpose. It is otherwise, however, with habitual grace and mortal actual or habitual sin: because mortal sin does not consist formally in the physical absence of the habit of grace or charity, but in the privation of rectitude, with which remaining habitually, or even actually, it does not conflict for the habit of grace or charity to be preserved: for although the habit of grace by its nature demands morally that it not be preserved in a subject so perversely disposed and unworthy, this nevertheless does not import an absolute necessity on God's part of not preserving grace: for God can act according to the moral, and also the natural exigency of a created form, and preserve those things which would otherwise destroy themselves.

You will object. 2. It implies someone being at once just and unjust, pleasing and odious to God, worthy of His glory and at the same time unworthy, and doomed to eternal death and damnation: whereas by sanctifying grace man has that he be just, and pleasing to God, and worthy of eternal life; but by sin, that he be unjust, odious to God, and doomed to eternal death: therefore it implies someone having sin and grace at once.

Distinguo. I distinguish the minor: he who is in grace is just, pleasing to God, and worthy of eternal life, physically and from the nature of the thing, I deny: morally, from good pleasure, and from the ordination of God, I grant. Hence the consequentia must be denied: for this grace does not hold in justified man by its native virtue, but only by divine ordination, as we said: whereupon, notwithstanding this moral disposition and ordination, God could preserve grace physically together with sin. Hence add that being pleasing and odious to God, and what must be said of the others, are not effects of contradictories, but only of contraries, arising from distinct foundations. Hence as contraries can be preserved divinely: so, notwithstanding morally opposite effects, the principles from which they arise can subsist together: for one and the same man, by reason of a diverse principle, can be worthy and unworthy of the same thing: thus the son of a king, by right of birth and primogeniture, is worthy of the royal crown and kingdom; which however, on account of crimes, or conspiracy against his Father, he is judged unworthy; so likewise a man who would be created in pure naturals would, by virtue of his nature, be worthy of some natural beatitude, which however he could become unworthy of morally and demeritoriously on account of sin.

You will object. 3. By mortal sin man is habitually averse from God; by grace, however, habitually converted to Him: but the same cannot at once be converted and averse with respect to the same, just as neither can he be ⟦leg.? raw: unieus⟧ and distinct: therefore neither can anyone have sin and grace at once.

Distinguo maiorem. By mortal sin man is averse from God, and by grace converted wholly and totally, I deny: in a certain respect, I grant. For sin is not an aversion wholly and totally from God, but only in a certain respect, namely by way of offense and injury of one remaining habitual, until it be remitted by God. Likewise sanctifying grace and charity are not a conversion of every kind excluding all aversion whatsoever, but only that which would come about through hatred of God: whence it also tolerates vicious habits opposed to the love of and conversion to God: and consequently grace does not necessarily and absolutely exclude sin.

You will object. 4. God cannot at once hate and love the same man: but He hates the one having sin, and loves the one having grace: therefore the same man cannot have both.

Distinguo maiorem. With respect to the same thing, by reason of one and the same motive, I grant: by reason of a diverse one, I deny. For God both hates and loves all sinners; He hates indeed insofar as they oppose Him, but He loves them because they are the works of His hands: For you love all things that are, and hate nothing of the things which you have made. Wis. 2. Hence it does not conflict that the same thing, by diverse reason, be lovable in one respect, and odiable in another.

You will object. 5. If grace could subsist with sin, it would follow that the expulsion of sin is not the formal effect of grace, and while God should cease to will to preserve grace together with sin, then sin would not be driven out by grace, but by the mere will of God: but the consequent is against the common opinion of Theologians: therefore also that from which it follows.

I deny the sequel of the major. For since the expulsion of sin is only a secondary effect of grace, it does not follow that if it be impeded by God, it is on that account judged to be destroyed: just as by similar reasoning the expulsion of fire would no less be the formal effect of heat, although for a time it might be suspended by the absolute power of God, so that fire together with heat might be preserved in the same subject. Nor does it follow either, that when ⟦garbled in scan: raw "darium, quem antea suspendebat"⟧

You will object. 6. When God cannot preserve both opposite forms, e.g. sin and grace, there is no need of a special will of God to remove one of them, but it suffices that the opposite form be induced: as, because God cannot preserve at once in the same column the denominations of right and left with respect to one and the same animal, therefore, the denomination of right being posited, the denomination of left is excluded without any other special will of God: therefore because God cannot preserve grace and sin by the ordinary way, it will suffice that grace be granted to the soul, so that sin may depart from it.

I answer. The antecedent is ⟦leg. verum? raw: rerum⟧ when forms are opposed by the nature of the thing and repugnant, such as right and left; but otherwise if they are opposed only demeritoriously and morally, as sin and grace.

You will object lastly, citing the Subtle Doctor in 2 dist. 37 n. ⟦?⟧ saying that privation of grace is not sin except insofar as it is of justice owed. He judges, then, that sin is a privation of owed grace: but a form and the privation of a form cannot exist at once even by absolute power: therefore neither grace and sin.

I answer. Therefore the Doctor calls sin a privation of justice, because this privation is the effect of sin: but an effect is often called by the name of its cause, for which reason St. Paul calls concupiscence sin, not because it is such formally, as we have said several times already, but because it is from sin and leads into sin. Add that the Subtle Doctor does not prove this absolutely, but by supposition; for he adds afterward: that (namely grace) the will deprived itself of demeritoriously.

Note 1. That since the justification of the sinner is a passage from the state of sin to the state of grace, and from the condition of a man odious to God to that of one loved, it is necessary that that passage be conceived as a motion from the term whence to the term whither, namely from sin, which is cast off and forsaken, to sanctifying grace, which is acquired and received: no otherwise than in natural generation there is made a motion from the privation of a form to the form itself. Thence the question is raised among Theologians, whether that casting off of sin and acquisition of grace are only one single thing, or rather a twofold mutation essentially distinct, each of which is truly real.

Note 2. That since it belongs to God alone by plenary and absolute authority to remit and absolve sin, and He has the supreme and full right thereto, and since a twofold remission of sin is customarily conceived and distinguished — one indeed by simple condonation, whereby the offended person freely and out of pure clemency remits the fault of the offender: the other by due satisfaction, whereby the guilty party, having merited punishment, satisfies exactly by enduring penalties the person offended according to the prescriptions of the law; so that a Judge could pronounce with equity that the guilty party has been absolved from all debt and guilt; hence it is disputed among Theologians whether God can, by full right, freely and out of pure clemency remit sin, not only without any satisfaction on the part of the sinner, but especially without the infusion of any sanctifying grace, and by mere external condonation alone.

Note 3. Sin can be thought to be remitted by external condonation alone, and without any condonation of grace, in three ways: namely first through supernatural acts as intermediary, in view of which God remits sin, as it were on account of dispositions fitting for remission and sufficient by divine ordination: second, speaking absolutely, and without any preceding supernatural act on the part of the sinner, but only by reason of certain purely natural acts, for instance natural penance, in view of which God, by His plenary authority, being content with such penance, although disproportionate to the remission of sin, would nevertheless will to condone and remit that sin: thirdly, finally, such remission can be thought to come about without any act of the sinner, whether natural or supernatural, and even without any physical mutation of the sinner himself.

Two points therefore come up for discussion in the present Question: First, whether the remission of sin and the infusion of grace are two mutations essentially distinct: Second, whether sin can be remitted by mere external and gratuitous condonation without any infusion of grace.

First Conclusion. — THE REMISSION OF SIN AND THE INFUSION OF GRACE ARE TWO MUTATIONS ESSENTIALLY DISTINCT. So the Doctor in I dist. 16 q. 2, to whom Suarez subscribes lib. T cap. 11, and also many other Moderns.

It is proved first from Concil. Trident., Sess. 6 cap. 7, where it says:

Iu> stification is not the sole remission of sins, but is renewal. And below: In justification itself, together with what is infused, man receives. Which enumerates as two distinct things the remission of sins and renewal: let that conjunction be noted, and. The same holds in St. Chrysostom, Homily 20 on Genesis, saying: Through contrition God not only bestows the cure of wounds, and shows men cleansed from sins, but also makes just him who is weighed down by innumerable burdens of sins. By which words two mutations are signified, no otherwise than when we say: through calefaction not only is heat produced, but cold is also expelled; which mode of speaking we certainly do not use when speech concerns a single and simple mutation: for we do not say that through illumination not only is light produced, but darkness is also driven away; for the diffusion of light is the very repulsion of the darkness itself. — The Council of Noguntinum, last, chapter i, also favors this, where treating of justification it says: Which justification, together with the remission of sins, confers also sanctification and the renewal of the interior man.

The Doctor proves the Conclusion at the place cited above num. 1 by four reasons: First indeed: one and the same simply cannot be multiplied and not multiplied, otherwise it would be one and not one: if the remission of sin is multiplied; but the infusion of grace is not multiplied; for there are more remissions of sins, for in that manner in which anyone is called a sinner through a transitory act of sin, so manifoldly is he called a sinner on account of many faults, when he committed them, each of which ought to have its own proper remission, inasmuch as one remission can exist along with another, for instance if the sinner had committed one sin and not another: but the infusion of grace is single, for it is not necessary that several sanctifying graces be infused in order that the sinner be justified. Nay it would even be superfluous, because through the infusion of only one grace the sinner is sufficiently justified: therefore the infusion of grace and the remission of sin are not only a single mutation. — Second, the same is not separated from itself: but the infusion of grace and the remission of guilt can be separated from each other: therefore they are two distinct mutations. The Doctor proves the minor: both because, as we shall say in the following Conclusion, a remission can take place by external condonation without any infusion of grace; and thus this remission can be separated from the infusion of grace: and because in fact God conferred grace upon the first parents without any remission of their preceding sin: therefore the infusion of grace and the remission of sin can exist separately, and consequently they are not one and the same. — Third, guilt and grace are not formally opposed, nor formally repugnant from the nature of the thing: otherwise the created will, which is the effectiva of sin and guilt, would also be effectively destructive of grace; for the productive cause of one of two formally opposed things is destructive of the other, seeing that fire, which produces heat in a subject, removes cold from it: but it is false that the created will could effectively destroy grace, otherwise it could annihilate it by natural and proper virtue: for as grace is not produced except by creation, so it can cease only by annihilation: but those things which are not formally opposed can exist without each other, nor does one necessarily infer the position of the other: therefore the infusion of grace and the remission of sin do not follow upon one another necessarily; and consequently they are not wrought by a single simple mutation. — Fourthly, finally: a mutation is not toward some positive form unless from that which is formally its privation: but sin, as we said, is not formally the privation of sanctifying grace; for a single form has only a single privation: but sin can be multiplied in the sinner who has already lost grace through the first sin, and therefore sin is not formally the privation of grace.

You will say 1°. Concil. Trident., Sess. 6 cap. 3 says justification is a translation from the state of sin to the state of grace. And chapter 7: Man, it says, through the grace received and gifts becomes from unjust just, and from enemy friend: therefore it judges that immediately and without a new mutation sin is formally remitted through the infusion of grace; and consequently that in the justification of the sinner there is only a single mutation. —

I deny the consequence, and to the antecedent I say that the Council says only that in the justification of the sinner there takes place a true motion from a contrary into a contrary term; so that there is an expulsion of sin and an introduction of grace; but the Council does not intend that that motion be only single and simple, but composed of a twofold motion, such as is found in the production of heat and the expulsion of cold, where there are two motions essentially distinct: one from the non-being of heat to its being; the other truly from the being of cold in the subject to its non-being.

You will say 2°. If a twofold mutation intervene in the justification of the sinner, it is necessary that a twofold form intervene; for a twofold formal effect is found, namely the renewal of man and the expulsion of sin: but that seems to be against the mind of the Council of Trent affirming that we are cleansed from sin and renewed by the same grace: therefore there cannot be a twofold mutation. —

I deny the sequel of the major; for although in the justification of a sinner there is a twofold effect, yet these can proceed from a single form: thus by one heat the subject is made hot and free from cold, and immediately thereafter it is not necessary that, although the change be twofold, a twofold form should also intervene.

You ask 1°. Whether those changes are real? — The Doctor answers in the same place, num. 64, that the infusion of grace and the remission of guilt are not two real changes; since the remission of guilt, as it is not unto any positive form, nor does it necessarily take away anything real and positive, cannot be a real and positive change: for it is not a real change except unto a really positive term or a real privation: therefore there is only one real change, namely the infusion of grace, because it is unto a real form: but the other is moral, which for that reason the Doctor calls in the same place a change of reason, because it is not unto any real term.

You ask 2°. Which of these changes does God intend more especially? — The Doctor answers in 1. dist. 1. quaest. 6., that God intends the infusion of grace more especially: For, he says at num. 9, an agent acting according to right reason principally intends perfection rather than the absence of defect or imperfection, because he intends that absence only on account of perfection: therefore God more principally intends positive perfection, namely the infusion of grace, than the absence of imperfection, namely the remission of sin.

You will say. From the first Epistle of John, cap. 5: For this purpose the Son of God appeared, that he might destroy the works of the devil: but the destruction of the works of the devil is nothing other than the remission of sin: therefore this is especially intended by God. Moreover St. Augustine lib. 22. De Civit. Dei, c. 27 says: Our justification consists rather in the remission of sins than in the pursuit of virtues: therefore the chief change is the remission of sins. Finally, grace is not infused except that sin be expelled: therefore such expulsion is first intended. —

I deny all these consequences, and to the first antecedent I say that Christ the Lord came chiefly for this end, that He might bestow upon us the life of grace, according to that word of John 10: I came that they may have life, and may have it more abundantly: which communication of celestial and divine life, since it is incompatible with sin, Christ is consequently reckoned to have come that He might undo sin. —

To the second I say that St. Augustine does not compare the infusion of grace with the expulsion of sin; but he only means that our justice, being frail and precipitate, and not persevering long — since man often rises again and again falls — hence it comes about that the state of sin seems of longer duration and more persevering than the state of grace and justice. —

To the third I say that indeed grace was intended that sin might be remitted, but not that the remission of sin is the primary effect of its infusion, but only secondary, and consequently it is not intended first, but only secondarily.

Second conclusion. — SIN CAN BE REMITTED BY THE ABSOLUTE POWER OF GOD THROUGH THE MERE EXTRINSIC AND MERITORIOUS CONDONATION OF GOD.

So holds the Subtle Doctor in many places, especially in 1. dist. 16. quaest. 2. num. 1., where he says: Guilt can be remitted without the infusion of grace. For God can by His absolute power create man in pure natural state without guilt and without grace: therefore He can likewise repair him after the fall, and so remit guilt without the infusion of grace. The same is held by the Seraphic Doctor in 1. dist. ⟦illegible: dist. number illegible⟧ art. 1. quaest. 7., Ocham in the same place on 1. q. 3. art. 1., and the more celebrated of the Ancients. Among the Recentiors indeed Suarez lib. 7. De gratia, cap. 23.; Silvius l. 2. quaest. 113.; Martinezius disput. 11. q. 7.; and many others.

And it is proved first: the divine will is of no less power than the human: but a human will can remit an offense by mere and simple condonation and release: therefore much more can the divine accomplish this. —

It is confirmed, because God can release a vow without any production whatsoever of a quality in him to whom it is released, and solely by the extrinsic condonation of the vow: therefore by equal reason He can remit the offense. —

Nor does it matter that this release must be made known through revelation; otherwise the one vowing would not know that he was absolved, etc. For we shall say that it belongs only per accidens to the release of a vow that one knows himself to be absolved; for if then a man is held to fulfill the vow, this happens not by reason of the obligation of the vow, but by reason of an erroneous conscience, by which he judges the vow to bind, when in truth it does not bind: as he who fasts on Sunday thinking it to be a day of sacred fasting is bound to fasting not per se but per accidens, on account of an erroneous conscience: therefore truly a vow can be released even though that release and relaxation be not made known. —

Next, habitual grace is an effect of the divine will, whereby God freely loves man: therefore even with grace excluded God can love man: but in that case man so loved by God will not be in sin. For God hates sinners: therefore sin can be taken away without the conferral of grace. —

Finally, sin and grace are not immediate opposites: therefore one can be removed without the introduction of the other. The consequence is evident: for things which are not immediate opposites have some medium, and consequently the subject can exist without both. The antecedent likewise stands from the aforesaid reason of the Doctor; for God could from the beginning create man without sin and grace, and establish him in the purely natural state: but He can restore that same state after he has sinned: for such as He could create him from the beginning, such can He by His absolute power restore after sin. —

The Doctor adds, that once the act of sin has passed away, nothing remains in the sinner except the guilt of fault, which is chiefly explicated through the obligation to punishment which the sinner is bound to undergo: but God can remit this obligation to the sinner, and exempt him from any punishment, without conferring upon him grace or any other gift: therefore without any infusion of grace sin can be remitted by the mere external condonation.

You will say 1°. Sin cannot be remitted except by a form which expels that whereby the sinner is constituted hateful to God, and worthy of hatred and punishment: but such form is none other than habitual grace: therefore sin cannot be remitted without the infusion of that grace. —

I deny the major: for that which constitutes the sinner habitually and formally hateful to God is nothing other than sin remaining habitually until it is remitted: but for its remission there is not absolutely required another form, but only the divine release, by which the sinner is freed from the guilt of fault, no otherwise than a debtor is freed by the gratuitous remission of his creditor from the debt and obligation contracted by the loan.

You will say 2°. Man cannot be the object of the hatred of God without sin: therefore neither the object of love without grace. —

I deny the consequence: the reason of the disparity is, because the object of love is made by God, but is not presupposed: whereas the object of hatred is not made by God, but by the sinner, and so is presupposed to the divine hatred: wherefore God cannot fail to hate the sinner existing in sin, because that sin provokes the divine indignation: but He can love him without the infusion of grace, because He can constitute and render the object lovable in another manner than through the infusion of grace.

You will say 3°. So long is God understood to have hatred and indignation toward the sinner, until He infuse grace into him: therefore He cannot remit sin to him without the infusion of grace. The consequence stands: for sin remains habitually so long as the sinner is odious and hostile to God. The antecedent is proved, because God is understood to be hostile and angry against anyone so long as He repels him from His grace, or good will: but He repels the sinner from His grace or good will so long as He does not restore to him the grace taken away on account of sin: therefore, etc. —

I deny the antecedent: for in order to lay aside hatred and indignation it suffices that God no longer wish to have the reason of the sin committed, nor on account of it to be indignant against the sinner, but voluntarily renounce the right which He had of pursuing him with hatred and punishing him: which indeed He can accomplish by His absolute will.

To the proof I say that the good will of God, and grace accepted in this sense for any gratuitous favor whatever, is manifold; wherefore God can positively deny one of those gratuitous gifts and grant another; and thus if God were to remit sin to anyone without infusing sanctifying grace, He would not be reckoned to repel him from all His good will, or gratuitous favor: since that gratuitous remission of sin would be a great argument of the good will and favor of God, even if He did not wish to confer upon him further benefit: for the creditor is reckoned to bestow a great benefit upon the debtor while he releases the debt to him, even if he confer no new favor upon him.